

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939

EDITED BY

E. L. WOODWARD, M.A., F.B.A.

*Professor of Modern History in the University
of Oxford*

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
ROHAN BUTLER, M.A.

Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford

FIRST SERIES

Volume III

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PREFACE

TO VOLUME III, FIRST SERIES

THE present volume begins the publication of Foreign Office correspondence for the latter half of 1919 and relates more particularly to British policy in eastern Europe, notably in Russia and adjacent territories. This volume is thus the sequel to the two previous volumes which contain the minutes of meetings of the Allied Supreme Council in western Europe, usually at Paris, during this period.

Chapter I of the present volume is the first full documentation in English of the withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces, as they were then officially styled before the Baltic States of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had been accorded recognition *de jure*. This chapter covers the period from the signature of the Armistice of Strasdenhof on July 3, 1919, to the withdrawal of the last German formation on December 16.

The documentation of the first chapter is complicated, among other things, by the fact that, as indicated in the Introductory Note to the chapter, His Majesty's Government regularly received reports from two separate missions in the Baltic Provinces. In the first place there was a military mission, possessing an interallied character, under General Sir Hubert Gough, who normally reported in the first instance to the War Office and to the British Peace Delegation, headed at that time by Mr. Balfour and later by Sir Eyre Crowe, at the Paris Conference; it was the Paris Peace Conference, rather than the Foreign Office under Lord Curzon, which usually dealt directly with this question. On the other hand, the second mission in the Baltic Provinces, the British diplomatic and economic commission under Colonel Tallents, generally reported in the first instance to the Foreign Office. Reports from the first of these two missions were usually, though not invariably, transmitted or repeated to the Foreign Office, and those from the second to the Peace Delegation. As will be evident from the documents, the two missions were both distinct from the later interallied mission to the Baltic Provinces under General Niessel of the French Army; the British representative on this mission was General Turner.

This duplication of British channels of communication was matched by the multiplication of those between the Allied Powers and the German authorities. Normal diplomatic relations between the two had not yet been restored after the First World War, and the main channels employed were as follows: first, formal correspondence between the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission and the German Armistice Commission (e.g. documents Nos. 1 and 53); secondly, communications between the Peace Conference at Paris and the German Peace Delegation at Versailles (e.g. documents Nos. 6 and 169); thirdly, direct contacts in the Baltic Provinces between the various Allied missions and the local German and Germano-Russian authorities (e.g. documents Nos. 17 and 22); fourthly, contacts in

Berlin, notably between the British Military Mission under General Malcolm and the German Government and other interested parties (e.g. documents Nos. 84 and 108).

The withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces necessarily involved a number of military considerations but the documents printed are not intended to give a detailed account of military developments. Documents of military significance have been included only to the extent necessary to facilitate an understanding of the diplomatic negotiations. Despite the technical complications indicated above it has seemed desirable to give some account of these negotiations with regard to the development and ramifications of a significant but hitherto relatively little-known episode.

It was of this episode that Mr. Lloyd George said in the House of Commons on November 17, 1919:

'There are Germans still in the Baltic Provinces. That is full of menace. I wonder whether hon. Members realise altogether how full of menace it is. There is a historical root for that. When Prussia and Germany were crushed to the earth by Napoleon, the great statesmen of Germany sought to overthrow the French despotism by organising in Russia. It was to Russia they went. It was to this very province—Koenigsberg. They went there. That is part of East Prussia; right along the Baltic Provinces they formed their armies, they attracted to their standard Prussian patriots. The same thing happened then as happens now. The Prussian King did his best to stop it, because he was afraid of France. He appealed to them to disarm; they refused, they defied their own Sovereign and it was from there that the organisation started that overthrew the French power in Germany. That historical appeal is undoubtedly at the present moment having its effect in Germany, and that is why these men have formed their bands in the Baltic Provinces. They must be cleared out, otherwise the peace of Europe is not safe. That is why at the last conference which I attended in Paris that question was determined; it was decided to take action in that respect.'

Chapter II illustrates British policy in relation to developments in Russia from the dispatch to Admiral Kolchak of the Allied note of May 26, 1919, to the instruction of March 12, 1920, for the closure of the British High Commission in Siberia. The chapter thus covers a difficult and eventful period in the later phase of Allied intervention in Russia down to the execution of Admiral Kolchak and the fall of his administration in Siberia, the end of White Russian resistance in North Russia and the occupation of Archangel and Murmansk by Soviet forces, the resignation of the British High Commissioner for South Russia where the position of General Denikin's forces had become serious, the conclusion of armistices between the Soviet Government and the Estonian and Latvian Governments, and the conclusion in Copenhagen on February 12, 1920, of the Anglo-Soviet agreement for the exchange of prisoners. Documents for 1920 are in general included in this chapter only in so far as they relate to one or other of these developments in the early months of that year.

The wide geographical scope of these events is evident and its significance was enhanced by the fact that, as explained in the Introductory Note to

Chapter II, His Majesty's Government had not then recognized the Soviet Government and had no accredited representative in Moscow, but maintained a number of separate missions at peripheral posts outside the sphere of Soviet control. These posts were, at any rate in origin, often consular, and the present volume thus contains a higher proportion than usual of correspondence with consular officials and local representatives on special mission. In view of these facts a possible editorial procedure would have been to split up the records of British policy in Russia at that time, and to devote a separate chapter to each main region. While this arrangement would have been convenient for those interested in a particular region, it seemed preferable on balance to adopt the alternative method of presenting British policy in Russia as a whole, thereby facilitating an appreciation of the interaction of developments in the several regions, as viewed by the senior staff of the Foreign Office. This method has, incidentally, necessitated the reconstitution of the overall picture of developments from a particularly large number of separate files.

After the termination of the meetings at Paris of the Council of Four in June 1919, the supervision of British policy in relation to Russia, unlike that as regards the withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces, was generally assumed by the Foreign Office rather than by the British Peace Delegation. A few particular issues were, however, treated on an allied basis by the Supreme Council in various forms—Council of Heads of Delegations, Council of Heads of Governments, &c. Among these issues were notably the trade embargo against Soviet Russia and its subsequent relaxation at the beginning of 1920, practical arrangements for the evacuation of Czechoslovak and other allied contingents from Siberia, and the question of Russian prisoners of war in Germany. Documents relating to these issues are not usually included in the present chapter since they are illustrated in detail in the preceding volumes in this Series. These issues should, however, be viewed in relation to those which form the subject of Chapter II. As indicated above, this chapter includes documents relative to the Anglo-Soviet negotiation for the exchange of prisoners. Such a negotiation of a technical character would not normally be illustrated in this Collection but in this instance in view of its general interest as being one of the earliest Anglo-Soviet negotiations, and of the corresponding attention which it attracted at the time, it has seemed advantageous to provide an account of it.

In the second chapter, as in the first, documents of military significance are included only to the extent necessary for an understanding of political developments as illustrated by the archives of the Foreign Office. Both chapters include a certain number of documents of economic significance with a view to indicating important economic issues in their relation to the political.

Chapter III traces the course of the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference with regard to the status and attribution of Eastern Galicia from the discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 18, 1919, to the suspension by the Council of Heads of Delegations on December 22, 1919,

of the previous decision to accord to Poland a twenty-five-year mandate for the territory in question. The British representatives had expressed views differing from those of their Allied colleagues in the course of these negotiations, which later had an important bearing upon such issues as the determination of the Curzon Line.

The three chapters, concerned as they all are with aspects of British policy in eastern Europe, inevitably overlap to a limited extent. The starting-points of the chapters conform approximately to the general starting-point for the First Series, namely, the signature of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919. It will be evident, however, that there has been no rigid adherence to this date since the most appropriate point from which to begin each chapter varies. Similarly as regards the inclusion of particular documents; in some cases, where this has seemed desirable, documents have been included in a chapter although they fall slightly outside the determining dates of that chapter. Documents are in general arranged chronologically within chapters (cf. section (ii) in the 'Preface to the Collection' in Volume I), the place of a document in the chronological sequence being determined in the customary manner by the date of dispatch rather than by that of receipt. Particular attention should, however, be paid to the date of receipt in the Foreign Office of telegrams and, especially, dispatches from remoter posts abroad, such as those in the present volume from outlying regions of Russia, in view of the time liable to elapse between dispatch and receipt. Also, during the disturbed period of the downfall of the administration of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, for instance, telegrams might sometimes be transmitted and received by different routes in inverse sequence; it has seemed best not to try to eliminate such discrepancies, so that document No. 642, for example, was later in origin than document No. 648.

In compiling the present volume extensive use has been made not only of the regular archives of the Foreign Office but also of the separate archives of the British Peace Delegation at Paris. The Editor has thus been able to collate many documents where necessary and, in a number of instances, to establish doubtful texts as indicated in footnotes. Documents are printed from both sources, and readers desiring to distinguish between them can do so by referring to the file-number printed in square brackets at the head of each document. Documents in the main archives of the Foreign Office are filed and cited in standard three-group numerical notation (e.g. document No. 2), whereas documents in the archives of the British Peace Delegation are filed upon a different system in four-group notation (e.g. document No. 1). A third occasional type of file-reference is to 'General' files (e.g. document No. 7). These are miscellaneous files of special collections or standard series of documents, such as, incidentally, the minutes of meetings of the Supreme Council printed in Volumes I and II of this series. Records of this kind are part of the main archives of the Foreign Office but instead of each document being entered separately and sorted away in the ordinary files, the documents are specially bound and kept accessible for convenient reference.

The general files include various personal collections of diplomatic papers

formed by Secretaries of State and other senior members of the Foreign Office. In preparing the present volume use has been made of such papers wherever necessary in the few instances in which they contain pertinent material not available elsewhere. This applies more particularly to the relevant papers of Lord Balfour, which are filed, and are here cited, under reference Confidential/General/229/4. The corresponding papers of Lord Curzon have recently become available but they contain little fresh material bearing on the subject-matter of the present volume; the only document printed from this source is that in note 4 to document No. 262.

Reference has been made above to the normal filing of Foreign Office documents by three-group numerical notation. The notation is three-group after allowance is made for the omission of the current year. Such omission is standard Foreign Office practice in citing references since it is assumed that any particular file is of the same current year as the document in question unless the contrary is specified. In the case of the years 1919-20, however, a special complication arises owing to the fact that at that period the system of registration for Foreign Office files was being revised.

The year 1918 was the last full year in which the Foreign Office employed without modification the filing system introduced in 1906, for which see the introductory 'Note on Arrangement of Documents &c.' in Volume III and subsequent volumes of *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*. Late in 1919 and during 1920 this system was revised to the extent that, instead of all papers being numbered consecutively in a single series irrespective of country (the first reference number) before further classification in a particular file (the second reference number) broadly according to country or other special category (the third reference number), each department of the Foreign Office henceforth had its own series numbered consecutively, the first reference number now being prefaced by a code letter referring to the department concerned, e.g. N. for Northern Department; the other two references remained as before. This revised filing system continued in use in the Foreign Office during the remainder of the period 1919-39 and is illustrated in the volumes of the Second and Third Series.

The process of revision was carried out within the Foreign Office department by department so that the old filing system ended in different departments at different dates, some in 1919 and others in 1920. In the case of the Russia Department, later Northern Department, which is the principal one as regards this volume, the change was not made until well on in the latter half of 1920. Pending this reorganization, however, new files for 1920 were not started under the old system at the beginning of the year as would normally have been the case; instead the old-style file-numbers for 1919 were carried over into 1920 and continued in use until the change-over was effected. Accordingly in this volume all documents carrying three-group numerical references are from 1919 files even where the documents are dated 1920 (e.g. documents Nos. 628-98). Such documents thus constitute an exception to the general rule mentioned above that the file for any particular document is of the same current year as that document.

It may perhaps be desirable also to refer briefly to a further filing complication peculiar to Lord Curzon's tenure of the Foreign Office, namely, the so-called Curzon Files. These files, which cut across the regular Foreign Office filing system, were, by Lord Curzon's desire, specially employed for papers submitted to him. The Curzon Files were thus superimposed upon the normal filing system but did not supersede it, the Curzon Files being in due course dispersed after action and the constituent papers sorted back into the regular Foreign Office files. It is therefore unnecessary to trouble readers with details of Curzon Files, which remain chiefly as an additional complication for the archivist. It may, however, be mentioned that the records of the Russia Department of the Foreign Office are in a special position as regards Curzon Files since that department from about October 1919 onwards took the initiative of printing its Curzon Files, for confidential official use, before they were broken up. Other departments of the Foreign Office do not appear to have adopted this procedure.

In addition to the archives of the Foreign Office and of the British Peace Delegation there is also a third category, namely the archives of H.M. Missions abroad. These last are in general not available for the period 1919-39. There are, however, certain exceptions, notably, as regards the present volume, the archives of H.M. Legation at Copenhagen and of the British Mission at Archangel, which are available for 1919. Relevant files in these archives have been examined but have been found to contain but little material of major importance not already accessible in Foreign Office archives. The files from Copenhagen and Archangel have been chiefly useful in collating doubtful texts and in furnishing occasional supplementary particulars given in footnotes. These files are cited as follows, e.g. Copenhagen Archives/F.O. 211/508.

The editorial method for this volume is in general the same as before. Thus no attempt has been made to render uniform throughout variant spellings in the original of foreign, and especially Russian, names. In occasional cases of possible doubt, however, an emendation has been inserted in square brackets. As in the preceding volumes, all editorial matter in the text is printed in square brackets, all matter in parenthesis being as in the original; parentheses were frequently used in the original deciphers of telegrams to indicate passages in which the text was uncertain. The only editorial omissions made in the main text of the original documents are, first, in occasional cases in which the matter is irrelevant to the subject in question as, for instance, where a single document deals with two or more widely differing topics (e.g. document No. 7, note 6, and document No. 135, note 5); secondly, in a very few instances brief personal references have been omitted out of consideration for those concerned. All such omissions are clearly indicated and none is of major political importance. All footnotes are editorial unless the contrary is stated. The previous practice has been followed of including in footnotes references to relevant printed sources of documentary material except that in Chapter II no attempt has been made to give detailed references to the copious material printed in Russian. Readers desiring to

consult such material are referred to the recognized bibliographies for this subject, such as those given by V. P. Potemkin (general editor): *Istoriya Diplomatii* (Moscow, 1945), Volume III, pp. 817 f. (French translation: *Histoire Diplomatique*—Paris, 1947—Volume III, pp. 839 f.); and by W. H. Chamberlain, *The Russian Revolution 1917-1921* (London 1935), Volume II, pp. 505 f. The former of these two includes references to material printed in *Krasny Arkhiv* (*Red Archives*. Moscow, 1922 f.). More than one hundred volumes have hitherto appeared in this Soviet serial miscellany of archival material.

As in the preceding volumes the footnotes occasionally include supplementary original material which for one reason or another, usually considerations of space, it has seemed desirable to present in this way. In order to facilitate reference to such material the more important of these footnotes are listed in their page-sequence in the Chapter Summaries (e.g. note 2 to No. 3).

The selection and editing of the documents in this volume have been carried out by Mr. Rohan Butler under the same conditions as before, namely, unrestricted access to all Foreign Office archives and full freedom and independence in the choice and presentation of documents. In taking full responsibility for the compilation of the volume the Editor would like to thank those members of the Foreign Office who have kindly facilitated his work and especially, as previously, the staff of the Reference Room of the Foreign Office Library for their indispensable co-operation. The Editor owes a special debt to the Hon. Margaret Lambert, Ph.D., for her very valuable help, and is further indebted to Miss A. Norman, M.B.E., Miss E. McIntosh, M.B.E., and Miss A. W. Orde for their assistance at different stages of preparation.

ROHAN BUTLER

. February 1949

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MAP

Map of Eastern Galicia to illustrate Reports Nos. 3 and 5 of the Commission on Polish Affairs	<i>Facing p. 840</i>
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES

CHAPTER I

Withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces July 3–December 16, 1919

NO. AND NAME	DATE 1919	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Introductory Note.	1
1 M. DUTASTA Paris	July 3	Note to Secretary of British Peace Delegation enclosing note from German Government to effect that German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces is in progress and could be rapidly completed if the Allied blockade of Libau and Windau were raised.	8
2 MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 125	July 3	Communicates message from Colonel Tallents at Rodenpois giving terms of the Armistice of Strasdenhof.	9
3 MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 127	July 5	Transmits report from Colonel Tallents at Riga regarding events following the armistice; attitude of the Iron Division.	10
		Note 2. Extract from note of July 10 by Colonel Tallents on the status of the Iron Division.	10
4 MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 131	July 6	Colonel Tallents reports on German evacuation of Riga.	11
5 SIR C. MARLING Copenhagen Tel. No. 1356	July 6	Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs has received a telegram from Berlin to effect that Riga is menaced with struggle between Esthonian and Latvian troops, and requesting the Powers to take necessary action; significant German interest in Latvia.	11
6 BARON VON LERSNER Versailles	July 6	Note to M. Clemenceau asking that steps be taken for the protection of Germans in Latvia, and submitting proposals.	12
7 COMMISSION ON BALTIC AFFAIRS Paris No. 14	July 7	Hearing of the Lithuanian Delegation with regard to the situation in Lithuania.	13
		Note 2. Conversation of July 1 between Sir E. Howard and M. Staugaitis.	13
8 GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Riga	July 8	Directions regarding the future of the Baltic Landeswehr; all Germans to resign and an Allied officer (Lt.-Col. the Hon. H. R. Alexander) to assume command.	17
9 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau Tel. No. 175	July 9	Russian troops at Mitau, especially force under Colonel Bermond-Avalov, reported to be under German influence; activities of German agents in Latvia.	18
10 GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Libau Tel. No. H.G. 49	July 11	Repetition to the British Peace Delegation of telegram reporting a meeting on July 9 between General Gough's representatives and German representatives regarding German delays in evacuating Latvia; urges	19

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
10 <i>Continued</i>		importance of immediate German withdrawal. <i>Note 4.</i> Letter of July 12 from General Thwaites to Marshal Foch.	20
11 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau Tel. No. 180	July 11	Col. Kanep's force evacuated from Libau: mixed garrison there now under a British commandant.	20
12 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau Tel. No. 182	July 12	Lithuanians obliged to purchase rolling stock from Germans; on July 15 Lithuanians expect to take over line from Radziwiliski to Prekult.	21
13 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau No. 43	July 12	Reports observations of Professor Shimkus on Lithuanian relations with Germany; German economic and political projects.	21
14 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau No. 44	July 14	Reports observations of Dr. Gaigalat on situation in Memel and East Prussia; former German proposals for a federation between East Prussia and the Baltic Provinces.	22
15 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau Tel. No. 187	July 14	Reports expected juncture of two Russian divisions in German pay; German troops moving towards Mitau to join Russian forces.	23
16 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau No. 45	July 15	Transmits summary of proposals made by a German committee formed in Tilsit to strengthen economic relations with Lithuania; proposals rejected by Lithuanian Government; recommends that a British loan be granted.	23
17 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga	July 15	Note of a conversation with Prince Lieven, who disclaimed political designs against Latvia and would prefer Allied to German support.	26
18 GENERAL PRINCE LIEVEN Mitau	July 16	Letter to General Burt, Riga, requesting assistance in order to counter designs of Colonel Bermond-Avalov.	27
19 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga	July 16	Note of a conversation with Baron Fircks; Baltic barons being accused by Germans of having betrayed them in Latvia.	28
20 M. SLEŽEVIČIUS Kovno J. No. 1235	July 18	Note to Colonel Tallents protesting against the conduct of German and Polish forces in Lithuania and requesting that the former be ordered to withdraw, and that arms and equipment be provided for the Lithuanian Army; transmits telegram to Lithuanian Peace Delegation concerning German pillaging and terrorization.	29
21 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga No. 12	July 19	Transmits copies of an order issued on June 16 by Major Fletcher to the Baltic Landeswehr stressing the necessity of defeating the Estonian and Latvian forces and frustrating alleged British designs in the Baltic Provinces.	31

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
22	COLONEL TALLENTS On board H.M.S. <i>Warwick</i>	July 20	Note on a conference between General Gough and General von der Goltz at St. Olai on July 19; obstructive attitude of the latter.	34
23	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 29	July 21	Transmits message for General Gough from Chief of Military Section to effect that Marshal Foch has renewed his demands to German Armistice Commission that German Commanders in Baltic Provinces be instructed to deal direct with General Gough.	38
24	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Riga Tel. No. G. 99	July 21	Telegram to the British Peace Delegation requesting that his proposals for German withdrawal be put into effect.	39
25	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 28	July 21	Transmits message for General Gough from Chief of Military Section regarding locomotives and rolling stock in the Baltic Provinces.	39
26	TO COLONEL TALLENTS Libau Tel. No. 9	July 21	Obnoxious Germans in Baltic formations to be removed or arrested where possible. <i>Note 3.</i> Copenhagen telegram No. 27 of July 24 to Libau: German officers wanted by Allies being smuggled into Prince Lieven's Corps; Japan their eventual destination.	40 40
27	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 102	July 22	Informs British Peace Delegation that he thinks it essential that General von der Goltz be recalled to Germany without delay.	40
28	MR. GRANT WATSON Riga No. 47	July 23	German policy and Russian activities in the Baltic Provinces; activities of Herr Winnig; Latvian and Estonian desire for independence.	40
29	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 93	July 25	Informs British Peace Delegation of the neutral zone agreed upon by the Latvian and German authorities.	44
30	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 103	July 29	Informs British Peace Delegation that the Germans decline to consider the use of Windau and Libau as evacuation ports.	44
31	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 109	July 31	Telegram to General Gough, Helsingfors, with regard to expediting German withdrawal; Russian troops continue to arrive at Mitau from Poland and Germany.	44
32	MR. MACDUFF Riga	Aug. 5	Note of a conversation with Mr. Carlile on July 31 with regard to attempted German economic penetration; M. Ulmanis has undertaken to take preventive measures.	45
33	MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 177	July 31	Colonel in the Northern Army reports that situation is most serious owing to non-arrival of stores; German agents exploiting the situation.	46
34	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 36	July 31	Transmits message for General Gough from Chief of Military Section informing him that his proposals for the evacuation of German forces likely to be approved in their entirety.	46

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
35	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 37	Aug. 1	Transmits to General Gough translation of telegram sent by Marshal Foch demanding recall of General von der Goltz and giving instructions for the evacuation of German troops from Latvia by August 30.	47
36	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Riga Tel. No. A.B. 115	Aug. 2	Transmits to British Peace Delegation report for Marshal Foch of an interview with General von der Goltz, and request that he be ordered to evacuate Latvia under Allied supervision by August 20.	48
37	MR. GRANT WATSON Riga Tel. No. 225.	Aug. 3	Draws attention to <i>non possumus</i> attitude adopted by General von der Goltz at interview on August 2; advocates stronger Allied action and publicity.	48
38	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Riga Tel. No. H.G. 57	Aug. 3	Transmits to British Peace Delegation a message for Marshal Foch with regard to his strong action relative to General von der Goltz.	49
39	MR. GRANT WATSON Riga No. 58	Aug. 4	Latvian Government rejects the claim of German troops to Latvian citizenship and grant of land in Latvia.	50
40	MR. GRANT WATSON Riga Tel. No. 236	Aug. 6	Local press has reproduced statement of German Foreign Minister to effect that German Minister to Latvia has stated that Latvian Government did not promise land to Germans: German Government not supporting demands of German soldiers, who are prohibited from entering foreign military formations.	51
41	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 133	Aug. 6	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, reporting present position regarding German evacuation. General von der Goltz has not yet received Marshal Foch's orders of Aug. 1.	51
42	GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 213/B/S	Aug. 7	Report transmitting observations by a reliable Russian officer regarding recruitment of Germans for service in the Baltic Provinces, and transport arrangements.	52
43	GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 16	Aug. 8	Extract from report regarding such recruitment, which is assisted by German military authorities: activities of Colonel Bermond-Avalov.	53
44	GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin Tel. No. Z. 85	Aug. 8	Informs British Peace Delegation that there is reason to believe that decision to hand over Russian prisoners of war in Germany to German authorities is very agreeable to Colonel Bermond-Avalov's recruiting agents in Berlin.	54
45	GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin Tel. No. Z. 87	Aug. 9	Informs British Peace Delegation of message to War Office regarding repatriation of Russians from Germany; Colonel Bermond-Avalov's forces would receive prior consideration.	54

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
46	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 147	Aug. 9	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, reporting Germans practically clear of north Courland: rumoured that Colonel Bermond-Avalov has received large loan and war material from Germans.	55
47	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 162	Aug. 10	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to War Office reporting upon a visit to General Yudenitch at Narva; German intrigues in his army.	55
48	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 156	Aug. 10	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, to effect that General von der Goltz has received orders to decline further negotiations regarding evacuation until he receives further instructions; continued reinforcements for Colonel Bermond-Avalov.	56
49	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 42	Aug. 11	Informs General Gough, Helsingfors, of latest steps taken by Marshal Foch to secure German compliance with Allied decisions regarding evacuation.	57
50	MR. GRANT WATSON Riga Tel. No. 261	Aug. 12	Evident Lithuano-Latvian agreement to attack Colonel Bermond-Avalov's forces should they attempt to advance to Dvinsk.	58
51	MR. MACDUFF Riga	Aug. 12	Note of a conversation with Latvian Ministers of Finance and Commerce regarding a German proposal to enter into a financial arrangement with the Latvian Government.	58
52	MR. GRANT WATSON Riga Tel. No. 266	Aug. 13	Arrival of German officials and private dealers to negotiate economic agreements with Latvia.	59
53	BARON VON OW- WACHENDORF Düsseldorf No. A.A.I. 4884	Aug. 13	Note to General Nudant regarding progress of German evacuation of Latvia. German Government refuses to recall General von der Goltz for the present.	60
54	BRITISH AND LATVIAN REPRESENTATIVES Riga	Aug. 15	Note of a meeting at Riga between British and Latvian representatives regarding German economic claims against Latvia. Proposed assistance to Latvia from a British banking group.	62
55	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 179	Aug. 17	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to War Office regarding German scheme of eastward expansion.	66
56	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 179	Aug. 17	Reports to British Peace Delegation that General von der Goltz is stated to have left for Berlin.	66
57	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 36	Aug. 18	Reports arrival of M. Goutchkof, who apparently wishes to ascertain how far Russians can accept German help without breaking with Allies.	66

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
58 M. SESKIS Paris No. I. 1738	Aug. 21	Note to Mr. Balfour, Paris, drawing attention to the conduct of the German troops and the danger to Latvia of their continued presence there; request for prompt and decisive action.	67
59 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 194	Aug. 22	Informs British Peace Delegation of visit of Colonel Bermondt-Avalov to British Military Mission: his future action depends on interview and orders received from General Yudenitch on August 26.	69
60 MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 4049	Aug. 23	Note to General Sackville-West, Paris, enclosing copy of reply to No. 53.	69
61 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 205	Aug. 24	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, stating that German Command say they will not be able to complete evacuation before latter half of September. Reports German arrest and detention of two British officers. <i>Note 2.</i> Extract from report of August 23 by Colonel Ward upon German treatment of the local population in Latvia.	72
62 MR. CAZALET Riga Tel. No. 5	Aug. 25	Reports return of General von der Goltz to Riga and German demonstration in Mitau resulting in pillage of Lettish garrison headquarters. Financial question between Russians and Germans reported settled.	73
63 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 6	Aug. 26	Transmits message from Military Section to General Burt, Riga, informing him of action taken with regard to arrest and detention of British officers. <i>Note 3.</i> German reply of October 24 relative to this arrest.	74
64 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 208	Aug. 26	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, regarding German demonstration in Mitau and German delay in evacuation.	74
65 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 209	Aug. 26	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, reporting situation in Mitau still serious; German thefts from British Mission there.	75
66 LITHUANIAN DELEGATION Paris No. I. 915	Aug. 26	Note to Supreme Council protesting against delay in evacuation of German troops from Lithuania.	76
67 PRINCE SAPIEHA London	Aug. 27	Polish memorandum concerning German activity in the Baltic Provinces and the threat of an undue growth of German influence in the East.	78
68 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 217	Aug. 27	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, reporting that Germans state that evacuation will take 66 days from Aug. 24 to complete. German demand for use of certain Lithuanian railways for transport of Russian troops.	81

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
69	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 219	Aug. 28	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, reporting situation in Mitau quieter. General von der Goltz will not evacuate by Aug. 31.	81
70	TO COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 25	Aug. 28	Instructions to inform M. Goutchkof that H.M.G. consider it most undesirable that any further assistance be obtained from Germany.	81
71	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 56	Aug. 28	At Military conference at Riga on August 26, plans for common offensive against Soviet forces agreed upon subject to political considerations. States immediate needs of situation in view of demands of German troops and suspension of German evacuation. Existence of Latvian Government imperilled.	82
72	GENERAL MARSH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 209	Aug. 29	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to War Office reporting his opinion that Colonel Bermond-Avalov more worthy of support in men and supplies than General Yudenitch.	83
73	GENERAL MARSH Helsingfors Tel. No. G.L. 90	Aug. 29	Telegram to General Burt, Riga: arms for Latvian and Lithuanian Governments: asks whether, if necessary, he could get Poles to attack General von der Goltz.	83
74	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 227	Aug. 29	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, reporting that General von der Goltz has sent an apology for arrest of Colonel Ward which has not been accepted. General von der Goltz refuses any responsibility for safety of Allied officers travelling in occupied territory: attempt to illustrate Allied powerlessness.	84
75	GENERAL MARSH Helsingfors Tel. No. G.L. 94	Aug. 31	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Riga, agreeing with Colonel Tallents's suggestions in No. 71, except those regarding cutting importation of German war material and of Russian reinforcements for Colonel Bermond-Avalov. Has urged equipment of Latvian forces and drastic measures to compel German evacuation.	84
76	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga No. 38	Sept. 1	Transmits report on situation in Riga from Aug. 26 to 31: military conference of Aug. 26; conversation at Mitau with Colonel Bermond-Avalov.	85
77	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 70	Sept. 3	Tension at Mitau relaxed.	89
78	BARON VON OW- WACHENDORF Düsseldorf No. A.A.I. 5283	Sept. 3	Note to General Nudant expressing regret that evacuation of German troops delayed by their indiscipline. Return of General von der Goltz to Mitau is against instructions, but situation easier there as a result of his presence.	90

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
79 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 77	Sept. 4	Reports that at request of Latvian Government he has handed to Colonel Bermond-Avalov's representative for signature draft declaration of goodwill towards Latvia. Information and views on proposed advance of Colonel Bermond-Avalov.	91
80 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 78	Sept. 5	Summary of questions asked urgently by Colonel Bermond-Avalov in regard to his advance.	92
81 GENERAL MARSH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 223	Sept. 5	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to War Office reporting that presence of superior German forces at Mitau prevents elimination of Germans from Colonel Bermond-Avalov's force. Asks whether steps being taken in Paris to ensure early German evacuation.	93
82 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 20	Sept. 5	Russo-German recruiting is proceeding and large numbers of men going north to join Colonel Bermond-Avalov's force. General Biscoupski arrived in Berlin. Transmits secret order by General von der Goltz in support of German enlistment in Russian forces.	94
83 LORD KILMARNOCK Copenhagen Tel. No. 1502	Sept. 8	Transmits message from Military Attaché regarding activities in Berlin of General von der Goltz, General Biscoupski, and certain Russian circles. Reported overtures by M. Lenin to German socialists.	95
84 MAJOR THORBURN Berlin No. 369/B/3	Sept. 9	Note of conversation with Colonel Durnovo regarding formation of Russo-German army to fight Bolshevism. Russian dissatisfaction with the Allies.	96
85 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga No. 44	Sept. 9	Transmits report on political situation, Sept. 1-9, as regards Colonel Bermond-Avalov's force, Baltic Landeswehr, &c.: encloses speech of Sept. 1 by General von der Goltz, correspondence between him and General Burt, note of a conversation in Warsaw between Colonel Rowan Robinson and Prince Shikhmatoff.	98
86 TO COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 34	Sept. 11	Answers to all four questions in No. 80 are in the negative.	105
87 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 102	Sept. 12	Asks for guidance with regard to the disposal of Colonel Bermond-Avalov's forces.	105
88 SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors No. 111	Sept. 14	Reports conversation with Finnish Foreign Minister regarding question of possible Finnish intervention in Russia: Germanophil entourage of General Mannerheim.	106
89 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1352	Sept. 17	Reports proceedings of Supreme Council: Mr. Polk's objection to employing Polish forces against Germans in the Baltic Provinces: General Weygand to draft a	111

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89 <i>Continued</i>		letter to the German Peace Delegation threatening sanctions in case of non-withdrawal of German forces.	
90 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1359	Sept. 18	Reports further discussion of this matter in the Supreme Council, and requests instructions.	111
91 TO M. BISSENEEK London No. 128878/W. 59	Sept. 18	Letter from Sir J. Tilley stating that instructions have been sent to British Military Mission at Reval to deliver to Riga equipment for 10,000 Latvian troops.	113
92 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 337	Sept. 19	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors: East Prussian frontier now reported opened and two German transports have crossed towards Prekuln. Colonel Bermond-Avalov reported to have received 6,000 sets of equipment.	113
93 SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 474	Sept. 19	German Minister has represented to Finnish M.F.A. that only chance of capture of Petrograd lies in Finnish co-operation with General von der Goltz's troops.	114
94 COLONEL PIRIE-GORDON Reval No. D.C. 238	Sept. 21	Transmits intercepted German message regarding an alleged agreement between certain German and Russian circles.	114
95 MM. ULMANIS AND MEIEROVICZ Riga Tel. No. 3209	Sept. 21	Telegram to Mr. Lloyd George protesting against conduct of German forces and requesting sanctions to secure their withdrawal: requests arms and ammunition and recognition <i>de jure</i> of Latvian independence.	115
96 MR. LLOYD GEORGE London Tel. Unnumbered		Reply to M. Ulmanis trusting that as a result of new measures to be taken Germans will shortly be cleared from Latvia. Regrets H.M.G. cannot provide more war material. H.M.G. will, when time comes, support fulfilment of Latvian national aspirations consistent with general European interests.	117
97 M. CZEPINSKI London No. I. 449 (iii)	Sept. 22	Note to Lord Hardinge asking that steps be taken for immediate withdrawal of Russo-German troops from Lithuania; encloses Lithuanian appeal of July 26 to Colonel Tallents.	117
98 TO SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1169	Sept. 22	Instructions to support M. Clemenceau strongly in advocating immediate ultimatum to German Government accompanied by threat of coercive measures.	120
99 TO MR. WISE Cologne Tel. Unnumbered	Sept. 22	Instructions not to commit H.M.G. in negotiations with Germans as to supply of food and raw materials, with a view to possibly exercising pressure.	120
100 TO SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 6176	Sept. 22	Transmits memorandum concerning above negotiations submitted by Consultative Food Committee to Supreme Economic Council.	120

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101 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 127	Sept. 22	Increasing insolence of German forces threatens to cause overthrow of Latvian Government. Requests fullest information regarding steps taken to compel Germans to evacuate.	123
102 TO SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 6184	Sept. 23	Transmits observations of M. Goutchkof regarding German readiness to save Russia from bolshevism and set up another government there: prospective advance of General von der Goltz.	123
103 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 357	Sept. 24	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, reporting reliable information that Germans have planned attack on Riga if Latvians attack them, as they allegedly expect: pointers to early German offensive attitude. General Burt advising Latvian withdrawal.	124
104 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin Tel. No. Z 149	Sept. 24	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to War Office, suggesting that General Biscoupski be sent to London to explain his suggestions. <i>Note 2.</i> War Office reply. Activities of Colonel Durnovo.	125 125
105 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. 1376	Sept. 25	Terms of draft note to German Government nearly agreed, but requests reply to suggestion that repatriation of German officer prisoners in British hands might be suspended.	125
106 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1380	Sept. 26	Question of appointment of successor to General Gough.	127
107 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 23	Sept. 26	Situation in Baltic Provinces causing anxiety to German Government.	127
108 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 2008/A/33	Sept. 26	Reports to War Office observations of Herr Noske regarding situation in Baltic Provinces.	127
109 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin Tel. Z. 156	Sept. 27	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to War Office, reporting conversation with General Biscoupski. General Malcolm informed him of expectation that H.M.G. would be entirely opposed to his assuming command of part of General von der Goltz's force.	128
110 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1382	Sept. 27	Supreme Council has approved text of ultimatum to German Government, which will be dispatched forthwith: question of repatriation of prisoners of war not mentioned in ultimatum.	129
111 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 54	Sept. 27	Telegram to General Marsh, Helsingfors, informing him of ultimatum regarding German evacuation.	129

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112 M. SESKIS Paris	Sept. 29	Note to M. Clemenceau informing him that continued German provocation in Latvia has prevented Latvian Government from refusing to discuss Soviet offer of pourparlers for peace.	130
113 M. CZEPINSKI London No. I. 493 (iii)	Sept. 29	Note to Lord Hardinge regarding danger that German troops will remain in Baltic Provinces as Russian volunteers; encloses Lithuanian military telegram concerning Russo-German manoeuvres in Lithuania.	130
114 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 377	Sept. 29	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors: Russo-German troops have driven Lithuanian troops out of Shawli and Radzivilishki: German troops have crossed neutral zone in North Courland.	132
115 SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 505	Oct. 1	Transmits press report that a political agreement has been concluded between Russian and German troops in Courland.	132
116 GENERAL MALGOLM Berlin No. 24	Oct. 3	Controversy in Berlin between Russian and German parties regarding policy in Baltic Provinces; possibility of attack on Riga.	133
117 BARON VON OW- WACHENDORF Düsseldorf No. A.A.I. 5910	Oct. 4	Note to General Nudant giving text of German Government's appeal to German troops to evacuate Baltic Provinces.	134
118 GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 396	Oct. 4	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to British Mission, Helsingfors, giving position of German forces: aggressive German attitude: untrue German report of Latvian attack.	135
119 MAJOR MAUDE Berlin	Oct. 5	Report on inquiries as to source of Colonel Bermond-Avalov's funds.	135
120 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 158	Oct. 7	Tension increasing between Latvian and Russo-German forces: probability of early hostilities.	137
121 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 159	Oct. 8	Following upon Russo-German provocation, fighting has begun between Russo-German and Latvian forces.	137
122 MM. ULMANIS AND MEIEROVICZ Riga Tel. No. 3947	Oct. 8	Telegram to Mr. Lloyd George: Russo-German forces have attacked Latvian forces; Latvia will defend her independence, and requests support.	137
123 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga No. 93	Oct. 9	First phase of the Russo-German attack; British Mission proposes to remain in Riga.	139
124 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 160	Oct. 9	Earliest information of any measures taken by Allies in response to German attack on Latvia would encourage Latvians.	140
125 MR. HARVEY Foreign Office	Oct. 9	Foreign Office memorandum on 'Germany and the West Russian Government' formed in Berlin.	140

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126 MR. RAMSAY Stockholm No. 459	Oct. 9	<i>Stockholms Dagbladet</i> has published a telegram from Königsberg purporting to reproduce secret instructions alleged to have been sent by Latvian M.F.A. to Latvian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin. <i>Note 2.</i> Latvian note denying authenticity of fabricated Latvian documents published in the German press.	143 144
127 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1425	Oct. 9	Supreme Council have agreed to accept German proposal for immediate setting up of an International Commission to supervise evacuation of German forces from Baltic Provinces; proposed French chairmanship of commission.	144
128 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1430	Oct. 10	Transmits amendments to draft reply submitted by Marshal Foch to German note of October 3 regarding evacuation of Baltic Provinces; reply to be published on October 13.	145
129 MR. HARVEY Foreign Office	Oct. 10	Note of conversation with M. Bisseneek regarding critical position in Latvia. Latvian request concerning war supplies and Allied occupation of Memel.	146
130 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 162	Oct. 10	Latvian army continues to hold right bank of Dwina. Riga orderly.	146
131 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 163	Oct. 11	On October 10 Colonel Bermond-Avalov offered armistice in insolent terms. Latvian Command propose to recommend Government to decline relations. Weak execution of Colonel Bermond-Avalov's plan of attack. Asks to be informed of Allied measures.	147
132 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga No. 94	Oct. 12	Transmits report on events in Riga, Oct. 9-11.	147
133 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 164	Oct. 12	Reports local situation. Latvians feel they are enforcing Armistice for Allies without support.	152
134 SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 315	Oct. 12	Polish Government assures him that it would not take any advantage of difficult situation created for Lithuania by action of Russo-German forces. Poland wishes to be on best of terms with Lithuania.	153
135 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1439	Oct. 13	Marshal Foch remains in favour of employing Polish Army should force be necessary to compel Germans to leave Baltic Provinces; Sir E. Crowe told him his impression that Mr. Lloyd George would be sympathetic.	154
136 TO SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1229	Oct. 14	Situation at Riga—suggests pressure might be applied to Germany by France refusing to ratify Treaty of Versailles.	155

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137	TO COLONEL TALLENTS Reval Tel. No. 88	Oct. 14	Informs of action taken by Allies to compel Germans to evacuate Baltic Provinces.	155
138	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga No. 95	Oct. 14	Transmits report on events in Riga, Oct. 12-13, with enclosures.	156
139	COLONEL GROVE Mitau Unnumbered	Oct. 16	Report on events in Mitau preceding and shortly after the Russo-German attack; conversations with Count Pahlen; encloses extracts from <i>Die Trommel</i> .	163
140	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga No. 96	Oct. 16	Transmits report covering events at Riga, Oct. 14 and 15; Allied naval units bombard Russo-German forces.	174
141	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 168A	Oct. 16	Indications that M. Goutchkof is hostile to England.	177
142	BARON VON OW- WACHENDORF Düsseldorf No. A.A.I. 6131	Oct. 16	Note to General Nudant concerning delay in German evacuation of Baltic Provinces and steps taken by German Government to secure it.	178
143	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Copenhagen Tel. No. 1441	Oct. 17	States that in consequence of attack on Riga Allied Naval Armistice Commission has temporarily suspended all free passages of German vessels in Baltic; blockade of Germany has not been re-imposed.	179
144	GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 25	Oct. 18	Reports reaction in Berlin to present situation in Baltic Provinces. German Government disturbed.	179
145	CAPTAIN DUNDAS Libau No. 66/4B	Oct. 18	Report to Admiralty on situation in Latvia and steps taken to deliver Admiral Cowan's ultimatum to Colonel Bermond-Avalov; encloses report by Lt.-Commander Deane on conversations with him, and on journey to Mitau.	181
146	COLONEL ROWAN ROBINSON Libau Tel. No. RR. 116	Oct. 18	Reports to British Peace Delegation that should Lithuanians attack Russo-German forces, General Eberhardt hints at action by Germany; no German troops evacuated; General Eberhardt should be recalled forthwith.	188
147	COLONEL WARD Kovno Tel. No. 3	Oct. 19	Recommends that most energetic measures be taken to ensure immediate evacuation of all Germans; Lithuanian grain and produce being sent to Germany.	188
148	COLONEL ROWAN ROBINSON Tel. No. RR. 124	Oct. 21	Informs British Peace Delegation that General Eberhardt is using Lithuanian defence measures against Colonel Bermond-Avalov as an excuse for delaying evacuation. Lithuanian Government wish to know if any date fixed for termination of evacuation.	189

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149	COLONEL ROWAN ROBINSON Kovno Tel. No. R.R. 126	Oct. 21	Informs British Peace Delegation that Allied telegram has been sent to General Eberhardt warning him that any advance of German troops northwards will be taken as an unwarranted act of aggression with object of delaying evacuation; Lithuanian guarantees considered sufficient.	189
150	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 180	Oct. 22	Reports situation in Riga, periodically shelled; Latvia to decline Estonian terms for assistance.	189
151	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1479	Oct. 22	Asks whether H.M.G. favour proposed action of President of Allied Naval Armistice Commission in threatening complete stoppage of German sailings either inside or outside Baltic.	190
152	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1478	Oct. 22	Embargo on German shipping in Baltic: Supreme Council has agreed to leave to Naval Authorities discretion to grant relaxations.	190
153	SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 576	Oct. 22	Finnish Cabinet has decided to put into force only preliminary plans of mobilization. General von der Goltz urges Finnish intervention in Russia.	191
154	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 523	Oct. 22	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram to effect that present attack on Latvia is a German effort and nothing seems to be stopping German reinforcements and supplies.	192
155	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 529	Oct. 23	Repeats to British Peace Delegation telegram urging that Memel and if possible Tilsit be occupied by Allied forces.	192
156	M. CZEPINSKI London No. I. 658 (iii)	Oct. 23	Note to Lord Hardinge reporting on latest events in Lithuania; Lithuanian clashes with Russo-German forces; Russo-German intrigues in Lithuania.	192
157	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1487	Oct. 24	Question of the replacement of General Gough.	195
158	GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 26	Oct. 24	Reports powerlessness of German Government to enforce its will on German troops in Baltic Provinces. Probable disintegration of Colonel Bermond-Avalov's force. Interallied Commission should concert with German Government against outlaws.	195
159	GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin Tel. No. Z. 194	Oct. 24	Informs British Peace Delegation that German Government reported to have seized roubles printed in Berlin for Colonel Bermond-Avalov. Baron von Knorring in Berlin has plenipotentiary powers from Col. Bermond-Avalov to treat with representatives of Entente.	196
160	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 64	Oct. 25	Instructs General Malcolm, Berlin, to refuse to treat with Baron von Knorring in absence of specific instructions to do so.	196

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161 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 185	Oct. 25	Requests supply of war material for Latvia.	197
162 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 188	Oct. 26	Indications that Colonel Bermond-Avalov's troops would be susceptible to organized propaganda from West.	197
163 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin Tel. No. Z. 201	Oct. 27	Acknowledges No. 160 and informs Sir E. Crowe, Paris, that he will speak to French representatives.	198
164 SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 595	Oct. 27	Has seen telegram from Finnish Minister, Berlin, stating that Colonel Bermond-Avalov desires Finnish intervention against Bolsheviks and is prepared to recognize Finnish independence.	198
165 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 193	Oct. 28	Reports conversation with Latvian M.F.A. regarding possible Polish intervention against Russo-German forces.	198
166 COLONEL ROWAN ROBINSON Libau Tel. No. RR. 137	Oct. 28	Informs British Peace Delegation that reports still being received of German troops entering Lithuania.	199
167 COLONEL ROWAN ROBINSON Kovno Tel. No. RR. 141	Oct. 28	Informs British Peace Delegation that if German evacuation not completed by November 10 Lithuanians propose to blow up main bridges on Shavli-Tauroggen line unless he is instructed to contrary.	199
168 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1499	Oct. 28	Reports discussion in Supreme Council on draft instructions for General Niessel, appointed President of Allied Commission to control German evacuation.	200
169 BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 42	Oct. 29	Note to M. Clemenceau asking that dispatch of Allied Baltic Commission be accelerated.	201
170 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 887	Oct. 29	Transmits report from British Representative at Omsk that Admiral Kolchak's Government will refuse German co-operation but public opinion will applaud any assistance.	202
171 LITHUANIAN DELEGATION Paris No. 2576	Oct. 29	Note to Supreme Council enclosing memorandum on recent events in Baltic Provinces and Russo-German intrigues; requests that German troops be evacuated.	202
172 COLONEL WARD Kovno Tel. No. 138	Oct. 30	Latest German plan according to fairly reliable information is to organize new state of Ost Deutschland consisting of East Prussia, Lithuania, and Latvia.	206
173 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 202	Oct. 30	Proposes to attempt journey to Kovno, Nov. 2, and asks for indication of H.M.G.'s policy regarding Polish action against Colonel Bermond-Avalov.	206

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174 MR. GREGORY Foreign Office	Oct. 30	Note of a conversation with M. Kopwillemm regarding possible common action between Esthonia and Latvia against German forces; question of military supplies.	206
175 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 27	Oct. 30	Extract from report stating that question of Baltic Provinces and Colonel Bermond-Avalov's army causing great anxiety to German Government who are unable to carry out wishes of Entente, having let things go too far. Recruits continue to leave for Baltic Provinces. Herr Noske badly informed.	207
176 BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 43	Oct. 30	Note to M. Clemenceau protesting against suspension of German shipping in the Baltic.	208
177 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 2	Oct. 31	Ref. No. 167. Informs Colonel Rowan Robinson, Kovno, that General Niessel would prefer bridge should not be destroyed.	210
178 To SIR C. MARLING Copenhagen Tel. No. 1472	Nov. 2	Instructions to inform Danish Government that Naval Authorities instructed to avoid unnecessary interference with shipping in Baltic; procedure for applications for free passage for German ships.	210
179 To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1320	Nov. 2	Ref. No. 168. General Niessel's Mission should confine itself to controlling evacuation of German troops; General Haking to be British representative with General Yudenitch.	211
180 To COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 112	Nov. 3	Ref. No. 173. H.M.G. doubt wisdom of Polish action against Colonel Bermond-Avalov; question will doubtless be dealt with by General Niessel's Mission.	211
181 COLONEL MAUDE Berlin	Nov. 3	Note of conversation with Lieut. Graublin regarding financial help given to Col. Bermond-Avalov; activities of Krupps and German Heavy Industry.	211
182 COLONEL ROWAN ROBINSON Kovno Tel. No. 144	Nov. 4	Informs British Peace Delegation that Lithuanian and German representatives have made arrangements to facilitate German evacuation.	212
183 COLONEL TALLENTS Kovno Tel. No. RR. 151	Nov. 4	Reports views of Lithuanian President and Prime Minister on position of Colonel Bermond-Avalov's forces; Polish intervention strongly deprecated; possible desirability of Allied occupation of Frankfurt.	212
184 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 28	Nov. 6	Herr Noske's efforts to stop recruiting for forces in Courland have met with some success. Admiral Hopmann appointed German representative to meet General Niessel.	213
185 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 215	Nov. 7	Latvian Government is inviting Lithuanian Government to an immediate military conference.	214

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186	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 216	Nov. 7	Reports desire of Latvian Government to break off diplomatic relations with Germany; requests instructions.	214
187	GENERAL TURNER Berlin No. 1	Nov. 9	Reports on activities of Allied Commission for evacuation of Germans from Baltic Provinces, Oct. 28-Nov. 10; conversations in Berlin.	214
188	TO SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7420	Nov. 10	Transmits letter from War Office to effect that Army Council strongly opposed to employment of Polish Army in Baltic States, and concurs in this opinion.	217
189	BARON VON LERSNER Paris	Nov. 10	Note to M. Dutasta regarding embargo in the Baltic.	218
190	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1617	Nov. 10	Transmits telegram from Military Attaché for D.M.I. regarding chiefs of Russian Western Government; Colonel Durnovo recently in Stockholm incognito.	219
191	COLONEL ROWAN ROBINSON Kovno Tel. No. RR. 167	Nov. 10	Informs British Peace Delegation that no Germans have left Lithuania in past week despite promise to evacuate in 14 days; outrageous robbery and debauchery by German forces in Lithuania.	219
192	COLONEL WARD Kovno No. 6	Nov. 11	German outrages and intrigues in Lithuania.	219
193	GENERAL BURT Riga Tel. No. A.B. 586	Nov. 12	Reports defeat of Iron Division and conclusion of second battle of Riga, now free from German bombardment.	222
194	TO COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 121	Nov. 12	States military stores to value of £16,000 being sent to Latvia.	223
195	GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 29	Nov. 13	Reports on activities of General Niessel's commission in Berlin; German Government at last taking vigorous action to stop recruitment of Germans for Russian service.	223
196	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 220	Nov. 14	Transmits telegram to Mr. Lloyd George from Latvian Prime Minister expressing gratitude for help received from H.M.G. in defence of Riga.	224
197	FOREIGN OFFICE	Nov. 15	Extract from Foreign Office Memorandum on Baltic States and Germany.	225
198	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 25	Nov. 17	Ref. No. 183. Informes Colonel Tallents of instructions given to General Niessel's Mission.	230
199	GENERAL TURNER Tilsit No. 2	Nov. 18	Reports on activities of Allied Commission, Nov. 10-17.	230
200	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 83	Nov. 20	Transmits to General Malcolm, Berlin, message for General Niessel regarding dispositions of British naval forces in Baltic.	233

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
201 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 30	Nov. 20	Position in Baltic seems to be approaching a satisfactory solution: dissolution of Colonel Bermond-Avalov's army reported to have set in.	234
202 TO COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 127	Nov. 21	States Latvian Government would appear to be justified in breaking off relations with Germany, but H.M.G. cannot assume responsibility for advising it as regards a formal breach.	234
203 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 236	Nov. 21	Reports position in Mitau after German withdrawal.	235
204 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 240	Nov. 23	Latvian Government unfavourably impressed by General Niessel's message demanding that Latvian army should be called off from pursuit of Germans.	236
205 GENERAL TURNER Tilsit No. 3	Nov. 25	Report on activities of Allied Commission, Nov. 18-24: situation in Latvia, Lithuania, and progress of German evacuation.	236
206 BRITISH PEACE DELEGATION Paris No. 2210	Nov. 26	Memorandum embodying telegram from President of A.N.A.C. for Supreme Council requesting approval of proposal to raise embargo on German vessels in the Baltic.	240
207 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 248	Nov. 28	Latvian representatives have come to satisfactory arrangements with General Niessel's commission about German evacuation.	241
208 CAPTAIN DEWHURST Riga Tel. No. 255	Dec. 1	Reports Lithuanian representations regarding German evacuation and actions of General Niessel.	241
209 M. BISSENEEK London No. 1008	Dec. 4	Requests H.M.G. to use its influence with Peace Conference regarding Latvian claim to reparation, and utilization in this connexion of German property in Latvia.	242
210 GENERAL TURNER Tilsit No. 4	Dec. 5	Report on activities of Allied Commission, Nov. 25-Dec. 5; German outrages in the Baltic Provinces; reported plans for a military <i>coup d'état</i> in Germany.	243
211 GENERAL TURNER Tilsit Unnumbered	Dec. 5	Letter to Colonel Kisch, Paris, stressing difficulties Allied Commission have had to contend with regarding evacuation of German troops; criticizes attitude of Supreme Council.	247
212 GENERAL TURNER Tilsit Tel. No. M. 42	Dec. 6	Informs British Peace Delegation that Iron Division is marching on Memel contrary to orders; General Eberhardt with last German troops believed to have left Shavli for Tilsit.	248
213 GENERAL TURNER Tilsit Tel. No. M. 46	Dec. 8	Reports to British Peace Delegation details regarding German evacuation by rail, now practically complete; movements of Iron Division.	248

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
214 GENERAL TURNER Tilsit Unnumbered	Dec. 9	Concluding report on evacuation of German forces, now nearing completion; activities of the German military party; conduct of General von Eberhardt; East Prussia not tired of war. <i>Note 3.</i> Later correspondence regarding the punishment of German offenders from the Baltic Provinces.	249 251
215 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 271	Dec. 9	Latvian Government have secured from Colonel Bermond-Avalov's office at Mitau two sets of confidential documents; translations will be transmitted to F.O.	255
216 GENERAL MALCOLM Berlin No. 33	Dec. 11	General Niessel has practically brought his Mission to the Baltic Provinces to a successful conclusion; transmits memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel Longhurst on the return of German troops from Courland.	256
217 GENERAL TURNER Tilsit Tel. No. M. 56	Dec. 14	Transmits to British Peace Delegation report that evacuation now complete with exception of small rear-guards.	258
218 CAPTAIN DEWHURST Riga No. 149	Dec. 15	Refers to No. 215 and transmits translations of Latvian summary-indexes of the Bermond-Avalov secret correspondence and of certain of the documents in question.	259
219 CAPTAIN DEWHURST Riga No. 156	Dec. 20	Refers to No. 218 and sends further translations of Latvian summary-index and of certain of the documents found.	274
220 CAPTAIN DEWHURST Riga No. 163	Dec. 27	Refers to No. 215 and sends four further translations of Bermond-Avalov documents.	291
221 COLONEL MAUDE Berlin	Dec. 31	Memorandum on certain aspects of Russo-German relations; German military and economic interests.	294
222 CAPTAIN DEWHURST Riga No. 3	1920 Jan. 9	Refers to No. 215 and transmits eight translations of Bermond-Avalov documents; all those of real importance have now been forwarded.	298

CHAPTER II

Policy of His Majesty's Government in relation to developments in Russia

May 26, 1919—March 12, 1920

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
	1919	Introductory Note.	308
223 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 31	May 24	Policy towards Russia; consideration of note to be sent to Admiral Kolchak; military situation in Siberia.	312

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
224	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 32	May 26	Policy towards Russia; signature of note to Admiral Kolchak.	319
225	SIR C. ELIOT Vladivostok Tel. No. 485	May 26	Transmits views regarding conditions relative to the internal administration of the Government of Admiral Kolchak which might be made in connexion with its recognition.	320
226	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 2	May 26	Informs Mr. Bosanquet, Reval, that Council of Foreign Ministers have adopted proposal of Supreme Economic Council that all areas of Russia not in Soviet hands should be supplied with food; Allied Governments do not wish to be in any way responsible for operations against Petrograd.	321
227	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 34	May 26	Question of a Polish-Ukrainian armistice: letter from Ukrainian Delegation to General Botha, and his reply.	321
228	MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 813	May 26	Reports visit received from members of Azerbaijan Delegation to Peace Conference, who asked whether H.M.G. would support their claim for recognition of their independence and whether any possibility that H.M.G. would accept a mandate for Azerbaijan; no hope held out as regards the latter.	324
229	MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 896	June 4	Transmits copy of note of May 26 to Italian Peace Delegation regarding replacement of British forces by Italian forces in the Caucasus.	325
230	MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 347	May 27	Reports arrival of British volunteer brigade.	326
231	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 35A	May 27	Discussion regarding Polish-Ukrainian armistice; Mr. Lloyd George raises question of attitude of French authorities in Poland; telegram sent to General Pilsudski.	326
232	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 36A	May 27	Discussion regarding Polish-Ukrainian armistice.	329
233	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 37	May 27	Insertion in note to Admiral Kolchak of proviso concerning Bessarabia; text of note.	330
234	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 37B	May 28	Discussion regarding Polish-Ukrainian armistice.	333

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235 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 42	May 30	Discussion regarding Polish-Ukrainian armistice: General Haller's position; telegrams from the French Minister at Warsaw.	333
236 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau Tel. No. 87	June 1	Reports that from information received Germans are still negotiating with Soviets.	336
237 MR. STEVENS Batoum No. 24	June 2	Represents undesirability of withdrawing British troops from the Caucasus, and surveys situation there.	336
238 COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 511	June 3	Transmits report from Mr. Hodgson at Omsk regarding unsatisfactory general situation: Mr. Hodgson of opinion that open support of Admiral Kolchak by Allied Powers a vital necessity.	339
239 SIR E. HOWARD Paris	June 3	Note of a conversation with Count Kokovtsoff and Prince Troubetskoi regarding recognition of Admiral Kolchak's Government.	340
240 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 44	June 3	Position of Admiral Kolchak discussed, and telegram recording reply of General Pilsudski to telegram from Peace Conference read.	342
241 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 891	June 3	Transmits message to be forwarded to M. Chicherin, Moscow, regarding exchange of prisoners.	343
242 MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 75	June 3	Reports that there appears to be danger of anti-Jewish pogroms if Petrograd is recaptured.	344
243 MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 79	June 4	Transmits message from General Gough for C.I.G.S. reporting decisions arrived at after conference with Esthonian Prime Minister and visit to Headquarters of Russian Northern Corps; requirements of the latter.	344
244 MR. GRANT WATSON Libau Tel. No. 95	June 4	Reports on intercepted Soviet message relative to journey of German mission to Russia; indications of German policy in Russia.	345
245 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1015	June 5	Reports position regarding foodstuffs for Russian Northern Corps and the population of areas occupied by it.	346
246 TO MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 812	June 5	Asks that question of food supplies for North Russia be taken up again with Food Section of S.E.C.; whole military situation depends on feeding of population. <i>Note 2.</i> Mr. Lindley's note of May 16 to General Miller regarding food supplies in North Russia.	346 346
247 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 48	June 5	Hearing of M. Paderewski; Polish claims in Galicia and Silesia; criticism by Mr. Lloyd George of Polish attitude.	348

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248	COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 521	June 7	Views as to reasons for increase of Bolshevism in Siberia.	355
249	COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 522	June 8	Transmits particulars from Chinese High Commissioner as to negotiations regarding command of Chinese troops on Chinese Eastern Railway; Japanese attitude.	356
250	COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 523	June 8	Transmits message from Mr. Hodgson, Omsk, reporting views of M.F.A. regarding conditions on which support would be accorded to Omsk Government; question of a new Russian Constituent Assembly.	357
251	COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 528	June 10	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot from Siasnoyarsk reporting views as to reasons for increase of Bolshevism in Siberia.	358
252	COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 531	June 10	Transmits message from Mr. Hodgson, Omsk, regarding measures taken for repression of Bolshevik outbreaks in Yeniseisk; Government deprecates arbitrary methods and will take steps to prevent recurrence.	359
253	M. CHICHERIN Moscow	June 10	Wireless message stating Soviet Government prepared to proceed immediately with exchange of certain prisoners, but general exchange must await arrival of Soviet commission in London or a neutral country.	359
254	TO SIR C. ELIOT Vladivostok No. 44	June 11	Records conversation between Sir R. Graham and M. Nabokoff regarding the proposed support of Admiral Kolchak; attitude of M. Sazonov.	360
255	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 60	June 11	Reply from Admiral Kolchak to Allied Note of May 26; assurances as to the aims of his Government.	361
256	TO MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 3779	June 11	Transmits copy of a Foreign Office memorandum regarding certain points in connexion with the recognition of Admiral Kolchak's Government, and asks for views thereon; encloses texts of Anglo-French convention of Dec. 23, 1917, of correspondence concerning the Inter-Allied Railway Committee in Siberia, of the Anglo-French financial agreement of Aug. 15, 1918, and of the Murmansk Agreement of July 7, 1918.	364
257	MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 62	June 12	Approval of telegram acknowledging Admiral Kolchak's reply and stating Allied willingness to extend the proposed support to him and his associates.	376
258	GENERAL DENIKIN Ekaterinodar	June 12	Note to General Briggs protesting against recognition of independence of Finland by Great Britain and U.S.A.; questions concerning Russian sovereignty should not be decided without Russian participation.	377

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
259	SIR E. HOWARD Paris	June 12	Note of a conversation between Mr. Balfour and Esthonian Delegates regarding Esthonian request for immediate recognition of her independence; H.M.G. considered no final settlement could be secured without Russian consent.	377
260	MR. GORVIN Paris S.E.C./28	June 13	Letter to Sir R. Graham regarding food requirements of Murmansk and Archangel; decision of Food Section of the S.E.C.	379
261	COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 547	June 15	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot, Omsk, reporting on military situation, which has greatly deteriorated.	380
262	To MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 3943	June 16	Asks for views on suggested reply to D.M.I. regarding the question of a combined Russian and Finnish advance on Petrograd.	381
			<i>Note 3.</i> General Mannerheim's conditions for Finnish co-operation against Petrograd.	382
			<i>Note 4.</i> Letter of June 1 from General Gough to Lord Curzon concerning above question.	383
263	To MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 3986	June 17	Asks whether M. Nabokoff may be informed that H.M.G. are prepared to recognize the right of the Omsk Government to deal with public property under their control; question of obtaining an advance from a London bank.	383
264	To SIR C. ELIOT Vladivostok Tel. No. 37	June 17	Omsk Government should accord every facility to Kara Sea Expedition in view of present advantages and of possible development of Anglo-Siberian trade.	384
265	MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 409	June 19	Reports situation regarding export of timber and import of foodstuffs.	384
266	MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 1015	June 19	Refers to No. 262 and transmits views as to instructions to be given to General Gough on the question of a Finnish advance against Petrograd.	385
267	SIR C. ELIOT Omsk No. 07	June 19	Transmits memoranda furnished by Professor Sir B. Pares; note on a ministerial conference at Omsk on June 12, and a supplementary note on a Ministry or Commission on Reconstruction; proposed Anglo-Siberian co-operation in reconstruction.	386
268	MR. JERRAM Novorossisk No. 7	June 20	Reports on local enthusiasm for Great Britain.	390
269	MR. CARR Paris	June 20	Note of a conversation between Sir E. Howard and the Carpatho-Russian Delegation, which claimed eventual reunion with Russia.	391

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
270 COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 557	June 21	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot, Omsk, reporting disappointment of Admiral Kolchak and Omsk Government at Allied non-recognition; puts forward questions asked by M.F.A.	392
271 To SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 430	June 21	Points out necessity for Admiral Kolchak to realize the exact conditions underlying Allied support; British assistance conditioned by attitude of Russian authorities.	393
272 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1072	June 21	Considers that before approval be given to conditions agreed to between Finnish Government and General Yudenitch for a Finnish advance on Petrograd, sanction of Admiral Kolchak should be obtained in writing. <i>Note 1.</i> Agreement between Finnish Government and General Yudenitch.	394
273 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 3	June 23	Transmits to General Gough, Helsingfors, message from C.I.G.S. to effect that as Admiral Kolchak agrees to a Finnish military occupation of Petrograd under certain conditions, support of Admiral Kolchak's views should be made clear.	395
274 MR. BELL Helsingfors Tel. No. 345	June 25	H.M.G.'s reply regarding proposal that Finnish troops should occupy Petrograd has made favourable impression in Finnish official circles. Divergent views of General Mannerheim and Finnish Cabinet.	396
275 M. SAZONOV Paris	June 25	Transmits to Mr. Balfour an <i>aide-mémoire</i> pointing out that it will be necessary for Russia to conclude a special peace treaty with Germany. <i>Note 1.</i> Extract from Russian memorandum of May 22 to the Peace Conference regarding conditions of peace with Germany.	396 397
276 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 420	June 25	Imperative that 10,000 tons of flour be received before end of August and further supplies shortly afterwards.	399
277 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 426	June 26	Reports opinion that projected plan to send 5,000 tons of munitions to Admiral Kolchak via Ob is not sound and that munitions more likely to reach Admiral Kolchak if held at Archangel.	399
278 To MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 382	June 26	In order to assist Anglo-Russian trade H.M.G. have decided on an insurance arrangement of which particulars given: asks for observations as to desirability of extending measure to North Russia.	400
279 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 936	June 26	Sends message for transmission to M. Chicherin regarding arrangements for proposed exchange of prisoners: cannot agree to Soviet representatives coming to the U.K. but would agree to Swiss or Scandinavian representative acting on behalf of Soviet Government.	401

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
280 COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 567	June 26	Transmits observations of Sir C. Eliot, Omsk, on current ideas for a Russo-Japanese-German alliance. <i>Note 1.</i> Telegram of May 17 from Lord Acton, Berne, transmitting information from Prince Lubomirski regarding Russian contacts with Japan and Germany; danger to Poland of a Russo-German combination.	402 402
281 COLONEL ROBERTSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 569	June 27	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot to effect that Admiral Kolchak intends to send an urgent telegram to Finland begging General Mannerheim to advance on Petrograd; Admiral Kolchak will also appeal to the Powers to support this request.	402
282 MEETING OF ALLIED SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 97	June 28	Consideration of a draft telegram to Admiral Kolchak in connexion with a proposal for the use of Czechoslovak forces in Siberia to co-operate with right wing of Admiral Kolchak's army.	403
283 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 432	June 28	Deprecates extension of British insurance scheme to imports in northern region, but asks that it be applied to timber exports.	405
284 TO MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 925	June 28	Asks whether question of transfer of Caspian fleet and of military command of Caucasus to Italians is now settled and whether Italian Government should be approached officially on this basis: considers that occupation of Georgia alone would be open to the gravest objection.	406
285 SIR R. RODD Rome Tel. No. 448	June 29	Refers to No. 284 and states opinion that there was no intention by Signor Tittoni to suggest occupation of Georgia alone; no instructions received as to what it may be contemplated that Italy should take over.	406
286 MR. BELL Helsingfors Tel. No. 352	June 30	Transmits observations on General Gough's telegram No. B.S. 97 of June 28 (<i>note 1</i>) regarding possibility of Finnish advance on Petrograd.	407
287 MR. RATTIGAN Bucharest No. 95	July 1	Refers to note sent by Russian Legation to Allied Representatives relative to the urgent necessity of forwarding to General Denikin the Russian military stores left in Rumania in 1917 and reports that an Allied note was addressed to Rumanian Government accordingly asking for the release of these stores. <i>Note 3.</i> Rumanian reply of July 9	408 408
288 TO MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 4398	July 1	Puts forward proposals regarding negotiations concerning the future status of the Baltic and Caucasian border-states and asks for views thereon.	409
289 TO MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1411	July 2	Instructions to ask U.S. Government to allow U.S. railway troops in Archangel to remain there after July 15.	411

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
290	MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1124	July 3	Refers to No. 289 and reports that as a result of unofficial inquiries there is no chance of U.S. Government acceding to request.	411
291	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 38	July 3	Transmits to Mr. Balfour, Paris, message for C.I.G.S. stating views regarding Finnish intervention in Russia and urging that Allied loan of £15,000,000 to Finland only means to secure her intervention and so save situation.	411
292	COLONEL KISCH Paris Unnumbered	July 4	Letter to Mr. Selby enclosing copy of observations by British Military Section, Paris, on No. 256.	412
293	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 587	July 4	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot, Ekaterinburg, describing situation, which is serious: collapse due to poor morale of troops and mismanagement of higher authorities.	415
294	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 588	July 4	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot giving reasons for unpopularity of Anglo-Russian Brigade; preparations being made for removal of Hampshires and Anglo-Russian Brigade to Omsk.	417
295	M. CHICHERIN Moscow	July 5	Wireless message: only way in which negotiations for exchange of prisoners can be carried on is for Soviet representatives to proceed to a neutral country.	417
296	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1126	July 6	Reports that from what M. Tittoni said in private conversation he does not think that Italians intend to occupy the Caucasus.	419
297	TO COLONEL KISCH Paris	July 7	Letter from Mr. Selby regarding question as to through what channel Russian problems are to be dealt with; appears probable that Peace Conference will no longer be able to deal with them.	419
298	MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1143	July 8	State Department states that question of withdrawal of U.S. railway troops from Archangel was settled by Supreme War Council, and suggest that it be taken up with General Tasker Bliss.	420
299	TO MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1435	July 8	States that Archangel Government are in urgent need of a further advance and stresses desirability of U.S. Government making a contribution similar to that already made by H.M.G. and French Government who are considering a further subsidy.	420
300	TO SIR C. ELIOT Vladivostok Tel. No. 452	July 8	Instructions to authorize British representative on Inter-Allied Railway Committee and British Military Representative in Siberia to join with their colleagues in representations to Ataman Semenov to discontinue interference with railway traffic.	420

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
301 To MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 410	July 8	States that military supplies for Admiral Kolchak mentioned in No. 277 will not be sent as there was not sufficient time to procure them.	421
302 To MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 101	July 8	Instructions to ask General Gough to draw General Yudenitch's attention to Allied note addressed to Admiral Kolchak and to point out that he is expected to adhere scrupulously to its principles as utmost importance attached to maintenance of good relations between border states and Admiral Kolchak.	421
303 To MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 408	July 8	Arrangements made for shipment of 6,300 tons of flour; asks regarding further shipments of flour required.	422
304 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 449	July 9	Transmits estimates for winter supply of flour.	422
305 To ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1153	July 9	Message for Colonel MacAlpine, Ekaterinodar, requesting him to investigate and report on what steps should be taken to promote economic well-being in General Denikin's area.	423
306 MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 1259	July 10	States policy of H.M.G. towards General Petlura; it is not the policy of H.M.G. to recognize Ukrainian independence or to encourage separatist tendencies.	424
307 MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 1290	July 11	Refers to No. 263 and suggests reply should be sent to Russian Chargé d'Affaires to the effect that the exact legal position is difficult to define but that H.M.G. will raise no objection to a London bank making a loan to the Omsk Government on the security of public property under their control.	425
308 MR. KERR Paris Unnumbered	July 11	Minute to Sir R. Graham transmitting information regarding Mr. Bullitt's mission to Russia and discussion with Soviet leaders of the question of peace: encloses text of the Bullitt Proposals.	425
309 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 20	July 12	Instructs Mr. Bell, Helsingfors, to join with Allied colleagues in making communication to Finnish Government to the effect that the Allied Governments have no objection should the Finnish Government accede to Admiral Kolchak's request for action against Petrograd.	429
310 GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 78	July 14	Informs Mr. Balfour, Paris, that Finland evidently not attracted to a march on Petrograd; favours immediate announcement of Allied loan to Finland as without Finnish assistance Petrograd cannot be taken.	430

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
311 Mr. RAMSAY Stockholm Tel. No. 1138	July 14	Official announcement from Helsingfors states Finnish Government has concluded no agreement with Admiral Kolchak for co-operation in capture of Petrograd.	430
312 Mr. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 470	July 15	Deprecates evacuation of British troops: suggests Labour Party send out mission of inspection: requests (1) authorization to state that there is no intention to evacuate British troops before the end of October and (2) information forthwith as to whether H.M.G. has decided to maintain troops in Archangel through the winter and whether, if decision depends on public opinion, it is prepared to leave decision to proposed Labour Mission. <i>Note 6.</i> Extract from Archangel dispatch No. 108 of July 16 concerning the attitude of British labour towards Russian affairs.	431 432
313 Mr. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 622	July 15	Transmits message from Consul at Ekaterinburg reporting dismissal of General Gaida and evacuation of Ekaterinburg.	433
314 Mr. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 628	July 15	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot reporting conversation with Admiral Kolchak when he impressed upon the Admiral the necessity of realizing the conditions under which he would continue to receive aid.	434
315 Mr. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 632A	July 16	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot regarding a note from the M.F.A. expressing the hope that H.M.G. will take into consideration urgency of guarding the Trans-Siberian Railway and suggesting that this be done by Japanese and American troops.	434
316 Mr. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 633	July 16	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot, Omsk, reporting conversation with Admiral Kolchak regarding proposed agreement with Finland. <i>Note 2.</i> Telegram of July 8 from General Yudenitch to Admiral Kolchak.	435 435
317 To Mr. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 110	July 16	Instructions to request General Gough to watch for, and immediately check, any reactionary tendencies in the Russian Northern Corps.	436
318 M. NABOKOFF London No. 788	July 17	Expresses hope, in view of the alarm which the news of the impending withdrawal of British troops from Archangel has caused, that H.M.G. will endeavour to dispel the anxiety which may be caused by the impression that Great Britain intends to withhold further assistance in the north of Russia.	436

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
319 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 635	July 17	Transmits message from Consul at Ekaterinburg, describing demoralization which has set in and suggesting measures necessary to be taken if Bolshevism is to be prevented from spreading to Western Siberia, and Omsk Government preserved.	437
320 FOREIGN OFFICE	July 17	Memorandum concerning (i) Bolshevik Russia; (ii) the situation in Siberia; (iii) deductions to be drawn from the attitude of the Soviet Government.	438
321 TO MR. BELL Helsingfors Tel. No. 551	July 18	Communicates attitude of H.M.G. regarding proposed Finnish advance on Petrograd as stated to M. Donner, who asked whether an agreement could be made between Entente Powers and Finnish Government whereby latter would be guaranteed financial support and war material.	444
322 MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1178	July 19	Acting Secretary of State states that U.S. Government have no funds available for assisting Archangel Government.	445
323 SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 5	July 19	Reports arrival of Japanese General Takayanagi, and conversations with him and M.F.A. regarding request for Japanese troops to guard railway; position of Ataman Semenoff.	445
324 SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 7	July 19	Admiral Kolchak denies any agreement for sending Japanese troops to Ural front and states that negotiations as to Japanese troops had been concerned only with question of replacing Czechoslovak troops in guarding railway.	446
325 MR. HOARE Archangel No. 113	July 21	Reports conversation with General Miller concerning the political situation and proposed governmental reorganization at Archangel; Russian staff bordering on panic at prospect of British withdrawal.	446
326 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 482	July 22	Russian troops unreliable unless in contact with British forces, which should be reinforced if possible; alternatively evacuation should be prompt.	449
327 TO MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1489	July 22	Instructions to urge U.S. Government to send assistance to facilitate further shipments of flour to Archangel.	450
328 TO MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 440	July 22	Arrangements being made for further shipment of flour to complete 10,000 tons required before end of August; question of further shipments under review.	450
329 TO MR. WARDROP	July 22	Letter of appointment to Mr. Wardrop; to proceed on special mission to Transcaucasia as Chief British Commissioner; objects of the mission. <i>Note 2. War Office instructions concerning demarcation line in Transcaucasia.</i>	451 451

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
330	TO MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 4970	July 23	Italian Ambassador believes Italian Government has abandoned intention of occupying the Caucasus, and will request confirmation.	452
331	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 105	July 23	Informs British Peace Delegation that in view of improbability of Finnish advance on Petrograd, General Yudenitch is transferring his H.Q. to Narva: urges supplies for North-West Army.	453
332	MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 491	July 24	Suggests British mediation between Soviet and White Russian authorities.	454
333	TO MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 445	July 24	H.M.G. has no alternative but to proceed with evacuation; requests observations urgently on evacuation of friendly elements; meanwhile no arrangements will be made for further shipments of flour.	455
334	MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1196	July 24	U.S. Government is sending 5,000 tons of flour to Archangel; understands no funds available for further assistance.	456
335	MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 493	July 25	Presumes decision to evacuate is irrevocable but nevertheless begs it be suspended for reconsideration; consequences to local population of British withdrawal.	456
336	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 994	July 25	Message for transmission to M. Chicherin asking whether Soviet Government would be ready to exchange certain prisoners at once provided a representative of the Russian Red Cross be permitted to proceed to Denmark or some other neutral country.	457
337	MR. BELL Helsingfors Tel. Unnumbered	July 26	Informs British Peace Delegation that in view of impending cabinet changes Finnish Government does not consider itself competent to enter into negotiations with White Russian authorities for an advance on Petrograd.	457
338	MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 166	July 27	Inquires as to whereabouts of certain supply-ships: if no statement can be made regarding their arrival Russian Northern Army expresses intention of applying elsewhere than to Allies for help.	458
339	MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 497	July 28	Considerations in connexion with evacuation; question of possible negotiation with Soviet authorities; number of persons to be evacuated unlikely to be under 13,000; Provisional Government not yet informed that immediate evacuation contemplated.	458
340	MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 498	July 28	Inquires whether balance of flour to make up 10,000 tons promised is to be sent and advises this if only to forestall Soviet propaganda that population being left to starve.	459

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
341 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 500	July 28	Exchange of views with Provisional Government concerning the evacuation of British forces and the question of continued White Russian resistance.	460
342 MR. HARVEY Foreign Office	July 28	Memorandum on Allied policy in Russia; advocates negotiations with the Soviet Government.	460
343 SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 12	July 29	Military and political situation critical; transmits observations regarding Admiral Kolchak and his forces.	464
344 TO LORD KILMARNOCK Copenhagen Tel. No. 1307	July 29	Refers to No. 336 and states that if the Soviet Government replies favourably it is proposed to suggest that the meeting between the British and Soviet representatives be held in Denmark; asks for views and suggests Danish Government might be sounded privately.	465
345 TO MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1514	July 29	Refers to No. 322 and points out that U.S. Government are morally committed to share in subvention: sends instructions to press U.S. Government for full statement of their position.	466
346 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 503	July 30	Reports reply of Provisional Government to memorandum presented by G.O.C.; Government now in favour of endeavouring to hold Archangel; reports discussion with M.F.A. and M. Yermoloff.	466
347 TO MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1044	July 30	Rumour spread at Tashkend that Russian Turkestan has been given to British for 25 years to guarantee repayment of British loans; suggests rumour, presumed untrue, be denied.	468
348 LORD KILMARNOCK Copenhagen Tel. No. 1436	July 31	Suggests some British stores at Copenhagen be given to Russian Northern Army.	468
349 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 505	July 31	Has urged upon acting M.F.A. concentration of all available troops on Murmansk front and evacuation of Archangel: recommends that situation be represented to Admiral Kolchak.	468
350 TO MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 462	July 31	Instructions to withdraw mission when desirable after consultation with military authorities.	469
351 TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1012	Aug. 1	Instructions to inform French Government that General Denikin has requested a British staff for base of new army in Crimea, and that H.M.G. is acceding to request while maintaining in principle agreement of Dec. 23, 1917.	469
352 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1225	Aug. 2	Agrees that a denial should be issued regarding rumoured cession of Russian Turkestan to Great Britain.	469

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
353	TO MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 125	Aug. 2	Transmits information regarding supply-ships.	470
354	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 697	Aug. 3	Transmits report from Omsk as to moderate behaviour of Soviet authorities after occupation of Ekaterinburg and Perm.	470
355	M. LITVINOV Moscow	July 30	Wireless message transmitting conditions under which Soviet Government will agree to send a commission to a neutral country to negotiate for an exchange of prisoners.	470
356	TO SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 1015	Aug. 5	Message for transmission to M. Chicherin warning him, in view of report regarding British prisoners, that he and MM. Lenin and Trotsky will be held personally responsible for their treatment and that favourable British treatment of Soviet prisoners will depend on treatment of British prisoners.	471
357	LORD KILMARNOCK Copenhagen Tel. No. 1444	Aug. 7	Danish Government agree to meeting of British and Soviet representatives at Copenhagen and will take steps to prevent Soviet representative from carrying out Bolshevik propaganda.	472
358	MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 512	Aug. 7	Reports representation from Provisional Government against Allied evacuation; is replying that decision to evacuate is believed to be final.	472
359	TO MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 473	Aug. 7	War Office has instructed G.O.C. Archangel to prevent offensive pending General Rawlinson's arrival; Mr. Hoare instructed to associate himself with General Ironside's representations.	473
360	SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 16	Aug. 8	Reports that North Sea Route Committee have dispatched 700,000 square poods of cargo for England and Archangel: they beg that S.S. <i>Novorissiya</i> be dispatched to Obi.	473
361	M. NABOKOFF London	Aug. 8	Letter to Sir R. Graham transmitting memorandum by M. Neratoff concerning political principles of General Denikin.	474
362	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 711	Aug. 9	Submits views on situation: Omsk Government discredited by failure of internal administration; essential to establish a representative assembly—joint message from diplomatic representatives in Vladivostok in this connexion; Czechoslovak elements are sound.	476
363	TO ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1328	Aug. 9	Message for transmission to Major Pinder, Ekaterinodar, instructing him to support General Holman's action to secure postponement or modification of new rates for royalties and surface rents at Grosny oil-fields.	477

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
363 <i>Continued</i>	Aug. 9	<i>Note 2.</i> Telegram of July 30 from General Holman concerning the raising of the above rates. <i>Note 3.</i> Extract from report of Oct. 8 by General Holman concerning negotiations on above subject.	477 477
364 MR. BALFOUR Paris No. G.T. 7949	Aug. 9	Letter to Mr. Lloyd George stressing his concern about the situation in the Caucasus: suggests that U.S. Government be asked to furnish troops to take over from British in order to prevent a massacre of Armenians.	478
365 MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 520	Aug. 10	Reports reconstruction of Government; local socialist criticism of British policy; trusts H.M.G. will not exclude possibility of maintaining a mission at Murmansk.	479
366 To MR. LINDSAY Washington No. 459	Aug. 11	Records conversation with the American Ambassador as to whether the U.S. Government would accept a mandate for Armenia and whether it would send troops to the Caucasus: considered improbable by American Ambassador.	480
367 To MR. BALFOUR Paris Unnumbered	Aug. 12	Refers to No. 364 and records action taken; impending situation was foreseen; can see no satisfactory solution nor any means of averting the disasters anticipated.	482
368 To MR. HOARE Archangel Tel. No. 486	Aug. 12	U.S. Government has purchased rye and wheat flour for shipment to Archangel and inquires whether H.M.G. and French Government will participate with \$1,000,000 each: H.M.G. propose replying in negative as evacuation of North Russia now decided.	484
369 SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 19	Aug. 13	Conversations in Omsk; approves decision to limit British military and financial support to South Russia; transmits proposals of Mr. Morris for helping Omsk Government which he considers should be recognized.	485
370 M. CHICHERIN Moscow	Aug. 13	Telegram protesting against treatment of Soviet prisoners by British command at Archangel; has caused Soviet Government to modify its policy towards certain British prisoners; repetition of threats to members of Soviet Government will cause it to reconsider the continuance of negotiations concerning an exchange of prisoners.	486
371 LORD KILMARNOCK Copenhagen Tel. No. 1453	Aug. 14	Danish Red Cross representative reports on reasons for arrest of foreigners in Russia and condition of British prisoners.	487
372 COLONEL PRIE-GORDON Reval Tel. No. D.C. 11	Aug. 14	Reports formation of a North-West Russian Government; certain of the ministers have signed declaration recognizing Estonian independence and inviting H.M.G. and French and U.S. Governments to do likewise.	488

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
373	COLONEL PIRIE-GORDON Reval Tel. No. D.C. 14	Aug. 14	North-West Russian Government has decided to make its headquarters at Reval; recommends its immediate recognition on footing similar to that accorded to General Denikin.	489
374	TO MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 5339	Aug. 14	Transmits, with comments, two telegrams from British G.H.Q., Constantinople, to the War Office summarizing two notes from the Georgian Government requesting the retention of British troops in Georgia, and the return to Georgia of Batoum, which is offered as a British base and coaling-station.	490
375	SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 24	Aug. 14	Requests instructions about intentions as to High Commissioner; has informed Mr. Morris that it appeared that British assistance would be concentrated on General Denikin; U.S. dislike of spheres of influence; Mr. Morris supporting Admiral Kolchak to prevent Japanese obtaining exclusive rights.	492
376	SIR P. WYNDHAM Warsaw No. 125	Aug. 14	Transmits note from the Polish Government drawing attention to the serious state of affairs created for Poland by the Allied evacuation of North Russia.	493
377	MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 1622	Aug. 15	According to information in Paris no organized Ukrainian army exists; Peace Conference has given no encouragement to idea of an independent Ukrainian State; dispatch of a military mission to the Ukraine not likely to serve any useful purpose.	494
378	COLONEL PIRIE-GORDON Reval Tel. No. D.C. 20	Aug. 15	Requests that it be impressed on Russian Political Conference that North-West Russian Government formed as a result of Allied pressure, and transmits reasons.	495
379	COLONEL PIRIE-GORDON Reval Tel. No. D.C. 21	Aug. 16	Has provisionally consented to North-West Russian Government purchasing certain stores in Germany; if this disapproved asks that Government receive financial aid to enable orders to be transferred to British firms.	495
380	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 725	Aug. 16	Transmits message from Sir C. Eliot, Omsk, regarding reforms undertaken by Omsk Government; considers they are too late.	496
381	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 726	Aug. 16	Rumours of an impending movement at Vladivostok in favour of more democratic internal policy; Czechoslovak elements contemplating some similar action; transmits observations.	497
382	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 727	Aug. 16	Transmits extracts from dispatch of British Liaison Officer at Omsk and from memorandum from General Knox regarding unsatisfactory administration of Siberia.	497

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
383	GENERAL SIR H. GOUGH Helsingfors Tel. No. G. 174	Aug. 17	Informs British Peace Delegation that Russian North-West Army completely reorganized; essential for Allies to recognize Esthonian independence <i>de jure</i> and to continue supplying North-West Army.	498
384	TO MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1096	Aug. 18	Expresses surprise at formation of North-West Russian Government and proposes that British local representatives be told that they acted <i>ultra vires</i> and that H.M.G. cannot approve such decisions being taken without reference to it.	499
385	COLONEL PIRIE-GORDON Reval No. D.C. 132	Aug. 18	Transmits report, with annexed documents, on events leading up to formation of North-West Russian Government and on question of Esthonian military co-operation in return for recognition of her independence; reports action taken regarding North-West roubles and urges that H.M.G. should agree to victual the North-West Army and civil population.	500
386	TO MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 5486	Aug. 18	Suggests that Provisional Government of Lithuania be recognized <i>de facto</i> on Esthonian and Latvian precedents.	509
387	MR. CARR Paris Unnumbered	Aug. 18	Transmits to Mr. Gregory, Foreign Office, an extract from a letter from General Malcolm, Berlin, to Colonel Twiss, Paris, regarding situation in Russia and her relations with Germany.	510
388	TO MR. LINDSAY Washington No. 477	Aug. 18	Records conversation with American Ambassador regarding question as to whether the U.S. would accept a mandate for Armenia, and the proposed evacuation of British troops from the Caucasus.	511
389	SIR P. COX Teheran Tel. No. 563	Aug. 19	Reports dismay of Persian Government at proposed British evacuation of the Caucasus, and asks if it is not possible to maintain sufficient troops to keep communications open.	512
390	MR. GREGORY Foreign Office	Aug. 19	Note of a conversation with M. Nabokoff who called to protest against the formation of the North-West Russian Government under pressure from British representatives.	513
391	MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1285	Aug. 19	Refers to No. 384 and states that the American and French authorities appear to know even less than H.M.G. about the proceedings; suggests telegram be sent to Reval expressing surprise at action taken but adding that final judgement withheld pending fuller information.	514
392	TO SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 522	Aug. 20	Agrees with interpretation of views of H.M.G. and confirms that office of High Commissioner remains unchanged.	515

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
393	M. NABOKOFF London No. 905	Aug. 20	Letter to Mr. Gregory drawing attention to serious situation in Archangel due to decision to withdraw British forces, and proposing that General Rawlinson should arrive at an understanding with the local Russian authorities regarding the question of supplies.	515
394	SIR C. ELIOT Omsk Tel. No. 28	Aug. 21	Admiral Kolchak has ordered General Miller to remain at Archangel with his troops, though he may move to Murmansk before winter. Omsk Government ask that H.M.G. will supply General Miller and that in event of his moving to Murmansk that port may be retained by Great Britain. M.F.A. referred to reports of imminent collapse of Soviet Government, and stated that Admiral Kolchak had refused overtures suggesting a compromise.	516
395	TO COLONEL TALLENTS Reval Tel. No. 13	Aug. 21	Expresses surprise of H.M.G. at action taken regarding North-West Russian Government without their approval and states that they cannot assent to proposals which have been made.	517
396	TO COLONEL TALLENTS Reval Tel. No. 17	Aug. 21	Refers to No. 395 and enumerates proposals referred to.	517
397	ADMIRAL SIR A. CALTHORPE Constantinople Tel. No. 1695	Aug. 21	Reports conversation with Persian M.F.A. regarding British withdrawal from the Caucasus; M.F.A. foresaw communications would be interrupted and Caucasus would relapse into chaos, and suggested that if evacuation carried out, question of handing over a portion of Caspian fleet to Persia should be considered.	518
398	SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. No. 460	Aug. 21	Reports conversation with Chinese M.F.A. regarding situation in Siberia and apparent change in Allied policy; M.F.A. would be grateful for indication of policy of H.M.G. for guidance of Chinese Government.	519
399	TO MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 5556	Aug. 21	Reviews general position regarding Allied intervention in Russia and large contributions made by H.M.G.; purposes that an Allied Conference be held in Paris to co-ordinate policy.	519
400	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 969	Aug. 22	French Government does not object to establishment of a British staff at General Denikin's new military base to be erected in Crimea, but reserves its right to reinforce its representation with General Denikin and to establish French organisms to protect French interests.	527

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
401 To SIR P. WYNDHAM Warsaw Tel. No. 231	Aug. 22	Circular telegram concerning the formation of the North-West Russian Government; disclaims action taken by General Gough and Colonel Pirie-Gordon; matter is now subject of correspondence between F.O. and Peace Delegation, and meanwhile all action connected therewith must be suspended.	527
402 M. LITVINOV Moscow Tel. No. 12/1156	Aug. 24	Suggests that Soviet representatives to conference on exchange of prisoners be given a safe conduct for their passage on a Swedish steamer leaving Petrograd shortly for Stockholm.	528
403 SIR C. MARLING Copenhagen Tel. Unnumbered	Aug. 25	General Gough assures him that he no way pledged H.M.G. to recognize Esthonian independence or to give financial support to North-West Government, but on the contrary warned it that such support must not be expected. <i>Note 2.</i> Telegram of Aug. 30 from General Yudenitch protesting against interference of the British Military Mission and requesting supplies.	528
404 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Unnumbered	Aug. 25	Letter to Mr. Gregory describing relations with Allied, especially American, representatives on Inter-Allied Railway Committee; has differed from Sir C. Eliot, considering that he is too anxious to please the Omsk Government regardless of their real interests and of British position in eyes of the population.	529
405 MR. BALFOUR Paris Tel. No. 1306	Aug. 27	Expresses agreement with general policy suggested in No. 399; he will explain British view of situation to Supreme Council and considers it probable that it will accept Lord Curzon's substantive proposal.	530
406 MR. LINDSAY Washington Tel. No. 1310	Aug. 28	State Department do not consider that Murmansk Agreement involves American financial support of Archangel Government.	531
407 To MR. LINDSAY Washington No. 497	Aug. 29	Records conversation between American Ambassador and Sir R. Graham regarding the evacuation of the Caucasus; U.S. Government could do nothing in the matter but appealed to H.M.G. not to withdraw British forces at present as the result would be chaos; encloses note of Aug. 19 from Lord Curzon to the American Ambassador.	531
408 MR. ALSTON Tokyo No. 354	Aug. 29	Transmits, with comments, minutes of a meeting recently held at the Japanese F.O. to discuss the formation of a combined British, American, and Japanese Corporation for industrial operations in Siberia.	533

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
409	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 1	Aug. 30	Reports enthusiastic reception on arrival in Georgia.	535
410	TO SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. No. 392	Sept. 1	Refers to No. 398 and states that H.M.G. has not changed its policy of active opposition to Bolshevism.	536
411	MR. LAMBERT Murmansk Tel. No. 99	Sept. 3	Requests instructions, in view of imminent evacuation, as to disposal of remaining stores of British Supply Mission.	536
412	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 4	Sept. 4	Reports observations of M.F.A. regarding present situation in Georgia; Georgian Government appeal for support of Great Britain as she is unable to stand alone; renews objections made before leaving London to complete British evacuation of Transcaucasia.	537
413	TO SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. No. 400	Sept. 6	War Office propose that Japan be asked to dispatch troops to Siberian front and, to obtain Japanese consent, suggest that pressure be put on Chinese Government to agree to Japanese guarding Chinese Eastern Railway as a temporary measure: asks for observations on this proposal.	538
414	SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors No. 103	Sept. 8	Reports conversation with General Mannerheim regarding question of a Finnish advance on Petrograd: transmits observations on General Mannerheim's remarks.	539
415	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 773	Sept. 11	Transmits message from Mr. Hodgson, Omsk, setting forth points concerning the front against Petrograd, presented by M.F.A. for consideration of H.M.G.	540
416	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 772	Sept. 11	Reports arrival of Mr. Morris and records conversation with representatives of opposition movement.	541
417	TO SIR G. GRAHAME Paris Tel. No. 1077	Sept. 11	Message for transmission to M. Litvinov informing him that Danish Government agree conditionally to proposed meeting of British and Soviet representatives, to discuss question of repatriation of prisoners, taking place in Denmark; suggests route by which Soviet representatives should travel.	542
418	COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 101	Sept. 12	Reports on an Esthonian-Latvian conference at Riga; discusses Soviet overtures received by Esthonia and Latvia and transmits questions asked by Latvian Government.	543
419	GENERAL YUDENITCH Reval No. 5	Sept. 12	Letter to Mr. Balfour outlining position of the North-West Army and urging that H.M.G. take steps to assure neutrality of Esthonia and Latvia, and Finnish participation in an advance on Petrograd.	545
420	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 12	Sept. 12	Summarizes views of Armenian Prime Minister on situation in Armenia and Transcaucasia generally.	548

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
421 MR. GREGORY Foreign Office	Sept. 13	Letter to Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London informing him that whilst the War Cabinet has already decided against dispatching more supplies and against retaining Murmansk, General Rawlinson is in communication with General Miller as to leaving available supplies, and 6,000 tons of flour are being shipped to Murmansk. <i>Note 3.</i> Memorandum of Aug. 12 from M. Sazonov to Allied Powers regarding reconsideration of Allied evacuation of North Russia.	549
422 SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. No. 499	Sept. 13	Submits observations criticizing proposal in No. 413.	550
423 SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. No. 501	Sept. 14	Refers to No. 422 and transmits telegram from H.M. Consul, Harbin, containing his criticisms of the proposal.	551
424 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 775	Sept. 14	General Gaida has admitted that he is associated with opposition movement of whose success he is confident: submits views and opinions of various persons regarding opposition movement and Omsk Government.	552
425 COLONEL TALLENTS Reval Tel. No. 106	Sept. 15	Reports on conference of Baltic States at Reval and summarizes certain points agreed upon; conference to be resumed at Dorpat in about ten days and conferring parties anxious to know views of Entente, especially H.M.G.	553
426 TO BRITISH MISSION Riga Tel. No. 44	Sept. 16	Instructions to make representations to Latvian Government to effect that H.M.G. request that it will take no action towards peace with Soviet Russia and trust that it will continue to conduct its foreign policy only as part of a concerted Allied plan; H.M.G. would be happy to listen to any suggestions which the Latvian Government may have to offer, and to tender such advice as it can.	554
427 LORD KILMARNOCK Copenhagen Tel. No. 1512	Sept. 16	Transmits secret information seeming to indicate that Soviet authorities intend to take advantage of the proposed meeting of British and Soviet delegates in Denmark to further Soviet political designs.	555
428 MR. LAMBERT Murmansk Tel. No. 104	Sept. 16	Reports optimistic views of Vice-Governor as to future prospects; submits for serious attention Vice-Governor's request that a few British officers be allowed to remain for administrative services with Russian forces.	555
429 TO MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 14	Sept. 17	Armenians are appealing to H.M.G. for arms and equipment and express willingness to place their forces under British or Allied officers: asks for views.	556

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
430 SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. No. 507	Sept. 17	Sir C. Eliot has stated that he would not have approved of suggested occupation by Japanese of Chinese Eastern Railway; considers question is political and cannot be treated purely as military.	557
431 SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. Unnumbered	Sept. 17	Transmits telegram from Tokyo containing observations on above question.	557
432 TO MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 558	Sept. 18	Instructions to do nothing to weaken position of Admiral Kolchak or give any encouragement to Czechoslovak elements or other rivals.	558
433 COLONEL PIRIE-GORDON Reval Tel. No. 49	Sept. 18	Reports assurance from M.F.A. that Esthonian Cabinet has decided not to make peace with Soviet Russia without permission of Great Britain; Esthonian Government would be heartened to continue struggle by recognition; M. Poska asks advice as to formation of an alliance of Baltic States.	558
434 SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 471	Sept. 18	Finnish Government prepared to decide its policy in regard to Soviet Russia in accordance with wishes of H.M.G., but in absence of early guidance will assume British disinterestedness.	559
435 MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 20	Sept. 19	Reports on German activities in Georgia and urges that vigorous action on the part of H.M.G. can alone save the country from falling into German orbit; submits that recognition of Transcaucasian republics a matter of urgency.	560
436 M. CHICHERIN Moscow Tel. No. 12/1232	Sept. 19	Rejects Denmark as meeting-place for negotiations concerning prisoners and suggests alternatives; would be prepared to send M. Litvinov with small staff.	562
437 COLONEL PIRIE-GORDON Reval Tel. No. 56	Sept. 21	Transmits reply of Esthonian Government to request from H.M.G. that it should not enter into peace negotiations with Soviet Russia.	562
438 COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 131	Sept. 22	Transmits terms on which Latvian Government will continue to fight Soviet forces and asks for interim reply by evening of Sept. 26.	564
439 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 785	Sept. 22	Situation seems much improved, movement in Vladivostok having stimulated action at Omsk; views of Mr. Morris.	564
440 SIR J. JORDAN Peking No. 431	Sept. 22	Transmits dispatch from Acting British Consul-General at Mukden reporting on Ataman Semenov's recent visit to Mukden.	565
441 TO COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 59	Sept. 23	Instructions to inform Lithuanian Government that H.M.G. recognize it as a <i>de facto</i> independent body.	567

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
442 To SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 643	Sept. 24	Instructions to inform Finnish Government that H.M.G. welcomes its proposal to act only in accordance with British wishes and that for the present the policy of H.M.G. with regard to Russia remains unchanged.	567
443 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 786	Sept. 24	Reports conversation with diplomatic representative of Omsk Government; assured latter of conditional support but represented injurious effect of lawless activities of persons such as Ataman Kalmykov.	568
444 M. LITVINOV Moscow Tel. No. 12/2124	Sept. 25	Intends to take with him three wounded British prisoners of war and requests that necessary arrangements be made.	568
445 To MR. BOSANQUET Reval Tel. No. 157	Sept. 25	Circular telegram outlining British policy towards Baltic States; instructions to inform Esthonian Government accordingly.	569
446 To MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 21	Sept. 26	No present intention of making any change in the status of Batoum; for the present a British force will remain there.	571
447 M. SABLINE London No. 1033	Sept. 26	Letter to Mr. Gregory inquiring whether it would be possible to instruct General Rawlinson to retard the British evacuation of Archangel.	571
448 To MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 571	Sept. 27	Instruction from Lord Hardinge to bear in mind official warning sent in No. 432.	571
449 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 797	Sept. 27	Transmits message from Omsk describing general situation; position at front is still critical and internal situation unsatisfactory; financial and economic situation is desperate; increasing hostility to Allies.	572
450 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 798	Sept. 27	Transmits message from Omsk reporting hostility of U.S. General Graves and Mr. Morris towards Omsk Government.	573
451 VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1407	Oct. 2	Secretary of State concerned at serious situation at Vladivostok where General Rozanoff violently anti-Ally except towards Japanese; attitude of Japanese considered very unsatisfactory by Secretary of State.	574
452 To MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 28	Oct. 2	Instructions to do everything possible to prevent Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments from taking any unfriendly action against General Denikin or encouraging such action in Daghestan.	574
453 MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 50	Oct. 2	Reports observations of Azerbaijan M.F.A. regarding (1) refusal of Azerbaijan Government to help Daghestan, (2) Soviet anti-British propaganda, and (3) desire of M.F.A. to attract British experts to Azerbaijan.	575

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
453 <i>Continued</i>	Oct. 2	<i>Note 1.</i> Tiflis telegram No. 49 of Oct. 2 reporting conversation with Azerbaijan Prime Minister.	575
454 MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 57	Oct. 4	Transmits observations on No. 452 and reports action taken.	576
455 TO MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 29	Oct. 4	Refers to suggestion made in No. 435 for recognition of Transcaucasian Republics and explains difficulties; asks for views on points raised.	577
456 MR. HOARE Murmansk Tel. No. 119	Oct. 4	Supports General Rawlinson's recommendation that H.M.S. <i>Erebus</i> should remain for next few weeks at Murmansk where spirit is better than at Archangel.	578
457 MR. HOARE Murmansk Tel. Unnumbered	Oct. 4	Most critical period will be first month after evacuation; suggests that if H.M.S. <i>Erebus</i> allowed to remain he should stay on board.	579
458 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 814	Oct. 4	Submits propositions as to desirability of strengthening Admiral Kolchak's Government by reform. <i>Note 1.</i> Vladivostok telegram of Oct. 1 transmitting report by Mr. Preston on movement in opposition to Omsk Government.	580 580
459 MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 60	Oct. 5	German Government has offered to Georgian Government free education in Germany for 300 young men for two years: desirability of similar British action.	583
460 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople No. 1842	Oct. 8	Transmits extract from a report by Major Torin on his visit to Taganrog: comments on poor organization of the Volunteer Army and on political aspirations of General Denikin.	583
461 MR. RATTIGAN Bucharest No. 169	Oct. 8	Reports representations made to Rumanian Prime Minister, at the request of the Russian Minister, regarding the danger of adopting a hostile policy towards General Denikin.	585
462 SIR R. RODD Rome No. 440	Oct. 8	Transmits translation of a <i>note-verbale</i> from the Italian Government to the effect that it is unable to participate in financial assistance to the Government at Archangel.	586
463 SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 528	Oct. 9	Reports proposal of General Marsh to dissolve North-West Russian Government immediately; has strongly urged that no action be taken without reference to H.M.G.	587
464 MR. JERRAM Novorossisk No. 56	Oct. 9	Calls attention to the gross corruption of government, especially customs, officials in South Russia.	587

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
465 To MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 591	Oct. 10	Transmits message for Mr. Hodgson, Omsk, referring to attitude of U.S. Government towards Admiral Kolchak and instructing Mr. Hodgson to do anything he can by discreet advice to help Admiral Kolchak to remedy matters.	588
466 To VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1847	Oct. 10	Instructions to draw attention of U.S. Government to serious situation which will arise in Siberia if it withholds supplies from Admiral Kolchak.	589
467 VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1441	Oct. 10	Reports anxiety of U.S. Government regarding reports that Cossacks might, under Japanese instigation, attack American soldiers in Eastern Siberia: reports action contemplated by U.S. Government and submits inquiry from Secretary of State as to whether H.M.G. would send a naval force to join American force at Vladivostok.	589
468 M. KOPWILLEM London No. 5487	Oct. 10	Note to Lord Hardinge transmitting a telegram from the Esthonian Government expressing gratitude for the support afforded it by the British Government in consequence of which latter has right to voice its wishes concerning Esthonian affairs.	590
469 MR. SELBY Foreign Office	Oct. 11	Minute regarding matters concerning Allied policy in Russia referred to the Peace Conference and respecting which little progress has been made; enumerates decisions taken by H.M.G. independently and records that an Allied conference is still regarded as desirable.	591
470 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 837	Oct. 11	Transmits message of Oct. 9 from Omsk to effect that Government is agitated regarding incursion by Ataman Semenov into zone of Chinese Eastern Railway, and has decided to order him to withdraw immediately.	592
471 To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 1151	Oct. 11	Message for transmission to M. Chicherin informing him that Danish Government will modify previous conditions and hoping that the Soviet Government will accordingly withdraw objection to Denmark as a venue for the proposed conference.	593
472 MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 70	Oct. 12	Transmits substance of proclamation circulated through Transcaucasia by Soviet Government denouncing British intervention and calling upon population to resist General Denikin and establish friendly relations with Soviet Government.	594
473 MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 78	Oct. 14	Georgian Cabinet has decided that Great Britain be requested to accept mandate.	595

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474	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 77	Oct. 14	Transmits information regarding concessions being offered by Georgian Government to Italy.	595
475	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 846	Oct. 15	Represents that support of Admiral Kolchak should not be unconditional.	596
476	TO M. SABLINE London	Oct. 15	Letter from Mr. Gregory to the effect that War Office state it would be impossible to make any alterations in arrangements for the Allied evacuation of North Russia.	596
477	M. CHICHERIN Moscow Tel. No. 12/933	Oct. 16	Agrees to Denmark as venue for conference and transmits particulars of M. Litvinov's mission.	597
478	TO MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 603	Oct. 17	Instructions to abstain from any further contact with the opponents of Admiral Kolchak at Vladivostok.	597
479	TO MR. ALSTON Tokyo Tel. No. 446	Oct. 17	Instructions to contradict press report in Japan suggesting that attitude of H.M.G. towards Admiral Kolchak might change.	598
480	TO MR. GOSLING Prague Tel. No. 168	Oct. 18	Instructions to approach Czechoslovak Government and express hope that it will instruct its representatives in Siberia to abstain from any action against Admiral Kolchak.	598
481	MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 855	Oct. 19	Transmits Omsk telegram of Oct. 14 commenting on proposals in No. 458.	598
482	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 84	Oct. 19	Reports on journey through Armenia.	600
483	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 81	Oct. 20	Submits views on points raised in No. 455 regarding suggested recognition of Transcaucasian Republics.	601
484	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 85	Oct. 20	Reports observations of M.F.A. and M. Ghambashidze regarding Georgian anxiety at the continued silence of the Allies, especially Great Britain, on the subject of the future fate of Transcaucasia.	603
485	COLONEL TALLENTS Reval Tel. No. 68	Oct. 20	Allied refusal to acknowledge <i>de jure</i> independence of Baltic States is having a disastrous effect in preventing their economic reconstruction and driving them into bankruptcy; submits views as to how needs of situation could be met.	604
486	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 371	Oct. 20	Reports observations of Acting M.F.A. suggesting need for close co-operation between the Polish Government and H.M.G. in the affairs of Russia.	605
487	TO SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7119	Oct. 20	Transmits a letter from M. Sabline on the subject of replacing the Czechoslovak forces which are about to be evacuated from Siberia.	606

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488 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 857	Oct. 20	Transmits message from Omsk reporting despondency of M.F.A. regarding Japanese refusal to send troops to guard railway, American attitude, and transfer of British effort to General Denikin.	607
489 MR. GOSLING Prague Tel. No. 201	Oct. 20	Reports denial by President that leaders of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia are working for overthrow of Kolchak Government; he will, however, repeat instructions to abstain from action against Admiral Kolchak.	607
490 To MR. ALSTON Tokyo Tel. No. 450	Oct. 20	Transmits substance of No. 467 and asks for observations.	608
491 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 865	Oct. 22	Transmits text of telegram to Omsk containing observations on General Knox's policy.	608
492 ADMIRAL SIR J. DE ROBECK Constantinople Tel. No. 1991	Oct. 22	There are clear proofs that Italians are being used as agents by German financial interests in Constantinople, South Russia, and Caucasus.	610
493 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1473	Oct. 22	Considers that as situation with regard to North-West Army has entirely changed it does not seem opportune to discuss their possible transfer to another theatre of war at the moment.	610
494 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 866	Oct. 23	Transmits telegram from Omsk giving reasons why Kolchak Government should be supported.	611
495 SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 393	Oct. 24	Discusses Polish apprehensions regarding régime which may succeed Soviet administration in event of latter being overthrown; Polish relations with General Denikin.	611
496 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 877	Oct. 26	Justifies action taken regarding opposition movement; reports his departure on Oct. 31 and recommends that Mr. Hodgson be made High Commissioner.	613
497 MR. O'REILLY Vladivostok Tel. No. 878	Oct. 27	Refers to No. 496 and transmits information concerning extent to which opposition movement has been restrained.	614
498 MR. ALSTON Tokyo Tel. No. 421	Oct. 27	Considers that nothing can effectually control Japanese penetration of China except a decision by other members of League of Nations upon a policy of rehabilitation of China; difficulties of taking action against local Russian commanders until Kolchak Government is recognized.	614
499 To SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7242	Oct. 27	Transmits letter from War Office relating to the difficulties encountered by General Denikin in the Ukraine and in Daghestan; sends instructions as to action to be taken.	615

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500	SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 594	Oct. 27	Reports conversation with the M.F.A. regarding French policy towards military operations by Finland against Petrograd.	617
501	SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 596	Oct. 27	Is impressed by dangers and difficulties of possible Finnish intervention in Russia.	618
502	M. SABLINE London No. 1197	Oct. 28	Transmits reply of Admiral Kolchak to General Knox regarding suggestions by the War Office concerning the policy to be adopted towards the Baltic States.	619
503	MR. LOWDON Odessa Tel. No. 28	Oct. 29	Reports pogrom of Jews in Kiev by Volunteer Army after retaking city.	620
504	M. SABLINE London	Oct. 29	Memorandum embodying a telegram from M. Sazonov in Paris stating that General Yudenitch has requested immediate Finnish help; if it is forthcoming the Omsk Government will be ready to recognize Finnish independence; asks that H.M.G. support action with which French Government agrees.	620
505	TO VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 1965	Oct. 30	Admiralty state that only one light cruiser will be available for service at Vladivostok and that H.M.S. <i>Carlisle</i> is there at present.	621
506	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 412	Oct. 30	Reports conversation with M. Paderewski regarding socialist opposition in connexion with Polish-Soviet hostilities and Soviet peace offers; stresses need for providing Polish troops with warm clothing.	621
507	SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 2059	Oct. 31	Transmits views regarding proposal that Allied Governments should guarantee the recognition by a future Russian Government of concessions granted by the Governments of the Baltic States.	622
508	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 111	Nov. 1	Reports conversation with Georgian Prime Minister regarding Georgia's relations with General Denikin, question of Zangezur, and refusal by H.M.G., according to Prime Minister, of mandate for Georgia.	623
509	ITALIAN AMBASSADOR London	Nov. 3	Memorandum asking for views of H.M.G. respecting the question of the recognition of Georgia.	624
510	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome No. 243	Nov. 3	Reports conversation of Commercial Counsellor with Signor Bissolati on the subject of the Georgian Mission which had come to ask for recognition of their Government and to develop economic relations with Italy.	625
511	MR. LOWDON Odessa Tel. No. 36	Nov. 3	Reports on political situation at Odessa: considers it not serious but trouble possible should Volunteer Army suffer serious setback.	626

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512	MR. O'BRIEN-BUTLER Vladivostok Tel. No. 894	Nov. 3	Transmits telegram from Omsk stating that Siberian Army retreating along whole front, and that internal situation remains bad.	627
513	MR. O'BRIEN-BUTLER Vladivostok Tel. No. 893	Nov. 3	Transmits telegram from Omsk of Oct. 29: Council of Ministers has decided to begin immediately evacuation of Government Departments to Irkutsk; Government itself will remain in Omsk as long as possible; M.F.A. very gloomy.	627
514	SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 629	Nov. 3	Transmits summary of telegram of Oct. 8 from Mr. Gibson, Petrograd, to Mr. Dukes, appealing to F.O. to exert every means to obtain release of British subjects in Soviet Russia and reporting on serious position of those at Petrograd.	628
515	M. SAZONOV Paris	Nov. 3	Note to the Allied Powers asking that part of Russian gold delivered to them by Germany should be used to subsidize a Finnish advance on Petrograd.	629
516	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 378	Nov. 3	Hears that the Soviet Red Cross Commissioner negotiating an exchange of prisoners with Poland has made very attractive peace offers to Polish authorities.	630
517	SIR P. COX Teheran Tel. No. 717	Nov. 4	Persian Government contemplate sending a confidential agent to Baku and Tiflis to ascertain attitude of Caucasian principalities towards Persia: asks for information on points connected therewith.	631
518	FRENCH EMBASSY London	Nov. 4	Asks for views of H.M.G. regarding Batoum.	631
519	MR. RATTIGAN Bucharest Tel. No. 494	Nov. 5	General Denikin has authorized Russian Minister to assure Rumanian Government of his wish to establish friendliest relations with Rumania.	631
520	SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 634	Nov. 5	Clandestine recruiting of volunteers for action in Russia continues; suggests that Finnish Government be warned that H.M.G. could not look favourably on such schemes; German intrigue appears to be at the back of the schemes.	632
521	SIR C. KENNARD Helsingfors Tel. No. 636	Nov. 7	Reports visit of M. Boije af Gennas who came to apply to H.M.G. for supply of equipment for 40,000 men for an expedition against Petrograd; M. Boije af Gennas was told his application could not be put forward unless submitted through Finnish Government.	632
522	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 432	Nov. 7	Reports interview with General Pilsudski who had noticed certain British obstruction in matters affecting Poland: General gave his views about Russia and stated that it would be useful to know likely policy of H.M.G.; internal position of Poland discouraging at the moment.	633

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523	MR. O'BRIEN-BUTLER Vladivostok Tel. No. 904	Nov. 7	Transmits telegram from Omsk of Oct. 31: cargo by Kara Sea expedition has arrived safely in Tomsk and Novo Nikolaievsk; suggests a rich opportunity for a British shipping company to organize a permanent service, probably forming an Anglo-Russian company.	636
524	SIR G. BUCHANAN Rome No. 481	Nov. 8	Reports visit of Head of Georgian Mission lately arrived in Rome. M. Sabakhtarishvili expressed his Government's desire to establish closer contact with European Powers, especially Great Britain. Count Sforza denied Italian Government was selling arms to Georgia.	637
525	M. KOPWILLEM London No. 6636	Nov. 10	Letter to Mr. Gregory transmitting a telegram from Esthonian Government inquiring as to the attitude of H.M.G. in questions relating to a possible conclusion of peace between Esthonia and Soviet Russia.	638
526	TO VISCOUNT GREY Washington Tel. No. 2018	Nov. 10	States that War Office are anxious to know whether U.S. have taken over the obligations in Siberia hitherto borne by H.M.G., and to receive a statement of U.S. policy with regard to furnishing assistance to Admiral Kolchak.	638
527	TO SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7445	Nov. 10	Proposes to reply to a Russian request for recognition of Admiral Kolchak's Government on economic grounds that H.M.G. unable to afford recognition at present, but before sending this reply to M. Sabline would be glad to know what answer the French Government intend to return.	639
528	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 910	Nov. 10	Reports resolution by Vladivostok Bourse Committee opposing project to form a separate government in Far East: trend of opinion is apparently that Admiral Kolchak's Government has been shaken and that there may be a movement by the social revolutionaries.	639
529	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 914	Nov. 11	Japanese representative has denied report that Japan was behind rumoured intention of General Rozanoff to declare independence of Far East; a junior officer of the Japanese General Staff had been indiscreet.	640
530	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 916	Nov. 11	General Rozanoff denies that he entertained any intention of creating independent state in the Far East.	640
531	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 915	Nov. 11	Transmits telegram of Nov. 8 from Mr. Hodgson, Omsk; is leaving for Irkutsk; summarizes position.	641
532	MR. LOWDON Odessa Tel. No. 46	Nov. 11	Reports arrangement between Galician authorities and Volunteer Army.	642

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533	M. CHICHERIN Moscow Tel. No. 11/1355	Nov. 12	M. Litvinov and staff intend crossing the front line on Nov. 17 if advised in time that the necessary instructions have been given to the Esthonian local military command.	642
534	To MR. PORTER Reval Tel. No. 203	Nov. 13	Transmits message for M. Chicherin, Moscow, acknowledging No. 533 and stating that necessary arrangements will be made.	642
535	To MR. O'GRADY	Nov. 13	Letter of appointment to Mr. O'Grady as chief of the British Delegation proceeding to Denmark to negotiate an exchange of prisoners with the Soviet Government; transmits instructions as to procedure to be adopted.	643
536	SIR G. GRAHAME Paris No. 1101	Nov. 13	Reports that French Government will return same answer as H.M.G. propose to the Russian request for the recognition of Admiral Kolchak's Government.	644
537	MR. PORTER Reval Tel. No. 359	Nov. 14	Transmits message from M. Chicherin, Moscow: Soviet Delegation will be able to cross the front line early on Nov. 16.	645
538	MR. PORTER Reval Tel. No. 360	Nov. 14	Learns from M.F.A. that M. Litvinov intends to proceed to Dorpat in connexion with an exchange of Esthonian hostages: question of whether he should not proceed direct to Reval.	645
539	M. CHICHERIN Moscow Tel. Wireless	Nov. 14	M. Litvinov and staff have left Moscow for the frontier: a clerk will remain at Dorpat while the others will proceed to Denmark.	646
540	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 927	Nov. 14	Vice-Consul at Irkutsk sends disquieting reports as to exasperation of population at soaring prices and unpopularity of Admiral Kolchak's Government: talk of imminent opposition coup gains credence.	646
541	To MARQUIS IMPERIALI London	Nov. 14	Note stating that the question of the recognition of Georgia is involved with that of the other Transcaucasian Republics and the whole Russian question, which is receiving the careful attention of H.M.G.	647
542	To SIR P. COX Teheran Tel. No. 606	Nov. 14	Refers to No. 517 and states that the answer is in the negative as regards resumption of British military control over Batoum-Baku route: other questions cannot at present be answered; Mr. Mackinder has been appointed British High Commissioner with General Denikin and on his arrival it is hoped that it may be possible to come to some general arrangement with regard to Transcaucasia.	647
543	SIR E. CROWE Paris Unnumbered	Nov. 15	Letter to Lord Hardinge referring to No. 499 and suggesting that as Supreme Council has not recently treated Russian questions and is shortly terminating it would be better to leave question to other channels dealing with the whole Russian problem.	647

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544	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 137A	Nov. 16	Transmits suggestions as to how situation might be improved in Azerbaijan and Daghestan; reports indicate that direct British offensive would evict Soviets from Central Asia.	649
545	COLONEL TALLENTS Dorpat Tel. No. 1	Nov. 17	Reports on M. Litvinov's discussions at Dorpat with representatives of Baltic States; the three English prisoners brought by M. Litvinov report British prisoners in Moscow urgently need supplies.	649
546	MR. ALSTON Tokyo Tel. No. 449	Nov. 17	<i>Ji Ji</i> newspaper reports abandonment of Omsk has upset plans of Japanese Government for relief of Russia and preservation of peace and security of Far East; Commander-in-Chief has recommended dispatch of reinforcements to Siberia.	650
547	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 938	Nov. 17	Reports that General Gaida has effected a <i>coup d'état</i> and a proclamation has appeared calling for the overthrow of Admiral Kolchak, cessation of civil war, and opening of peace negotiations with Soviets; summarizes situation.	650
548	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 942	Nov. 18	Reports collapse of <i>coup d'état</i> and capture of General Gaida who has been handed over to Czech authorities by General Rozanoff; persistent rumours of trouble at Irkutsk, Omsk, Chita, and Nikolsk.	651
549	TO MR. LINDLEY Vienna Tel. No. 7	Nov. 18	Asks for views as to whether H.M.G. should on political grounds save the North Russian Conversion Office from bankruptcy.	652
550	COLONEL TALLENTS Dorpat Tel. No. 3	Nov. 19	M. Litvinov said to have offered to recognize independence of Baltic States, Soviet withdrawal from Latgalen, and reparation for damage done by Soviet forces.	652
551	MR. LINDLEY Vienna Tel. No. 16	Nov. 20	Replies affirmatively to No. 549 and transmits views.	653
552	MR. RUSSELL Berne Tel. No. 1328	Nov. 20	Has received information that when British and French decisions respecting the cessation of active support to the powers of order in Russia became known in Berlin, General Ludendorf informed supporters ground was now clear for German influence in Russia and that before very long German Empire would be more powerful than ever.	654
553	TO SIR E. CROWE Paris No. 7593	Nov. 21	Considers that question of the recognition by a future Russian Government of concessions granted by Governments of the Baltic States is suitable for discussion at forthcoming international conference on Russia.	654
554	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 952	Nov. 21	Submits appreciation of situation in Siberia; regards militant anti-Bolshevism there as at an end and present Omsk Government as moribund.	654

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555	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1649	Nov. 23	Reports information received to the effect that while Soviet Government realizes that Copenhagen Conference has been arranged by H.M.G. solely for reasons affecting British prisoners it nevertheless regards meeting as a feeler put forward by H.M.G. with a view to sounding public opinion on question of peace with Soviet Russia.	656
556	M. KOPWILLEM London No. 7036	Nov. 24	Letter to Mr. Gregory transmitting telegram announcing that Esthonian Government is compelled to accept Soviet offer to open peace negotiations, which will begin on Dec. 1; agreement has been reached for exchange of prisoners between Soviet Russia and Baltic States.	656
557	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 956	Nov. 24	Transmits telegram of Nov. 22 from Mr. Hodgson, Chita; Omsk occupied by Soviets on Nov. 15; summarizes political situation; Admiral Kolchak to come to Irkutsk as soon as situation at front permits.	657
558	MR. LOWDON Odessa Tel. No. 59	Nov. 25	Reports general retreat of the Volunteer Army; Kursk captured by Red Army and Kiev may fall at any moment.	657
559	COMMANDER SMYTHIES Reval No. 15	Nov. 25	Reports that Russian North-West Army as a separate body may be said to have ceased to exist and transmits details regarding its disposal; reports arrival of M. Litvinov and staff and records conversation with him.	658
560	TO M. KOPWILLEM London	Nov. 25	Letter from Mr. Gregory conveying reserved attitude of H.M.G. in regard to questions raised in No. 525.	660
561	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1520	Nov. 25	Message for Mr. O'Grady suggesting it might be desirable to force the pace of the negotiations with M. Litvinov and to endeavour to reach preliminary agreement on main principles at the earliest.	660
562	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1653	Nov. 25	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady reporting arrival of M. Litvinov.	661
563	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1657	Nov. 25	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady: M. Litvinov states that all service prisoners are now in Moscow and mainly in good health; he has promised to ask Moscow and Petrograd for names of British civilian residents and state of their health.	661
564	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 158	Nov. 25	Reports conversation with Azerbaijan Prime Minister regarding Azerbaijan-Armenian agreement, and celebration thereof; Italian Government had offered Azerbaijan munitions.	661

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
565	To M. DE FLEURIAU London	Nov. 26	Note from Sir J. Tilley stating that the withdrawal of the British troops from Batoum has been temporarily postponed owing to disorders certain to follow upon immediate evacuation: status of Batoum after evacuation would no doubt be determined by Peace Conference.	663
566	To MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1524	Nov. 26	Message for Mr. O'Grady concerning report by French Ambassador of a conversation between French Minister in Copenhagen, Mr. Grant Watson, and himself regarding certain questions likely to be raised by M. Litvinov in addition to that of prisoners; emphasizes necessity of confining mission to its specific object.	663
567	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. Unnumbered	Nov. 26	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady agreeing with views in No. 561 but stating that it is impossible to expedite negotiations without credentials, which are urgently requested.	664
568	To MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1526	Nov. 27	Message for Mr. O'Grady informing him that letter of appointment has been dispatched.	665
569	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1665	Nov. 27	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady referring to No. 566 and expressing astonishment that such a garbled version of his conversation should have been supplied by French Minister in Copenhagen; Mr. O'Grady will persistently adhere to his instructions.	665
570	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1669	Nov. 27	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady inquiring whether there are any Russian subjects in prison in England for political or war offences and, if so, presumes there will be no objection to releasing and repatriating them.	666
571	LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 692	Nov. 27	Transmits information from M.F.A. regarding decisions adopted at secret meeting at Helsingfors under Russian General Masolow concerning White Russian organization in Baltic Provinces.	666
572	MR. ALSTON Tokyo Tel. No. 466	Nov. 27	Transmits message from Military Attaché conveying private opinion of Japanese Minister of War regarding Russian situation; he requests views of British Imperial General Staff.	666
573	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1671	Nov. 28	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady setting forth proposals of M. Litvinov regarding exchange of prisoners and his own alternative proposals; Mr. O'Grady inquires whether H.M.G. is prepared to accept whole or any part of M. Litvinov's proposals as a basis for negotiation.	668

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
574 MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1675	Nov. 29	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady regarding question of sending supplies of warm clothing to British prisoners and civilians in Russia: M. Litvinov would agree if he is permitted to send drugs; difficulties of sending food.	670
575 MR. O'GRADY Copenhagen Unnumbered	Nov. 29	M. Litvinov is empowered to enter into peace negotiations; transmits copies of his letters of authority.	670
576 TO MR. MACKINDER	Nov.	Letter of appointment to Mr. Mackinder as British High Commissioner for South Russia; describes present situation and policy of H.M.G. with regard to General Denikin.	672
577 TO MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 108	Dec. 1	Instructions to inform Azerbaijan Government that so far as H.M.G. is concerned its case will receive sympathetic treatment; no British forces are available for offensive suggested in No. 544.	678
578 MR. STEVENS Batoum No. 75	Dec. 1	Reports on oil situation in Caucasus and submits that the required additional rolling stock for railways should be promptly supplied by Great Britain.	678
579 MR. ALSTON Tokyo No. 503	Dec. 1	Transmits report by Military Attaché of a conversation with the Japanese Minister for War concerning the possibility of an alliance between Japan, Russia, and Germany, which is discounted by him.	680
580 TO MR. MACKINDER	Dec. 2	Supplements instructions in No. 576.	681
581 TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1539	Dec. 2	Message for Mr. O'Grady approving his alternative proposals communicated in No. 573; instructions to refuse to admit that the exchange of British subjects for Russian can be made dependent upon any arrangement for the release of Russians from outside British jurisdiction.	682
582 MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1690	Dec. 2	Message from Mr. O'Grady: M. Litvinov states that Soviet Government desires to reach understanding with Baltic States and that H.M.G. is chief obstacle preventing them from making peace; asks whether he should deny this.	682
583 MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1692	Dec. 3	Reports conversation of Mr. O'Grady with M. Litvinov regarding peace proposals given to Mr. Bullitt; M. Litvinov now proposes to submit proposals to H.M.G. through H.M. Legation.	683
584 MR. ALSTON Tokyo Tel. No. 475	Dec. 3	Transmits information received by Military Attaché regarding Japanese reinforcements for Siberia.	683
585 MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 978	Dec. 3	Transmits message of Nov. 30 from Chita regarding project that all Siberia east of Lake Baikal plus Russian concessions in Manchuria should become a province under the military dictatorship of Ataman Semenov.	684

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
586	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 980	Dec. 4	Gives views on Ataman Semenov and his position.	684
587	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 981	Dec. 4	Reports attitude adopted towards proposals of a British subject to supply Ataman Semenov with military and civilian equipment; gives opinion as to Ataman Semenov's aims.	685
588	MR. LAMPSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 987	Dec. 4	New M.F.A. has inquired whether H.M.G. has decided to change its attitude towards Soviet Government and consider question of entering into relations with it; asks for views of H.M.G.	686
589	MR. GREGORY Foreign Office	Dec. 5	Note of conversation with Mr. Butler Wright of American Embassy regarding question of continued support of Admiral Kolchak.	687
590	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1549	Dec. 6	Instructions to decline to receive any peace proposals from M. Litvinov.	687
591	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1551	Dec. 6	Transmits instructions for Mr. O'Grady to abstain from any discussion of political questions of nature referred to in No. 582.	688
592	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1707	Dec. 6	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady reporting on discussions with M. Litvinov and outlining further proposals received from him.	688
593	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1556	Dec. 8	Message for Mr. O'Grady informing him that M. Litvinov may be allowed to send a certain quantity of drugs on condition that clothing may be sent to British prisoners and civilians in Russia.	689
594	MR. LOWDON Odessa Tel. No. 73	Dec. 8	Press comment suggests Mr. Mackinder's appointment is organized British intervention; suggests a statement defining Mr. Mackinder's position.	690
595	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1560	Dec. 9	Message for Mr. O'Grady informing him that there are fewer than 25 Russians in prison for political or war offences; they would be allowed to return to Russia if they desire.	690
596	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1559	Dec. 9	Message for Mr. O'Grady instructing him to inquire from M. Litvinov about Mr. Gibson and the British old women's home in Petrograd.	691
597	REV. NORTH Moscow Tel. No. 1144	Dec. 9	Over 400 British subjects in Moscow and district anxiously desire to leave Russia owing to great privations; asks exchange be expedited.	691
598	SIR C. MARLING Copenhagen Tel. No. 1724	Dec. 10	Reports receipt of letter from M. Litvinov to Allied Legations regarding Soviet peace proposals; letters are being returned to M. Litvinov with statement that recipients are not authorized to receive communications from him.	691

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
599	MR. O'GRADY Copenhagen Unnumbered	Dec. 10	Letter to Mr. Gregory transmitting extract from letter from M. Litvinov regarding Soviet peace proposals and copy of peace resolution adopted by the 7th All-Russian Congress of Soviets.	692
600	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 195	Dec. 10	Azerbaijan Prime Minister reports proposal of Persian Prince Mirza Riza Khan for confederation of Azerbaijan with Persia; Azerbaijan Prime Minister asks whether H.M.G. supported proposal.	693
601	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1564	Dec. 11	Message for Mr. O'Grady authorizing him to deny allegation regarding H.M.G. in No. 582.	694
602	LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 734	Dec. 11	M.F.A. has heard from Esthonian Minister of War that 15 Soviet divisions now concentrated against three Esthonian divisions and that German officers are directing the Soviet forces in this region.	694
603	TO LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 729	Dec. 12	Refers to Nos. 520 and 521 and approves Sir C. Kennard's action; non-committal attitude should be adopted towards question of the volunteer movement in Finland.	695
604	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1566	Dec. 13	Message for Mr. O'Grady: M. Litvinov's proposals are considered wholly unreasonable; time has come to let M. Litvinov know that unless he modifies them negotiations will be broken off.	695
605	LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 751	Dec. 14	Suggests for consideration whether it might not be desirable for Finland to recognize <i>de facto</i> Soviet Government and for blockade of Soviet Russia to be raised.	696
606	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1567	Dec. 15	Approves action taken as reported in No. 598.	697
607	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1746	Dec. 18	Message from Mr. O'Grady stating that M. Litvinov has broken off negotiations and about to issue press communiqué to which Mr. O'Grady will, if necessary, briefly reply.	697
608	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1584	Dec. 19	Message for Mr. O'Grady concerning statement reported to have been made by M. Litvinov to Reuter's correspondent regarding Soviet minimum demands which, if accurate, might afford a basis for discussion; enumerates further concessions which H.M.G. might consider.	697
609	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1585	Dec. 19	Instructions to inform Danish Government that it may still be possible for Mr. O'Grady to resume negotiations with M. Litvinov, and that H.M.G. trusts that he will not be removed from Denmark until further negotiations are out of the question.	698

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610 To COLONEL TALLENTS Riga Tel. No. 167	Dec. 19	Instructions to use his influence, to extent he considers desirable, to prolong Soviet-Esthonian negotiations without, however, exerting pressure on Esthonian free judgement; Admiralty is being asked to send ships to Reval. <i>Note 2.</i> Helsingfors telegram No. 781 of Dec. 21 reporting conversation between Lord Acton and Esthonian Minister.	699 699
611 MR. O'BRIEN-BUTLER Vladivostok Tel. No. 1005	Dec. 19	Transmits telegram of Dec. 17 from Mr. Lampson, Irkutsk: M.F.A. takes very gloomy view of situation which he regards as becoming hourly more threatening in view of delayed arrival of Admiral Kolchak and M. Pepelaiev; M.F.A. regards as essential dispatch of 2,000 Japanese troops to Irkutsk and economic assistance; American Consul-General assured by his Government that it intends to continue to support Admiral Kolchak.	699
612 MR. O'BRIEN-BUTLER Vladivostok Tel. No. 1006	Dec. 19	Transmits message from Irkutsk: Japanese Ambassador at request of M.F.A. has suggested to Japanese Government the dispatch of two or three Japanese battalions to Irkutsk from Chita.	700
613 FOREIGN OFFICE	Dec.	Memorandum on political, military, and economic developments in Siberia and on Allied intervention there. <i>Note 1.</i> Extract from F.O. memorandum of Dec. 24 on Transcaucasia. <i>Note 27.</i> Correspondence concerning reported economic concessions to Japan granted by Ataman Semenov.	700 700 729
614 MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 1756	Dec. 20	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady acknowledging No. 608 and commenting on proposals; M. Litvinov has agreed to resume negotiations.	732
615 To MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 141	Dec. 20	Transmits précis of political desires of Azerbaijan Delegation at Paris aiming at eventual union of Azerbaijan with Persia, as received from Persian M.F.A.; asks whether movement has any strong local support and whether the initiative really came from Azerbaijan Delegation in Paris.	733
616 MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 217	Dec. 21	Azerbaijan Prime Minister has asked Persian Commission whether it would be possible for Colonel Stokes at Baku to be present at negotiations there between Persia and Azerbaijan; suggests that if Colonel Stokes should receive an invitation to be present he should decline.	734
617 MR. ALSTON Tokyo Tel. No. 508	Dec. 21	According to French Ambassador Japanese M.F.A. has received a telegram from Japanese Ambassador at Irkutsk stating that unless 2,000 Japanese troops sent	734

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
617 <i>Continued</i>	Dec. 21	there the town will fall to the Soviets; Japanese Government prepared to send troops if approved by U.S. Government, which it is consulting.	
618 To MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 142	Dec. 22	Instructions to endeavour, in conjunction with General Holman, to bring about a settlement between Georgia and the Volunteer Army; transmits conditions which should afford a fair basis for settlement.	735
619 MR. HOARE Foreign Office	Dec. 22	Memorandum on situation in Russia and the necessity for a definite policy towards that country.	735
620 M. LITVINOV Copenhagen	Dec. 22	Letter to Mr. O'Grady concerning questions affecting the possible establishment of peace between Great Britain and Soviet Russia.	738
621 MR. RATTIGAN Bucharest No. 233	Dec. 24	Reports arrival of Mr. Mackinder and conversation between him and M. Vaida-Voevod at which Mr. Mackinder outlined policy of H.M.G. in regard to the Russian question.	740
622 MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 237	Dec. 27	Repeats telegram reporting anxiety felt at situation in Transcaspia and its bearing on Transcaucasus; Soviet activities with regard to Persia.	741
623 MR. LEGGETT Vladivostok Tel. No. 1020	Dec. 28	Transmits telegram from Irkutsk reporting socialist revolution has occurred and revolutionary troops hold station: gold to be sent to Vladivostok under Czech escort: departure of foreign representatives from Irkutsk likely not to be long delayed.	742
624 MR. LEGGETT Vladivostok Tel. No. 1022	Dec. 29	Transmits telegram from Irkutsk reporting upon the revolutionary situation there.	743
625 MR. LOWDON Odessa Tel. No. 90	Dec. 29	Panic continues but good order prevails in city: he is assuring Russians that, if necessary, British authorities will provide transport to remove all who are compromised with Bolsheviks.	744
626 To SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1541	Dec. 29	Transmits details regarding two conditions made by Soviet Government on which the negotiations respecting prisoners hang, and sends instructions to put before Supreme Council urgently the question of Soviet representation on International Commission at Berlin.	744
627 SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 522	Dec. 31	Polish Government has received a peace proposal from Soviet Government; a reply is being considered.	745
628 COMMANDER SMYTHIES Reval Tel. No. 115	Jan. 1	Reports that armistice between Esthonia and Soviet Russia was concluded on Dec. 31 at Dorpat.	745

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
629	TO LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 749	Jan. 1	Circular telegram transmitting text of resolutions regarding Russia agreed at Anglo-French Conference in London.	746
630	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 3	Jan. 3	Suggests measures to be taken to protect British communications with Persia in event of complete collapse of General Denikin's forces at an early date.	746
631	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 5	Jan. 6	Transmits substance of Georgian note asking H.M.G. for effective aid in view of General Denikin's probable collapse. Urges that H.M.G. take immediate steps to hold Transcaucasia against Soviet and Turkish forces.	747
			<i>Note 3.</i> Tiflis telegram No. 11 of Jan. 8 reporting conversation between Colonel Stokes and Azerbaijan M.F.A.; overture from Soviet Government to Azerbaijan and Georgian Governments.	748
632	SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. No. 7	Jan. 6	Transmits reports on situation in Siberia; insurgents at Irkutsk reinforced; Ataman Semenov organizing detachment of German prisoners.	749
633	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 17	Jan. 8	Message for Mr. O'Grady regarding Soviet representation on International Commission at Berlin: instructions to inform M. Litvinov that the question is undecided and will be referred to authorities higher than the Supreme Council.	750
634	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 28	Jan. 8	Message from Mr. O'Grady regarding release of any Russian political refugees imprisoned in England, and of British women in Russia.	750
635	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 19	Jan. 10	Transmits message from Lord Curzon stating that situation in Caucasus has been referred to Inter-Allied Military Council at Versailles; Allied <i>de facto</i> recognition given to Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments; details military questions which should be discussed at meeting of Eastern Committee on Jan. 12.	751
636	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 24	Jan. 10	Transmits message from Lord Curzon stating that <i>de facto</i> recognition of Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments does not involve any decision as to their boundaries.	752
637	SIR P. COX Teheran Tel. No. 14	Jan. 11	Persian Prime Minister has asked that it should be urged on H.M.G. what an enormous advantage it would be to Persia and to British interests there if independence of Azerbaijan Government could now be recognized and it were to place itself under friendly guidance of Great Britain and ally itself with Persia.	752

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
638	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 20	Jan. 11	Transmits Azerbaijan request that H.M.G. should authorize the sending of help to Daghestan to prevent Soviet predominance; suggests withdrawal of Volunteer Army and affirmative answer to request. Records interim reply.	753
639	TO MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 26	Jan. 12	Refers to Nos. 630 and 631 and states that question of military and economic assistance is under Cabinet consideration.	753
640	TO EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 44	Jan. 13	Refers to No. 635 and transmits report for Lord Curzon of discussion in the Eastern Committee concerning defence of the Middle East against possible Soviet attack.	753
641	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 25	Jan. 13	Recognition of Government has roused great patriotic demonstration in Tiflis; reports from Azerbaijan state that uncompromising reply has been sent to Soviet Government declaring adherence to Allies and agreeing in tone with Georgian reply.	755
642	SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. Unnumbered	Jan. 13	Transmits message of Jan. 11 from Mr. Lampson, Chita, asking for indication of future policy of H.M.G. in Siberia following on fall of Admiral Kolchak: submits view, shared by Allied colleagues, that further presence of Allies in Siberia can serve no useful purpose; submits suggestion for British representation if H.M.G. considers maintenance of High Commissioner no longer necessary.	756
643	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 36	Jan. 14	Informs Mr. O'Grady that General Miller at Archangel is willing to meet wishes of H.M.G. regarding Soviet prisoners and a list of those required by M. Litvinov has been sent to him for observations; General Miller's requests in return.	757
644	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. Unnumbered	Jan. 14	Mr. O'Grady reports that he has been unable to make any progress since his return to Copenhagen; submits details regarding situation and asks whether H.M.G. will agree to raising blockade of Soviet Russia and make necessary representations to Supreme Council.	757
645	TO MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. Unnumbered	Jan. 15	Instructions to avoid giving any encouragement to Georgia or Azerbaijan to take aggressive action against either Volunteer Army or the Soviet forces.	759
646	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 36	Jan. 17	Polish Prime Minister states that Polish Government has sent interim reply to Soviet Government stating that it could not definitely answer peace proposals till it had consulted Allies; to achieve a successful conclusion of the war, Poland would have to be supported in war and railway material.	759

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
647	MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 31	Jan. 18	Any Georgian or Azerbaijan aggression highly improbable; considers some encouraging utterance by H.M.G. with regard to North Caucasus would be very valuable.	760
648	MR. LEGGETT Vladivostok Tel. No. 13	Jan. 18	Transmits message from Mr. Lampson, Verkhne-Udinsk, Jan 7, reporting discomfiture of Government forces and negotiations with insurgents at Irkutsk: General Janin received telegram from Admiral Kolchak declaring his intention to resign and asking for protection by Allied troops.	760
649	MR. O'GRADY Copenhagen Unnumbered	Jan. 18	Submits text of a draft agreement for the exchange of prisoners of war and civilians which M. Litvinov is prepared to submit to his Government for approval.	762
650	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 43	Jan. 19	Informs Mr. O'Grady that no Russian political prisoners are imprisoned without charge, but ready to make further inquiries if M. Litvinov will send fuller details.	764
651	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 41	Jan. 19	Submits opinion on the present position of Poland as affected by the collapse of General Denikin's army.	764
652	EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 68	Jan. 20	Message from Lord Curzon stating that on Jan. 19 the Supreme Council accepted principle of sending help to Transcaucasian states; local British representatives to be instructed to facilitate the consequent inquiries.	766
653	MR. LEGGETT Vladivostok Tel. No. 21	Jan. 20	Transmits message from Mr. Lampson, Irkutsk, Jan. 2, regarding protection of Admiral Kolchak and question of disposal of gold.	766
654	TO MR. LAMPSON Harbin Tel. No. 3	Jan. 21	Refers to No. 642 and states that matter has been referred to Peace Conference and that instructions will be sent as soon as possible.	768
655	TO MR. WARDROP Tiflis Tel. No. 42	Jan. 21	Reports decision of Supreme Council to recognize Armenian Government <i>de facto</i> without prejudice to eventual settlement of frontiers; Armenian Government to be informed.	768
656	SIR H. MACKINDER Marseilles No. 1	Jan. 21	General report, with appendices, on situation in South Russia; recommendations for future policy.	768
657	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 66	Jan. 21	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady asking how questions of Archangel prisoners and Berlin Commission now stand as Rev. North is appealing from Moscow to expedite exchange owing to outbreak of dysentery, typhus, and smallpox.	799
658	M. CHICHERIN Moscow Tel. Wireless	Jan. 21	Protests against treatment of M. Litvinov in Copenhagen and asks for transfer of negotiations to another country.	799

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
659 MR. LEGGETT Vladivostok Tel. No. 23	Jan. 22	Transmits telegram from Mr. Lampson, Harbin, Jan. 21, stating that Admiral Kolchak has announced his resignation as Supreme Ruler in favour of General Denikin and pending latter's instructions has handed over full power in Far East to Ataman Semenov.	800
660 SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 48	Jan. 23	Reports interview with General Pilsudski who described conversation he had had with MM. Savinkoff and Tchaikovsky regarding plans for combating Bolshevism and regulating future relations between Poland and Anti-Bolshevik Russia.	800
661 LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 98	Jan. 23	Reports conversation with Esthonian Prime Minister regarding conference of Baltic States at Helsingfors and Soviet-Esthonian negotiations.	801
662 LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 106	Jan. 24	Reports public statement by Finnish Prime Minister regarding results of the Baltic Conference.	802
663 MR. HODGSON Vladivostok Tel. No. 27	Jan. 24	Transmits telegram from H.M. Consul at Chita; Soviets have assumed power in Irkutsk.	803
664 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 46	Jan. 27	Records conversation of Mr. Lloyd George with M. Patek on the subject of the Soviet offer of peace to Poland; views of Mr. Lloyd George.	803
665 TO LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 19	Jan. 27	Instructions, in connexion with the O'Grady-Litvinov negotiation, to ascertain from German Government whether they intend to set up International Commission for prisoners of war; inquires as to activities of Colonel Brandt.	806
666 TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 61	Jan. 28	Message for Mr. O'Grady referring to No. 665; if he thinks it desirable he may inform M. Litvinov that Colonel Brandt's activities are being inquired into.	806
667 LORD KILMARNOCK Berlin Tel. No. 29	Jan. 29	Refers to No. 665 and reports that the International Red Cross has taken the place of the International Commission; transmits information regarding Colonel Brandt.	807
668 TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 65	Jan. 29	Message for Mr. O'Grady stating that general tenor of draft agreement with M. Litvinov agreed to, but that as various points require careful attention, Mr. O'Grady should not agree to it except as a working basis pending further instructions.	807
669 TO MR. PORTER Reval Tel. No. 37	Jan. 29	Message for transmission to M. Chicherin replying to allegations in No. 658 and urging that M. Litvinov be instructed to hasten the conclusion of the negotiations.	808

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
670	LORD ACTON Helsingfors Tel. No. 132	Jan. 30	Transmits text of telegram sent to Copenhagen for Mr. O'Grady with reference to a letter from the Rev. North, which has been brought by Lieutenant Bremner, and reports by the latter concerning distressing condition and needs of British prisoners in Russia.	809
671	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 110	Jan. 31	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady stating that he would be glad to receive as soon as possible final views concerning outstanding points of agreement as he and M. Litvinov anxious to sign agreement without further delay.	810
672	COMMANDER SMYTHIES Reval Tel. No. 6	Feb. 2	Treaty of peace between Esthonia and Soviet Russia signed at Dorpat.	810
673	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 119	Feb. 3	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady stating that M. Litvinov has copy of No. 669 and protests against implication that he is delaying negotiations.	810
674	M. CHICHERIN Moscow Tel. Wireless	Feb. 6	Refers to No. 669 and details inconveniences to which M. Litvinov is put in Copenhagen; protests against assertion that Soviet authorities are responsible for protraction of negotiations; when treaty has been signed Soviet authorities look forward to arrangements being made for the transfer of delegates to another country.	810
675	TO MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 96	Feb. 7	Message for Mr. O'Grady: a draft agreement has been approved by the Cabinet; transmits Cabinet instructions regarding presentation of draft agreement to M. Litvinov.	812
			<i>Note 1.</i> Cabinet Draft of Anglo-Soviet Agreement for the exchange of prisoners.	812
676	TO GENERAL KEYES Novorossisk Tel. No. 81	Feb. 9	States reasons why H.M.G. can no longer support Sir H. Mackinder's proposals for assistance to General Denikin.	814
677	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 152	Feb. 10	Message from Mr. O'Grady reporting receipt of draft agreement; will communicate with M. Litvinov immediately.	815
678	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 155A	Feb. 11	Reports that Mr. O'Grady has decided to present a draft to M. Litvinov and request his immediate signature; Mr. O'Grady has omitted article 9 of Cabinet Draft and inserted another article and also made minor changes.	815
679	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. Unnumbered	Feb. 11	Reports that M. Litvinov has refused to sign draft agreement presented by Mr. O'Grady and details points which M. Litvinov desires to insert; Mr. Grant Watson has represented to Mr. O'Grady seriousness of changing Cabinet Draft without consulting Lord Curzon.	815

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
680	To MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 108	Feb. 12	Message for Mr. O'Grady: Lord Curzon had hoped to have heard from him of presentation of draft agreement to M. Litvinov; trusts that Mr. O'Grady understood that it was to be presented as approved by Cabinet, and that M. Litvinov had to choose between accepting or rejecting it as such.	816
681	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 159	Feb. 12	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady stating that he has to-day signed agreement, acting under clause 10 of letter of instructions (No. 535).	816
682	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 160	Feb. 12	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady: M. Trotsky has informed M. Litvinov that H.M.G. may rest assured that all British prisoners who have fallen into the hands of the Red Army will be well treated.	817
683	SIR J. JORDAN Peking Tel. No. 12	Feb. 12	Transmits telegram of Feb. 7 from Captain Stilling, Irkutsk, reporting that Admiral Kolchak and M. Pepeliaev were shot at 5 o'clock on morning of Feb. 7.	817
684	To MR. ALSTON Tokyo Tel. No. 50	Feb. 13	Instructions to inform Japanese Government that H.M.G. proposes to withdraw British Military Mission in Siberia at an early date; if Japanese Government maintains a force there, question of attaching a British officer will be considered.	817
685	MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Unnumbered	Feb. 13	Letter to Mr. Gregory commenting on negotiations and signing of agreement; suggests that if H.M.G. accepts agreement Mr. Abrahamson of British Red Cross should carry out execution of it; considers Danish Government will not allow M. Litvinov to stay much longer in Copenhagen.	818
686	MR. O'GRADY Copenhagen Unnumbered	Feb. 14	Transmits and comments on agreement as signed.	819
687	To MR. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 120	Feb. 16	Message for Mr. O'Grady commenting on agreement signed with M. Litvinov and suggesting that explanatory statement should be signed regarding one point; requests information as to arrangements for repatriation.	820
688	GENERAL MILLER Archangel Tel. Unnumbered	Feb. 17	Reports that the Provisional Government has been obliged to give up the struggle on the Archangel front and asks that H.M.G. use its influence with the Soviet Government to induce it to refrain from any violence against the representatives and property of the population.	822
689	To GENERAL KEYES Novorossisk Tel. No. K. 135	Feb. 18	Transmits message from Sir H. Mackinder announcing his resignation as High Commissioner for South Russia.	822

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
690	To Mr. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 123	Feb. 18	Message for Mr. O'Grady: Conference of Ambassadors has agreed to the suppression of the International Commission in Berlin for Russian prisoners in Germany and to the request of the International Red Cross that it should undertake the necessary relief work.	823
691	To Mr. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 124	Feb. 19	Message for Mr. O'Grady expressing anxiety regarding treatment of British prisoners of war and civilians in Russia and instructing him to protest to M. Litvinov, pointing out that present state of affairs is a disgrace to any Government.	823
692	Mr. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 188	Feb. 19	Transmits message from Mr. O'Grady reporting that he has signed with M. Litvinov, as suggested, an annex to the Agreement; sends information requested in No. 687.	824
693	Mr. GRANT WATSON Copenhagen Tel. No. 189	Feb. 19	Message from Mr. O'Grady transmitting text of annex referred to in No. 692.	824
694	To EARL OF DERBY Paris Tel. No. 258	Feb. 19	Instructions to inform French Government that H.M.G. proposes to abolish post of High Commissioner in Siberia, and asks whether it intends to do the same.	825
695	To Mr. PORTER Reval Tel. No. 61	Feb. 20	Message for transmission to M. Chicherin with reference to No. 688; if M. Chicherin has any proposals to make to General Miller with a view to peaceful capitulation, Lord Curzon will be happy to transmit them.	825
696	M. CHICHERIN Moscow Tel. Wireless	Feb. 21	Acknowledges No. 695 and transmits proposals for capitulation of White Russian forces and authorities of Northern Region.	826
697	To Mr. PORTER Reval Tel. No. 76	Feb. 28	Transmits message for M. Chicherin acknowledging No. 696; now too late to communicate it to North Russian Government but has telegraphed it to Alexandrovsk for communication to Revolutionary Government apparently established at Murmansk.	826
698	To Mr. LAMPSON Peking Tel. No. 88	Mar. 12	Post of High Commissioner in Siberia has been abolished; instructions to close the mission.	827

CHAPTER III

Negotiations relative to the status and attribution of Eastern Galicia

June 18–December 22, 1919

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Introductory Note.	828
699 COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS Paris No. 3	June 17	Report on the question of Eastern Galicia.	829
700 MEETING OF COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS Paris I.C. 197	June 18	Determination of a line on the River Zbrucz between the Polish and Ukrainian forces; consideration of a note by Mr. Balfour and of proposed solutions regarding the question of Eastern Galicia.	844
701 MEETING OF COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS Paris I.C. 199	June 25	Political status of Eastern Galicia; consideration of supplementary report by the Commission on Polish Affairs; discussion and adoption of resolution proposed by Mr. Lansing.	851
702 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL Paris C.F. 92	June 25	Approval of a note to the Polish Government authorizing it to extend operations to the River Zbrucz.	861
703 MR. NORMAN Paris	July 5	Letter to M. Dutasta suggesting that all decisions concerning Eastern Galicia adopted on June 25 (No. 701) be communicated to the Ukrainian Government.	862
704 M. SYDORENKO Paris	July 9	Note to Mr. Balfour, Paris, enclosing a note to M. Clemenceau protesting against decision of June 25 authorizing Polish Government to extend its operations to the River Zbrucz, and rejecting Polish claims to Eastern Galicia.	862
705 M. DUTASTA Paris	July 11	Letter to Mr. Norman, Paris, informing him that decisions Nos. 3 and 4 adopted regarding Eastern Galicia on June 25 have been communicated to Ukrainian authorities.	867
706 M. SYDORENKO Paris	July 15	Note to M. Clemenceau protesting against the decision of the Peace Conference to authorize the Polish Government to establish a civil administration in Eastern Galicia.	868
707 LORD ACTON Berne Tel. No. 1113	July 21	Repeats telegram sent to British Delegation at Paris: Ukrainian representatives in Berne regard Eastern Galicia as irretrievably lost; they apparently consider that it will be given to Poland as compensation for the loss of Upper Silesia.	871

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
708	M. DUTASTA Paris	July 24	Transmits to Mr. Norman, Paris, a protest of the Carpatho-Russian Committee regarding the decision of the Peace Conference to assign the administration of Eastern Galicia to Poland.	871
709	MR. BALFOUR Paris No. 1586	Aug. 12	Does not favour appointment of a British commission of investigation into the alleged atrocities in Eastern Galicia as requested by Ukrainian Delegation in London.	872
710	MEETING OF COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS Paris No. 32	Aug. 20	Discussion of the report of the Sub-Commission on Eastern Galicia.	872
711	MEETING OF COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS Paris No. 33	Aug. 23	Hearing of the Ukrainian delegates; discussion on minorities; adoption of report on the future status of Eastern Galicia.	875
712	M. DUTASTA Paris	Aug. 26	Note to Mr. Norman, Paris, enclosing a Polish note setting forth the point of view of the Polish Government regarding the question of Eastern Galicia, which should be an integral part of Poland.	882
713	M. BARTOSZEWICZ Paris	Aug. 29	Note to Mr. Balfour, Paris, transmitting a telegram from Chairman of the International Committee appointed to protect British and Allied oil interests in Galicia asking that the committee be heard by the Peace Conference before any decision taken as regards Eastern Galicia; any attempt to diminish Polish sovereignty there would have adverse economic consequences.	884
714	DR. PANEYKO Paris	Sept. 1	Note to M. Clemenceau protesting against Polish treatment of Ukrainian population in Eastern Galicia.	885
715	SIR P. WYNDHAM Warsaw No. 265	Sept. 4	Ukraino-Polish armistice concluded; transmits information received from Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs regarding Ukraino-Polish negotiations.	886
716	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1373	Sept. 25	Reports discussion in Supreme Council of report of Polish Commission on future status of Eastern Galicia, and of proposals by Mr. Polk; requests instructions on certain points.	887
717	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1395	Oct. 1	Refers to No. 716 and again asks for instructions, though presumes he should not maintain previous position of H.M.G. against apparent unanimity of other delegations.	889
718	M. DUTASTA Paris	Oct. 1	Transmits to Mr. Norman, Paris, a letter of Sept. 25 to M. Clemenceau from Dr. Paneyko rebutting arguments advanced by M. Paderewski concerning Eastern Galicia.	889

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
719	MR. CAMPBELL Foreign Office	Oct. 2	Note of a conversation with Count Horodyski, an envoy of M. Paderewski, regarding Eastern Galicia, purchase of railway trucks, and the need for a definite eastern policy.	891
720	SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 299	Oct. 4	Reports recommendations of Major Paris from Lemburg in favour of assigning Eastern Galicia to Poland.	892
721	M. DUTASTA Paris	Oct. 10	Note to Mr. Norman, Paris, transmitting an <i>aide-memoire</i> from the Russian Embassy advocating a plebiscite in Eastern Galicia. <i>Note 1.</i> Note of May 10, 1919, from the Russian Political Conference advancing Russian claims in connexion with terms of peace with Austria and Hungary.	892 893
722	DR. PANEYKO Paris	Oct. 13	Note to Sir E. Crowe, Paris, rebutting Polish arguments concerning Eastern Galicia.	894
723	TO SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1228	Oct. 13	Refers to No. 716 and states that the amendments therein proposed cannot be agreed to; under no circumstances should Eastern Galicia be annexed to Poland; best solution would be that Poland should be given a mandate for 10 years.	895
724	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1444	Oct. 15	Refers to No. 723 and urges that before Supreme Council is approached in the matter time-limit of ten years may be reconsidered.	896
725	TO SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1288	Oct. 24	States that Prime Minister considers that a mandate pure and simple is practically tantamount to annexation and if Peace Conference decides against proposal put forward on instructions in No. 723, it should be against the vote of the British representative.	897
726	TO SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1329	Nov. 4	Asks, in connexion with a parliamentary question, for immediate report regarding state of the question of Eastern Galicia.	897
727	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1526	Nov. 5	Question of Eastern Galicia has not yet come before Supreme Council; Peace Conference cannot decide anything against wishes of the British plenipotentiary and if other plenipotentiaries object to British proposal no decision will be reached.	898
728	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1533	Nov. 7	View of H.M.G. that Poland should hold a mandate for Eastern Galicia for ten years discussed by Supreme Council: decided that the question be referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs for report on Nov. 10.	898
729	SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1542	Nov. 10	Polish Commission agrees to a 25-year mandate for Poland for Eastern Galicia. Sir E. Crowe states that in order to avoid a deadlock he proposes to agree to 25-year limit when Commission's report comes before Supreme Council.	899

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
730 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. 1550	Nov. 11	Supreme Council has accepted recommendation of Polish Commission that Poland should hold a 25-year mandate for Eastern Galicia.	900
731 TO SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1352	Nov. 12	Refers to No. 729 and states that in order to secure unanimity compromise is accepted.	900
732 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1599	Nov. 21	Reports proceedings of Supreme Council during which modification proposed regarding decision reached respecting Polish mandate for Eastern Galicia; as a result of representations American delegate withdrew his proposed modification.	901
733 SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 454	Dec. 2	Reports bitter feeling over decision regarding Eastern Galicia; records conversation with M. Dietrichs regarding Eastern Galicia and Danzig.	901
734 SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw Tel. No. 457	Dec. 4	Repeats telegram to Sir E. Crowe, Paris, submitting request from Polish Prime Minister that, in view of reverse to General Denikin's left wing, the publication of decision of Supreme Council regarding Eastern Galicia might be delayed for a few months: supports request.	902
735 SIR H. RUMBOLD Warsaw No. 512	Dec. 4	Reports conversation with Polish Prime Minister regarding decision of Supreme Council concerning Eastern Galicia; considers it would be wise from Allied point of view to refrain for present from publishing the decision.	903
736 DR. MARKOFF Paris	Dec. 6	Note to Sir E. Crowe, Paris, transmitting protest of the Carpatho-Russian Committee against the decision of the Supreme Council concerning Eastern Galicia.	905
737 M. DUTASTA Paris	Dec. 12	Transmits to Mr. Norman, Paris, letter from the Polish Delegation protesting against the decision of the Supreme Council to confer a limited mandate for Eastern Galicia.	906
738 TO SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1506	Dec. 20	At recent conference in London M. Clemenceau pressed that recent decision as to 25-year mandate for Eastern Galicia should be suspended for reconsideration; proposal was with great reluctance agreed to by Prime Minister.	908
739 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1732	Dec. 22	Has communicated to M. Clemenceau relevant wording of No. 738 in response to his request for exact terms of formula assented to by Prime Minister.	908
740 SIR E. CROWE Paris Tel. No. 1733	Dec. 22	Reports proposal submitted to Supreme Council by M. Clemenceau for a suspension of the recent decision of the Supreme Council regarding a 25-year mandate for Eastern Galicia: resolution adopted.	909

CHAPTER I

Withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces

July 3—December 16, 1919

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE position in the Baltic Provinces at the beginning of July 1919 was described in a Foreign Office 'Memorandum respecting the Situation in the South Baltic States', dated July 11, 1919, eight days later than document No. 1 in this chapter. This memorandum read:

'At the meeting of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the 12th June¹ the following decisions were reached:—

'1. Marshal Foch should order the Germans—

- (a) To stop all future advance northwards towards Esthonia.²
- (b) To evacuate Libau and Windau at once and to complete the evacuation of all territory which before the war formed part of Russia with the least possible delay, in accordance with Article 12 of the Armistice.³

'2. That the local national forces of the Baltic Provinces should be supported with equipment, arms, ammunition, clothing and supplies generally.

'3. That the Military Representatives in Versailles should advise as to what supplies should be sent and by whom.

¹ In error for June 13; for the minutes of this meeting see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919* (Washington, 1942 f.), vol. vi, p. 370 f.

² For the then situation in Esthonia and Latvia, see below.

³ On June 18, 1919, Marshal Foch transmitted these orders, in telegram No. 3039, to General Nudant, President of the Interallied Armistice Commission at Spa, for 'urgent communication to the German Armistice Commission'. This was the first occasion upon which the Allied and Associated Powers had demanded, by virtue of article 12 of the Armistice of Compiègne of November 11, 1918, the withdrawal from the Baltic Provinces of the German forces which had hitherto been retained there in accordance with the desire of the Allied and Associated Powers, and under the same article of the armistice. This article read: 'Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie avant la guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la Roumanie, de la Turquie doivent rentrer immédiatement dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, telles qu'elles étaient au 1^{er} août, 1914. Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie avant la guerre de la Russie devront également rentrer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, définies comme ci-dessus, dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu, compte tenu de la situation intérieure de ces territoires.' The German Government had previously disputed the Allied right, under this article, to retain German forces in the Baltic Provinces.

'On the 1st July, General Gough⁴ was informed by Mr. Balfour—

'1. That the Supreme Council of the Conference had decided that the Germans, when evacuating the Baltic Provinces, should leave behind them the German railway material now there. This would be treated as part of the railway material which Germany was bound to deliver under the terms of the Armistice.

'2. It was further agreed that the Allies should secure as soon as possible the restoration of the Russian gauge on the Baltic railways, in view of their closer economic connection with Russia than with Germany.

'On the 28th June Marshal Foch issued orders that the Germans should provide for—

'1. Free passage and circulation in the Baltic States, where occupied by Germans, for members of British political and military missions.

'2. Use of telegraph and telephone lines operated by Germans.

'3. The carrying of arms.

'4. Immunity from interference on whatever grounds.

'In view of the above instructions of Marshal Foch and of the probable withdrawal of all German forces from the South Baltic at an early date, it is perhaps of importance that the present situation of the various *de facto* Governments and Corps should be briefly described.

'The Russian Northern Corps

'The Russian Northern Corps which was originally formed from refugee Russians, officers and men, in Esthonia, has gradually increased in numbers until now it consists of about thirteen thousand armed men and a total force of about twenty-five thousand. The relations between this Corps and Esthonia have never been cordial as the Esthonians have always feared that in assisting the Russian Northern Corps to retake Petrograd they would be hastening their own downfall. For some time pressure was brought to bear on the Esthonian Provisional Government to pass to the Russian Northern Corps a certain proportion of stores and equipment provided by His Majesty's Government, but this arrangement worked unsatisfactorily and as the result of urgent representations from General Gough, it has now been arranged that food and arms shall be sent direct to the Russian Northern Corps without passing through the hands of the Esthonian military authorities. The Director of Military Operations has informed us that stores to meet the requirements of the Russian Northern Corps are now awaiting shipment.

'In the meanwhile, in answer to the enquiry from the Chief of the Staff of

⁴ General Sir H. Gough had been appointed Chief of the British Military Mission to Finland and the Baltic States on June 4, 1919. His instructions of that date from General Sir H. Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stated in part: 'The Governments of the other principal Allied and Associated Powers (the United States of America, France and Italy) have agreed that the execution of Allied military policy in the Baltic States shall be under British control, and Allied officers will, therefore, be attached to your Mission.'

the Russian Northern Corps, transmitted through Mr. Bosanquet,⁵ a telegram was sent by Mr. Balfour stating that the Supreme Economic Council had undertaken to supply with food the Petrograd area if recaptured, but that at the same time great care should be taken to avoid committing the Allies specifically to the relief of Petrograd, as the Allied Governments did not want to be made in any way responsible for the military operations against that city.

'Towards the latter part of June, the Russian Northern Corps commenced a counter-attack on the Bolsheviks in the neighbourhood of Krasnaya Gorka on the coast line South-West of Kronstadt and some successes were won. On the 30th June, however, a telegram was received from Reval, stating that, in consequence of lack of artillery ammunition, the Russian Northern Corps was giving ground before the Bolsheviks.

'General Gough, in a telegram despatched on the 3rd July, states that the collapse of the Russian Northern Corps is imminent and he fears that the effect of such Bolshevik victories on the North-West front may very adversely affect the situation in Latvia and Esthonia.

'In a telegram on the 4th July, we received the terms of a message sent by General Rodzianko to Generals Judenitch⁶ and Gough. In this the Commander of the Russian Northern Corps disclaimed any responsibility for further successful resistance on the North-West front owing to lack of officers, shells, absolute absence of any reserves, arrival too late of technical equipment as well as the extreme exhaustion of his troops.

'On the 4th July, the War Office telegraphed to General Gough stating that the promised guns and ammunition were being sent and that they would do their best to continue their support of the Russian Northern Corps with munitions.

'Esthonia

'Esthonia is certainly the most vigorous and promising of the South Baltic States. Under a Radical Bourgeois Government elected by a Constituent Assembly, the country has been well administered and the Esthonian Army has been able to carry on a very successful campaign against the Bolsheviks.

'His Majesty's Government recognised the Provisional Government of Esthonia as a *de facto* one in May, 1919.

'The Esthonian Army on the right wing of the Russian Northern Corps drove the Bolsheviks from the borders of Esthonia and captured Pskov. The friction which exists between the Esthonians and the Russian Northern Corps has already been explained; the separation of these two forces, so far as supply is concerned, may diminish its intensity, but it cannot be expected to disappear until the future policy of Admiral Kolchak's Government with regard to the Baltic States⁷ is more satisfactorily defined.

⁵ H.M. Consul-General at Reval (Tallinn).

⁶ General Yudenitch, as the Commander-in-Chief of all White Russian forces in the Baltic Provinces, was the superior officer of General Rodzianko who held the operational command of the Russian Northern Corps, later the Russian North-West Army.

⁷ See Chap. II.

'It was while pursuing their victorious advance against the Bolsheviks that the Esthonian Army came into conflict with the Baltic Landwehr and the German forces under the command of General von der Goltz. These forces had just cleared Riga of Bolsheviks and as a part of German policy they were anxious to support the Baltic⁸ element at the expense either of Letts or of Esthonians. Possibly it was hoped that, threatened by the German forces in the South, the Esthonians would be overwhelmed by a returning wave of Bolshevism from the East. Hostilities commenced early in June and it was only after several days' fighting that an armistice was concluded by General Gough. This armistice, however, was broken a few days later by the Baltic Landwehr. The second armistice was arranged on the 3rd July, according to the terms of which the German forces were to evacuate Latvia as soon as possible and the Esthonians were to remain in the position they occupied on the 3rd July.

'A considerable quantity of military material was sent to the Esthonian Army by the War Office in the spring. A request has already been received from the Esthonian Staff that they may be supplied with more ammunition and supplies but General Gough has been instructed to submit a report on the total requirements of the Esthonian, Lettish, and Lithuanian armies, and, until his recommendations have been considered and the Allied Representatives in Paris have decided which Powers should furnish the stores in question, the War Office do not consider it possible to do any more.

'Since early in the year, constant and pressing appeals have been received from the Esthonian Delegates, both in this country and in Paris, for a loan for the use of the Esthonian Provisional Government.

'The Treasury were consulted, but they replied that they considered the granting of financial assistance to such Governments as those of the Baltic States was a matter to be dealt with by the Allies as a whole and that in the particular case in question they would only feel justified in advancing money on the ground that it was part of a general world policy in which the other Allied Powers had at least as much interest as His Majesty's Government.

'The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the 25th June discussed a recommendation of the Commission on Baltic Affairs,⁹ in which it was urged that immediate financial assistance must be given to the Baltic States, if any policy was to be adopted which could have the effect of eradicating German influence and counteracting the danger of Bolshevism. It was decided, however, that no further financial assistance could be given to the Baltic Provinces at present.

'There is little doubt that, in the first flush of their success in driving out the Bolsheviks and in consequence of the very considerable encouragement given from all sides to separatist movements among the Border Peoples of Russia, the Esthonian people are now almost overwhelmingly in favour of complete separation and independence from Russia. At a session of the Constituent Assembly of Esthonia in May, 1919, it was declared that

⁸ i.e. Teutonic.

⁹ Cf. op. cit. vol. vi, pp. 673-4.

"Esthonia had broken for ever the bonds which for two centuries had bound her to Russia," and further that "on the 24th February, 1918, the bonds between Esthonia and the Russian Republic were broken; Esthonia was now an independent and democratic Republic." On the 11th June of this year, His Majesty's Government were approached by M. Kopwille¹⁰ with the request that the complete independence of Esthonia should be recognised. Subsequently on the 2nd July we were informed by Mr. Bosanquet that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (who was apparently referring to the Allied Note to Admiral Kolchak)⁷ was deeply disappointed at the idea that the fate of Esthonia would be settled by the new Russian Government and not by the Peace Conference. He clearly feared that, on the reaction of Russia, Esthonia would be abandoned to the tender mercies of the Central Government.

'Esthonian national feeling hardly existed before the war and the creation of an independent Esthonia is obviously a geographical and political impossibility. At the same time it was felt that Esthonia had done much as a bulwark against Bolshevism and the *de facto* recognition of its Government by Great Britain had been a substantial encouragement to separatist feeling. A despatch has now accordingly been sent to Paris urging that the Allies should take upon themselves the task of reconciling the claims of Esthonia and of the other Baltic States with the evident wish of the Siberian Government for a reunited Russia.

'Latvia

'The situation in Latvia has been dominated by the presence there of General von der Goltz and his German force. At the beginning of May, M. Ulmanis, the Lettish Prime Minister, was driven from power by the Germans and a strong Balt administration under the presidency of M. Needra was thereupon set up;¹¹ the power of the Germans in Latvia became absolute, the whole local administration being subject to their control. The main support of the German policy was the Balt Landwehr, a force recruited locally from the Balt element of the country and containing a large number of German soldiers who had been pressed into its ranks as a stiffening. A great number of the officers were ex-German officers and the whole force was commanded by Major Fletcher, a Prussian. With the aid of this force, General von der Goltz recaptured Riga from the Bolsheviks, whereupon a veritable reign of terror was begun by Major Fletcher, who was appointed the Governor. The opportunity was taken by him to execute large numbers of Letts, under the pretext that they were Bolsheviks, and so sure of their position did the Germans become that they dared to advance against the Esthonians, believing that they could overwhelm them as well.

'It was at this juncture that Marshal Foch's demands were sent requesting the immediate evacuation of Latvia by all German forces. Eventually an

¹⁰ Esthonian Representative in London.

¹¹ The fall of the Government of M. Ulmanis resulted from a *coup d'état* carried out against it by Germano-Balt elements in Libau on April 16, 1919.

armistice was concluded on the 3rd July by Colonel Tallents,¹² between the Esthonian and the German Balt forces. Under this armistice all German forces were to evacuate Latvia as soon as possible; no forward movement was to be made by them in the meantime, except against the Bolshevik troops. All German officers and troops were to leave Riga and its suburbs by the 5th July. No military stores¹³ were to be removed. The Landwehr were to leave Riga at once and withdraw behind the river Dvina. Free communication was to be opened by the Germans between Riga and Libau, and finally the Allied Governments were to assume temporary administration of Riga in co-operation with the Letts.

'According to the latest information, Libau is now clear of Germans, whilst the evacuation of Riga is also proceeding satisfactorily. In the meanwhile, M. Ulmanis, the former Premier of the Lettish Provisional Government, who had been forced to take refuge from the Germans on a ship in the harbour of Libau, returned again on June 27th and was warmly welcomed. A temporary Government has been formed on the advice of the Allied Representatives, consisting of six Letts, three Balts and one Jew. This Government will be responsible to the Volksrat (an Assembly containing representatives from various local classes and trades) and will concern itself with the maintenance of order, distribution of food and so forth. The Lettish Government left for Riga on the 7th July. A proposal is on foot to offer the post of Minister of Commerce to a Russian with a view to improving future relations. Since the conclusion of the armistice, Colonel Tallents has been acting as temporary Governor of Riga. It remains to be seen how far General von der Goltz intends to carry out the spirit of Marshal Foch's demands, but possibly the Germans really intend to withdraw, feeling confident that they can safely leave the care of their prestige in the hands of the Baltic element of the population. Whilst great care must be taken to eliminate all pure German elements, such as Major Fletcher and his numerous German subordinates in the Baltic Landwehr, the Balts must always remain a very important section of the population of Latvia, and as their standard of education is on the whole higher than that of their fellow-countrymen, it is clear that their interested co-operation with the Government of the country must be secured, otherwise there is no possibility of success. According to a telegram from Mr. Grant Watson¹⁴ of the 30th June, they now seem willing to come into line with the national policy, and the inclusion of three Balts in M. Ulmanis's Government may have a very beneficial effect.

'Like all other Baltic States, Latvia is in urgent need of money and His Majesty's Government have been repeatedly approached by the Lettish representatives in this country and in Paris with the request that a loan should

¹² Colonel Tallents had been appointed British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces in May 1919. In that capacity he was at the head of a British political and economic mission, and was responsible to the Foreign Office. General Gough and Colonel Tallents were instructed to work in close co-operation.

¹³ See, however, No. 2, note 3.

¹⁴ Mr. Grant Watson, First Secretary in H.M. Legation at Copenhagen, was employed on special service in Latvia, May-August 1919.

be granted. The Treasury, however, refused to sanction any such loan on the grounds already indicated above in the case of Esthonia and the decision of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers also quoted above definitely disposes of the question for the time being. It is the declared policy of the Allies to hasten the formation of local Lettish forces, but it is hard to see how this can be carried out by the supply of material alone.

'Prince Lieven's Corps

'This force originally consisted of about five hundred men and was drawn from Russian prisoners of war in Germany. They are paid from German funds voted for Eastern defence and all their equipment is German. They appear to have taken part satisfactorily in the operations against the Bolsheviks.

'A recent report indicates that considerable reinforcements are about to be sent from Germany to join Prince Lieven and the number is given as forty thousand.¹⁵ It is hard to believe that so many recruits have been obtained from Russian prisoners in Germany, but, in any case, the arrival of a far smaller reinforcement would exercise great influence on the situation in Latvia. Accordingly a despatch has been sent to Paris urging that the objectives of this force should be narrowly defined so as to prevent any interference in local political affairs.

'On the evacuation of Libau by the German forces, Prince Lieven's Corps moved into the town to serve as a garrison. This action provoked a protest from the Lettish Government who have asked that the Russian troops may be sent to the front and their place taken by Lettish troops.

'We are informed that Lettish troops are now on their way by sea to Libau, but in the meanwhile it has been arranged that General Gough shall assume command of all the forces in Libau.

'In spite, however, of the fears of the Lettish Government, Prince Lieven's force do not seem to be contemplating any political interference and the Russian Colonel in command has called on our representative at Libau and the Head of the French Mission to say that he had orders to place himself at the disposal of the Entente.

O. C. H[ARVEY]'¹⁶

¹⁵ This figure had been given by Prof. Piip, head of an Esthonian Delegation in London, during a conversation which he had had at the Foreign Office on July 1, 1919, as reported in dispatch No. 4531 A of July 5 from Lord Curzon to Mr. Balfour in Paris. This dispatch reported that Prof. Piip had stated that these forces 'would be employed under the command of Prince Lieven for the reconquest of the Baltic States for Russia and that it was in fact the first step in the direction of a Russo-German alliance. The whole matter was being kept secret, but there was no doubt that there existed an understanding between the existing authorities in Russia and Germany.'

¹⁶ A member of the Russia Department of the Foreign Office.

No. 1

M. Dutasta¹ to Mr. Norman² (Paris. Received July 3)

[599/2/5/14333]

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX
SECRÉTARIAT GÉNÉRAL

QUAI D'ORSAY
PARIS, le 3 juillet 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation Britannique un exemplaire d'une communication de Monsieur le Maréchal Foch en date du 2 juillet,³ transmettant la réponse du gouvernement allemand, relative à l'arrêt de l'avance allemande en Esthonie et à l'évacuation de Libau et Windau.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 1

General Baron von Hammerstein⁴ to General Nudant (Spa)

COMMISSION ALLEMANDE D'ARMISTICE

SPA, le 29 juin 1919

Wako no. 25624

Réponse à la note C.I.P.A. No. 1271/G du 18 juin⁵ et 1400/G du 27 juin,⁶ avant-dernier paragraphe:

Au nom de M. le Ministre d'Empire Erzberger, j'ai à faire la communication suivante:

1°. Une marche en avant de troupes allemandes vers le nord dans la direction de l'Esthonie n'a jamais été envisagée.

2°. L'évacuation rapide de Windau et de Libau ainsi que de tous les territoires qui, avant la guerre, appartenaient à l'empire russe, a été ordonnée par le Gouvernement allemand avant l'arrivée de la note C.I.P.A. No. 1271/G du 18 juin 1919, et elle est actuellement, comme on l'a déjà fait savoir dans sa note du 8 juin,⁷ en cours d'exécution. Il en est de même pour l'évacuation de Libau et de Windau qui peut se terminer en un délai très court, si le barrage ordonné par l'Entente est entièrement levé et si les

¹ Secretary-General of the Peace Conference at Paris.

² Mr. H. Norman was at that time Secretary of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference.

³ This covering note from Marshal Foch to M. Clemenceau is not printed. It reported the action taken by Marshal Foch on June 18, 1919, in accordance with the Supreme Council's decision of June 13 (see Introductory Note, note 3), and transmitted the reply of the German Government, printed below.

⁴ President of the German Armistice Commission at Spa.

⁵ Note in original: 'Transmissive du télégramme 3039 du 18 juin du Maréchal Foch.'

⁶ Not printed. This note asked for a reply to No. 1271/G by July 1, 1919.

⁷ Not printed.

navires allemands sont autorisés à naviguer librement entre Libau et Windau ainsi qu'entre ces deux ports allemands.⁸

Ministre des Finances d'Empire Erzberger 38320/6—No. 1726-1699.

HAMMERSTEIN⁹

⁸ A phase had here fallen out in translation. The original German of the last sentence read: 'Dasselbe gilt für die Räumung von Libau und Windau, die in kürzester Frist beendet sein kann, wenn die von der Entente verhängte Sperre vollständig aufgehoben und den deutschen Schiffen allgemein freie Fahrt zwischen Libau und Windau, sowie zwischen diesen beiden *Häfen und den* deutschen Häfen zugestanden wird.' (Editorial italics). The reference was to a local blockade maintained at that time by Allied naval forces in the Baltic with the object of preventing German ships or nationals from entering or leaving Latvian ports. This measure had been adopted in May 1919 in consequence of the domination of Latvia by German forces. The point raised in the German note was met by telegram No. 1204 of June 29 sent by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to Admiral Goette, President of the German Naval Armistice Commission. This telegram stated in part: 'As German Government undertakes through you to comply with the instructions contained in telegram No. 3039 from Marshal Foch dated June 18 permission is granted for German ships to proceed to Windau and Libau for the purpose of evacuating German troops from the occupied territories.' General Nudant, in reply to the present note, drew the attention of General von Hammerstein to this telegram in a note of July 1.

⁹ The terms of this note were communicated to General Gough in a telegram of July 3 from Mr. Balfour in Paris.

No. 2

Mr. Bosanquet (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received July 4)

No. 125 Telegraphic [97689/61232/38]

REVAL, July 3, 1919

Following from Colonel Tallents at Rodenpois. Begins.

Armistice signed at 3.30 this morning.

Following is exact text. Begins:¹

An armistice is hereby concluded on the following terms between the troops under Esthonian command on the one hand and the Landeswehr and the troops under German command on the other one.² Hostilities to cease by land, sea and air at noon on July third. 2. All German forces to be clear of Latvia as soon as possible in accordance with the terms of peace; no forward movement to be made by German troops in any part of Latvia in the meantime except against the Bolshevik troops of the Russian Soviet Republic in accordance with the treaty of peace. 3. All German officers and troops to leave Riga and its suburbs at once, this evacuation to be completed by six p.m. July fifth Mid. European time, except a few staff officers to supervise the evacuation of German stores and the troops required to guard stores from pillage. 4. An Allied officer in Riga to ensure that no military stores³ are

¹ The following text of the Armistice of Strasdenhof is printed by Sir S. Tallents in *Man and Boy* (London, 1943), p. 330. Sir S. Tallents gives, op. cit., the detailed circumstances of the signature of this armistice. (See also Vol. I, No. 11, appendix B.)

² The punctuation here was falsified in transmission. The full stop should be after 'other', and 'one' should be a numerical heading corresponding to those below.

³ In error for 'no non-military stores'.

removed. 5. The Landeswehr to leave Riga and its suburbs at once and to withdraw behind the River Dvina and this evacuation to be completed by 6 p.m. July 5th Mid. European time, their future dispositions to be settled in accordance with paragraph nine below. 6. The Estonians not to advance beyond the positions which they occupied at three a.m. on July 3rd. 7. Free communication by road, rail and telegraph to be opened by the Germans between Riga and Libau. 8. Allied Governors to assume temporarily the administration of Riga in cooperation with the Lettish Governors. 9. Further details to be settled under the direction of the Allied Military Mission. Made and signed at Strasdenhof twelve kilometres East of Riga, July 3rd, 1919, at three thirty a.m. Mid. European time.

Proceeding Riga at once. Will communicate further from there. Sent London, Paris, Libau, Copenhagen and Britmis⁴ Helsingfors for General Gough.

⁴ Telegraphic designation of the British Military Mission.

No. 3

Mr. Bosanquet (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received July 5)

No. 127 Telegraphic [98693/68613/38]

REVAL, July 5, 1919

Col. Tallents reports from Riga today as follows:

Armistice is as arranged July 3 and remains in force pending establishment of a Government. All executions of prisoners have been suspended by him. Latest information has been furnished to Senior Naval Officer Baltic regarding mines in Gulf of Riga. He¹ is taking steps to re-establish water supply of city. He proposes that as soon as possible after Germans have left and General Gough has arrived Ulmanis should come to Riga. Attitude of Iron Division² constitutes greatest difficulty and it appears to him imperative that it should be withdrawn from Latvia. Address Riga is British Mission, and communication is by wireless. He has issued brief proclamation to explain situation.³

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 127.

Sent to Paris, Libau, Copenhagen and reported [? repeated] to General Gough.

¹ i.e. Colonel Tallents.

² An element attached to the German 6th Reserve Corps under the command of General von der Goltz. Colonel Tallents stated, in a note of July 10 on the 'Status of Iron Division' (received in the Foreign Office on July 23): 'It is plain . . . that the Germans for a short time detached the Iron Division to the Latvian army with a view to saving it from the general German withdrawal in Latvia required by the Treaty of Peace. It appears equally clear that with the fall of the Needra Government and the defeat of the Germans and Landeswehr by the Estonians this subterfuge was abandoned'. In this connexion General von der Goltz had informed Colonel Tallents in a note of July 5: 'The treaty of the Iron Division with the Latvian Government was concluded in agreement with the Needra ministry. The High Command therefore now regards the Iron Division as Imperial German troops'.

³ The text of this proclamation of July 3, 1919, together with a reduced facsimile reproduction thereof, is printed op. cit., p. 332.

No. 4

Mr. Bosanquet (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received July 7)
No. 131 Telegraphic [99331/855/38]

REVAL, July 6, 1919

Following from Colonel Tallents, July 5.

All Riga East of Dwina clear of Germans. Latest reports at (19.00 ? 7 p.m. hours) all indicate withdrawal duly completed on western bank also. Water supply re-established. I opened new session of Town Council this afternoon with satisfactory results. Ends.

Please repeat to Paris and London.¹

¹ Mr. Bosanquet subsequently transmitted to Lord Curzon, in telegram No. 138 of July 11 (received July 12), a paraphrased message of July 9 from Colonel Tallents which read in part: 'I have resigned powers as a civil governor to Ulmanis who landed July 8 and received popular welcome. Later the same evening General Gough was also well received upon landing. Town remains quiet though it continues nervous. Baltic Germans allege that an unrest still exists in the country districts and Bolshevik elements have returned with Lettish troops.' The rest of the message concerned the reconstruction of liberated Latvia and requested that an Allied loan might be granted (cf. Introductory Note).

No. 5

Sir G. Marling¹ (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received July 7)
No. 1356 Telegraphic [98806/68613/38]

COPENHAGEN, July 6, 1919

Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me officially of text of telegram that he has received from 'Committee for Relief of all foreigners in Riga' with an office at 107 Kurfürstenstrasse, Berlin.

Message states Riga is menaced with struggle between Esthonian and Lettish troops and begs Powers to take measure[s] to avert further calamity to much tried town. Presumably by Lettish troops Landwehr are to be understood.

Berlin's interest in Latvia as shown by this and by my telegram No. 1355² seems significant.

Sent to Libau and Helsingfors for General Gough.

¹ H.M. Minister at Copenhagen.

² This telegram of July 6 reported that 'a press message from Berlin received here yesterday states "Russian troops are showing hostility to Entente" in Libau and Lettish press agency has received information that "von der Goltz has offered his services to Koltchak's representatives in Helsingfors and is now acting as Chief of Staff to Lieven's corps"'.¹

Baron von Lersner¹ to M. Clemenceau²

[101271/855/38]

(Translation.)

VERSAILLES, July 6, 1919

Sir,

In the name of the German Government I venture to draw the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments to the menacing situation in which not only German nationals but also the entire peace-loving population in Latvia and especially at Riga are placed owing to the conflicts which are taking place between Lettish and Esthonian troops. It is true that according to the latest news an armistice has been concluded and an English and an American Governor have taken over military and civil authority at Riga. Negotiations are also proceeding for the formation of a Coalition Cabinet in Latvia under the former President of the Council, Ulmanis.

Even granting however that the armistice is prolonged and that the Coalition Cabinet is formed, the fears of the German population in those regions for their lives and property are sufficiently well-founded. The presence in the country of Bolshevik elements which remained behind, and the national conflicts³ which are proceeding make it desirable that measures should now be proposed with a view to protecting the German population which is threatened.

The Allied and Associated Governments having assumed responsibility for quiet and order by re-establishing the Ulmanis Cabinet at Libau and by appointing English and American officers at Riga, the German Government makes the following proposals to the Allied and Associated Governments:—

Dates will be fixed for the evacuation of Latvia by the German troops after an agreement has been reached on the spot by the German Command, the Lettish Government and the Allied Commissions. After expiry of these periods the responsibility for the maintenance of quiet and order and for the protection of the population will devolve upon the Lettish Government, or in certain cases upon the Allied Commissions. Measures will in particular be taken in these regions for the protection of the German population which is menaced.

The German Delegation would be glad to receive a reply to these proposals.⁴

I have, etc.,

FREIHERR VON LERSNER

¹ President of the German Peace Delegation at Versailles.

² This note was transmitted to Lord Curzon under cover of dispatch No. 1251 of July 9 from Mr. Balfour, and was received in the Foreign Office on July 11.

³ The original German read *Gegensätze*.

⁴ In a communication dated August 3, 1919, the Commission on Baltic Affairs at the Peace Conference drew the attention of the Supreme Council to this unanswered note, but it appears that no written reply was made.

No. 7

Record of a Meeting of the Commission on Baltic Affairs at the Peace Conference in Paris on July 7, 1919

[Confidential/General/177/2]

Procès-verbal No 14. Séance du 7 juillet 1919

La séance est ouverte à 10 heures 30, sous la présidence de Sir Esme Howard.¹

Sont présents: Le Major R. Tyler (*États-Unis d'Amérique*); Sir E. Howard (*Empire Britannique*); M. de Céligny (*France*); le Marquis della Torretta (*Italie*); M. Otchiai (*Japon*).

Assistent également à la séance: Le Lieut-Colonel Warwick Greene (*États-Unis d'Amérique*); M. Vignon et le Commandant Aublet (*France*).

MM. les Membres de la Délégation lithuanienne sont introduits. Ce sont:

Audition de la Délégation lithuanienne. • MM. le Professeur A. Voldemar, Président de la Délégation; J. Staugaitis, Vice-Président du Conseil d'État; le Chanoine Grigaitis, Vicaire général; le Colonel Gedgoudas; Klimas, Secrétaire de la Délégation.

Un mémorandum exposant les revendications de la Lithuanie est distribué aux Membres de la Commission.

M. STAUGAITIS, sur l'invitation du Président, donne les renseignements suivants:

L'ordre est maintenant presque complètement établi en Lithuanie.

Il existe un Gouvernement dont j'ai l'honneur d'être Vice-Président; mais, dans les conditions actuelles, il a été impossible de procéder à des élections pour former le Parlement.

Nous avons une armée qui repousse l'invasion étrangère et maintient l'ordre intérieur sans le secours d'autres troupes. Les troupes allemandes qui sont dans l'intérieur du pays — il n'y en a plus sur le front — sont plutôt un élément de désordre.

LE PRÉSIDENT. Veuillez répéter ici ce que vous m'avez dit au sujet de la situation des partis politiques.²

¹ H.M. Minister at Stockholm; at that time a member of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference and Chairman of the Commission on Baltic Affairs.

² M. Staugaitis had given Sir E. Howard information upon this subject in the course of a conversation between them concerning relations between the United Kingdom and Lithuania which had taken place in Paris on July 1, 1919. M. Staugaitis had also stated on that occasion, as recorded in Sir E. Howard's note of the conversation, that when Lithuania 'was first occupied by the Germans they were looked upon rather in the light of liberators but that the requisitions and high-handed dealings of the Germans towards the peasantry and the people at large had altogether alienated all sympathy for Germany and that there was no question but that the great mass of the people now would welcome the departure of the Germans and look to Great Britain as their best protector'. In reply Sir E. Howard 'was careful to emphasise that while we were willing and anxious to do what was possible to assist the Baltic States over the present critical period, we could only act in every way in harmony with our Allies'.

M. STAUGAITIS. Le parti le plus puissant est celui des démocrates chrétiens. Vient ensuite le parti des socialistes-populistes qui est également nombreux. Le parti qui comprend le plus de forces intellectuelles est le parti du progrès national. Ces partis sont unanimes pour réclamer l'indépendance de la Lithuanie. Les allogènes habitant le pays, en particulier les Juifs et les Blancs-Russiens, sont du même avis, à l'exception de quelques Polonais.

Le Gouvernement est composé de représentants de tous ces partis. C'est ce qui forme la coalition dans le Cabinet.

Le parti socialiste forme deux branches: les socialistes-démocrates, comprenant plutôt les intellectuels, et les socialistes-populistes, qui ont des organisations ouvrières dans le pays.

Les Juifs et les Blancs-Russiens sont aussi représentés dans le Cabinet par des titulaires spéciaux à chaque nationalité.

On peut considérer le Cabinet actuel comme un Gouvernement national représentant tous les partis.

La Lithuanie est un pays éminemment agricole; elle a moins souffert que d'autres de la guerre, car les Allemands ont ménagé jusqu'à un certain point le pays, pensant s'y maintenir après la guerre. La situation économique a été difficile seulement dans les villes à cause de la difficulté d'y transporter des vivres.

Quand les Bolcheviks ont à leur tour envahi la Lithuanie, ils ont tout pillé.

Malgré toutes ces difficultés, on est parvenu à labourer et à ensemercer les champs, sauf dans les propriétés de grande étendue, et nous espérons avoir une récolte suffisante.

LE PRÉSIDENT. Le Gouvernement peut-il se maintenir par ses propres ressources, par le produit des impôts ou la vente de stocks de bois ou autres produits?

M. STAUGAITIS. On peut répondre oui si l'on n'envisage que les dépenses normales d'administration du pays. Mais le Gouvernement crée une armée plus forte qu'il faut vêtir, équiper et armer. De là une source de dépenses considérables à laquelle il ne peut subvenir avec ses propres revenus.

Il y a bien encore des stocks de bois, mais il y en a peu car les Allemands ont procédé à une exploitation intensive, et même, depuis la constitution du Gouvernement national, ils ont continué à exporter le bois malgré l'interdiction.

Du reste les moyens de transport font défaut. Peut-être, si la récolte est bonne, pourra-t-on exporter des produits agricoles.

LE PROFESSEUR VOLDEMAR. Les statistiques allemandes évaluent à 23 millions de marks les bois importés en Allemagne où ils représentaient 43 millions.

De même elles mentionnent pour 208 millions de marks les exportations de Lithuanie qui représentaient en réalité en Allemagne 338 millions de marks. Et ce n'était pas la totalité des exportations.

On peut donc penser que les recettes dépasseront de beaucoup les dépenses.

LE PRÉSIDENT. En résumé, il existe en Lithuanie un Gouvernement national qui représente tous les partis. Il croit pouvoir assurer l'ordre avec ses

propres forces, après le départ des Allemands, et même organiser des forces locales suffisantes pour défendre la frontière contre les Bolcheviks.

Il peut payer les dépenses d'administration, mais il lui faut de l'argent pour l'armée.

La situation économique n'est pas aussi mauvaise que dans les autres provinces baltiques. Les habitants ne redoutent pas la famine et il n'est pas nécessaire d'insister sur le ravitaillement.

Quant aux marchandises et produits à exporter, vous ne pouvez indiquer de chiffre, faute d'évaluation. Il faut cependant trouver une base pour l'ouverture de crédits. C'est la question la plus urgente à régler.

LE LIEUT^T-COLONEL GREENE (*États-Unis d'Amérique*). La question de l'armée est extrêmement urgente en Lithuanie, d'où je reviens.

Le Colonel Dawley, Conseiller militaire, envoyé par le Général Pershing, y a trouvé 20,000 hommes de troupes allemandes payées par le Gouvernement lithuanien. 10,000 à 12,000 s'y trouvent encore.

Le Gouvernement allemand s'était engagé à équiper une armée de 20,000 Lithuaniens. 15,000 le sont aujourd'hui.

Les soldats allemands en Lithuanie sont payés par le Gouvernement local à raison de 5 marks par jour prélevés sur l'emprunt.

Le Colonel Dawley a trouvé les troupes lithuaniennes en excellent état et très bien commandées. Mais cette armée vient à peine d'être levée. Il lui faut encore deux mois d'entraînement avant de pouvoir défendre efficacement le pays.

La question militaire est urgente, car après le départ des Allemands le pays risque de s'effondrer, puisque l'armée lithuanienne dépend d'eux jusqu'ici au point de vue du ravitaillement, de l'équipement et des armes.

Au point de vue finances, le Gouvernement lithuanien s'est procuré 5 millions de marks au moyen d'impôts et 100 millions de marks au moyen d'un emprunt fait au Gouvernement allemand. En outre, celui-ci lui a offert une nouvelle somme de 100 millions à la condition qu'il abandonne ses droits sur la Prusse orientale ainsi que les autres revendications qu'il avait présentées.

Au point de vue politique, la Mission a pu se rendre compte que le Gouvernement actuel est vraiment national autant que les circonstances le permettent. Personnellement, j'ai pu constater que juifs et catholiques sont également favorables à ce Gouvernement. Il en est de même des Blancs-Russiens. Quant à l'élément polonais il lui est fortement opposé parce qu'il n'a pas de représentant dans ce Gouvernement.

Deux dangers peuvent se présenter. Le premier provient du sentiment nettement anti-polonais de la population. Dans le cas où les Alliés viendraient aider le Gouvernement lithuanien, celui-ci devrait donner des assurances qu'il acceptera l'arbitrage sur toutes les questions pendantes entre lui et la Pologne.

LE COMMANDANT AUBLET (*France*). La mission militaire française nous a déclaré que le Gouvernement lithuanien était prêt à accepter tout arbitrage soit de l'Entente, soit de la Ligue des Nations. Quand la ligne de démarcation

entre Lithuanie et Pologne qui avait été fixée ici³ a été proclamée là-bas, elle a été immédiatement acceptée par le Gouvernement lithuanien parce qu'il s'agissait d'une décision de l'Entente.

LE LIEUT^{NT}-COLONEL GREENE (*États-Unis d'Amérique*). Le deuxième danger réside dans le mouvement antisémite qui prend naissance en ce moment dans la population. Si ce sentiment prenait de la force il ne serait pas sans nuire à la cause lithuanienne dans le public de l'Entente, mais il semble pouvoir être arrêté par le Gouvernement lithuanien.

Quant à la capacité financière de l'État lithuanien, en vue du remboursement des avances qui pourraient lui être consenties, il semble que le pays possède des ressources largement suffisantes pour lui permettre de rembourser les emprunts qui seraient nécessaires pour maintenir la situation militaire actuelle. Il faudrait sans doute faire appel au crédit pendant les trois premiers mois mais ensuite le pays pourrait vivre par ses propres moyens.

Il ne faut pas oublier d'ailleurs qu'une grosse dépense vient de la présence de 20 à 40,000 hommes de troupe allemands qui vivent dans le pays et dans une large mesure vivent du pays. 10,000 hommes de troupes lithuaniennes bien équipés et bien commandés seraient d'une efficacité supérieure, car ces troupes allemandes ne mettent aucun cœur à soutenir la cause qui leur est confiée et ne restent là que parce que les conditions de nourriture sont meilleures qu'ailleurs.

M. VOLDEMAR. Notre Gouvernement nous prie de soumettre à la Conférence une requête tendant à éloigner les troupes allemandes. Des conflits sanglants se sont produits entre Allemands et Lithuaniens.

La présence des troupes allemandes constitue plutôt une menace qu'une protection. Elles n'aiment guère se battre contre les bolchevistes. Jusqu'ici le Gouvernement lithuanien payait 4 marks par jour à chaque Allemand. J'ai envoyé une protestation à cet égard parce que selon les conditions de l'Armistice ce sont les Alliés qui ont stipulé que les troupes allemandes resteraient dans le pays.⁴ le paiement de ces troupes ne nous regarde donc pas.

Au point de vue de leur utilisation, les Allemands eux-mêmes nous ont indiqué que lorsqu'on voulait les employer contre les bolchevistes ce n'était pas à Berlin qu'il fallait s'adresser mais au régiment dont on désirait le concours. 'Payez telle somme, nous a-t-on dit, et le régiment marchera. Si vous ne payez rien il se joindra aux bolchevistes.'

Nous avons surpris des négociations au cours desquelles les Allemands vendaient un de leurs régiments aux bolchevistes pour 5 millions de roubles. Aujourd'hui leur concours n'est plus nécessaire et nous désirons trouver un moyen de les éloigner à condition que l'armée lithuanienne reçoive de son côté le nécessaire en armes et en munitions.

Au sujet du mouvement anti-juif en Lithuanie, je reconnais que des meurtres ont pu se produire, mais cela ne provient aucunement d'un sentiment antisémite. Cela est si vrai que les Lithuaniens, lors des élections à la Douma impériale en Russie, faisaient bloc avec les Juifs contre les Polonais.

³ See Vol. I, No. 19, minute 1 and appendix A.

⁴ Cf. Introductory Note, note 3.

Ce qui a pu créer dans certains cas de l'animosité contre les Juifs c'est que ceux-ci ont souvent servi d'interprètes entre la population et les Allemands, en particulier lors des réquisitions dans les villages. Cela a pu produire parfois mauvais effet.

De même aussi les Juifs ont fait de la spéculation et il n'y a rien d'étonnant dans ces conditions que des lynchages et des actes de violence aient eu lieu.

Le meilleur remède serait dans la création d'un Ministère des affaires juives qui réglerait toutes ces questions et mettra fin à toutes les conséquences fâcheuses de l'état de choses actuel.

LE PRÉSIDENT. Nous vous remercions beaucoup, messieurs, d'être venus exposer vos revendications et nous donner des renseignements sur la Lithuanie. Nous désirons venir en aide à votre pays pour qu'il puisse former comme les autres États baltiques un Gouvernement stable et maintenir une barrière contre l'influence allemande d'une part et le bolchevisme de l'autre.

Au sujet du statut de la Lithuanie nous pensons qu'il est impossible d'arriver à une décision définitive en ce moment. La solution de la question doit être remise jusqu'au moment où nous pourrions passer un accord avec la Russie. Sans cela il ne pourrait pas y avoir de paix durable.

Le seul moyen de résoudre le problème financier serait d'essayer de faire des emprunts en se basant sur les ressources que possède votre Gouvernement. Ce qu'on pourra faire on le fera, mais j'ai déjà expliqué à M. Staugaitis les difficultés que nous rencontrons dans nos propres pays, en particulier en Angleterre.⁵ Les dépenses sont énormes et les ouvriers se demanderaient pourquoi nous donnerions notre argent aux autres alors que nous en avons tant besoin nous-mêmes. J'espère cependant qu'avec de la bonne volonté on pourra arriver à une solution de cette question.

Je veux ajouter enfin qu'il est nécessaire d'éviter tout conflit avec les Israélites et qu'il faut essayer également d'arriver à un accord amiable avec le Gouvernement polonais.

La Délégation lithuanienne se retire. . . .⁶

⁵ Cf. note 2 above.

⁶ The meeting passed to the consideration of other matters.

No. 8

Directions given by the Head of the Allied Military Mission in accordance with Clauses 5 and 9 of the Armistice made at Strasdenhof on July 3, 1919¹

[106613/61232/38]

1. All officers and men of the Landeswehr who, at any time before January 1st, 1919, were citizens of the German Empire, shall resign or be discharged from the Landeswehr forthwith.

¹ These directions were communicated to the Foreign Office as an appendix to dispatch No. 10 of July 13, 1919, from Colonel Tallents (not printed). This dispatch was received on July 23.

2. An Allied officer nominated by the Head of the Allied Military Mission will assume command of the Landeswehr immediately.²

3. All arms, ammunition, equipment, and other military supplies of every nature in possession of the Landeswehr or of individual members of the Landeswehr, excepting property personally owned at the time of the signing of these directions, will, as from this date, become the property of the Latvian State and will be disposed of accordingly.

H. P. GOUGH

Lt.-General

8th July 1919

² This officer was Lt.-Col. the Hon. H. R. Alexander, who had been attached to Colonel Tallents's mission as Relief Adviser. Colonel Tallents stated in his above-mentioned covering dispatch: 'In the crisis through which we have been passing I felt justified in agreeing with General Gough to the appointment of Lt.-Col. Alexander as Commander of the Landeswehr. This officer has exceptional qualifications of experience, intelligence and personality for this post. He is trusted and liked by both Balts and Letts, and if anyone can carry through the reorganization of the Landeswehr he will do it. He made a satisfactory start yesterday, when he met the leaders of the Corps. I am informed that Major Fletcher himself has behaved most properly in this matter by encouraging his men to accept the new regime and discouraging all suggestions of opposition.'

No. 9

Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received July 11)

No. 175 Telegraphic [101283/855/38]

LIBAU, July 9, 1919

Copenhagen telegram No. 1355,¹ July 6.

Reports in (? Esthonia) received² that Russian troops at Mitau are under German influence, especially force under Colonel Bermont, a Caucasian of German extraction. Placards posted there call Germans to join Russian Army where it is stated special German units will be formed. From recent events it appears that Prince Lieven who is weak in zeal is dominated by his pro-German entourage and is more concerned with local politics than with future of Russia. Germans and Balts are still trying to use Russians in order to maintain their ascendancy in Courland.

At Libau Russian Commander Colonel Kanep is pro-Entente but he has continually to struggle against German influence and he is having great difficulty in carrying out orders of General Judenitch transmitted by General Gough to send his whole force to Narva.

Although Germany has recognised independence of Latvia German agents are fostering belief amongst Russians that Germany favours a United Russia and is willing to do more to equip Russian forces than Entente.

I have advised Military Mission to keep Balts and Russian units as distinct as possible.

Repeated to Copenhagen, Paris and General Gough informed.

¹ See No. 5, note 2.

² In the text of this telegram as received by the British Delegation in Paris this passage read: 'Reports continue to be received' etc.

No. 10

General Sir H. Gough (Libau) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received July 11)
No. H.G. 49 Telegraphic [599/2/5/15064]

LIBAU, July 11, 1919

Following for C.I.G.S.¹ is result of meeting between my representatives and German representatives 8 miles south of Riga, July 9.

1. Germans refused to leave Latvia until they consider large German interests are secure.

2. They do not recognise Ulman's [Ulmanis] Government until he has formed a Cabinet proved to their satisfaction capable of conducting the affairs of the country.

3. They refuse to evacuate by sea but if they withdraw intend to do so by road and rail.

4. They will not consider any guarantee of personal safety given by the Entente representatives.

5. Von der Goltz has given orders that no one is to come to Riga to meet my representatives.

My comment on above is as follows:

1. Until von der Goltz is ordered to get into direct touch with me and inform me of his movements and plans for evacuation I am powerless to enforce or even report on carrying out of evacuation of Latvia by the Germans.²

2. Germans are deliberately delaying their evacuation in order to complicate matters in Latvia. Composition of Latvia Government is no affair of Germans and should not be allowed to have any bearing whatever on the question of their immediate withdrawal.

3. Libau was evacuated by Germans for their own advantage as by cutting all wires, railways and roads and encircling the town they hoped to cause food troubles and difficulties for Entente. Subsequent evacuations have been caused by force of arms, not by orders from Paris.

(End of Part one.)

¹ Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

² On July 8, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Paris had, on the motion of Mr. Balfour, decided that General Gough be authorized to deal directly with local German commanders in the Baltic States in order to expedite their evacuation by German forces; Marshal Foch was requested to communicate the substance of this decision to the German Government 'with a request that the German Commanders in the Baltic States may be given the necessary instructions' (see Vol. I, No. 5, minute 5). Marshal Foch telegraphed accordingly to General Nudant on July 9; General Gough and the War Office were informed of this action in telegram No. 18 of July 10 from Mr. Balfour, which General Gough had apparently not received at the time of the dispatch of his telegram No. H.G. 49.

Part II.

4. I have the word of Baron Taube who raised and fought with Landwehr, given before a deputation from Baltic Barons, that Landwehr assisted by German troops were ordered to attack Esthonians by von der Goltz on June 18.³

5. Germans are intriguing with Lieven's Russians, the Russian North West Army and the Landwehr. Unless the Germans withdraw immediately and fulfil promises so often made temper of Letts and Esthonians will be inflamed to pitch which will result in serious conflict. At present I am able to control affairs but if situation is not firmly handled at once I solemnly warn you that I shall no longer be able to save Germans or Landwehr or the unhappy civilian population and what is now a peaceful and propitious settlement will end in war.

6. Please wire me Helsingfors repeating Britmis Riga what measures you intend to take to ensure immediate evacuation of Latvia by the Germans.

Addressed to War Office. Repeated Riga for Britmis and Colonel Tallents, and Astoria Paris for C.M.S. British Delegation.⁴

³ The reference was to the rupture of the local Armistice of Wenden which preceded that of Strasdenhof: cf. Introductory Note and No. 21, note 2.

⁴ On July 12 General Thwaites, Director of Military Intelligence, in his capacity of Chief of the Military Section (C.M.S.) of the British Delegation in Paris, transmitted a copy of this telegram to Marshal Foch under cover of letter M.S. 446 in which General Thwaites observed 'that the Germans are not proceeding honestly with the evacuation, and that their action, if allowed to continue on the present lines, will inevitably lead to a fresh outbreak of hostilities in this region'. General Thwaites requested that 'very early action should be taken in the matter' and submitted proposals for a further communication to the German Government. These proposals were substantially incorporated in Marshal Foch's telegram No. 3341 of July 13 to General Nudant, printed in Vol. I, No. 23, appendix C. (This message was transmitted by General Nudant to the German Government in his letter No. 1414/G of July 14. The German reply thereto, letter A.A.I. No. 4349 of July 24, is also printed in Vol. I, loc. cit.) Marshal Foch's telegram was communicated to General Gough in telegram No. 23 of July 16 from Mr. Balfour (not printed).

No. 11

Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received July 12)

No. 180 Telegraphic [101654/855/38]

LIBAU, July 11, 1919

My telegram No. 175,¹ July 9.

Colonel Kanep owing to his personal influence over his men was able to embark all his force July 10 except small detachment of cavalry and artillery.

Libau garrison now consists of Letts, Russians and Balts with British Commandant.

Repeated to Copenhagen and Paris.

¹ No. 9.

No. 12

Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received July 12)
No. 182 Telegraphic [102014/76438/38]

LIBAU, July 12, 1919

My telegram No. 66¹ of May 19.

Lithuanians have been obliged to purchase rolling stock from Germans.

On July 15 Lithuanians expect to take over from Germans line from Radziwiliski to Prekuln.

Repeated to Paris.

¹ Not printed. This telegram had reported that the Germans 'have announced intention of removing all rolling stock from Lithuania'.

No. 13

Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received July 18)
No. 43 [104532/8/38]

LIBAU, July 12, 1919

... As¹ regards Germany, the Lithuanian Government had not accepted the proposals recently made by the Germans for a loan etc., which would have made Lithuania a vassal state of Germany. They had also refused permission to the Germans to remain on Lithuanian territory with a view to holding the line from Wilkowitzki-Mariampol, to ward off any attack by the Poles. The Germans evidently wished to live on good terms with the Lithuanians and several proposals had been put forward by the Germans with a view to strengthening the economic ties between the two countries. The Lithuanians, however, could not forget the cruelties of the German occupation and they feared the ambition of Germany to conquer Lithuania economically. The idea had been canvassed of a union between East Prussia, Lithuania and Courland and an imperial commissioner, named Grenz, had come to Kowno to sound the Government on the subject. According to the scheme, the new state would be entirely agricultural and the idea had received the support of influential circles in East Prussia and of the big landowners of Courland. Lately the matter seemed to have been dropped and this change of attitude seemed due to the fact that the majority in East Prussia were determined to maintain intimate relations with West Prussia and the new proposal might impede this. The scheme had received no encouragement in Lithuania.

I have, etc.,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

¹ This dispatch reported a conversation between Mr. Grant Watson and Prof. Shimkus, Lithuanian Minister of Trade and Industry, recently arrived in Libau. The earlier part of the dispatch contained observations by Prof. Shimkus upon Lithuanian relations with other Powers.

No. 14

Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)

No. 44 [109197/8/59]

LIBAU, July 14, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 43¹ of 12th inst., I have the honour to report that I received a few days ago the visit of Dr. Gaigalat, the leader of the Lithuanians in Prussia who had fled from Memel to Libau because he had been warned that the Germans intended to arrest him. He stated that in the Memel district there was a considerable amount of bad feeling between the Germans and the Lithuanians and he hoped that the Allies would soon take over the area to be ceded with a view to calming the people. . . .²

The Lithuanians of Prussia were anxious to be united with Lithuania and the Germans would also prefer that to Allied rule, as they felt that, under Lithuanian rule, it would be easier for them to return eventually to Germany, while if the Allies remained in possession, such a course would be impossible. The Germans, of course, had not given up hope of an eventual retrocession of the territory to Germany.

As regards the situation in East Prussia, Dr. Gaigalat said that it was dominated by the fear of Poland. That had been the basis of the movement in favour of a union between East Prussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia. The prime mover had been Hr. Batocki, the over-president [*sic*], and after his fall the scheme had been abandoned owing to lack of popular support both in East Prussia and Lithuania. The Government was now in the hands of the Social Democrats, who were very nationalistic at present in their political opinions, especially Hr. Winnig.³ His party was combatting the 'Los von Deutschland' movement. Dr. Gaigalat mentioned that in the spring of this year, Hr. Bolck, a socialist, and a leading member in East Prussian political circles, had requested him to proceed on a mission to Kowno to sound the Lithuanian Government as regards the proposed union referred to above. The federation or 'Staatenbund' was to be of a very loose character and according to Hr. Bolck, it was intended that the constitution should be democratic and there were to be no ties with Germany. It is interesting to

¹ No. 13.

² Mr. Grant Watson proceeded to report particulars communicated by Dr. Gaigalat concerning the internal situation in Memel and local reactions to the forthcoming separation of Memel from Germany upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles. Dr. Gaigalat 'did not anticipate any serious opposition on the part of the local population . . . Of the population of 90-100,000, only about 40,000 were Germans and Jews; of these the majority were indifferent as to the political future of the district. The merchants on the whole were pleased at the prospect, as the joining up commercially of Memel to the valley of the Niemen could not but bring prosperity to the town. . . . A very vigorous campaign in favour of union with Germany was being carried on in the press, but this propaganda was artificial and the active pro-German movement was in reality only supported by the pastors and school teachers. The latter were irreconcilable enemies of the Lithuanian movement and would certainly be obliged to emigrate.'

³ Herr Winnig had recently succeeded Herr von Batocki as *Oberpräsident* of East Prussia. Cf. No. 28, note 2.

note that Esthonia was to be included; indeed the hand of the Baltic Committee at Koenigsberg with their programme of a German Baltonia is discernable in all these negotiations between Prussia and the neighbouring states. The Lithuanian Government refused to entertain any proposal involving union with Prussia.

Dr. Gaigalat had no special information as to the plans of the German military in Courland but he stated that in general the German military desired to co-operate closely with Russian forces as it was felt that only in Russia could Germany recoup herself for her losses in the West.

I am sending copies of this despatch to General Sir H. Gough and to General Burt.⁴

I have, etc.,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

⁴ Representative in Riga of the Military Mission under General Gough.

No. 15

Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received July 15)

No. 187 Telegraphic [103135/61232/38]

LIBAU, July 14, 1919

According to reliable source Davidoff's Russian division is expected to join Keller's Russian Division¹ at Mitau, both being in German pay. German troops passed through Prekuln July 7th to 11th from Memel towards Mitau. In conversation they stated that they were going to join up with Russian forces. Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Paris, Gough, Burt.

¹ This formation was under the command of Colonel Prince Bermond-Avalov, referred to as Colonel Bermont in No. 9. The formation was named after General Count Keller who, in the autumn of 1918, had been commander-in-chief-designate of the Russian Volunteer Northern Army, then forming, with German support, with a view to anti-Soviet operations in the Baltic Provinces. In December 1918 General Keller, before being able to take up his command, was killed in Kiev by Ukrainian nationalist supporters of General Petliura.

No. 16

Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)

No. 45 [109198/8/59]

LIBAU, July 15, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of some proposals made by a German Committee formed in Tilsit to strengthen the economic relations between Germany and Lithuania.

The Committee propose the creation of a large organisation at Tilsit of which the Lithuanian buying and purchasing societies would be members and which would practically control all the exports and imports of Lithuania. The organisation would arrange so that only German goods would reach the

Lithuanian market, while the Lithuanian exports would be sent exclusively to Germany.

The Lithuanian Government rejected the proposals.

Attention has been drawn in previous despatches to the efforts being made by the Germans to dominate the Lithuanian market and to the efforts being made by the Lithuanians to resist this encroachment.

The pro-Entente Government at Kovno, supported by the bulk of the people, have so far controlled the situation, but at any moment they may be forced to capitulate owing to 1. the aggressive attitude of the Poles, 2. financial difficulties.

It is clear that a country which has been stripped first by the Germans, then by the Bolsheviks, cannot recover without a foreign loan, especially as an army has to be maintained on a war footing.

As a pure financial transaction, the grant of a loan would not involve a great risk, as the Entente should be able to restrain the Poles and the country has great natural resources. The timber industry and agriculture should revive very rapidly. The commercial liberation of Memel should greatly increase the prosperity of the valley of the Niemen. In these circumstances, I submit that British bankers should be authorised to examine the value of the securities offered by the State with a view to assisting the Lithuanian Government financially.

Whatever decision is taken eventually as regards the future political constitution of Lithuania, it must be borne in mind that the national movement in Lithuania is quite as strong as the national movement in Latvia, Esthonia and Finland, and that the Lithuanian Government have shown quite as much aptitude to develop a local administration as the Lettish and Esthonian Governments. As at the present time there is no prospect of a democratic and orderly Government being formed in Russia, the Baltic Provinces will be obliged to fend for themselves for several years to come. During that period they will get no assistance from Russia and if Germany grants assistance, it will only be at usurious rates. The Baltic Provinces therefore regard the Allies as their sole source of assistance and they offer fair security for the repayment of a loan as soon as the country is freed of foreign elements, such as Poles, Germans, and Bolsheviks.

In Lithuania the money is required for the purchase of:—rolling stock, agricultural machinery, fertilisers, light railways for the transport of timber, etc.

As all these articles are required for restoring the fertility and prosperity of the country, I would recommend the grant of credit in London to the Lithuanian Government to purchase these articles of prime necessity. The credit would doubtless be secured by the forests taken over by the state.

As a mail is leaving for England, I am sending this despatch without consulting Colonel Tallents, who is in Riga, as I feel sure that he will concur generally in these recommendations. I am sending a copy to Riga by the first opportunity.

I have, etc.,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 16

Summary of proposals made to the Lithuanian Government by the Committee of encouragement of German-Lithuanian economic relations

The Committee state that there has been a strong desire on the part of Lithuanian agricultural and industrial concerns to expand and improve their mode of work through the organisation of purchasing and selling societies. Supporters of this activity, particularly those in the districts of Rossieny and Lakow, went to Tilsit for advice and assistance. As a result there were organised by the Committee meetings of German officials, German Lithuanians and representatives of banks to discuss the situation. The Government in Berlin as well as the German industrial combines were informed and were asked to assist. It was decided to create in Tilsit a society for technical advice which would form a connecting link between Lithuanian Societies and German industrial societies, under the auspices of the Government.

Apparently the local farmers are loath to subject themselves to German control such as the organisation described above would exercise over their activities; but the necessity of such control is emphasised by repeated assertions that under Russian yoke there had been no chance for Lithuanians to become accustomed to scientific and accurate methods of husbandry and accountancy. Tilsit is therefore expected to serve as educating centre and trusted [*sic*] with the mission of rendering the Lithuanians capable of managing their own affairs.

The following arrangements were proposed to widen the scope of activity of the above mentioned society for 'technical advice':—

1. A central company would be formed in Tilsit, which German industrial concerns, Lithuanian agricultural societies and landowners would join as members.

2. This central society would organise the proper equipment and schooling of Lithuanian societies according to German experience and would help them in the sale of their products and the purchase of German goods. There would be also a special technical department with the same objects as the above mentioned society for 'technical advice'.

3. The board of this society would consist of German officials, German Lithuanians who enjoy confidence in Lithuania and representatives of the local large banks as well as representatives of Lithuanian societies. Of course should the Lithuanian Government desire to be represented by a commissioner in the directorate, such a representative would be equally eligible.

It is hoped by means of this organisation to do away with the small middle-man and to improve the market for Lithuanian produce in Germany.

Should all these proposals be considered favourably by the Lithuanian Government, the whole machinery of German business would be set in motion to further the closest co-operation with Lithuania. In this manner the necessary capital would be introduced and German educational activity would begin in Lithuania. An answer is requested making it clear whether an agreement can be expected to be reached this year.

Note by Colonel Tallents of a conversation with General Prince Lieven in Riga
[109202/61232/59]

I had a long and frank talk with Prince Lieven today (July 15) during the latter part of which Uhlmanis was also present.

Prince Lieven said he had always refrained from interfering with the internal politics of Latvia, and he felt that recent suggestions in the Lettish papers that he had political designs against her independence were both unjust and harmful. He said that in April last he had been asked to assume the military dictatorship of the country, but had declined to do so unless the population and Colonel Ballod² invited him. In the absence of such an invitation he had done nothing. When the Landeswehr attacked the Estonians he had recalled his own troops, to the annoyance both of the Landeswehr and the Germans, and one of his own detachments had lately kept order in Libau to the satisfaction of the Allies and Mr. Uhlmanis.

He now had three detachments under his personal command. Of these one had already left Libau for the northern front;³ a second was only beginning to be formed in Riga, and a third was at Mitau. A Russian colonel Bermont, who now commanded 800 men in Mitau, had declined to conform to General Yudenitch's instructions. Prince Lieven wished to purge his forces of Germanophil elements, but as he had not sufficient forces to disarm him and liked the man personally, he had told him that he must accordingly cease to belong to his corps. He had advised him to go against the Bolsheviks on the left bank of the Dvina, keeping entirely out of Latvia. Prince Lieven mentioned the rumour that General von der Goltz with Colonel Bermont thought of making a raid on Riga. He hardly thought this likely, but said it was certainly possible, since Bermont appeared to have ample funds and was a Caucasian of headstrong temperament. For himself he did not expect to get much further help from the Germans. In January last he had seen Admiral Sinclair.⁴ Lately he had seen Admiral Cowan,⁵ but on neither occasion had he been able to secure support from the Allies, which he would have preferred to German help. He hoped that this would now be arranged through General Burt. He himself was moving from Mitau to Riga in two days, and he would like to arrange that his troops should have a base at Libau, where they could be equipped before being sent up to the Narva front. There would not be more than 1,000 or 1,500 men in the barracks at Libau under such an arrangement at one time. This point he put to Mr. Uhlmanis, who was disposed to accept the proposal provided that the Allies

¹ This note was transmitted by Colonel Tallents to Lord Curzon under cover of his dispatch No. 11 (not printed), dated from Riga on July 16 and received in the Foreign Office on July 29.

² Colonel in command of Latvian forces.

³ Cf. No. 11.

⁴ Admiral formerly in command of British naval forces in the Baltic.

⁵ Admiral then in command of British naval forces in the Baltic.

would take the responsibility for these forces and attach a couple of officers to them. He mentioned that he had already sent an officer to stop the transfer of Russians from Poland to his corps until its base had been separated from the Germans at Mitau.

Prince Lieven impressed me, as he has impressed General Burt, with his obvious sincerity.

In the course of his conversation he told me that German troops only about a fortnight ago, before withdrawing from the neighbourhood of his estate near Mitau, had thrown all his valuable library into the river.

S. G. TALLENTS

15/7/19

No. 18

*General Prince Lieven to General Burt (Riga)*¹

[109208/109208/59]

My General!

MITAU, July 16, 1919

When I came back to Mitau I found all upside down. Col. Bermont has more or less set himself in my place as Commander of my Corps. He has all the sympathies on his side because he has all the money and all the power. Neither I nor the detachment of Col. Wergolitsch² have received any more funds and we cannot pay our men on the 20th of July their wages. They will then run over to Bermont who has everywhere his agents.

I have 3 requests:

1st, to give my detachment and the one of Col. Wergolitsch the possibility to go to a place under your protection. It can be only question of Riga or Libau.

2nd. We must be fed here or there by the means of Lettish troops. The costs could be paid back later on.

3rd. We must have funds to pay the wages of our men on the 20th of July, about 700,000 marks (350,000 Rbls Ost) for 10 days, for Wergolitsch and me. Could this sum not be advanced by Ulmanis till I realize the affairs I spoke to you about in Libau?

If we do not undertake these three steps we lose most of our men and the prestige of the Entente. Bermont and Germany win just so much. The position is too serious as to be able to be passed by [*sic*], for I cannot move our men away from Mitau if I cannot promise them that they will receive all that what they have to receive.

I am sorry to say that I received the most desolate complaints from the rest of my detachment in Libau. Their enshippment for the north is postponed from day to day. The men are very badly fed and the horses not at all, for they have no hay nor straw nor oats any more. Col. Robinson³ promised help for tomorrow, but the help never comes. The men wish to break up and

¹ A copy of this letter was transmitted by Colonel Tallents to Lord Curzon on July 19 and was received in the Foreign Office on July 29.

² Colonel in command of a Russian force in Lithuania.

³ Colonel Rowan Robinson was British military representative at Libau.

come back to Mitau. I wired them to wait. I send today Capt. Kavelin to Libau with a letter to Col. Robinson.

At last I should like to tell you that I have controlled the rumours about an attack of Germans against Riga, and I came to the conviction that it is a bluff colported by some provocator. Nobody thinks of going to Riga.

I hope to be after tomorrow (Friday) in Riga and hope our work will advance. I would be too sad if all passed over to Bermont and I stayed alone true to my principles.

It was a special privilege to have met you in common work and I am,

Yours very truly,

PRINCE LIEVEN

P.S. Lieutenant Nuremberg is in state to give you further explanations.

PRINCE LIEVEN⁴

⁴ This letter was minuted as follows on July 30 by Mr. Harvey in the Russia Department of the Foreign Office: 'This is rather sad reading but I think the situation of Prince Lieven's Corps has improved since the date of this letter. General Gough borrowed 700,000 marks from M. Ulmanis's Government to pay the Corps on July 21, and Paris have approved in principle the issue of a credit of £500,000 for General Gough's use. Practically all Prince Lieven's men have now been sent to join the Russian North-West Army.

'Col. Bermont has been intriguing with the Germans at Mitau but it is unlikely that they will do much to help him.'

General Gough had asked that the Allied Governments should grant an immediate credit of £500,000 at the end of June, and the matter had been discussed by the Supreme Council at Paris on July 8 and 21, when it was postponed: see Vol. I, No. 5, minute 5 and No. 16, minute 7. In dispatch No. 1396 of July 25, Mr. Balfour asked Lord Curzon to obtain 'a very early decision' in the matter from the Treasury, observing that he was 'doubtless aware of the importance attached by both the Political and Military Sections here to obtaining a favourable decision'. On August 22, however, in answer to an inquiry of August 14 from Lord Curzon, Mr. Balfour telegraphed that the 'impression gained from informal conversations here is that other Allied Governments will not participate in the advance' of £500,000. On the following day the Treasury informed the Foreign Office that it was understood that the proposal had not been favourably received by the Treasuries of Allied Governments, and that under these circumstances it was not considered possible 'to accede to General Gough's request. This decision has already been communicated to General Gough from Paris.'

No. 19

Note by Colonel Tallents of a conversation with Baron Fircks in Riga¹

[109206/855/59]

Baron Fircks, the President of the Baltic National Committee, came to see me this afternoon (July 16) and to thank me for the part which I had taken over the formation of the new Government.²

He told me that in Germany (e.g. at Sweinemunde [*sic*] and Stettin) great hostility was being shown by the German population to the Baltic Barons whom they accused of having betrayed them in Latvia. This cry apparently

¹ This note was transmitted by Colonel Tallents to Lord Curzon on July 19 and was received in the Foreign Office on July 29.

² Cf. Introductory Note.

arises from the fact that many of the Germans were originally encouraged to enlist for fighting in Latvia by the promise of land. Baron Fircks had privately conceived the idea that if the State would buy from them one-third of their estates, which they had originally offered to sell for this purpose, the Courland Barons might use the proceeds to compensate the men.

He told me that he had spoken with von der Goltz about ten days ago, and that von der Goltz had then told him that he should not embark upon an adventure for the capture of Riga, as this would embarrass his Government too much.

He told me further that in the better parts of Riga the Balts were treated with correctness. This, he thought, was not true of the lower quarters of the city. He expressed regret that Colonel Ballod³ should have been allowed to go to the front leaving Colonel Semitan³ with his less disciplined and more discontented troops in the town.

³ A Latvian officer.

No. 20

M. Sleževičius to Colonel Tallents¹

J. No. 1235 [112813/8/59]

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE L'ÉTAT LITUANIEN,

KAUNAS,² le 18 juillet 1919

Le Gouvernement Lituanien a l'honneur de Vous envoyer, ci-joint, les copies de[s] communiqués au sujet de la conduite des Polonais et des Allemands en Lituanie.³ Le Gouvernement Lituanien Vous demande d'attirer l'attention de Votre Haut Gouvernement sur la position pénible dans laquelle se trouve mise la Lituanie. D'un côté lorsque le Gouvernement Lituanien était obligé de concentrer toute sa force armée sur le front contre les bolchéviks russes et quand il espérait que la ligne de démarcation serait respectée, les Polonais, dédaignant la ligne de démarcation établie par l'Entente, se précipitent sur le territoire de la Lituanie,⁴ violant l'ordre dans la contrée; [? ils] dispersent à main armée les institutions civiles du Gouvernement Lituanien; ils emprisonnent les représentants du Pouvoir Lituanien et assaillent les innocents citoyens de la Lituanie, leur ravissent leur propriété et souvent même la vie.

D'un autre côté, l'Armée allemande ne prêtant aucun égard aux plus formelles exigences du Gouvernement Lituanien, et n'ayant garde de ses propres assurances que, jusqu'au 15 juillet, elle sortirait des limites de l'État

¹ This note was addressed to Colonel Tallents at Libau and was transmitted from there to Lord Curzon by Colonel Rowan Robinson on July 26. It was received in the Foreign Office on August 7, 1919.

² i.e. Kovno.

³ Annexed to the original were fifteen enclosures, which included complaints from Lithuanian local authorities, Lithuanian military reports, and extracts from the Lithuanian press. One specimen of these enclosures is printed below.

⁴ Cf. Vol. I, No. 19, minute 1.

Lituanien,⁵ non seulement elle n'abandonne pas ce pays, mais elle s'efforce de faire revenir l'ancien temps de son occupation. Des masses de soldats se conduisent inhumainement envers les habitants; ils accomplissent des agressions et des pillages; ils dévalisent les voyageurs sur les routes; ils s'emparent des charrettes avec leurs chevaux; ils frappent et dispersent les villageois; ils osent réquisitionner officiellement: quand on refuse de s'y soumettre, ils menacent de fusillades et d'incendieage [*sic*] de villages entiers.

Comme l'Armée allemande se trouve concentrée sur un espace peu étendu et elle est riche en armes de toute sorte, mitrailleuses et artillerie, l'Armée lituanienne qui se trouve partagée entre le front bolchévique russe et le front polonais ne dispose pas d'hommes libres pour la défense de la pression allemande. Les gens se sont réfugiés dans les bois. Les Allemands font paître leurs troupeaux dans les champs de blé, dans les jardins.

Tout ceci est exprimé dans les rapports ci-joints.³

Sans tenir compte des prières du Gouvernement Lituanien dirigées aux Puissances Alliées et [de] ses protestations contre l'invasion polonaise en Lituanie et l'obstination des Allemands à ne pas quitter la terre lituanienne, tant les Allemands que les Polonais demeurent tous sur le territoire lituanien. Pour ce, le Gouvernement Lituanien a l'honneur de Vous prier de bien vouloir attirer l'attention du Haut Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne sur la position pénible de la Lituanie et de le prier de donner des ordres formels de défendre aux Polonais d'envahir la Lituanie et qu'il soit ordonné définitivement aux Allemands de quitter la Lituanie; de plus, comme une formidable offensive des bolchéviks russes est attendue, pour repousser laquelle toutes les qualités des armes sont nécessaires avec leurs munitions, j'ai l'honneur de prier le Haut Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne de donner à l'Armée lituanienne, le plus vite possible, des armes pour armer 15,000 mille [*sic*] hommes au moins, ainsi que les munitions nécessaires à ce nombre d'armes pour eux et des vêtements pour ces quinze mille soldats.

Agréez, etc.

M. SLEŽEVIČIUS

Le Ministre Président

et

l'Administrateur du Ministère des Affaires
Étrangères.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 20³

M. Sleževičius to the Lithuanian Delegation in Paris

Dépêche. N. 99

KAUNAS, le 17 juillet 1919

Le Gouvernement Lituanien vient de recevoir de Siauliai le rapport suivant:

Dans les derniers temps la situation devient intolérable. Tous les travaux ont cessé à cause des pillages commis par les Allemands dans tout l'arrondisse-

⁵ Cf. No. 12.

ment de Siauliai. Plus de 10 villages et grandes propriétés fut pillé, beaucoup de gens est tué [*sic*], on abat le bétail et détruit les récoltes. Dans les communes de Lygumai, Gaišiunai et Stačiunai la milice fut supprimée, les soldats sont désarmés, le nombre des Allemands croît dans les alentours. Le Commandant lituanien n'a pas les moyens de protéger les habitants contre les assauts et pillages des Allemands.

La panique règne dans les villages—les gens s'enfuient et se cachent dans les forêts.

Nous demandons d'entreprendre tout le nécessaire pour aboutir—avec l'aide des Puissances alliées et de l'armée—au retrait immédiat des Allemands.

De grande nécessité pour Siauliai serait également la présence d'un représentant des Puissances alliées pour contrôler les agissements des Allemands.

Signatures: le Chef de l'administration de l'arrondissement. Le Délégué du Ministère du Ravitaillement pour l'arrondissement de Siauliai. Le Délégué du Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Biens d'Etat.

Des plaintes pareilles arrivent au Gouvernement Lituanien chaque jour, non seulement de l'arrondissement de Siauliai mais de presque toutes les contrées de la Lituanie occupées par les Allemands. En conséquence, le Gouvernement Lituanien demande d'entreprendre de suite tous les pas nécessaires en vue que toute la Lituanie et en première ligne la partie de la Lituanie au Nord du Nemunas⁶—nommément les arrondissements de Siauliai, Telšiai, Rossieinai et autres, soient immédiatement évacués [*sic*] par l'armée allemande.

SLEŽEVIČIUS

Pour la Traduction. Dr. [signature illegible].

⁶ i.e. the river Niemen.

No. 21

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)

No. 12 [109203/61232/59]

Sir,

RIGA, July 19, 1919

I have the honour to enclose herewith in duplicate copies of an order issued by Major Fletcher, commanding the Baltic Landeswehr, to his officers. The original copies of this order were found by the interpreter attached to my mission, in the Ritterhaus, Riga.¹ It will be observed from the date upon it that it was issued three days after the second meeting at Wenden, when I communicated to Major Fletcher General Gough's orders for the continuation of the armistice.²

¹ It was noted in an English heading to the German text of the enclosure (see note 3 below) that these copies had been found on July 16, 1919.

² The reference was to the local Armistice of Wenden which preceded that of Strasdenhof: for events relating thereto see Sir S. Tallents, *op. cit.*, p. 314 f.; Lt.-Col. du Parquet, *Der Drang nach Osten: L'Aventure allemande en Lettonie* (Paris, 1926), p. 98 f.; General Count R. von der Goltz, *Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum* (Leipzig, 1920), p. 197 f.

This order sets out clearly the German view of English activities in the Baltic Provinces. It also shows how much the Germans fear exactly those developments which have, in fact, taken place during the last month.

I have, etc.,

S. G. TALLENTS

Lt.-Col.

British Commissioner for the
Baltic Provinces.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 21

*Order issued by Major Fletcher in Riga
Translation supplied by the Latvian Government³*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE
BAL TIC LANDESWEHR.

RIGA, June 16, 1919

Confidential and to be destroyed after its use.

To the officers for acquainting the men.

As it will probably come to a fight with the Ulmanis-Letts and Esthonians the following, as regards the present position, is to be considered:

After the overthrow of Ulmanis' government, which is hostile towards the Germans, in Lettland in April last it was replaced by that of Needra. Although Needra is an enthusiastic Lett he will not be in opposition to the local Germans in regard to their right to live, to do business and to make headway in the country. On the other hand, as regards the aims of Ulmanis it is known by his own statements and numerous instances that he wishes to exterminate and to expel not only the so-called 'Barons', but *every* local German. From news just received from England it may be concluded with certainty that English aims are identical i.e. both to make impossible every endeavour of Germany becoming strong and to frustrate, by all means, the coming alliance of Germany with Russia. With the assistance of Esthonians and Ulmanis a Lettland is to be called into existence which is to be a tributary of England and is to serve as a wedge between Germany and Russia. Having this in view, England not only frustrated at the time the armistice, concluded on the 10th June a.c. at Wenden² and sanctioned already by the Allied Powers, according to which Lettland, i.e. the Government Needra, was promised Northern Lettland and Esthonians and Ulmanis-Lettish troops

³ Colonel Tallents also enclosed a copy of the original German text (not printed). The original translation supplied by the Latvian Government, as received in the Foreign Office, has been retained. This translation, though not always perfectly idiomatic, is literal except for occasional passages noted below.

had to clear the district, but is now creating conditions under which Germanism *must* go under on the Baltic coast,⁴ viz:—

1. Setting up the Ministry Ulmanis,
2. Sending back one half of the German troops to Germany, etc.

In other words, England thinks to have found in the Esthonian troops and the two Lettish Ulmanis brigades the necessary force in order to give the Germans here the death-blow, to make impossible for Germany every later development and expansion and to steal from Germany the opportunity of having before long a great and powerful Ally—Russia. Ulmanis and the present Esthonian government are half-Bolshevistic which is demonstrated by the fact that they have taken into their service whole Bolshevik regiments and have called Red Guards, who are in hiding in forests, to combat, with arms in hand, the Germans—the Iron Division and the Landeswehr. England has, as the reward of Judas, got from Esthonia the island Oesel in order to make business, as usual, on both sides.

If it is now impossible that the treaty of the Esthonian armistice of the 10th June a.c. attains again its full force and Needra's government remains in power, then Germanism and every German here are lost. France and America, as it has been shown by the negotiations, are against England. Therefore, the hour requires the support of the government Needra and the prevention by all means of the coming of Ulmanis' government. This can only be achieved by a victory over the Esthonian and the Lettish Ulmanis troops and must be assisted by the Iron Division with all strength at their disposal.

The revival of the Bolsheviks is a new danger threatening already from the East, but this can only be combatted when Northern Lettland is freed from Esthonians and rebellious Letts and an anti-Bolshevist government is here in power.

Finally, the question to be asked is not whether one *wishes* to fight. One *must* fight if one does not wish to go under. Further *negotiations* surely throttle us diplomatically.⁵ Now is the time of action. There can be no doubt that also England will in the end recognise a victorious Lettland, with the government of Needra at head, which will then grant⁶ its deliverers land for colonisation. Only then the German question here will be solved in a tolerable way for Germanism, and one will have the prospect in the present difficult times of finding a home and possibility of existence in this beautiful country.

The important duty of the leaders is to enlighten convincingly their men in this sense,

The Commander in Chief
FLETCHER

The correctness for translation certifies: Lt. Student

⁴ In original: '... und verlangt nun Bedingungen bei denen hier das Deutschtum zu Grunde gehen muss.'

⁵ In original: 'Weiteres Verhandeln würgt uns diplomatisch unfehlbar ab.'

⁶ In literal translation '... will then gladly [gern] grant'.

*Note by Colonel Tallents of a Conference at St. Olai*¹

[113491/61232/59]

1. A conference between General Gough and General von der Goltz was held at St. Olai, between Riga and Mitau, on July 19 at two o'clock. The following were present:—

British: General Gough, General Burt, Lt.-Col. Tallents, Major Wilson, Major Keenan, Mr. Harrison.

Allied: Col. du Parquet, French Mission.
Lt. Stonestreet, U.S. Mission.

German: General von der Goltz.

Mr. Burchardt, Chief German Civil Representative.

Captain von Jagow, of Gen. von der Goltz's staff.

Captain von Ludwiger, Mr. Burchardt's Civil Representative in Riga.
Other German officers unknown.

Others: Two Lettish and two Esthonian representatives were in waiting outside in case they were required to sign a peace agreement in pursuance of the armistice of Strasdenhof, July 3. During part of the conference Major Fletcher, Commanding the Landeswehr, Baron von Taube (Landeswehr), Count Dohne and Mr. Reusner, a civilian leader of the Balts, were present.

Mr. Harrison took full notes of the proceedings, which will be available in due course. This advance report is based on notes taken by me.

2. *General von der Goltz's position.* General von der Goltz, for whom Captain von Jagow spoke practically throughout, said that he had no instructions from his Government to deal direct with General Gough. The day before, upon receiving a note from General Gough referring to such instructions, he had telegraphed to his Army Headquarters, but had as yet no answer. He was nevertheless prepared to make a statement of his intentions as regards withdrawal. In answer to questions he said that the German withdrawal from Libau was based on military considerations and not upon instructions received through his Government from the Allies.

3. *The need for a local peace agreement.* General von der Goltz said he wanted a peace made in pursuance of the Strasdenhof Armistice of July 3 as a guarantee of his safety during withdrawal. General Gough pointed out that the Esthonians had already withdrawn to Ramockzy, Wenden, etc. Peace in fact existed, and he saw no point in making a formal peace agreement. But if this was desired, he would raise no difficulty. General von der Goltz said that in view of General Gough's statement about an Esthonian withdrawal, the signature of a peace agreement was not a matter of concern to him. But he would like an undertaking from the Esthonians or General Gough that all German prisoners, wounded and sick would be returned, and that the

¹ This note of July 20, 1919, was received in the Foreign Office on August 8.

Esthonians would give up the three aeroplanes taken by them early in June. General Gough gave this undertaking, except as regards the aeroplanes. General von der Goltz claimed that they had been forced to land in Esthonia while employed on duties arising out of the common operations against the Bolsheviks. Their return was a question of principle and not of intrinsic value. General Gough said he would refer the question to Paris.

4. *The rights of German soldiers to land in Latvia.* Mr. Burchardt said they would like to know the position of German soldiers who had become entitled to land in Latvia under an agreement made by Mr. Ulmanis in December 1918. General Gough pointed out that all such agreements were abrogated by Articles 392 and 393² of the Treaty of Peace. The Germans asked whether this was only General Gough's personal view or the view taken by the Latvian Government. General Gough said it was primarily his own view. But the Latvian Government had no discretion as regards the abrogation of the agreement and the Peace Treaty. They might make a fresh agreement, but from conversation with Mr. Ulmanis he was sure he had no such intention. Mr. Burchardt claimed that the old agreement was made with individual German soldiers on the ground that individual soldiers were given copies of it; also (as regards Article 393)² that it was made freely and not by force.

General von der Goltz said he could not guarantee the actions of his troops on the interpretation adopted by General Gough to which neither he nor his Government agreed. Every German soldier knew that in December last Mr. Ulmanis came to the German authorities for help 'in an attitude unworthy of a man'. 'Their sensibilities would be hurt.' He would publish the matter in an order to his troops.

5. *The future of the Landeswehr.* General Gough explained that the German elements in the Landeswehr would be separated from the Baltic elements forthwith and must return to Germany. General von der Goltz said he had been preparing to supply the Landeswehr with fresh German material, but if the Germans were dismissed from it, he should not do this. General Gough agreed. General von der Goltz said that this decision and the time required for the separation of Germans from Balts would delay his general evacuation.

6. *The German evacuation of Latvia.* The particular case of Windau was first discussed. Finally General von der Goltz agreed to evacuate the garrison of Windau itself—about 600 men—on July 24th on General Gough's arranging for a ship. But he could not arrange for an equally prompt evacuation of the troops under von Gordon within a radius of fifty miles from Windau. If the garrison of Windau went at once, then these latter troops must withdraw by Mitau. Railway facilities at Mitau only allowed the use of the two main lines back to Germany i.e. via Shawli and via Memel and not of the Mitau-Windau line in addition.

7. The Germans stated that their plans for withdrawal were complete. At one point they stated that they would begin to withdraw directly they get orders from Germany. At another they said that their withdrawal had already

² In error for 292 and 293.

begun, pointing in particular to the small number of goods trains required as proof that a large bulk of stores had already been evacuated. They also spoke of ordering the necessary rolling stock from Germany at once. It was not clear whether they claimed to have already begun evacuation from Mitau (as apart from the withdrawal of troops through Mitau from Lithuania) or not.

8. The Germans said that with ample supplies of locomotives, rolling stock and coal the capacity of the two railways from Mitau to Germany was six trains a day. But transfer of rolling stock to the Allies, the defective condition of the remaining stock and strikes in the colliery districts of Germany must be set against the estimate. East Prussia had suffered especially from these difficulties. They invited the help of the Allies in surmounting this. Their railway directorate said that under present conditions a maximum service of three trains per day was possible. And this involved the complete cessation of passenger traffic and made no allowance for the evacuation of civilian refugees and their property. They suggested that General Gough should send a railway representative to Mitau. Evacuation by road was impossible, having regard to the inflamed state of Lettish opinion and to the fact that their troops were volunteers with revolutionary tendencies and not soldiers of the old German army.

9. They would require:—

177 troop trains
3 supply trains
19 food supply trains
15 munition trains
<hr/>
214 trains

This meant that the evacuation would take seventy-four days in existing conditions or thirty-seven days if the maximum improvement on these conditions was effected.

10. General von der Goltz said that as a junction for the Windau, Shawli and Memel lines, Mitau itself could not be evacuated for a long time.

Miscellaneous points

11. General von der Goltz undertook to restore telegraphic communication between Riga and Libau immediately.

12. General Gough asked General von der Goltz whether he recognised the Peace Treaty and his obligation to withdraw under it. General von der Goltz's reply was translated in the affirmative. He was understood to say actually that 'He had nothing against that'.

13. In reply to a question as to whether General von der Goltz recognised the right of British officers to travel freely in Latvia and Lithuania on passes signed by General Gough or Col. Tallents, Mr. Burchardt stated that arrangements had already been made in the matter. (This is correct.)

14. Mr. Burchardt said that the German commandant of a place near Libau had received orders from the British military commandant of Libau

to withdraw as soon as possible. General Gough agreed that this was probably *ultra vires*.

15. Mr. Burchardt said a number of questions arose under Marechal Foch's order about railway material.³ General Gough said that Major Easton should be sent to Mitau to deal with them.

16. General Gough referred to reports about the arrival of fresh troops in Mitau and asked for an explanation. Could General von der Goltz give an assurance that no more troops would be brought up? The reply was that when it was still uncertain whether the peace would be signed, General von der Goltz had sent back all the troops he could spare to join the concentration against Poland. When peace was signed he had asked for part of them to be returned for purposes of railway protection. Troops were still coming up to protect the line to Shawli where bands of brigands abounded. Only that day an attempt to destroy an important bridge had been reported.

17. Mr. Burchardt asked if General Gough agreed to his sending a courier to his representative in Reval. General Gough said that, so far as he was concerned, he would raise no objection.

18. Mr. Burchardt said that there had been fewer applications from civilian Germans to leave Riga in the S.S. *Hanover* than had been expected. Could they use the space for taking away German non-military material such as saw-milling machinery? General Gough refused this request.

Note

The impression made on me by this conference and confirmed by independent information was that the Germans were making no serious effort to withdraw from Latvia but were delaying the withdrawal in the hope that some excuse for their further intervention in the country might arise. I presume that the Allies will take steps sharply to accelerate the German retirement. There appears no ground for the claim that it cannot be carried out by road or by rail, road and sea in a very much shorter time than seventy-four days. On this point, however, I know that General Gough is making definite recommendations.⁴ I believe that he may also suggest arrangements for the handing over of surplus German war material. From the political point of view, the presence of German troops in Latvia has an evil effect which might easily become disastrous. This danger will be increased by the knowledge of the German troops that their hopes of land in Latvia are vain. Nothing is more vital than decisive measures for their prompt withdrawal. In particular Mr. Ulmanis asks that Mitau may be promptly evacuated or at least that a Lettish Civil Government may be established there at once. It appears possible that General von der Goltz's personal recall should be demanded on one of these alternative grounds, that he has deliberately failed

³ See Introductory Note.

⁴ These recommendations (evacuation, by sea, of all German forces from Latvia to be completed by August 20; prohibition of further entrance of German troops into Latvia) were contained in General Gough's telegram No. H.G. 53 of July 20 to Mr. Balfour reporting on the conference at St. Olai. This telegram is printed in Vol. I, No. 23, appendix C.

to obey his Government or has shown incompetence in endeavouring to comply with his instructions. There is a noticeable difference of attitude between General von der Goltz, who is plainly obstructive, and Mr. Burchardt, the Civil Representative. The latter, whatever his motives, and I am advised that he cannot be trusted far, expresses willingness to meet the wishes of the Entente representatives. In conversation he once made a remark to me which suggested that he was charged with seeing that von der Goltz showed a reasonable respect for the German Government's instructions. There is, also, a noticeable difference in the attitude adopted towards Allied representatives by officers of von der Goltz's staff in his presence and in his absence.

S. G. TALLENTS

Lt.-Col.

British Commissioner for the Baltic
Provinces

On board H.M.S. *Warwick*
between Riga and Libau,⁵
July 20, 1919.

⁵ In his telegram No. 33 of July 20 to Lord Curzon (received July 21; not printed), briefly reporting the conference at St. Olai, Colonel Tallents had concluded: 'After consultation with General Gough am proceeding to London immediately with a view to discussing urgent questions.' In the same telegram Colonel Tallents had stated: 'Regard sharp acceleration of withdrawal essential and easy. Attach great importance to completion of cutting further passage beyond Danzig (? zone) from Warsaw and Germany.'

No. 23

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir H. Gough (Riga)
No. 29 Telegraphic [599/2/5/15064]

PARIS, July 21, 1919

Following from Chief Military Section.

Reference my telegrams No. 18 of July 10th and No. 23 of July 16th to Helsingfors.¹

In view of denial by von der Goltz of knowledge of mandate conferred on you by Entente to deal direct with German local command regarding evacuation of Latvia by German forces, Marshal Foch has renewed his previous demands in this connection to German Armistice Commission and has further demanded that necessary instructions be issued without delay to German command in Baltic States.²

Repeated War Office No. 126; Foreign Office (by bag) No. 1181; General Haking, Cologne, No. 63; General Malcolm, Berlin, No. 47; General Wiart, Warsaw, No. 230/240 (by bag).

¹ For these telegrams see No. 10, notes 2 and 4 respectively.

² The reference was to Marshal Foch's telegram No. 3454 of July 20, printed in Vol. I, No. 23, appendix C.

No. 24

General Sir H. Gough (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received July 22)
No. G. 99 Telegraphic [599/2/5/15990]

RIGA, July 21, 1919

Following for Chief of Military Section.

Your 23, July 11,¹ was not received by me before despatch of my H.G. 53,² July 20. Grateful for prompt action and request you to carry out suggestions contained in my H.G. 53,² July 20, which will enable me to put an end to the present situation with its awkward possibilities.

¹ In error for July 16: see No. 23.

² See No. 22, note 4.

No. 25

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 24)
No. 28 Telegraphic: by bag [106493/61232/38]

PARIS, July 21, 1919

Following for General Gough (Riga).

Following from Chief Military Section:

Reference my wire No. 25 of 1st July.¹ The arrangement by which Germans were to leave behind locomotives and rolling stock in the Baltic States as part of the material due to the Allies has been dropped and Paragraph 1 of above telegram² is cancelled. The Supreme Economic Council is endeavouring to arrange for the despatch through Poland to Lithuania of 1,000 wagons and at least 30 locomotives. General Hammond, head of Allied Railway Mission at Warsaw, will be in charge of arrangements in Poland. You will be kept informed of progress but there may be considerable delay in arrival of locomotives and rolling stock. Understand Germans are inclined to hire or sell locomotives and rolling stock to Lithuanians. Any such arrangements that can be arrived at locally should be encouraged preferably on a hire basis. Please keep me advised of situation.

Repeated General Hammond, Warsaw No. 237/238, War Office No. 125, and Foreign Office No. 1187 by bag.

Following for General Hammond only.

This rolling stock for Lithuania is in addition to the 100 locomotives and 2,000 wagons ceded to Poland.

¹ This telegram (not printed) transmitted the message of that date cited in the first section of the Foreign Office memorandum in the Introductory Note.

² See paragraph 1 of the message of July 1 cited in the Foreign Office memorandum.

No. 26

*Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Libau)*¹

No. 9 Telegraphic [101235/61232/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 21, 1919*

Your telegram No. 8² (of 18th June).

You should take what action you can to secure removal or arrest of all obnoxious Germans in Balt formations representing themselves as Letts including Major Fletcher.³

¹ This telegram had been previously approved by Mr. Balfour.

² Not printed.

³ On July 24 Lord Kilmarnock, British Chargé d'Affaires at Copenhagen, informed Mr. Grant Watson in Copenhagen telegram No. 27 to Libau: 'Reliable source reports that German officers whose delivery had been asked for by Allies have sworn never to give themselves up and that large proportion have already been smuggled into Prince Lieven's corps through intermediary of Grenzschutz Ost. They are eventually to work their way to Japan and Japanese are said to have promised assistance'. This telegram was apparently not repeated to the Foreign Office (Copenhagen Archives/F.O. 211/508).

No. 27

General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris.

Received July 24)

No. G. 102 Telegraphic [599/2/5/16126]

HELSINGFORS, *July 22, 1919*

Herewith corrected copy of G.N. 143/22.

My H.G. 53¹ of July 20.

I think it essential that General von der Goltz should be ordered back to Germany without delay: Allies have already ordered that he should be relieved of command² but he has remained under various pretexts. As long as he remains his presence is dangerous.

Addressed Paris, repeated War Office and Riga.

¹ See No. 22, note 4.

² In a telegram of May 3, 1919, Marshal Foch had instructed General Nudant to inform the German Armistice Commission 'that the immediate recall of von der Goltz is now decided'. The decision had, however, subsequently been allowed to lapse.

No. 28

Mr. Grant Watson (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 5)

No. 47 [112101/61232/59]

RIGA, *July 23, 1919*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 39¹ of the 2nd inst., I have the honour to report that the German policy towards the Baltic States is still mainly

¹ Not printed. This dispatch, dated from Libau, related to events preceding the Armistice of Strasdenhof.

directed by Herr Winnig who, in addition to his duties as High Commissioner for East Prussia, acts as German Representative in Latvia and Esthonia.² He enjoys great influence in East Prussian circles as also with the Majority Socialists in Berlin; but those who are well acquainted with his work state that he is not far-seeing and that he has no grasp of reality. Under the influence of drink and other stimulants he is quick to seize at new ideas, but as regards Latvia, the policy which he has advocated has been opportunist. When the Revolution broke out in Germany in December he worked for the recognition of the independence of the Baltic Provinces and for the strengthening of the local national forces to build a dam against the Bolshevik tide. The forces, however, showed themselves hostile to Germany. Later, when the growth of the Polish army seemed to threaten East Prussia, he favoured the formation of a Staatenbund between East Prussia, Lithuania and Latvia, but again he failed to see that such a scheme was doomed to failure because of fundamental national antipathies. More recently the policy of Germany of forming Russian forces in Courland in close touch with Germany to hold the Bolshevik front and to check the Lettish movement partially failed because Germany could not control the Russian commanders.

German policy is still directed towards the maintenance of German influence on Russian forces by (i) grant of equipment, pay, etc., (ii) secret support of the policy of a united Russia. As regards this latter point, it is clear that Germany is willing to go back on her recognition of the independence of Latvia if by so doing she is able to win the support of the Russians. From intercepted orders, etc., Germany appears to realise that the formation of the independent States of Esthonia and Latvia, lying between Germany and Russia and fundamentally hostile to Germany, will severely hamper the relations between the two countries. The attitude of the Germans towards the Ulmanis Government, which personifies national aspirations, has never been more hostile than at present. Herr Winnig, the Minister, remains at Koenigsberg, but his representative Herr Burchardt is at Mitau. Branch missions have been established at Libau and Riga, which are in charge of Dr. Kuck and Captain von Ludwiger respectively.

As regards the military policy of Germany, the intention of General Count von der Goltz seems to be to remain in Courland until the last possible moment in the hope that some complication may occur which would render the further withdrawal of the German forces unnecessary.

The re-entry of the Russians on the Lettish stage has been neither dignified nor successful. For six months the Letts have seen practically no other Russians in Latvia except the Bolshevik troops with which they were fighting, except a small corps of two hundred under Prince Lieven who, to his credit

² In January 1919 Herr Winnig had been appointed by the German and Prussian Governments to the special office of *Reichskommissar* for East and West Prussia and for German-occupied territory of the former Russian Empire. In the summer of 1919 Herr Winnig became *Oberpräsident* of East Prussia (cf. No. 14, note 3). For the attitude and activities of Herr Winnig at that time, cf. his personal narrative: August Winnig: *Heimkehr* (Hamburg, 1935) *passim*.

be it said, remained at the front even in the darkest days of the Bolshevik successes. By the help of the Germans, Latvia was gradually liberated, but behind the German front there sprang up Russian armies, armed and equipped by the Germans. They came from Warsaw and from Germany, and in a short time their numbers increased from 200 to 5,000, and it was announced that further reinforcements were expected. The Letts feared that the Germans, while making a semblance of leaving the country, would in reality hand over the Government to Russian troops in their pay.

On June 24th the Germans informed the Balts of their intention to evacuate Libau, and the latter, having no Balt troops ready, immediately sent a detachment of Lieven's Russian troops to take the place of the retreating German garrison. The Commander of the Russian troops was Colonel Kanep, a Russian officer who had come into Courland from Warsaw, and who was chosen for his post because of his military qualifications. On his staff were several pro-German agents of the pan-Russian group, and it was clearly their intention to keep Libau as a Russian base. The Balts encouraged the scheme because they hoped that the Russians would help them to maintain their ascendancy in Courland. The plot failed because Colonel Kanep, against the orders of Prince Lieven's staff, placed himself at the disposal of the Entente, and shortly afterwards, acting contrary to the instructions of the Russian authorities at Mitau, obeyed those of General Judenitch, conveyed to him by General Gough, to move his troops to the Narva front. Libau then came into full possession of the Letts who appointed a Civil Governor to act under a British Military Governor.

The evacuation of Libau by the Russians was a severe blow to the German and Russian intriguers at Mitau, and the embarkation of Colonel Kanep's force and the attention which they received from the Allies, brought over further Russian forces to our side, and shortly afterwards Prince Lieven himself broke away from his German entourage and moved from Mitau to Riga.

The presence of General von der Goltz and of the German and Russian troops at Mitau had a very disquieting effect on the population at Riga, but the situation was relieved when General Gough conveyed to Prince Lieven General Judenitch's orders that Lieven's troops should also be transported to the Narva front. As in the case of Colonel Kanep's troops, so also in this case every obstacle was placed in the way of their departure. However, on July 22nd 1,500 Russians embarked at Riga on the S.S. *Saratov* for Narva, and arrangements were made for the shipment of further Russian detachments.

As the Germans have been separated from the Baltic Landeswehr, which Colonel Alexander is reorganizing at Tuksum, the German forces are being isolated. The Russian soldiers who sailed on the S.S. *Saratov* belonged to the Tula division who had originally formed part of the Red Army but had mutinied at Homel³ and after killing the Bolshevik commissars had joined

³ i.e. Gomel.

Petliura's army in the Ukraine⁴ and had reached Mitau through Warsaw and Germany. Their recent defection to the Entente may well-nigh constitute the death blow to the scheme for German-Russian cooperation in Latvia. So far the Russian forces operating against the Bolsheviks have been unable to establish any base at a Lettish port.

The fact that the Russians returned here in the train of the hated Germans has greatly lowered their prestige in the eyes of the Letts. The Russians have further damaged their position locally by acting in a tactless manner and by letting the people know that in their opinion nothing had changed and that they considered Latvia still as a mere province of Russia. They made too much display of the Russian flag and of Russian national anthems, and their presence only served to remind the people of the hated Russian regime.

Letts who are best in touch with the situation in Russia do not expect that order will be reestablished in that country for many years to come, and they are not looking to Russia for any assistance whatever. Meanwhile the Lettish national movement and the desire for complete independence is getting stronger, especially since the collapse of the Balts. The Letts are not yet conscious of their own shortcomings and of the difficulties of forming a Government, and their one desire is to be freed of both the Germans and the Russians. The Letts and the Esthonians desire that their independence should be recognised both by the Allies and Russia, and then as independent sovereign States they would negotiate with Russia about economic matters. As regards political matters, they desire to have no connexion whatever with Russia, and they do not wish to send delegates to a central Russian Diet in the same way that Bavaria sends its representatives to the German Imperial Landtag. They are most anxious that there should be no Russian interference in the affairs of Latvia.

As regards economic matters, the Letts will, both in their own interest and in that of Russia, grant every facility for transit trade. The Minister President expects that Windau—the terminus of a railway from Dvinsk, Moscow, Siberia—and Riga, which is also a terminus for the railway, will be free ports, and that goods in transit will only have to pay nominal charges. The broad gauge would be used so that Russian trains would run straight into the port. Every facility would be granted to Russian trade, and as regards transit trade, railway, postal, and telegraphic facilities, the Letts would be willing to negotiate conventions with the Russians of a far-reaching nature.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to General Sir H. Gough.

I have, etc.,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

⁴ For the army of General Petliura, see chap. II.

No. 29

General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received July 28)
No. A.B. 93 Telegraphic [599/2/5/16559]¹

RIGA, July 25, 1919

Neutral zone agreed upon by Letts and Germans. (A) Letts hold line Totark[a]lne-Gigke-Reisen-Jungfern[h]of. Thence from right bank of river Duna to Shuke-Neuhof-Nerzendorf-Gut Pulkakh-Wintnap-Assern. Continuing to Radswilischk-Gut Walhof-Gut Berghof-Gut Draken, river Misse-Gut Olai-Akangal-Kalnzem-Messbild-Lapmesch.²

¹ The text of this telegram arrived corrupt. The telegram was repeated by request on August 4 (received August 5) as telegram No. A.B. 126 [599/2/5/17224]. This amended text is the one here printed.

² In the original text of July 25 this sentence read: '(B) Radswilischk Gutwalhof Gutber Ghof Gutbirgalen Mittel Shot Pooa Draupa Bussing Neugut River Misse Peterhof Skangal Ljula Messbild Lapemesch [sic].' The neutral zone separated the Latvian forces, facing generally south, from the Russo-German forces, facing generally north.

No. 30

General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 1)
No. A.B. 103 Telegraphic [599/2/5/16891]

RIGA, July 29, 1919

1. Result of Easton's conference with Germans¹ unsatisfactory. Germans decline to consider use of Windau and Libau as evacuation ports even if allies guarantee their troops security and provide extra engines for the railways. . . .²

¹ Cf. No. 22, paragraph 15.

² Paragraph 2 of this telegram related to dispositions of Latvian forces confronting the Soviet forces.

No. 31

General Burt (Riga) to General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors)¹
No. A.B. 109 Telegraphic [599/2/5/17292]

RIGA, July 31, 1919

1. A. From information obtained by Easton at conference he estimates that Germans can utilize 6 trains per day of 30 wagons each to evacuate; estimated 20 men per wagon equals 3,600 men per day. Taking safe estimate

¹ This telegram was communicated to the British Delegation in Paris. The original text evidently arrived corrupt; the present text is that of a repetition, dispatched on August 4 and received on August 5.

of German troops in Latvia at 40,000 men, complete evacuation therefore works out at 12 days. Allow double time for delay, at say 24 days.

B. On the above basis figures given by Germans at Olai conference show total of 106,000 German troops in Latvia.

C. Although Germans promised plan of evacuation this has not materialised and they seem to have no intention of sending it.

D. Do you authorise me to instruct von der Goltz to clear the Windau-Tuckum railway by a certain date and to complete in the meantime his preparations for evacuation of Mitau?

2. Russian troops continue to arrive at Mitau for Bermont and Wyrgo-litsch from Poland² and Germany. 1,200 prisoners of war arrived in Mitau yesterday.

Addressed Britmis, Helsingfors; repeated Britmis, Libau and Troopers.

² On August 4, 1919, General Carton de Wiart, Chief of the British Military Mission in Poland, was instructed to 'endeavour to stop further transfer of Russians from Poland to Baltic States'.

No. 32

Note by Mr. Macduff¹ of a conversation with Mr. Carlile at Riga²
[115011/61232/59]

Minute of interview with Mr. Hugh H. M. Carlile of Kirchenstrasse 26v., member of the Riga Manufacturers' Assoc. and one of the Association's delegates, on 31 July 1919, at Riga:

Mr. Carlile supplied the following information: German trade representatives have arrived in the Baltic States to collect pre-war debts from various industrial and commercial creditors, and are willing to take shares in the different concerns, supply new machinery and new capital where necessary, in order to obtain an opening for the employment of German capital and enterprise in the Baltic States, presumably with the hope of eventually securing a share of control in the financial, industrial and commercial development of these States.

Comment: Would it not be desirable to advise the Baltic Governments to take steps to prevent the infiltration of German influence into the economic development of these States?

Mr. Ulmanis the Prime Minister has undertaken to take preventative measures.³

WM. H. MACDUFF

5. 8. 19

¹ Assistant Commissioner in charge of commercial affairs on Colonel Tallents's mission.

² This note was communicated by Mr. Macduff to the Foreign Office on August 5, 1919.

³ This sentence was a manuscript addition to the original typescript.

No. 33

Mr. Bosanquet (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received August 1)
No. 177 Telegraphic [110981/67181/59]

REVAL, July 31, 1919

My telegram No. 174.¹

A Colonel in Northern Army yesterday told one of my staff that situation was most serious owing to non-arrival of military and other stores.² Soldiers were eager to turn to Germany as England had failed them. England kept on promising but it was now believed stores would never arrive owing to political difficulties encountered by British Government. Esthonia had been getting supplies but Northern Army had not.

There can be no doubt that German agents are exploiting situation to the utmost.³

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Paris.

¹ Not printed.

² Cf. Nos. 338 and 353.

³ In telegram No. 179 of August 1 Mr. Bosanquet transmitted a report which stated: 'German propaganda being vigorously carried on in Northern Army. Anti-ally meeting of senior officers quite recently.' In telegram No. 195 of August 6 Mr. Bosanquet transmitted a further report stating that 'German propaganda (? has had) great (? success in) Northern Army and soldiers are all pouring abuse on British. Nothing is being done to counteract this. German element in army itself is very strong.' (In telegram No. 191 of August 5 Mr. Bosanquet had transmitted a report that Prince Lieven's troops transferred to General Yudenitch's command 'are quite German and do not even speak Russian properly'.)

No. 34

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors)
No. 36 Telegraphic [599/2/5/16106]

PARIS, July 31, 1919

Following from Chief of Military Section.

Reference your H.G. 53¹ of July 20 and G. 102² of July 22 there is every probability of your proposals being approved in their entirety³ and if necessary instructions being issued to German Government through Armistice Commission within 24 hours. In view of delay which has elapsed since despatch of your H.G. 53 dates mentioned in paras. 3 and 6 of your recommendations will perhaps be retarded by one week. Ends.

Repeated to War Office No. 138.

¹ See No. 22, note 4.

² No. 27.

³ The Supreme Council in Paris had on July 30 'decided to inform Marshal Foch that General Gough's conclusions as submitted in Marshal Foch's letter of the 28th July were acceptable. Marshal Foch was directed to take all measures necessary for putting the proposals in question into effect.' See Vol. I, No. 23, minute 4 and appendix C.

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors)
No. 37 Telegraphic [599/2/5/16106]

PARIS, August 1, 1919

Reference your H.G. 53,¹ July 20 and G. 133,² July 30. Following is translation of telegram addressed today by Marshal Foch to President, Armistice Commission. Begins. No. 3637

(1) On the 18th June Allied and Associated Governments invited German Government to give necessary orders for the earliest possible evacuation by the Germans of all territories which before the war formed part of the Russian Empire and particularly of Latvia. General Gough, who is entrusted with the control of this evacuation, reports that General von der Goltz persists in making difficulties and has given no assurance that the orders of the Entente will be executed by all possible means and with the necessary attention.

(2) Consequently the Allied and Associated Governments have taken the following decisions on July 30:—

(a) General von der Goltz should be at once recalled.

(b) The evacuation of German troops from Latvia will begin immediately and will be carried out by sea, transports being furnished under conditions to be fixed by A.N.A.C.³

(c) The German authorities are to submit their plan of evacuation before August 15 and to complete its execution before August 30.

(d) Military material now in Latvia and Lithuania is not to be removed without General Gough's authority. All necessary information with regard to the present position of supply and ammunition depots already moved to be communicated to him.

(e) The entry into Latvia of fresh German troops is forbidden.

(3) Communicate these decisions to the German Armistice Commission urgently and demand that a reply be communicated with the least possible delay. Ends.

Repeated General Gough, Riga, No. 37 and War Office No. 139. Copy by bag to Foreign Office.⁴

¹ See No. 22, note 4.

² Not printed. In this telegram General Gough requested that Marshal Foch be informed that he was unable to take action in connexion with the Lithuanian-Polish dispute 'until I am empowered by Marshal Foch to direct von der Goltz to evacuate Latvia as detailed in my telegram H.G. 53'.

³ The Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

⁴ This copy was received in the Foreign Office on August 5.

No. 36

General Sir H. Gough (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 3)
No. A.B. 115 Telegraphic [599/2/5/17062]

RIGA, August 2, 1919

Following for Marshal Foch. Begins:—

Have not received answer to my H.G. 53¹ of July 20th. but interviewed von der Goltz to-day as internal affairs in Latvia are becoming acute owing to continued presence of Germans.

I gave von der Goltz a written request.

- (1) To allow me to see his scheme of evacuation.
- (2) Suggested two schemes of evacuation one by sea and one by train by which he could clear Latvia by August 20th.
- (3) Asked for details of his strength of armaments.
- (4) Refused on behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments to accept his statement that it is necessary to take 74 days to evacuate Latvia.

In reply von der Goltz made following statements.

- (1) That he refused to show me his scheme of evacuation and that he had received no orders to do so.
- (2) That if he [had] been ordered to allow me to supervise his evacuation he would have already evacuated Latvia.
- (3) That the evacuation could be carried out in less than 74 days but that he did not intend to shorten the time without instructions from his superiors.

In view of the above I personally request you to order von der Goltz to evacuate Latvia by August 20th by which date his evacuation can be completed and to allow his plans to be supervised by me.

I assure you that with the departure of the Germans from Latvia most of the difficulties which are now insoluble will adjust themselves.

On the other hand his presence here creates a very menacing situation in the Baltic States.

Address answer to Gough, Helsingfors and repeat British Mission, Riga.
Repeated Berlin and War Office.

¹ See No. 22, note 4.

No. 37

Mr. Grant Watson (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 4)
No. 225 Telegraphic [111654/855/59]

RIGA, August 3, 1919

General Gough has requested me to draw your special attention to *non possumus* attitude adopted by General von der Goltz at interview on

August 3.¹ Latter declined to submit any plan of evacuation of Courland by Germans.

Experience of the past few weeks has shown that no work of reconstruction or of pacification can be carried out in Latvia as long as Germans are in Mitau.

Present moment is most favourable for development of a National Administration and as Balts have been removed from German influence it should be possible to get both Lettish and Balts to work together for common good of Latvia. If however moment is allowed to pass and General von der Goltz is allowed to carry on his intrigues to set nationality against nationality and to foster Bolshevism then country will again relapse into complete chaos and Germans will find some fresh pretext for remaining in occupation of Courland.

In previous telegrams I have drawn your attention to insistent demand of German soldiers for land in Courland and it is clear that German Authorities will have trouble in dealing with these men.

Situation would seem to call for still stronger action on the part of Allies so that Germans may be brought to understand that Allies intend to see that their demands are carried out.

In addition to exercise of pressure (? on) German Government would it not be possible to draw more attention in English and German Press to Pan-German schemes of von der Goltz which would be (? report)ed (? against) desires of majority of Germans?²

Repeated to Paris, Helsingfors for General Gough.

¹ This interview was held on August 2 (cf. No. 36).

² Arising out of this suggestion, the News Department of the Foreign Office drew attention to the matter in a letter of August 19, 1919, to the Publicity Section of British Military Headquarters at Cologne.

No. 38

*General Sir H. Gough (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 4)
No. H.G. 57 Telegraphic¹ [599/2/5/17163]*

RIGA, August 3, 1919

Your 37.² Following for Marshal Foch begins:—

Your strong action with reference to von der Goltz: if he carries out your orders many difficulties will be solved. I will do everything possible to clear up the Lithuanian question.³

¹ Note in original: 'This telegram was very corrupt at the start and the above [below] is the best interpretation we can get.' (A fuller text of this telegram, as communicated to the Supreme Council on August 6, is printed in Vol. I, No. 29, minute 5: see there also a telegram of August 3 from Colonel du Parquet relative to the withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces.)

² No. 35.

³ Cf. No. 35, note 2.

Mr. Grant Watson (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 11)
No. 58 [114858/855/59]

RIGA, August 4, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that M. Meierovitch, the Lettish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has communicated to me copies of correspondence dealing with the claim of German soldiers to Lettish citizenship, and to the grant of land in Latvia as a reward for their alleged services against the Bolsheviks.

From these papers it appears that at a meeting held at the Mitau Club on July 27, the assembled representatives of about 10,000 soldiers urged the German Legation to support their claim to citizenship and land in Latvia, 'promised by the big land-owners for the liberation of Latvia from Bolshevism'. In a resolution they stated: 'We have reconquered Courland with our blood for a Government of Latvia. Without us the preservation of the Republic of Latvia, the culture and the wellbeing of the country, and salvation of the peace-loving inhabitants would never have been possible. We have fought and bled in reliance on the solemn promise of the Government of Latvia, represented by the Ministry of Ulmanis, and we expect with certainty, on the honour of the Ministry and the people of Latvia, that they will redeem their pledged word.'

In forwarding this resolution to the Lettish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the German Minister enquired whether the Minister President would be willing to receive five representatives of the soldiers.

In reply the Lettish Government stated that such a promise was unknown to the Ulmanis Government. 'If the authors of the resolution', the Note continues, 'refer to the project of a treaty proposed by the Government of Latvia on December 29, 1918,¹ at the German Legation, I must remind you that this document has remained only a draft treaty which has never been concluded and carried into effect. Moreover, even admitting that such a treaty was concluded, in virtue of Article 292 of the Peace Treaty, it would have to be regarded as annulled, because Germany, in signing the Peace Treaty, renounced all such agreements. As for the assertion expressed in the resolution, to the effect that its authors reconquered Latvia for the Lettish Government and that they were the sole supporters of the Lettish Republic, I have but to point out that the events which took place at Libau on April 16 this year² and later have clearly shown that the German troops sent to Latvia have neither lent aid to the Government of Latvia nor supported the Lettish Republic; on the contrary, it is they who have made common cause with the Landeswehr of German Balts, who on April 16 tried to overthrow the Government of Latvia and subsequently, in agreement with the troops of Germany, made war against the Esthonian and Lettish army, the effects of which Latvia still feels. Thus, the demand of the authors of the resolution to be granted the right of Lettish citizenship is devoid of both legal and moral foundation.

¹ German text printed by A. Winnig, *op. cit.*, p. 88. ² Cf. Introductory Note, note 11.

'As for the assertion of the authors of the resolution concerning the promises of the large landed proprietors to distribute land among them for colonization, I must object that the Government of Latvia has never authorized the large landed proprietors to make such promises and that, consequently, such promises, if they have been made by the large landed proprietors, must be considered as a criminal fraud committed by private persons of which the Government of Latvia has no knowledge and which has no validity whatsoever, these persons not being authorized to make promises of land.

'In view of the circumstances explained, I see no reason why a special delegation should be sent to the President of the Council of Ministers of Latvia.'

A copy of this despatch is being sent to General Sir H. Gough.

I have, etc.,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

No. 40

Mr. Grant Watson (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 7)

No. 236 Telegraphic [112955/855/59]

My telegram No. 225,¹ August 3.

RIGA, August 6, 1919

Press here reproduces statement of German Minister for Foreign Affairs that German Minister to Lettland has telegraphed to the effect that agreement with Lettish Government regarding grant of land to German soldiers for colonization was only provisional, so that Lettish Government did not promise land to Germans.

German Government are not supporting demands of soldiers.

German soldiers are prohibited from entering foreign military formations and officers who support such proceeding will be brought before Court Martial.

Repeated to Helsingfors for General Gough and Paris.

¹ No. 37.

No. 41

General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 7)

No. A.B. 133 Telegraphic [599/2/5/17394]

RIGA, August 6, 1919

Part I. 1. Bermont and Wyxitsch [? Wyrgolitsch] refuse to proceed to Narva at present.

2. Von der Goltz has not received Marshal Foch's orders of 1st August. Until he has received these orders through his higher command¹ he will

¹ General Burt had informed General von der Goltz of these orders on August 4. In telegram No. A.B. 145 of August 8 General Burt again reported that General von der Goltz had not admitted official receipt of these orders.

continue on his present plan of evacuation and declines to comply with the demands contained in General Gough's letter dated 2nd August re war material.² He says that in any case war material will be handed over in accordance with Article No. 169 of Peace Treaty.

3. Von der Goltz points out that if compelled to evacuate by sea his present plan of evacuation will be delayed. Ends.

Part II paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of this message to follow.

Part II. 4. The area in North Courland west of line drawn through Rojen-Talssen Schnepeln (south of Goldingen) will be evacuated of German troops by August 10th.

5. Reported Germans are evacuating Bausk area to Shavli. There are indications that Germans will evacuate Mitau about 14th August.

6. Germans have invited Lettish Government to take over the Tuckum-Windau railway to-day.

Addressed Britmis Helsingfors; repeated Supreme War Council, Versailles, Britmis Libau, and War Office London.

² For this matter, cf. Nos. 35 and 36.

No. 42

*Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 213/B/S [599/2/5/17799]

BERLIN, August 7, 1919

I forward herewith a report from a most reliable Russian officer who has seen and spoken to German soldiers at the Schlesische Station here, who have been recruited for Prince Lieven's force in Russia but who are in all probability going to Mitau to join Bermont.

N. MALCOLM
Major-General
Chief of British Military Mission

ENCLOSURE IN No. 42

6/8/19

Almost every night batches of German soldiers are leaving Berlin for the Baltic provinces. These soldiers are proceeding in small groups of about 40 to 70 men or independently via Insterburg, Tilsit, Laugsargen.

To-night at 9.5 p.m. a batch of 74 German subjects will leave the Schlesische Bahnhof for Mitau.

At 3.48 I met a Russian soldier at the Schlesische Bahnhof who belonged to the party of prisoners of war who had left at 1.28. His luggage had been

¹ This report was addressed to the Director of Military Intelligence at both London and Paris, and was copied to General Nudant. It was received by the British Delegation in Paris on August 12.

taken by his friends. I availed myself of this opportunity and asked at the 'Kommandantur' and 'Anwerbestelle für's Freicorps Hülsen'² whether this soldier could go with the German party to Mitau, having previously learned that there was such a one proceeding. At the 'Anwerbestelle' I was told that a party of German soldiers was leaving the same evening at 11.16 and that the Russian could very well go with them to Mitau and there meet his party.

Most of the German soldiers proceeding to Mitau say that they are going to Mitau to join Koltschack under the command of Prince Lieven. Talking with many of these Germans I got the impression that this sending of German soldiers to Russia is being done on a very large scale. Some of these transports I was told are being sent to Königsberg and from there to Windau by ship. From Windau to Courland by 'Feldbahn'.³ The soldiers going to Russia know that in case of being wounded they would get no pension. When I tried to learn for what purpose they were going to Russia, the more or less general opinion was that, as they told me, 'We will have to be allies with Russia in order to fight the Bolsheviks and our common enemies the Poles.' The Entente, they say, will not be able to send an army to Europe [*sic*] now, having enough trouble in their own countries.

² Recruiting office for the freecorps Hülsen.

³ Narrow-gauge railway.

No. 43

*Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 16 [118659/4232/18]

BERLIN, August 8, 1919

. . . Very² great activity has recently been observed in recruiting for the German forces, and Russian forces under German influence, which are being assembled in the Baltic Provinces.

A considerable force is being assembled in the neighbourhood of Mitau under Colonel Bermont, who has his recruiting agents in Berlin.

Two sources for the supply of recruits are open to him:—

- (a) Disbanded German soldiers, who are easily induced to join a Russian formation.
- (b) Russian prisoners of war and refugees.

The force is said to be well equipped in every way, and is said to be maintained by means of money supplied by big German industrialists, whose object is to destroy Lenin's régime, to convert the Baltic Provinces into a German colony, and thence to proceed to the exploitation of Russian resources for German benefit.

¹ At this period, in the absence of British diplomatic representation in Berlin, General Malcolm made regular reports, in the first instance to the Director of Military Intelligence, upon political and military conditions in Germany. The present report was received in the Foreign Office on August 21.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

Colonel Bermont has declared that he means to go to Moscow if necessary, and induces Russian prisoners of war to join him by declaring that his force provides the only prospect of repatriation.

Many Russians, both in the Baltic States and in Germany, are strongly opposed to joining Colonel Bermont, owing to the German influences which control him; but these same men are by no means Ententophil, owing to the uncertainty as to our real policy in the Baltic States.

It is, of course, certain that recruiting of both Russians and Germans is carried on with the assistance of the German military authorities, if not with that of the Civil Government.

Freiheit,³ in a leading article on the 6th August, attacked the Government on account of this dishonest policy in the Baltic States, and announced openly that 'big trains are moving daily towards Tilsit, Lausargen, and Schaulen, carrying troops and all sorts of war material'.

In so far as Colonel Bermont proposes to use his forces against the Bolsheviks, he may be of service to us. His ultimate objects would, however, appear to be opposed to our policy. . . .²

³ Organ of the German Independent Socialist Party.

No. 44

General Malcolm (Berlin) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 9)
No. Z. 85 Telegraphic [608/2/5/17566]

BERLIN, August 8, 1919

There is reason to believe that the decision to hand over Russian prisoners of war in Germany to German authorities¹ is giving great pleasure to Bermont's recruiting agents in Berlin who state that their task will be now quite simple.

¹ For this decision of the Supreme Council, adopted on August 2, see Vol. I, No. 26, minute 7.

No. 45

General Malcolm (Berlin) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 10)
No. Z. 87 Telegraphic [608/2/5/17618]

BERLIN, August 9, 1919

Following sent to War Office and repeated General Halsey¹ and Astoria.

In view of shortage of provisions of all kinds and strong probability of serious disturbances when supplies from Allies cease Germans are anxious to repatriate Russians as quickly as possible. At the same time they cannot send them through Lithuania, Poland or Hungary without help from Entente. They have no means of sea transport to North Russia or Archangel. The only place open to them is the Baltic States. They would probably meet any

¹ At that time British representative on the Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission.

wishes of ours if any means of transport are available but Bermont would naturally receive prior consideration. Unofficial pressure would depend upon what my future position is to be.² Might be able to do something but feeling towards us will become more hostile when clauses 227 and 231³ are enforced.

² A War Office telegram of August 12 to General Gough stated: 'Pending further orders, General Malcolm has been instructed to remain at Berlin and to carry out duties which he has been performing other than those concerned with Russian prisoners. Although repatriation of Russians is now entirely in the hands of the Germans, General Malcolm will endeavour unofficially to induce the Germans to carry out the repatriation according to our wishes.'

³ Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles arraigned the former Emperor William II; article 231 was the so-called 'war-guilt clause'.

No. 46

General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 10)
No. A.B. 147 Telegraphic [599/2/5/17688]

RIGA, August 9, 1919

Following addressed to Helsingfors, repeated Astoria, War Office and Libau.

1. Germans continue to evacuate and are now practically clear of North Courland.

2. It is rumoured that Bermont has received large loan from Germans¹ and that Germans have handed over war material in bulk to Bermont.

¹ For financial relations at that time between Colonel Bermond-Avalov and certain German circles see the record of a meeting at Mitau on August 15, 1919, between General von der Goltz, Colonel Bermond-Avalov, and Herr Römmer, a financial agent for Russian interests in Berlin: this record is printed by General Count R. von der Goltz, op. cit., pp. 299-303.

No. 47

General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris.
Received August 11)¹

No. G. 162 Telegraphic [612/5/1/17715]

HELSINGFORS, August 10, 1919

Have just returned from visit to Yudenitch at Narva. Interview unsatisfactory for following reasons:

1. Russians under Arsenieff² and Rodzianko are still intriguing with Germans through von der Goltz. Yudenitch, although surrounded by inefficient and intriguing staff which I cannot prevail on him to change, remains faithful to Allies.

¹ This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris.

² General in the Russian North-West Army.

2. Arsenieff and Rodzianko wish to base themselves at Pskov and not on Narva. Former affords good line of retreat through Latvia to join Bermont and Vergolitch's Russians and join Germans, and Baltic Landwehr.
3. Esthonians have no intention of allowing reactionary or pro-German Russians to retire without fighting into their country and prefer to make separate Peace with Bolsheviks.
4. Esthonians, who are only good troops in Baltic, do not understand for what they are fighting. They have forced out Bolsheviks and Germans and they are now asked to march on Petrograd and save Russians who have quarrelled with and threatened them ever since the Esthonians gave them help which was refused by every other small State including Finland.

My views of above are as follows:—

1. That if von der Goltz obeys terms dictated by Paris telegram 37³ of Aug. 1st blow will be delivered to German prestige which will completely upset laborious scheming of the latter's.
2. That if there is any truth in rumours of vast plot to join Russia and Germany and defy Allies it will mature within few weeks.
3. Esthonians fear Bolsheviks, who have promised not to invade Esthonia, less than reactionary Russians and Germans.
4. That to keep essential aid of Esthonians it is desirable to recognise independence.

Finally I think (a) situation serious until von der Goltz goes; (b) that north west army in the event of departure of von der Goltz will have strong alliance with reaction and they will be helped by supply of munitions which are arriving, but also I realise danger of complete breaking up of these, next fortnight [*sic*]; (c) that Yudenitch is too old and not energetic enough to deal with vast problem before him.

Full appreciation of situation following.

³ No. 35.

No. 48

General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 11)
No. A.B. 156 Telegraphic [599/2/5/17689]

RIGA, August 10, 1919

Following addressed to Helsingfors, repeated British Council, Versailles, War Office and Astoria.

1. Von der Goltz has now received Marshal Foch's note with instructions from his higher command to decline further negotiations re evacuation with

either General Gough or General Burt until he receives further instructions from his higher command.¹

2. Russian prisoners of war continue to arrive at Mitau for Bermont from Germany and Poland.

¹ This paragraph was further repeated to Paris from Helsingfors by General Gough in telegram No. G. 167 of August 11 (received August 13) in which General Gough commented: 'Reference above [message] next step is in your hands. Prevarication of von der Goltz should not be tolerated another day. If von der Goltz is allowed to remain after Paris telegram No. 37 [i.e. No. 35] of August 1, already dangerous situation will be made worse in Russian North-West Army and it will be impossible for us to maintain peace and order in Baltic States.'

No. 49

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors)¹

No. 42 Telegraphic [115532/61232/59]

PARIS, August 11, 1919

Reference General Burt's telegram No. 133,² dated August 6.

Marshal Foch's attention having been drawn to the delay on the part of the German authorities in transmitting to von der Goltz decisions of Allied and Associated Governments regarding evacuation, Marshal Foch instructed President Inter-Allied Armistice Commission on August 10 as follows:—

Begins. Demand urgently that the German Armistice Commission should inform you of the date on which the instructions have been or will be sent by the German Government. Make it clear again that the Allied and Associated Governments attach the greatest importance to the early and complete execution of the decisions notified in my telegram No. 3637³ of August 1. Ends.

General Burt's telegram No. A.B. 156⁴ of August 10 has since been received, and paragraph 1 has been communicated to Marshal Foch with the suggestion that further action through the Armistice Commission should be deferred until we hear from you whether Germans are proceeding satisfactorily with the evacuation or not, and whether they intend to comply with demand for recall of von der Goltz. If you wish any further communication made to German Government telegraph your proposals, but it is obviously undesirable to multiply such communications more than is absolutely necessary with the view of ensuring compliance with the decisions of the Allied and Associated Governments.

¹ This telegram was repeated to General Burt as No. 4, to the War Office as No. 152, and to the Foreign Office by bag (received August 13).

² No. 41.

³ See No. 35.

⁴ No. 48.

No. 50

Mr. Grant Watson (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 14)
No. 261 Telegraphic [116256/61232/59]

RIGA, August 12, 1919

There is evidently an agreement between Lettish and Lithuanians to attack Russian forces under Colonel Bermont should (? latter), contrary to General Judenitch's orders, attempt to advance from Mitau to Dvinsk.¹

Latest reports from Mitau unsatisfactory and indicate that Germans are still joined to Russian units in considerable numbers.

Repeated to Helsingfors for General Gough; Paris.

¹ In telegram No. A.B. 161 of even date General Burt stated: 'It is reported that Bermont will attempt to move his troops into the Dvinsk sector during next fortnight.'

No. 51

*Note of a conversation between Mr. Macduff and MM. Erhardt
and Seeberg at Riga*
[125739/57548/59]

*Note on interview between the Latvian Ministers of Finance and Commerce, Messrs.
Erhardt and Seeberg, and Mr. Macduff, at Riga, on August 12, 1919.¹*

MR. ERHARDT stated that he had received an official visit and had an interview with Dr. jur. Fritz Bach, Generaldirektor im Reichsschatzministerium, Berlin, and representatives of German banking interests, who had proposed to him that the Latvian Government should enter into a financial arrangement with the German Government. These delegates offered to replace the Ost roubles in circulation in Latvia, guaranteed by the German Government, for Latvian Government notes. It was estimated that the total value of Ost roubles in circulation in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia at the present time was M. 700,000,000 represented by some 350,000,000 Ost roubles, the original issue having been M. 1,000,000,000. The delegates proposed that the whole of these Ost roubles should be called in, and to ensure that they would be surrendered by the population, the German Government would announce their repudiation of this currency unless exchanged for Latvian currency through the Latvian Government. The whole of the Ost currency would then be delivered over to the German Government against credit for its equivalent value in marks to be opened for the account of the Latvian Government in Berlin.

Mr. Erhardt stated that upon receiving this proposal he came to the conclusion that the motive behind it was to compel the Latvian Government to purchase German goods.

MR. MACDUFF pointed out that the Germans were obviously in great anxiety lest, upon the issue of the Latvian currency on a gold basis which

¹ This note was communicated to the Foreign Office by Mr. Macduff and was received on September 6, 1919.

it was already proposed to substitute for the Ost currency with the assistance of the Allied banking interests, the latter should suffer depreciation and consequently become of no value as a means of exchange. The scheme of the German delegates had a twofold object: firstly, to obviate having to pay full value for the Ost roubles, and secondly, to lay the foundations of a market for their goods in Latvia for the full amount of the Ost roubles in circulation. Mr. Macduff counselled the Minister to call in the Ost roubles, as suggested by the German delegates, but instead of surrendering them to Germany against credit in Berlin, to issue, with the assistance of the Allied banking interests, their own currency in exchange, retaining possession of the Ost currency, with the object of demanding its liquidation in full from the Germans at a later date.

MR. ERHARDT remarked that the proposal of the Germans only appealed to his Government and country in so far as it afforded means to meet their present extreme need of military equipment and stores and provisions for the winter, etc., urgently required for their army.

MR. MACDUFF stated that the subject of financial assistance to Latvia was receiving the close attention of the British Government, and Colonel Tallents, accompanied by a financial expert, was at present on his way to Riga, and they were expected upon their arrival to present a scheme for the settlement of the present financial difficulties.

MR. ERHARDT said that the German deputation which waited upon him numbered some dozen members. They asked many questions with regard to the re-establishment of business relations, shipping facilities, the possibility of Germany securing part of the flax crop, whether Great Britain had obtained a monopoly, etc.

MR. MACDUFF expressed his intention of suggesting to the Prime Minister of Latvia that a reply be given to the German representatives to the effect that no questions of such a nature could be entered into until the whole of the German army at present in the Baltic States had retired to within their own frontiers, as established by the Peace Treaty.

No. 52

Mr. Grant Watson (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 15)

No. 266 Telegraphic [116806/116806/59]

RIGA, August 13, 1919

Party of Germans headed by Dr. Bach of German treasury and consisting of some officials and private dealers has arrived from Berlin to negotiate with Letts about . . .¹ and other matters.

They have offered to sell through private dealers for payment in Ost marks 15,000 rifles, 30,000 uniforms and other equipment which Lettish Government would accept if no other conditions were attached.

Commission have proposed that Letts should hand over all Ost money

¹ The text here is uncertain.

in circulation in Latvia to be held in Berlin for credit of Lettish Government. Latter would be obliged thereby to use credit for the purchase of German goods.

Ulmanis informs me that Letts will not agree to this latter condition.

Steamship *Vera* (see my telegram No. 239 of August 6th)² sailing about 18th instant for United Kingdom. Lettish Government enquired whether vessel could obtain cargo of arms and uniforms for the return voyage.³

Ost Bank have offered loan to Lettish Government who have refused it. Repeated to Paris, Helsingfors for General Gough.

² Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

³ On August 14, 1919, MM. Ulmanis and Meierovics telegraphed an urgent appeal to Mr. Balfour (received August 15) in which they stated in part that 'the Latvian army cannot keep the front without rifles against machine guns and artillery. The soldiers cannot be kept in the trenches without clothing and barefooted, especially considering the approaching autumn. Without all these means it is impossible to offer efficacious resistance to the increasing propaganda both at the front and in the rear of the Bolsheviks and the Russian and German reactionaries sympathising to each other. Considering the uttermost urgency of the matter the provisional Government of Latvia regards it their duty to entreat your Excellency to supply Latvia with money, arms, food, clothing and ammunitions. If Latvia could hope her request which has been specified and tendered to your Government by her representatives five weeks ago being complied with, we entreat Your Excellency to the help being sent without delay. Without immediate help everything would be lost, therefore we beg to insist on the situation being extremely critical.' (Generals Gough and Burt had previously telegraphed to the War Office detailed statements of the requirements of the Latvian army.)

No. 53

*Baron von Ow-Wachendorf to General Nudant (Cologne)*¹

No. A.A.I. 4884 [2121/1/3/18044]

(Translation.)

DÜSSELDORF, August 13, 1919

Representative of the German Government to the President, Interallied Armistice Commission.

In confirmation of my telegram of to-day.

In reply to Note No. 1495/G² of 2/8/19, I have the honour to state the following on behalf of the German Government.

The German Government cannot recognise as just the accusation of the Allied and Associated Governments that the evacuation of Lettland is being purposely delayed by the Government or its officials. On the contrary, she has shown her desire to make the evacuation as smooth as possible, as shown in the Note of the 5th July in which the Government proposed the appointment of a German-Lettish-British Commission.³ In the conversation between

¹ The Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission had been transferred from Spa to Cologne early in July. The German Armistice Commission had moved from Spa to Düsseldorf.

² In this note General Nudant transmitted to the German Government Marshal Foch's telegram No. 3637 of August 1: see No. 35.

³ No German note of July 5 has been traced in Foreign Office archives. The reference was evidently to the proposal contained in the penultimate paragraph of the German note dated July 6, 1919: see No. 6.

General Count Goltz and General Gough on the 19th July full particulars of all questions concerning the evacuation were given by the Government Representative without reserve.

Since then the evacuation has been further carried out according to the plan proposed in this conversation. In the north part of Courland the line Kl. Irbenus [Irben]-Maiten [Usmaiten]-See-Goldingen and the part west thereof has been reached. The German Government further points out that the demands of the Allied and Associated Governments on the subject of the evacuation of Lettland can only be based on Article XII of the Armistice Agreement of the 11th November 1918 and must be confined to that Article. The German Government regrets that it cannot carry out further demands.

The demands made by F.-M. Foch under No. 2 heading on behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments are replied to in detail as follows:

(a) The demand for the recall of General Count Goltz is an interference with the High Command delegated by the German authorities and is not supported in any way in the clauses of Article XII of the Armistice Agreement. The German Government regrets that it must refuse fulfilment of this request. The Government reserves to itself the right to recall the General when the evacuation of Lettland has progressed to a favourable extent.

(b) The evacuation of Courland has already begun and will be proceeded with with the greatest possible rapidity. The demanded transport by sea cannot be carried through via Dünamünde. A shipment to Dünamünde would upset the whole plan for the evacuation from North to South which is already being carried out according to plan and would therefore lead only to new delays. The collection of German troops for transport into a port would bring the troops into close touch with the Lettish authorities, Lettish troops and civilians. This would no doubt lead to large demonstrations by the German troops against the Lettish Government and must therefore be avoided. The German Government points out that the behaviour of the Lettish Government supported by General Gough has caused a deep bitterness among the German volunteers. They have fought for eight months and suffered severe losses, trusting that as reward for fighting against the Bolsheviks and at the same time in accordance with the promises of the Lettish authorities by the Ulmanis Cabinet in December 1918, they would be given facilities for settling down there. The non-fulfilment of this promise by the Lettish Government and the shattering of their expectations has aroused in them the feeling that they have been deceived.

Even in the normal course of the evacuation the danger is to be expected that numerous German volunteers will make use of the right to end their service and remain behind in the country. Even if the German Government does all in its power to evacuate all the German troops from Lettland in good order, it warns you in advance not to increase the present friction which would be the case if the evacuation were hurried too much or if the transport were made by sea through a port.

(c) General Gough will be kept informed of the progress of the evacuation

both before and after movements. The submission of an exact plan of evacuation is not possible as the evacuation depends on the number of locomotives promised by the English Government and on the coal situation. Under these circumstances the evacuation cannot be carried through until 30th August.

(d) This wish cannot be granted as it is neither founded on Article XII of the Armistice Agreement nor on any later Agreement.

(e) This demand will be complied with. The necessary orders have already been given.

OW-WACHENDORF

No. 54

Note of a meeting at Riga of British and Latvian Representatives¹

[125739/57548/59]

Conference between the Prime Minister of the Latvian Government (Mr. Ulmanis), the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Meierovitz), the Minister of Finance (Mr. Erhardt), Colonel Tallents, C.B.,² Mr. W. H. Macduff, and Mr. Fortington (representing a London banking group), at Riga on August 15, 1919.

MR. MEIEROVITZ stated that the Latvian Ministers were being importuned by Germany with a proposal to withdraw the Ost roubles from circulation and replace it by Latvian currency, to the value of which credit (700,000,000 marks) would be established in Germany. Moreover, the German representatives were making a number of claims against Latvia. They demanded a monthly payment of 70,000 to 80,000 roubles for the use of rolling stock on the Latvian railways.

COL. TALLENTS expressed the opinion that under the Peace Treaty Germany was bound to leave the rolling stock.

MR. MEIEROVITZ remarked that the Germans did not consider Latvia a participating party under the Treaty. Further, they looked to Latvia to defray the cost of the bridges and other erections built in the country during the war, and of the trenches. The German representatives, moreover, alleged that the Allies had made an agreement with Needra's Government regarding the wood at Libau and Windau.

COL. TALLENTS remarked that he was sure there were no dealings between the Allies and Needra's Government.

MR. MEIEROVITZ stated that the Germans were demanding, further, that the Latvian Government should pay the cost of the Landeswehr up to July 15, and that the ships which had formerly belonged to them should be surrendered. The ships in Latvian ports could be divided into three categories: firstly, those which had formerly belonged to Germany, secondly prizes taken

¹ This note was communicated to the Foreign Office by Mr. Macduff and was received on September 6, 1919.

² Colonel Tallents returned to Riga on August 15.

from Germany during the war, and thirdly, those captured by the Germans at the time of their entry into the country. Then there were those from Latvian ports now in Germany. A meeting was taking place that day with the German representatives respecting these ships. It was proposed that the Latvians should surrender to Germany the ships in their ports which were formerly hers in return for those in German ports belonging to Latvia. The Peace Treaty provided that all German ships in Allied ports were to be retained as security, but the German representatives held that Latvia had not been at war with Germany. This was a fine point for decision by the Allies.

COLONEL TALLENTS observed that the Germans were clearly directing these negotiations into the channels in which they had hopes of gain, ignoring any other question. He would like to go into these questions upon another occasion when Mr. Grant Watson might be able to attend.

Col. Tallents then introduced the subject of finance, upon which he had recently visited London, where he had got into touch with a strong financial group. The head of that group had received a promise from the Board of Trade of every encouragement, and Mr. Fortington had come out with the object of doing his best to assist the Latvian Government in their present need, as the representative of this group with power of direct action.

MR. FORTINGTON, taking up the subject, remarked that the problem which faced the Latvian Government fell into two parts: firstly, their immediate pressing requirements for material, and secondly, the subsequent establishment of permanent commercial relations with Great Britain. He felt justified, from what he had heard, in suggesting the immediate opening of relations on a basis of barter.

MR. MEIEROVITZ remarked that the only question was whether they would be at first in a position to offer adequate value in flax and timber to cover the cost of relieving immediate needs.

MR. FORTINGTON thought that on broad lines sufficient security could be offered. It was not the hope of his principals to reap an immediate reward; they looked to the trade of the future for that.

MR. MEIEROVITZ referred to the pressing urgency of obtaining rifles and ammunition for the armies opposed to the Bolsheviks. The Germans were fully alive to their dire need and were endeavouring to take advantage of it by offering to provide these necessities, thus making the country indebted to them.

MR. FORTINGTON expressed the readiness of the group represented by him to purchase on commission in England on behalf of the Latvian Government, thus obviating the payment of prohibitive prices; but he wished to emphasise their intention not to profiteer on the transactions. Regarding the shipping question, Mr. Fortington remarked that his group controlled a large interest in the shipping world and could secure the shipping necessary to make regular shipments of material from England and return shipments to England of flax and timber. He asked whether the Latvian Government would acquiesce in such an arrangement.

MR. MEIEROVITZ assured him that they would, remarking that the Bolsheviks at present held 1000 tons of flax, which would be available for exchange when the army was enabled to recover it by the possession of arms.

MR. FORTINGTON asked for confirmation of the opinion that had been expressed to him that not only the Government of Latvia but also the people were pro-British.

MR. MEIEROVITZ expressed his firm conviction that the feelings of the people were entirely pro-British. If circumstances should compel them to accept assistance from Germany, it would only be temporary, and the population quite understood that if the Germans were permitted to gain economic influence, political influence would quickly follow.

MR. ULMANIS stated that the Latvian Government's boat *Vera* was just about to leave for Leith with flax and timber and that it was desirable that she should return with arms and ammunition, the cost of which would be defrayed out of the sum of £35,000 standing to their credit in London.

MR. FORTINGTON promised to suggest to his principals that they should re-load the *Vera* for her return journey.

MR. ULMANIS said that upon arrival at Riga the boat could again return to England with a cargo of 1000 tons of flax, were it not for the fact that at the present time the Latvian Government had not the money with which to pay for the flax themselves. It was necessary, therefore, for them first to obtain an advance from the purchasers. The firm with whom the contract was made would have to make an advance up to 60-65% of the value of the flax. This was the only solution of Latvia's present position, except she turned to Germany, who was only too anxious to supply them with all they wanted. If Great Britain could save Latvia from falling into the clutches of Germany, she might make her own terms.

MR. FORTINGTON said that his principals were prepared to go a considerable way in tiding Latvia over her present difficulties, but they were desirous of laying the foundations of permanent relations.

MR. ERHARDT saw no obstacle to the establishment of such relations. The first steps to that end were the regulation of the bank question with the aid of the British Government and the raising of a loan. Latvia's present circumstances permitted her only to import goods from the country able to offer her credit, as she had not sufficient value to offer in return cargoes. The only way to ensure the establishment of enduring business relations was to afford help over the present crisis.

COL. TALLENTS stated that he believed it was the intention of the British Government to open credit to the extent of £26,000,000 for the use of banks and commercial houses. None of this sum had been apportioned, but those desirous of availing themselves of assistance would make application for it. Thus in order to obtain any substantial amount of assistance from this source the Government of Latvia should be linked up with some sound commercial house in London.

MR. FORTINGTON proposed the establishment in London of a chartered company, but

MR. ERHARDT demurred, saying that such a company would transact business with private people and firms, whereas their desire was to obtain a Government loan or establishment of credit.

MR. FORTINGTON pointed out that the time would be very ill-chosen for the issue of a loan of £5,000,000 to £10,000,000 to the State of Latvia in London. The conditions in the Baltic States were regarded in England as somewhat turbulent and scarcely inspired the necessary confidence. For the next six months private backing should be looked to by them for assistance.

MR. ERHARDT said that the shares of the National Bank proposed by the Latvian Government should be subscribed in Allied countries, the security remaining untouched in London. Notes would then be issued, bills discounted and credits opened in Latvia, and the stability of the Latvian currency would be assured.

MR. MACDUFF said that upon the establishment of the National Bank, the local banks would deposit their assets, consisting of securities, with it. These securities were partly in Russia and partly in Berlin at present and were now unrealisable, but would be realisable as soon as conditions became settled. The local banks had additional assets in the form of real estate and mortgage bonds, and representatives of these banks had promised to furnish full information as to the value and whereabouts of these securities, from which a true estimate could be formed of them.

MR. FORTINGTON promised to place the matter before his principals with the utmost speed and hoped then to put forward a concrete proposal.

MR. ULMANIS, replying to an enquiry as to how long it would be before there would be a surplus of foodstuffs for export, replied that it would be five or six years before they would be in a position to export bacon and butter, and then only providing they could import breeding stock from England. Ultimately, they would doubtless be able to export linseed, barley and oats also. Probably the rubber manufactories could be re-established within 2 years; the French were ready to invest 45,000,000 francs in the Provodnik Co.

The primary necessities were those of the army and the factories; 20% of the soldiers were at the present moment barefooted and over 60% were in rags. If only an agreement could be come to for an advance on the flax and 20,000 uniforms and pairs of boots could be procured before the end of August, there would then be time to settle the less urgent matters.

MR. FORTINGTON promised to cable regarding the possibility of arranging for a shipload of boots, uniforms and equipment immediately, to which a reply might be expected in four days.

It having been arranged that the question of financial assistance should be gone into by Mr. Fortington and the Minister of Finance upon a subsequent occasion,³ the conference closed.

³ Commercial negotiations were continued by Mr. Fortington and by the end of the year contracts had been drawn up with the Latvian and Lithuanian Governments whereby those Governments received financial advances against the yield of the flax crops of their respective countries.

No. 55

General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris.

*Received August 19)*¹

No. G. 179 Telegraphic [599/2/1/18193]

HELSINGFORS, August 17, 1919

Following for C.I.G.S. Personal and Urgent.

1. It is certain that German scheme of expansion eastward into Russia is being energetically developed. Original plan in North West, namely to crush Latvian and Esthonian efforts for independence, failed. They now transfer attention to west Russia and are building up force in rear of front Jactriwe [*sic*] Minsk using Russia principally and Poland secondarily as instruments of policy. Principal tool is Bermont. Policy of reaction is acceptable to Russians who grudge Latvian possession of Riga and Libau.

2. Please refer to my telegram G. 178 August 16 Dirmilint² for details regarding German propaganda.

3. Repatriation of Russians under German arrangements will assist German schemes on Russia but since decision has been made it is essential to take prompt action to deliver counter-blow.

I leave for Riga August 19 *en route* for England.

There is no danger to Latvia from Bolshevik attack provided German troops and commander leave country and that German intrigue be checked on North West front. What action is intended about disposal of Memel, see Article 99, Conditions of Peace?

¹ This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris and to General Malcolm in Berlin.

² Not printed.

No. 56

General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 18)

No. A.B. 179 Telegraphic [599/2/5/17892]

RIGA, August 17, 1919

Von der Goltz is reported to have left Mitau for Berlin.¹

¹ Cf. Vol. I, No. 36, minute 6.

No. 57

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 19)

No. 36 Telegraphic [117981/91/38]

RIGA, August 18, 1919

Mr. Goutchkof, Russian Minister of War under Kerensky, has arrived at Riga. He wishes to see General Gough and General Yudenich in order to discuss means of strengthening Baltic Front.

From previous conversation with Grant Watson it appears he considers support of Allies as insufficient for Russia's needs and is anxious to ascertain how far Russians can accept help from Germany without breaking with Allies.

Repeated to Paris.

No. 58

*M. Seskis to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*¹

No. I. 1738 [599/2/5/17623]

PARIS, le 21 août 1919

Excellence,

La Délégation lettone considère de son devoir d'attirer encore une fois l'attention de la Conférence de la Paix sur la conduite des troupes du général von der Goltz et sur l'imminent danger que crée leur séjour prolongé sur le territoire de la Latvia.

Sans égard aux sommations faites par la Commission interalliée, von der Goltz non seulement maintient opiniâtrément ses troupes en Latvia, mais encore y attire des renforts d'Allemagne. Von der Goltz lui-même ne le dément pas, alléguant que de nouvelles forces lui sont indispensables pour couvrir la retraite de son armée. Visiblement les troupes allemandes ont si peu envie d'abandonner le pays, qu'elles ont envoyé une députation spéciale à Weimar pour négocier, près du Gouvernement, une prolongation de séjour en Latvia.² De cette manière, l'effectif des troupes allemandes en Latvia au lieu de diminuer, va toujours en augmentant.

Il s'ensuit que leur conduite devient de plus en plus provocante et il est parfaitement clair qu'ils établissent systématiquement le trouble et le désordre dans le pays. Ainsi, à Mitau, ils ont lancé des proclamations invitant le peuple à un massacre des Juifs, et ils mènent publiquement une ardente campagne bolcheviste parmi la population dans la partie de la Courlande occupée par eux. En outre, s'élèvent constamment des conflits et se commettent des pillages méthodiques. Par exemple, une attaque ouverte a été opérée contre Schlock, des militaires lettons ont été arrêtés; les bateaux circulant entre Mitau et Riga ont été appréhendés à maintes reprises, les passagers outragés et les officiers lettons arrêtés. A Mitau, une rixe à main armée a eu lieu entre les Russes et les Allemands laissant pour résultat plusieurs victimes. Les Allemands ont aussi tenté de provoquer un

¹ The date of receipt is not entered on the file, but on August 27 this letter was noted as having been acknowledged.

² General von der Goltz, during his visit to Germany at that time (cf. No. 56), proceeded to Weimar in the company of General Groener, then Commandant of the Military Area of Kolberg (where German General Headquarters were established), in order to discuss this matter with Herr Ebert, President of the German Republic, and Herr Müller, German Foreign Minister. General von der Goltz also conferred with Herr Noske, German Minister of Defence. According to General von der Goltz, these conversations were in the main satisfactory to him: see his account, op. cit., pp. 242-5. (Cf. No. 113.)

conflit semblable avec les officiers lettons de Mitau, conflit qui n'a été conjuré que grâce au sang-froid des derniers. Mais les Allemands ne se sont pas bornés à cela. Récemment une conspiration contre les Autorités lettones se découvrait à Libau, ayant pour but de provoquer des troubles, créant un prétexte très commode à une nouvelle occupation de la ville par les troupes de von der Goltz. Bref, il se produit un constant et systématique appel à l'anarchie afin de créer des motifs à un séjour prolongé des troupes allemandes en Latvia, en qualité de gardiennes de l'ordre.

Le but politique qu'a en vue l'armée de von der Goltz — s'efforçant par tous les moyens de rester en Latvia — est clairement exposé dans l'ordre du jour du colonel [*sic*] Fletcher (16 juin 1919) marqué: 'secret et à détruire après lecture'. L'Angleterre — dit cet ordre du jour — veut élever un mur de séparation entre l'Allemagne et la Russie, qui 'enlèverait à la première la possibilité de trouver une grande et puissante alliée — la Russie', et qui 'empêcherait une future alliance avec la Russie'.³

A cette tendance de l'Angleterre avec laquelle — selon l'ordre du jour du colonel Fletcher — la France et l'Amérique ne sympathisent pas, les troupes allemandes doivent s'opposer par l'anéantissement de l'indépendance de la Latvia.

D'accord avec cet énoncé, von der Goltz, dans son ordre du jour du 13 juin 1919 (N° 844/19) déclare que, 'en principe nous devons, de toutes nos forces, soutenir et renforcer les troupes russes afin qu'elles atteignent leur but'. Voilà pourquoi — quoique von der Goltz défend jusqu'à présent à des unités entières allemandes de passer du côté des Russes — il déclare néanmoins que 'contre des cas individuels de passage des militaires allemands dans l'armée russe, dès à présent aucune objection ne sera faite' tandis que, dans l'avenir, si les troupes allemandes sont contraintes de quitter la Latvia, 'le passage d'unités entières sera encouragé par tous les moyens possibles'.

De cette façon, il est clair que la politique allemande aspire non seulement à l'anéantissement de la Latvia, mais par cela même vise à contrecarrer la politique des Puissances alliées et associées. Leurs intérêts, non moins que ceux de la Latvia, exigent une immédiate évacuation des troupes allemandes. L'insuccès de la Latvia, dans ce sens, est identique à l'insuccès des Alliés.

La Délégation lettone considère nécessaire de démontrer que toutes les mesures prises, jusqu'à présent, par les Alliés pour l'éloignement des troupes allemandes, sont insuffisamment décisives et ne peuvent être couronnées de succès. La destitution seule de von der Goltz et de quelques-uns de ses officiers ne saurait avoir aucun résultat, vu qu'en leur lieu apparaîtront de nouveaux personnages qui auront la même mentalité et la même façon d'agir. De même l'interdiction faite aux navires allemands d'entrer dans les ports lettons n'opérera aucune pression sur eux, vu que, au moyen de la voie ferrée Chavli-Mitau qu'ils ont dans leurs mains, les Allemands pourront importer et exporter tout ce qui leur fera plaisir. Si même l'on fixait un terme très proche aux Allemands pour l'évacuation cela ne pourrait avoir d'autre importance que leur empressement à achever le pillage de l'abondante

³ See No. 21.

moisson de Courlande. L'éloignement des Allemands doit s'effectuer sans délai.

La Délégation lettone n'oserait indiquer à la Conférence de la Paix les mesures pour contraindre les Allemands. Sans doute la Conférence de la Paix sait mieux quelles mesures elle tient en son pouvoir pour forcer à l'accomplissement des clauses du traité de Paix. Mais la Délégation lettone considère nécessaire d'indiquer que ces mesures doivent être des plus décisives et doivent être mises en vigueur sans ajournement.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

J. SESKIS

Président de la Délégation lettone
par intérim

No. 59

General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 23)

No. A.B. 194 Telegraphic [599/2/5/17250]

RIGA, August 22, 1919

I. Bermont visited the mission yesterday. His future action depends on interview and orders received from General Yudenich on August 26. He indicates that he is willing to join North Russian Corps and to co-operate on right flank of Balachowitsch¹ in the Pskow sector with about 3,000 men.² He is anxious to employ a portion of his force in the Dwinsk sector but it is doubtful if he will have sufficient troops ready for the proposed offensive in that sector. For supply reasons it is economical that he should be ordered by General Yudenich to move all his force to the Pskow sector.

II. General G[ough] left for Copenhagen on August 21 at 2 p.m.

¹ General Bulak Balachovich was in command of an anti-Soviet partisan detachment on this front.

² A reply to this telegram from the War Office, dated August 25, 1919, instructed General Burt 'that permission should only be given Bermont to co-operate with North Western Army on condition German elements in his force are eliminated'.

No. 60

Marshal Foch to General Sackville-West¹ (Paris)²

No. 4049 [599/2/5/18033]

(Translation.)

A.G.H.Q., August 23, 1919

I have the honour to forward you herewith copy of the letter I am sending to General Nudant, in execution of the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council at its session of 20th August.³

¹ Chief of the Military Section of the British Delegation in Paris in succession to General Thwaites.

² The date of receipt is uncertain. For the action on this letter taken on August 26 see note 4 below.

³ The Supreme Council had on August 20 considered a note by Marshal Foch of August

I should be obliged if you would be good enough, on your part, to cause the instructions to be sent General Gough which he will require for carrying out this resolution.⁴

By Order,

WEYGAND, Major-General

ENCLOSURE IN No. 60

3rd Section.

August 24, 1919

No. 4050

From: Marshal Foch, Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: General Nudant, Chairman of the I.P.A.C., Cologne.

Following my telegram No. 3,637⁵ of 1st August, I have the honour to request you to transmit forthwith to the German Representative on the Armistice Commission the following communication in reply to the German Note of 13th August:—

‘The Allied and Associated Governments take note that the German Government has given orders prohibiting any further entry of German troops into Lettonia.

‘As concerns General von der Goltz, the German Government appears to have realised, since the transmission of its note of 13th August, that the demand for his recall put forward by the Entente and the sole motive of which was the political attitude of that officer, in no wise affects his power of command.

‘Such, at least, is the interpretation which the Allied and Associated Powers believe they are to put on the declaration made to General Dupont⁶ to the effect that General von der Goltz will not return to Mitau and will establish himself at Tilsit.

‘They confidently trust that the effect of the measure thus announced will be to put an end for the future to any interference by the German Command in the internal affairs of the Baltic Provinces.

‘As regards the evacuation of the German troops from the Baltic Provinces

18 relative to the German note of August 13 (No. 53). After discussion in the Supreme Council ‘the conclusions of Marshal Foch’s note . . . were adopted and it was decided that General Gough should be asked by Marshal Foch to obtain the execution of the demands contained therein, with the exception of the recall of General von der Goltz, pending further information regarding that officer’ (see below). Marshal Foch’s note of August 18 and the record of the deliberation upon it in the Supreme Council are printed in Vol. I, No. 38, minute 3 and appendix A.

⁴ The substance of the enclosed letter from Marshal Foch to General Nudant was communicated to the British Military Mission at Helsingfors in Mr. Balfour’s telegram No. 46 of August 26, and was repeated to General Burt as No. 7, to the War Office as No. 161, and to the Foreign Office by bag (received August 29; a copy communicated to the Foreign Office by the Director of Military Intelligence had been received on the previous day).

⁵ See No. 35.

⁶ Chief of the French Military Mission in Berlin.

and the supervision of that evacuation, (Points (b), (c) and (d) of the second paragraph of the notification made in their name on 2nd August by General Nudant),⁵ the Allied and Associated Governments cannot admit the objections put forward by the German Government.

‘(b) The pretext adduced for rejecting evacuation by sea—based on the irritation excited among the German volunteers as a result of the refusal of the Lettish Government to grant them the right to settle in Lettonia—cannot be taken into consideration.

‘The Lettish Government has, as a matter of fact, in a letter addressed to the German Chargé d’Affaires in Lettonia—allowed the claims put forward by Germany in this matter.

‘Moreover, the possibility of evacuation by sea is a question to be settled on the spot by the Allied representatives.

‘(c) In the same way, the general plan of evacuation fixing the order of precedence of the various arms and the dates, taking into account the various means of transport (sea or land) available, can and must be fixed on the spot at once by the Allied representatives, after consultation with the German authorities.

‘(d) Finally, Article XIV of the Armistice, which provided that the German troops must cease any requisition, seizure or coercive measure with a view to diverting towards Germany the resources of regions to be evacuated, gives the Allied representatives the right to supervise the execution of that clause and to ascertain that the German troops carry off no material which does not properly belong to them.

‘Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers maintain their resolutions on Points (b), (c) and (d) set forth in the second paragraph of the Note of 2nd August, subject to any decisions which General Gough, their representative, may take on the spot after consultation with the local German authorities, as to the method of execution of the plan of evacuation, it being understood that evacuation will take place concurrently by sea and land, under the conditions best calculated to hasten its completion.

‘The German Government is requested forthwith to ask the German military authorities in the Baltic Provinces to put themselves into communication with General Gough in order to settle all the details of the plan of evacuation with him and to effect its execution.’

In order that I may be aware of the conditions under which communications may be established between General Gough and the German military authorities, I beg you to enquire of the German representatives what is the present organisation of the Command of the German troops in the Baltic Provinces and to inform me of the result of your enquiries.

For your private information, and in order that you may be able, if necessary, to discuss with the German representatives the points referred to in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the above-mentioned Note, I am forwarding you herewith the letter which I am causing to be sent to the Peace

Conference with a view to assisting their decisions,⁷ also the documents attached to that letter.

By Order,

WEYGAND, Major-General

Copies for:

The President of the Council of Ministers, President of the Peace Conference.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Peace Conference).

Secretariat General (Peace Conference).

Chief of Military Section, British Delegation.

Army Staff, 3rd Bureau A.

⁷ The reference was to Marshal Foch's letter of August 18: see note 3 above.

No. 61

*General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 25)¹
No. A.B 205 Telegraphic [599/2/5/18381]*

RIGA, August 24, 1919

Part One.

1. German command now inform me that they will not be able to complete evacuation of Latvia before latter half of September. Further state German Government have informed Entente that the evacuation cannot be completed by date laid down by Marshal Foch, August 31. Chief of Staff informs me von der Goltz is expected to return Mitau today.

2. All our reliable information shows Germans have evacuated the bulk of their troops from Latvia and that only strong rearguards remain.

Part II.

3. Colonel Ward, R.A.F., and Captain Wessel attached to Baltic Commission were arrested at Skudvy on August 20 by the Germans² and kept under

¹ This telegram was addressed to the British Mission at Helsingfors and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris and the War Office.

² These officers, together with Mr. Berry of the Mission, were arrested by Captain von Plehwe, commander of the Group Plehwe, while they were making an official investigation of the treatment of the local population by German forces. Colonel Ward stated in his report of this investigation, dated August 23 (transmitted by Colonel Tallents to Lord Curzon on August 27 and received on September 17):

'Inquiries made in the districts of Doblen and Frauenburg showed that no requisitions of crops had been made by the German military authorities, nor did there appear to have been any appreciable looting of crops on the part of the soldiers. I came across a case of one peasant having had a small quantity of hay stolen by German soldiers, but this seems to have been an exceptional case. In other respects, however, the behaviour of the German troops round Doblen and Frauenburg seems to have been very unsatisfactory. There seemed to be a lot of thieving on the part of the soldiers from scattered farmhouses of money, household goods etc., which is almost invariably accompanied by threats of shooting, so that the inhabitants are completely terrorised by the German soldiery, who go about in

arrest for 48 hours and not allowed to communicate with the Mission. They were kept under arrest in dirty billets and treated with insolence. Reason for arrest—suspected of having committed hostile acts against German soldiers in occupied territory. This charge was of course without foundation. On their release and reporting case to German Chief of the Staff at Mitau Colonel Ward received following apology. Regret very much that this incident has taken place. There are no reasons to bring forward for your arrest. A full apology is now being demanded with a statement of action taken against the officers who carried out the arrest.

4. Colonel Rowan-Robinson states that he was fired on by German troops whilst motor-boating from Libau to Kovno. Details follow as soon as received.

small parties of two or more with rifles and revolvers. . . . I attach hereto signed statements, marked 'b', 'c', 'd', of cases of looting which came before my immediate notice [not printed]. Moreover, I found the relations between the Lettish garrison officers and Lieut. Grosch, the commanding officer of the Polizeikompagnie and Ortskompagnie No. 3, stationed at Frauenburg, exceedingly bad, owing to the high-handed manner in which this German officer behaved towards them and the Lettish soldiers. I interviewed this Lieut. Grosch myself, and found him to be a most aggressive and unpleasant type of Prussian officer, who I should certainly say would do little to discourage his soldiers from treating the inhabitants badly. I should say that the system by which the German soldiers are living on the country, and supposedly paying for what they get is apt to lead to unofficial requisition on the part of the soldiers, who probably keep the money for their own pockets.

'I was given to understand by Lettish officers that Lieut. Grosch was given orders to evacuate Frauenburg on Thursday, August 14, but up to August 18 he had made no attempt to go, stating openly that he likes the country and does not intend to move. North of Frauenburg we found no German soldiers, all places having been evacuated. In these districts the peasants were peaceful and contented, no looting or violence of any sort taking place.'

No. 62

Mr. Cazalet¹ (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 26)

No. 5 Telegraphic [120708/61232/59]

RIGA, August 25, 1919

1. Von der Goltz has returned to Mitau.
2. Reported financial question between Russians and Germans is now settled.
3. German demonstrations in Mitau on night of August 24th resulting in disarming of Lettish garrison of 180 men. Lettish garrison headquarters entered and safe containing 50,000 roubles blown open and pillaged.
4. I have telegraphed for either Colonel Tallents or Gordon² to come from Reval at once by special train.

¹ A British Deputy Assistant Commissioner for commercial matters.

² Colonel Tallents had left Riga upon a visit to Reval on August 22. Colonel Pirie-Gordon was Deputy British Commissioner, stationed at Reval.

No. 63

*Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Burt (Riga)*¹

No. 6 Telegraphic [599/2/5/18381]

PARIS, August 26, 1919

Following from Military Section, begins:

Reference your A.B. 205² of August 24, part two, Marshal Foch has been asked to demand formal apology from German Government, and punishment of officers concerned in the arrest.³ Reference your Para. 4, similar action as regards firing on Colonel Rowan-Robinson is deferred pending receipt of full information. Ends.

¹ This telegram was repeated to the British Mission at Helsingfors as No. 45, to the War Office as No. 159, and to the Foreign Office by bag (received August 29 together with No. 61).

² No. 61.

³ This demand for apology was made in a note of August 29. On October 24, 1919, Baron von Ow-Wachendorf replied on behalf of the German Government to General Nudant as follows (translation):

'En réponse à votre note du 29 août 1919 No. 1628/G(1) j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer ce qui suit:

'Le Lieutenant Colonel anglais Ward ainsi que le Capitaine Wessell l'accompagnant, qui avaient été arrêtés le 20 août 1919, furent remis en liberté aussitôt après constatation des faits, pendant que d'autre part le représentant du Général von der Goltz fit faire par le chef deson État-Major des excuses verbales et écrites, faisant exprimer ses regrets. Le Général von der Goltz lui-même a exprimé par une lettre ses regrets au Général Burt de l'incident qui était survenu.

'De nouvelles excuses pour la forme paraissent de ce fait superflues. Même si les agissements du Capitaine von Plehwe reposent sur des suppositions erronées, il n'y a rien dans son attitude qui puisse soulever un motif de punition. Les troupes du Capitaine von Plehwe de même que des habitants de l'endroit ont informé ce dernier que des membres de la Commission de l'Entente ont, a plusieurs reprises, voyagé dans le pays, dans le but d'espionner les troupes et de rassembler du matériel de guerre contre elles. Sur ces déclarations, le Capitaine von Plehwe a jugé nécessaire d'ordonner l'arrestation provisoire de ces membres. Les résultats de l'enquête ne permettant pas cette arrestation provisoire, la mise en liberté de ces Officiers fut ordonnée.

'De communication reçue de la fraction de troupes compétentes il ressort que les Officiers arrêtés furent conduits dans un hôtel de l'endroit convenant aux circonstances. Quant au fait que les Officiers anglais n'ont pas pu, pendant leur détention, téléphoner à l'autorité de Riga de laquelle ils dépendent, il faut attribuer la cause de cette non-possibilité au fait que la communication avec Riga ne peut pas être obtenue de cette localité.

'L'incident fut communiqué immédiatement par téléphone par le Capitaine von Plehwe au Chef d'État-Major du 6^e Corps d'Armée de réserve; et ce dernier a personnellement télégraphié à la Mission Militaire Anglaise à Riga, pour la mettre au courant de ce qui s'est passé.'

No. 64

*General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 26)*¹

No. A.B. 208 Telegraphic [599/2/5/18374]

Part 1.

RIGA, August 26, 1919

1. In continuation of A.B. 206,² August 25th, demonstration by German troops at Mitau commenced at 9 p.m. and was a protest against Ger-

¹ This telegram was addressed to the British Mission at Helsingfors and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris, the War Office, and the British Mission at Libau.

² Not printed. This telegram was identical in substance with paragraphs 1-3 of No. 62.

man evacuation. Major Bischoff commanding Iron Division addressed German troops during demonstration in such a way that implied that the complete evacuation would not be enforced. Von der Goltz arrived by train at 2 a.m. and was met by a deputation of German troops. Petition handed to von der Goltz to renounce the German Government and to continue to . . .³ German troops in Latvia.

2. I am informed by German command that German troops refuse to comply with orders to entrain, giving former reasons, alleged Lettish promises of land and now desire⁴ to return to Germany. Evacuation is therefore stopped for present.

3. Britmis Mitau considers that remaining German troops at Mitau are showing signs of getting out of hand.

Part 2.

4. German command reports two bridges blown up, one on Mitau-Prekultn Railway near Friedrichshof and one between Mitau and Meiten on the Shavli railway and informs me on this account also the evacuation will be delayed.

5. Kovno reports that Germans now inform that Northern Lithuania will not be evacuated completely before the first half of October.

6. I consider that German demonstration and apparent lack of discipline is part of a new German plan to delay evacuation. The destruction of bridges which cannot be proved against the Germans is undoubtedly part of the plan also.

7. The Baltic Commission request Troopers to hand a copy of this to Foreign Office.⁵

³ The text here is uncertain.

⁴ In a copy of this telegram communicated by the War Office to the Foreign Office (received August 28) this passage read: 'and non-desirable to return', etc.

⁵ Cf. note 4 above.

No. 65

*General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 27)*¹

No. A.B. 209 Telegraphic [599/2/5/18374]

RIGA, August 26, 1919

1 [sic] Situation in Mitau still serious; German troops continue to plunder private houses and Lettish Government buildings.² On night of August 25-26th

¹ The address and repetitions of this telegram were as for No. 64.

² On August 30, 1919, M. Seskis addressed a note to M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, on the subject of these German disturbances at Mitau. M. Seskis stated that 'd'après des renseignements de source absolument certaine, les éléments russo-allemands à Berlin ont élaboré un plan ayant pour but le renversement du Gouvernement letton et la pénétration des troupes allemandes en Russie'; he drew attention to 'l'imminent danger qui menace la Latvia et la paix de l'Europe, du côté des réactionnaires russo-allemands qui se débloquent au contrôle de l'Entente'. In conclusion M. Seskis requested that the Peace

German troops rushed the house of British Mission at Mitau on pretext of searching for Lettish officers with arms. Stole various articles from British officers and servants. Full written apology is being demanded and compensation for stolen articles.³

Conference should (i) make representations to the German Government with a view to securing the cessation of disturbances on the part of the German troops and the severe punishment of the guilty; (ii) land approximately 5,000 Allied troops at Memel in order to counteract German designs—this request had been agreed with the Lithuanian Government, which supported it; (iii) insist upon the prompt withdrawal of German forces from Latvia. On September 2, 1919, MM. Ulmanis and Meierovicz addressed a telegram to Mr. Lloyd George (received September 11) and M. Clemenceau upon the same subject and with similar requests; the telegram also repeated the earlier Latvian request for supplies for the Latvian army.

³ Subsequently, in telegram No. A.B. 258 of September 4, Major Keenan of the British Military Mission, Riga, reported: 'Von der Goltz has tendered apology for raid on British Mission, Mitau, and has paid full compensation for articles stolen.'

No. 66

*Note from the Lithuanian Delegation in Paris to the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers*¹

No. I. 915 [599/2/5/18607]

PARIS, le 26 août, 1919

Messieurs,

La Délégation de Lithuanie à la Conférence de la Paix estime de son devoir de porter à la connaissance du Conseil Suprême les événements provoqués sur territoire lithuanien par la prolongation du séjour des troupes allemandes en Lithuanie.

D'après la déclaration du 16 août courant présentée au Gouvernement Lithuanien par le Ministre Plénipotentiaire de l'État allemand en Lithuanie, l'évacuation complète des territoires lithuaniens ne pourra pas s'accomplir avant le 8 octobre. D'ici à cette date, les voies ferrées de la Lithuanie du Nord resteront entre les mains des autorités militaires allemandes, entre autres les lignes Tilsitt-Chavli-Mitau, Radzivilichki-Prekult et Memel-Prekult. Tout le territoire desservi par ce réseau, c'est-à-dire près de la moitié du Gouvernement de Kovno, se trouve, contrairement aux stipulations du traité de paix, condamné à subir la présence des Allemands qui, s'appuyant sur une force armée considérable, poursuivent leurs réquisitions et exactions, ou, pour appeler les choses par leur nom, leur pillage organisé, souvent accompagné de rencontres sanglantes avec les populations.

Devant une pareille situation et en considérant: que le prolongement du séjour des troupes allemandes en Lithuanie est dépourvu de toute raison d'être,

¹ This note, together with a Lithuanian note of August 22 concerning 'the political action of the Polish army in Lithuania', was transmitted by the Lithuanian Delegation under a short covering note of August 29 (not printed). On September 2 Mr. Balfour forwarded copies of these notes to Lord Curzon (received September 4).

— que les autorités militaires allemandes, en différant l'évacuation, n'ont en vue que l'accaparement des récoltes d'automne dans les parties occupées ;
— que le séjour des troupes allemandes en Lithuanie prolonge la dés-organisation de ces régions et, en les isolant des autres territoires de la Lithuanie, empêche leur reconstruction, la délégation de Lithuanie à la Conférence de la Paix sollicite les Puissances de l'Entente d'employer les mesures les plus énergiques pour que les armées allemandes évacuent sans délai et sans atermoiements le territoire lithuanien et délivrent enfin ce pays, qui a si cruellement souffert de la guerre.

La Délégation de Lithuanie appelle, en outre, l'attention des Alliés sur les menaces de complications suivantes :

Depuis le 26 juillet, des détachements dits 'régiments russes du Général Prince de Lieven' se concentrent sous la protection du Général von der Goltz, dans le rayon de la ville de Chavli non évacuée par les forces allemandes. Ces détachements soi-disant russes se composent presque exclusivement d'Allemands qui ont orné leurs vêtements d'insignes russes. Une mission spéciale envoyée par le Colonel Vyrgolitch au nom du Détachement de Volontaires du Corps du Prince de Lieven et composée du Général-Major Bogdanoff, du Colonel Nicoline et des Lieutenants Goloubtseff et Petersen, a déclaré officiellement au Gouvernement de Lithuanie que le détachement du Colonel Vyrgolitch a occupé la ville de Kourchany, dans le voisinage de Chavli, par ordre du Baron [*sic*] von der Goltz, commandant le VI^{ème} corps baltique allemand.

Or, l'enquête ordonnée par le Gouvernement de Lithuanie a établi que l'organisation et la composition de ce détachement, aussi bien que son attitude vis-à-vis des populations, sont de tout point identiques à celles des troupes allemandes sous la protection et la direction desquelles se trouve le détachement pseudo-russe.

En prévision de complications possibles, le Gouvernement de Lithuanie s'est empressé de rendre compte de la situation aux Représentants des Puissances de l'Entente. Il a, dans le même temps, adressé au Gouvernement allemand une note de protestation dans laquelle il exigeait le retrait immédiat des nouvelles formations et l'évacuation générale de la Lithuanie par les forces allemandes. Néanmoins, la protestation et les exigences du Gouvernement de Lithuanie sont demeurées sans résultat.

La Délégation de Lithuanie à la Conférence de la Paix appelle, en conséquence, l'attention du Conseil Suprême des Alliés sur ces faits et le prie de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que l'évacuation générale de la Lithuanie par les armées allemandes soit accompagnée du retrait de cette suspecte formation russo-germanique.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

pour Le Président de la Délégation de Lithuanie
à la Conférence de la Paix

Le Secrétaire,
P. KLIMAS.

T. NAROUCHEVITCH

Memorandum from the Polish Minister in London¹
[122132/82871/38]

POLISH LEGATION, LONDON, August 27, 1919

Memorandum concerning German activity in Russia and the threat of an undue growth of German influence in the East

1. The Polish army has for a considerable time been engaged in fighting the bolsheviks, and maintains an anti-bolshevik front of great importance. This Polish action is most important, considering that:

(a) The bulk of the Soviet troops is immobilised to this front and is being repeatedly defeated by the Polish troops, thus preventing the bolshevik forces from bringing irresistible pressure to bear against the Russian and Allied armies engaged in fighting the Soviet troops.

(b) The Polish front is the only substantial barrier between bolshevism and [the] civilised world.

2. Poland wishes to fulfil her part in protecting itself and other countries against a bolshevik advance, as well as in preventing a direct contact of Germany and Russia, most dangerous to Poland on account of her geographical position, and no less dangerous to the Entente Powers. The co-operation of Germany in any anti-bolshevik action can be considered at present as being solely a masked means employed by Germany to regain contact and influence Russia. Such an activity on the part of Germany is most dangerous to Poland's future and to the maintenance of Peace. It also threatens the Entente Powers in their most vital interests and can be the cause of an uncalled for growth of power of Germany.

3. Such a growth of German activity places the Russian Allied interests at stake, and through the possibility of recreating a Russia, governed by German influence, can endanger especially British Eastern and Baltic interests.

4. The Germans had towards the end of the war repeatedly proclaimed that in the case of realising their aims of regaining German influence in Russia, the eventual loss of Alsace Lorraine and their colonies would be easily outbalanced.

5. It is a well known fact that before and especially during the war the domination of the Baltic countries by Germany was a prominent tendency in their policy and was aimed at ensuring a favourable ground of contact with Russia and a decisive influence on the Baltic Coast. Special attention

¹ This memorandum was left on August 28, 1919, by Prince Sapieha with Sir R. Graham, Acting Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Lord Hardinge at the Paris Peace Conference. In a letter of September 3 the Foreign Office informed the Polish Minister that this memorandum 'has been forwarded to the Peace Delegation, Paris, who have full power to take whatever action is considered necessary'.

was paid by Germany to Esthonia, Livland, Courland and during the war to an increase of influence in Lithuania.

6. This German policy has not altered and is at present considerably developing. The German authorities have taken advantage of their position as occupants to help in the erection of the Lieven army of Courland Barons. They have supplied this army with war material, ammunition, instructors and officers.

7. German influence has acquired sufficient power to divert [? divest] the Lettish Government instituted under Allied auspices of its actual power.

8. The present action of Germany in Russia is clearly dualistic and calculated to meet any emergency. The Germans are assisting on the one hand the Russian anti-bolshevik armies, on the other hand they are in close contact with and are supplying to the bolshevik army, operating against Poland, munitions, soldiers, and officers.

9. Eastern Prussia is being used as a basis by Germany for their activity in Russia and the Baltic countries, and this province acquires considerable importance as a stronghold from which radiates German influence towards the East.

10. The following trustworthy information fully corroborates the above stated facts.

(a) An understanding exists between Germany and Admiral Koltchak based on stipulations by virtue of which Germany is to supply soldiers and war material to be used in mutually fighting bolshevism, on one hand, on the other a mutual action against Poland in the future is contemplated. On July 28th 165 German officers were despatched from Königsberg via Tilsit and Mitau to join General [sic] Koltchak's army. An enlisting office called 'Hauptbüro für Graf Keller zur Bekämpfung des Bolshevismus' has been organised in Königsberg. In Königsberg the Germans are concentrating big supplies of arms, munitions and artillery which are continuously transported there from Western Prussia, Danzig and other centres. In the neighbourhood of Mitau and to the north-east of the Polish and Lithuanian borders are concentrated: the 'Baltische Landwehr' about 15,000 strong with batteries and aviation park; the 'Eiserne Division' (German army) about 10,000 men strong with a considerable supply of 15 cm. guns. Fresh transports are arriving from Germany. These troops have 5 columns of motor-cars. It is further stated that considerable numbers of German troops are stationed at Perkul [? Prekuln], Murawiw, Radziwiliszki, and especially in Schawle. There is a German aeroplane station at Friedrichshof with 130 machines.

The provisionment of this army is exported from East Prussia. The pay of the men is 11 marks. That of non-commissioned officers 16 marks—officers 18 marks daily.

(b) The contact between German and anti-bolshevik armies is proved amongst other information, by the following intercepted telegrams sent by the 'Oberkommando Nord'.

1st telegram:

'General Kommando hat baldigst zu melden, ob Grenzschutz Abteilungen I, II und III bereit zur Verwendung in Lettland. Bejahendenfalls hat zum Abtransport nach Mitau bereitzuhalten.'²

2nd telegram of July 8:

'Einzige Möglichkeit deutscher Ostpolitik noch zum Erfolg zu verhelfen besteht nach Ansicht des 6. Armee Korps in kräftiger Unterstützung der [in] Aufstellung begriffenen antibolschewistischen Russentruppen. Teile von deutschen Truppen in Lettland sind bereit in russische Dienste zu treten. Unterstützung dieser Bewegung ist vom Oberkommando bei Befehlstelle Kolberg beantragt. Aufklärung aller Truppen, die nach Lettland gehen wollen, in diesem Sinne ist geboten.'³

(c) The German-Russian army numbering over 100,000 men stretches on a line east of Augustow through Kalwarya, Maryampol, Pilwizski, Rosienie, Radziwiliski, Szawle, Mitau. It must be added that General Diebitch's German army, after having left Augustow conformly with the agreement,⁴ instead of retiring to Germany went in the direction of Rosienie. On the road from Taurogi to Szawle consignments of aeroplanes can be seen daily going northwards and do not return.

The above stated facts make it urgent that:

- I. The enlisting of German soldiers for Russia should be stopped.
- II. The transport of German troops, ammunition, and war material to Russia should be discontinued.
- III. The carrying off of foodstuffs from Eastern Prussia should be stopped.
- IV. A strict control and supervision of all German coast traffic should be enforced in the Baltic.

² Translation: 'Command headquarters is to report at earliest whether frontier guard detachments I, II and III ready for use in Latvia. If so, it is to hold them in readiness for transport to Mitau.'

³ Translation: 'Only possibility of still assisting German eastern policy to success lies, in view of the 6th Army Corps, in strong support of the anti-bolshevist Russian troops in process of formation. Parts of German troops in Latvia are prepared to enter Russian service. Support of this movement is applied for by High Command to Kolberg Command Centre. Enlightenment in this sense of all troops who wish to go to Latvia is expedient.'

⁴ This German withdrawal had been effected in accordance with the Allied delimitation of a temporary Polish-Lithuanian line of demarcation whereby Augustow was in Polish occupation (cf. Vol. I, No. 19, app. A). In this connexion Baron von Ow-Wachendorf had stated in part in note A.A.I. No. 4772 of August 9, 1919, to General Nudant: 'The order that Southern Lithuania south of the Niemen must be evacuated shortly had reached the German Troops in Lithuania from the German High Command already before the French Note No. 1509/G of 4.8.19 had arrived. South Lithuania and with it the Districts of Suwalki and those West of Seini will therefore be evacuated shortly by German troops.'

No. 68

*General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 29)*¹
No. A.B. 217 Telegraphic [599/2/5/18374]

RIGA, August 27, 1919

1. Germans inform me by letter dated August 23 that owing to shortage of rolling-stock, coal, etc. trains required for evacuation purposes would be reduced and from August 24th the evacuation would still take 66 days to complete. I have replied referring Germans to Marshal Foch's demand dated August 1st.²

2. Von der Goltz has now written to me in same sense as para. 2 of my A.B. 208³ dated August 25th adding that he has recommended his Government to delay the planned evacuation of his Corps Headquarters from Mitau in order to avoid further disorder amongst his troops.

3. In my opinion the recent German demonstrations at Mitau are part of a new German plan to create delay in evacuation and to assist the German schemes with Russians Bermont and Wyr[gol]itsch.

4. Britmis Kovno reports that Germans demand from Lithuanian Government the use of railways Tilsit-Schavli-Poniewez and Vilna-Duenaburg for the transport of Russian troops. Failing permission, Germans will stop coal supply to Lithuania.

¹ This telegram was addressed to Helsingfors and repeated to the British Delegation at Paris and the War Office. A copy was received in the Foreign Office on September 1.

² See No. 35.

³ No. 64.

No. 69

*General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 28)*¹
No. A.B. 219 Telegraphic [599/2/5/18374]

RIGA, August 28, 1919

1. Situation in Mitau quieter. Germans are bringing back troops to Latvia. 1,000 men arrived at Mitau on August 27th from Schavli.

2. Von der Goltz now states definitely in writing that he will not evacuate by 31st August.

¹ This telegram was addressed and repeated as for No. 68. A copy was received in the Foreign Office on September 1.

No. 70

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Riga)
No. 25 Telegraphic [121675/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 28, 1919

Your telegram No. 36¹ (of August 18).

You should inform General Goutchkof that His Majesty's Government consider it most undesirable that any further assistance should be obtained from Germany.

¹ No. 57.

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received August 29)

No. 56 Telegraphic [124757/61232/59]

RIGA, August 28, 1919

At Military Conference held at Riga August 26 plans for common offensive against Bolsheviks were agreed upon subject to political considerations.¹

I visited Mitau August 27 (? at the request of) General Marsh and Mr. Ulmanis. Following Goltz's return August 25 German troops submitted demands covering security employment on discharge, land settlement in Latvia etc. Goltz has notified military mission of suspension of evacuation pending settlement of troops' demands by German Government. He has issued secret order urging discipline but expressing sympathy with soldiers demands.² I believe he desires to maintain discipline for his own purposes and will not countenance march on Riga while he retains control. However he has apparently obtained support from German conservative interests. Germans have demanded free use of railways from Lithuanian Government.

Bermont is wholly dependent upon Germans but his main motive is personal megalomania.

Goltz is plainly counting on him as cover for establishing German military corridor to Russia.

Bermont promised me yesterday he would sign proclamation covering points raised by Latvian Government.³ But Latvian Government having regard for German cessation of evacuation and Bermont's close German connection are greatly embarrassed by his proposal for advance through Latvia and protest against scheme.

I understand Lithuanian Government hold same view. I share fears and anticipate that German army will shortly have to be treated as outlaws. Immediate needs of situation are

- (1) Acceleration of fullest equipment of Lettish troops.
- (2) Much stronger steps by Allies to compel evacuation of Courland by all German soldiers.
- (3) Absolute bar against importation of war material from Germany whether nominally for Bermont or not. Most desirable that Allied military control should be established on railway at frontier.
- (4) Cutting off of all further Russian reinforcements from Bermont.

¹ At this military conference, for which cf. No. 76, the chairman and British representative was General Marsh, chief of staff to General Gough and acting as head of the military mission during the latter's absence. At this meeting it was agreed to launch a common offensive against the Soviet forces along the eastern front from Esthonia to Poland, subject to settlement of political questions and confirmation of mutual agreement to commence the offensive on September 15, 1919.

² This order is printed by General Count R. von der Goltz, op. cit., p. 248.

³ See No. 76.

As existence of present Latvian Government is imperilled I request that any possible assurances on above points may be telegraphed to me urgently for communication to them.

Repeated to Paris, Helsingfors for General Marshall [Marsh].

No. 72

*General Marsh (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*¹
No. G. 209 Telegraphic [123836/855/59]

HELSINGFORS, August 29, 1919

Your 80811 M.I.R.² August 26.

General [*sic*] Bermont asks that Russian prisoners be sent to him and advises me that more Russians he receives better it will be for him to eliminate German elements in his force. I agree.

General Yudenitch said that he would come to Riga and speak to Bermont on this subject.

Bermont has more character and decision than Yudenitch and in my opinion is more likely to develop a serious situation eastward than Yudenitch and is therefore more worthy of support in men and supplies.

There is however danger of German influence remaining and growing stronger in Russian forces of Latvia if Allied Powers do not immediately send supply of food, pay, equipment, war stores, via Mission Riga to Bermont.

¹ This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris and Missions in Riga and Reval. The date of receipt in Paris is uncertain.

² Not printed.

No. 73

*General Marsh (Helsingfors) to General Burt (Riga)*¹
No. G.L. 90 Telegraphic [123992/61232/59]

HELSINGFORS, August 29, 1919

Your A.B. 222,² August 28.

1. Bermont with whom I spoke for one hour before entering conference³ promised to eliminate Germans. Therefore agree that you instruct him accordingly also as suggested in your part 2 von der Goltz. Please wire Paris to take drastic steps suggested if they refuse.

2. Latvian and Lithuanian Governments will be given all available arms

¹ This telegram was repeated to the British Mission at Reval and to the War Office for General Gough (received August 30).

² In transmitting telegram G.L. 90 to the Foreign Office (see note 4 below), the Director of Military Intelligence noted: 'The telegram referred to from the British Mission, Riga, has not been received by the War Office, and the significance of paragraph 1 is, therefore, not clear.'

³ Evidently the military conference of August 26 at Riga: see No. 76.

and ammunition at once to enable them to fight. If necessary could you get Poles to attack von der Goltz?⁴

⁴ The Director of Military Intelligence communicated this telegram to the Foreign Office on September 2 together with the following paraphrase of the telegram dispatched in reply from the War Office to Helsingfors (repeated to Riga and Paris) on September 1: 'Attempt should on no account be made to induce Poles to attack Germans or [*sic*] von der Goltz.' In his covering note of September 2 to Sir R. Graham the Director of Military Intelligence inquired 'whether he considers that any further instructions should be sent to the British Mission, Helsingfors, in this connection'. Sir R. Graham replied on September 8 suggesting 'that Sir W. Thwaites should address his enquiry to the Peace Delegation since the conduct of this question is in their hands rather than in those of the Foreign Office'. The question of employing Polish forces in the manner suggested was considered by the Supreme Council in Paris on September 15-17: see Vol. I, No. 57, minute 8; No. 58, minute 1; No. 59, minute 1.

No. 74

*General Burt (Riga) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 31)*¹
No. A.B. 227 Telegraphic [599/2/5/18374]

RIGA, August 29, 1919

1. Von der Goltz has sent an apology for arrest of Colonel Ward which I have refused to accept and have informed him that the matter is referred to you.² He refuses to take any action against Captain Plehwe. He has annulled the pass issued to Colonel Ward with the German visé and refuses to accept any responsibility for the safety of Colonel Ward in territory occupied by German troops. He further refuses any responsibility for the safety of officers travelling in the occupied territory.

2. I see in this and the recent occurrences in Mitau an effort of von der Goltz to show to the inhabitants of these provinces the powerlessness of the Entente to eject him.

¹ This telegram was addressed to the British Mission at Helsingfors and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris and the War Office.

² i.e. British Mission at Helsingfors.

No. 75

*General Marsh (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris.
Received September 1)*¹
No. G.L. 94 Telegraphic [599/2/5/18374]

HELSINGFORS, August 31, 1919

Agree with Tallents' suggestions made in his No. 56,² August 28, to Foreign Office except those regarding cutting importation of German war material and of Russian reinforcements from Bermont.

¹ This telegram was addressed to the British Mission at Riga and repeated to the British Mission at Reval, British Delegation at Paris, and the War Office.

² No. 71.

1. Peace Treaty laid down that all German material was to be handed over to Allies and to be destroyed. As Allies have not taken over this war material General Gough recommends that it be used against Bolsheviks by Russians but not paid for.

2. Although General Gough considers security of border states from either German or reactionary Russian influence of paramount consideration, he cannot disregard existence of Russian armed community in Latvia under Bermont. By reinforcing this force with Russians and sending it out of Latvia into Russia we should attain our threefold object—firstly strengthening Russian element in Bermont's division and thus assisting Bermont to eliminate German element; secondly sending force against Bolsheviks, thirdly ridding Latvia of presence of Russians.

3. Have already wired Paris and London urging:—

A. Acceleration of fullest equipment of Lettish troops and have instructed Reval to send first available consignment to Riga.

B. Drastic measures to compel Germans to evacuate.³ If these steps taken consider Latvian apprehensions can be appeased by Tallents; probably Latvian army under your guidance⁴ will be strong enough to compel Russians to leave Latvia by shortest route to Russia.

³ In his telegram No. G. 210 of August 29 to the War Office, repeated to the British Delegation in Paris (text received, August 31, very corrupt), General Marsh had stated: 'Situation has now become acute. . . . Situation in Latvia can only be redeemed by drastic measures, that is by forcing German Government to employ armed force to quell mutiny amongst von der Goltz's troops, if necessary by renewal of blockade, and by allied military intervention renewal of which might induce . . . [text uncertain] from south.' An amended text of the last phrase read: '. . . and by allied military intervention in which (?) Poles might be induced to join (?) from south.' This telegram further referred to the unsatisfactory condition of the Russian North-West Army under General Yudenitch and suggested the need for considering whether this force was (amended paraphrased text) 'worthy of further support. General Marsh is of opinion that Lithuanians, Esthonians and Letts whose interests conflict reactionary Russians are more worthy, and that any attempt to retake Petrograd without German influence becoming paramount is impossible unless Latvians, Lithuanians and Esthonians shall be placed in security against German or Russian . . . [text uncertain] that is, reactionary domination. Please warn General Gough and repeat Mission Berlin.'

⁴ i.e. General Burt's guidance.

No. 76

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 10)

No. 38 [127251/61232/59]

RIGA, September 1, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose herewith my Report covering the situation in Riga from August 26 to August 31, 1919.

I have, etc.,

S. G. TALLENTS

Report covering the situation in Riga from August 26 to August 31, 1919

I left Reval on the evening of August 25 in a special train, by which General Marsh, General Laidoner and others were travelling to the Military Conference at Riga. We reached Riga early on the afternoon of August 26.

General Marsh held the same afternoon a conference in the Ritterhaus, at which the Esthonian, Lettish, Lithuanian and Russian forces¹ were represented. The possibility of a joint offensive against the Bolsheviks was discussed. I attended the conference for about 20 minutes at the beginning, but as it was conducted in Russian and other urgent affairs required attention, I then left.

About 7.30 the same evening General Marsh sent me a message asking if I would come at once to speak with Mr. Ulmanis, who was with him. I did so, and found Mr. Ulmanis in a state of considerable excitement, owing to a clause in a document signed at the conference which provided for the passage through Latvia towards Dvinsk of the Russian forces commanded by Colonel Bermont at Mitau. He pointed out that Colonel Bermont was in the closest relations with the Germans, and that this permission was a victory for them, and he feared that his Government would be upset if the proposal were carried through. He complained that while the agreement was explicitly made subject to political considerations, the political aspects of the proposed operations ought to have been considered in advance of the laying of military plans. I promised I would see Colonel Bermont on the following day and ascertain whether he would give a guarantee in the sense indicated by Mr. Meierovich, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On the afternoon of August 27 I motored with General Burt to Mitau and there saw Colonel Bermont. This man is a Caucasian by birth, but of mixed blood—probably in part Jewish. He is an adventurer, suffering apparently from megalomania, highly theatrical, and obviously envisages himself as a possible future Tsar of Russia. He was before the war a subaltern in the 1st Lancers, in which capacity he earned no special distinction. He is believed to have no right to the rank of Colonel. It is also questioned by other Russians whether he has the right to the White Cross, which he wears conspicuously on his uniform. He originally entered upon his present adventure by joining Prince Lieven's Corps in Berlin. He has lately associated very freely with Germans at Mitau, giving extravagant entertainments and often drinking heavily. He is said to know little German but to have a few phrases, the

¹ The Russian forces were represented by an envoy from General Yudenitch and by Colonel Bermond-Avalov. A detailed account of the conference of August 26 is printed by General Prince Awaloff (i.e. Bermond-Avalov): *Im Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus* (Glückstadt & Hamburg, 1925), p. 174 f. (In general these memoirs of Prince Bermond-Avalov, which are copiously illustrated, contain much detailed information and documentary material concerning the organization and operations of the Russian Volunteer Western Army under his command. Statements by Prince Bermond-Avalov should not, however, be invariably accepted without reserve in the absence of confirmation from an independent source.)

chief of which is 'Deutschland über Alles', which he airs before the Germans, especially when he is in his cups.

He received us partially undressed in bed, explaining that he had caught a chill through extreme excitement the day before. A noticeable feature in his room was a large portrait of 'Unser Kronprinz'. It should be added to this picture that he is a clever and cunning man of good education and address.

I told Colonel Bermont the difficulties of the Latvian Government, and asked him whether he would be prepared to declare in writing: (1) that he would recognise and deal frankly with the Latvian Government, (2) that he had nothing but peaceful intentions towards the Latvian people and army, (3) that he would not stay in Latvian territory longer than necessary, (4) that the plans for his passage through the country (as regards transport, food, etc.) would be subject to special agreement with the Latvian Commander-in-Chief, (5) that while in Latvia he would be under the general control of the Latvian Commander-in-Chief in the same way as the North West Russian Army was under the control of General Laidoner during its stay in Estonian territory, and (6) that he would live on the country as little as possible. Colonel Bermont replied that he would give such a declaration, and it was agreed that if the Latvian Government was prepared to go ahead on these lines, I should settle a draft with Mr. Ulmanis and send it to him to consider and sign. He stated that he proposed to attach Prince Kropotkin as liaison officer between himself and both the Latvian Ministry of War and the British Military Mission in Riga. He also promised to attach a liaison officer to Colonel Ballod, who, he anticipated, would be operating on his flank at the front. Finally, he stated that he could not advance unless, and until, the war material—especially harness—now stopped at the German frontier, were allowed to proceed to Mitau. He understood that General Marsh had promised him that this material should be released, and General Burt promised to telegraph to General Marsh on the subject.

On the morning of August 28 Mr. Ulmanis with Mr. Meierovich and General Simonson² came to see me. They repeated the views expressed on the evening of August 26 and said that if the Germans came towards Riga, the whole Lettish population, armed or unarmed, including the Cabinet, would go out and oppose them. They emphasised the necessity of equipping the Latvian army completely so that it could, if necessary, deal both with the Germans and with Bermont's force. I explained that my views of the situation, as conveyed to the Foreign Office in my telegram No. 56,³ were substantially the same as his own. I promised to attend a meeting of the chiefs of the Lettish parties to be held the same evening.

In the afternoon of August 28, General Dessino, who had been sent to Riga by General Yudenich to discuss matters with Bermont, called on me. I explained the difficulties of the Lettish Government, telling him that I shared most of them. His estimate of Bermont clearly agreed substantially with

² Commander-in-Chief of the Latvian army.

³ No. 71.

mine; but he pointed out, as is the fact, that Bermont had a considerable hold on his men, and urged that he should be sent towards Dvinsk on the two grounds, that his men would supply a valuable reinforcement in the fight against the Bolsheviks, and that the danger of his co-operation with the Germans would be lessened and more easily dealt with once they had been separated. I told him that I was meeting Lettish representatives the same day, and he promised to call again after himself seeing Bermont at Mitau on the following day.

The meeting of the chiefs of the Lettish parties which I was to attend on August 28 lasted so long that I had gone to bed before they were ready to see me. On August 29 and 30, however, I had separate interviews with the following:—

Dr. Mendrs and Mr. Zelms, Social Democratic Party.

Dr. Bergson and Mr. Bankaw, Democratic Party.

Mr. Sahlits, Mr. Benus, Radical Democratic Party.

Mr. Klihwe and Mr. Pauluk, Farmers' League.

I had been told that the Social Democrats might refuse my invitation in order to show their independence; in fact, however, they came and all the delegates discussed the national situation with me in a spirit of great personal friendliness. The representatives of the Farmers' League (Mr. Ulmanis' own party) were inclined to be more critical than the others, but in substance their views were the same. They believed that the great hope for Latvia lay in close relations with England. Their government had promised them that equipment for the army and other assistance would be forthcoming early in August; practically no equipment had yet arrived, and while they themselves, as leaders, understood some of the difficulties and sympathised with the government because of them, the rank and file of their parties complained that the government had not fulfilled their promises. They all agreed that a Cabinet crisis at this critical moment would be a national danger. They had no criticisms to make in particular against Mr. Ulmanis or Dr. Erhardt (the Balt Minister of Finance, to whose excellent work I paid a special tribute). They asked me, however, whether England would object to a few personal changes in the Cabinet.

I told them that I should maintain our condition that there must be two Balts in the Cabinet and that I could not countenance any overthrow of the Cabinet; but I explained that it was not for the English representative to say that personal changes not affecting the composition or stability of the Cabinet as a whole were undesirable. As regards supply of equipment, I told them what I felt, viz. that the responsibility for the present unprepared state of the Lettish Army lay rather with the Entente than in any lack of energy on the part of the Cabinet.

At a meeting of the Peoples' Council on the evening of August 30, some harsh criticisms were passed upon certain members of the Government, with the result that Dr. Walters has resigned and General Simonson will in future continue to act as Commander-in-Chief, ceasing to hold the additional post

of Minister of War. I attach little importance to either of these changes. Dr. Walters, though a clever man, suffers in Lettish eyes from a German education and manner, and has further contributed injudicious articles to the press, which have been traced back to him. General Simonson, though an amiable and pleasant man, is in no degree an organiser. It is significant of his régime that I personally discovered in the docks yesterday a pile of discarded Russian steel helmets and some heaps of horseshoes, adaptable for use at a time when the Lettish commands are crying out for supplies of both.

At the time of writing (August 31) the situation at Mitau remains critical, and I am sending Sir Victor Warrender⁴ there this afternoon to bring back a personal report upon events. It is understood that following upon a Sports Meeting this afternoon, the German troops will be told of a reply from the German Government to the effect that their representations, referred to in my telegram No. 56,³ could only be considered when the complainants go back to German soil. General von der Goltz's chief of staff has told Colonel Grove⁵ that in his view the troops will not act on this decision.

Should any incident take place in Mitau tonight, I hope to be able to catch the same mail as will carry this dispatch with a supplementary report upon it.

S. G. TALLENTS

⁴ Personal assistant to Colonel Tallents.

⁵ Representative at Mitau of the British Military Mission.

No. 77

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 4)

No. 70 Telegraphic [124961/61232/59]

RIGA, September 3, 1919

General Burt met von der Goltz yesterday. Refer to his telegram to War Office number A.B. 246.¹ His personal impression shared by Lettish Representatives at Mitau was that tension there was temporarily at any rate decidedly relaxed.

Repeated to Paris.

¹ In this short telegram of even date General Burt reported that General von der Goltz 'would give no date for evacuation nor submit any plans. The only instructions he says he has received from his Government are to get his troops under discipline.

² At a parade on August 1, von der Goltz addressed his men that they must be prepared to leave Courland. Those who remained behind would be in a precarious position.

³ He says he has no authority over German troops in Bermont's corps as they are all volunteers.'

*Baron von Ow-Wachendorf to General Nudant (Cologne)**No. A.A.I. 5283 [599/2/5/18891]*

DÜSSELDORF, le 3 septembre 1919

*Note du Représentant du Gouvernement allemand**(Traduction.)*

J'ai l'honneur de répondre ce qui suit à vos Notes 1620/G¹ et 1621/G² du 27 août, et 1624/G du 28 août.³

'Le Gouvernement allemand regrette que l'évacuation totale et rapide des territoires baltes ordonnée par lui ait été arrêtée par l'attitude indisciplinée des troupes allemandes se trouvant encore en Courlande. Pendant que le Gouvernement allemand juge de la façon la plus sévère l'acte de propre autorité des troupes, il se voit cependant dans l'impossibilité, à la suite des restrictions imposées par les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés, d'obtenir l'obéissance des troupes par l'emploi de forces militaires. Le Gouvernement allemand se permet de faire remarquer que, par sa note du 15 [13] août, N° 4884,⁴ il avait déjà fait remarquer la résistance probable de certains corps de troupe et les complications qui pouvaient en résulter. Dans l'état des choses, il ne resta au Gouvernement allemand rien d'autre que de tenter d'amener les troupes à la raison et de les retenir de commettre des excès, notamment contre les ressortissants des Puissances Alliées. Uniquement dans ce but et certainement contre ses instructions formelles, le Général Comte Goltz est retourné à Mitau. Les services supérieurs n'ont pas pu se résoudre à reconnaître la conception qu'il avait fait valoir que les troubles n'auraient pas éclaté dans les troupes s'il était resté à Mitau et que sa présence contribuerait certainement au rétablissement du calme.'

Il[s] lui ont accordé plus tard l'autorisation de retourner à Mitau, mais le rappelleront de là-bas aussitôt qu'il aura atteint le but. Effectivement, on ne peut pas méconnaître l'effet favorable que son apparition a déjà exercé sur l'attitude des troupes. Ce qui irrite encore au plus haut point le moral des troupes, c'est l'établissement d'un plan d'évacuation et particulièrement de transport des troupes par mer, actuellement encore impossible, ce dont les représentants des Gouvernements alliés et associés peuvent se rendre compte en place et lieu. De même, il n'est pas possible de faire des communications d'ici au sujet de l'organisation militaire actuelle, car des changements peuvent survenir journellement. Les représentants des Puissances alliées qui se trouvent à Mitau et qui sont en relations constantes avec le

¹ Note in original: 'Notification de la lettre 4050 du 24 août.' See No. 60.

² Note in original: 'Note relative au dernier § de la lettre 4050 du 24 août.' This note (not printed) asked for information concerning the organization of the command of German forces in the Baltic Provinces.

³ Note in original: 'Notification du télégramme 4112 du 28 août.' This telegram related to the attacks by German forces against the Latvian authorities in Mitau: see below.

⁴ No. 53.

Comte Goltz peuvent se renseigner continuellement au sujet de la situation militaire de tout instant et sur l'organisation allemande.

Somme toute, il apparaît, en considération de l'instabilité des circonstances venant en question, que la négociation de toute l'affaire d'évacuation sur place par les deux Commandants militaires soit la seule solution des complications en cours; la proposition conforme à cette conception faite dans la note 1620/G⁵ a reçu consentement avec satisfaction. Les attaques de soldats allemands contre les soldats et autorités lettones mentionnées dans la note N° 1624/G,⁶ qui ont été condamnées énergiquement par le Gouvernement allemand, sont à considérer comme une affaire pendante entre les Gouvernements allemand et letton et constituent actuellement l'objet de négociations entre ces deux Gouvernements.

WACHENDORF

C.I.P.A.

Transmis à M. le Maréchal Com^t. en Chef les A.A.

N° 2171

Le Général Nudant, Président C.I.P.A.

4 septembre

p.o. le Chef d'État Major (Signé)

⁵ See note 1 above.

⁶ See note 3 above.

No. 79

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 6)

No. 77 Telegraphic [126027/61232/59]

RIGA, September 4, 1919

My telegrams Nos. London 56,¹ Paris 25, Helsingfors 17.

At the request of Latvian Government I have today handed to Bermont's representative for signature draft declaration of goodwill towards Latvian army and people, etc. Last paragraph contains statement that he will exclude Germans from his force without specifying date. This follows his promise to General Marsh on August 26—see General Marsh's telegram G.L. 90,² August 29. Expect he will agree to all points except last. If he signs last he quarrels with Germans, or signs without intention of observing signature. For his latest relations with Germans see Major Keenan's numbers A.B. 257, 258,³ September 4.

¹ No. 71.

² No. 73.

³ Telegram No. A.B. 257, addressed to the British Mission in Helsingfors and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris and the War Office, read: 'Following information is from reliable source and is best kept secret. Meeting of pro-German Russians took place about a fortnight ago in Berlin regarding financial assistance to Russian troops fighting on west front. Bermondts and Wyrgolitsch were represented. Germans refused to provide financial assistance unless the Russian General Beskuvsky [Biskupski] was appointed to command Bermondts's and Wyrgolitsch forces. Senator Belgard who is now here from Berlin approached Bermondts to persuade him but Bermondts still refuses.' (For relations at that time between Colonel Bermondts-Avalov, Colonel Virgolitsch, and Russians in Berlin, notably General Biscoupski (cf. No. 82) and Senator Bellegarde, see General Count R. von der Goltz, op. cit., pp. 223-4, and General Prince Awaloff [Bermondts-Avalov], op. cit., *passim*.) Telegram No. A.B. 258, addressed and repeated as for No. A.B. 257, transmitted a report that 'Iron Division will move to front with Bermondts's corps'.

Bermont now proposes to advance via Shavli, Ponevyej. He has received notice from Lithuanian Prime Minister that their frontier is closed to him. General Dessino on mission to Bermont from Yudenich today handed me letter stating that 'pretensions of Latvia concerning Latgallen⁴ are without foundation' and urged verbally that Bermont be assisted to proceed there on this ground. News from Esthonia and visit of French Officer from Poland yesterday demonstrate that joint offensive proposed for September 15⁵ is impossible, and urges that Bermont advance on this account no longer exists [*sic*].

If Bermont advances either before Dvinsk falls or at any time with Germans in his force complications at the front with Lithuania, Letts or Poles appears certain. On this account apart from wider political considerations I still hold that no more war material should be released from . . .⁶ for him and no political pressure put by me on Lithuanian or Latvian Governments to assist his advance until military Mission are satisfied that (1) he will take no substantial number of Germans with him and (2) (? material)s sent him will not be used by revolting German troops. I shall act on this view unless otherwise instructed. When Letts receive expected war materials his action can be dictated and only remaining danger will be lest his force deprived of German support should be left destitute in this country.

Lettish Government has surmounted crisis and will now stand provided that war supplies arrive quickly. Bolshevik officer [offer] of peace to Esthonia has not raised political problems here yet.

Please telegraph me latest information re proposed frontiers in Lattgalia.⁷

Repeated to Paris, Helsingfors for General Marsh.

⁴ The Latvian Government claimed the district of Latgallen as Latvian territory.

⁵ See No. 71, note 1.

⁶ The text here is uncertain.

⁷ Acting on advice from Mr. Balfour, Lord Curzon, in telegram No. 42 of September 16, informed Colonel Tallents that 'His Majesty's Government do not consider any purpose would be served by attempting at present to fix any frontiers for Lattgalia'.

No. 80

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 6)

No. 78 Telegraphic [126077/61232/59]

RIGA, September 5, 1919

Following is summary of questions asked urgently by Bermont and referred to me by General Burt as raising political considerations. I have been informed political decisions involved must come from London or Paris. First. Will German frontier be opened for passage of prisoners and war material to him and if so when? Secondly will unhindered passage for troops and supplies be guaranteed to him on lines Germany-Ponevicyej[*sic*]-Dvinsk. Third. May his Corps get equipment from Germany? Fourth. Will England

supply him with food and finance? Alternatively 'would it be possible' to get them from German financial circles?

With reference to question two guarantee physically impossible owing to probable attitude of Lettland, Lithuania as a whole.

With reference to question three General Gough has already consented subject to supplies not being paid for.¹

My views of situation contained in my telegrams Nos. 56 and 77² London and 25, 29 Paris. Regard Bermont's immediate advance on Dvinsk as likely to weaken front against Bolsheviks by diverting attention of troops already successfully opposing them. Only ground for his immediate advance is Russian desire to secure Latgalen.

I request instructions earliest as to foregoing questions be sent to Military Mission or me.

Repeated to Helsingfors for General Gough and Paris.

¹ See No. 75.

² Nos. 71 and 79.

No. 81

*General Marsh (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris)*¹

No. G. 223 Telegraphic [142122/116696/59]

HELSINGFORS, September 5, 1919

1. Bermont promised me on August 26th that he would eliminate German[s] from his Russian Corps and in that event I undertook to recommend to you² his reinforcement by Russian prisoners of war and his supply with war material, either forfeited German stores or of allied stores if available. Under these circumstances Bermont was to leave Lettland on September 15th in direction of Dvinsk and endeavour to penetrate into Russia.

2. But the presence of superior German forces at Mitau prevent Bermont from fulfilling his promise and, under your 80708 M.I.R. of August 25th,³ from taking part in general offensive of September 15th.

3. German volunteers could be eliminated from Russian Corps and general offensive south west of Lake Luban would have fair chance of success but not otherwise.

4. Reports from Riga indicate no probability of German evacuation. Can you inform me whether steps are being taken in Paris to ensure evacuation soon in view of prospective disjointed offensive and therefore probable . . .⁴ owing to continued presence of Germans?

¹ This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation at Paris and the British Mission at Riga. The date of receipt by the British Delegation at Paris is uncertain, the present text being that of a paraphrased repetition subsequently received in the Foreign Office.

² i.e. the War Office.

³ In error for 80778 M.I.R. This was the telegram referred to in No. 59, note 2.

⁴ The text here is uncertain.

No. 82

*Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 20 [129507/4232/18]

BERLIN, September 5, 1919

... The² formation of the Reichswehr is continuing fast, and all unauthorized formations are being demobilised or incorporated in the Reichswehr. *Reichswehrgruppenkommandos* are being formed and organized, and in the near future the reorganization of the German Army as Reichswehr will be complete.

The Russo-German recruiting is proceeding, and large numbers of non-commissioned officers and men are still going north to join Bermont's force. General Biscoupski has arrived in Berlin and is trying to organise all the Russian forces fighting against the Bolsheviks in the Baltic States. He has come to an agreement with the Germans and is to get large sums of money from them. It is reported that his sympathies, however, are pro-Entente and that he hopes to make use of the Germans only until such time as he can get on without them.

A translation of a secret order by General von der Goltz, in support of enlistment in the Russo-German Baltic forces, which appeared in the *Freiheit*, is attached hereto (Paper B).

A. L. LONGHURST, Lieut.-Colonel
For Chief of the British Military Mission
1 Moltkestrasse, Berlin

APPENDIX TO No. 82

Paper B

General von der Goltz as Leader of the Russian Counter-Revolution
(*Freiheit*, 29th August, 1919)

The following secret order of General von der Goltz has reached us, which throws a strong light on the activities of this General:—

General Command Orders. VI. Reserve Corps

Abt. 1a. 971. 19 (Secret).

MITAU, July 31, 1919

Corps Order.³

There is some improvement to be noticed in the Russian situation. However the financial question is still in need of solution.

¹ This report was made by Colonel Longhurst of the British Military Mission at Berlin in the temporary absence of General Malcolm (cf. No. 43, note 1). It was received in the Foreign Office on September 16, 1919.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

³ A brief summary of this order had been transmitted by General Burt to Helsingfors, Paris, and London in telegram No. A.B. 145 of August 8, 1919.

In spite of existing difficulties, I consider it wrong for individual leaders to spread propaganda directly against entering Russian service. It is very important that in the place of the VI Reserve Corps, which has been recalled, another body of troops should take over the fighting against Bolshevism in the districts freed by us.

Whoever stirs up agitation against accepting Russian service should realise that this same agitation will be stirred up by German Spartacists, Englishmen and Letts.

I therefore order that such agitation should be suppressed.

In the near future company commanders will be informed if it is possible to carry into effect an important scheme for the safety of Germany.

(Signed) General von der Goltz

In issuing this order General von der Goltz quite openly stands as a confederate of the Russian counter-revolutionary generals, who are mobilising their forces in Courland and Lithuania.

This general, who is still in the service of Germany, is not ashamed to further propaganda for entering Russian service among the troops under his command and to threaten them with heavy penalties if they hinder this propaganda.

This procedure on the part of General von der Goltz borders on treason, and is at any rate an offence against the German soldiers who are utterly powerless to resist the influence of the Russian intriguers and of the officers.

When will the beautiful figure of the chief offender, General von der Goltz, disappear from the scene?

No. 83

Lord Kilbarnock (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received September 9)
No. 1502 Telegraphic [126821/126821/38]

COPENHAGEN, September 8, 1919

Following from Military Attaché for Director of Military Intelligence, 69. (Begins.)

Following information dated Berlin September 3rd received from M. Caro who has same from reliable source.

General Goltz has just arrived at Berlin with a Russian officer. He has visited General Biskubski, Dierugine, Roumantzieff and Countess Kleinmichel.¹ Goltz wishes [?]me to form democratic Government in Baltic countries and territory which will be freed from Bolshevism. Members of future Cabinet all Russians frequenting salon of Kleinmichel.² They are instructed by Baron von Rosen.³

¹ Cf. No. 79, note 3, for sources relative to such Russian circles then in Berlin. See also No. 125.

² Countess Kleinmichel had formerly occupied a prominent social position in St. Petersburg.

³ Probably the former Russian Ambassador at Tokyo and Washington.

German Socialists are much frightened at arrival of Goltz which seems to prelude German and Russian counter-revolution and tend[s] more and more to counteract alliance with Bolsheviks.

Lenin, who had already sent a letter to Scheidemann,⁴ has had similar message delivered to Haase⁵ urging delegates be sent to Moscow to work on preliminaries of Peace. Lenin guarantees that he will keep all engagements contracted with Germany.

Soviets of Moscow have just discussed report intercepted from General Dovbor Musnicki to General Pilsudski in which former tells of progress made by propaganda and agitation of Russian Bolsheviks and German military circles.

Numbers of Polish Officers and soldiers have become Bolsheviks, many of them carrying on military espionage against Poland.

⁴ A leader of the German Socialist Party and formerly German Chancellor.

⁵ A leader of the German Independent Socialist Party.

No. 84

Note by Major Thorburn of a Conversation with Colonel Durnovo in Berlin¹

No. 369/B/3 [599/2/1/18882]

BERLIN, September 9, 1919

I had to-day an informal interview with Colonel Durnovo, Chief of General Biscoupski's staff; he is the man chiefly concerned in forming the Russia[n]-German army to fight against Bolshevism.

1. He told me quite frankly that this army was to be formed with German money, German arms, German provisions and a large percentage of German soldiers for the following reasons:—

(a) He did not consider that it was possible for the Entente to help Russia substantially at the moment; he said that as far as the Baltic States were concerned winter was coming on, and that the Entente were not sending in large quantities of provisions or arms yet and that as it was now the 9th September, before they could arrive, it would be too late to organise the army and start fighting Bolshevism this winter.

(b) He asked me what success our enterprises had so far. General Yudenitch's army has ceased to exist and was semi-bolshevik: neither Kolchak nor Denikin were having any success although we had sent them arms and munitions. He thought one of the reasons for this was that they accepted soldiers who had been formerly in the Bolshevik ranks and were unreliable.

(c) He pointed out that as far as the Entente was concerned Russia was only a secondary object and not the first object of their policy and that, there-

¹ Major Thorburn was a member of the British Military Mission in Berlin. Copies of the present note were transmitted to the War Office and the British Delegation in Paris (received September 15).

fore, far more was to be hoped from Germany as the Russian question was absolutely of vital importance to Germany.

2. That owing to the political state of England it was impossible for England to come entirely out into the open and help Russia with men and money in the way Germany could; consequently he said that the only solution was for a Russia[n]-German army, formed of the really good Russia[n]-German elements backed up by German help with an entirely Russia[n] command. No men who had ever served in the Bolshevik army would be allowed into it. He said that this army would be formed entirely with the idea of fighting Bolshevism and he did not want any political questions to come into it at all until Russia had been put on her legs again. He proposed to form this army on the line from Mitau to Lithuania and to try and get into it in addition to the men he is collecting in Germany the best elements of the forces now operating in the Baltic. He told me that he would give us a list of the arms and equipment for this army which the Germans are prepared to give him provided the Entente have no objection and asked me to get permission from the Entente to allow the Germans to give him these arms and equipment.

3. With regard to future policy his is, of course, a pan-Russian and he considers it impossible that the Baltic States should exist and is very much against the British Policy [? of] trying to set up small Baltic States on their legs but he says that he is quite prepared to leave that to such time as Russia is reorganised and the whole question could be reopened.

4. He was very bitter against the Treaty of Versailles in which no mention of Russia was made and said that even if the Entente had put in a clause to the effect that the whole Russian question would be considered when order had been re-established in Russia the pan-Russian Party would have been much more Ententeophile. He said that he quite understood the fear that England had of a Russia[n]-German alliance as this alliance would be the only possible counterbalance to the Entente. He considered this Russo-German rapprochement inevitable because he said that both Russia and Germany were like sick men and were therefore bound to feel for each other and bound to help each other. He thought it far more important at the moment to fight Bolshevism and face the possible Russia[n]-German agreement than to allow Bolshevism to spread into Germany this winter in which case he thought it would spread all over the world.

5. He said that at the moment his only object was to fight Bolshevism and he could not understand why the Entente were placing difficulties in his way. He said that Mr. Leach of the City and Midland Bank had already prevented two Russia[n]-German financial arrangements but that the matter was settled at last and that he was getting the money to raise this army. He told me that the whole matter was moving very rapidly and provided that the Entente did not interfere, which would delay matters, he hoped to have a thoroughly organised and well equipped army on the Bolshevik front within two months.

6. He finally kept on impressing upon me that he had not the smallest desire to work against the Entente but that for the reasons given above the Entente was not able to help Russia to the same extent as Germany and that therefore the Russians must look to Germany for help and whatever happened he proposed to do so.

K. THORBURN

No. 85

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 18)

No. 44 [130927/61232/59]

RIGA, September 9, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose herewith my report on the political situation, from September 1st to 9th, 1919, together with two copies.

I have, etc.,

S. G. TALLENTS

ENCLOSURE IN No. 85

RIGA, September 9, 1919

Report by the British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces

1. I have stayed in Riga since my return from Reval on August 26, postponing a proposed visit to Kovno, owing to critical events here. While, therefore, I have been in telegraphic touch with Colonel Gordon at Reval and Colonel Ward at Kovno throughout, this report, like my last one, sets out the position primarily as it appears from Riga. Though all the various problems involved are related, it is convenient to deal with them separately in this report.

The German Troops of Occupation

2. On September 1st von der Goltz made a speech at a parade of the Iron Division, of which a verbatim report was supplied to the Military Mission. I attach (Appendix 1) an English translation of that speech. On September 5th von der Goltz, with most of his staff, moved from Mitau to Janischki. On September 4th he addressed to the Military Mission a letter, of which a translation is attached (Appendix 2). On September 8th Freiherr Ago v. Maltzan, who describes himself as 'Botschaftsrat',¹ told Mr. Ulmanis that he expected some 7,000 German soldiers to remain in Latvia or Lithuania against the express wishes of the German Government. He agreed that after a certain date, which he provisionally suggested might prove to be October 1st, all such soldiers must be treated as 'vagabonds'.

3. The German troops now in Courland appear to be composed of:

- (a) Men who want to settle somewhere outside Germany, preferably in Courland.

¹ Counsellor of Embassy.

- (b) Soldiers of fortune, prepared to join the highest bidder.
- (c) Men who want to go home to Germany.
- (d) Men who do not want to go home to Germany, unless employment is assured to them there.
- (e) Men who have no plans of any kind, but feel more comfortable where they are than they expect to find themselves in Germany.

The attitude of individual soldiers to the officers of this Mission varies. On two occasions they helped to mend broken-down cars belonging to this Mission, and on one of these occasions provided the officers in the car with food. They appear uniformly hostile to the Letts.

4. As throwing some light on the support which these troops are receiving from Germany, I attach (Appendix 3) a report of an interview between Colonel Rowan Robinson, of the Military Mission at Kovno, and Major Prince Shikhmatoff. I have already forwarded by telegram² a report which reached Colonel Ward at Kovno 'on good authority' to the effect that daily aeroplane communication was maintained between the Germans at Radzi-velishki and the Bolsheviks at Vitebsk. Colonel Pirie-Gordon has forwarded independent evidence of German activities in Petrograd itself. An American subject who left Moscow on August 12th lately reported in Kovno that some 20 German engineers had been employed by the Bolshevik Government at very high salaries on the re-organisation of the railways.

Colonel Bermond's Force

The future movements of Bermond's force have raised many difficulties during the last week. At the Military Conference held here on August 26th General Marsh had a preliminary private interview with Bermond and Captain Bray, an officer of Russian birth and sympathies attached to the Riga Military Mission. General Dessino arrived in Riga on the same day with orders from General Yudenich to Bermond to advance towards Pskoff. He was surprised to find at the opening of the conference which followed the private interview referred to that Bermond's counter proposal to march towards Dvinsk was officially approved. On the same day Colonel Bermond appears to have had a provisional promise from General Marsh to the effect that the flow of Russian prisoners to his force would again be resumed and that war material would be allowed to pass the German frontier to him.³ In my telegram No. 78⁴ of September 5th I referred for decision at home the specific questions raised by Bermond as a result of this conference. On September 5th I received information from Colonel Ward at Kovno that the German Ministry had asked the Lithuanian Government to allow some 5,000 Russian troops under Colonel Vyrgolich to use the railway Shadov-Ponevyej

² Not printed. This short telegram, dated September 8 (received September 9), gave only the particulars here mentioned.

³ With reference to this report Lord Hardinge, in a letter of September 30, 1919, drew the attention of the Director of Military Intelligence to what he termed 'another grave case of improper action on the part of General Marsh'.

⁴ No. 80.

for the purpose of reaching the Dvinsk front. Among other objections, the Lithuanian Government felt that this movement would seriously upset the communications of their army.⁵ On September 4th I had sent to Colonel Bermondts for his signature, in pursuance of a provisional agreement made with him on August 27th, the draft of a declaration agreed with the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I attach (Appendix 4) a copy of this draft. So far I have received no reply from Colonel Bermondts.

5. It is clear that Bermondts's chief anxiety to go to the front arises from a desire to secure Dvinsk before the Polish, Lithuanian or Latvian forces arrive there. In this he is supported by General Dessino, a copy of whose letter to me of September 4th is attached (Appendix 5).⁶

6. The next steps to be taken with regard to Bermondts depend partly upon his attitude towards the draft declaration which I sent to him on September 4th, but mainly upon the answer received to my telegram of September 5th, No. 78.⁴ At the present time I have had no cause to modify the conclusions expressed in my telegrams Nos. 56⁷ and 78,⁴ which may be summarised as follows:

- (a) No further Russian prisoners should be allowed to join Bermondts and no more war material should be allowed to cross the German frontier for his use until the position of the Germans now in Courland and Lithuania has been effectively cleared up.

⁵ Colonel Tallents had reported in telegram No. 80 of September 6 (received September 7): 'Pending instructions from Allies permission for passage of Russo-German troops over Lithuanian railway as asked for by German authorities has been refused by Lithuanian Cabinet.'

⁶ Not printed. In this letter General Dessino stated (translation from the Russian) that 'the so-called district of Latgallen with its two chief towns, Dvinsk and Riejitza, has a population of about one million: 50% Russians, 35% Letts, and a small percentage of Poles, Jews, etc. . . . Latvia possesses no rights in Latgallen.' General Dessino considered 'that the representatives of the Entente have no grounds for wasting time on political discussions with Latvia' concerning the transport to that area of Colonel Bermondts-Avalov's forces, which should be effected without delay for military reasons. 'In addition to this, the idea that Bermondts and Virgolitch have about 25% of Germans in their detachments who are likely to influence Russia in the future is also groundless. In the same way the supposition that the transport of the above-mentioned troops will make a corridor for von der Goltz is also groundless, because the Entente can prevent this, but if the Entente cannot do so, one must assume that von der Goltz is sufficiently strong to go where he pleases without the help of Bermondts and Virgolitch. But besides this, it is undesirable both for the Letts themselves and for the Entente to leave these two detachments with von der Goltz's army, because of the objections made against the Russian forces (although they do include a few Germans) that in the accomplishment of their aim—war against the Bolsheviks in the most important strategical direction—[? they] might excite the army against the Letts and the Entente and bring about undesirable complications. Their speedy transport to Dvinsk will cut them off from von der Goltz and the sole physical communication with Courland will be the communication line by which the various stores will be temporarily received, but this line will have no actual strength. Therefore it is necessary to permit and help these detachments as soon as possible in their move to Dvinsk and put aside the question of evacuation by von der Goltz when dealing with this matter.'

⁷ No. 71.

- (b) Any immediate advance by Bermondts towards Dvinsk is likely to weaken rather than strengthen the front against the Bolsheviks in that neighbourhood.
- (c) The one cardinal local need at the moment is to supply ample military equipment to the Lettish and Lithuanian armies, so that the future movements of both Germans and Russians in Courland and Lithuania can be settled by dictation and not by negotiation.

The Baltic Landeswehr

7. In accordance with the Strasdenhof Armistice of July 3rd, General Gough issued instructions to the Landeswehr which involved the banishment of all Germans from the force and its re-organisation under the command of Lt.-Colonel Hon. H. R. Alexander, whom, in view of the urgency, I lent from the staff of my Mission for this purpose.⁸ The Landeswehr are now in course of proceeding to the Bolshevik front. Colonel Alexander has had many difficulties with them, the latest being an objection on the part of the Landeswehr to go to the front, on the ground that the Lettish Command would probably place them in a position where they would be decimated by the Bolsheviks. This attitude was accentuated by a disinclination on the part of the People's Council to pass the amnesty, which was one of the points with which Mr. Ulmanis's Government undertook on their appointment to deal. There is some nervousness in Lettish circles lest the Landeswehr should combine with Colonel Bermondts if he reaches the front in their neighbourhood. On the whole, however, it appears probable that once they are engaged with the Bolsheviks, most of the difficulties hitherto experienced with this force will be forgotten.

The Latvian Government

8. After the crisis referred to in my last report,⁹ the position of the Government became easier. Equipment for the army is now immediately expected. There is expectation of a financial arrangement between the Government and the London group, whose representative, Mr. Fortington, came out with me to Riga in the middle of August; and the fear of a German-Russian march on Riga has been, temporarily at any rate, dispelled. There has also been lately a steady and marked revival of life in Riga. The forthcoming negotiations between the Estonian and the Bolshevik Governments¹⁰ do not appear to have excited much interest in Latvia or to be viewed with sympathy by the Latvian Government. . . .¹¹

S. G. TALLENTS

⁸ See No. 8.

⁹ Cf. No. 76.

¹⁰ Cf. No. 79.

¹¹ The remainder of this dispatch related to the convocation at Riga for September 10, 1919, of a conference between the Baltic Governments in order to 'discuss preliminary questions of economic policy and defence'. Cf. No. 418.

*Translation from the German.*¹²

*General Command of the 6th Reserve Corps,
K.H.Q., September 2, 1919*

Speech of the commanding General of the 6th Reserve Corps, Graf von der Goltz, on the occasion of the parade of the Iron Division, on 1 Sept. 1919, at Mitau:—

Comrades, I am taking part in the parade to-day in order to ascertain the behaviour of the troops and report upon it. As you know, I have not sanctioned the refusal to return to Germany, because disobedience is, in military matters, unheard of, and in it lurks the danger that all other bonds of discipline and cohesion may disappear. I could not therefore set myself at the head of a movement which is aimed against my own order to evacuate.

I have also agreed to look after you and remain here, as I do not fail to recognise that your leaders, who have made themselves the mouthpieces of the troops, especially the leader of the Iron Division, are driven by their care for the soldiers and warm patriotic hearts. I am thinking—and have for a long time been working upon the matter—of how I am to provide for your future and how I can defend East Prussia with the 6th Reserve Corps no longer in a state of readiness for action to hold the Bolsheviks from their frontiers, but, in consequence of the pressure of England, ordered away by the Government practically to be disbanded.

But I am obliged also to direct your attention to the difficulties of remaining and settling in Courland, upon the cessation of the accustomed high wages and food supplies, as well as the impossibility of fighting side by side with the Russians against the Bolsheviks as soon as the provision of money ceases, however much I myself may think it necessary. I do not want you afterwards to feel disappointed and deceived. I hope that my untiring efforts will be successful in bringing about the consent of England, and consequently of our German Government, to our remaining here in Courland for the protection of Germany and West Europe. Should this not be the case, you will have to go, and work must be sought in Germany; otherwise you would make enemies of everybody in Germany. There is no comprehension of your position but full condemnation of your desire, as much in the newspapers of your party as in those nearest to the Government. To win the world, the great thing is to show that here in Courland are imprisoned troops composed of good soldiers, respectable men and patriotic Germans, who, in spite of their just hatred hold themselves from any act of violence against the English and the Letts. You must preserve discipline amongst yourselves, and all that riff-raff, which unfortunately comes to us from Germany in such large numbers, must be hurled aside regardless of consequences. Such troops will earn the respect of the whole civilised world. Irresponsible people and Spartacists call such troops reactionary, because to them everyone who stands for order

¹² The German text of this speech is printed by General Count R. von der Goltz, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-51.

and good behaviour is offensive. But that should not trouble us. We know that order and work belong to the future of Germany if we do not want her to collapse and drag down the whole world with her into the abyss.

The main thing with every German is love of Fatherland. The kings of Prussia called themselves the first servants of the State. If our young German Republic wishes to become of importance, everyone must become a servant of the State and of the Fatherland, and in all their relations always think of the Fatherland only.

With these objects before your eyes, I hope that you will give me and your leaders further confidence and unconditionally follow their orders. To strengthen this, let us express the hope: Long life to our beloved (and held-in-common) Fatherland!¹³

GRAF VON DER GOLTZ

Correctness vouched,
Otto Wernburg.

APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 85

Note from General von der Goltz to General Burt

Generalkommando, VI Reserve-Korps.

Abt. Iw. Nr. 584.

(Translation.¹⁴)

MITAU, September 4, 1919

To the Leader of the Allied Military Mission,
Lt.-General Burt, Riga.

I am instructed by the German Government to inform you that the Government is doing everything to induce the troops to return to Germany, also that it condemns very strongly the unlawful conduct of the troops, at the same time quite comprehending their bitterness, that they should now completely evacuate Courland, whereby their prospects for settlement are finally destroyed. The German Government has no military forces at its disposal to counteract the disobedience of the troops in continuing to remain in Courland, and can eventually only sever its connection with them. The Government, however, points out the approaching danger that the men, who consider themselves cheated, may collect in bands and cause unlawfulness and acts of violence, also the dangers arising out of all this for Courland.

VON DER GOLTZ¹⁵

¹³ In the original German: *Um dies zu bekräftigen, wollen wir ein Hoch auf unser gemeinsames geliebtes Vaterland ausbringen.*

¹⁴ The original German text (not printed) was also included in the original of this appendix.

¹⁵ General Burt replied to this note in a letter of September 10 which read (for source see below): 'In your letter Iw. No. 584, September 4, it is observed with regret that your Government foresees danger of illegal conduct on the part of German soldiers in Courland. In view of the time which has elapsed since Paris gave the order for the withdrawal of German troops from Courland and the propaganda for settlement in the country which during this time has been carried on among German troops, it is improbable that any one else can be made responsible for the present state of things than the German command. To

*Report of an interview between Colonel Rowan Robinson and Major Prince Shikhmatoff,
Russian Volunteer Army, Russian Agent in Warsaw*

WARSAW, September 1, 1919

The Monarchist Party in Germany, which is managing the Russo-German detachment, is financed by Krupp; the principal agents are von der Goltz and Brandes.¹⁶ The head is Hindenburg. The H.Q. are at Königsberg.

The Russo-German army is mainly intended for use against the German Revolutionary Government. Schemes have been laid to meet various eventualities. The Russian Bolsheviks, Bermard [*sic*] and Vyrgolich are all to be used as tools, to be broken after use.

First Scheme: Aid Bolshevism in Russia till it spreads seriously to France and England, and then kill it in Russia. After that make use of grateful Russians to restore monarchy in Germany.

Second Scheme: If France and England don't go Bolshevik, and Russia remains Bolshevik, hand Bermard and Vyrgolich over to the Bolsheviks to keep them quiet, using their German troops to aid in restoring the Monarchy.

Third Scheme: If Bolshevism is weakening in Russia, and showing signs of beginning in France and England, use Bermard and Vyrgolich against the Russian Bolsheviks, using other troops against the German Government.

The existing German Government is said to have full cognizance of the nature of the force and the method of financing it, but not of its purpose, which is falsely represented to them as the crushing of Bolshevism in Russia, and that only.

(I understand, from the British Mission here, that Major Shikhmatoff was suspected of pro-German sympathies, largely owing to the fact that the prevent any mistakes, will you please furnish me as quickly as possible with a list of those persons who have placed themselves outside the law.)

To this letter General von der Goltz replied (no date given: see below): 'Re your letter of September 10, B.M.R.G. 34, delivered on September 15: I decline to discuss your ideas in the first two clauses of your letter. In the last clause of your letter you venture to request me to indicate to you certain of my fellow-countrymen as guilty. I see in this presumption a grave insult to my person and to German national feeling. I should like to advise you, therefore, in future not to make such base demands either to me or my subordinates. I should be compelled to forbid every communication with you and to turn out every Englishman from the territory still occupied by German troops, as the safety of the Allied Missions which intentionally and rudely insult German national pride is out of the question. I shall place your letter before my Government, and I am convinced that it will give a fitting reply to your Government, through the proper representative of the German Empire, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to this abusive demand which an Allied Commission thinks it can make to a German General abroad.'

This correspondence is untraced in Foreign Office archives. It was, however, published in the German press in the latter part of September 1919 and an English translation was published in *The Times* on September 29, 1919 (cf. Vol. I, No. 66, minute 3). The text here printed is that published in *The Times*. The German text of both letters is printed by General Count R. von der Goltz, op. cit., pp. 260-1.

¹⁶ The reference is uncertain but was perhaps to Herr Ernst Brandes, a landowner in East Prussia.

Germans always gave him every facility for travelling and staying where he wished. My own impression of him is that he is out to win Russia back for Russia, and was formerly probably prepared to accept German help rather than none.)

R. ROWAN ROBINSON

APPENDIX 4 TO No. 85

Draft declaration agreed with the Latvian Government and conveyed to Colonel Bermondts on September 4th, 1919

In order to make clear my good intentions to the country in which my troops are at present stationed, I declare:

1. That it is my desire to recognise and deal frankly with the Government of Latvia.
2. That I have nothing but peaceful intentions towards the Latvian people and army.
3. That I shall not stay in Latvian territory longer than is necessary.
4. That while in Latvia I place myself under the general control of the Latvian Commander-in-Chief.
5. That any plans for my passage through Latvian territory will be subject to special agreement with the Latvian Commander-in-Chief.
6. That in any such passage I shall refrain from requisitioning and shall rely as little as possible upon the resources of the country.
7. That I will exclude from the force under my command all subjects of Germany or of her allies during the late War.

..... 1919.

No. 86

*Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Riga)
No. 34 Telegraphic [126077/61232/59]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 11, 1919*

Your telegram No. 78¹ (of 5th instant).

The answer to all four questions is in the negative.

¹ No. 80.

No. 87

*Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)
No. 102 Telegraphic [129067/61232/59]*

RIGA, *September 12, 1919*

Reference your telegram No. 34.¹

Two alternative issues are possible.

1. Bermondts may use German supplies and troops in defiance of Allies and possibly of German Government.
2. His forces will become ineffective.

¹ No. 86.

Alternative No. 1 is connected with general question of disposal of German forces in Courland. In my opinion while every effort should be made to secure satisfactory settlement without fighting, Letts and Lithuanians cannot be discouraged in last resort from preventing an advance by Bermondts with German support.

In the case of alternative 2 what destination is desired for Bermondts forces?

Possibility appears to be (A) Transport by sea to North-West Russian Army. (B) Internment. (C) Return to Germany. (D) Annihilation by Letts and Lithuanians.

I am conveying answers contained in your telegram 34¹ to Military Mission pointing out that conclusions of General Marsh's conference of August 26 which left Bermondts with impression that his advance towards Dwinsk without prior expulsion of Germans and with any German material obtainable otherwise than on payment, was approved by Entente, were explicitly made subject to political consideration.

But in order that they may be placed in a position to assume something other than purely negative attitude towards Bermondts, I request that earliest instructions regarding points raised in 2nd and 3rd paragraphs based jointly on military and political considerations, may be sent for further guidance to Military Mission and myself.²

Repeated to Paris and Helsingfors for General Marsh.

² This telegram remained unanswered. It was proposed in the Russia Department of the Foreign Office on September 16 that the question of the disposal of Colonel Prince Bermondts-Avalov's forces should be deferred until it was known whether or not the Baltic States would conclude peace with the Soviet Government (cf. Chap. II).

No. 88

Sir C. Kennard¹ (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received September 23)

No. 111 [132785/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, September 14, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that an article entitled 'To Helsingfors,' published recently by Trotsky in the Petrograd *Pravda*, in which it was stated that the Soviet could now concentrate against Finland troops not only sufficient for defence but also adequate for an offensive, has called forth widespread comment here.

The pro-German *Dagens Press* has been quick to utilise the pretext, and in a leading article, which can be taken to reflect the opinions of the Activist Party, writes:—

"The Entente ought now, if ever, to make up its mind at last to take the bull by the horns and strike a blow; the sooner the better. It ought to give heed to the well-known saying of the *Écho de Paris*, that the only

¹ British Chargé d'Affaires at Helsingfors.

common enemy is Bolshevism, and possibly, also, to accept the offer of the German general, who, according to a report in the *Temps*, offered to provide six divisions for a march on Petrograd. It ought, in short, now to answer the watchword: "To Helsingfors" with the order "To Petrograd".'

In a more restrained article, the *Hufvudstadsblad*, of the 11th September, reviews the situation as follows:—

'The reason why no settlement has yet been come to with Lenin's robber State is, of course, first to be sought in White Russia itself, in its lack of firmness, unanimity, organisation, and enthusiasm for the task. But if it is once admitted that Bolshevism is the foe of civilisation, and that the Russians have shown themselves unable by their own strength to put an end to the tyranny of anarchy, it ought to be the duty of the civilised peoples to take action. With regard to Finland we have already expressed our views on the question. We maintain that Finland, like all Russia's neighbours, has a peculiarly keen interest in the destruction of Russian Bolshevism, which is a constant threat to our security and our internal peace. But Finland cannot throw herself into so extensive an enterprise as an offensive against Soviet Russia without absolutely safe guarantees. And at present there is a complete absence of such guarantees. White Russia, which desires our help, has not been able to make up its mind to such an obvious thing as an open and unreserved recognition of Finland's independence. There is significance in the remarks on this subject that M. Shébéko² has made in Helsingfors. He wisely refrains from saying anything about Koltchak's opinion in the matter, and only declares that he, Shébéko, has sympathy with our independence, but considers that "the separation of the two States ought to take place with due regard to Russia's vital interests." Such words are, to say the least, inconclusive, and our co-operation will not be gained by inconclusive words and surreptitious reservations.'

I have quoted from these two articles at some length because of the significance of the reference to German troops contained in the former, and because the latter is a clear reflection of the distrust of White Russia which prevails in all circles, and of which M. Shébéko's mission here has called forth renewed testimony.

I had an opportunity recently of a long private conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As his Excellency commenced by enquiring whether I had noticed the article in the *Dagens Press*, cited above, I replied that the scarcely veiled allusion to Von der Goltz, coming from that quarter, had naturally struck me. As we were talking privately I could add that indications had already come to my notice to show that German propaganda here was working along lines calculated to prepare co-operation between the White Finnish Guards and the Germans. It had inevitably occurred to me

² White Russian diplomatic representative recently appointed to assist General Yudenitch.

to wonder how far General Mannerheim was aware of this. In reply, Dr. Holsti stated that he fully believed that General Mannerheim was not a conscious party to such intrigue. He was above all a soldier heated by the idea of an advance on Petrograd, and too willing, therefore, to treat anyone as a friend who shared his view as to the immediate necessity for it. With his entourage, however, it was different. He was closely surrounded by Professor Ingman, the ex-Premier, who *inter alia* had headed the deputation that had offered the crown of Finland to Prince Friedrich Karl, and by General Ignatius, who, on the eve of the presidential election, had openly threatened a rising in Osterbotten in the event of Mannerheim not being elected. He, Dr. Holsti, had reason to believe that these two men were, at least, in touch with Von der Goltz. Both were bitterly opposed to Esthonian independence, and were in other ways in sympathy with German policy in the Baltic. In their circles it was argued that if the Entente continued to fail to make a definite pronouncement, Finland could but fall back on German co-operation in an expedition against Petrograd.

It was, Dr. Holsti continued, the danger of this orientation towards Germany and all that it might entail on Finland that made him unwillingly turn to the solution of the situation which would be offered by a Finnish advance on Petrograd with the co-operation of the Allies. He said unwillingly because the present Government's policy was one of non-intervention, and would, unless intervention was proved to be absolutely necessary, continue to be so. It might well be, however, that intervention would prove to be inevitable.

I made no comment on this statement beyond enquiring what his Excellency meant exactly by 'co-operation'. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied:—

1. A loan.
2. Assistance in arms, ammunition, and equipment.
3. A clear understanding that the Entente Powers would pledge themselves to obtain from the future Russian Government the recognition of Finland's independence.

On this basis the present Government would agree, if pressed, to intervene in Russia. They could not, and would not, however, accept any assurances given by any Russian parties. If the co-operation he described were forthcoming, Finland would move, but only on those conditions. His Excellency went on to add that he did not see how in any case it would be possible for Finland to take active measures against Soviet Russia in the immediate future. The Minister of War had recently informed him that with the equipment at present available in Finland only one-third of the army could be mobilised; the autumn was at hand; even the Germans, with all the resources of the most modern military technique at their disposal, had found it impossible to operate in Russia once the rains had commenced.

I informed his Excellency that the first part of this information was of course news to me. I had all along been impressed by the very great dangers that would be entailed by a hastily and ill-prepared Finnish adventure in

Russia, and the statement made by the Minister of War could but fortify that impression. It could not be doubted, such reliable witnesses as Mr. Paul Dukés³ had stated it also, that the Bolsheviki would put up a stubborn resistance, and the situation which would be created by a set-back to an intervening force on the outskirts of Petrograd would be disastrous. I ventured, I continued, to lay unnecessary emphasis on what was of course already abundantly clear to his Excellency because I had noticed in a certain circle here a spirit of jingoism that appeared to make light of difficulties and dangers, and to go on the assumption that if once the Entente Powers had promised co-operation to Finland, the victory march of General Mannerheim on Petrograd was assured. His Excellency replied that the Government were fully alive to all the dangers that a military expedition into Russia would entail. He had already informed me that the President and the Government were opposed to a policy of intervention; they would in no case take any hasty steps. The position of General Mannerheim was an anomalous one, and was the cause of great embarrassment to the Government. Matters, moreover, had not been improved by M. Shébéko's visit to Helsingfors. M. Shébéko had been in constant touch with Mannerheim, and had only visited the Foreign Office once quite informally. He had exerted his influence to confirm General Mannerheim in his belief that he was the chosen conqueror of Petrograd, and urged on all sides that Finland's best means of defence against Bolshevism was to attack it. Dr. Holsti believed, however, that General Mannerheim, though not a politician, was a good soldier, and was unlikely to discount the dangers of intervention in Russia from a military point of view.

I replied that I hoped this was the case, but that it struck me that the general's entourage, if they were as black as his Excellency had painted them, might well see behind a hasty expedition against Petrograd a means of eventually calling in the aid of German troops, who after all would be within easy reach compared to those of the Entente, if a set-back to Finnish arms occurred. In any case, I added, this constant and, in some circles, assured talk of intervention, when nothing was as yet decided, seemed to me impolitic, as it would not fail to give a pretext to the Socialists to point to the danger, with which, in their formulæ, international capitalists and Russian reactionaries threatened the country and would thus influence them more and more to preach the necessity for Finland of coming to terms with the Soviet Government.

At the conclusion of our conversation I mentioned to the Minister for Foreign Affairs an opinion I had heard expressed once or twice here that, in default of Finnish intervention in Russia, and in the event of Esthonia embracing Bolshevism, Finland would be bound to follow suit. His Excellency replied that, if Esthonia came to terms with the Soviet régime, the position in Finland would be rendered very much more difficult on account

³ Mr. Dukés was Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service in Russia (cf. Sir Paul Dukés: *Red Dusk and the Morrow*—London, 1922). Mr. Dukés had recently passed through Helsingfors on his way to London from Petrograd.

of the longer frontiers it would be necessary to guard. It would be impossible in fact to prevent Bolshevik agents and propaganda from entering Finland in the summer from Esthonia. To the more restricted question I then put to Dr. Holsti, he replied, that he did not consider that the conclusion of a peace between Esthonia and the Soviet would, *ipso facto*, entail Bolshevism in Finland.

This statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is confirmed by much of the information that is available to me here.

That there are still supporters of the proletariat dictatorship to the Russian cause in Finland is true, but their number is small. There are Bolsheviks also in Sweden, which has not been the scene of a recent civil war. Among the Social-Democrats there is similarly a small ring of agitators headed by Herr Laherman, the manager of the people's savings bank at Helsingfors, but they cannot now be called Bolsheviks.

The considerations, however, which lead me to think that the Bolshevik peril here is, in spite of Finland's geographical position and the statements in the party press, an exaggerated one are firstly, that it is difficult to believe that a period of anarchy and suffering, such as Finland has recently experienced can be repeated by a nation, at least by that generation, that has experienced it; and secondly, because there is every indication to show that the bulk of the people have a very conscious desire at present for a policy of recuperation and peace. The election of President Ståhlberg, as I noted in my despatch No. 100⁴ of the 4th September, was a proof that the *bourgeoisie* and the Social-Democratic Parties generally desired to heal the wounds inflicted by the revolution, and to cause the party distinctions of 'red' and 'white' in the country to disappear. If certain members of the present Government have failed in the expectations placed in them—I would note here that the present Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to be influenced almost daily by different opinions—if the present administration comes indeed to lose office, the guiding factor will not, I think, be changed that the *bourgeoisie* and Social-Democrats have shown themselves, and will continue to show themselves, capable of collecting the people round the nation's duties of peace.

I cannot for these considerations believe that military intervention in Russia by Finland would be popular here outside certain circles, or arouse any willing co-operation among the bulk of the people; on the other hand, the very various influences that are at work in the Activist Party, successfully veiled though they are at present, strengthen my opinion that in any dealings which we may have with General Mannerheim, honest though I believe him to be, we should proceed with extreme caution and reserve.

I have, &c.,

COLERIDGE KENNARD

⁴ Not printed. (Cf. No. 337, note 2.)

No. 89

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 18)

No. 1352 Telegraphic [130495/7067/39]

PARIS, September 17, 1919

Following for War Cabinet.

Proceedings of Council this morning at which Sir E. Crowe represented His Majesty's Government.¹

1. A letter was read from Mr. Polk² pointing out danger of employing Polish troops against Germans in Baltic States in accordance with resolution passed by Supreme Council on September 15³ (? because) it would involve war between Poland and Germany and produce renewed trouble in Upper Silesia which would deprive Central Europe of coal. It would be better to wait till treaty has been ratified after which order in coal region would be kept by Allied forces. Marshal Foch said he saw no means of enforcing compliance with ultimatum save by Polish troops. Mr. Polk suggested economic pressure such as a blockade might be applied to Germany or repatriation of prisoners suspended. It was decided that instead of sending an ultimatum to German Government a letter should be addressed to German Delegation at Versailles stating that if evacuation were not carried out measures indicated by Mr. Polk would be applied and possibly Polish troops used. Preparation of this letter was entrusted to General Weygand. . . .⁴

¹ For the official record of this meeting see Vol. I, No. 59.

² Representative of the United States on the Supreme Council.

³ For this resolution and the discussions preceding it, in which Mr. Lloyd George and Marshal Foch had advocated the employment of Polish forces, see Vol. I, No. 57, minutes

⁴ (b) and 8, and No. 58, minute 1.

⁴ The remainder of this telegram related to other matters discussed at this meeting.

No. 90

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 19)

No. 1359 Telegraphic, en clair. By bag [131389/61232/59]

PARIS, September 18, 1919

German evacuation of Baltic provinces. My telegram No. 1352¹ of yesterday.

1. General Weygand submitted for consideration following draft of note to head of German delegation at Versailles. . . .²

2. Questioned by me, Marshal Foch declared that he had no belief whatever that this note would in fact bring about the desired evacuation. I then

¹ No. 89.

² There followed the text of the draft reply to the German note of September 3 (No. 78). This text is printed in Vol. I, No. 60, appendix B. The official record of the discussion in the Supreme Council on September 18, reported below by Sir E. Crowe, is printed in Vol. I, No. 60, minute 2.

reminded the Conference that it was Mr. Lloyd George who had urged the necessity of getting the Germans out of the Baltic States. The original plan thereupon adopted was to send an ultimatum and back it up by military force. That was an intelligible proposition, but it had to be discarded owing to the American opposition to the employment of the only military force available.³ The substitution of a threat of some undefined economic action seemed to me so completely to alter the character of the measure contemplated that I seriously doubted the wisdom of resorting to another ultimatum to [*sic*] the three already sent, which had met with bland refusals.

3. Apart from this I could not without further instructions commit my Government to the adoption of the coercive measures proposed. For instance I anticipated great difficulties in stopping at this stage the repatriation of our German prisoners. Nor could I say whether His Majesty's Government was prepared, or even technically in a position to reimpose drastic restrictions on trade and intercourse with Germany, involving possibly a renewal of the blockade with its complicated machinery, the censorship, financial regulations, etc.

4. I therefore suggested the Conference should defer a decision so as to allow each of the five delegations meanwhile to obtain from their Governments a definite statement of the precise measures which they were respectively prepared to take. Some uniformity of action on the part of all was clearly essential. If we could agree on the measures to be taken, I thought the best course would be to take them at once instead of merely threatening, and to inform the German Delegation of the fact and of the reasons, with an intimation that the measures would continue until the Germans evacuated the Baltic States, in accordance with the terms of the armistice.

5. This suggestion was generally favoured, and the discussion adjourned accordingly. It will presumably be resumed on Monday next (September 22nd). I should therefore be grateful to receive before that date Your Lordship's instructions

- (1) As to whether you approve the immediate adoption of coercive measures, other than military, and
- (2) As to what particular measures His Majesty's Government are ready on their part to enforce.

6. My naval and military advisers suggest for consideration

- (a) The retention by us of German *officer* prisoners.
- (b) The formal blockading of some particular German port or ports, such as Hamburg, or Stettin.

It will of course be realized that any partial blockade might operate to the advantage of such countries as do not close their own frontiers to German trade.

³ Mr. Polk's opposition to the employment of Polish forces was supported by General Gough who was heard by the Supreme Council at this meeting of September 18: see Vol. I, No. 60, minute 2.

7. I should mention that Mr. Polk, having referred to the financial facilities at present being accorded to German traders by private firms in America, declared his readiness and ability to put a stop to these at once, and in fact undertook to inform the German Delegation immediately, without waiting for the decision of the Conference, that these facilities would be stopped if the Germans continued to flout the legitimate demands of the Allies.

No. 91

Sir J. Tilley¹ to M. Bisseneek²
No. 128878/W. 59 [128878/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 18, 1919

Sir,

With reference to the visit of the Lettish Minister of Finance, Doctor Erhardt, to this country,³ I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that a telegram has been received from the British Mission at Helsingfors⁴ to the effect that instructions have been sent to the British Military Mission at Reval to deliver to Riga full equipment including arms and clothing for ten thousand Lettish troops.

Lord Curzon would be glad if you would bring this information to the knowledge of Doctor Erhardt as it is possible that it may be of interest to him in connection with his negotiations in the city.

I am, etc.,

J. A. C. TILLEY⁵

¹ Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office. ² Latvian Representative in London.

³ Dr. Erhardt, accompanied by Mr. Fortington, had recently arrived in London in connexion with negotiations for military supplies and financial assistance to Latvia.

⁴ No. G. 234 of September 10, received in Foreign Office on September 13. In this telegram General Marsh further stated: 'Quite agree with Riga that local problem can be solved only by hastening equipment of Letts and Lithuanians and compelling German troops to withdraw by force. Matter more urgent than capture of Petrograd.'

⁵ On September 22, 1919, M. Bisseneek acknowledged receipt of this letter and expressed the gratitude of the Latvian Government for the delivery of equipment.

No. 92

General Burt (Riga) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 22)¹
No. A.B. 337 Telegraphic [599/2/518905]

RIGA, September 19, 1919

Reported German-Russian frontier² is now opened. Two German transports crossed the frontier this week in the direction of Prekultn. Bermont is reported to have received six thousand sets of equipment this week.

¹ The present text is that of a repetition, dated September 21 and received September 22, of the original message of September 19. The telegram was addressed to the British Mission at Helsingfors and repeated to the British Mission at Kovno, the British Delegation at Paris, and the War Office.

² i.e. the frontier between East Prussia and Lithuania.

No. 93

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received September 20)
No. 474 Telegraphic [131936/61232/59]

HELSINGFORS, September 19, 1919

German Minister visited Foreign Office here today and represented to Minister for Foreign Affairs that only chance of capture of Petrograd lay in co-operation between Finland and von der Goltz's troops.

German Minister vigorously defended White Russians and sharply criticised formation of North-West Russian Government.¹

¹ For the formation of this government in August 1919, see Chap. II.

No. 94

Colonel Pirie-Gordon (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received October 4)
No. D.C. 238 [137118/82871/38]

REVAL, September 21, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose translation of an intercepted German message emanating from Berlin, which has been communicated to me by the Prime Minister of the North-West Russian Government as being an interesting sidelight upon the activities of the Black or pro-German party among the Russians.

I have, etc.,

HARRY PIRIE-GORDON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 94

Intercepted German Message from Berlin

Received September 16, 1919

The discussions between the Centre and Right, which are united in a private group to which, apart from distinguished politicians, belong also the representatives of the General Staff, high finance, officers and the Foreign Office on one side and the Russian Representatives (official representatives of the Russian émigrés in Germany, *de facto* a connection with the Russian Representatives in Paris is not impossible) on the other, have come to an agreement on the following principles:

1. Russia to have an entirely free hand in Persia.
2. The ultimate fate of Turkey to be decided by Russia alone.
3. Boundaries of Poland to be the same as in 1914.
4. The Baltic Provinces to receive a far-reaching autonomy but on condition that they are incorporated in the State of Russia.
5. Finland to be recognised as an independent State.

The Germans, on their part, promise effective military assistance against the Bolsheviks (von der Goltz, about 25,000 men in Courland, 60,000 on the Prussian frontier, 15,000 in Lithuania) besides financial assistance (up to the present 200 million German marks are mentioned).

The Germans have not yet finally declared their conditions; so far, only the following have been formulated:

1. A particularly favourable Trade Treaty for Germany (possibly for 10 years; the duration is not yet definitely fixed).
2. The right of colonisation in Russia. (Great difficulties are being made by the Russians—an agreement has not yet been reached.)

The present German Government is strongly against the above-mentioned group although a few members are in sympathy with it. As a matter of fact, the group in question is sufficiently strong to put up against the Government an army of 100,000 men, to provide it with all necessities and in spite of all difficulties to increase it from day to day.

No. 95

MM. Ulmanis and Meierovicz to Mr. Lloyd George.¹

No. 3209 Telegraphic [136153/855/59]

RIGA, September 21, 1919

Referring to our telegram Nr. 2370 of September 1² I [*sic*] beg to inform Your Excellency of what follows: the situation in Latvia and particularly in Courland becomes more and more difficult and threatening. The Germans don't evacuate Courland; on the contrary since September 13 200–300 German soldiers are daily arriving in Mitau and all signs so [*sic*] the preparations of warm lodgings and heating make us think that they intend to pass the winter in Courland. The headquarters of the sixth reserve corps is still in Mitau. The Germans reoccupy localities they had left and disarm Lettish troops. They officially summon Lettish troops to leave certain localities and officially prohibit requisitions being made in Courland for the needs of our troops, what checks the work of supplying our army with food. They officially carry out requisitions for the Iron Division.³ The Lettish commandantures are being attacked and looted, the Latvian and Allied flags being torn down from Government buildings e.g. at Frauenburg. Germans continue evacuating rolling material and distructing [*sic*] railroad lines between Olai and Mitau. German troops become more and more disorganised and act like loose bands pillaging and trampling down cornfields, robbing grain from

¹ This telegram was received in the Foreign Office on October 2.

² Cf. No. 65, note 2.

³ General Burt had reported from Riga in telegram No. A.B. 335 of September 18 (received that day by the British Delegation in Paris): 'Germans in the Iron Division are ordering Lettish town garrisons in Courland to withdraw out of area at 24 hours notice, which Germans call their reserved area. German requisitioning is continuing.'

peasants and spreading a régime of unbearable terror. Cases of assassination are frequent.⁴ In many districts the inhabitants abandon their homes. Hunger in Courland creates a state of depression in Latvia, weakens our military force and prevents us from directing all our forces against the Bolsheviks. This certainly paralyses our commerce and industry. Rumours spread by Germans that the Latvian front would be broken by the Bolsheviks are not correct. On the contrary the Lettish Army has had considerable successes lately. The German troops are far from forming a barrier against a Bolshevik invasion, as it has been proved by the event of 1918 and 1919 when they delivered Latvia to Bolshevik terror and hindered the organisation of a Lettish army. The German troops and the so-called Russian detachments consisting to the half of Germans with Bermont at their head constitute the front guard of a great alliance between Russian and German reactionaries. The aim of this alliance is the oppression of the independence of the States newly formed on the Baltic Coast, the establishment of an autocratic régime both in Germany and Russia and a war of revenge with the Allied (*sic*). Considering that the events in Courland endanger our independence as well as the peace of the whole of Europe, we beg to address to Your Excellency the urgent request to take decisive measures to stop once for all the intrigues and machinations of the German Government and to deliver us from the Russo-German nightmare in Courland. We are convinced that only reprisals of military character as (1) the retaining of German war prisoners in the Allied countries (2) the landing of Allied troops at Memel (3) a demonstration of the Allied Fleet (4) the renewal of the blockade of Germany and other analogical measures can induce the Germans to leave the occupied districts and to renounce to [*sic*] their aggressive plans. We kindly entreat Your Excellency to transmit our demand to, and to support it at, the Peace Conference as well as to oblige Germany to comply with article 433 of the Versailles Treaty regarding Latvia. By the mediation of Your Excellency we beg to address to the Peace Conference the demand to recognise *de jure* the independence of the State of Latvia, and to officially declare that the obligations imposed upon Germany by the Versailles treaty in general are to be observed also as regards Latvia owing to the Germans pretexting [*sic*] not to know which articles of the Versailles Treaty are valid for Latvia, and pretending all political and economical questions regarding Latvia to be regulated by special Russo-German Treaty. Reiterating our demands expressed in our

⁴ The Latvian Government had drawn the attention of the German Government to these and similar facts in a note of September 18 from M. Meierovicz to the German Chargé d'Affaires at Riga. This note, of which a copy was transmitted by Colonel Tallents to the Foreign Office on September 23, concluded as follows: 'Le Gouvernement Provisoire de Latvia a l'honneur d'adresser au Gouvernement de la République d'Allemagne la question suivante: Est-il connu au Gouvernement Allemand que sur le territoire de la Latvia se trouvent encore des troupes allemandes? En cas si ce fait lui est connu, nous avons l'honneur de prier le Gouvernement Allemand de nous faire parvenir dans un délai le plus bref des renseignements; 1) où, en quel nombre et quels détachements allemands se trouvent encore sur le territoire de la Latvia; 2) comment le Gouvernement Allemand justifie le séjour des troupes allemands en Latvia.'

telegram Nr. 2370² especially regarding ammunitions and arms, we are awaiting a favourable reply from Your Excellency.

ULMANIS, Prime Minister of Latvia
MEIEROVICZ, Minister for Foreign Affairs

No. 96

Mr. Lloyd George to M. Ulmanis
Unnumbered. Telegraphic [136153/855/59]

LONDON¹

I have just received your telegram of September 21.² I hasten to assure you that His Majesty's Government are fully alive to the sufferings which have been inflicted on your valiant people by the German troops under Gen. von der Goltz and in concert with the Allied Governments are about to adopt decisive measures for bringing pressure to bear on the German Government in order to secure the immediate withdrawal of their troops. I trust that in consequence all German elements will shortly be cleared from Latvia.

As regards the further request for assistance which you put forward, I much regret that His Majesty's Government are not in a position to provide further war material to Latvia. Our engagements in other parts of the world are so heavy and the shortage of shipping is so great that no other course unfortunately is open to us.

The question of recognising the independence of Latvia can only be considered by His Majesty's Government in consultation with their Allies, but I can assure you that, when the future position of Latvia comes up for determination either by the Peace Conference or the League of Nations, you may count on His Majesty's Government doing all in their power to secure the due fulfilment of Latvian national aspirations consistently with the general European interest.

¹ The file copy of this telegram is undated. It is noted on the file as being a 'copy of reply sent by the P[rime] M[inister]'.
² No. 95.

No. 97

M. Czepinski¹ to Lord Hardinge (Received September 23)
No. I. 449 (iii) [132696/8/59]

Sir,
LITHUANIAN DELEGATION, LONDON, September 22, 1919

Some parts of Lithuania are still occupied by the German General Dibitch's [Diebitsch's] corps constituting a part of von der Goltz's army. The troops control a considerable portion of the Libau railway line, namely from Radzviliskis to Mazeikiai, and a line running from Shavli up to Tilsit, as well as that between Prekultn and Memel. According to the information of the Lithuanian General Staff the total number of German troops in Lithuania was at least 5,000 men.

¹ Lithuanian Representative in London.

In July last, certain parts of Graf von Keller's detachment, commanded by Col. Virgolitch, the former Chief of Prince Lieven's Staff at Mitau, have been added to these, about 2,000 men, chiefly consisting of Germans and Russian prisoners of war. The detachment has been created by Prince Lieven, and its officers are almost exclusively Baltic Barons and Russians. The troops are engaged especially between Shavli and Kursenai in recruiting German soldiers and Russian prisoners of war released from Germany, so as to organise an army for Youdenich's and other Russian Generals' assistance in fighting the Bolsheviks. Both Dibitch's corps and parts of Graf von Keller's detachment are acting in full harmony and supporting one another; they are systematically requisitioning, plundering, and even terrorising the local population, if the latter offers a physical resistance.

Generally speaking, the conduct of the Russo-German troops in Lithuania bears a provocative and brutal character and according to the reports the local population suffers so heavily at their hands that even the Bolshevik injuries were less violent compared with the Russo-German methods.

Following on the appearance of Graf von Keller's detachment in Lithuania, the Lithuanian Government lodged on the 26th July, a protest, No. 1460 (a copy of which is enclosed herewith), with Col. Tallents,² Chief of the British Mission at Riga, against the new invasions and asking for his assistance, but this brought no positive results.

According to the report of the Lithuanian Embassy in Berlin to the Lithuanian Government, the Russo-German troops in Lithuania are carrying out schemes of [? a] political block of the Russian monarchists residing in Berlin, Prussian Junkers, and Baltic Barons, its chief aim being to crush the Bolsheviks and ultimately to conclude a political pact between Germany and Russia. The funds for their activity are provided by the block itself.

The German Government, though avowedly not supporting the activity of the block, have adopted a passive attitude regarding this matter, till the agitation of the Independent Socialists of Germany succeeded in bringing this policy on the 18th August to the notice of the National German Assembly at Weimar. Since that time the German Government has forbidden the Russians in Berlin to continue the recruiting of the volunteers, although it is still going on in Lithuania among the prisoners of war.

From a copy, enclosed herewith, of a Secret order of General von der Goltz, dated July 31st,³ it appears also that the German and Russian armies in Lithuania have a common object of saving both Russia and Germany.

During my last visit in Lithuania, I had an opportunity of speaking with Keller's officers and men, and I can only confirm that people constituting these armies are very hostile to the Allied Powers, their only hope being political approachment [*sic*] between Germany and Russia.

The Lithuanian people are fully aware of the great danger which the Russo-German intrigues confront Lithuania [*sic*] and seeing the entirely passive attitude of the Allies in this respect, are demanding their Government

² Colonel Tallents was absent from the Baltic Provinces at that time: cf. No. 22, note 5.

³ Not printed. For the text of this order see No. 82.

to find a way out of the complications and to get rid of the intruders. Their spirit was clearly expressed during a great political demonstration, held on the 17th August, at Kovno. On reaching the residence of the German General Commissioner in Lithuania, the crowd demanded that the German troops should without delay be withdrawn from Lithuania, together with their friends, the Russian Kolchakists.

Bringing the above to your notice, I beg leave to request His Britannic Majesty's Government to give due consideration to these facts, and to adopt adequate steps in order that the Russo-German troops may immediately be withdrawn from Lithuania.

I am, etc.,

VINCENT CZEPINSKI

Plenipotentiary Delegate of the State of
Lithuania in the United Kingdom

ENCLOSURE IN No. 97

M. Sleževičius to Colonel Tallents

7.—No. 1460.

KAUNAS, le 26 juillet 1919

Le Gouvernement Lituanien a été informé que des sergents fourriers revêtus d'uniformes russes appartenant à l'armée du Prince de Lieven sont arrivés à Schauliai afin d'y préparer des quartiers pour 15,000 soldats de l'armée ci-dessus mentionnée qui a l'intention de stationner dans ces parages deux mois environ et de faire venir de la Lettonie en Lituanie encore plus de troupes du Prince de Lieven. Bien que la plupart des officiers et tous les soldats soient en uniforme russe, ils ne savent pas un mot de russe et ne parlent que l'allemand.

Le Gouvernement Lituanien proteste le plus cathégoriquement [*sic*] que des Russes et des Allemands vêtus en uniforme russe de l'armée Lieven entrent par force en Lituanie, pour s'y créer une base militaire.

Le Gouvernement Lituanien a déclaré à ces sergents fourriers de quitter sur-le-champ la ville de Siauliai et a publié en même temps l'ordre [? que] dans le cas que les troupes du Prince Lieven essayaient de venir par force sur le territoire de la Lituanie le chemin leur serait barré à main armée et que jamais aucune armée n'entrerait en Lituanie sans trouver résistance sérieuse.

Le Gouvernement Lituanien, tâchant de délivrer son pays de toute armée étrangère, a l'honneur de Vous prier, Monsieur, de vouloir bien faire toutes les démarches nécessaires pour qu'il soit défendu à l'armée du Prince Lieven ou à n'importe quelle autre armée russe d'entrer par force en Lituanie.

Veuillez, etc.,

SLEŽEVIČIUS

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres

et

l'Administrateur du Ministère des Affaires
Étrangères

No. 98

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 1169 Telegraphic [131389/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 22, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1359¹ (September 18).

You should support M. Clemenceau strongly in advocating immediate ultimatum to German Government accompanied by threat of coercive measures without for the moment indicating or deciding what these will be.

Prime Minister suggests that Supreme Council of Versailles with Naval Representatives should be consulted at once as to form of coercion to be applied in case of need. Use of Polish forces need not necessarily be discarded owing to American opposition.

A suggestion which has just been made is that we notify the German Government that until German forces are withdrawn from the Baltic the Allied and Associated Powers will not consider demands for food and raw material recently put forward by the Germans which are now under consideration by the Supreme Economic Council.

¹ No. 90.

No. 99

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wise¹ (Cologne)

Unnumbered. Telegraphic² [131389/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 22, 1919*

You should be careful not to commit us in negotiations with Germans as to supply of food and raw materials. Supreme Council in Paris are considering means of exercising pressure on Germans to induce them to evacuate Baltic States and withholding of food supplies from Germany has been suggested in this connexion.

¹ Mr. E. F. Wise was a member of the British Economic Delegation at Cologne.

² This telegram was communicated to the War Office for transmission.

No. 100

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 6176 [131389/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 22, 1919*

Sir,

With reference to your telegram No. 1359¹ of the 18th instant and my telegram 1169² of to-day, respecting the measures to be taken to bring about

¹ No. 90.

² No. 98.

the withdrawal of General von der Goltz from the Baltic Provinces, I transmit to you (in original for return) a copy of a memorandum submitted by the Consultative Food Committee to the Supreme Economic Council.³

You will see from this document that whereas the Allies have agreed to allow Germany to postpone payment of such portion of the first thousand million pounds sterling by reparation as may be necessary to enable her to purchase such quantities of food and raw material as the Allies and Associated Governments consider essential, it now appears that the amount of foodstuffs alone required by Germany during the next four months are expected to cost about £250,000,000 sterling. It is believed that the cost of the requisite raw materials will exceed that figure, but no exact estimate has been formed.

The Cabinet are now considering what measures are possible for exerting pressure of the kind indicated in your telegram, either by the use of force or the establishment of a partial blockade, but you will no doubt agree that a refusal to take into consideration the application of the German Government for foodstuffs and raw material until all German troops are withdrawn from the Baltic States would probably be an effective weapon.

I suggest therefore that the Supreme Council should take this proposal at once into consideration pending the receipt of the further views of His Majesty's Government on the situation.

I have, etc.,

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

J. A. C. TILLEY

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 100

Memorandum submitted by the Consultative Food Committee to the Supreme Economic Council³

Under Article 235 of the Peace Treaty the Allies have agreed to allow Germany to postpone payment of such portion of the first thousand million pounds sterling by reparation as may be necessary to enable her to purchase such quantities of food and raw material as the principal Allied and Associated Governments consider essential for her if she is to be in a position to pay reparation.

In the formal reply of the Allied and Associated Governments to the German objections to the Peace Treaty it was stated that the portion of the concession in this clause must be subject to the Germans complying with such conditions as the Allied and Associated Governments might find it necessary to lay down with a view to protecting their own interests.

The Organising Committee of the Reparation Commission at one of their early meetings with the Germans at Versailles asked for a list of the feeding-stuffs and raw materials which the Germans desired should be within the limits of this clause.

³ This memorandum has been supplied from the archives of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference, file 599/2/5/19099.

On the 6th August Herr von Lersner submitted a list of feeding-stuffs, fodder, fertilisers and raw materials, of which a copy is attached,⁴ which he stated would be required by Germany in the near future. The lists of feeding-stuffs and fodder have been carefully considered by the Consultative Food Committee and the following conclusions have been reached:—

1. Having regard to pre-war requirements of Germany and the information available as to German harvests and the state of German live stock, the requirements stated do not appear to be at all excessive, based on a pre-war consumption, and assuming that an allowance has been made for the accumulation of a small stock of these commodities, in addition to consumption. But it is not possible to give a complete answer to this point until more information is available with regard to some of the items.

2. It is not possible to consider the demands in detail until the information is available as to the finance which will be at Germany's disposal.

In round figures the feeding-stuffs, fodder and fertilisers in the lists submitted, apart from raw materials, would cost about two hundred and fifty million sterling for the full amounts supplied. Herr von Lersner, Chief German Delegate at Versailles, is unable to give any information as to how the money can be provided. Apparently it must come, either from credits supplied by the Allied and Neutral Governments or from the postponement of the reparation in Clause 235 of the Treaty.

3. The Consultative Food Committee desires to ask the Supreme Economic Council for information as to the amount of finance that will be available for Germany for the purchase of food-stuffs.

4. No information is available as to the tonnage that will be at the disposal of Germany. It is assumed, however, by the Consultative Food Committee that if finance is available Germany would be able to charter considerable quantities of tonnage in the open markets. This question, however, would apparently have to be considered by the Shipping Section.

5. If Finance and Tonnage are at Germany's disposal for the whole year it is, in the opinion of the Consultative Food Committee, essential that Germany should be required to make her purchase under general or specific direction from the Consultative Food Committee. In respect of some commodities, e.g. meat, feeding cakes and feeding-stuffs it is improbable that more than a proportion of the German demands could possibly be supplied. In respect of these and also other commodities the fact of Germany buying on this scale might have serious effects on the markets.

6. The Consultative Food Committee recommends that as soon as the decision is reached as to the amount of finance available to Germany for food it should be authorised to discuss programme and purchase in detail with the German experts. For this purpose the most convenient course would be for the Germans to send their experts to London.

⁴ Not printed.

No. 101

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 22)

No. 127 Telegraphic [132425/855/59]

RIGA, September 22, 1919

Increasing insolence of German forces in Courland and complete lack of official information in political and military missions solely regarding¹ any measures proposed by Allies for their expulsion threatens (? to) cause overthrow of Lettish Government when People's Council next meets. Press telegrams received here September 18 said that Marshal Foch had been authorised to resolve (*sic*) measures.

Please send fullest possible information as to steps taken by Allies in this connection.²

Repeated to Paris.

¹ In the text of this telegram as received in Paris this phrase read: '... in political and military missions here regarding', etc.

² This telegram was not answered from the Foreign Office where it was presumed that a reply would be sent by the British Delegation in Paris.

No. 102

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 6184 [129747/82871/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 23, 1919

Sir,

M. Guchkoff has recently been in London on a flying visit from the Baltic States, and has stated in conversation that he has come to the conclusion, after having been to Berlin, that the Germans alone are prepared to save Russia from the Bolsheviks and set up a proper Government in that country.

He is of opinion that General von der Goltz now has an army of one hundred and twenty thousand, chiefly consisting of Russian prisoners in German uniform, who are being well equipped and privately financed in Germany, though the German Government, who are cognisant of the facts, are taking no official part in its formation.

M. Guchkoff stated that he had been informed by Germans that they were merely waiting for the time when His Majesty's Government would abandon Denikin, whereupon this army under General von der Goltz, would unite with the other Russian armies, and would advance on Petrograd and Moscow where they were sure of a welcome.

M. Guchkoff calculated that after such an occupation of Moscow and Petrograd, General Denikin would be forced to come to terms with General von der Goltz, and that by next spring Russia would be restored by Germany and that then Germany would feel strong enough to refuse to carry out the terms of the Peace Treaty.

I forward the above information as I consider that coming from a person such as M. Guchkoff it is worthy of consideration.

I am, etc.,

[for Earl Curzon of Kedleston
V. WELLESLEY]

No. 103

General Burt (Riga) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 25)¹

No. A.B. 357 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19122]

RIGA, September 24, 1919

Part 1.

1. Reliable information that Germans have formulated plan for attack on Riga in the event of Letts attacking Germans.

A. If Letts attack, Germans will retire from neutral zone and join up with Bermont's Russian troops and then counter-attack Letts with Russian-German force. Objective will be Riga which will be attacked from west and south.

B. After capture of Riga Germans' defensive line will be Stint See, Jaegel See, Egel River, Dwina River.

C. Town of Riga will be administered by Russians, and Russian Governor will be appointed. Plans have already been worked out for administration.

D. Peace proposals would then be offered to Letts including restoration of Lettish Government on certain conditions.

E. Russian-German forces would then secure Dwinsk-Riga railway and fight Bolsheviks.

Part 2.

[2] Germans are circulating rumours that they expect to be attacked by Letts. There are other indications which point to German offensive attitude in the near future. Recent disarming of Lettish town-guards in Kourland. Gradual arrival of German reinforcements from Germany and military stores. Movement of German troops towards the River Ducena, where it is reported, unconfirmed yet, that Germans have crossed the neutral zone. Announcement by German troops that they will drop question of colonization for the present and fight Bolsheviks. It is certain that German provocation of Letts to (? 'attack' omitted) when the Germans are ready and the German plan of utilising the Russians will place allied missions in such a position with the Russians that missions would have to evacuate.

Part 3.

3. I am recommending Letts to take steps to withdraw their forward troops on neutral zone at first signs of German aggression and to continue to withdraw, allowing the Germans to advance unhindered. I cannot rest assured that Letts will accept this advice after their experiences in April and May when their troops having acted on the advice of the British Mission

¹ This telegram was addressed and repeated as for No. 92.

received no support to prevent Germans continuing. Should Letts fall into present German trap and attack, I foresee the collapse of Lettland and Estland into Bolshevism and thus N.W. Army will be involved in disaster.

Lithuania may also be involved. In any case all the restoration work at present in progress in these provinces will collapse.

No. 104

General Malcolm (Berlin) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris).

*Received September 25)*¹

No. Z. 149 Telegraphic [606/3/8/19155]

BERLIN, September 24, 1919

Think it would be a very good thing if I might send General Biscoupski London to explain his suggestions. He is by far the best Russian I have met and has a good name among Russians. Do you agree? Have said nothing to him yet. Matter urgent as he will probably leave soon if financial arrangements break down as is almost certain.²

¹ This telegram was addressed to the Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris.

² In reply General Malcolm was informed by War Office telegram No. 81420 of September 26 that the views of the military representative in London of Admiral Kolchak were being asked and that meanwhile he should adhere to War Office telegram No. 81408 of September 24 to him. This telegram stated: 'For some months Colonel Durnovo has been head of pro-German organizations in Scandinavia, and any opinion expressed by him must be regarded as a German opinion. At present nothing is known in War Office concerning Biskoupsky, but from fact that he is in close connection with Durnovo he may also be regarded as expressing views of Germans. General Hoffmann is considered to be more dangerous to our interests than even von der Goltz. You should, therefore, have as little dealings as possible with all three unless necessary for the purpose of keeping them under observation.' General Biscoupski did not visit London.

No. 105

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 27)

No. 1376 Telegraphic: by bag [134201/61232/59]

PARIS, September 25, 1919

Acting on instructions contained in your telegram No. 1169¹ of 22nd September, I brought up before the Supreme Council this morning the question of the German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.² I submitted as a basis for discussion a draft embodying the first four paragraphs of General Weygand's original draft note (see my telegram No. 1359³ of 18th September) to which I added two further paragraphs based on your despatch. . . .⁴

Mr. Polk had previously suggested the modification of the phrase in the

¹ No. 98.

² For the official record of this discussion see Vol. I, No. 64, minute 7.

³ No. 90.

⁴ There followed the text of the revised note. For this text see Vol. I, No. 64, note 4.

Weygand note relating to isolated Germans who had enlisted in Russian units, as it was not clear what legal right we had to call upon the German Government to enforce their evacuation in individual cases, or what means might be at Germany's disposal to give effect to such a demand.⁵ I agreed to this and Mr. Polk promised to prepare a revised draft in consultation with the Drafting Committee. Mr. Polk also agreed to my suggestion to add, at the end of the penultimate paragraph, a sentence stating that the U.S. Government were refusing financial facilities to German traders in the United States until our demands were complied with.

Subject to these modifications, the draft proposed by me was favourably received, and it was agreed to refer it to the Drafting Committee for the setting up of a definite text. The French Government, however, expressed a strong desire to add as a third measure of coercion the stoppage of repatriation of German prisoners of war. I explained to the Council the reasons why I thought that H.M.G. might find it difficult to interfere with the repatriation already set on foot of German prisoners in British hands, and the Japanese delegate made a similar reservation on behalf of his Government.

Attempts were made to find a formula which would convey to the German Government a threat of the total or partial suspension of repatriation without committing any of the Allied and Associated Governments individually. This, however, was found to present great difficulties. The French representative pointed out that if in practice none of the Governments except the French were prepared to suspend repatriation, the Germans would not, in fact, be any worse off than they are at present, as the repatriation of prisoners of war in French hands has not yet begun. It would therefore be an idle threat and would moreover accentuate the difference between Allied and Associated Governments in the matter in such a way as to produce unfortunate political consequences. In these circumstances, I promised again to telegraph to H.M.G. for definite instructions on this point, which, though raised in my telegram, is not dealt with in Your Lordship's reply. I should be glad especially to be informed whether the suggestion made in my telegram No. 1359,³ on the proposal of the Military Section here, that the repatriation of German officer prisoners in British hands might be suspended, may not perhaps afford a solution of the question.

As regards the military or naval measures which might ultimately be taken, I am advised by General Sackville West that as the matter has already been considered by Marshal Foch himself, whose proposals⁶ were not accepted by the Supreme Council, it would be technically improper to resubmit it to the lower instance of the Versailles Council. I accordingly suggested that when Marshal Foch came to reconsider the question of the possible employment of force, I desired to place at his disposal the technical assistance of my naval advisers in order to make a comprehensive study of the problem from the naval as well as from the military point of view.

⁵ See Vol. I, No. 60, minute 2.

⁶ For these proposals, which involved the use of the Polish army, see Vol. I, No. 58, minute 1.

No. 106

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 29)
No. 1380 Telegraphic. By bag [134658/134658/59]

PARIS, September 26, 1919

I learn that it is unlikely that General Gough will return to the Baltic States. In view of his position as head of the Inter-Allied Mission and of the difficult conditions at present existing in these provinces, I venture to draw your attention to the question of the appointment of a successor which appears to me to require urgent consideration. I presume that the Supreme Council would be prepared to accept General Gough's successor as head of the Inter-Allied Military Mission, but they are of course in no way committed to do so, and in any case it might be desirable to submit the name of the officer designated as General Gough's successor to them before the appointment is confirmed.

If it has been definitely decided that General Gough will not return to the Baltic, I think it will be well for me to inform the Council to this effect at an early date, and I shall be glad to know whether you desire me to take the opportunity of making any statements as to his successor.

No. 107

*Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 23 [139686/4232/18]

BERLIN, September 26, 1919

... The² situation in the Baltic Provinces is causing considerable anxiety to the German Government, which finds itself threatened by a renewal of the blockade. On the one hand, it feels powerless to enforce its orders to the troops; on the other hand, it fears that should they obey their orders to withdraw, they will be followed into East Prussia by some 150,000 inhabitants of the Baltic States who, in their turn, will be closely followed by the Russian Red Armies. How far these fears are justified it is not possible for any member of this Mission to judge, as we have no real knowledge of the situation there. I therefore report them merely as they are stated to me.

In certain circles, d'Annunzio's example³ is a good deal quoted and admired. . . .²

¹ This report was received in the Foreign Office on October 10.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

³ As regards his recent seizure of Fiume.

No. 108

*General Malcolm (Berlin) to General Sir W. Thwaites*¹

No. 2008/A/33 [137404/61232/59]

BERLIN, September 26, 1919

1. Herr Noske asked me if he could see me last night, and a meeting was arranged. On arrival, I learned that Herr Noske wished to talk about the

¹ A copy of this dispatch was communicated by the Director of Military Intelligence to the Foreign Office on October 4, 1919.

situation in the Baltic Provinces. I made it clear that I had nothing whatever to do with that part of the world and that, beyond what I had heard in Berlin, and read in the Press, I knew nothing of what was going on there. He said that he quite understood my position, and regretted the difficulty which the German Government had in laying its views directly before any Entente Government.

2. He then made the following points:—

- (a) That the German Government was really doing its best to induce the troops to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces. An officer had now been sent to von der Goltz to inform the troops that unless they complied, pay and supplies would be stopped.
- (b) That in spite of this he was afraid that the troops would refuse to withdraw, and that the German Government would be held responsible. Some of the troops, being without money or food, would disperse and start looting.
- (c) That if the German troops did withdraw there would still be 7,000 Russian troops without pay, who would also be a danger. These have also hitherto been paid by the German Government; this is to stop on the 30th Sept.
- (d) That in consequence of the fear of these disorders some 150,000 Germans now in the Baltic Provinces would leave for East Prussia and would be promptly followed by the Red Armies.
- (e) That a request had been received from Versailles for permission to send an Inter-allied Commission to the Baltic Provinces to investigate conditions on the spot.² Such a Commission was welcome to the German Government.

3. Having no real knowledge of the situation in the Baltic Provinces, I merely promised to report Herr Noske's views as he was obviously anxious about the situation. I added that the danger and difficulties which he foresaw must be evident to the British Mission on the spot and that no doubt steps were being taken to meet them.

N. MALCOLM, Major-General
Chief of British Military Mission, Berlin

² This question had been raised in certain conversations at Versailles between an American representative and Baron von Lersner. A résumé of these conversations is printed in Vol. I, No. 66, appendix C.

No. 109

*General Malcolm (Berlin) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 28)*¹
No. 7. 156 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19122]

BERLIN, September 27, 1919

Have just had visit from General Biscoupski who tells me that he received telegram last night from Mitau saying that 10,000 to 15,000 of von der

¹ This telegram was addressed and repeated as for No. 104.

Goltz's men who wished to remain in Baltic Provinces were ready to place themselves under his orders to fight.

He had not replied yet. I told him that as far as I knew England would be entirely opposed to German troops remaining in Baltic Provinces even under a Russian commander. I presume this is the case.

It was (? in my opinion)² a great disappointment to him. He considers that the rest of the Germans, about 20,000, will return with Goltz.

² In a text of this telegram communicated by the War Office to the Foreign Office (received October 1) this phrase read: 'It was eventually [? evidently] a great disappointment', etc.

No. 110

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 27)

No. 1382 Telegraphic [134512/61232/59]

PARIS, September 27, 1919

German Evacuation of Baltic.

Council of Five has approved text of ultimatum which will accordingly be despatched through Foch today. Text follows by bag tonight.¹

French Delegates themselves suggest not touching in this ultimatum on question of repatriation of prisoners of war.

It will remain open to Allied and Associated Governments to stop or retard repatriation as one of measures which they threaten to take in the event of Germany remaining recalcitrant.

¹ For the text of this note and the discussion in the Supreme Council preceding its adoption see Vol. I, No. 66, minute 3 and appendix E.

No. 111

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to General Marsh (Helsingfors)¹

No. 54 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19084]

PARIS, September 27, 1919

Supreme Council to-day approved text of a communication for immediate despatch by Marshal Foch to the German Government through the Armistice Commission demanding in strong terms the complete evacuation of all former Russian territory by all German troops and demobilised Germans serving in Russian formations.²

German Government is being informed of certain severe measures of an economic character actually taken to bring pressure to bear on German Government pending compliance with Allied demands, while Allies reserve the right to take further measures should this prove necessary.

¹ This telegram was repeated to the British Missions at Riga (as No. 16) and Warsaw (as No. 311/12) and to the War Office as No. 172.

² Text as corrected by the immediately succeeding telegram (not printed). The original text read: '... all German troops and other troops under German control.'

Text of communication is to be published and will be telegraphed to you *en clair* as soon as it has reached German Government.

Meanwhile the above is for the information and guidance only of Allied Missions.

No. 112

*M. Seskis to M. Clemenceau*¹

[599/2/5/19333]

PARIS, le 29 septembre 1919

Excellence,

La Délégation Lettone a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de Latvia a reçu, le 11 septembre, du Gouvernement des Soviets russes l'offre d'ouvrir des pourparlers de paix.² Quoique n'ignorant point le peu de foi qu'on doit ajouter aux traités conclus avec les bolcheviks, le Gouvernement Letton ne s'est pas cru en état de refuser leur offre pour les raisons suivantes:

Malgré plusieurs notes adressées par le Gouvernement et la Délégation Lettone à la Conférence avec la demande de faire évacuer la Courlande par les troupes russo-allemandes de von der Goltz, le nombre de ces dernières s'augmente de jour en jour de détachements armés arrivant d'Allemagne; les troupes allemandes terrorisent et pillent la population de Courlande et leur attitude envers le Gouvernement de Latvia devient de plus en plus provocante et menaçante. Malgré son moral excellent, l'armée lettone, faute d'armement et d'équipement, n'est pas suffisamment forte et nombreuse pour lutter en même temps contre l'armée allemande en Courlande et les bolcheviks qui occupent toujours la Latgale.

Le Gouvernement de Latvia s'est adressé aux Représentants des Puissances alliées afin de savoir quel appui elles voudraient lui accorder dans la lutte contre les Allemands et les bolcheviks. En parfait accord avec les Gouvernements de l'Esthonie et de la Lithuanie, le Gouvernement de Latvia élabore une réponse commune au Gouvernement des Soviets.²

J. SESKIS

Président de la Délégation Lettone

¹ This note was communicated to the British Delegation by the Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference (received October 3).

² For these negotiations see Chap. II.

No. 113

M. Czepinski to Lord Hardinge (Received September 30)

No. I. 493 (iii) [135211/61232/59]

LONDON, September 29, 1919

Sir,

Supplementary to my letter of the 22nd inst., No. 449,¹ I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a secret telephonogram sent to the Chief of the

¹ No. 97.

Lithuanian General Headquarters by the Military Commander of the District and town of Shauli. From this it is evident that the German Government has already ordered the evacuation of Courland and the Northern part of Lithuania, but has decided not to transport to Germany those volunteers of German origin who wish to remain in Lithuania.

In compliance with this clause, as the same message indicates, various divisions of these German troops are joining Koltchak's adherents, who are even awaiting a transport of new armed forces from Berlin.

In today's newspapers there is a notice that the Supreme Council have authorised Marshal Foch to address a resolute note to the German Government requesting the immediate evacuation of Lithuania and Courland by the troops of General von der Gol[t]z; but there is still a danger that these troops will remain in Lithuania and Courland as volunteers under Koltchak.

I have, etc.

V. CZEPINSKI

Plenipotentiary Delegate of the State
of Lithuania in the United Kingdom

ENCLOSURE IN No. 113

Lithuanian Military Telegram

Commander-in-Chief
of the district and town of Siauliai.

August 28, 1919.
No. 1480

Telephonogram 36

Secret.
Urgent

Chief of General Headquarters.

The Commander-in-Chief of the town of Siauliai states that he is in possession of authentic news to the effect that the following has been received at Dibic's [Diebitsch's] Headquarters from the Central German Administration (*Deutsche Reichsleitung*):

The evacuation of Courland and of the Northern part of Lithuania is to proceed in this way: after the return to Germany of the Siauliai brigade and the garrison of the district of Libau, the 6th Reserve Corps is to begin on August 20th to evacuate the environs of Mitau and Bausk, which evacuation must be completed in one month. A further three weeks will be necessary for the evacuation of the military forces defending Prekuln, Mitau, Bausk Siauliai and Lidoviniai.

Volunteers of German origin who wish to remain in Lithuania as private citizens are not to be transported to Germany.

I have authentic news that on August 26th one artillery depot with four

batteries of guns, one battalion of infantry, (about 600 men) with 30 machine-guns and about 200 cavalry, joined Koltchak's forces.

These military divisions have been quartered at Radzivilischki. On September 1st those who joined the Koltchakists are to leave for Siauliai and will occupy the barracks of the third regiment.

At Kurschany the Koltchakists are awaiting this week a transport of one thousand armed men from Berlin—this news I have from the Koltchakist Intelligence Department.²

Commander-in-Chief of the town
and district of Siauliai
OFFICIER BIRONTAS

² A few days previously General von der Goltz had apparently come to an understanding with President Ebert and Herren Müller and Noske concerning the non-recall of German volunteers and the supply of reinforcements for the Russian contingents: see General Count R. von der Goltz, op. cit., pp. 242-3. (Cf. No. 58, note 2.)

No. 114

*General Burt (Riga) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received September 30)*¹
No. A.B. 377 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19122]

RIGA, September 29, 1919

1. Kowno reports Russo-German troops have driven Lithuanian troops out of Shawli and Radziwilishki.
2. German troops have crossed the neutral zone in North Courland.

¹ This telegram was addressed to the British Mission at Helsingfors and repeated to the British Delegation at Paris, the British Mission at Libau, and the War Office.

No. 115

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received October 1)
No. 505 Telegraphic [135875/61232/59]

HELSINGFORS, October 1, 1919

Press reproduce statement from *Libausche Worten* asserting that an agreement has been concluded between Russian and German troops in Courland. According to this agreement Germans agree to support (Russians) until Russian Monarchy regains its former frontiers. Finland alone is to be independent. Esthonia, Lettland and Lithuania are to have local Government. Russia on its side is to help to restore Germany.

Repeated to Riga.

*Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 24 [143739/4232/18]

BERLIN, October 3, 1919

The Baltic Provinces

... In² contrast to the Polish and other questions,³ the situation in the Baltic Provinces has not improved during the past week. For some time a controversy has been going on in Berlin between the Russian Party, which is headed by General Biscoupski, and the German Party, headed by Senator Bellegarde, who is in close touch with Colonel Bermont in Courland. Both parties have wanted money. General Biscoupski asked for 300,000,000 marks to pursue a 'Russian' policy, but the proposed paymasters would not consider anything beyond a weekly allowance which would enable them to dictate a German policy. As the result, General Biscoupski resigned the Presidency of the Russian Council in Berlin on Sunday last, leaving the field clear for his rivals, who wanted, among other things, to make an attack on Riga.

General Biscoupski has now been asked to return to the Council, but will only do so on condition that all idea of a German Baltic policy should be dropped in favour of his own 'Russian' idea.⁴ Both parties are opposed to the complete withdrawal of the German troops in accordance with the ultimatum, but the difficulties of obtaining money and supplies, should in the end compel obedience. For the moment, however, the German Party is the more powerful. This may lead to collisions between the opposing troops, possibly even to the proposed attack on Riga.

There are still many people who say 'look at Fiume' without recognising that a military adventure in the Baltic Provinces would have no support from the mass of the German people.

N. MALCOLM

¹ This report was received in the Foreign Office on October 20.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

³ The Polish question referred to was that relating to local problems occasioned by the delimitation of the new frontier between Poland and Germany.

⁴ These events had given rise to confused and inaccurate rumours in the Baltic Provinces. Thus Mr. Bosanquet, in Reval telegram No. 269 of October 1 (received in Foreign Office on October 2), forwarded a Lithuanian report, transmitted via Riga, of an imminent Russo-German *coup d'état* with the object of occupying Kovno and installing a new Lithuanian government favourable to German interests. According to this report General von der Goltz would be replaced by General Biscoupski as part of an 'enterprise supported by German Government who will loan Lithuania 300,000,000 marks if successful'. In telegram No. A.B. 379 of September 29, repeated on October 1, from Riga General Burt had transmitted an 'unconfirmed report that General Beskubsky [Biscoupski] had been appointed commander-in-chief of west front by pro-German Russian party in Berlin and that a Russian West Government has been formed in Berlin. . . . Rumours are current in Russian circles that General Malcolm, Berlin, interviewed General Beskubsky [Biscoupski] with a view to persuading latter to join side of Entente and had offered him three hundred million Reichsmarks to finance Russian forces in Baltic Provinces.'

*Baron von Ow-Wachendorf to General Nudant (Cologne)*¹
A.A.I. Nr. 5910 [599/2/5/19434]

(Traduction.)

DÜSSELDORF, le 4 octobre 1919

*Le Représentant du Gouvernement au Président de la Commission
 Interalliée Permanente d'Armistice.*

Suite à ma note A.A.I. 5900 du 3 octobre,² j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement de l'Empire a adressé un appel aux Allemands de l'Empire qui apparten[en]t encore aux troupes se trouvant dans la Baltique et qu'il a été porté à leur connaissance par ordre général des Commandants d'Unités ce qui suit:

'Soldats. Vous avez lu la dernière note de l'Entente concernant l'évacuation de la Baltique. Par cette note, le peuple allemand est menacé d'un nouveau blocus, d'une fermeture de tout crédit, et du refus d'importer des matières premières. Dans les cercles militaires de l'Entente on demande une nouvelle marche en avant, qui de ce fait amènerait l'occupation de Francfort. Certains journaux français comme *Le Temps* demandent la prise de possession des territoires de la Ruhr, et tout cela parce qu'un certain nombre de sujets allemands qui se sont engagés dans le corps de volontaires de la Baltique, ne veulent pas quitter le pays étranger, parce qu'ils vont à l'encontre des ordres du Gouvernement allemand en restant sur ce territoire, sachant que de millions de gens vont se trouver sans travail en Allemagne, que la misère ne fera qu'augmenter, et que finalement la famine que l'on cherchait avec grande peine à éviter, éclatera maintenant, à l'entrée de l'hiver, non seulement occasionnée par l'Entente, mais encore par le refus d'obéissance des propres citoyens; sur soixante millions d'habitants des milliers de vies sont en danger. Le *Times* annonce que la marche en avant commencera le 20 octobre, et qu'au premier novembre le nouveau blocus entrera en vigueur. Le Gouvernement de l'Empire s'adresse pour la dernière fois directement à la conscience et au sentiment patriotique des soldats allemands de la Baltique. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a jamais douté que les soldats allemands se laisseraient engager [*sic*] par des promesses qui n'ont jamais été tenues.³ Il comprend cela, et a également fait comprendre à l'Entente qu'il règne parmi eux un grand mécontentement, mais maintenant des circonstances plus graves sont en jeu. Tout le peuple mourra de faim et les autres biens d'un peuple seront ruinés, si dans le courant de ce mois les troupes allemandes n'évacuent pas la Baltique. Celui qui ne voudra pas se rendre responsable de la ruine

¹ This note was transmitted to the British Delegation in Paris by the Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference on October 7, 1919.

² This note, printed in Vol. I, No. 70, appendix A, was in reply to the Allied note of September 28, as agreed on September 27: see No. 110.

³ The original German of this sentence ran: 'Sie [die Reichsregierung] hat nie verkannt, dass die deutschen Soldaten auf Versprechungen hin sich anwerben liessen, die nicht gehalten worden sind.'

de son propre pays se soumettra à la nécessité la plus absolue, quittera ce pays étranger où les soldats allemands n'ont plus rien à faire.

'Le Gouvernement allemand ne peut et ne doit laisser subsister aucun doute, dans l'intérêt de l'Allemagne, qu'il emploiera tous les moyens qui sont en son pouvoir pour forcer l'évacuation des Provinces Baltiques, et il espère que cet appel sera suffisant pour démontrer aux soldats allemands qu'il ne s'agit plus maintenant de leur propre peau ni de leur intérêt personnel, mais de tout un peuple. Les adversaires ont levé le blocus; à vous d'empêcher maintenant ce [? que] celui-ci qui a fait plus de ravages meurtriers dans nos rangs que toutes les autres de la guerre [*sic*], soit remis en vigueur.⁴ Conformez vous à l'ordre de rentrer.'

OW-WACHENDORF

Cologne, le 5 octobre 1919.

Transmis à M. le Maréchal Commandant en
Chef les Armées alliées, 4 bis Boulevard des
Invalides, Paris.

Le Général Nudant, Président de la C.I.P.A.

⁴ The original German of this sentence ran: 'Die Gegner haben die Blokade aufgehoben! An Euch ist es zu verhindern, dass die Blokade, die mörderischer in unsern Reihen gehaust hat als alle andern Kriegswaffen, wieder verhängt wird.'

No. 118

*General Burt (Riga) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received October 6)*¹

No. A.B. 396 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19454]

RIGA, October 4, 1919

1. German troops continue to move in the direction of Jacobstadt.
2. No sign of evacuation of German troops commencing.
3. Von der Goltz adopting aggressive attitude towards Letts.
4. Further Russian troops have relieved Germans on the eastern neutral zone.
5. German Naudorf (*sic*)² wireless circulated on the 30th ultimo that the Letts attacked Russians in the Olai sector. This report is entirely without foundation.

¹ This telegram was addressed and repeated as for No. 92. A copy was received in the Foreign Office on October 9.

² This should apparently read 'Nauen'.

No. 119

*Report by Major Maude (Berlin)*¹ *on inquiries to ascertain the source of
Colonel Bermond-Avalov's funds*²

[143617/61232/59]

BERLIN, October 5, 1919

According to information obtained through various reliable sources, Bermont has received 60 million marks for the current month and 50 million

¹ Major Maude was a member of the British Military Mission in Berlin.

² This report was communicated to the Foreign Office by the British Delegation in Paris under date of October 18 and was received on October 21.

marks for next month. My information was obtained on the 3rd October and my informant stated that 'current month' meant October. This is confirmed to a certain extent by the fact that Bermont's agents in Berlin were endeavouring to raise money urgently during the latter half of September which they would have had no necessity to do had funds for October then been assured.

The money was paid through the Russische-Deutsches Finanz Syndicate A.G., 78 Unter den Linden, Berlin.

This Syndicate has a capital of 300,000 marks which is the maximum capital permitted under German law for any Banking Syndicate without registration. The Russische-Deutsches Finanz Syndicate has only recently come into existence and so far as I can ascertain, none of the Berlin Banks have had any dealings with it. Its Directors are:—

- (a) Paul Beyer, formerly of Rostow, South Russia.
- (b) Brenemann, formerly of Union Bank of Moscow.
- (c) Dr. Friedlieb.

Dr. Friedlieb appears to be the moving spirit in conjunction with a man named Fehrmann believed to be a Russian Jew but whose history I have not yet obtained. Dr. Friedlieb is a Russian Jew and was formerly *Commercial* Director of Wireless Companies in Russia, but has little technical knowledge of wireless. About 4 to 5 months ago he approached the Telefunken and Laurens with a view to their supplying large quantities of wireless apparatus for Russia. Negotiations, however, were not seriously opened up. The advisers of the Telefunken and Laurens believed his overtures were bluff and they were not satisfied as to the destination of the apparatus in Russia. Friedlieb only recently lived at the Pension Steinplatz, Berlin. He has now, however, established himself and is living in considerable style at Sanatorium Hellena Meyer, Grünewald, and is looked upon as a very wealthy man locally. One informant stated confidentially that the Russische-Deutsches Finanz Syndicate is financed by an association of representatives of the Deutsche Schwere Industrie.³ My second informant who supplemented and corroborated the information of my first on other points stated that this was not unlikely but could supply me with no names of the actual backers, beyond the fact that Friedlieb was frequently, in the evenings, at the house of a large cable manufacturer by name Cassira [? Cassirer], whose mother is a Russian and a cousin of Friedlieb. He told me, however, that many of the wealthy manufacturers who had Russian connections before the war had been approached for money at various times and under various pretexts. He also told me that the Swedes and the Dutch had been approached for money in return for concessions and future business advantages in Russia but had refused all such offers as they could obtain better security for any money invested elsewhere. He, however, knows Friedlieb and has a considerable hold over him and may obtain the information out of him.

In the course of the above enquiries I would like to bring to your notice a small piece of information which I obtained, viz., that at the Eilvise Wire-

³ German Heavy Industry.

less Station there is a hut in an open field with a receiving apparatus capable of picking up messages sent from any quarter of the world, e.g. California. It is not Telefunken but worked on the spool without antennae. The hut is made of wood so as to be inconspicuous and it was rather hinted to me that it is now working.

C. R. MAUDE

No. 120

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 8)

No. 158 Telegraphic [138340/61232/59]

RIGA, October 7, 1919

Tension is increasing between Letts and Russo-German forces. Chances of avoiding an early outbreak with wide implications appear remote. In general I am refraining from duplicating the information sent by Military Mission to War Office.

Repeated to Copenhagen, Paris, Reval and Helsingfors for General Marsh.

No. 121

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)

No. 159 Telegraphic [139163/855/59]

RIGA, October 8, 1919

Wireless request was made by Bermont to Ulmanis on evening of October 7 for immediate information of steps taken by Latvian Government to secure his unimpeded advance towards Bolshevik front in Latvia.¹ During night of October 7 German-Russian troops are reported to have entered Shlok in neutral zone and advanced towards Dubbelin where Lettish command repulsed them. German aeroplanes this morning aimed bombs at Letts' batteries. Following on this plain German-Russian provocation, fighting is proceeding.

Sent to Paris and Copenhagen.

¹ A German text of this message (date given as October 6) is printed by General Prince Awaloff [Bermond-Avalov], op. cit., p. 202.

No. 122

*MM. Ulmanis and Meierovicz to Mr. Lloyd George
(Received October 9)*

No. 3947 Telegraphic [140701/61232/59]

RIGA, October 8, 1919

During the whole of the conflict with the German troops in Latvia the Provisional Government of Latvia have sufficiently proved the honesty and pacifism of their intentions so in consenting [*sic*] to conclude the Armistice of July 3rd when the German troops in Riga, being encircled by Latvian and Esthonian troops, were on the verge of being easily wired [*? wiped*] up. On

the request of the representatives of the Allied Powers the possibility was given to them to withdraw to Courland with the promise to evacuate that province in possibly short [*sic*] time. Germany has not kept her promise and in spite of her official declarations has done nothing in order to withdraw her army from Latvian territory. On the contrary Germany has availed herself of the Armistice for the purpose of doubling her military forces in Courland, where they have soiled themselves with unheard of crimes and acts of violence towards military persons, institutions, and Latvian citizens. Moreover the German troops in Courland have done everything in their power to hinder the organisation of our army, and to check our struggle against the Bolsheviks, who still occupy one part of our territory, so by [*sic*] their mutiny on August 24 and 25 when our troops after having forced with considerable losses Lievenhof were compelled to leave it in consequence of the events of Mitau. These last days our troops have assumed again the offensive¹ have taken Lievenhof, forced the Dvina near Tsargrad and delivered in a few days considerable territories. The German[s] have availed themselves of this moment to attack in a treacherous manner our troops in the rear. The German troops in Courland together with the Bermond-Avaloff detachments consisting to the greater part of Germans, have begun the hostilities against Latvia: 1) Schlock situated in the neutral zone has been attacked in the night from October 7 to 8, 2) Dubbelin has been attacked on October 8th, but all these German attacks were repulsed, 3) on October 8th at 10 o'clock in the morning German aeroplanes have dropped bombs on our batteries and crossed over Riga. 4) German armed cars have opened fire on our positions. 5) At the same time Germans keep under rifle and gun fire high road between Riga and Mitau; in their attacks, the invaders make use of asphyxiating [*sic*] gases.² 6) On October 3 and 4 the German Legation have left Riga. The Treaty of Peace has been violated by Germany and we entreat the Allied Powers to take without delay decisive steps in order to oblige Germany to respect it. An Alliance has already been concluded between Germany and the Russian Germanophiles; this alliance endangers not only the independence of Latvia but also the Peace of the world and is directed against the Allied and Associated Powers. The Government of Latvia protest before the civilized world against the German policy of violence as well as against German troops and the Bermond-Avalov detachments attacking out [our] troops and territory. The Government of Latvia beg to request all Governments and all Nations of the civilized world to side with the right in this conflict which we are far from having provoked. We declare before the civilized world that the Lettish Nation and their Government will defend their independence against the invaders to the last drop of their blood. Riga October 8th 1919. 3947.

Prime Minister of Latvia, ULMANIS
Minister for Foreign Affairs, MEIEROVICS

¹ i.e. an offensive against Soviet forces.

² In a similar telegram of even date which MM. Ulmanis and Meierovicz addressed to M. Clemenceau this phrase read 'asphyxiating gas'.

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)

No. 93 [144887/139661/59]

RIGA, October 9, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose copies of two official communiqués¹ issued by the Lettish Staff upon the attack by the German-Russian forces upon the Latvian army. I sent Mr. Cazalet off by motorcar to Reval last night with a dispatch² and instructions to proceed personally to London. There was no object in keeping him in Riga at the present crisis, and it may be useful for an eye-witness of the first day's incidents in Riga to report to the Foreign Office personally.

During the early hours of this morning a critical situation developed on the front outside Riga, and the Cabinet met about 1 a.m.; but a Lettish counter-attack at 7 o'clock restored the front and at the moment of writing it is believed that another German attack is developing. The Government is rapidly mobilising a corps of volunteers in the city, and General Burt and I, who have just been for a walk in the town, have seen several detachments of them, including numerous students, some young boys and a few old men, marching cheerfully through the streets. In the course of last night similar detachments were collecting in Riga, and some of them passed singing under my window.

It appears clear that the German forces who attacked, in particular along the main Mitau-Riga chaussée, expected to get into the town. On the other hand it is not clear that this is their main line of advance, and we are expecting news of a determined German movement in the Friederichstadt direction.

Mr. Ulmanis tells me that in the course of last night over 100 houses were visited, but not more than about 17 people, including one or two well-known German agents, a few Letts and some Russians, were actually arrested. The whole of the town is entirely orderly and quiet. I have just been to the General Staff with General Burt to congratulate General Simonsen on the way in which his men have been fighting, and found them all cheerful and calm. Any signs of a departure by this Mission would have the very worst moral effect in the town—Mr. Ulmanis's own remark was that if we left 'it would be a worse blow to the Latvian cause than even Bermond's attack itself'. I propose that the Mission as a whole therefore should remain. If the Germans actually enter the town, we should of course have no official relations with them and should probably leave after a day or so, unless, as is possible, reasons of humanity made it desirable in my opinion that at least one or two officers should stay. I cannot forget from this point of view the effect which the visit paid by myself and the American Commissioner to Major Fletcher

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed. This brief dispatch No. 92 of October 8, 1919, reported the events mentioned in No. 121 and enclosed a translation of Colonel Bermond-Avalov's wireless message referred to therein.

in Riga on June 9 had in cutting short the brutal executions which were then proceeding. It is probable, however, that any such function could be efficiently discharged by the American Food Administration and Red Cross representatives in the town, and that, in the event of the Germans coming, a deliberate but firm withdrawal on the part of the Mission would prove to be the best course.

I am officially informed that all prisoners so far taken have been German soldiers. Mr. Ulmanis tells me that some of the Bavarians captured state that they came from Germany only a few days ago. They have stated that they were told they would be fighting the Bolsheviks and that they would be liberally rewarded.

This dispatch is being carried to Reval by an officer of the Military Mission who will travel by a special train with delegates from the Lettish Government sent to induce the Esthonians to join in the fight.

I have, etc.,

S. G. TALLENTS

No. 124

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 10)

No. 160 Telegraphic [139164/855/59]

RIGA, October 9, 1919

Earliest information of any measures taken by allies in response to German attack on Latvia would greatly encourage Letts who are continuing a gallant resistance.

Sent to Paris.

No. 125

Foreign Office Memorandum on 'Germany and the West Russian Government'

[141242/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 9, 1919

... The¹ real attitude of the German Government is difficult to gauge. They certainly did not make continuous efforts to withdraw their troops in July and August, when the latter were more in hand than they are now. General von Eberhard² is reported to be more monarchical and shrewd than his predecessor. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that the German Socialist Government can have much sympathy with General von der Goltz,

¹ The first part of this memorandum briefly recapitulated the previous sequence of negotiations. It recalled the 'repeated messages' relative to German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces which had been sent by Marshal Foch to the German authorities, culminating in the Allied ultimatum of September 27, 1919 (see No. 110), and the German reply thereto of October 3 (see No. 117, note 2). The account included a résumé, based on No. 108, of the conversation between General Malcolm and Herr Noske on September 25.

² In the German note of October 3, 1919 (see No. 117, note 2), it was announced that General von der Goltz had been replaced by General von Eberhardt.

and his Russian militarist friends, who, moreover, come in for bitter attack in the German Socialist Press.

West Russian Government

At this juncture, the announcement is made from Berlin that a West Russian Government has been formed there under General Biskupski.³ General Biskupski is a member of the Russian organization in Berlin, financed by the Germans, which has been collecting Russian troops for use in the Baltic States under Prince Lieven, and Colonel Bermond. On September 27th, he called on General Malcolm, and said that he had received a telegram from Mitau stating that 10,000 to 15,000 of von der Goltz' troops were ready to place themselves under his orders to fight. He was told that Great Britain would be entirely opposed to any such arrangement.⁴

From telegrams which have been received from Berlin and other sources, we know that a great deal of intrigue has been going on between certain German circles and Russian émigrés. An intercepted German message from Berlin sent us by Colonel Pirie-Gordon is interesting: it is stated that in return for most favourable rights of trade and colonization in Russia, the Germans would promise effective military and financial aid against the Bolsheviks.⁵ On October 2nd it was reported from Kovno that General Biskupski had conversed with a reliable Lithuanian, and it appeared that a *coup d'état* to take Kovno was being planned by a Russian-German group, consisting of General Biskupski, Baron von der Ropp and one Gabrys, a Lithuanian, who had been a German agent in Switzerland.⁶

The names of the new Ministry, as given in *The Times* of October 9th, give the measure of their sympathies. Colonel Durnovo⁷ is an extreme reactionary Russian, who has been the head of pro-German organizations in Scandinavia, and acted as a German agent in Finland. M. Derjugin⁸ is a Russian reactionary. Herren Roemmer, Poppe and Berg⁹ are either pure Germans, or German Balts.

Owing to conflicting reports, the War Office are quite unable to give accurate figures for troops. In Latvia, very roughly, the number of troops who must be regarded as affected to the interests of the new Government appear to be as follows—

(a) Forces of Colonel Bermond and of Colonel Wergolitch—	12,000
(b) German troops, consisting of	
Iron Division	} 30,000–50,000
Frei-Korps	
2nd Infantry Brigade	

N.B. (a) contains a considerable proportion of German volunteers.

³ This announcement was made on October 7 and was published in *The Times* two days later.

⁴ See No. 109.

⁵ See No. 94.

⁶ See No. 116, note 4.

⁷ Colonel Durnovo (see No. 84) had become Minister of War in the West Russian Government.

⁸ M. Derjugin (cf. No. 83) was Minister of the Interior in the West Russian Government.

⁹ Herren Römmer (cf. No. 46, note 1), Poppe, and Berg were respectively Ministers of Commerce, Public Worship, and Finance.

Germany and Russia

Bearing in mind the obvious interest and intention of Germany to endeavour to compensate herself for her losses in the West by securing paramount influence in Russia, there would appear to be two courses open to her. She can either go in with the Bolsheviks, and run Russia for them, or she can endeavour to take the leading part in overturning them and setting up a new Government of non-Bolshevik character. Whilst the German Government and the extreme Left have shewn inclinations to adopt the former course, the German Centre and Right—of whom the new West Russian Government must be considered the tool—are out for the latter. In either case, the final objective is the same, namely the capture of Russia by Germany.

The plan of the new Russo-German combine would appear to be an advance from the Mitau-Shawli area via Riga and Pskoff, on Petrograd. After capturing Pskoff, the advancing forces would presumably effect a junction with the Russian North-West Army, now fighting a minor offensive near Gdov, and they would then press on to Petrograd. With Petrograd in their hands, they could pose as the deliverers of Russia, and Admiral Kolchak and General Denekin would find it difficult, if not impossible, not to join them. The outcome would be a thoroughly Germanised Russia, in violent antagonism to Allied policy and ideals, whether in Russia itself, or in the Borderlands, Finland, the Baltic States, Poland and Persia. It would appear evident, therefore, that the interests of the Allies, and indeed of Russia herself, demand that the new German move be stopped at all cost. It can, in fact, be said that it would be better that Petrograd should not be captured at all than it should be captured by the Germans.

The difficulty is to discover the most effective way of nipping this movement in the bud. [A department of the War Office],¹⁰ whom I have consulted by telephone, state that the German and Russian forces have probably a large accumulation of supplies and ammunition, and if the attempt was made, they might well go straight through the Bolsheviks, and reach Petrograd. For another month at least, weather conditions are favourable. The distance from Pskoff, now in the front line, to Petrograd is under one hundred and fifty miles, but from Shawli, where the bulk of the German forces now are, to Pskoff is about two hundred miles, although their nearest point to the Bolshevik front, namely Lievenhof on the Dvina, is under one hundred miles.

The only measures which are within our power to take would appear to be the following—

(i) The Allies can insist on the disavowal of the whole movement by the German Government, and the rigorous closing of the frontier—which could be patrolled by Lettish and Lithuanian forces. Possibly the threat of loss of civil rights in Germany might exercise a disintegrating effect on the German troops, if the Allies are in a position to demand it.

(ii) The local armies of Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia can be relied on to oppose a German invasion, but they are ill-equipped, and could only offer slight resistance.

¹⁰ The designation of this department is omitted.

(The total strength of the Lettish Army is 20,000, and of the Lithuanian Army 9,000, but a considerable proportion are unarmed, and the best troops are on the Bolshevik front.)

It is understood that the objections against the use of the Polish Army are overwhelming.

(iii) Pressure can be brought to bear on Admiral Kolchak and General Denekin to disavow the movement, but this is a somewhat feeble weapon, for if the Germans reach Petrograd, they will hardly be in a position to resist them.

If such measures as these are adopted at once, it is possible that the advance may break down from reasons of morale, and then, as supplies become short, it will be possible to arrange for the evacuation of the German troops to Germany, whilst the Russians can be brought into line, and employed according as the situation develops, either on the North-West front or, as is proposed by the War Office, in the event of peace being concluded by the Baltic States, on General Denekin's front.

If these fail, and the German-Russian Allies reach Petrograd, the only hope, and it is indeed a slender one, is to urge Admiral Kolchak and General Denekin to press on to Moscow, establish themselves there, and then drive the Germans from Petrograd.

O. C. HARVEY

No. 126

Mr. Ramsay¹ (Stockholm) to Earl Curzon (Received October 18)

No. 459 [141985/855/59]

STOCKHOLM, October 9, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship that the *Stockholms Dagbladet* of the 4th instant published under the heading 'Behind the Lettish Political Scenes' a telegram from Koenigsberg purporting to reproduce from an East Prussian newspaper certain secret instructions alleged to have been sent by the Lettish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Lettish Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin on August 18 last. The substance of these instructions is as follows:—

After pointing out that people in Paris are dissatisfied with General Gough, and that it is becoming more and more improbable that the decision to be taken in Paris with regard to the Baltic States will be in favour of their independence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is quoted as saying 'we must therefore, under all circumstances, assure ourselves of Russian sympathies in order at least to secure national autonomy'. The Chargé d'Affaires is therefore instructed to extend relations between Berlin and the Russians in Paris, 'who are bitter enemies of the Entente', and to indicate to them that the Lettish Government by no means rely entirely on the Entente, but are prepared, if circumstances require it, even to side with Russia against the Entente, provided certain national liberties be assured to the Letts.

¹ First Secretary in H.M. Legation at Stockholm.

The Lettish Ministry for Foreign Affairs also expresses great dissatisfaction with M. Gutchkow who 'swims entirely in Entente waters', and points out that German policy cannot injure Lettland to any appreciable extent, as the aim of that policy is to 'abandon the Baltic Provinces without injury'.

I have thought it advisable to report this somewhat crude German publication,² as it appears to indicate the lines on which the German militarists hope to overcome the opposition of the Baltic States to their schemes of a German reorganization of Russia and of utilisation of the forces thus secured to them for reactionary purposes in Germany, after which they could fairly claim to have won both the war and the peace on the Eastern front to balance their losses in the West.

I have, etc.,

PATRICK RAMSAY

² It appears that this publication formed part of a propaganda campaign based upon such fabricated documents. Their authenticity was formally denied by the Chief of the Diplomatic-Political Department of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an undated note of November 1919 which was transmitted by Colonel Tallents to the Foreign Office on November 15 (received November 25). This note characterized the campaign as 'a masterpiece of lies and slander' and stated: 'Not satisfied with bombarding Riga for five weeks with mines and poisonous gas-shells, they ["the enemies of Latvia"] have even tried to poison the allied opinion of Europe—and therefore the basest lies, the darkest gossip and the meanest provocation are the means they know best to apply. In our aims as in our political views and in the correctness of our demands nothing wrong was to be found, [? so] the accomplices and the consorts of Bermondts started publishing in the German newspapers letters, pretending to be written by the Latvian Foreign Minister, Z. A. Meierovicz, in which, naturally, not one word of truth is to be found.'

No. 127

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 10)

No. 1425 Telegraphic. By bag [139634/61232/59]

PARIS, October 9, 1919

At the meeting of the Council yesterday¹ it was agreed to accept the German proposal for the immediate setting up of an International Commission, including a German representative, to supervise the German evacuation of the Baltic States. Marshal Foch, who was charged with the drafting of the reply to the German note,² pointed out that in the ordinary course it would have been natural to entrust General Gough with the Chairmanship of the proposed Commission. It was, however, understood that General Gough was no longer available and meanwhile the matter was pressing. After some discussion I said that His Majesty's Government would no doubt be prepared to accept a French General as chairman and this solution was unanimously

¹ It appears probable that this telegram, dated October 9, was drafted on October 8. The 'meeting of the Council yesterday' was that of October 7: see Vol. I, No. 70 for the official record thereof.

² See No. 117, note 2.

approved. This arrangement may have some bearing on the question of the appointment of a successor to General Gough, and I therefore venture to draw Your Lordship's attention to the matter in connection with my telegram No. 1380³ of September 26th.

If a French General becomes chairman of the Evacuation Commission, the appointment to the Baltic Provinces of a British Political Officer of high standing will be increasingly important, and I should be glad to be informed whether any progress has been made with the suggestion in the last paragraph of Your Lordship's despatch No. 5574 of August 21st, in which Mr. Balfour concurred in his telegram No. 1732⁴ of September 1st.

³ No. 106.

⁴ Mr. Balfour's despatch (not telegram) No. 1732 of September 1 (received September 3) read: 'With reference to your despatch No. 5574 of the 21st ultimo [not printed] regarding the formation of a North West Russian Government [cf. No. 93, note 1] and the situation in the Baltic, I concur in the proposal contained in the last paragraph, that a civilian political officer should be appointed for the purpose of exercising supervision over all British Missions in the Baltic.' This proposal was not carried into effect.

No. 128

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)

No. 1430 Telegraphic. By bag [140137/61232/59]

PARIS, October 10, 1919

Marshal Foch submitted to the Supreme Council today the following draft reply to the German note of October 3 respecting the evacuation of the Baltic regions. . . .¹

On the Marshal's own proposal it was decided to add at the end a paragraph referring to the active hostilities opened by the German troops, as reported in Colonel Tallents' telegram from Riga No. 52² of October 8.

I pointed out that for the purpose of justifying the allied attitude in the eyes of German public opinion, it was desirable to dwell somewhat more fully on the unsatisfactory nature of the German contention that the German Government had done all they could and were nevertheless victimized by the uncalled-for severity of the allied measures of coercion. I therefore suggested inserting after the 2nd paragraph of the Marshal's draft note, the following passage which was adopted. . . .³

In consequence of news received from Riga and at my suggestion a further sentence is being added to the note stating that the Allied and Associated Governments will hold the German Government responsible for any injury or damage arising to Allied personnel as the result of any action of von der Goltz and the German troops.

It was decided to arrange for the publication of the note in the press on Monday morning, October 13.

¹ There followed the text of the draft printed in Vol. I, No. 71, appendix D.

² Repetition to Paris of No. 121.

³ There followed the text printed in Vol. I, No. 71, appendix E.

Note by Mr. Harvey of a Conversation with M. Bissineek
[141492/855/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 10, 1919*

M. Bissineek [*sic*], the Lettish Representative, has just called to lay before the Foreign Office the critical position of his country in consequence of the new German move.

In his opinion the Germans had really no intention of advancing on Petrograd, but were reviving the old idea of German colonization in the Baltic States. In support of this view he said that the German forces included many Spartacists who would never consent to fight the Bolsheviks. He held, therefore, that the alleged anti-Bolshevist campaign was merely a blind.

M. Bissineek called attention to the parlous condition of the Lettish army, without sufficient equipment and without artillery. It would be impossible for the Lettish troops to hold up the Germans, with their long range guns, for any length of time. Even though the Dwina might be a temporary obstacle, the time was rapidly approaching when it would be frozen.

M. Bissineek referred to our recent telegram defining the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Baltic States,¹ and in particular to the sentence in which it was stated that His Majesty's Government might be prepared to reconsider their decision as to the supply of war material in the event of the existence of the Baltic states being imperilled by the invasion of Bolshevik forces. He enquired whether His Majesty's Government would adopt the same attitude in the case of an invasion of German forces.

As a further means of assistance to his country M. Bissineek earnestly begged that Memel might immediately be occupied by Allied forces.

O. C. HARVEY

¹ No. 445.

No. 130

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 12)
No. 162 Telegraphic [140211/139661/59]

RIGA, *October 10, 1919*

The Latvian army continues to hold right bank of the Dwina. Their spirit is excellent. Riga is orderly. Both missions are well. Twenty-two o'clock, October 10.¹

¹ This telegram was repeated to Paris as No. 55.

No. 131

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 12)

No. 163 Telegraphic [140212/139661/59]

RIGA, October 11, 1919

Bermondts telegraphed October 10th proffering armistice in insolent terms. Lettish command proposed to recommend Government at Wenden¹ (? to send) forcible answer declining relations with him.

Right bank of Dwina is still secure.

An enemy concentration is reported opposite Dalen Island. Enemy shelling . . . ed² to-day. No aeroplanes came over Riga. Hardly any firing audible tonight. My . . . ² impression, based on very limited information available here, is obvious weakness in execution of Bermondts's plan.

We evacuate to-morrow to ships at river mouth all but essential nucleus of Mission.

All well in both Missions.

Please send me via Reval in this cypher information of general position and of measures taken by Allies.

Repeated to Copenhagen, Paris, Helsingfors, Stockholm, and Reval.

¹ The Latvian Government was temporarily evacuated to Wenden.

² The text here is uncertain.

No. 132

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 29)

No. 94 [146705/61232/59]

RIGA, October 12, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a dispatch, setting out events at Riga from October 9th to 11th, 1919, during which time this Mission's opportunities for observation were limited by shell and rifle fire. The report was written from time to time, as the events to which it relates occurred.

I have, etc.,

S. G. TALLENTS

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 132

Report on events at Riga, October 9th to 11th, 1919

Riga, October 9, 1919

1. About 3.15 p.m. Capt. Bentley of the Military Mission, who had been employed in the training of the Lettish Army, Mr. Copping, the correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle*, who had lived with my Mission since his arrival in Riga from Reval on October 8th, and a Lettish officer, Captain Crum, went out in a motor car towards the front. They crossed the main town bridge over the Dwina and turned to the north towards the Lettish left flank. On reaching the sandhills, they met a number of Letts in retreat. An officer

explained that two companies had declined to advance because of the heavy machine-gun fire opposing them. Capt. Bentley and Mr. Copping encouraged these retiring soldiers to hold their ground, promising to go and ask for reinforcements, and the Letts complied. The English party, returning towards the town, found a battalion headquarters and reported what they had seen. Further on they met a detachment of schoolboy recruits, armed for the first time that morning, and were told that these were the only reinforcements available. As they came into the suburbs a few shells were falling among the houses, and women and children were crouching under cover of the walls. As they drew near to the bridge, they met a party of more seasoned Lettish soldiers, who, however, explained that they were *en route* to reinforce the centre. They returned to the British Mission at the Ritterhaus about 5 p.m. Shortly before, an aeroplane had crossed the town several times, and had been met, as had already happened on several occasions, with indiscriminate rifle fire from the streets.

2. About 6.30 p.m. Capt. Dewhurst, Mr. Hansen and I went for a walk. The light was then beginning to fail. As we came on to the river front, an aeroplane again crossed the town and was again pursued by wild rifle fire. It may here be noted that one of the Riga evening papers published a statement that the Allied ships had that afternoon joined in the firing against an aeroplane. Capt. Curtis of H.M.S. *Abdiel* and the captain of the French destroyer *Aisne* both told me personally that this was quite untrue.

3. After calling at the ship we walked along the river side towards the main bridge for about 500 yards. There was apparently an attack proceeding on the Lettish left flank. Occasionally lights were going up in that direction and we could see a fire on the same side. As we turned in from the quay, Mr. Ulmanis came by in a car and stopped to speak to us. He was cheerful, and I arranged to send over a case of port for the encouragement of himself and his Cabinet. On returning to dinner, I was handed the following optimistic communiqué:

'Evening, October 9th.

Front holds strong. Certain places changed hands during hot fightings [*sic*], until they came at last into our possession. Conditions are changing in our favour by every hour.

Spirit of our troops wonderful.

(sgd.) Chief of the Staff'.

4. At 8.30 p.m. Capt. Dewhurst and Mr. Student, a Lettish officer attached for liaison and interpreting duties to my Mission, walked down the Jacobstrasse. They first met five transport carts, loaded with men and ammunition, trotting away from the direction of the enemy. They stopped the last cart and were told that the line was 'in panic' and that the convoy did not know where they were going. Further on they met small parties of armed men moving in the same direction, and were again told that 'the line was broken and in panic'. Capt. Dewhurst returned and reported at the Ritterhaus. He then went out again, with Mr. Copping and Mr. Student, and was

told by an officer at the bridge-head that the Lettish left flank had been broken by a strong force of armoured cars, but that some cavalry had gone out to protect the further bridge-head. He was also told that the Lettish right flank was believed to have advanced some eight versts.

5. In the evening I collected all the members of my Mission at the Ritterhaus except Capt. Farrow, whom I judged it best to leave in hospital. Four of the servants went to a neighbouring flat for the night and two of them were left in their flat by the garage. Capt. Dewhurst, who went in the Ford car to fetch Mr. Ellis and Mr. Collas, reported some twenty carts halted by the roadside in the Alexander Boulevard, knots of men retreating and a complete absence of any guards for the streets.

6. Shortly before deciding to call all members of the Mission to the Ritterhaus, I went up to the quarters of the Military Mission and had some conversation with General Burt and Capt. Keyserling, formerly A.D.C. to Colonel Alexander in his command of the Landeswehr and then in charge of the Landeswehr headquarters in Riga. A proposal had been made that his men, who would not take part in the fighting against the German-Russian forces, should relieve the Lettish guard over the Ritterhaus. I thought it well to make it clear to Capt. Keyserling, having regard to the possibly far-reaching effects of the action of the Landeswehr in this crisis, that we could take no responsibility for advising him. Knowing him personally, I expressed the view that the state of affairs created by Bermond's attack could hardly be allowed to stand in the long run, and that the ultimate relations between Balts and Letts might be permanently affected by the Landeswehr's attitude at this juncture. Capt. Keyserling said that he understood that we could take no responsibility, and added that he had his own orders 'from the Landeswehr' to remain quietly in Riga. He also suggested that this step had been tacitly agreed between himself and Colonel Kalnin of the Lettish Staff, in frequent conversations bearing on the point.

7. Another case which had to be settled the same evening was that of our Lettish liaison officer, Mr. Student. Upon his raising the point with me I said that, if he proposed to stay with us we would take him away with us, if we went. But I said we could not be responsible for his future, and I pointed out that his leaving Riga at this point might prevent his ever returning. He elected to take his chance with us, and I asked him to go and put on plain clothes and join us in the Ritterhaus for the night.

October 10th.

8. About 8 o'clock on October 10th, Mr. Ulmanis, Mr. Meierovicz, General Simonsen and Colonel Kalnin drove up to the Ritterhaus. I went down to meet them and brought them in to have some coffee, at which General Burt joined us. They handed us the copy of a wireless message from General Youdenich, of which the following is a translation:

'North-Western Front. To the Russian officers who have remained true to their duty. I command volunteers to place themselves immediately under the orders of their senior. The representative of the British Mission

will join them. Take all measures for instant departure by sea to unite with the North-Western army.

Original signed by General of Infantry Youdenich.

Major-General Vandaly and Kondourev.

'By order of the Chief of the North-Western Front I wish to bring to your notice that he has to-day issued the following command to troops under his charge:

'Order by Chief in command of all Russian armed forces of North-Western Front.

'No. 73, 9/x/19. Narva. As Colonel Bermont has not executed one of my commands to the time stated and has even started hostilities against the Lettish troops, I declare to all that he is a traitor to his country, and exclude him and those under his command from the Roll.'¹

Mr. Ulmanis also urged the importance to the Letts of an armistice. General Burt promised that he would give any help he could in getting a message transmitted to the attacking force (e.g. by ship's wireless). But we both held the view that the British representatives could not act officially in the matter, except on pure grounds of humanity. Mr. Ulmanis asked if the Entente would help them. General Burt and I said we could not think that they would not take drastic action, but had no information from the west.

9. After Mr. Ulmanis had left, I had some conversation with Capt. Orbeson, of the American Relief Administration, who said that he should remain in Riga if the Germans entered it, and engage in his purely humanitarian work. I mentioned to him that I was, among other things, representing the Supreme Economic Council and could, if necessary, leave an officer under that heading to keep him company. He was favourably disposed to this idea, and I said that I would consider it further.

10. During the morning the question of pourparlers for an armistice was brought up from various quarters. General Burt several times asked my opinion on points which arose in this connection, and I took the line that while firing was as hot and uncontrolled as it then was on the river front, it was little use trying to establish touch with the enemy. I also expressed to him the view that Colonel Bermondts could only agree to an armistice on condition of the town being evacuated by the Letts, and that unless the Lettish Command were prepared to give this order, which they said they were not, it was useless to try and open pourparlers on the front.

11. At one stage the following message from General Simonsen was actually brought to the Mission for transmission:

'To avoid destroying the town and losses of civil inhabitants, I suggest to stop fighting and begin pourparlers about an armistice and to find out the reasons why the bloodshed has begun and to find the means to stop it.

(sgd.) General Simonsen

Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Latvia.'

¹ Cf. No. 218, enclosure 3, document 11; also General Prince Awaloff [Bermondts-Avalov], op. cit., p. 206.

During the morning also a messenger going down to the quay found that the two destroyers had left. Later Capt. Burgess came up from H.M.S. *Abdiel* and reported that she was moored in the stream about half-an-hour's walk from the Ritterhaus. On this, I agreed with General Burt that we would send on board all officers not directly required, and I started all officers except Capt. Dewhurst, Sir Victor Warrender and myself. They came back, however, about an hour later with the news that the ships had both disappeared, and brought rumours from Lettish sources as to their having been fired on by the attacking forces.

I discussed at the same time with Capt. Keyserling how to send a message to Colonel Alexander, instructing him to leave the Landeswehr and make for the nearest British Mission. But on attempting to send this message, Capt. Keyserling found he could not secure communication.

12. Directly after lunch Baron Fircks, the President of the Baltic National Committee, came to have a talk with me. He had just seen on the Nicolai-strasse the body of a young boy lying with his school books beside him, and was evidently glad to quiet his nerves by talking. He deplored Bermond's adventure, as he had several times deplored its probability to me before the event. He had personally pleaded at Mitau for the avoidance of a march on Riga, but he thought that Bermond, believing Dvinsk to have fallen to the Poles, desired to open his escapade by some dramatic capture, for the sake of his own prestige and for the sake of attracting volunteers from Germany. He saw little hope for the Baltic population in the provinces. If the Letts and the Estonians swept back over Riga they had no hope for the future.

13. At 5.45 p.m. Colonel Luters of the General Staff came and told us what he knew of the position. The Letts were holding the right bank of the Dwina firmly and had orders in no circumstances to withdraw. The Latvian and Estonian Governments were consulting by telephone, and Estonian help was expected. Mr. Ulmanis had also stated that help from Poland was likely. They had extricated all their forces from the further side of the Dwina the night before, including guns and cavalry. Shells were coming down to them from Estonia.

Colonel Luters raised a question about the number of the Landeswehr guard in the Ritterhaus, and their presence in their usual headquarters opposite. He said they mistrusted the presence of the Landeswehr so near to the bridge, and wanted to concentrate them in the barracks at 37 Alexander-strasse. We left him to discuss the position with Capt. Keyserling, who afterwards expressed to me his uneasiness about the intentions of Colonel Luters, whom he mistrusted.

14. During the whole day rifle fire was continuous on the river front. A considerable number of light shells fell from fifty to a hundred yards from the Mission, one bursting close to Paymaster Lt.-Commander Stoddart on his return from a search for H.M.S. *Abdiel*. I went for a walk through the town after dinner and visited some of the places where most shells fell. Outside the War Office, at which several were successfully directed, the body of a young man was still lying on the pavement where a shell had caught him. Further

on, the top storey of a building close by the Wireless Station was blazing like an open fire. The Town Fire Brigade, however, arrived while I was watching it. In general the streets were empty, except for patrols of students and others who were acting as police. The town was quiet and orderly.

15. Finally, about 11 p.m. Major Keenan rung us up from Neu Mühlgraben, down by the mouth of the river, where he had landed in a motor launch, and Capt. Dewhurst took a car down to bring him in. About 1 a.m. in the morning Major Keenan arrived, and General Burt provisionally arranged with him for all the officers whom we had attempted to evacuate that morning, to go down on foot to the mouth of the river. After hearing, however, from Captain Dewhurst an account of the difficulties of the road, I obtained General Burt's agreement to a postponement of the plan for that night.

October 11th.

16. About 9 a.m. a copy of a message, of which the following is a translation, was brought in to me with a request that Colonel Kalnin might come and discuss it with General Burt and myself:

'To the Commander of the Lettish Army. The threat to my flank from the side of the Letts and Estonians has been victoriously resolved by my troops. My base has been completely secured. To avoid further brotherly bloodshed I offer you an armistice and pourparlers in Mitau, and call you to combined operations against the Bolsheviks. I await your reply by radio.

'The Commander of the Western Army

'Colonel Avaloff-Bermond't.'

General Burt arranged that he and I should go down to the War Office instead of bringing Colonel Kalnin to the Ritterhaus, and we met there General Simonsen, Colonel Kalnin, Colonel Lutters, Colonel du Parquet and Capt. Orbeson. General Simonsen said that they thought of answering simply that they would have no dealings with a man who had been declared a traitor by General Youdenich. I suggested to General Burt that the answer, while it should be brief should, for the sake of propaganda among his own troops, dispose of Bermond't's claim to victorious action. I understand, however, that at the time of closing this dispatch (the evening of October 12th) no answer has been sent to Bermond't's message.

S. G. TALLENTS

No. 133

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 13)

No. 164 Telegraphic [140652/139661/59]

RIGA, October 12, 1919

Lack of information as to any action by Allies is creating a bad impression on Letts who feel that they are enforcing Armistice for Allies without support.

Bermondts has addressed to Allied Forces Missions an impudent note claiming attack by Letts and Esthonian troops as immediate cause of war. He describes his actions as necessary for restoring order and security . . .¹ against Bolsheviks. He asks the Allies to support his efforts in accordance with their treaties with Russia. All claims that Letts were aggressors should be dismissed without qualification. Von der Goltz has sent complaints to Military Mission regarding treatment of Germans in Libau from which we suspect intention of occupation of Libau.

Lettish Government has returned to Riga. They are still discussing with Esthonians conditions of co-operation but anticipate an agreement. Best feature is proposed supremacy of command by Laidoner.² Letts' command is unequal to situation.

American Colonel Ryan arrived from Mitau to-day. He indicates some division of counsel between nominal Russian and German Commanders. Germans spoke of 700 casualties, 250 killed. He was subject to skilful propaganda in Mitau by Pahlen, Baltic President Bermondts's new administrative council 'for provinces occupied by his troops'.

Pahlen deplored his present associations, expressing desire that Allies should take over the whole adventure from Germans. All Germans met by Ryan expressed a determination not to return to Germany but in case of compulsory return the intention of satisfying their needs by force in Germany. A Russian battery commander acting without superior authority was to-day received on destroyer and on pretext that ships might be accidentally hit secured their withdrawal to mouth of the river from Senior Naval Officer. This incident causes damage to British prestige.

Both Missions are all safe. Repeated to Paris.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

² Esthonian commander-in-chief.

No. 134

Sir H. Rumbold¹ (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received October 12)

No. 315 Telegraphic [140210/30489/55]

WARSAW, October 12, 1919

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs sent Director of Political Department to me today to say that von der Goltz was bombarding Riga, and that Bermondts's force had taken Shavli and Radsivilishki and had interned one of Lithuanian authorities at those places.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs wished to give me a formal and spontaneous assurance that Poles would not take any advantage of difficult situation thus created for Lithuanians who were at liberty to denude Lithuanian-Polish frontier of troops if they so desired. Polish Government would not do anything which could in any way favour Russo-German adventurers of

¹ H.M. Minister at Warsaw.

von der Goltz and Bermond. Poles wished to be on best of terms with Lithuania.²

Sent to Peace Conference 227.

² In telegram No. 327 of October 15 (received that day) Sir H. Rumbold further reported: 'Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs points out that whilst Polish Government have every intention of abiding by their formal assurance that they will not take advantage of Lithuania's present difficulties, it is very desirable that Lithuanian Government should on their side modify their anti-Polish policy. Polish Government admit that a number of Lithuanian Poles recently tried to upset Lithuanian Government, but this was because they suspected Lithuanian Government of playing into the hands of Germans. Conspiracy was neither backed nor inspired by Polish Government, who consider that having regard to their spontaneous assurance of neutrality, good effect would be produced on Polish-Lithuanian relations if Lithuanian Government were to release some at all events of recently arrested Lithuanian Poles amongst whom there are stated to be women (? and) children.'

No. 135

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)¹

No. 1439 Telegraphic [141196/139661/59]

PARIS, October 13, 1919

Marshal Foch spoke to me to-day very earnestly about his anxieties as regards important questions which he considered ought to receive immediate attention. One was German aggression in Baltic States, and the other Syria. In both cases problems were involved which might entail heavy military responsibilities upon him.

As regards Baltic, he feared Allied Governments would very soon see themselves compelled to make their authority respected by force of arms. He remained in favour of employing Polish Army.

I asked whether its lack of clothing, equipment, and ammunition, which Marshal in spite of himself brought² to attention of Conference recently,³ would not in his opinion now render its employment for the moment impracticable.

He thought not. At any rate he declared that if Allied Governments were to ask him to-morrow to take necessary steps for enforcing their will on a recalcitrant Germany he felt confident that he could guarantee sufficiency of such measures. What with Polish Army, and Allied forces on Rhine the thing could be done. Only we must not delay. Process of demobilization was rapidly reducing available forces below point where success could be guaranteed.

I reminded the Marshal that my Government had strongly supported proposal to employ Polish Army and had sincerely regretted decision of Supreme Council objecting to that measure. My impression was that Prime

¹ Owing to an error in internal circulation in the Foreign Office this telegram was not seen by Lord Curzon until October 19.

² The text as sent from Paris here read: '... which the Marshal had himself brought' etc.

³ On October 2, 1919: see Vol. I, No. 69, minute 2.

Minister would be quite prepared to see proposal revived and adopted. I pointed out that decision of Conference was result of American refusal to agree to any action, which, by leading to a new war between Germany and Poland, might jeopardize working of Silesian coalfield.⁴

This danger would, I observed, cease from moment that under terms of Treaty of Peace Upper Silesia was occupied by Allied forces.

I presume that whole question will shortly come before Conference and I should be glad if I could meanwhile be furnished with instructions as to general attitude I should adopt in discussing it. . . .⁵

⁴ See No. 89.

⁵ The remainder of this telegram referred to Anglo-French relations in Syria: cf. Vol. IV of this series.

No. 136

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)
No. 1229 Telegraphic [141242/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 14, 1919*

Situation at Riga.

If not too late could not pressure be applied to the Germans by France refusing to ratify Treaty¹ and thereby continuing the war until German forces are withdrawn from Baltic?

I leave you to make this suggestion to your colleagues if you think it is of any use.

¹ France ratified the Treaty of Versailles on October 14, 1919.

No. 137

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Reval)
No. 88 Telegraphic [140212/139661/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 14, 1919*

Your Riga telegrams 163¹ (October 11th) and 164² (October 12th).

A strongly worded note has been sent from Paris to the German Government in reply to the German note of October 3rd respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

The Allies insist on the strict fulfilment of their demands for the evacuation of the German troops, and until this has been accomplished the Allies will not consider the requests put forward by the German Government regarding the revictualling of Germany in food and raw materials and will refuse all financial facilities which the German Government may now enjoy or request. In order to facilitate the evacuation and to assist the German Government, the Allies agree to send an Allied Representative Commission

¹ No. 131.

² No. 133.

under a General Officer to acquaint themselves with the measures adopted by the German Government and to exercise on the spot effective control of the execution of these measures.

The above-mentioned coercive measures will not be abolished until a favourable report has been received from the Head of the Commission. The contentions of the German Government that their action absolves them from the charge of neglect of their obligations under the Armistice are plainly refuted in the text of the note and attention is drawn to the anomalous position of General von der Goltz. In consequence of the news from Riga, a further sentence was added stating that the Allies would hold the German Govt. responsible for any injury caused to Allied personnel as the result of any action of von der Goltz' German troops.

Please inform Mr. Bosanquet, Military Mission of the above.

No. 138

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)

No. 95 [146240/139661/59]

RIGA, October 14, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose herewith, in triplicate, my report upon events which have occurred in Riga from October 12th-13th 1919.

I have, etc.,

S. G. TALLENTS

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 138

Report of events in Riga, October 12th to 13th, 1919

12th October.

1. At about 10.30 I called on General Simonsen and Colonel Kalnin at the Headquarters Staff, and told them that in accordance with a decision taken by General Burt with regard to his own Mission, I proposed to embark the same evening those members of my Mission who were not required for immediate work. I explained that a sufficient staff was remaining in Riga, and that I had come to them personally so that there should be no misunderstanding about what I was doing. Colonel Kalnin looked much overwrought at this interview, and upon my telling General Simonsen that he could, of course, count on my offering any help I could give, but that I feared the Political Mission could do little for him at the moment, Colonel Kalnin let fall a bitter aside in Lettish to the effect that help from England ought to have come long ago.

2. At lunch time Mr. Ulmanis arrived with Mr. Meierovicz and asked anxiously what the Allies were doing about Bermond's attack. We could only tell him that we had no news of any kind, except that a blockade of

German ships had been imposed in the Baltic.¹ He told me that negotiations with the Estonians for military co-operation were proceeding. The Estonians asked for Walk and for a single command under General Laidoner. Certain difficulties still remain but he expected that these would be settled. I had been hailed in the streets that morning by General Pödder and Colonel Reek, old acquaintances in the Estonian army, and these officers came to call on me after lunch. They explained that they had come to Riga in spite of strict orders to the contrary and impressed on me that theirs was an unofficial visit. I left them talking with Mr. Ulmanis.

3. At this point we received news from the ships by telephone that they were moving out in response to a request made by a Russian officer who had boarded them the same morning. The account given of this incident so surprised General Burt and myself that we decided to visit the S[enior] N[aval] O[fficer] in person.

4. On our way to the river, we called on Colonel Ryan of the American Red Cross, who had that morning crossed the bridge under a flag of truce. He had come to the bridgehead accompanied by Colonel Grove, but the latter, as a military officer, had not been allowed to cross, whereas Colonel Ryan, as a Red Cross representative, had been sent forward. He had climbed across a ladder where the centre part of the bridge had been raised [*sic*] and was evidently tired of adventures, for though he had arranged to go back after three days, he expressed his intention of staying in Riga. He spoke of seeing some heavy artillery on the Mitau road drawn by six horses to a gun. The Germans had spoken to him of 700 casualties in all, of which 250 were killed. They had said that their worst losses were due to an encounter between two German companies which mistook each other for Letts and were finally wiped out after bitter fighting by a Lettish armoured train which ran in between them. Every German to whom he had spoken has expressed his determination not to return to Germany. They were going, they said, to make a place for themselves in Russia. If they got driven back to Germany, they would there take by force whatever they needed. In the meantime conflicting orders were being given by German and Russian officers, the former being inclined to take command and the latter to resent their assumption of authority in the operations. The Iron Division, he said, were anxious to take Riga but the Russians were against a violent attack on the town.

5. Colonel Ryan had seen in Mitau with Colonel Grove, Count Pahlen, the Balt President of the new Council which Bermondts had appointed.

¹ On October 10, 1919, the Admiralty had telegraphed to Admiral Sir W. Cowan, British Admiral Commanding in the Baltic (S.N.O. Baltic), the text of the following telegram (copy received in Foreign Office on October 11) sent by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to Admiral Goette, President of the German Naval Armistice Commission: 'All free passages of German vessels in Baltic are temporarily suspended in consequence of attack on Riga. Ships now at sea in Baltic are to be recalled and no others allowed to proceed while this suspension remains in force. Mine-sweepers are to be recalled. German vessels found at sea in Baltic are liable to seizure by the Allies.' In the Admiralty message Admiral Cowan was requested to transmit this information to Allied naval forces in the Baltic and to 'enforce these orders to the best of your ability with vessels at your disposal'.

Pahlen had expressed his regret at not having had an opportunity of explaining his position to me. He was inclined to apologise to Colonel Ryan for the company in which he now found himself, and urged that the best solution was for the Allies to father the whole adventure and direct it along reasonable lines. It is interesting to note that Pahlen was until lately regarded as one of the Balts who were especially sympathetic to the Letts. When Mr. Tschakste, the Lettish President of the People's Council, complained to Baron Fircks of the inclusion of Brummer as a Balt representative in the People's Council, he at the same time suggested that Pahlen ought to have been chosen instead for the vacancy. I am told that in South Lettland the peasants are bolshevistically inclined—largely owing to the continued German occupation and that the propertied Letts in consequence tend to join forces with the Balts. The inclusion of Letts in Bermond's new Council has probably been made possible by this fact.

6. I was handed by Colonel Ryan a note from Bermond's Council, of which a copy is attached to this dispatch as appendix 1.

7. Colonel Ryan also handed General Burt a protest from General von der Goltz with regard to the treatment of certain Germans in Libau. This note aroused some suspicion that von der Goltz had designs on that town.

8. I was given the same afternoon a translated copy of an intercepted telegram of 12th October from Bermond's Council to Yudenitch. It read as follows:—

The counter action against the Lettish and Estonian troops has been undertaken with the intention not to put my army in such a situation as you have put the Northern Army, not guarding its rear. After your former orders, explanations through your officers followed that those orders had not to be obeyed by me, because you are not the full master of your actions. In this same sense I read your last telegram. By further operations I hope not only to bring assistance to my own country, but to the Northern Army. I cannot believe the awful accusations you bring against me, because at the same time as your army is so impossibly situated as regards Russian pride, my army is holding aloft the Russian standard.

Colonel Avaloff.²

9. On leaving Colonel Ryan, General Burt and I motored down to the landing stage by the Provodnik factory, where we had arranged for a motor-boat to meet us. We went off to H.M.S. *Abdiel* and there saw Major Keenan and, for a time, Captain Curtiss, the S.N.O. We were principally occupied in discussing with them two incidents:

10. Some misunderstanding had arisen out of a telephone message received by Major Greenslade from Major Keenan that the British ships were protecting the Lettish right flank, would shoot any aeroplane that came within range, and would prevent troops from crossing the river. We ascertained from Major Keenan that the destroyers had the previous day been arranged in

² Cf. No. 218, enclosure 3, document 12. (A German text is printed by General Prince Avaloff [Bermond-Avalov], op. cit., p. 206.)

positions which enabled them to watch the Lettish right flank, but that no definite decision had been taken as to action in case any part of the Russian troops attempted to cross. I suggested to Major Keenan that this arrangement hardly constituted 'protection' in the military sense. General Burt said that he must at once see the Lettish Headquarters Staff on his return to Riga and explain the mistake. This he subsequently did.

11. We also discussed with Major Keenan the incident of that morning which had resulted in Capt. Curtiss' decision to move the Allied destroyers down the river. This operation took place while we were on board H.M.S. *Abdiel*, and Capt. Curtiss, who was superintending the navigation, was therefore not present during most of our discussion. I attach as appendix 2 copy of a note of this incident given to me on the following day by the Military Mission. It appeared to me, and, I understood, to General Burt, from Major Keenan's account that Baron von Rönne had been treated with excessive consideration, and that the decision to move the ships down the river on the suggestion of a Russian battery commander, acting without his superior's orders, was likely to be most damaging to British prestige.

12. In agreement with General Burt, I drafted the following telegram which the S.N.O. undertook to have dispatched:—

'Following for Troopers, Astoria, Foreign Office from General Burt, Colonel Tallents: Following information is vitally required (1) What steps are Allies taking on Bermond's attack? (2) Are his forces regarded as outlaws or Germans breaking the armistice? (3) Lettish Government on the ground that they are doing work of the Allies urgently request bombardment by ships for purposes of moral support. Can permission be granted?'³

We sent this telegram because we learned that the S.N.O., like ourselves, was entirely without information upon the points which it raised, except that he had received an order to be strictly neutral.

13. We embarked on the night of 12th October the following officers from the Political Mission:—

Lt.-Commander Stoddart (in charge), Mr. Hansen (second in command), Mr. Berry, Capt. Brodie, Mr. Malcolm, Mr. Ellis, Capt. Farrow, Mr. Richards, Sergt. Worrall.

Commander Stoddart and Mr. Berry were instructed to proceed to Reval by sea at the first opportunity for the purpose of bringing the accounts of that Branch of the Mission up to date. Capt. Farrow, who was sick, was to be evacuated to England at the first convenient opportunity for discharge from the service of the Mission. Those left on the staff of the Mission ashore were as follows:—

Lt.-Colonel Tallents, Capt. Dewhurst, Capt. Sir V. Warrender, Mr. L. Collas, Mr. Hampson, Mr. Wilson, Corp. Warren, Mr. Student, 'Christopher' (an English-speaking Lett).

³ This telegram was received in the Foreign Office on October 13. No action upon it was taken there, it being anticipated that the necessary action would be taken by the British Delegation in Paris: cf. No. 140, note 3.

There were also embarked the following Danish and Dutch subjects. . . .⁴ I had observed that one of the men recommended for embarkation by the Danish Consul was an agent of the Baltic Bank, and I asked Major Keenan before leaving the ships to secure that all these alien refugees were kept strictly on board and that there should be a considerable delay, if possible, in their arrival at their destinations.

October 13th.

14. At 3 a.m. Major Greenslade woke me with a note of a telephone message from Major Keenan. This indicated that the S.N.O. Baltic desired to know, in case of bombardment by the ships being practicable, whether the Allied Missions could be embarked. I got up and drafted a suggested reply for despatch by S.N.O. Riga, and asked Major Greenslade to suggest to General Burt that he should propose this answer to the French and American Missions in the morning. The telegram was ultimately sent as drafted in the following terms, the words in brackets being added by General Burt:—

‘Missions unanimously desire Allied bombardment for moral effect on Lett and Hun. For same purpose they insist on staying in Riga—on their own responsibility if necessary.

‘(May a Naval Officer come here immediately for full details of action required.)’

15. I was shown the same morning a copy of a telegram which General Burt and Colonel du Parquet had decided to send to the ships for despatch to S.N.O. Baltic. This telegram ran as follows:—

‘General Burt and Colonel du Parquet request you to send to the O.C. forces at Mitau and Dünamünde that [*sic*] they should withdraw their guns and troops at once from the positions at and about Dünamünde as these constitute a danger to the Allied vessels which have distinct orders to remain in the river.

‘If this order is not carried out by the time that the S.N.O. Riga orders, it will be necessary for the Allied ships to take action to enforce this.

‘Signed: Alfred Burt, Brig. Gen.

‘Du Parquet, Lt-Col.,

‘Chef Mission Français.’

16. I learned this morning that Mr. Meierowicz, the Foreign Minister, had left the night before for Warsaw.

17. Numerous persons of British, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, Russian, Polish, Persian, Czecho-Slovakian and other nationalities visited the Mission during the morning to ask for protection in various forms. I accordingly visited the deputy for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Albat, and later Capt. Dambalkan, the Town Commandant, with a view to agreeing systematic arrangements. Our Lettish liaison officer, Mr. Student, was given a pass to conduct parties of refugees to the landing stage. We undertook to provide the Commandatur each day with a list of those evacuated and to refer any

⁴ List of thirteen names here omitted.

doubtful cases to the Commandant for his opinion. The Lettish authorities, on their part, agreed that I should evacuate any nationals of other countries that I thought fit. Their main object was to prevent deserters from escaping. We sent on board the ships, leaving the landing stage at 7 o'clock the same evening, the following party. . . .⁵

Each member of this party was required to sign the following declaration:—

'I understand that no guarantee of embarkation is given, no responsibility is taken for the safety of person or property, no particular destination can be promised, and once embarked, no one will be allowed to disembark, at any rate till further notice.'

18. About 3 p.m. I was called to the telephone office to speak on a Hughes machine with Reval. I found that Major Bevin, of the Reval Military Mission was at the other end of the line, having been called as the result of an arrangement intended to take effect the day before. I told him I believed that the Riga Military Mission wanted to know what supplies of arms they were sending to the Letts. He replied that the S.S. *Pyrgos* had just arrived with guns of all sorts and that the first consignment of supplies would leave Reval by rail on the evening of October 14th. I inquired whether any news had been received of the Allies' action on Bermond's attack and was told that none had reached them.

S. G. TALLENTS

APPENDIX I TO No. 138

*Copy of Note handed to Lt.-Col. Tallents by Colonel Ryan on
October 12th, 1919*

The President of the Central Council of the Western Provinces of Russia, Senator Count Pahlen, expressed [*sic*] his highest esteem to Lt.-Colonel Grove and has the honour of forwarding herewith a copy of a circular despatch sent by the Chief Commander of the Western Russian Army to the representatives of the Governments allied to Russia.

The Note

Aux représentants des Puissances Alliées à la Russie.

Le 21 septembre j'ai dû, comme chef de la force armée russe formée dans les provinces occidentales pour combattre les Bolcheviks, entreprendre le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité de ma base d'action. A ce sujet j'ai conclu avec le chef des forces allemandes occupant le pays une convention d'après laquelle je lui ai garanti la retraite successive de ses forces et la sécurité de leur transport en Allemagne.⁶

⁵ List of fifteen names of British, Belgian, Russian, Latvian, Danish, and Dutch private citizens here omitted.

⁶ The salient provisions of this convention concluded on September 21, 1919, between General von der Goltz and Colonel Bermond-Avalov, whereby the supreme command of the Russo-German forces in the Baltic Provinces was transferred from German to Russian command, are printed by General Count R. von der Goltz, *op. cit.*, p. 266. (General von

Pour aider à sortir de l'état chaotique de l'administration dans lequel se trouvent les provinces occupées par mes troupes j'ai nommé un Conseil Central et lui ai indiqué comme tâche d'élaborer et d'organiser une administration temporaire et préparer les bases d'institutions libérales selon les principes démocratiques et les vœux de la population.

Pendant ce temps à mon grand regret le Gouvernement temporaire letton a commencé à accumuler sur les frontières de ma base militaire des forces considérables lettonnes et même estoniennes, violant la zone neutrale et provoquant une série d'escarmouches [*sic*] dès que mes troupes on[t] remplacé les postes allemands. J'avais donné ordre à mes postes de ne pas engager avec les troupes letto-estoniennes, malgré leurs provocations continuelles, mais celles-ci, loin de montrer la modération, ont cru voir dans ma manière d'agir, un acte de faiblesse et se sont ruées sur mes positions. J'ai été forcé par leur attitude à prendre des mesures me garantissant une sécurité militaire et d'occuper une nouvelle ligne qui m'ouvre la possibilité de marcher sur les ennemis de mon pays, les Bolcheviks et de les combattre plus efficacement.

J'ose espérer que les Puissances alliées à ma patrie voudront bien selon les traités qui les lient à celle-ci, soutenir mes efforts et me faciliter ma liberté d'action.⁷

MITAU, octobre

Général en chef de l'Armée Russe de l'occident
AVALOFF-BERMOND

Contresigné pour le Conseil Central
Président, SÉNATEUR COMTE PAHLEN
Membres du Conseil,

GÉNÉRAL MAJOR SOCOL
INGÉNIEUR ILLYNE.

APPENDIX 2 TO No. 138

*Copy of a Note by Major Keenan of the Visit of a Russian Officer to H.M.S. Abdiel
on October 12, 1919*

A meeting was held aboard the *Abdiel*, consisting of the Commander of the *Aisne* and the *Francis Garnier*, Capt. Curtiss, Major Keenan, a French interpreter, and two officers from the right bank of the Dwina dressed in Russian uniform, one of whom called himself Baron von Rönne.

Baron von Rönne, of Keller's Corps, boarded the French ship *Marne* this der Goltz states that 'the English Mission' was informed of this convention on September 22. This communication is untraced in Foreign Office archives. General von der Goltz further states that this convention was supplemented on September 25 in that he requested Colonel Bermond-Avalov to communicate it to the Latvian Government with the additional provision that all the agreed measures were directed solely towards 'the struggle against bolshevism', and with an invitation to the Latvian Government to co-operate in this struggle. Cf. also Herr Noske's telegram of September 26 to General von der Goltz, printed *ibid.*, pp. 270-1.)

⁷ A slightly variant German text of this note is printed by General Prince Awaloff [Bermond-Avalov], *op. cit.*, p. 204.

morning and explained that he had just arrived at Dünamünde and had placed his guns in position in the sector Ilpezaen-Dünamünde.

He requested that the ships lying now at Mühlgraben should be withdrawn to Dünamünde, as he could not hold himself responsible, in the event of the Letts shooting in his direction, that no damage would happen to the ship now stationed at Mühlgraben. He would, however, guarantee the ships' safety if situated at the mouth of the river, near the *Marne*.

On arrival on board the H.M.S. *Abdiel* with French officers, Baron von Rönne explained the same thing.

When asked who his Commanding Officer was he replied that he belonged to Keller's Corps. Asked again who his Commanding Officer was, he replied 'Colonel Awaloff'. He was then read General Yudenich's order of the day,⁸ which he stated he had not heard. He was then asked if he had received instructions from Colonel Awaloff to request the British and French ships to remove from their present positions. He replied 'No'. He was acting on his own initiative, as he had no desire to see any accidents happening to the British and French ships.

He was asked whether he knew that British and French ships had been fired on by artillery from the left bank of the river on the morning of the 13th [*sic*] inst. This he professed not to know. It was made clear to him that an explanation of this occurrence was still being awaited, and for the present the matter had been reported to higher authorities.

It was explained to him that a regular service between Riga and the ships would have to be established, and he was asked what action he would take, if any, against British motor boats or boats of any description flying the White Ensign. He stated that he wanted to avoid any action against Allied ships, and ships flying the White Ensign by day and navigation lights by night would not be molested.

Captain Curtiss decided to move the ships under his command to the mouth of the river.

⁸ See No. 132.

No. 139

*Report by Colonel Grove (Mitau)*¹

[158338/139661/59]

MITAU, October 16, 1919

The following notes of occurrences of the last week and of impressions I have received as a result of various discussions and reports may some of them be of interest to you.

¹ This report, addressed to the British Military Mission at Riga, was subsequently transmitted by Colonel Tallents to the Foreign Office under cover of dispatch No. 133 of November 22, 1919 (received December 4). In this covering dispatch Colonel Tallents observed that 'the report is somewhat out of date but it has at least a certain historical interest as giving the impressions of a British officer who was in Mitau during the weeks preceding Bermond's final decision to attack and during the first few days of that attack'.

1. *Formation and aims of Western Russian Government.*² On the morning of the 8th October a Russian officer called on me at about 10.30 a.m., and delivered to me a copy of a message addressed by Avaloff (formerly Bermond) to the representatives of all Allied Powers. This copy I have since sent in to Riga to be delivered to you by Colonel Ryan of the American Red Cross.³ A German translation of it will be found in the Drittes Extrablatt of *Die Trommel*.⁴

I went round at once and saw Count Pahlen and protested against the course taken by him and the party with which he is working, and pointed out the consequences of their actions as I foresaw them. I denied the truth of the allegations by which Avaloff and his self-constituted government attempted to justify their action. I also made it clear that I could not recognise the existence of the Western Russian Government.

2. I have had several conversations with Count Pahlen since, of which the gist is as follows.

I have always taken the attitude that the movement with which he has associated himself is one conceived and initiated by a certain German party, that the same proposals that he now supports, particularly that the German troops which refused to be evacuated should be employed to fight against the Bolsheviks, had been made to me personally by von der Goltz some eight weeks ago, i.e. some six weeks before Count Pahlen had openly declared any connection with the movement, and that I saw no change in the policy or in the development of the situation since the Russians had nominally taken over control. On these grounds I took the line that the Entente was justified in regarding the movement with suspicion, as still a German policy under German control, and directed ultimately against the interests of the Entente.

The attitude adopted by Count Pahlen throughout has been that the Russian forces on this front were too weak to achieve anything without help, that the necessary force was only obtainable by employing as mercenaries the German troops in Courland who refused to be evacuated, that this was further the best solution of the problem of how to deal with those Germans who refused under any circumstances to return to their own country and who would otherwise only have degenerated ultimately into marauding bands, and possibly in some cases have gone over to Bolshevism; that the Bolsheviks employed mercenary troops, the French German mercenaries in their foreign Legion and in the army of Haller,⁵ and why should the right to do so be refused to Russia by the Entente, who are her allies? To this I replied that I could not accept his view that the Germans were employed by the Russians,

² The body here described as the Western Russian Government was apparently the same as Colonel Bermond-Avalov's 'new administrative council' referred to in Nos. 133 and 138. The relation of this body to the West Russian Government formed in Berlin (cf. No. 125) is somewhat obscure.

³ See No. 138.

⁴ Newspaper of the German forces in the Baltic Provinces.

⁵ A Polish army under General Haller had been constituted in France during the First World War.

but was rather of the opinion that the Russians were being employed by the Germans. I further gave it as my opinion that there were only two alternative ways of describing the position of Awaloff, Count Pahlen and those associated with them. Either they are dupes who are being used by the Germans to give a Russian semblance to what is still a purely German movement, or, if his assertion is correct, then they have flouted the Entente by adopting deliberately a movement and a policy to which the Entente have consistently and unequivocally stated and shown their opposition.

As regards the action in attacking the Letts when the ostensible object of the formation of the force and the employment of the Germans was to fight against Bolshevik Russia, the general defence offered by Count Pahlen is that of military necessity set forth in Awaloff's message to the Allies. At the same time it is perfectly apparent from admissions that Count Pahlen has made at various times that the object was to upset the Ulmanis Government and to settle at once and definitely any question of independence for Latvia and annex that country as a Russian Province. In one conversation Count Pahlen observed that the re-annexation of these provinces would have necessitated hard fighting if postponed until after the restoration of Russia. Many Russians undoubtedly share his views of the Baltic States as provinces which have rebelled, which must ultimately be re-annexed and of which the re-annexation will cost more the longer it is postponed.

Count Pahlen's attitude throughout is that German help and association with Germany is distasteful to him personally, as it is undoubtedly to many Russian officers, but that the need for help on this side, and the failure of the Entente either to afford that help or to allow them to accept under a form of Entente control the assistance in men and material available in Germany has been and is driving Russians, however reluctantly, into the arms of that country. The only remedy that he can suggest is the recognition by the Entente of this movement as a *fait accompli* and the assumption of control by them. This in his opinion would be effected by:

1. The substitution of Entente financial support for that at present furnished from Germany.
2. The establishment of effective Entente control on the railways where they cross the frontier.
3. The appointment of a competent adviser to the Russians who are at the head of the movement.

The general impression that I have received of Count Pahlen is that he is a patriotic Russian, sincere in his desire to restore Russia within the borders as before the war, but more broadminded and liberal than is usually the case in Russians of this class. Such influence as he possesses in the present movement is, I think, employed on the side of moderation.

The future aims and intentions of this self-constituted government are not quite clear. They maintain that they have no intention of or desire to either take or occupy Riga. This has been constantly asserted to me by Count Pahlen, although in a talk with Darsneek, former Lettish Governor of Upper

Courland, he said they had not attacked it for want of sufficient gun ammunition, but would do so when they had got enough up. (I have not been able to think of any explanation of his deliberately making this statement to Darsneek.) Major Bischoff stated two or three days ago to an American newspaper correspondent that they had no intention of attacking Riga. I find it hard to believe that Riga will not ultimately be occupied if the movement is successful, unless in that case Pahlen's suggestion that the town should be under an Allied Governor with a mixed police of 200 Russians and the Lettish civil police is adopted. I gather the impression that the Russian element would be glad to keep the Germans out of Riga.

Various proclamations issued to the Letts by Avaloff will be found in the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Extrablatts [*sic*] of *Die Trommel*.⁶

The composition of the Lettish Committee⁷ will be found in the 3rd Extrablatt.

The basis for the elections it is proposed to carry out will probably be the scheme formerly drawn up by Needra. The expressed intention is to give the Letts a preponderance of two to one over other classes in the National Assembly and in internal administrative appointments.

The dismissal of all officials appointed under the Ulmanis Government is in progress. They are being replaced by Russians who arrive armed with an authority signed by Wankin and Kampe.⁸ It is stated that this is only a temporary measure and that Lettish appointments will eventually be made.

3. *German Troops*. The composition of the Deutsche Legion is given by the signatures to a proclamation which appears in the Viertes Extrablatt of the *Trommel*.⁹

I have no definite evidence of the effect of the fighting on the morale of the troops. There are reports of a fair number of individual cases of men who had not reckoned with having hard fighting when they enrolled for service here, and who are trying to return to Germany.

It is stated that von der Goltz has now returned to Königsberg. He was in Mitau on the 13th October introducing his successor von Eberhardt to the leading Russians. It is alleged that Needra's son, who is said to be attached to Avaloff's staff, stated that von der Goltz had been up in Thorensberg and that he had controlled operations. I think it likely he may have visited Thorensberg but improbable that he actually conducted the operations, though no doubt all the preliminary dispositions and the plan of action were the work of him and his staff.

4. *Russian Troops*. The Russian troops hold the left of the front extending

⁶ One specimen of these proclamations is printed below as appendix 1; the remainder are not printed. Texts of several of the numerous proclamations and appeals issued by Colonel Bermond-Avalov are printed by him, *op. cit.*, p. 207 f., and by Lt.-Col. du Parquet, *op. cit.*, p. 168 f.

⁷ i.e. a Lettish Committee constituted on October 8, 1919, in Mitau in the interests of Colonel Bermond-Avaloff (cf. No. 138, para. 5).

⁸ Members of the above-mentioned Lettish Committee.

⁹ See appendix 4 below.

from Duenamuende exactly how far I do not know, but at any rate Thorensberg is occupied by Germans.¹⁰

General Youdenitch's wireless message has been received and answered by Awaloff. The answer was drafted by the Government and is said by a Russian officer to be very good, but I do not know either gist or terms. Youdenitch's message is known to many officers but has not been published. It is said that many Russian officers and men feel that they have been engaged in a bad adventure and would be glad to be out of it and that they would be very grateful to the Allies if they could find an exit for them. Most would prefer service with Denikin but would rather be with Youdenitch than here.

About 4 days ago three officers from a battery in Wyrgolitch's Corps came and asked if I could help them to get away to join Youdenitch. They represented that several officers and some 200 men, practically the whole battery, disliked the adventure in which they found themselves involved and would like to go to Youdenitch.

5. *Financial Question.* It is stated that the Eiserne Division drew three months' pay in advance from Germany not long ago. It has always been admitted by the General Kommando that there are six weeks' supplies for the whole force in Courland and Lithuania.

A Russian officer told me that money had been received from Denikin. He did not know this of his own knowledge but had only been told by Awaloff to tell me so.

The *Freiheit* of a recent date had the full text of a contract purporting to have been made between the American firm of G. P. Morgan and the members of the Western Russian Government in Berlin, headed by Biskupski. This I am informed was a plant. The man who purported to be the representative of G. P. Morgan was an agent of the German Government or of a socialist party, and the object was to discover what this Russian Government's aims and intentions were.

It is stated that little if any more produce will reach the market of Mitau from the surrounding country, as the military authorities are requisitioning it on payment at prices better than can be obtained in town.

6. *Baron Ropp.*¹¹ Baron Frederic Ropp has been in Mitau ever since the 7th or 8th October. He describes himself as representing the Lithuanian National Party, and is watching events here from the point of view of their probable effect on Lithuania. He expressed the view that the disarmament of the Lithuanian army and the nomination of a Russian Governor of Lithuania would probably follow the attainment by the Russo-Germans of their object here. This he was anxious if possible to prevent by any means, but described it as less distasteful to Lithuanians than Polish intervention. He also insisted on his desire not to take any action that would be opposed to the wishes or policy of the Entente.

I enclose a copy of a letter of protest addressed by him to Count Pahlen

¹⁰ For maps illustrating dispositions in the battle of Riga see General Prince Awaloff [Bermondt-Avalov], op. cit.

¹¹ Cf. No. 125.

on hearing that Lithuanian troops at Schaulen and Kurschani had been disarmed by Wyrgolitch's troops. The answer will be found in the 5th Extrablatt of *Die Trommel*.¹²

7. *Newspaper Items*. The following are worth reading in the German papers sent herewith, in addition to articles already referred to in this report.

Bischoff's proclamation to his troops, in 3rd Extrablatt of *Die Trommel*.¹³

Interview with von der Goltz, in 2nd Extrablatt.¹⁴

Goltz's farewell to his troops in 6th Extrablatt.¹⁵

Goltz's letter to Awaloff in 6th Extrablatt.¹⁶

Story of formation of Russian N.W. Government, in *Tilsiter Zeitung* of October 9th.¹⁷

I send herewith 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Extrablatts of *Die Trommel* and *Tilsiter Zeitung* of 8th, 9th and 12th October.¹⁸

J. J. GROVE, Lt.-Col.

General Staff

APPENDIX I TO No. 139

Die Trommel of the 9th October 1919

Colonel Awaloff-Bermondt's Appeal to the Inhabitants of Courland

To all inhabitants.

As representative of the Russian Power, I have on the 21st of August after the withdrawal of German troops taken charge of the governing and protection of the Latvian territory.

I declare to all inhabitants that in future I shall not allow any disorder, nor attempts on persons or property, no matter to whom it may belong to. I invite all inhabitants, without distinction to nationality, party or creed, to return to peace work [*sic*] and to submit in every respect to the authorities appointed and sanctioned by me, keeping in mind, that the Russian Supreme Power always took care for the welfare and prosperity of the country and during many years maintained peace in it.

The army formed by me marches against the Bolsheviks—who are the worst enemy of the people and with whom villains are ready to make peace—into the fight to deliver Russia from her slavery.

I invite the population to support me with all its might in my undertaking and not to listen to the insinuations coming from the enemies of liberty and culture.

¹² This correspondence is not printed. In his answer to Baron von der Ropp Count Pahlen expressed his sincere regret for the incident and stated that Colonel Bermondt-Avalov had strictly forbidden Colonel Virgolitsch's troops to meddle in internal Lithuanian affairs or to 'become guilty of hostile notions. The Commander-in-Chief has ordered to start unhesitatingly an exact investigation of the event reported by you. Further, the Commander, before having received your report and without having put himself into communication with you, had ordered to return the arms to your soldiers.'

¹³ See appendix 3 below.

¹⁵ See appendix 5 below.

¹⁷ Apparently in error for October 12: see appendix 7 below.

¹⁸ Extracts from these enclosures were annexed in somewhat unidiomatic translation to the original, and the more important of them are printed below as appendices.

¹⁴ See appendix 2 below.

¹⁶ See appendix 6 below.

I shall punish severely all offenders, help the poor and protect those having suffered from injustice.

In the Latvian regions occupied by me I shall take all steps which will be necessary to the self-determination of the population in conformity with its desires.

God help me thereto!

Commander-in-Chief of the Western Army
of Volunteers

COLONEL AWALOFF

APPENDIX 2 TO No. 139

Second extra edition of the *Trommel* of October 9th, 1919

An Interview with Count von der Goltz

Shortly before his departure from Mitau, I had, as chief editor of *Die Trommel* an interview with Count von der Goltz, who is no longer Commander of the VI Reserve Corps; nor does a great part of us German soldiers belong to the VIth Reserve Corps any longer, those who remain here in the Baltic in the Russian Western Army in order to continue the fight against the bolshevism for our native country and the fight for our right on [*sic*] land and settlement. Therefore farewell feelings prevail in Mitau, but the interview with Count von der Goltz had truly no character of wo[e]fulness; our commanding general cannot imagine at all to be obliged [*sic*] to take leave from us, and therefore it is a delightful feeling to know that he will continue to care for us, as he did before.

At the very beginning of our conversation, Count von der Goltz asked me if I knew that the Bolshevik leader Trotzki had the intention to start at the end of August a general offensive on the Baltic front. Trotzki decided on the offensive, just when the German troops in the Baltic had received order to evacuate Courland. 'This offensive was not realized,' said Count von der Goltz, 'for on the 24th of August the Commander of the Iron Division—Major Bischof—gave the order not to evacuate his troops to Germany.'¹⁹ Thereby Major Bischof *de facto* frustrated Trotzki's plan to start the offensive, for the Bolshevik leader in Moscow had not the courage to order the red armies to march against Riga, Mitau and Libau, while German troops were stationed in the Baltic. In the German native country they hardly realize the fact that the Bolsheviks fear the German troops in Courland and that they have resolved to advance towards the west, as soon as this sheltering wall be removed. If the German troops had not, against Government orders, remained in the Baltic, the Red troops would long ago have crossed the German eastern frontier, massacring, corrupting and destroying.'

I then asked Count von der Goltz, if and when the new order of the Government in Berlin, called forth by the shameless ultimatum of the Entente, would be executed. Count von der Goltz replied: In about 14 days the last German troops I hitherto commanded and for whose fate I feel myself responsible, will have left Courland. Of course the evacuation of Lithuania will require a little more time. We must, to be able to return home in order, retire ourselves slowly. In Courland now remain those Germans who have enlisted into the Russian Western army of Colonel Prince Awaloff-Bermond, and no government, not to speak about the Government in Berlin, is able to recall by order of the Entente these troops, officers and soldiers who feel that having become Russian subjects they are now emigrants

¹⁹ Cf. No. 64.

and German-foreigners. The German troops having entered Russian services have severed themselves from the new Germany. No one may find fault with them for that, taking into consideration that the Government has for several times called forth their opposition. Firstly the troops, who, performing correctly their soldier's duty during many months, have recognized the great danger of bolshevism, have the desire to remain further posted before the frontier protecting their native country against the flood of anarchy and crime. The soldier as well as the officer are earnestly anxious about the security of the eastern front, and they can't understand why the native country through the Government who seems not to know the real situation here in the east recalls them at a moment from an important post, when the red flood is growing larger anew.

The Letts and Esths have further concluded a contract and thereby opened the red armies the way to the west. The way would be open, and the horrors of a bolshevist-spartakistic civil war would be unchained in Germany, if there would not still stand in the field in Lithuania and Courland a reliable wall consisting of Germans and Russians having turned the face to the east, being ready to fight.

Secondly, the German troops who now against [the] Government's order remain abroad as foreigners and have entered Russian services have had the disagreeable experience that the Government has not only the possibility, but what is still worse, is not even inclined to defend the German soldiers' interests, who since January are engaged in the struggle against bolshevism. The Lettish Government had promised the German soldiers land for settlement, and as the Lettish Government faithlessly broke this promise, the governing men in Berlin were not able to assist the soldiers in getting their right and obtaining the deserved reward. Quite natural that the authority of the German Government was not strengthened among the troops by that fact; but still more the troops were hurt by the repeated pliability of the German government vis-à-vis the Entente. The soldiers and officers here abroad, without regard to parties, but enthusiastic for their German nationality, are in concord that the Entente is not able to compel Germany to force by the Government's order the German emigrants and German-foreigners to return home.

The Government should have declined with indignation such a demand. For tomorrow the Entente will require perhaps that all Germans who have been naturalised on the American Continent have to return. That is absurd, and even a victor does not put such demands to the vanquished foe, if the latter declares it being inaccomplishable. The men in Berlin have not declined anything, but have agreed to all. They were morally weak and without dignity in their actions. But the Entente has used the conflict in Courland as occasion for humiliating Germany, and she will surely in future contrive many reasons for such humiliations, if this flexibility and weakness will prevail in Berlin further still.

In the clear air abroad, the German learns to realize that, and the native country is short-sighted and ungrateful if it does not appreciate the deeds of his sons, who are abroad and have protected it against bolshevism, as they continue to do at present.

APPENDIX 3 to No. 139

Third extra-edition of the *Trommel* of October 10th, 1919

Major Bischof to his Brave Men

Soldiers of the Iron Division!

The Entente has threatened the German Government with proclaiming blockade anew, if Latvia would not be evacuated. The Government appeal to you: Lay

down the arms! Just as it was in November 1918. As you were deceived then, you will be now duped again.

In April you raised your voices to me against the peace of dishonour and annihilation. Now, you see this peace not only annihilating the German people economically and politically, but morally too. This treaty of peace has thousands of paragraphs, but none of them is accomplishable. For the Entente will, as she refers now to Par. 292, take another paragraph as pretext in order to strangle the German people entirely. Therefore, even this menace of the Entente won't frighten us. Our yielding would not at all help our native country. In a few days, the same play would recommence. All the Entente says is a lie. She does not lie only in one point openly expressed by her: that she tends to exterminate the German nation by all means, even the most immoral ones.

In April the American Mission urged here in Mitau on me that the Iron Division might take Riga. Then this was already resolved, although not ratified.

I ask the whole world, as far as it has still a spark of morality, not suffocated in the atmosphere of lies, if the Entente still has the right to apply towards us Par. 292 of the peace treaty. Nevertheless she does it.

We want to place the country conquered only by ourselves under Russian flag. We want to help the Russians to deliver their country from the plague of the world. You know I am German and remain German to the last drop of blood, so I may trust you will follow me also on this track without hesitation, that you, like me, will fight for Germany by helping our friends, and by the side of Count Keller's Corps we shall defend our right, and if it is necessary, gain it by fighting once again. The Entente shows us her real face, if she tries to hinder us: her threatening us is only a pretext in order to hurt the German people.

Therefore remain steady, soldiers of the Iron Division, and if the English, Letts and Esths will fight against us, we shall show them that we justly are bearing our name.

BISCHOF, Major
and Commander of the Iron Division

APPENDIX 4 TO NO. 139

4th Extra-edition of the *Trommel* of October 11th, 1919

Captain Siewert to the German Legion of the Russian Western Army, the German Fatherland and the Civilized Nations of the World

The German Corps of volunteers being stationed in Courland issues the following appeal to the German fatherland and all civilized nations of the world.

With a heavy heart we are fighting, having resolved contrary to the orders issued by our Government under the pressure of the Entente, to hold out on the Bolshevik front.

Although being as soldiers educated in the duty of obedience, nevertheless we think that we must consider our conscience to be higher than the obedience to compelling orders, the conscience which exerts us to protect the frontiers of our fatherland from ineffable sufferings which would be the consequences for our people of the breaking through of the Bolshevik hordes, the conscience which calls us to cooperate in the delivery of the mankind from the disastrous consequences of the Russian bolshevism.

By our ears we hear cries of assaulted women, massacred children, before our eyes we see brutally mutilated corpses! We never could apprehend that in face of such horrors a flame of indignation did not rise in the whole world, that

announcers of religions and teachers of human sciences did not summon to a sacred union against the horrible evil what menaces from here the whole world.

Do not err, German brethren, do not deceive yourselves to be sure, you, having all to defend the same culture—that the unrestrained bolshevism could not corrode you either! Do not let yourselves be deluded, if the wild cat that has grown within your frontiers—a child of the animal raging now in Russia—has at present closed its eyes. It is not dead, it does not sleep! It makes secretly horrible plans and lies in wait! Do not confound this pattern of false doctrine with the truth of a socialist view of the world. We who have been christened by the German revolution, after having taken part in the horrid world-war, we know the truth and the real force which this view of world contains. Not against it are directed our arms, no! We want to hold out here for you in order to fight for it and to save it.

We can't believe there could exist any statesman who would dare to assume before his own conscience and the conscience of his nation the responsibility to give way to the hordes and gangs of robbers who under pretence of this high view of life have organised murder and crimes.

We deny what malevolent people spread in the world as being our intentions. Do not believe them, they are mercenaries of Spartakus hired by Bolshevik leaders; they want to calumniate us before the eyes of the world in order to remove us and to get free hands themselves.

If we want to remain here abroad, we do not do it for imperialistic or reactionary reasons. We will accomplish an imperative duty towards the fatherland and a sublime task towards the world! We tremble for our sisters and brothers, we are anxious about the culture and the whole world! Above the hatred the world-war has unfettered among the nations, we are setting as great uniting ideas, for which we will fight and die, the common struggle for the defence of this highest religion against the mortal poison of the degenerated bolshevism.

If the fatherland would prevail upon itself to leave us, if the statesmen of the other nations would assume the responsibility to abandon us, well! then we are just the last, who have saved their sense of duty and honour towards the mankind out of the great war which has deranged the world and its moral! Perhaps there is a God still in the world who will assist us!

SIEWERT, Captain in the navy
in the name of
Regiment of sharpshooters Baltenland
Free Corps Stever
Group von Plehve
Free Corps von Brandis
Bad.-Assault-Batallion, Courland
Group von Jena
Free Corps von Wildemann
Free Corps von Meden
Free Corps Rieckhoff
Battle-squadron Sachsenberg
Detachment of Aviators 424
Detachment of Aviators 426

as well as in the name of armoured trains and armoured cars, information and communication troops, column and field-hospitals. Also the Iron Division stands on the above point of view.

APPENDIX 5 TO No. 139

6th Extra-edition of the *Trommel* of October 15th, 1919

Count von der Goltz to his Faithful Men

Comrades of the old VIth Reserve Corps, at present in the Russian Western Army!

I followed your heroism before Riga with the greatest interest and with a warm heart. I know the spirit and the discipline have been elevated in the last months more and more. But the best test is always the fight. You stood it well. I thank you and am proud of you. But to the greatest gratitude are entitled those killed and wounded for the great sake. The cruel mutilation of several Russian comrades, who fell wounded into the hands of the enemy, proved that we fought against criminals, against mean Bolsheviks. Disgrace for those using such crimes to ruin Germany and Russia.

The State-Government has dismissed me from my post as commanding general of the VIth Reserve Corps. But with all my might I shall care for my old soldiers. Innumerable difficulties have to be overcome by you, but also above all by the higher command. Union is strength, waywardness is ruin! I rely upon your discipline and your unselfishness, good spirit and I know that you will always keep your confidence in me, come it as it might!

God with you and your just sake. To the devil with the rule of Criminals-Bolsheviks and with their friends!

COUNT VON DER GOLTZ

APPENDIX 6 TO No. 139

6th Extra-edition of the *Trommel* of October 15th, 1919

Count von der Goltz to Prince Awaloff

To Prince Awaloff, Commander of the Russian Western Army!

Your Excellency know[s] that I followed with particular interest the development of your corps already since a long time. I know with what zeal your Excellency have [*sic*] cared for the instructions of the corps you have formed yourself, that you knew how to elevate the discipline of your newly formed troops and to acquire the confidence of your troops. With great ingenuity your Excellency have performed the task you had to do, in spite of all complications and are now on a far visible post as leader of the Western Army.

I felicitate your Excellency on the successes of battle. For the first time since more than a century, Russian-German formations have fought side by side, and it is a particular pleasure to me that I can utter to your Excellency that the young Russian formation[s] have fought excellently.

God give your just sake a full victory, for the good of your fatherland and of the struggle against the bolshevism, for the victory of the whole cultured world.

COUNT VON DER GOLTZ

Tilsit Gazette of October 12th, 1919

The Organisation of the Western Russian Government

Berlin, 16th October.²⁰ Dr. Römmer, who was also mentioned by the independent socialists in their revelations about the Russian statesmen in Berlin, gave the following explanation to a collaborator of the *Neue Berliner Zeitung*. The Government constituted for Western Russia or being about to be constituted consists of eight Russians, two German Balts, two Letts and one Jew. The political platform of this government will be the pure bourgeois democracy.

It will be possible to give definite statements about this government only when an official declaration will be published. In any case it consists only of absolute enemies of Bolsheviks. Its residence will be probably in Mitau. I myself am only a representative of the army. I am acting here in Berlin for the interests of the army, am making purchases etc. An official representation of the provisional Western Russian Government would be imaginable only, if Germany would recognise this Government. It was not the case hitherto. Nevertheless, I am not an entirely private person. For by my mediation the Russian volunteers are forwarded to the front. Besides it, I am in Berlin in order to remain in contact with Denikin and Koltshak.

From Berlin I have the possibility to be in connection through Paris and Stockholm with Denikin and Koltshak. We are somehow a section of Koltshak and Denikin. Here in Berlin has been constituted some time ago a military and political council under the leadership of General Biskupski. General Biskupski has connections with General Malcolm, Chief of the British Military Mission in Berlin.

²⁰ This date is evidently incorrect and may be in error for October 6.

No. 140

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 29)

No. 96 [146666/61232/59]

RIGA, October 16, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a report covering events at Riga on October 14th and 15th, 1919.

I have, etc.,

S. G. TALLENTS

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 140

Report on events in Riga, from October 14th and 15th, 1919

14th October

1. . . .¹

2. Mr. Ulmanis was very slightly wounded this morning. A piece of shrapnel appears to have struck his boot and to have caused a contusion upon

¹ In paragraph 1 Colonel Tallents reported on assistance given to the widow of the late Belgian consul in Riga in making arrangements for the burial of her husband and her own embarkation.

his leg. This wound should prove of no practical inconvenience and much political advantage to him. I found him in the evening reclining on the sofa and interviewing a local reporter.

In a long private talk after the reporter left he discussed with me, in optimistic vein, questions of future Government organisation in Latvia, especially those connected with the development of Latvian resources. He told me that the Estonians were demanding not only Walk, but the right to occupy the district to the south of Walk, as a condition of their military aid. He had received an indignant telegram from the Lettish residents of Walk. He had also been unfavourably impressed by the conduct of General Pödder and Colonel Reek on their recent informal visit to Riga, which I have already reported. Both these officers got very drunk on that occasion. While hopeful that the Poles would join in the fight against Bermondts, he was afraid that one of the chief inducements to them would be the opportunity for occupying Lithuania, and he told me that the Poles already showed signs of desiring to absorb Libau as a substitute for Dantzic.²

3. In the course of the day Baron Fircks, President of the Balt National Committee, who is regarded by Mr. Ulmanis as having played a proper part during recent weeks, came and during a private conversation gave me various items of information about the Mitau conspiracy, in which a number of his previous associates have taken part. He mentioned amongst other points that a friend of his had spoken to him of a conversation with General Malcolm in Berlin at the time when the German offers of financial assistance for Bermondts's adventure were becoming prominent. This friend had told Baron Fircks that General Malcolm had given him to understand that England would not object to the employment of German volunteers in Bermondts's advance. He had also suggested to him that English financial support might be obtained. Baron Fircks knew that some of Bermondts's associates had been encouraged to join him by the impression this created that England really supported Bermondts's plans. I report this conversation merely as showing what I had already gathered from other quarters, viz. that there was some genuine misapprehension, apart from obvious German propaganda, in the views of some of Bermondts's adherents about England's attitude in the matter.

15th October

4. At 5.30 a.m. the Letts attacked across the main bridge over the Dwina. They went out without wire-cutters or gas helmets, spent some time in trying to pass the German barbed wire defences, and were repulsed with loss. I understand that gas was used against them.

5. Mr. Ulmanis, taking me aside, told me privately this morning that

² In Riga telegram No. 167 of October 16 (received that day; not printed) briefly reporting events described in this dispatch, Colonel Tallents stated: 'I trust Allies will make clear to Poles if they overcame [join in] attack on Bermondts that this step involves no justification for absorption of Lithuania.'

they had decided to replace General Simonsen by Colonel Ballod, who had reluctantly agreed to act as Commander-in-Chief on condition that he could return to take command of the Courland Division when the present operations were over.

6. The following reply was received to the ultimatum sent by the S.N.O. Baltic:³

‘To the British Admiral.

There are not and never have been any German troops in Dünamünde.
Request to the Chief of Russian Western Army.

Lt.-General Ebbard’.⁴

In view of this evasive answer, it was decided that the bombardment should proceed. Colonel Alexander and I motored down the right bank of the Dwina and climbed upon the roof of a factory near Neu Mühlgraben overlooking the mouth, from which we had a birdseye view of the operation. The wind was blowing strongly towards the sea and the noise of the bombardment was accordingly muffled, but we could see the flashes of the guns and observed some of the damage done by the bombardment in Dünamünde. After the firing had continued for about half-an-hour, some six Lettish tugs of various sizes put out of a creek between ourselves and the river mouth and, after cruising up and down for a short while, crossed towards Dünamünde. At this point we heard heavy machine-gun fire. This was followed by a bombardment by the ships of the Russian church, which stands prominently over Dünamünde. After this, fire slackened, and we could make out across an intervening tongue of land the Lettish boats advancing up the Aa, apparently stopping to land men at a bend in the river. I was afterwards told by Mr. Ulmanis that their men had landed and had taken 500 prisoners, mostly Russians, who thought they were fighting against the Bolsheviks. He told me at about 10.30 the same evening that the troops who had crossed were working their way towards Riga without orders, and that the Staff had been forced to send supports across the river to Dünamünde.

7. Mr. Ulmanis also told me that the Government were submitting for any comments by the Latvian High Command the text of a proposed reply to the offer of pourparlers sent to them by Bermondts on the second day of

³ On October 13 Admiral Cowan had telegraphed to the Admiralty that he had required the German forces on the river Dwina to withdraw by noon on October 15, failing which he then proposed to shell them. On October 14 the Admiralty telegraphed in reply to Admiral Cowan that it was impossible to obtain a decision on this subject from the Supreme War Council before the hour named; Admiral Cowan was informed that he must therefore use his discretion and that he might rest assured of Admiralty support. (Both telegrams were communicated to the Foreign Office on October 15.) On October 15 the Supreme Council in Paris gave retrospective sanction to Admiral Cowan's course of action: see Vol. I, No. 74, minute 2. (For British naval operations in the Baltic generally during 1919 see Admiral Cowan's dispatch printed as a supplement to the *London Gazette* of April 6, 1920: *London Gazette* 1920, vol. ii, pp. 4229-34.)

⁴ Apparently in error for Eberhardt.

the attack. It was proposed to decline all negotiations. The Cabinet had also decided to send out a short wireless, declaring that all Latvian subjects implicated in Bermond's conspiracy were traitors, and would forfeit any estates that they possessed in Latvia.

8. In the afternoon I called on Dr. Erhardt, who had arrived from London on the previous day, and had a long talk with him on the subject of future financial arrangements in Latvia.

9. A good impression has been caused by the announcement that General Yudenich is sending the Letts four guns for use against Bermond's force.

10. I have organised a distribution of rations from the supplies belonging to this Mission to British subjects in the town, and in a few cases I have been obliged also to make small advances of money. Most of them had been without food and a few of them were quite destitute. Many of them had been complaining that the British Mission during recent months had done nothing for them. Having regard to the excessively trying times through which all the inhabitants of Riga have passed during recent years, I have not resented these complaints, but hope that the present issues of food will allay them for the future. The *Princess Margaret* brought up with her supplies of repatriated prisoners' rations for their benefit. It has not been so far possible to land them in Riga, but I still hope to get them on shore before she leaves for Copenhagen.

11. I received a signal last night to the effect that the *Princess Margaret* must leave not later than Friday, with a comment from the captain of H.M.S. *Abdiel* that she could not maintain water and food supplies. I was told on her arrival that she could accommodate from 300-400 refugees, whereas in fact I have sent on board less than thirty. If, as might easily have happened, I had sent off to her a full complement of passengers, there would apparently have been a commissariat breakdown before she reached Copenhagen. It appears to me under these circumstances that the arrangements for her departure must have been defective.

S. G. TALLENTS

No. 141

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 17)

No. 168A Telegraphic [142213/136169/59]

RIGA, October 16, 1919

Indications are reaching me privately from reliable sources tending to confirm, without definite proof, impression that I formed during his recent visit to Baltic Provinces in role of Red Cross representative that Alexander Goutchkoff has lately played a very doubtful part and is hostile to England.

(Traduction.)

DÜSSELDORF, le 16 octobre 1919

*Le Représentant du Gouvernement allemand au Président de la Commission Interalliée
Permanente d'Armistice.*

En réponse à votre note No. 1802/G(1)² qui me fut transmise le 11 octobre, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer ce qui suit :

Les Gouvernements alliés et associés ont, pour la première fois, sommé le Gouvernement allemand d'évacuer les provinces baltiques et lettones³ par leur communication du 18 juin, alors qu'en mai dernier ils ont formellement demandé, sans tenir compte de la protestation du Gouvernement allemand, que les troupes allemandes de ces provinces ne soient pas retirées.

Depuis, le Gouvernement allemand s'est efforcé, sans arrêt, de faire exécuter le retrait de ces troupes. Il a employé tous les moyens en son pouvoir pour briser la résistance des troupes qui se sont obstinées en raison des promesses de naturalisation et d'établissement qui leur ont été faites par le Gouvernement letton. Le Gouvernement allemand leur a même coupé tout ravitaillement en vivres et en munitions, supprimé la solde, et enlevé tout espoir de soutien à l'avenir. Il a pris les mesures nécessaires pour entraver tout renfort tant en munitions qu'en hommes, et a, pour cela, formé [? fermé]⁴ la circulation aux frontières baltiques et donné la surveillance de tous les postes-frontières à des mandataires spécialement chargés de ce service. Tout ceci démontre que le Gouvernement allemand n'a jamais prêté à l'accusation d'éluder des engagements comme cela est dit par les notes des Gouvernements alliés et associés.

Le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas non plus refusé de rappeler le Général von der Goltz de la Baltique; il s'est plutôt basé simplement sur le fait qu'il s'agissait d'une affaire intérieure de l'Allemagne. C'est seulement les mutineries de la division de fer qui se produisirent peu de temps avant son départ, qui décidèrent celui-ci, de sa propre initiative, à retourner à Mitau. Ce retour momentané fut également admis uniquement parce que le Général von der Goltz était le plus en mesure de faire peser son autorité sur les troupes rebelles pour les décider à se remettre à l'ordre de rentrer. Une fraction de ces troupes avait déjà autrefois obéi à ses ordres. Lorsque son influence n'eut plus d'efficacité, le Comte von der Goltz fut définitivement rappelé de son poste et envoyé à Berlin.

Entre-temps, le Général von Eberhardt a repris le commandement de ces troupes en remplacement du Général von der Goltz.

Le Gouvernement allemand n'a reconnu aucun nouveau Gouvernement dans ces territoires et n'a aucun rapport avec celui-ci.

¹ A copy of this note was communicated by the secretariat-general of the Peace Conference to the British Delegation in Paris on October 21, 1919.

² The Allied note of October 10: see No. 128.

³ In the original German, *des Baltikums und Litauens*. ⁴ In the original German, *gesperrt*.

Il a formellement interdit aux soldats allemands de s'engager dans des formations russes, et a rompu toutes relations avec ceux qui se sont engagés malgré tout dans ces formations.⁵ Il ne se trouve parmi les troupes d'opération russes de la Baltique aucun soldat allemand sur lequel le Gouvernement allemand ait encore quelque autorité de commandement. Hors de l'offensive du Général [sic] Bermont, aucune troupe ne fut commandée par un chef allemand, et les plans politiques et militaires du Général Awalov-Bermont ne sont nullement approuvés. L'Allemagne n'a aucune intention guerrière contre les Lettons ou contre le peuple russe.

Le Gouvernement allemand est heureux d'apprendre que les Puissances alliées et associées ont l'intention d'envoyer une Commission interalliée dans les provinces de la Baltique. Il demande que cette Commission parte le plus tôt possible et vienne prendre contact à son passage à Berlin, pour y entamer des pourparlers avec l'office compétent. Cette commission pourra se rendre compte par son propre jugement que les reproches portés contre le Gouvernement allemand n'ont pas lieu d'être maintenus.

OW-WACHENDORF

⁵ This sentence read in the original German: 'Sie hat den deutschen Soldaten strengstens verboten, in russische Formationen einzutreten und mit denjenigen, die dies trotzdem getan haben, jede Verbindung abgebrochen.'

No. 143

Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Copenhagen)

No. 1441 Telegraphic [141671/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 17, 1919

Your telegram No. 1571¹ (of October 15th).

The blockade of Germany has not been reimposed.

In consequence of attack on Riga Allied Naval Armistice Commission have temporarily suspended all free passages of German vessels in Baltic. Ships now at sea in Baltic are to be recalled and no others allowed to proceed while this suspension remains in force. This does not apply to neutral ships trading with Germany but all German ships found at sea in Baltic are liable to seizure by the Allies.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram Lord Kilmarnock asked for instructions concerning sailings in the Baltic and, in particular, whether the blockade of Germany had been reimposed.

No. 144

*Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 25 [147690/4232/18]

Part I—Political.

BERLIN, October 18, 1919

1. I returned to Berlin on the morning of October 16, after an absence of twelve days in London and Paris.

¹ A copy of this report was received in the Foreign Office on October 31.

2. The principal subject of interest at the present moment is the situation in the Baltic States and the renewal of the blockade, following upon the last note from the Supreme Council. The German Government appears to be thoroughly disturbed by the turn which events have recently taken. In consequence it is now doing its best to induce the German troops to return to Germany, but it has allowed things to go so far that it is almost powerless to do so. The arrival of the Inter-Allied Mission is awaited with some eagerness, as it is looked upon as the most likely method of finding some way out of the difficulty. The possibility of direct discussion between representatives of the Entente and the German Government ought to be of assistance, but it is, I think, beginning to be recognized that we are absolutely determined that all German troops must leave the Baltic Provinces.

A great deal has been made in the Press of the fact that the 'Note' arrived at the same time as an invitation to Germany to assist in blockading Soviet Russia.²

3. The whole situation has led to attacks by the Independent Socialists upon the Government, which is accused of pursuing a reactionary policy in Courland and against Soviet Russia. It has also been accused of trafficking with the so-called West Russian Government, which was said to have established itself in Berlin under General Biscoupski.

It appears from various published statements that a rather disreputable agent of the Independents, Herr Moschel, passed himself off to General Biscoupski as representative of J. P. Morgan and Co., and concluded a bogus loan on the security of lands, forests, etc., in Russia. He finally induced General Biscoupski to sign this document as 'President of the West Russian Government'. Other members of the Russian Council in Berlin also signed in various capacities. The document was then photographed, and copies have been circulated by the Independents. When the subject was raised in the Reichstag, Noske was able to give a very complete answer, and as the very shady methods adopted by the Independents have now been exposed, they did not score any success, nor did they attract any serious notice in the Press. In the course of the attack, the Independent Socialist Cohn made a reference to this Mission.

4. The general estimate here appears to be that some 20,000 troops have gone over to the Russian formations, and that perhaps 15,000 will return to Germany, but not as complete units. It is said that the men will march, while the artillery and ammunition will come back by train. It will not, however, be possible to run more than two trains daily.

5. Irrespective of the possible delay in ratification of the Peace Treaty, the immediate effects of the blockade seem likely to be:—

- (a) The cessation of the import of Swedish ore for the Silesian industry, and
- (b) The stoppage of sea transport of coal to Königsberg. . . .³

² For this question see Vol. I.

³ The rest of this report related to other matters.

*Report by Captain Dundas (Libau)*¹

No. 66/4B [148274/855/59]

H.M.S. PHAETON, October 18, 1919

Report on the Situation in Latvia.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that your ultimatum to the Officer commanding German forces at Mitau and Dünamünde,² received as a signal timed 14.23 October 14, was sent by Shore W/T Station (Libau) to Mitau at 02.40, 15th.

No acknowledgement from addressee could be obtained, so to comply with your 21.32 of October 13 that utmost endeavours should be made to ensure its delivery, arrangements were made for Lieutenant Commander Deane of this ship, accompanied by Lieutenant Andrews and Lieutenant Salin as interpreter, both of British Military Mission of Libau, were [*sic*] sent by motor car to Prekultn starting at 06.00, October 14, with orders to proceed to Prekultn and Mitau, intimation of their departure and intended object being conveyed by W/T to Officer Commanding Troops at Mitau.

The order that they were your emissaries or messengers and to enter into no discussion or expression of views was strictly adhered to, and Lieutenant Commander Deane returned on board at 16.30 October 17, and his report is attached.

From his report and from report of Colonel Grove, British Mission at Mitau, the following opinion of the situation is submitted.

General Prince Avaloff Bermont, Commander in Chief of the Volunteer Russian Western Army, and of the West Dvina Forces (as he styles himself), outwardly in supreme command and responsible for military acts and for the attack on Riga, surrounded by Russian Generals and with Russian Officers on his staff, with a force composed of Russians and Germans (part of von der Goltz's army)—the latter he terms 'hired Germans'—has, and is, undoubtedly acting principally, if not wholly, under *German* influence; it would be better described as Germans employing Russians and not vice versa.

He is vain to a supreme degree and has been continually in the company of, and under the influence of von der Goltz; several photographs obtained at Mitau show him in prominence by the side of von der Goltz on many occasions, review of German troops etc.³

Courteous, and anxious to appear in favourable light to Naval representative, with evident intention to impress with favourable views of his avowed policy, which he stated to be for Russia and Anti-Bolshevik.

¹ A copy of this report, addressed by the British Senior Naval Officer, Libau, to Admiral Cowan, was communicated by the Admiralty to the Foreign Office on November 1, 1919.

² See No. 140.

³ For such photographs see General Count R. von der Goltz, *op. cit.*, facing p. 225, and General Prince Awaloff, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

His explanation of the attack on Riga was to protect his left flank, and form a sea base, before advancing on the Bolsheviks, and at the same time to subdue Lettish insurgents. . . .⁴

I have, etc.,
L. DUNDAS
Captain (S.N.O. Libau)

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 145

H.M.S. PHAETON, *October 18, 1919*

Sir,

In compliance with your orders to deliver a sealed package to the Officer Commanding German troops at Mitau and Dünamünde, I have the honour to state that I left H.M.S. *Phaeton* at 07.00 L.T. on October 14 and proceeded to the British Military Mission at Libau where I was joined by Lieutenant Andrews, East Lancashire Regiment and Lieutenant Salin, Interpreter in Russian and German, both attached to the Mission.

Having obtained a pass from Herr von Kuck authorising us to proceed from Libau to Mitau and back, we proceeded by car to Prekult and thence by rail to Mitau, reaching our destination at about 21.45 L.T.

I then reported at the British Military Mission at Mitau and interviewed Colonel Grove who gave me the latest information as to local affairs and who told me that Bermont, who has lately adopted his mother's name of Avaloff, was now in command of the forces operating on the Dvina; he also placed at my disposal the services of Captain Anitschkow, a Russian officer in attendance on him.

The latter escorted us to a private residence of Colonel Prince Avaloff where we were received by the Graf von der Pahlen, a Russian who is head of civil affairs in the North West Russian Government and adviser to Colonel Prince Avaloff.

The Graf von der Pahlen speaks very fair English and there was no need to make use of our interpreter Lieutenant Salin.

The Graf von der Pahlen informed me that Colonel Avaloff was away at the front but was expected back shortly, and he sent a note by a messenger to meet Avaloff and inform him of our arrival and our desire to interview him without delay.

Meanwhile he entered into conversation with me and suspecting he was trying to draw me, I was very cautious in my replies, but I nevertheless gained a certain amount of information from him.

He told me he knew the contents of my note as it had already been received by radio; but immediately correcting himself he substituted the word 'intercepted' for 'received'.

He said that Colonel Avaloff had concluded it was not intended for him and had sent a radio signal in reply, to this effect, also stating that all neutral

⁴ The rest of the political section of this report reproduced points from Colonel Grove's report of October 16: see No. 139.

shipping at Dünamünde would be respected so long as it did not carry munitions of war to those fighting against his Russian forces.

The Graf von der Pahlen also told me a certain amount about his private affairs, mentioning his connection with England and how that when representing the Y.M.C.A. in Russia he had come to England in 1914 for the International Congress.

Subsequently he mentioned the loss of several of his estates in Russia owing to the Bolsheviks, and in Germany owing to the war; evidently with a desire to impress on me his personal friendship for England and the Allies, and his debt against the Germans and Bolsheviks.

After a short time the messenger returned and the Graf thereupon informed me that Colonel Avaloff would not be returning that night but would receive us between 09.00 and 09.30 M.E.T. next day.

It is my personal opinion that Colonel Avaloff was in Mitau all the time and that, the hour being late, he had deliberately caused delay in order to gain time to prepare his plans and consult his staff, and that the Graf von der Pahlen had been deputed to interview us and draw us beforehand.

We were accommodated for the night at the British Mission.

Captain Anitschkow presented himself at about 09.00 next morning to conduct the audience. We were received with due ceremony and found Colonel Avaloff surrounded by his staff, all, I noted, being of Russian nationality. Amongst them were three Generals to whom we were personally introduced, one of whom was General Sokol. Colonel Dschesnokow was Chief of Staff. The Graf von der Pahlen was also present. A young Russian officer acted as interpreter.

I stated that I was a bearer of a communication from the British Admiral and that I understood Colonel Avaloff was in command of all forces operating on the Dwina. This he admitted.

I then asked who was in command of the German portion of his troops. He said there were no German troops.

I then asked if he denied that there were any soldiers of German nationality under his command. He admitted that there were some Germans but stated that they were volunteer soldiers hired for their services and that there were no independent units and no German Officers in command of them.

Colonel Avaloff also stated that he would not accept my note as it could not be intended for him, being addressed to the Officer in command of *German* forces, whereas there were no German forces in his command. The only officer in command of German forces in the vicinity was General von Eberhardt who had taken von der Goltz's place and was engaged in withdrawing all German forces from the Baltic States in accordance with the Allies' demands. General von Eberhardt was now in Lithuania and the radio message Colonel Avaloff had intercepted had been forwarded to him. Furthermore, if he, Colonel Avaloff, were to open the letter it would immediately put him in the position of acknowledging that he was the person to whom it was addressed and would cause an immediate fracture of the amicable relations existing between himself and the Allies, owing to the peremptory

terms in which it was couched. He stated that he knew the contents, having already intercepted the radio signal similarly addressed. He was quite sure that it was never intended that he, a Russian, and an ally of the Entente would be addressed in such terms.

Throughout the interview my whole endeavour was to get him to see the fact that whether it was correct or not that there were German troops operating against the Letts on the Dwina, the fact remained that the Admiral considered that these troops were there, and that therefore Colonel Avaloff was the Officer in command of them, since on his own admission there were no German Commanders and that therefore he should accept all responsibility. If he considered that there had been a mistake it was for him to explain it in his reply to the Admiral. I personally took upon myself the responsibility for delivering the note to him, as I considered he was the person for whom it was intended.

He continually evaded a direct answer and took some pains to show the innocence of his aims and the fact that he had no quarrel with the Letts except that they were attacking him and interfering with his campaign against the Bolsheviks. He stated that he had never fired at the Lettish troops, he had no desire to take Riga, but only to occupy the line of the Dwina. All the hostility came from the Letts who threatened his positions.

I asked him how it was that the British Mission at Riga had been endangered by his shell fire. He evaded a direct answer but said that he had ordered all firing to cease and had endeavoured to arrange an Armistice with the Letts, but that his emissary with the white flag had been fired on. He had also distributed leaflets addressed to the Lettish inhabitants, one of which he presented to me and which I attach.⁵

My continual endeavour was to impress on him that I was only a messenger and my sole duty was to deliver the note to the person to whom it was addressed, and that I considered that he was that person. I was not empowered to discuss the position at all. His only reply was to emphasise his friendship and that of Russia for the Allies. He stated that among those present were three Generals who had received the highest honours which could be conferred on a Russian and that these honours had been awarded in consideration of their services on behalf of the Allies in the late war. He himself had been twice wounded in the same cause. Finally he suggested that further instructions should be asked for by radio, to which I eventually agreed, hoping for a confirmation of my authority to deliver the note to him.

He suggested it should be a combined message signed by both of us, but as he wished to communicate direct with the Admiral it was eventually arranged that I should send mine to Senior Naval Officer, Libau, in English, whilst his to the Admiral was to be in French, this being the diplomatic language and understood by all of us. He was not sufficiently familiar with

⁵ Not attached to filed original. For texts of such leaflets see General Prince Avaloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-8, and Lt.-Col. du Parquet, *op. cit.*, p. 175 f.

English and he stated that there was some difficulty in communicating Russian characters by morse.

I wrote out my message which was then interpreted and I was asked if I would make two small alterations in the wording. This I agreed to. The final message being as received by you.

The two small alterations made were (one) the insertion of the word[s] 'as commander of Russian troops' at the end of the first sentence, and (2) the substitution of the words 'hired by Colonel Avaloff and by the Government of West Russia' for the words 'amalgamated in Russian regiments' and for my first correction of this which was worded 'hired by Colonel Avaloff as representative of Russia'.

Colonel Avaloff's message was then drafted in French and read aloud by the Graf von der Pahlen and I noted that it was the same as mine for all practical purposes.⁶

I addressed it to Senior Naval Officer, Baltic, through S.N.O. Libau, explaining that it must go that way.

I then withdrew, stating that nothing more could be done until a reply was received, and that I anticipated some time would elapse before then.

An hour or two later, however, having heard nothing further and having thought things over, I decided to make a final effort to induce Colonel Avaloff to accept the note; and with Lieutenants Andrews and Salin, presented myself at the audience chamber requesting a further interview.

This time Colonel Avaloff was alone and seemed eager for further news, for he came forward into the ante-room to greet me.

This interview lasted about an hour and a half, during the latter part of which Colonel Avaloff was supported by Colonel Dschesnokow, his chief of staff.

I put it to Colonel Avaloff that since he had replied to the radio signal, he could reply in the same way to the note.

His answer was that it would not be the same thing, and that directly he opened the note the present friendly relations which he wished to preserve with the Allies would instantly cease, owing to the words being in the form of an ultimatum, and that the Allies had no right to address him in that form.

Another statement made by him in the course of this interview was to the effect that he had never signed the Peace Treaty at Versailles.

In response to a suggestion of mine that he should take the note unopened, and if he still continued to believe that it was intended for someone else, to forward it elsewhere, he replied that he was not the village postman.

Seeing that we had reached an impasse and that he would have nothing whatever to do with the note, which was practically what he eventually said, I persuaded him to give me a written statement to that effect, which I attach together with a translation.⁷ He would not sign it himself but deputed his chief of staff to do so. I had to be satisfied with this and told him so. This concluded the interview.

⁶ Cf. the German text of the message printed by General Prince Awaloff, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁷ Enclosure 2 below.

After Colonel Avaloff had enquired about our personal comfort, accommodation, and food, and had offered the services of a Russian Officer to attend on us and asked if there was not anything he could not do for us, we parted with mutual expressions of friendship and hopes for a better understanding in the future.

Colonel Avaloff appears to be extremely vain and susceptible to flattery and as such would easily become a tool for German intrigues. He seems inclined to be hot-tempered but his adviser the Graf von der Pahlen keeps a restraining hand on him. He wears the uniform of a Colonel of Cossacks of which he is inordinately proud, not allowing anyone else to wear the same. He is a Caucasian by birth.

In the shop windows at Mitau we observed several photographs of Colonel Avaloff in company with von der Goltz with whom he seemed on very intimate terms.

If we had not adopted the attitude of being solely messengers and not in a position to discuss the situation, we should have had many opportunities of pointing out discrepancies in his statements notably one in which he said that he had to report daily to Denniken, whereas it is a known thing that Yudenitch has declared him an outlaw, and in that case it is impossible that Denniken should recognise him.

We heard stories of the discontent of many of the Russian Officers serving under Avaloff, who wished to be elsewhere, not agreeing with the advisability of this campaign. We were actually present at an interview between Colonel Grove and a Russian Officer, Colonel Keller, in which the latter spoke of this state of affairs.

Notes on observations made during the journey to and from Mitau are attached.⁸

I have, etc.,

A. H. DEANE

Lieutenant-Commander R.N.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 145

Translation

Chief of Military Field Office
of the Commander of the
Western Volunteer Army.

Lieutenant-Commander Deane

October 15, 1919

The letter addressed to the Commanding Officer of the German forces in Mitau and Dünamünde, the Commanding Officer of the Volunteer Western Army cannot accept as it is not addressed to him, which I inform.

COLONEL DSCHESNOKOW
(countersigned) Adjutant, LIEUT. ARHIDOW

⁸ Enclosure 3 below.

Notes on Observations made during Journey to and from Mitau

(1) The proportion of German soldiers to Russians in the streets was about 4 to 1. The former were wearing German uniform with Russian badges.

(2) The discipline of the troops in Mitau seemed fairly good and there were no signs of hostility towards us. Those we met on our journey were the reverse. The Commandant at the Mitau railway station, a German, was most polite to us and helped us in every way, giving us a soldier to escort us and show us the way. He also gave us a free pass back to Prekultn available for a month and put no difficulties whatever in our way.

(3) During the journey between Prekultn and Mitau the majority of our fellow travellers were German soldiers of all grades. They did not appear to be travelling in connection with any concentration of troops but mainly for their own pleasure. The railway stations were crowded with loiterers with no discipline and apparently unbounded leisure. Some of these were inclined to be insulting. There were hardly any officers amongst them and these seemed to have no connection with, or control over them. They waved German and Russian flags and said they belonged to Kolchak's army. Except in the immediate vicinity of Mitau, they appeared to have no connection with the forces commanded by Avaloff. None of them had the Russian badges. At Prekultn, except for the formality of passes, there appeared to be no obstacle to the mingling of Lettish and German troops, in fact we gave a passage part of the way to the Lettish Commandant at Prekultn whom we met there and who lives in the same house as the German Commandant.

The Lettish troops there have merely been disarmed and sent to Libau. Ever since the disarmament there seems to be no friction between the Germans and Letts.

There appears to be no large force of Germans at Prekultn and no immediate threat to Libau.

Avaloff himself stated that he had no objective in that direction, but this statement must be taken for what it is worth.

The German outposts are on the eastern bank of the Wartaga river and the Lett outposts are on the outskirts of Grobin, there being therefore about 7 to 8 miles of neutral zone.

The German Commandant, Lieutenant Meyer, at Prekultn informed us that from October 17 all passage of troops and food between Germany and Courland had been stopped by the German Government.

Captain Anidschkow mentioned that there was a separate German unit under Avaloff commanded by Major Bischoff. They call themselves the German Legion. This legion is mentioned in the *Trommel*, a German paper published in Mitau, together with details of its units. This is in direct contradiction of Avaloff's statement. Bischoff is the man who led the outlaws of von der Goltz's army.

Since the completion of the report of my interviews with Colonel Avaloff, Lieutenant Salin has informed me that on asking the Adjutant, Lieutenant Arhidow, why Colonel Avaloff had changed his name, he was informed that it was because of the death of Colonel Avaloff's wife in Petrograd. The latter was killed by Bolsheviks.

No. 146

*Colonel Rowan Robinson (Libau) to Sir E. Crowe
(Paris. Received October 19)*

No. RR. 116 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19745]

LIBAU, October 18, 1919

1. Should Lithuanians attack Russo-Germans, Eberhardt not only threatens action by Bermont but hints also at action by Germany. He pretends this to be his private, not his official opinion.
2. No German troops are evacuated at present.
3. Eberhardt should be at once recalled.

No. 147

Colonel Ward (Kovno) to Earl Curzon (Received October 21)

No. 3 Telegraphic [143838/61232/59]

KOVNO, October 19, 1919

In view of following three facts:—

1. General strike declared in Warsaw thus paralysing possible Polish action against Russo-Germans.
2. Telegram from Eberhardt clearly showing his intention of interfering in internal Lithuanian affairs.
3. No German troops as yet have been evacuated but large quantities of Lithuanian grain and produce passing by rail from Shavli into Germany, I recommend most energetic measures possible be taken to ensure immediate evacuation of all Germans including those in Russian units.

Suggest Commission be sent to Tauroggen to control all railway traffic.¹

Addressed to Foreign Office; repeated to Paris, Riga, and Reval.

¹ Telegram No. A.B. 512a of October 18, 1919, from the British Military Mission at Riga to the War Office (repeated to the British Delegation in Paris: received October 19), had reported: 'Polish Officer specially sent to report here today stated that German frontier was open, supplies coming through and troops moving into East Prussia. Poles anxious to help Letts but Lithuanian difficulty stands in the way. I wish to state that with present force Letts will be unable to undertake strong defensive operations against the Germans. Cannot get into communication with Kovno or Warsaw.'

No. 148

*Colonel Rowan Robinson (Kovno) to Sir E. Crowe
(Paris. Received October 23)*

No. RR. 124 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19588]

KOVNO, October 21, 1919

Eberhardt has delivered to Lithuanian Government ultimatum that he will attack Lithuanian troops unless they clear 20 kilometres from railway. Government has informed him Lithuania will not attack his troops during withdrawal and has agreed to keep troops ten kilometres from railway.

Eberhardt is using Lithuanian defence measures against Bermont as excuse for delay. German troops have robbed and bullied Lithuanians for three years. This present fear therefore probably . . .¹ Lithuanian Government wishes to know if any date has been fixed for termination of evacuation.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

No. 149

*Colonel Rowan Robinson (Kovno) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris.
Received October 24)*

No. RR. 126 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19892]

KOVNO, October 21, 1919

Re my R.R. 124¹ to-day's date have wired to-day to Eberhardt in conjunction with French Mission that we consider Lithuanian guarantees sufficient and that any further advance of German troops koxthwards (*sic*) [? northwards] will be taken as an act of unwarranted aggression on his part with sole object of delaying evacuation. Ends.

¹ No. 148.

No. 150

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)

No. 180 Telegraphic [144930/139661/59]

RIGA, October 22, 1919

1. Letts dissatisfied and will decline the terms for assistance of Esthonians, acceptance of which is being pressed for by latter. Only help from Esthonia so far is armoured trains which they now threaten to withdraw.

2. No news yet from Foreign Minister Meierovich seeking help in Poland.

3. Issue of bread and provisions taken over by the town council. Shortage of fats.

4. Railway communication uncertain.

5. Mobilization in local districts proceeding satisfactorily.

6. Letts hold former positions. Town periodically shelled to-day. Missions all well.

Repeated to Reval.

No. 151

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 22)

No. 1479 Telegraphic [144510/141673/2150]

PARIS, October 22, 1919

See telegram addressed today to Supreme Council by Admiral Charlton in his capacity as President of Allied Naval Armistice Commission¹ proposing to send a telegram tomorrow to German Admiral in which amongst other measures complete stoppage of German sailings either inside or outside Baltic is threatened.

It is urgently necessary for me to know whether War Cabinet on their part are in favour of proposed action and whether I am to urge it upon Supreme Council. I should be placed in difficult position if I supported a policy advocated by British Admiral which His Majesty's Government did not approve. In view of your telegram No. 1267² I hesitate to believe such approval is assured and so far as I am able to form an opinion on spur of moment I am doubtful of its wisdom.³

¹ This telegram is printed in Vol. II, No. 6, appendix A.

² Not printed. In this telegram of October 21 Lord Curzon informed Sir E. Crowe that the Danish Legation in London had made inquiries concerning the application of the Allied embargo on German shipping in the Baltic and urgent representations for its mitigation in a number of particular instances, including the reopening of ferry communication with Mecklenburg, and permission for sailings from Schleswig and for German ships lying in Swedish ports with cargoes for Danish destinations and conversely. The telegram commented: 'Measures taken by naval authorities against German shipping have been confirmed by Supreme Council but we are not aware whether full consideration was given beforehand to hardships thereby inevitably inflicted on neutrals, such as those set out in above-mentioned memorandum. Unless restrictions are relaxed in sense desired, representations similar to above may be expected from other neutral Governments. Moreover, it is obvious that damage may be done to Allied interests, e.g., by seizure of German ships carrying wood to Belgium. . . . Please draw attention of Supreme Council to above difficulties. . . . You should also, unless you see objection, propose that Naval Authorities should be instructed to confine seizures to German ships not performing allied or neutral services. Complaints made by Danish Government appear to us justified, and we should be glad if possible to give them satisfaction without delay.'

³ No reply was sent to this telegram in view of a subsequent note from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission stating that, in accordance with the general policy of the Supreme Council, the proposed telegram to Admiral Goette had not been sent. This note is printed in Vol. II, No. 6, appendix B.

No. 152

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)

No. 1478 Telegraphic. By bag [144908/141673/2150]

PARIS, October 22, 1919

Your telegram No. 1267.¹ Embargo on German Shipping in the Baltic.

It is true that Supreme Council approved measures taken by Naval Authorities but it was because those authorities had considered it necessary

¹ See No. 151, note 2.

or desirable to take on their own initiative the action they did that I asked for and obtained the Supreme Council's covering sanction. The Supreme Council have throughout displayed every readiness to defer to the judgment of the naval authorities and agreed at to-day's meeting² to leave it to their discretion to grant such relaxations as are compatible with the military objects of the embargo. In particular it was agreed that there should be no needless interference with innocent neutral trade carried in German vessels, nor with local German fisheries or coastal trade. I have undertaken to convey the Supreme Council's decision to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission; I therefore beg that Admiralty be asked to communicate it to Admiral Charlton who will no doubt take the necessary action accordingly. . . .³

² The official record of this meeting is printed in Vol. II, No. 4.

³ The remainder of telegram proposed that a question previously raised by the Foreign Office as to the definition of the term 'Baltic' for the purposes of the embargo should be referred to the Admiralty.

No. 153

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received October 22)

No. 576 Telegraphic [144514/144099/38]

HELSINGFORS, October 22, 1919

My telegrams 572 and 573.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that after secret meeting of Cabinet last night it was decided only to put into force preliminary plans of mobilization. Army would therefore not be mobilized for present. Guns of Ino would co-operate with Admiral Cowan but not with General Judenitch as Government had clearer and clearer proof that German interests were directly supporting present conservative agitation for active intervention in Russia.

Secret.

Minister for Foreign Affairs showed me cyphered telegram received last night from Finnish Minister at Berlin. Translation is as follows: 'Von der Goltz urges that it will be of advantage to Finland to intervene (? at once) in Russia in co-operation with White Russian Governments. Apart from other reasons von der Goltz represents that Finnish intervention now will assure the recognition of Finnish independence by future Russian Government.'

Repeated to Stockholm and Reval.

¹ Not printed. In telegram No. 572 of October 21 (received October 22) Sir C. Kennard had reported that 'demand from conservative circles for Finnish intervention in Russia is growing in intensity. . . . Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-night that mobilization of Finnish army had been ordered as a "precautionary measure" but that Government would take no active measures without reference to His Majesty's Government.' Telegram No. 573 of October 22 (received October 23) reported that 'Finnish authorities informed Admiral Cowan October 21 that Ino battery near Terijoki had been ordered to cooperate with British ships in bombarding Cronstadt. Admiral Cowan replied last night congratulating Finnish authorities on this decision. Battery opened fire on Cronstadt this morning. This step will probably facilitate general active Finnish intervention against Bolsheviks.'

No. 154

*General Burt (Riga) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received October 23)*¹
No. A.B. 523 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19892]

RIGA, October 22, 1919

From information from Landwehr now serving with Lettish it appears quite definite that the present attack on Latvia is a German effort in which every available reserve is being thrown as other efforts have failed. No outside influence appears to be having any definite effect in stopping German reinforcements and supplies. Strength in Courland reported increasing daily.

¹ This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation at Paris and the British Mission at Helsingfors.

No. 155

*General Burt (Riga) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received October 24)*¹
No. A.B. 529 Telegraphic [599/2/5/19892]

RIGA, October 23, 1919

Continual attacks by Germans on Latvia have reached such a stage that it is strongly urged that Memel and if possible Tilsitt be occupied by . . .² troops.³

¹ This telegram was addressed and repeated as for No. 154.

² The text here is uncertain. Allied troops were probably meant.

³ Sir E. Crowe raised this question in the Supreme Council on October 25, and its study was referred to the Military Representatives: see Vol. II, No. 6, minute 3.

No. 156

M. Czepinski to Lord Hardinge (Received October 25)
No. I. 658 (iii) [145446/8/59]

LONDON, October 23, 1919

Sir,

Based on the communications which I have received from the Lithuanian Government, I have the honour to report as follows in regard to the latest events in Lithuania:

1. *Lithuania and the Russo-German Kolchakists.*

The adherents of Admiral Kolchak and other Russian generals in Lithuania, consisting chiefly of Baltic Barons, German troops and Russian prisoners of war, are busily engaged in the Shauli district in circulating proclamations written in both Russian and Lithuanian, in which a wide autonomy is

promised to Lithuania if she will support them. The Kolchakists are concentrating their forces at Shauli and in the district, where they intend to create a base for military operations against the Bolsheviks. These Kolchakists commandeered the post, telegraph and telephone offices at Shauli, being assisted in doing so by the Germans, and ordered that only the Russian language should be used in these offices. Moreover, the Kolchakists removed the Lithuanian flags from the Shauli streets, replacing them by the Russian tricolour. The townspeople feel as if they were again in the throes of the old Russian régime, especially on hearing the singing of the Russian National Anthem, which is full of praise for the autocracy of the Czar. Such aggressive conduct on the part of the Kolchakists is excessively irritating to the Lithuanian people, who are beginning to take up arms to resist these new persecutors.

After the Kolchakists occupied the offices of the Lithuanian Government at Shauli and its district, and disarmed the Lithuanian troops there, the Lithuanian Government took its forces from the Bolshevik and Polish fronts, concentrating them in the vicinity of Ponieviez and Seduva, and decided to attack the Kolchakists under General [*sic*] Virgolitsch. The latter saw that he would lose the battle, and appealed to the German General Eberhardt, the successor of von der Goltz, for mediation to negotiate with the Lithuanian Government. The latter however demanded the immediate withdrawal from Lithuania of Virgolitsch's troops.

On October 15, near Radzviliszki, the Lithuanian vanguard met the Kolchakist forces and a battle took place. The Lithuanians succeeded in pushing back the Kolchakist troops and in capturing the villages of Daugeliszi and Siaylenai.

On October 16 near Pasvalis and Joniszkelis the Kolchak band of plunderers was attacked by the Lithuanian partisans; namely, armed peasants. These succeeded in disarming the Kolchakists and in capturing from them some machine-guns, twenty horses and various other war material. The village people in Lithuania are bitterly opposed to the Kolchakists, and are taking up arms and organising parties and detachments to fight these invaders.

On October 17 the Lithuanian reconnoitring forces seized at the station of Abeli on the Ponieviez-Dvinsk railway, a German aeroplane which was flying to Moscow with two Germans, two Turks and one Russian as passengers.¹ The Lithuanian officer compelled the Germans to drive the airship [*sic*] to Kowno, where the Turks and the Russian were sent by train.

In connection with these facts I add here a brief report of the Lithuanian Ambassador in Berlin to the Lithuanian Prime Minister in Kowno, regarding the connection between the Russo-German Kolchakists and some Lithuanian politicians.

Baron Friedrich Ropp, a Lithuanian landowner and the famous initiator of the idea of the federation of Lithuania and Germany, his brother-in-law Wildemann, and the no less famous Lithuanian politician Gabrys, are taking an active part in the work of the Kolchak agency in Berlin. Ropp

¹ For this incident see Vol. II, No. 4, minute 1.

has established a special office which is called the 'Committee to save the inhabitants of Riga of all nationalities'.² The business of recruiting the Kolchakists is carried on from this office, and schemes for their activities in Lithuania are elaborated there. Ropp manages all the business, helped by the famous Russian Senator Bellegarde, who is a great landowner in Courland. The latter visited Lithuania some time ago, and negotiated there with Colonel Virgolitch, who is the commander of the Russo-German Kolchakists in Lithuania. The son of Mr. Bellegarde is serving in Virgolitch's regiment. Mr. Bellegarde has a great desire to approach the Lithuanian Government, in order to make a convention for the future action against the Bolsheviks.

Mr. Wildemann is staying in Berlin, although he has been nominated commander of a Kolchakist battalion, and proposes to go to Lithuania as soon as possible.

The famous Lithuanian politician Gabrys is acting spontaneously in two directions: he is striving to recruit and organise a group of his followers at Kowno, the seat of the Lithuanian Government. Having this in view, he has lately visited Lithuania and now boasts that the number of his followers is steadily increasing. He hopes in the near future to overthrow the present Lithuanian Government. On the other hand, it appears that his greatest hopes are centred on the Kolchakists; and he has therefore joined them, in company with Baron Ropp, and is acting in unison with them, trusting that they will help him to get into power in Lithuania.

All these men boast, not only that they have numerous followers among the officers of the Lithuanian army, but also that the members of the French Military Mission in Lithuania are supporting them—not to speak of the Germans. Their only opponents are Englishmen.

After the departure of the Russian General Monkevici from Berlin, General Biskupski was nominated Kolchakist leader there. Mr. Gabrys and Baron Ropp are in constant negotiation with this general, and it is rumoured that they have entered into a convention with him on the following conditions: that the Kolchakists will help Gabrys and Ropp to overthrow the present Lithuanian Government, and to establish a new Cabinet in which Gabrys will be Prime Minister and Ropp Minister of Finance. On their part they promise to help to organise and entertain the Kolchakist army in Lithuania in every way, and to induce the Lithuanian army to join the Kolchakists for a common attack against the Bolsheviks; and finally to bring up the question of federal relations between Lithuania and Russia. They boast that the German Government, with the exception of Mr. Mueller the Foreign Minister, and Mr. Erzberger, the Minister of Finance, sympathise with them, and have even promised to grant to the Gabrys-Ropp Government a loan of 300,000,000 marks. Out of this sum 200,000,000 must be handed over to the Kolchakists. It is not at all certain that the German Government are taking this attitude; but there is no doubt that the Pan-Germans, in company with the Barons of Courland and the Russian monarchists living in Berlin, are supporting the idea.

² Cf. No. 5.

These facts may be considered as proof that there is real cohesion between the Kolchak forces and the German and Russian reactionaries. . . .³

I have, etc.,

VINCENT CZEPINSKI

Plenipotentiary Delegate of the State of
Lithuania in the United Kingdom

³ The second part of this letter, not printed, was headed: 'Polish outrages in Lithuania.'

No. 157

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 25)

No. 1487 Telegraphic. By bag [145686/134658/59]

PARIS, October 24, 1919

War Office telegram to Sir C. Sackville West gives as ground for General Gough's not returning to the Baltic States that principal duty of his military mission is now being taken over by the inter-allied commission under General Mangin. I assume that I may now definitely inform the Supreme Council of General Gough's relinquishment of his post as inter-allied representative in the Baltic States? I gather that it is not intended to propose another British officer to fill the functions of the inter-allied representative other than those connected with the German evacuation. If so the French will probably propose to make General Mangin the successor generally to General Gough. Am I authorised to assent to such arrangement? If not, I trust I may be furnished with definite instructions as to the grounds on which I should base any objection we may make.

No. 158

Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)¹

No. 26 [148014/4232/18]

BERLIN, October 24, 1919

... The² country really wants to work, and will probably succeed. There are great difficulties in the way—especially transport difficulties owing to lack of rolling stock; but they are far from being insuperable. It is, however, very important, not only for Germany, but for Central Europe as a whole, that the Baltic problem should be settled as quickly as possible and that the blockade should be again raised as soon as a solution, satisfactory to the Entente Powers, can be reached. For this purpose it is very important that there should be the least possible delay in sending the Commission to Berlin. Everything points to the powerlessness of the Government to enforce its will upon the troops in Kurland, or even upon certain highly-placed officers in

¹ A copy of this report was received in the Foreign Office on November 1, 1919.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

Germany, who have been active in support of von der Goltz and Bermont. Incidentally, I may say that it is commonly reported that the really strong and important leader is not von der Goltz, Bermont, or Eberhardt, but Bischoff of the *Eiserne Division*. A few recruits are still crossing the frontier into Kurland and the German Government is unable to stop them. However, Bermont has not sufficient funds to carry on for long; and the probability is that with the approach of winter his force, being without money and supplies, will dissolve into roving bands, many of which will find their way back into Germany.

It seems therefore that the proper course will be for the Commission to arrange with the German Government for joint action against a formidable body of outlaws. I have little doubt that, with the exception of a comparatively small party, the whole country would welcome any such action, especially if it is made perfectly clear that the Entente intends to stick to the letter of its recent Note, and not discuss financial assistance to Germany until a satisfactory solution has been reached in the Baltic. . . .²

No. 159

General Malcolm (Berlin) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received October 24)
No. Z. 194 Telegraphic [597/1/24/19935]

BERLIN, October 24, 1919

Reported German Government has seized (25 million?) roubles printed in Berlin for Bermont.

A certain Baron von Knorring [*sic*] now in Berlin (formerly?) a Russian diplomat has plenipotentiary powers from Bermont to treat with representatives of the Entente. He is awaiting arrival of the commission. Meanwhile is in touch with Pahlen at Mitau and is active in Berlin.

No. 160

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to General Malcolm (Berlin)
No. 64 Telegraphic [597/1/24/19935]

PARIS, October 25, 1919

Reference your Z. 194,¹ October 24th.

You will of course refuse to treat with Bermont's representative in the absence of specific instructions to do so and it is presumed that other Entente representatives will adopt similar attitude.²

¹ No. 159.

² Copies of this telegram and the preceding one were transmitted by Sir E. Crowe to Lord Curzon on October 27, 1919 (received October 29). In reply Sir E. Crowe was requested to repeat them to Colonel Tallents at Riga and Sir H. Rumbold at Warsaw.

No. 161

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 26)

No. 185 Telegraphic [145734/855/59]

RIGA, October 25, 1919

In your telegram No. 66¹ of September 25 I was instructed to inform the Latvian Government that if their liberties were threatened by Bolshevik invasion His Majesty's Government might be prepared to make sacrifices and to reconsider their decision as to supply of war material. I desire to draw attention to following points:—

1. Their liberties are now threatened by force which they dread no less than Soviet of Russia and whose advance is no less dangerous to Allies.
2. In repelling this German force Letts are doing work for which Allies are responsible under armistice and have failed to perform.
3. Latvian army has been equipped on scale that compares most unfavourably with Estonian or North-Western Army. Further, ten guns recently sent them from Reval arrived there without sights and twenty-five per cent of rifles were damaged. Military Mission inform me further supplies are refused.
4. General Udenich after his recent advance received prompt promise from delegate of extensive further equipment.

These facts and inequalities are raising most bitter political feeling in Latvia. I can invent no justification in mitigation of this. I venture to represent urgently that some redress should be granted. Could not His Majesty's Government or Allies (? at least) present to Latvia cargo of war material now understood to be loading in London on *Vera* and supply adequate artillery?

Failing supply may I be instructed what defence of foregoing inequalities I am to provide Latvia[n] Government.

¹ No. 445.

No. 162

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 27)

No. 188 Telegraphic [145764/139661/59]

RIGA, October 26, 1919

S. . . .¹ reports suggest that Bermond's troops would be most susceptible to organized propaganda from West. General Burt agrees that rumours forecasting attacks by Allied tanks, aeroplanes, monitors on their communications would be beneficial. Russians should be told of Udenich's denunciation of Bermond and his promise to accept deserters prepared to sign acknowledgement of Bermond's crimes and declaration of their ignorance

¹ Thus in original.

of Udenich's orders and renunciation of German sympathies. Military Mission are organising necessary transport from Libau or Riga to Narva. 300 already transferred.

No. 163

General Malcolm (Berlin) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received October 27)
No. 2. 201 Telegraphic [597/1/24/19935]

BERLIN, October 27, 1919

Your 64,¹ October 25th. This clearly understood. Will speak to French representatives but have (? no omitted) doubt at all of their attitude Mac-knorring [*sic*].²

¹ No. 160.

² The approximate sense of the last phrase as sent was probably 're von Knorring' (cf. No. 159).

No. 164

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)
No. 595 Telegraphic [146340/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, October 27, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs showed me original of cypher telegram from Finnish Minister, Berlin, today. Translation is as follows.

I have direct information that Bermondts desires Finnish intervention against Bolsheviks (? and is) prepared to recognise Finnish independence.

¹ Not printed.

No. 165

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 29)
No. 193 Telegraphic [146737/139661/59]

RIGA, October 28, 1919

Foreign Minister Meierovitch has arrived from Warsaw. Following is substance of conversation with him October 28th. Begins:

1. Germans are collected about Rossieni and Radzivilishki-Shadov-Beisagola under command of Wirobt (? about) Svyentinani and are prepared to send up to 200,000 men towards Ponevyez.¹ They stated that their only demand was for most favoured nation treatise [*sic*] at some port on Latvian coast. They would acquiesce in British commander-in-chief as demanded by Lithuania though preferring a Pole for operations in Lithuania by Polish

¹ Mr. Harvey noted on this telegram on October 30: 'The Germans have not got 200,000 men, and from the context it would appear that it should refer to the Poles.'

or Lithuanian troops against German-Russian forces. They would agree to an allied endorsement of full guarantees which they could give for strict limit of movements and stay of Polish Forces in Lithuania to military needs of these operations. They have no claims on Latgalia.

3. [*sic*] Lithuania is willing to operate against Russian but not against German forces pleading shortage of arms and ammunition and confidence in good faith of Eberhardt and effectiveness of his measures for . . .² entry. They could muster 10,000 men.

4. Poles anticipated a possible British opposition to their intervention and Latvian Government at their request ask me to convey their desire for Polish intervention and Allied supervision on lines desired by Lithuania. Ends.

I assume that you have the reports of these negotiations from Warsaw.³ Discussions took place on assumption that Great Britain was continuing to be responsible for Allied military control in Baltic States. I assume that this position is in fact changed by General Mangin's appointment and that any Allied commander in Lithuania would be French. This might be [*sic*] but would not necessarily affect Lithuania's acceptance of proposal. I learn privately that Pilsudski told Meierovitch that he now commanded 'the strongest army in the world'. May Riga Military Mission and myself be kept closely informed of decision and developments?

Repeated to Paris and Reval.

² The text here is uncertain.

³ These reports are not printed.

No. 166

Colonel Rowan Robinson (Libau) to Sir E. Crowe
(Paris. Received October 29)

No. RR. 137 Telegraphic [599/2/5/20049]

LIBAU, October 28, 1919

Continual reports still being received of German troops mainly in civilian clothing entering Lithuania near Bajoran [? Bayahren] and Laugszargen.

No. 167

Colonel Rowan Robinson (Kovno) to Sir E. Crowe
(Paris. Received October 30)

No. RR. 141 Telegraphic [599/2/5/20049]

KOVNO, October 28, 1919

If German evacuation is not completed by November 10 Lithuanians propose to blow up the main bridges on Shavli-Tauroggen line on that date unless you send me orders to the contrary.¹

¹ This telegram was repeated to the War Office and British Missions at Libau, Riga, and Helsingfors.

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 29)

No. 1499 Telegraphic. By bag [146745/61232/59]

PARIS, October 28, 1919

The Supreme Council to-day considered¹ the attached draft instructions² for General Niessel, who has been definitely nominated as President of the Commission to control the German evacuation of the Baltic States.³

It will be seen that these instructions extend the scope of General Niessel's Commission beyond the task of merely supervising the evacuation. They give General Niessel powers at least as full as those formerly entrusted to General Gough. I have not yet received a reply to my telegram 1487⁴ of October 24, but I have seen War Office telegram No. 81864⁵ dated October 23 to Sir Charles Sackville-West, and I felt justified in announcing that General Gough would not be returning to the Baltic States, and that my Government would agree to his duties in so far as they concern the Baltic States passing into the hands of General Niessel.

At the same time I did not feel justified in agreeing to those portions of the draft instructions which refer to political issues, particularly that portion of paragraph 6 which extends the authority of the Commission in certain eventualities to Petrograd.

General Weygand having explained the great urgency of despatching the Commission with the least possible delay, it was decided to adopt the draft instructions in so far as they concern military questions or questions concerned with the Baltic States exclusively, i.e. paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10.

I reserved my opinion on paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 and 11, which touch upon wider political issues, and of which Article 6 may possibly conflict with the intentions of His Majesty's Government with regard to Lieutenant-General Haking.⁶ I note, however, that paragraph 4 of General Haking's instructions mentions that General Niessel's Commission is to take over the duties of the present Allied Baltic Commission.

General Niessel hopes to leave for Berlin on the 1st November and will proceed by sea to Riga or Reval after treating with the German Government

¹ The official record of this meeting is printed in Vol. II, No. 7.

² Not printed. These draft instructions are printed in Vol. II, No. 7, appendix C.

³ The French General Niessel was nominated in place of General Mangin: cf. Vol. II, No. 6, minute 3.

⁴ No. 157.

⁵ Not printed. This was the telegram referred to by Sir E. Crowe in No. 157.

⁶ General Sir R. Haking had on October 22, 1919, been instructed to proceed upon a special mission to General Yudenitch. In communicating a copy of these instructions to the Foreign Office on October 27, 1919, the War Office suggested that it should be made clear to the French Government 'that General Haking's Mission, which is accredited solely to the Russian forces, is not intended to interfere in any way with the Allied Mission under General Niessel to the Baltic States, with which General Haking will, of course, act in the most cordial co-operation': cf. No. 179. (See also Vol. II, No. 7, note 3.)

and arranging for the control of railways on the East Prussian frontier. It was arranged that if necessary his full instructions should follow him to Berlin, but it would be preferable if possible to issue the instructions prior to his departure. I hope therefore that I may be furnished with your views on the enclosed draft as early as possible. General Niessel submitted that in order to enable him to put pressure if necessary on German troops and Commanders in the Baltic States, it is essential that he should be empowered to organise and equip troops of the Baltic States. For this reason he asks for the widest possible powers in this respect, and I think this is right, although I am aware that no further consignments of military material can be provided from British sources.

The financial question involved is to be discussed at tomorrow's meeting of the Supreme Council.

As regards naval action to which section 9 of the draft instructions refer, I made it clear that our naval forces could in no case be placed under the authority of the commission, and I took objection in this connection to the provision that the commission will serve as intermediary between the Supreme Council and the allied navies. I was assured that all that was intended was to ensure that the naval authorities co-operated with the Commission by furnishing transport, possibly supply for the members of the Commission itself.

Under section 10 I stipulated that the allied British and French Missions in the Baltic States who are to place themselves under the orders of the Commission, must be understood to mean the Military missions only.

As regards the reserved political clauses generally, I think that, except those relating to Petrograd to which you may see objection, they are on the whole well conceived and may receive our support.

No. 169

Baron von Lersner to M. Clemenceau¹

No. 42 [599/2/5/20066]

(Translation)

PARIS, October 29, 1919

Sir,

In your last note, Your Excellency foreshadowed the speedy arrival of the Interallied Baltic Commission.

My Government would be grateful if the despatch of this Commission could be accelerated as much as possible, since it hopes that the support of the said Commission will make for a speedy settlement of the increasingly complicated situation in the Baltic Provinces.

Accept, etc.,

BARON VON LERSNER

¹ A copy of this note was communicated by the secretariat-general of the Peace Conference to the British Delegation on October 31 (received November 1).

No. 170

Mr. O'Reilly¹ (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 5)
No. 887 Telegraphic [148884/139661/59]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 29, 1919

Following received from Omsk,² 51, October 22nd.

Coercion both of Admiral Koltchak and of General Dietrichs³ is task of hostile Russo-German (? action) in Baltic States.

From information given by Yudenitch they are (? convinced that) German troops may be used for or against Bolshevik front or as interests of Germany may dictate, but they are against German co-operation under any circumstances. A note to this effect was to have been addressed to the Allied Governments but I understand the proposal has been dropped. Press expresses similar views but blames hesitancy and delay of Allies for present situation: Germanophile Party here is not (? strong) but is gaining ground and public opinion does not share heroic views of Government and will applaud assistance by whomsoever it is rendered.

¹ Acting British High Commissioner in Siberia.

² i.e. from Mr. Hodgson, H.M. Consul at Vladivostok, employed on special service at Omsk.

³ Russian General serving in support of Admiral Kolchak.

No. 171

Note from the Lithuanian Delegation in Paris to the Allied Supreme Council¹
No. 2576 [599/2/5/20424]

PARIS, le 29 octobre, 1919

Messieurs,

Nous avons l'honneur de vous présenter sous ce pli un exposé des récents événements baltiques et d'attirer votre attention sur la situation extrêmement difficile créée par l'action des Allemands et des Germano-Russes dans les trois nouvelles Républiques, et surtout en Lithuanie, pays limitrophe de la Prusse et condamné par là à servir aux Allemands de communication avec la Courlande.

L'examen des faits relevés dans notre exposé inclinera, nous l'espérons, le Haut Conseil à accéder à notre requête, dont l'objet est, d'une part, l'évacuation du territoire lithuanien par les troupes allemandes et la rentrée de ces troupes dans leur patrie, et de l'autre, l'envoi des forces germano-russes, organisées sous le régime allemand, soit en Allemagne, soit vers le front bolchevik.

Veillez agréer, Messieurs, etc.

Le Secrétaire:

BR. BALUTIS²

Le Président de la Délégation de
Lithuanie à la Conférence de
la Paix.

A. VOLDEMAR²

¹ A copy of this note was communicated by the secretariat-general of the Peace Conference to the British Delegation on November 13 (received November 15).

² The signature was originally noted as illegible and has been supplied from another copy of the note which was subsequently communicated by the Lithuanian Delegation to the British Delegation in Paris.

Sur le Coup d'État des Germano-Russes en Lithuanie et en Lettonie au commencement d'octobre 1919

Le Gouvernement lithuanien savait, grâce à des renseignements précis, que l'on tramait quelque chose contre la Lithuanie et la Lettonie à Berlin. D'après ces renseignements, un gouvernement russe s'était constitué sous la présidence du Général Biskupski dans le but de rétablir la Russie à peu près telle qu'elle était à la veille de la guerre mondiale. La reconstruction de l'État russe devait être entreprise avec l'aide des Allemands. On rapportait qu'un emprunt de 300 millions de marks était accordé à ce Gouvernement. Le plan était conçu de telle façon que des coups de théâtre devaient se produire en Lithuanie et en Lettonie. La population mécontente du gouvernement actuel le renverserait. En Lettonie c'était l'ancien Cabinet de Néedra qui devait revenir au pouvoir. En Lithuanie, on projetait de former un nouveau gouvernement sous la présidence de l'agent allemand Gabrys avec son ami le Baron von der Ropp comme ministre des finances. Ceux-ci obtiendraient cent millions de marks pour les besoins gouvernementaux. On escomptait que les fonctionnaires et les officiers lithuaniens, en vue de toucher immédiatement leur traitement arriéré, ne se montreraient pas trop opposés à ce coup d'état. On projetait de s'emparer du même coup de Riga et de Kovno.

Selon nos informations, ce plan avait été présenté au Cabinet des Ministres à Berlin et il avait reçu l'approbation de tous les Ministres excepté Müller et Erzberger.

Les événements prouvèrent que les renseignements étaient exacts. Mais le gouvernement de Lithuanie ne jugeait pas le danger très grave de ce côté. Il était tout à fait sûr que personne ne pourrait renverser le gouvernement du dedans. On pourrait le faire tomber par la force militaire extérieure, mais dans ce cas on ne réussirait jamais à former un nouveau gouvernement lithuanien. Il était fermement persuadé que les Alliés ne laisseraient jamais impuni cet acte de violence russo-allemand, d'autant plus que l'ordre d'évacuer la Lithuanie et les pays baltiques était déjà envoyé au nom des alliés par le Maréchal Foch. Enfin les Allemands qui dirigeaient toute cette entreprise savaient très bien que les Polonais qui guettaient cette occasion favorable pour s'emparer de Kovno et de toute la Lithuanie encore non-occupée, ne manqueraient pas de lancer leur armée sur Kovno à la nouvelle de l'attaque des Germano-Russes. Et comme ce plan ne promettait rien de bon pour les Germano-Russes, le Gouvernement de Lithuanie était tout à fait convaincu que de ce côté-là le pays ne courait pas de danger grave. Il communiqua immédiatement ce jugement sur la situation aux représentants des missions alliées. Ce qu'il appréhendait plus sérieusement c'était une avance polonaise sur Kovno qui pouvait, sans en être priée, se porter au secours à la première nouvelle de la poussée germano-russe. Les documents secrets polonais dont il dispose justifient parfaitement cette appréhension.

Tout à coup il reçoit par télégraphie sans fil un message du gouvernement

de Lettonie, lui apprenant l'attaque de Riga, message adressé aux Esthoniens, aux Lithuaniens et aux Polonais et implorant une aide aux Lettons dans leur lutte contre des forces supérieures au point de vue du nombre et de l'outillage militaire. Dans un cas si grave, le gouvernement de Lithuanie voulait avoir l'opinion des missions alliées sur la possibilité des opérations militaires contre les Germano-Russes. A ce moment, il était encore imparfaitement informé quant aux troupes allemandes de von der Goltz; n'ayant d'autres renseignements à leur sujet que le radio-télégramme d'Ulmanis-Meyerovitch, il croyait que ces troupes prenaient également part à l'assaut.

Les opinions des Représentants alliés étaient partagées. Les capitaines Pujol et de Jonquièrre de la mission française estimaient impossible une action militaire contre les Germano-Russes. Cet avis était partagé par le Colonel Ward, chef de la Mission britannique diplomatique. Seul, le Colonel Rowan Robinson, chef de la Mission Militaire britannique, émit l'opinion que si l'on attaquait sans perdre de temps, on aurait quelque chance de succès. Comme les forces lithuaniennes sur ce front étaient insignifiantes, le Cabinet des Ministres résolut le même jour de jeter toutes les forces disponibles contre les Germano-Russes, toutefois sans donner ordre d'entrer en ligne immédiatement.

Le lendemain, un radio annonçait que Avaloff-Bermond-Keller-Ouroussoff ou de quelqu'autre nom qu'on le veuille appeler proposait un armistice aux Lettons. D'autre part, nous avons reçu une invitation du Général Eberhardt dans laquelle celui-ci annonçait qu'il était arrivé dans les pays baltiques pour effectuer l'évacuation de ceux-ci et nous priaient de lui envoyer un délégué pour échanger des vues sur le meilleur moyen d'aplanir les difficultés. Faisant suite à cette demande, le gouvernement de Lithuanie avait envoyé le Major Lormanias qui devait exprimer le vif mécontentement que le gouvernement lithuanien ressentait de ce que nos amis les Lettons avaient été assaillis par les troupes allemandes, et demander de hâter l'évacuation en exigeant que les territoires évacués de Lithuanie fussent transmis aux autorités lithuaniennes. Le 15 octobre, Lormanias revint. De l'accueil qu'il reçut et de l'entretien qu'il eut avec le Général Eberhardt, il eut l'impression que le général allemand avait prié d'envoyer des délégués, non pas pour discuter la question de l'évacuation qui, somme toute, était bien simple, mais pour servir d'intermédiaire entre les Lithuaniens et les Russes. Notre délégué avait déclaré que sa mission était uniquement auprès du général Eberhardt et qu'il n'avait pas d'autorisation pour entrer en pourparlers avec les Germano-Russes. Néanmoins, une conversation privée eut lieu entre lui et le colonel russe Schtchepkine. Celui-ci lui déclara que les Russes avaient perdu l'espoir de reconstituer la Russie avec l'aide des Alliés et n'y comptai[en]t parvenir qu'avec le secours allemand, qui leur était assuré. Si les Lithuaniens ne font pas obstacle à l'armée russe, ils peuvent être certains d'obtenir une autonomie dans l'empire russe. L'armée russe ne peut pas évacuer la Lithuanie du Nord, car sa base se trouve en Allemagne à Tilsitt, d'où elle peut obtenir des armes, des munitions et autres choses nécessaires.

Notre Délégué nous a rapporté cet entretien à titre d'information.

Officiellement, nous avons reçu quelques renseignements et documents sur l'attitude de l'armée russe-allemande entre le 10 et le 15 octobre. D'abord un radio signé Avaloff et adressé au Général Denikine a été intercepté à Kovno. Dans ce télégramme, le Colonel Avaloff affirmait qu'il avait attaqué les Lettons parce qu'ils refusai[en]t le passage sur le front bolcheviste. Ayant assuré sa base du côté des Lettons, il promettait d'attaquer les troupes bolchevistes de l'Est pour assurer la marche sur Moscou à l'armée de Denikine. Un autre commandant russe, le Colonel Vyrgolitch avait envoyé une note au gouvernement de Lithuanie qui fut reçue le 14 octobre à Kovno. Dans cette note, il constatait d'abord qu'il n'avait pas l'intention de se mêler aux affaires de la République de Lithuanie, qu'il déplorait les événements de Chavli, où une compagnie lithuanienne avait été désarmée par l'armée russe, enfin que son intention était de rejoindre les Russes qui combattaient les Bolchevistes sur le front. Ce qui est d'importance dans son message c'est qu'il prétend agir selon les ordres du Général Youdenitch.

Enfin, des télégrammes furent échangés entre moi-même et le Comte von Pahlen, l'ancien gouverneur de Vilna. Ces télégrammes furent signés par lui comme Président du Conseil Central auprès de l'armée russe de l'Ouest. Le premier télégramme contenait une réponse à la lettre du baron von der Ropp. Cette réponse confirme qu'à l'instant du déclanchement des hostilités contre les Lettons, Ropp se trouvait en Courlande et que, le 10 octobre, il considérait le plan comme manqué. Voulant passer pour un ami des Lithuaniens, il protestait en leur nom contre les procédés des Russes contre les soldats lithuaniens.³ Dans ma réponse, je me bornai à constater que Ropp n'était pas du tout en rapport avec le gouvernement de Lithuanie et qu'en général, il n'avait pas le droit de parler au nom des Lithuaniens. Là-dessus, le Comte Pahlen, à la date du 13 octobre, répondit que les sentiments exprimés dans sa lettre au baron von der Ropp étaient destinés au gouvernement lithuanien. Ayant appris la mystification que s'était permis le baron, le Comte Pahlen pria d'envoyer un représentant autorisé auprès du Conseil Central russe à Mitau.

Tous ces actes permettraient de conclure à un certain esprit de conciliation chez les Russes. Mais ces affirmations amicales étaient-elles bien sincères? Nous avons plus d'un raison d'en douter. Dès le commencement des hostilités contre les Lettons, il y eu[t] des proclamations russes distribuées parmi la population lithuanienne dans lesquelles on annonçait la reconstruction d'une Russie indissoluble et indivisible. Pour la bonne conduite des Lithuaniens envers les Russes, on promettait de voter pour l'autonomie de la Lithuanie au sein de l'Empire russe, quand l'assemblée constituante russe serait convoquée.

D'autre part, les troupes germano-russes se comportent en Lithuanie, comme en pays conquis. Au commencement de leur offensive contre les Lettons, les Russes s'étaient emparés des postes téléphoniques et télégraphiques de Chavli. Il était inderdit de communiquer avec les autorités lithuaniennes de Kovno autrement qu'en russe. Des sommes qui se trouvaient

³ See No. 139.

dans les caisses d'État locales furent enlevées. Le commandant militaire lithuanien de Chavli, Birmantos [? Birontas], put s'évader seulement sous le déguisement d'un prêtre.

La population qui subit journellement des actes de violence de la part des Germano-Russes, devient de plus en plus inquiète. Si le gouvernement lithuanien ne lui prête pas l'aide nécessaire, elle va se révolter et massacrer les Allemands et les Russes. L'armée lithuanienne d'autre part ne peut pas rester indifférente devant le spectacle de ces affronts continuels infligés à ses frères.

No. 172

Colonel Ward (Kovno) to Earl Curzon (Received November 3)¹

No. 138 Telegraphic [599/2/5/20049]

KOVNO, October 30, 1919

Latest German plan according to fairly reliable information is to organise new state called Ost Deutschland consisting of East Prussia, Lithuania and Latvia, which will secede temporarily from Germany in order to escape from pressure of Allies.

¹ The file copy of this telegram is missing from the main archives of the Foreign Office, and the present text is supplied from the archives of the British Delegation in Paris.

No. 173

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received October 31)

No. 202 Telegraphic [147310/139661/59]

RIGA, October 30, 1919

My telegram No. 193.¹

I propose to attempt journey to Kowno leaving Riga November 2nd. May I receive by return brief indication of His Majesty's Government's policy regarding Polish action against Bermont?

¹ No. 165.

No. 174

Note by Mr. Gregory of a Conversation with M. Kopwillem

[148930/855/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 30, 1919

The Esthonian Representative called to-day to enquire (1) the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to the negotiations now proceeding between the Esthonians and the Letts for common action against the Germans: (2) whether His Majesty's Government desired the Esthonians to enter the field against the Germans: (3) whether the Inter-Allied Military Mission intended to deal with Bermont as well as Eberhardt: (4) whether

the contingency contemplated in our telegram of September 25¹ had arisen, namely, the reversal of the decision not to supply arms and ammunition to the Esthonians in the event of the existence of their country being imperilled.

With regard to (1) and (2), I said that I imagined His Majesty's Government would prefer to leave the adjustment of relations between Esthonia and Latvia to the Governments of those countries, and that Esthonia must settle for herself what part she should play in the present situation.

As regards (3), I understood that the Inter-Allied Military Mission would deal with Bermont equally with Eberhardt.

As regards (4), I must submit the point to the Secretary of State and would let M. Kopwillem have an answer in due course.²

J. D. GREGORY

¹ No. 445.

² On November 13, 1919, Mr. Gregory, in pursuance of this undertaking, wrote to inform M. Kopwillem that 'in view of the Russo-German attack on Latvia certain supplies of arms and ammunition have been supplied by His Majesty's Government to the Lettish Government'. These were the supplies referred to in No. 194.

No. 175

*Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 27 [153675/4232/18]

BERLIN, October 30, 1919

... Turning² from internal to external politics, the question of the Baltic Provinces and Bermont's Army is really causing great anxiety. The blockade is a serious matter for coastal trade and traffic with neutral countries, yet the Government, while genuinely trying to carry out the wishes of the Entente, is now powerless to do so. They have let things go too far. General von See[c]kt³ has been sent to East Prussia to try to bring the people there to reason, and to stop the traffic across the frontier. At the same time money is being printed in Berlin for the West Russian Government, and recruits are leaving for Kurland two or three times a week.

Many millions of marks, and roubles, of paper money have been seized by Herr Noske, but in many ways the Government is extraordinarily ill-informed as to what is going on. So much so that it has been necessary for me to hand to Herr Noske two reports upon matters which are almost common knowledge, except in actual detail, outside Government circles. How such things are possible in view of the secret service system, I cannot say, but it is certain that the British Mission is in possession of many facts which have not hitherto been known to the Reichswehr Minister. I can only conclude that, somehow or other, information is deliberately concealed from him and from the Government. It comes to us on account of the predominant part which we have hitherto played in the repatriation of Prisoners of War.

¹ A copy of this report was received in the Foreign Office on November 19, 1919.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

³ At that time Director of the *Allgemeines Truppenamt* established after the dissolution of the German Great General Staff.

With reference to this Baltic question, a curious story is now going about in certain circles in Berlin to the effect that Bermont is being secretly supported by Denikin through the medium of agents in this city. The alleged reason for his doing so is that he intends in some way to use Bermont as a threat against the Entente with the object of compelling the recognition, ultimately, of a united Russia without self-government for the Baltic States. . . .²

No. 176

*Baron von Lersner to M. Clemenceau*¹

No. 43 [151874/141673/2150]

(Translation)

PARIS, October 30, 1919

Sir,

I am instructed by the German Government to reply as below to your communication of October 27.²

The Interallied Naval Commission transmitted the following wireless to the German Naval Commission on October 10,³ viz:—

‘Owing to the attack on Riga, all navigation permits for German ships in the Baltic are temporarily suspended. Ships at present at sea in the Baltic are recalled and no other ships will be given permission to proceed to the Baltic while this suspension lasts. German ships found at sea in the Baltic are subject to seizure by the Allies. Minesweepers are recalled.’

The request of the German Naval Commission for confirmation that German navigation in German territorial waters would not be impeded was answered as follows by the Interallied Naval Commission on October 14:—

‘The suspension of free navigation for German ships includes territorial waters.’

The blockade on those waters was only withdrawn by wireless of October 26. According to information which has reached the German Government, there are in the Reval roadstead 8 German ships, most of which were stopped by English naval forces in Estonian territorial waters and escorted there, while the remainder were prevented from leaving that port. Other ships are detained in Libau, among them a tug with two lighters and a cargo of 1,400 tons of coal stopped in Pillau roadstead on their way to Königsberg. Two small sailing boats on their way from Finland to the Netherlands were seized near the Danish coast. All these ships had the necessary permit from the Interallied Naval Commission and some of them had left before the announcement of the blockade by the Commission, others at a time which made due warning impossible (partly on account of lack of W/T installations). These

¹ A copy of this note was communicated by the British Delegation in Paris to the Foreign Office on November 12 (received November 14).

² This note was that approved by the Supreme Council on October 25, and printed in Vol. II, No. 6, appendix C.

³ Cf. No. 138, note 1.

measures have also done very serious damage to the economic life of Germany. Numerous German ships are shut up in German Baltic ports. Indispensable raw materials (ores, etc.) and food supplies, especially meat and potatoes bought in Denmark, cannot be brought to the German market owing to the impossibility of placing German tonnage at their disposal, which is a serious matter in view of the extremely unfavourable potato harvest. The extension of the blockade to fishing (which can only be practised within territorial waters to a very limited extent and yields very little) not only causes a very considerable falling off in the food supplies of the great inland towns, since the Baltic fisheries yield several thousand tons daily, but also heavy loss to the fishing population—which alone numbers 15,000, exclusive of dependents. These losses cannot be made good merely by allowing free navigation in territorial waters. This restriction will in particular render considerably more difficult the transport of coal required to prevent the complete breakdown of economic life in East Prussia. The utter impossibility, due to the blockade extending even to territorial waters, of assisting the heavily congested railways by means of water transport has already led to the closing down of the electrical works at Königsberg, where the gas and water works are also threatened with idleness.

In its Notes concerning withdrawal from the Baltic, and especially those of October 3 and 16,⁴ the German Government demonstrated that it had striven by every means in its power energetically to effect the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic and Lithuania. In their Note of October 10,⁵ the Allied and Associated Governments expressly approved the nature of the measures taken for this purpose by the German Government. They also accepted the proposal that Allied representatives should be sent to enquire more closely into the measures taken and, if necessary, to make other proposals. While referring to its Note of October 16 for a detailed statement of its attitude, the German Government wishes to point out that the German military authorities were not concerned in the operations near Riga given as the ultimate reason of the measures taken by the Interallied Naval Commission. In so far as any former German troops now under West Russian command may have taken part in it, the German Government can only repeat that for its part it made every effort to prevent this. If, despite this state of things, a blockade is decreed against German shipping and wide stretches of German coast and even occasionally over German territorial waters which avowedly come under German sovereignty according to international law, the German Government must solemnly protest before the whole world against these unjustifiable reprisals which have caused serious loss to countless Germans who took no part whatever in the Baltic happenings.

The German Government has noted from your communications of 27th instant that the Interallied Naval Commission has been instructed to do all in its power to meet our protests—which have, moreover, by no means been confined to fishing boats and other small craft. It must, however, point out that hitherto, apart from the wireless of 26th instant mentioned above and

⁴ See No. 117, note 2, and No. 142.

⁵ See No. 128.

from permission to resume the work of minesweeping granted at our special request the competent German authorities have received no communication from the said Naval Commission, either with reference to fishing (especially mentioned in their Note of 27th instant) or with reference to transports from neutral countries (which were not mentioned). On the other hand, as was at once pointed out by the German Peace Delegation, the German Government can perceive no military reasons for the continuation of these oppressive restrictions. Military reasons can at most be alleged for a blockade of the coast from the German frontier to the southern frontier of Finland, but not for holding up all German Baltic navigation outside German territorial waters.

The German Government, therefore, once more urgently requests the Allied and Associated Governments to rescind completely and at once a measure which was expressly described as temporary when instituted, and to order that all detained ships found to have been unaware of the blockade at the time of their detention shall be restored to their owners.

I remain, etc.,

FREIHERR VON LERSNER

No. 177

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Colonel Rowan Robinson (Kovno)

No. 2 Telegraphic [599/2/5/20049]

PARIS, October 31, 1919

Reference your RR. 141¹ dated October 28, General Niessel, who is very shortly proceeding to Baltic States via Berlin as President of the Allied Commission to arrange for German evacuation, would prefer bridge not to be destroyed as it would inevitably delay evacuation and would be used by Germans as a pretext for relieving themselves of their responsibility in the matter.

It is realised, however, that at this distance and with a situation which is constantly changing we are not in a position to give definite orders on the subject.

¹ No. 167.

No. 178

Earl Curzon to Sir C. Marling (Copenhagen)

No. 1472 Telegraphic [147560/141673/2150]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 2, 1919

Restrictions on German shipping in the Baltic.

Naval Authorities have been instructed, in accordance with decision of Supreme Council,¹ to avoid unnecessary interference with innocent neutral cargoes and with German local fisheries and coastal trade.

You should verbally inform Government to which you are accredited that all applications for free passages for German ships should be made through

¹ Decision of October 22, 1919: see Vol. II, No. 4, minute 9.

Admiral Goette, President of the German Naval Armistice Commission, to the President of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

Sent to Stockholm and Christiania.

No. 179

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 1320 Telegraphic [146745/61232/59]

Your telegram No. 1499.¹

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 2, 1919

Our view is that the political scope of General Niessel's Mission should be limited as much as possible and that it should confine itself to its primary duty of controlling the evacuation of the Baltic States by the German troops.² General Haking will proceed to join Yudenitch as British representative, his functions being quite apart from those of Niessel's Mission, with which however he will of course act in the most cordial co-operation.

¹ No. 168.

² The instructions to be given to General Niessel were further considered by the Supreme Council on November 5: see Vol. II, No. 14, minute 4.

No. 180

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Riga)

No. 112 Telegraphic [147310/139661/59]

Your telegram No. 202.¹

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 3, 1919

So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned they are doubtful of the wisdom of Poland embarking on operations against Bermont, particularly in view of the existing dearth of military equipment in Poland, but this question will no doubt be dealt with by General Niessel's mission which is about to start for the Baltic, and it would therefore be better for you for the time being to avoid expressing any opinion on the subject.

¹ No. 173.

No. 181

Note by Colonel Maude of a Conversation with Lieutenant Graublin in Berlin¹

[151391/4232/18]

BERLIN, November 3, 1919

This officer is a member of the Anti-Bolshevik League referred to in my last report.² He was formerly representative of the Inter-Allied Commission in the prisoners of war camp at Crossen.

¹ This note was communicated to the Director of Military Intelligence under cover of General Malcolm's dispatch No. 7778/1/14 of November 3 (copy received in Foreign Office on November 12).

² Not printed. A report on the activities of the Anti-Bolshevik League is printed in Vol. II, No. 18, appendix C.

He confirms the views expressed in my last report, viz., that Krupps backed Bermont financially and with war material.

He has considerable knowledge of the affairs of the Schilde Konsortium.

He states definitely that Bermont's money has given out again and that the Deutsche Schwere Industrie are unlikely to give him further support.

The Deutsche Schwere Industrie are transferring their activities to Denikin.

Bermont sent a courier to Denikin a fortnight ago asking for financial help.

Lieutenant Graublin confirms the previous report that Krupps have broken up and reconverted an enormous amount of German war material.

The Anti-Bolshevik League are very anxious to obtain permission from the Supreme Council to transport about 200 tons of ammunition (mainly small arms) to Denikin as quickly as possible.³ The reason for this haste is that Krupps apparently are under orders to make away with all German war material which they have taken over, by the middle of November.

C. R. MAUDE

³ For a decision of the Supreme Council in this matter see Vol. II, No. 18, minute 5.

No. 182

*Colonel Rowan Robinson (Kovno) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received November 8)*¹

No. 144 Telegraphic [599/2/5/20135]

KOVNO, November 4, 1919

At a meeting of Lithuanian and German representatives held on October 30 . . .² arrangements satisfactory to both parties were arranged for facilitating evacuation of German troops.

¹ This telegram was repeated to the War Office and British Missions at Riga and Helsingfors.

² The text here is uncertain.

No. 183

Colonel Tallents (Kovno) to Earl Curzon (Received November 6)

No. RR. 151 Telegraphic [150323/61232/59]

KOVNO, November 4, 1919

Part 1.—I had a long (?) explanation¹ with the Lithuanian President, and Prime Minister Galvanauskas, whom I met for the first time, is a man of first-rate intelligence. Following are their main views of the (?) Bermondts position. Begins:—

1. Latest report . . .² that men are still coming from Germany and plenty of material is returning. It is vital that this traffic should be stopped, and it could be done by the immediate occupation of Memel by an Allied force.

¹ In a text of this telegram received by the British Delegation in Paris this read: '? conversation'.

² The text here is uncertain.

2. Bermondts's soldiers (?), but not his officers, are already demoralised. During the last five days the Lithuanians have bought 80,000 S.A.A. and some rifles from them . . .² offer. While depriving Bermondts, such purchases would be the cheapest way of equipping Lithuanian army, but the Government has not the necessary money.

Part 2.—3. They strongly deprecate Polish intervention. They believe that after advancing the Poles would copy the Germans and continually postpone (?) their withdrawal. They point out that greater Russia aims coincide with theirs as to the necessity of banishing the Poles from Lithuania, though doubtless differing as to her future status.

4. If the Germans fail to withdraw, they urge the occupation of Frankfort as striking directly at the high financial interests which are supporting Bermondts.

Part 3.—General Crozier,³ Colonel Robinson, Colonel Ward and I agree on the (?) appreciation of situation:—

1. Lithuania and Courland must at all cost be cleared of German and Russian soldiers.

2. Polish intervention is the last price to be paid for this end.

3. If (a) Memel is promptly occupied;

(b) the *Vera's* cargo reaches Riga;

(c) Lithuanians receive equipment through Poland, or are provided with 2,000,000 marks to buy equipment from Bermondts;

(d) pressure on Germany is maintained and, if necessary, extended to occupation of Frankfort, the country could probably be cleared without Polish intervention.

Having been informed only that General Niessel is slowly travelling to Berlin, we are all in the greatest need of information as to Allied views and plans.

³ Head of a British military mission recently attached to the Lithuanian army for organizing purposes: cf. No. 192.

No. 184

*Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 28 [154675/4232/18]

BERLIN, November 6, 1919

. . . Herr² Noske continues, to the best of his ability, his efforts to suppress recruiting for the forces in Kurland, and in spite of secret opposition has met with some success. The best informed opinions here believe that the 3,000 Diebitch troops will return from Lithuania, and about 5,000, mostly technical, troops will come back from Kurland. This will leave about 30,000 to be dealt with by the Baltic Commission which arrives here tomorrow.

Admiral Hopmann has been appointed the German representative to meet General Niessel, as it was considered that it would be easier for a sailor to act in this capacity than for a soldier. . . .²

¹ A copy of this report was received in the Foreign Office on November 22, 1919.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

No. 185

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)

No. 215 Telegraphic [150190/61232/59]

RIGA, November 7, 1919

Following my visit to Kovno, Latvian Government are inviting Lithuania to an immediate military conference. This should do much to improve present unsatisfactory relations due to (? Latvia)n overtures to Poland and Lithuanian agreement with Eberhardt.

Repeated to Paris.

No. 186

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)

No. 216 Telegraphic [150191/61232/59]

RIGA, November 7, 1919

Latvian Government wishes to break off diplomatic relations with Germany without declaring war. They specify as grounds:

1. Present hostilities by Germans and continued enlistment into Bermont organisation.
2. Departure of German Consulate from Riga without notice.
3. Prevention by Germans of Lettish mobilisation in Courland and encouragement of Bermont organisation.
4. Atrocities and continual provocation towards Letts.

They apparently regard this as a means of laying on Germany cost of all damage to Riga. They ask my opinion. I have declined to answer pending reference to you. I request instructions by telegraph.

Repeated to Paris.

No. 187

Report by General Turner¹ (Berlin)²

No. 1 [606/2/20/20499]

BERLIN, November 9, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to forward report as under on the work carried out by the Allied Commission for the evacuation of the Germans from the Baltic provinces during period 28th October to 10th November, at Paris 28th October to 5th November:—

1. The various members of the mission assembled at Paris and conferences were held under presidency of General Niessel to discuss in general the tasks entrusted to the mission and the means proposed for carrying out these tasks.

¹ British representative on General Niessel's mission.

² A copy of this report to the Secretary of State for War was received by the British Delegation in Paris on November 18, 1919, and transmitted to the Foreign Office on December 5.

Information was gathered on the present situation in the Baltic from available military sources and from the various accredited political representatives of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania whom the commission interviewed.

2. The mission left Paris on the evening of the 5th, and staying a few hours only in Cologne, arrived at Berlin on morning of the 7th.

3. On the evening of the 7th instant the first conference was held between the delegates of the German Government and the Allied Commission.

The German delegates were under the presidency of Admiral Hoffmann [Hopmann], who was assisted by Major von Kessler, one other military member and a representative of the German Foreign Office.

After the commission had examined the credentials of the German delegates, the task entrusted to the mission was explained and it was pointed out that the Allied Governments would hold the German Government and the German people responsible for the course of events in the Baltic provinces in so far as the actions of either German troops or officials or German and Russian troops were concerned.

A document expressing the demands of the commission was then handed to the German delegates.

The document was divided into four parts as under:—

(a) Statistical information required on the following subjects:—

1. Location of headquarters.
2. Numbers and distribution of troops.
3. Location of supply and munition depots.
4. Transport facilities for the evacuation.

(b) Copies of orders already issued by the German Government on the subject of (1) evacuation of Baltic provinces; (2) the organised control of all personnel and material passing the frontier; (3) the closing of all bureaux in Berlin and elsewhere concerned in recruiting propaganda for, or financial support of German military enterprises in the Baltic.

(c) Measures proposed by German Government for carrying out evacuation of all German personnel and material of German origin, for preventing pillage, destruction or removal of munitions or property of the Baltic States concerned, and for ensuring that railway services in areas evacuated could continue their normal services.

(d) Information as to steps taken to facilitate the work of the mission and the individual members throughout the area under consideration, and a demand that the delegates selected by the German Government should possess full authority to issue orders in conformation with wishes of commission to all local German authorities, military or otherwise.

4. The next conference was held the following evening (8th instant).

The information supplied by German delegates in answer to questions requiring detailed replies was very incomplete.

They advanced as cause for the want of precision in their answers the lack of communications, the difficulty of obtaining information from Germano-

Russian headquarters, and their lack of knowledge concerning personnel and material which had been despatched by private German enterprise and without approval or knowledge of Government officials.

I personally am of the opinion that the German Government intends to act in good faith and that they are anxious to clear up the situation.

It was resolved that should sufficient detailed information still be unavailable during the course of the next forty-eight hours, that the War Council at Paris should be so informed, and that the commission should proceed to the frontier in order to endeavour to obtain the necessary information locally.

5. A further conference was held by the commission to interview local representatives of Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Governments.

6. It is the present intention of the commission to leave Berlin Tuesday³ morning for Tilsit, spending a few hours only at Königsberg in order to interview German authorities there.

7. An interview is being given by Herr Noske, the German War Minister, to the commission to-morrow morning, 10th instant.

8. I have instructed such members of the British Military Mission at Kovno as can be spared from their duties there to report to me at Tilsit, in order that frontier controls may be organised with least possible delay. This conforms to similar instructions issued by General Niessel to French Military Mission at Kovno.

9. I have wired to British Mission, Reval, instructions to send the remainder to [? of] my Staff, as detailed in my special instructions from War Office, to meet me at Tilsit on the 14th instant.

10. My appreciation of the situation based on information available up to the present and formed at a considerable distance from the area under consideration is as follows:—

(a) The German Government in Berlin is willing to co-operate with the Allied Commission and has already issued strong orders on the subject (2nd October), but at present lacks the power to ensure that these orders are obeyed and has taken no punitive measures against proved offenders, and is still unable to stop considerable bodies of troops and large quantities of material from crossing the frontier.

(b) It is possible that the German Government might have acted with greater vigour and produced more visible effect had the Allies given greater evidence of their determination to insist on the withdrawal of German troops at an earlier stage in the situation, before the German and German-Russian forces had become so disintegrated and so undisciplined and before the organised recruiting and financial support had assumed its present dimensions.

(c) Furthermore it should be recognised that we are confronted by a two-fold problem.

The evacuation of loyal and obedient German elements which may possibly offer no great difficulties, and the evacuation of a much greater number of lawless undisciplined Germans, recognising no authority but that of their immediate superiors and who are rapidly developing into marauding bands.

³ November 11, 1919.

A reasonable estimate of purely German elements of this type is 25,000, and this problem presents very considerable difficulties.

(d) I am, therefore, of the opinion that we shall be unable to complete our task without resource to military force, either Allied or local, and I am aware of some of the difficulties involved in the question of Allied military action, and at the same time it does not appear probable that an efficient local force could be organised without a considerable amount of training and importation of arms from Allied sources.

11. Enclosed are the reports on events up to 31st October, handed to the Commission by the German delegates.⁴

12. Should any information of value or interest result from to-morrow's interview with Herr Noske or the conference with the German delegates it will be forwarded as soon as possible.

13. It has been arranged that General Dupont of the French Army shall for the present act as intermediary between the Berlin Government and the Allied Commission and watch the interests of the Commission in Berlin. He has, in addition, been specially charged with the duty of assuring that the measures taken by the German Government for the prevention of propaganda and the despatch of financial support from Germany to Bermont are adequate.

I have, &c.,

A. J. TURNER, *Brigadier-General*⁵

Copies: British Military Section, Hotel Astoria, Paris; General Malcolm (no enclosures); File 2.

⁴ Not annexed to filed original.

⁵ This and subsequent reports by General Turner (Nos. 199, 205, 210, 214) may be compared with the detailed account of the work of this Allied Commission given by General A. Niessel: *L'évacuation des pays baltiques par les Allemands* (Paris, 1935) *passim*. This account includes extracts from minutes of the proceedings of the commission.

No. 188

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 7420 [147211/139661/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 10, 1919*

Sir:—

I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter No. 0149/8236 (M.I. 2) of the 30th ultimo which has been received from the War Office, relative to the employment of the Polish Army in order to bring about the evacuation of the German forces in the Baltic States. I fully concur in the terms of this letter and I would add that even in the event of General Niessel strongly recommending the employment of the Polish Army against the Russo-German forces, I should be unwilling to countenance it.

I am, etc.,

(for the Secretary of State)

GERALD SPICER

0149/8236 (M.I. 2.)

WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.

October 30, 1919

Sir:—

I am commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 141196/W/59, dated the 22nd October, regarding a conversation held in Paris on the 13th instant between Sir Eyre Crowe and Marshal Foch.¹

In reply I am to say that the Council are strongly opposed to the employment of the Polish Army for the enforcement of the Entente will upon the Germans, with regard to their attitude towards the Baltic States. The military advice given by their representatives in Paris has consistently been of this nature, and the Council feel that it is totally undesirable to embroil Poland with Germany at this juncture.²

I am, etc.,

B. B. CUBBITT

¹ See No. 135.² The latter part of this letter, relating to Syria (cf. No. 135), was not transmitted to Sir E. Crowe under cover of the above dispatch.

No. 189

Baron von Lersner to M. Dutasta¹

[152623/141673/2150]

PARIS, November 10, 1919

Translation.

Sir,

In continuation of the verbal and written communications which I have had the honour to make to Your Excellency regarding the blockade in the Baltic, I am directed by my Government to request that the validity of the general sailing permits in force prior to October 10 of the current year shall be renewed in respect to Baltic navigation. At present the Interallied Naval Commission issues a special sailing permit for each separate voyage, which gives rise to much loss of time, in view of the large number of requests daily put forward under this head.

I should further be grateful to Your Excellency if the steamers and sailing vessels still held up might be released as soon as possible.

I remain, etc.,

FREIHERR VON LERSNER

¹ A copy of this note was transmitted by Sir E. Crowe to Lord Curzon on November 14 (received November 17).

No. 190

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 11)
No. 1617 Telegraphic [150606/4232/18]

COPENHAGEN, November 10, 1919

Following from Military Attaché for Director of Military Intelligence, 78.
Following information from Mr. Caro, source reliable.

In spite of recent arrest[s] in Berlin¹ real chiefs of Western Government have been left alone as for example Baskubski [Biscoupski] and Dournovo. Latter was recently in Stockholm incognito as Colonel von Schultze and was much together with Behrmann, correspondent of *Vossische Zeitung*. Behrmann is to act as intermediary for correspondence between German-Russians and Baltic, Finland, Sweden and Norway.

General Gurko is now in Berlin. Rumour says Gurko has been to Mitau and conferred with Bermont but this is sent under greatest reserve.

¹ Cf. No. 195.

No. 191

Colonel Rowan Robinson (Kovno) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received November 11)
No. RR. 167 [599/2/5/20450]

KOVNO, November 10, 1919

Robbery and debauchery by German troops in Lithuania outrageous. Since promise last week of theirs to complete evacuation within 14 days no Germans have left Lithuania.

No. 192

Colonel Ward (Kovno) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28)
No. 6 [156362/8/59]

KOVNO, November 11, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to report that since my last report Major-General Crozier and his staff have arrived in Kovno, being attached to the Lithuanian Army for organizing purposes.

German Troops: On November 2 an agreement was made between the Lithuanians and Germans defining their respective fronts and arranging some other points which have hitherto caused friction. I enclose a copy of this agreement.¹ It is not a satisfactory arrangement, the principal mistake in it being that it gives no definite date by which the Germans shall have evacuated Lithuania, or even a date by which the agreement is to be abrogated. The actual evacuation is hardly making any headway, and there are

¹ Not printed.

still troops and supplies coming in from across the frontier. The only way to stop this will be the occupation of Memel, regarding which a telegram has already been sent. The Germans and Russo-Germans are all mixed up in the occupied district, and von Eberhardt, whose mission was to evacuate the Germans, seems to be more concerned in settling in the Russo-Germans. He is doing his best to arrange for retaining control of the railways and railway material, even after his troops have gone, on the ground, as he says, of finally handing over to General Niessel's commission. This is a trick for letting Russo-Germans get control of the railways after he has gone, and steps should be taken to prevent this without delay by insisting on his handing over the railways to the Governments of the countries to which they belong.

The behaviour of the German troops becomes worse and worse. I have before me a list of complaints, dated the 7th inst., from the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence to von Eberhardt, giving twenty-three authentic cases of outrages committed by the Germans since the 21st ult. The following in brief are the outrages:—

1. German troops broke up telephone station at Szilany.
2. On the 22nd ult. the same occurred at Yurburg.
3. On the 24th ult. at Krottingen, they broke up all the Lithuanian administrative offices, destroyed and took away books and documents, robbed the post-office safe, and ill-treated the watchman. They plundered a watchmaker's shop, and rode away on Lithuanian horses to Polangen.
4. On the 25th ult. a German cyclist company stole 2,000 marks from Rossieny.
5. On the 29th ult. they came again to Krottingen, disarmed the town guard and militia, and plundered the inhabitants.
6. On the 2nd inst. they killed an estate owner of the village Uzmarje.
7. On the 3rd inst. at the village Gudeszie, south-west of Radzivilishki, four soldiers raped the wife of an estate owner in front of him and his children, and afterwards made him kiss their hands.
8. At a village near Radzivilishki they robbed the inhabitants.
9. In Shavli the priest was robbed.
- 10, 11 & 12 are all cases of robbery at Radzivilishki.
13. On the 1st inst. 200 German soldiers took all the horses and cattle from the village Kauliuny.
14. On the 2nd inst., in the same village, the officer in command of the German troops compelled the inhabitants to give up 200 pairs of stockings and 300 pairs of gloves, 100 pairs of drawers, 100 shirts and 10 fur coats.
15. In order that the inhabitants of Radzivilishki and district should be helpless against the German soldiery, the German commandant ordered all civilians to give up their arms under penalty of death.
16. The Germans have not yet returned the confiscated locomotives, as promised in the agreement.
- 17, 18, 19 & 20 are robberies at Radzivilishki.

21. The German army is supplied with Bermont paper money, which is being printed in Berlin and is completely valueless. The inhabitants are being forced to accept this for purchases.

22. In the outskirts of Radzivilishki, Shavli, and Krottingen a vast amount of plundering is taking place, in which officers in masks also take part. (One such mask was taken from a German lieutenant and is now in possession of the Ministry of War.)

23. In the recent fighting between German and Lithuanian troops, thirty to forty Lithuanian soldiers were captured, and these men had their clothing taken from them, and the Germans are now wearing it.

As an example of the German official point of view, I enclose a letter from Herr Zimmerle,² the German Plenipotentiary here, to the Prime Minister, in which he reports that a detachment of German troops³ have crossed the frontier into Lithuania against the will of its Government, and that therefore the German Government cannot take any responsibility for their actions. I understand that these men amount to between 1,500 and 2,000. Of course the Lithuanian Government replied that they should have to hold the German Government responsible for everything that was done by these men while in Lithuania. This, I should like to point out, is only a confession on the part of the Germans of one definite case, but that quantities of similar cases have occurred and are still occurring where Germans did not make any report at all.

In connexion with the German occupation and the Russo-German enterprise, the following information has recently been received from a source that has usually been found reliable:

East Prussia, Lettland and Lithuania are to form a separate state called Ost Deutschland. This state will not for the present accept the orders of the German Government, but will return later into the fold, when Lettland and Lithuania have been consolidated and the dominating influence in Russia has been obtained. The affair is being financed by the big industrial groups in West Germany. The new state will be able to draw moral and material support from Germany, and yet the German Government will be able to disclaim any connexion therewith. The Entente will be unable to exercise its power satisfactorily or give much assistance to the Letts and Lithuanians. The new state will be the training ground and the munition factory for the greater Germany to be formed out of Ost Deutschland, Germany, Austria-Germany, and many [? any] states that may have temporarily seceded. At present East Prussia is settling [? seething] with this intrigue. There are recruiting offices in most villages and many munition depots. The watch on the frontier is a farce. A certain number of trainloads of troops have returned to Germany, but the men leave their arms behind and many more are coming into Lithuania than are going out of it. Such frontier officials as wish to act in accordance with their instructions are afraid to do so.

This scheme is of course only one of the successive variants of the original that have been produced to meet new conditions. The following methods,

² Not printed. The letter was as summarized by Colonel Ward. ³ Freikorps Rossbach.

in addition to those already applied, would exercise a depressing influence on its organizers:—

1. The occupation of Frankfurt.

2. The exaction of contributions from all occupied districts and the transfer of the money regularly to the Lettish and Lithuanian Governments in compensation for the damage done by the East-German troops. The money so obtained would enable these states to carry on a war against the invaders with some hope of success.

3. The immediate occupation of Memel internationalized area by as strong an Allied force as can now be spared.

Bermont's Troops: Recently Colonel Bermont wrote to the Lithuanian Government asking that he should be allowed to send two representatives to Kovno to enter into negotiations with the Lithuanian Government. This was flatly refused. It is understood that recruiting is going on busily for his army in Germany, and an immense amount of agitation and propaganda is being made as a final effort among the Germans in Courland and Lithuania to get them over into his forces. The Lithuanian Government have started propaganda on their part showing up the manner in which these troops are being swindled with promises and payments in worthless money by the West Russian Government which does not exist and has been recognised by no one.

The feeling in Lithuania against Germans and Russo-Germans is very strong, and the opinion is that their behaviour is worse than that of the Bolsheviks. If only the army were in a stronger position and supplied with arms and ammunition, it would willingly turn out this enemy by force of arms. It would be an easy matter, owing to the demoralization of the Germans and Russo-German troops, to buy up large quantities of their war material, if the Lithuanians had the money, but unfortunately the financial crisis is as acute as ever. A telegram was sent, while Colonel Tallents was here, asking that money or arms to the amount of two million marks might be supplied for this purpose. . . .⁴

I have, etc.,

R. B. WARD

⁴ The remainder of this dispatch, not printed, reported on Polish-Lithuanian relations and internal Lithuanian affairs.

No. 193

*General Burt (Riga) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received November 12)*¹

No. A.B. 586 Telegraphic [599/2/5/20450]

RIGA, November 12, 1919

November 8.² To-day's operations concluded the second battle of Riga. After a three days offensive and with the support of allied fleet the Letts

¹ This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation at Paris and British Missions at Reval, Kovno, and Libau.

² This telegram, dated November 8 in the text, was apparently not dispatched until November 12.

encircled the city on the west. The German Iron Division was defeated and thrown back in disorder to Olai midway between Riga and Mitau having abandoned three heavy and eight field guns, numerous trench mortars and machine guns. Town now free from German bombardment, demonstrations taking place in front of Allied Missions.

No. 194

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Riga)

No. 121 Telegraphic [148930/855/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 12, 1919*

In view of the Russo-German attack on Latvia the Cabinet has decided to send the Lettish Government military stores to the value of £16,000. One million rounds of small arms ammunition was despatched on October 18 on H.M.S. *Dunedin*, and the remaining $2\frac{1}{2}$ million rounds of this consignment are now awaiting tonnage. In addition a further consignment is awaiting shipment consisting of 10,000 rifles, 1,400 machine guns and 18 million rounds of small arms ammunition, for which financial authority had been obtained some time ago. If you consider necessary, the Lettish Government should be informed.

No. 195

*Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 29 [156209/4232/18]

BERLIN, *November 13, 1919*

. . . The² Baltic Commission, under General Niessel, which arrived in Berlin on Friday last,³ left for Tilsit on Tuesday⁴ night. The conferences with the representatives of the German Government ended satisfactorily, as the commission received all the information and powers for which it asked. This was to be expected, and the difficulties will not begin until General Niessel begins to negotiate with Bermont, Eberhardt, Wagner, and especially Bischoff.

It is something of a blow to our prestige that the conduct of our negotiations has been transferred from a British to a French General. Indeed, General Niessel was himself good enough to say that he felt that his position was, in this respect, extremely delicate. He was, perhaps, somewhat optimistic as to the results of his efforts, but he starts with the enormous advantage of having been able to deal directly with the German Government, and of being able to keep up direct communication through General Dupont, who is to act as the Berlin representative of the Baltic Mission.

¹ A copy of this report was received in the Foreign Office on November 27, 1919.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

³ November 7, 1919.

⁴ November 11, 1919.

I have little hesitation in saying that if similar direct communications had been established when General Gough's Mission first went to the Baltic, the whole situation would have been satisfactorily cleared up long ago. As it is, Bermont's Russo-German troops have been allowed time to consolidate their position, and they will now be much harder to dislodge than they would have been say in July or August. They have settled down to a sort of colonial existence; many of the troops are well off and regularly engaged in very remunerative commerce with Germany, a state of affairs which makes them most unwilling to come away.

On the other hand, the Government is at last acting really vigorously against the various organisations which have been working in Berlin, and many arrests have been made, partly, it is believed, as the result of the information provided by this Mission, and on the 11th instant, Herr Noske issued the following order:—

- (a) German subjects are forbidden to enter Russian service.
- (b) German military persons are forbidden to recruit for Russian service.
- (c) Recruiting in Russian prisoner of war camps is forbidden.
- (d) German military persons are forbidden to participate in any action for the sending of material to Russian formations.

Certainly this order is issued none too soon, especially if it is true, as reported in *Freiheit*, that a complete party of 2,000 men, known as the Rossbach detachment, left Colmsee (Thorn), reached Tilsit on October 30, and passed the frontier into the Baltic Provinces. The number given by *Freiheit*, two thousand, is probably nearly double the correct figure. . . .²

No. 196

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received November 15)

No. 220 Telegraphic [152122/139661/59]

RIGA, November 14, 1919

Prime Minister of Latvia requests following telegram may be transmitted to Mr. Lloyd George. (Begins.)

On the anniversary of the memorable day when German militarism, struck in the heart, was obliged to bow before the gallant valour of the victorious Allied Armies we are glad to bring to your notice that the attempts made by the remnants of German militarism to recover its former power by uniting itself with the dark forces of former Tsarist Russia have been checked at the gates of Riga. Gallant young Lettish army, poorly clad, insufficiently armed and equipped but inspired by sentiment of liberty and ready to die for independence and better future of its country, has thrown enemy back from shore of Dwina whence during last five weeks he has continuously been bombarding capital of Latvia with shells of different calibres and often charged with poisonous gases causing victims among peaceful citizens, women and children and old men. We beg to transmit through your inter-

mediary to British Nation and Government most heartfelt gratitude of Latvia and Government and [? for] assistance rendered by British Squadron in operations which have been crowned with success, as well as for supply of arms, munitions and equipment sent to Latvia, thus enabling her to maintain herself against enemy whose superiority both numerical and technical is evident. We hope that in her desperate struggle carried on in name of principles of liberty and civilization, which during last five years have also been and still are those of noble British Nation, Latvia can reckon with further assistance both material and moral from Great Britain and her Government. Ulmanis. (Ends.)¹

¹ Mr. Lloyd George inquired of the Foreign Office whether it was desirable to answer this telegram and, if so, in what sense. It was proposed by the Russia Department of the Foreign Office on November 21, 1919, that the Prime Minister should send a telegram to M. Ulmanis which would 'congratulate on the successful defence of Riga by the Letts against the Germans and repeat that H.M.G. will be always prepared to consider whether they can render assistance when the national existence and liberties of Latvia are threatened with extinction'. No file copy of such a telegram has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 197

Extract from Foreign Office Memorandum on The Baltic States and Germany¹

[155063/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 15, 1919

... E. *The Aims of Germany in the Baltic States.*²

With these facts set out, the main questions at issue can now be discussed, namely: (a) How far is the German Government involved in the action of the German forces in the Baltic? (b) What are the German aims?

With regard to (a) our information is certainly not sufficient to implicate the German Government as a whole. The latter have ostensibly given all the information at *their* disposal to the Niessel Mission, but, according to General Malcolm, there is a great deal going on behind the back of the German Government, or at least behind the back of Noske, who is believed to be genuinely trying to play straight and carry out the Peace contract. But he has had to employ many of the officials of the old régime in the departments under him, and there are a large number of them in the German War

¹ This memorandum was circulated by Lord Curzon to the Cabinet under cover of a brief note of November 21, 1919, in which he stated that he took this action in accordance with a request 'the other day in the Cabinet for an *aperçu* of the situation in the Baltic States, with reference more especially to German penetration and ambitions'.

² The first four parts (not printed) of this long memorandum were as follows: (A) Brief general sketch of the ethnographic composition, internal situation and political aspirations of the Baltic Provinces. (B) Relations between the Baltic Provinces and Russia. (C) Brief account of the German and Russian forces in the Baltic Provinces ('No exact figures of the German forces in the Baltic are forthcoming, but they are supposed to amount to anything between 40,000 and 100,000'). (D) A sketch of the previous activities of these forces and of the negotiations to secure their withdrawal, as given in preceding documents.

Office who are signing their names and putting the War Office stamp on orders and secret instructions of which Noske knows nothing, e.g., the movement orders to the various reinforcements, German and Russian, which have been leaving Berlin for the Baltic at midnight two or three times a week. But Noske deals promptly with a good proportion of the offenders whenever he finds them out. These officials are clearly acting as agents of various Conservative associations who are hoping to be the instruments of a Russian reaction, and who look to General von der Goltz, himself a thorough-going reactionary, as their leader. The latter is completely out of hand, and is in constant communication with Bermondts and with Bischoffsky [? Bis-coupski], who is the Russian moving spirit in Berlin.

The financing of the German-Russian forces is undertaken by a number of German financial firms, chiefly the Deutsche Schwere Industrie and the Schilde consortium in Berlin, while Krupp is playing a considerable role in supplying equipment and material. The following are instances of the activities of those firms which have come to our notice.

It appears that the Deutsche Schwere Industrie put enough money into Bermondts on October 1 to last him for six weeks, and simultaneously a wave of Russianism swept over Germany. In the meantime Virgolich, who had originally started as a purely anti-Russian-Bolshevist, collected his Russian officers and troops on the understanding that they should operate against the Russian Bolsheviks only. He collected for this purpose between 4,000 and 5,000 men; of his officers, two-thirds were Russians, and of his men two-thirds were Germans. His money, however, ran out at the end of September, at the same time as Bermondts's; but, unlike Bermondts, he failed to raise fresh funds in Berlin. Thereupon Bermondts, who, as just stated, was more successful and had got money from the Deutsche Schwere Industrie (and also from Swedish sources), bought him in exchange for his support. As soon as Virgolich's Russian officers realised what had happened they tried to break away from him, and this is the original cause of the movement which has lately been reported to us, namely, that a considerable proportion of his forces are anxious to join Yudenitch. The last information is that as many as 1,000 men are trying to make their way to him via Jacobstadt. It is believed that all the best Russian elements in Bermondts's army would follow suit if they were given any encouragement or knew how to get up to Yudenitch. As, however, Yudenitch's army will now be forced to disarm and disappear from Esthonia in the face of the impending conclusion of peace between the Esthonians and the Bolsheviks, the migration of Bermondts's Russians to Yudenitch will cease to be a practical question.

Again, as regards Krupp's part in the business, it appears that since the Armistice he has apparently bought back from the German Government enormous quantities of war material of all sorts. The bulk of this he has used for keeping his factories going by converting it into agricultural implements, &c. But in the middle of September he still found himself with a good deal of surplus material which had to 'vanish' by the time peace was ratified, presumably by the middle of November. Much of this he handed over to

Bermond, and supplemented it with money in return for future concessions in the Baltic and in Russia. Since Bermond failed he has opened up negotiations with Denikin's agent in Berlin on the same lines. He is operating through the Schilde consortium in Berlin, and has got one of his representatives in Schilde's office. His lead in backing these operations and the temporary successes of the three Russian leaders caused the Germans to wake up to the fact that their only hope of salvation lies in building themselves up on Russia, i.e., getting their raw material from Russia and even subsequently utilising Russian man-power against France.

The Germans are divided financially into two camps: the business men on the Rhine whose factories are working (thanks to the occupation) are all looking westward; the rest of Germany is all looking east. The Germans realise that, when the *valuta* is against any country, though *individuals* can quite easily buy in the more expensive market, the *national* wealth can only be righted by buying in a cheaper market, i.e., for Germany in Russia. There was an astonishing rush a few weeks ago to offer money to any Russian proposition, not only in Berlin, but in Dresden, Munich, &c., but the speculators had a bad set-back by the Yudenitch and Bermond fiasco. Now it looks as though the Germans, or at all events the Krupp group, will make a serious bid to get in with Denikin.

This all gives a picture, however fragmentary, of the trend of opinion among certain political and business circles in Germany towards Russia. It seems fairly clear that the support of the Baltic venture comes from private associations and not from the Government, who are, perhaps, ready, though impotent, to check it. The latter would no doubt be glad if it succeeded, but they have quite enough on their hands to risk a foreign enterprise which would easily bring them down.

Nevertheless, pressure put on the Government as such—especially if it is of the kind likely to affect the firms who have been speculating on Russia, such as the withholding of raw material, which is what we are now doing—ought not to be ineffective in stimulating them (the Government) to be more stringent in stopping money and supplies to the German and Russo-German forces in the Baltic. The danger is that by creating discontent in Germany we make their position more unsteady than it is and risk a convulsion which might result either in a reactionary *coup d'état* or a Spartacist outbreak.

The Germans in the Baltic are, however, evidently impervious to admonitions from Berlin, and, though they may be reduced to standing still through lack of supplies, they show no signs of allowing themselves to be actually dislodged except by the direct use of force. On the contrary, it is reported that fresh instalments of men are still arriving from Germany. They are said to be largely composed of men who have lost everything through the war, of dispossessed Alsace-Lorrainers, and of soldiers of fortune who have severed all ties with Germany and want to make their futures abroad. The only army that could be employed against them is the Polish army, and there are patent objections to adopting that expedient. Moreover, there are now indications that Polish-German hostility is dying down, and the Polish troops

might quite easily resent an attempt by the Allies to use them against the Germans. They recognise that they have got to live alongside Germany long after the Baltic question has been settled.

Accordingly the application of force is not seriously within the range of practical politics, and unless, therefore, the German Government are prepared, under economic pressure from us, *and able* to stop the despatch of supplies and reinforcements to their Baltic forces, and so immobilise the latter on the spot, we shall be obliged to admit our entire impotence to modify the situation. General von Eberhardt, who has succeeded General von der Goltz, for the ostensible purpose of effecting the evacuation, is every bit as deliberately obstructive as his predecessor. But he is not a d'Annunzio, and, in fact, there being no question of Irredentism in this case, Germany will neither be made delirious by the success nor shaken to her foundations by the failure of the Baltic enterprise. Our hope is, therefore, that the moderate parties in Germany, the Centre and the Majority Socialists, who are genuinely, we are told, averse to new adventures abroad, will eventually so dominate the internal German situation that the reactionary and imperialist parties and the speculators on Russia will find it increasingly difficult to play a game of their own.

(b) To state in a single definition the object of the German enterprise in the Baltic, or the aims of its various authors, is difficult with the insufficient data at our disposal. There must clearly be present to the minds of the subscribers a general sense of once more promoting *Deutschtum* abroad, but there can hardly at this point be a real consensus of opinion as to how that is to be done. For the majority of the troops employed, officers as well as men, colonisation is the main end in view. They have already taken root in the country where they have been engaged, and have become more colonists than fighting troops. For instance, they have taken over and have become shareholders in many of the Lettish sawmills, and are sending into Germany large quantities of milk and food of all descriptions, for which they receive no payment actually in the Baltic States, but for which they or their families receive payment in Germany. As much as 37 million marks' worth of goods are stated to have been thus imported into Germany last month without payment going out. It has already been mentioned that a large proportion of von der Goltz's army are men rendered homeless through the war. To them, therefore, the expedition has offered a new chance in life, and, far from being the conscious vanguard in the new *Aufmarsch im Osten*, all they ask is to be left alone and become harmless settlers in a fairly hospitable land.

There remains, however, the aim of von der Goltz, Eberhardt, and their like, both on the spot and in Germany, and there can be little doubt that for them the ultimate goal is the Germanisation of Russia, which will be brought about by utilising every force, every motive, every need of the German who is seeking fresh fields for migration or expansion. There are long gaps in the Baltic-Bolshevist front lines, and during the last year it is certain that large numbers of Germans have been swarming through. Whether these men are

Spartacists or not does not matter; it is a wiser creed for them, and, indeed, we have heard only within the last week of a German Soviet in Russia. What matters is that, from the great jumping-off ground of a half Germanised Latvia, only Germans have been free to make their way across the frontier into the interior. It is generally predicted that when the veil is eventually lifted from Soviet Russia the whole country will be found dotted with German farms and settlements and Germans well ahead in the race for trade. These people will rapidly shed their Spartacist colouring and supply the human material necessary for rebuilding Russia in German form. This will apply equally whether the rebirth of Russia is brought about by transformation from within or by salvation from without. In any case it is obviously the game of the German parties that place on the forefront of their programme the conversion of Russia into a German colony, to have their men on the spot ready for all emergencies that the future may throw up. The Germans, as neighbours, not as psychologists, understand the Russians better than we do, and, what is worse, the age-long tendency of the Russians to turn to the Germans for statecraft shows no signs of diminution.

In conclusion, the relations between the Baltic peoples and their two big neighbours needs a short notice in estimating the prospects of the Germans on the territory of the former. The existing relations between the Baltic States and Russia have been already sketched (see B).³ But they are even now in process of change, like everything else in Eastern Europe. The cleavage between all the border States and the anti-Bolshevist Russians is now almost a *fait accompli*. Since the Estonians 'let down' Yudenitch over the Petrograd [? advance] there is little hope of averting the ultimate revenge of the All-Russians against the little States. It is significant that Lettish and Lithuanian battalions with German commanders have recently been observed on the Bolshevik front against Denikin. Have the Baltic States definitely decided that their fate depends on the defeat of the anti-Soviet forces—that it is now a matter of life and death for them? They are working in increasingly close conjunction with Finland and Poland. Will they succeed in bringing about a combination of Border States—the *cordon sanitaire* at last? If so, this *cordon sanitaire* will now be not against Bolshevik Russia, but against anti-Bolshevist Russia, for peace between the States and the Soviet is almost a foregone conclusion. In this case will it eventually involve a German orientation in the policy of those States? It is largely up to us to prevent it. The Baltic States, having finally cast the die, will need at least moral protection against an unfavourable turn in the wheel of fortune. If they fail to get it from us they are bound to turn some day to Germany, and the foundations that Germany is laying now will then stand her in good stead.

³ See note 2 above.

No. 198

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Colonel Tallents (Riga)

No. 25 Telegraphic [599/2/5/20450]

PARIS, November 17, 1919

Your telegram No. 151¹ to Foreign Office (of November 4, German evacuation of the Baltic States).

Instructions given to General Niessel's mission are:—

(a) to obtain information from the German Government as to measures taken by it for evacuation:

(b) to supervise the execution of such measures:

(c) to demand further measures if necessary.

Evacuation to comprise German elements in Russian formations as well as German troops proper, and German civil functionaries except any accepted and approved by the Baltic Governments.

The commission reached Berlin on the 7th and demanded of the German Government:

(a) Precise statistical information as to number and position of forces, munitions, transport material, etc.:

(b) copies of all orders issued by the German Government regarding evacuation, control of personnel and prevention of recruiting or financial support in Germany itself:

(c) statement of measures proposed by the German Government for carrying out evacuation.

Information obtained on these points was inadequate, the German Government professing inability themselves to obtain detailed information from headquarters, and the mission has gone via Königsberg to Tilsit.

You will probably by now be in a position to communicate with General Turner and obtain later information from him direct.

¹ No. 183. With reference to this telegram Lord Curzon had on November 14, 1919, telegraphed to Sir E. Crowe requesting him to 'telegraph to Colonel Tallents a short statement of the Supreme Council's views and plans in regard to the evacuation of the Germans from the Baltic States'.

No. 199

*Report by General Turner (Tilsit)*¹

No. 2 [606/2/20/20818]

TILSIT, November 18, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to report as under on the work carried out by the Allied Commission during the period 10th November to 17th November, both inclusive:—

November 10. An interview was given to Allied Commission by Herr Noske, Minister of War, during which he showed himself fully disposed to

¹ This report, addressed as was No. 187, was received by the British Delegation in Paris on November 29, 1919, and transmitted to the Foreign Office on December 5.

accord the German delegates all necessary powers to act without further reference to Berlin on all questions connected with evacuation.

November 11. A final interview before departure was held in order to discuss details of journey and written authorities to be given to all members of the Commission, and all matters were dealt with in a highly satisfactory manner. Although precise information regarding disposition of troops was still lacking, the Mission then left for Koenigsberg.

Six demobilised British officers under Lieutenant-Colonel Dowdey, D.S.O., M.C., who had engaged in the Lithuanian army, passed through Berlin on the 11th November, on their way to join General Crozier at Kovno.

November 12. Interview with General von Esdorff at Koenigsberg. The Ober-Präsident of East Prussia, Herr Winnig, addressed the Allied Commission on subject of evacuation, but on venturing to raise controversial matters not directly relevant to the subject matter of the Commission, had to be very firmly called to order.

The attitude of German Chief of Staff was most unsatisfactory, and in general the local military authorities appeared anxious only to disclaim responsibility and to state their helplessness and ignorance of existing distribution of troops, and made no suggestions as to plans for carrying out the instructions of the Allied Governments.

The system of frontier control was examined and found to be practically non-existent, a state of affairs in which the Chief of Staff appeared to acquiesce.

It appeared also that the evacuation of the obedient troops had practically been completed.

November 13. The Commission left Koenigsberg at 4 A.M., and arrived at Tilsit a few hours later.

At an interview held during the morning, General Eberhardt, commanding the 6th Reserve Corps, and General Ehrhardt, commanding the Frontier Police, were present.

General Eberhardt appeared to consider that since all loyal German troops were in course of evacuation, nothing more could be done, but he was at once informed that he would be held responsible for all ex-German and Germano-Russian troops still in the Baltic.

The Frontier Control, consisting of military and civil police, and also Customs authorities, under no centralized control, appeared to be very inefficiently organised.

Certain general information regarding troops was supplied, and detail[ed] answers to all questions put by the Commission were promised.

The feature of this interview was manifestation of goodwill and eagerness to do everything possible to accelerate the evacuation, coupled with the usual confession of inability to cope with the situation.

The Commission decided to give General Eberhardt a short time to make further dispositions, and to collect further information, and took advantage of this pause to visit Kovno.

November 14. The Mission arrived at Kovno, and were very hospitably received by the Lithuanian Government.

The main object of the visit was to gather information on the following subjects:—

(a) General organisation of administrative services in the country, i.e., police force, &c., and in order to satisfy Commission that these services could continue their proper functions after the departure of the Germans.

(b) The railway organisation, and details as to personnel, locomotives and rolling stock.

(c) Military situation in general and especially in regard to military action against German and Russo-German forces.

The Lithuanian Government expressed their opinion that the population was being restrained with difficulty from acts of reprisal against German and Russo-German troops, owing to constant acts of pillage and violence committed by the latter, and that the entire population viewed with grave anxiety the action of the Poles in disregarding the line of demarcation as laid down by Marshal Foch.² While this subject is not within the powers of the Mission, I consider it necessary to state that the prestige of the *Entente* has been considerably lowered in Lithuania by the fact that it is apparently either unable or unwilling to enforce the instructions already given to the Polish Government—instructions which are quite clear as to the line to be held by Polish troops, and that the settlement of this state of affairs is essential if blows are to be avoided between the Lithuanians and Poles.

November 15. Very satisfactory answers to all questions were received from various heads of Departments of the Lithuanian Government.

The situation and possible plans of action were discussed with the local Allied Missions (Colonel Rowan Robinson and Colonel Reboul).

The Mission received a wire from Admiral Hopman, president of the German Delegation, stating that Colonel Bermont had placed himself and his troops under the command of General Eberhardt.

This removed the main difficulty presented by German authorities, and the situation assumed a more favourable aspect. The news was communicated as received to all Allied Missions.

November 16. The Mission left for Tilsit in the afternoon.

November 17. At Tilsit two conferences were held with the German delegates to discuss details of the evacuation, including questions of railway transport, billeting of troops, and the payment to them of recognised money (not Bermont money), handing over of rolling-stock, Allied control posts, and the attitude to be maintained by Lithuanian and Lettish troops during the German withdrawal.

The further movements of the Mission not decided on pending the arrival of detail[ed] situation reports from General Eberhardt, who left previous evening for Mitau, who would be able to say if movement to Riga would be possible.

² Cf. No. 7.

The Mission will probably proceed to Riga during the next few days, either by rail or sea.

In conclusion, the following points are brought to your notice:—

Existing British Mission at Kovno is doing most excellent work and I consider it out of the question to reduce this Mission at present below its existing establishment of two staff officers and one cypher officer, especially in view of the situation on the Bolshevik, German and Polish fronts.

At present neither Major Keenan's party³ with cypher officer's clerks and motor cars nor the eight control officers from Cologne have arrived.

With reference to seven-seater all-metal monoplane of German construction which landed prematurely in its flight from Colonel Bermont to Moscow, at Kovno,⁴ full details have been submitted by Lieut.-Colonel Ward, British Political Representative at Kovno, to Air Ministry.

I expect the situation will have been sufficiently cleared up during the next two or three days for me to make an appreciation of the situation and a forecast of future events.

You will be informed by wire of progress of evacuation, wires will be repeated to Berlin and Paris.

I have, &c.,

A. J. TURNER, *Brigadier-General*

Copies to Brit. Mil. Sect., Paris; British Mission, Berlin.

³ Major Keenan was in charge of a party of British military personnel detailed to proceed from Riga and report to General Turner.

⁴ For this incident see Vol. II, No. 4, minute 1.

No. 200

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to General Malcolm (Berlin)

No. 83 Telegraphic [607/1/4/20629]

PARIS, *November 20, 1919*

Following for General Turner for General Niessel's information at request of Naval Section. Begins.

Naval forces now in Gulf of Finland and Gulf of Riga will be withdrawn as soon as S.N.O. considers ice and weather conditions will render continued assistance to Latvia and Esthonia liable to entail damage to British ships.

2. A naval force comprising two light cruisers and 5 T.B.D. under Commodore Duff will remain in Baltic waters during winter¹ to watch events and afford moral support also means of communication to missions and British forces in plebiscite areas.

¹ This retention of a British naval squadron in Baltic waters had been favoured by the Foreign Office on political grounds and had recently been approved by the Cabinet.

No. 201

*Extract from Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 30 [157880/4232/18]

BERLIN, November 20, 1919

... The² position in the Baltic seems to be approaching a satisfactory solution. Several officers from Bermont's army have arrived in Berlin. According to their accounts, dissolution set in as soon as the German troops placed themselves under Bermont's orders. They were then, for the first time, 'administered' by Bermont's 'Q' staff, with the result that for four days they got no food, and so came to the conclusion that it would be better to return to Germany under Eberhard than to remain in Kurland with Bermont. Also they have no longer any intention of fighting if it can be avoided. This break up has further simplified General Niessel's task, and there is now good reason to believe that he will bring it to a successful conclusion.

Germany, of course, still maintains that Eberhard's withdrawal means Bolshevism in a violent form on the frontiers of East Prussia and Memel. . . .²

¹ A copy of this report was received in the Foreign Office on December 2, 1919.

² The remainder of this report related to other matters.

No. 202

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Riga)

No. 127 Telegraphic [150191/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 21, 1919

Your telegram 216¹ (of November 7).

The Latvian Government would appear to be quite justified in breaking off relations with Germany, but His Majesty's Government cannot assume any responsibility in giving them advice as regards a formal breach.²

¹ No. 186.

² In a note of November 25, 1919, to the German Government the Latvian Foreign Minister, after enumerating hostile German activities on the lines indicated in No. 186, concluded as follows:

'Dans un radio No. 1899, le Général Eberhardt informe le Gouvernement Provisoire de Latvia que les troupes russo-allemandes opérant contre la Latvia se trouvent sous sa protection, et les compétences du Général Eberhardt sont confirmées par le télégramme du 23 novembre du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne, à la suite de quoi le Gouvernement Provisoire de Latvia est obligé à considérer la Latvia comme attaquée par l'Allemagne et de fait en état de guerre avec elle.

'En conséquence, le Gouvernement Provisoire de Latvia considère comme impossible de maintenir des relations diplomatiques avec l'Allemagne et rappelle ses représentants diplomatiques auprès du Gouvernement Allemand en confiant la défense des intérêts des citoyens latviens en Allemagne au Gouvernement d'Esthonie.

'Vu que le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne dans son télégramme du 23 novembre nous fait savoir que le Général Eberhardt est autorisé à discuter les conditions de l'armistice, nous prions de faire savoir ces conditions au Gouvernement Provisoire de Latvia.'

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received November 22)

No. 236 Telegraphic [154719/139661/59]

RIGA, November 21, 1919

With Captain Hurst and Mr. Hanson I motored to Mitau November 21 (? evening).¹ Four miles from Mitau I met Colonel Ryan returning who told us that there was sharp fighting on road ahead and Mitau had not fallen. We nevertheless proceeded on foot with some machine-gun and artillery fire ahead. We entered Mitau without difficulty about half-past six and found Lettish troops had only penetrated town two hours before. I ascertained in Mitau Germans received orders at 11 p.m. November 20 to evacuate by 3 a.m. November 21. Advancing Letts had serious loss four kilometres north of Mitau on morning of November 21 but occupied the town with slight resistance. We saw only one dead German soldier. Letts estimate captured guns at about ten including one six-inch with 1500 rounds. Germans had looted almost all shops on night of November 19. Mitau Castle, fired by them, was blazing when we arrived. They are burning farms as they retire and sky was red with conflagrations. Lettish command in Mitau had already received reports of several murders of farmers.²

I called on senior available officer in Mitau and represented to him importance of reserving civil suspects for judicial treatment. I found him alive to his responsibilities. He told me there had been some pillaging on first entry of their troops but his patrols now controlled town. Our own observations confirmed this. The Lettish troops were in excellent spirits in spite of advance through continuous snow and cold. The town was orderly and women were distributing food unmolested. There was no shooting. In one case only I found Lettish soldiers completing looting of shop broken open by Germans. They were promptly ejected by patrol which I summoned. Round market square we saw five dead men in civilian dress who had been shot as disguised Germans. Most of them wore some article of military clothing. We saw three civilians being marched away under military escort.

Chemist who gave us supper held 10,000 Bermondts roubles accepted as payment under German compulsion.

We reached Riga shortly after midnight. I forward above military information because no other Allied representative has yet visited Mitau. Military

¹ The text of this telegram as received by the British Delegation in Paris read 'November 21 afternoon'.

² On November 22, on instructions from Colonel Tallents, Mr. Collas of his mission, accompanied by military personnel and Mr. Duranty, correspondent of the *New York Times*, investigated and confirmed three specimen instances of arson or murder by retreating German troops of the Iron Division and the Baden Battery. As regards the firing of Mitau castle, Mr. Collas stated in his report, dated November 23, 1919: 'In order to ensure the utter destruction of the valuable Gobelins, carvings and other treasures for which this castle was famous, and of the College Library with its irreplaceable collection of rare volumes, which we were informed had also been burned, the Germans had put all the appliances of the Mitau fire brigade out of action. This base plan has succeeded too well, for the contents were obviously now beyond rescue.'

mission will attempt to communicate substance of above to General Turner. I understand that Allied military representatives, misled November 21 by (? reports) of continued fighting, will proceed to Mitau November 22 morning.

Sent to Paris and Reval for General Burt.

No. 204

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received November 24)

No. 240 Telegraphic [155009/139661/59]

RIGA, November 23, 1919

Colonel Ballod, Lettish Commander-in-Chief, called on me officially November 23rd and pointed out with moderation . . .¹ created by General Niessel's demand that Lettish Army should be called off from pursuit of Germans. He pointed out Germans are still delaying to plunder and burn White side² whenever they are not driven. He was prepared only to cease attacking for 24 hours and then to judge whether their retirement was at an adequate speed.³

Tone and substance of General Niessel's message and his failure to send any representative to consult existing military Missions at Riga and learn Lettish views here impressed Lettish Government unfavourably. Suggestion implied in his first telegram sent by wireless *en clair* that Letts needed restraint from killing Balts gave great offence. Officers of this Mission (? November 22nd) inspect(?ed and) photographed farms freshly burnt and peasants murdered by German soldiers.⁴

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Paris.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

² The text of this telegram as received by the British Delegation in Paris here read 'countryside'.

³ On November 24, 1919, General Burt at Riga telegraphed to General Turner at Memel (repeated to Paris) that 'orders have been given by Lettish Government for cessation of military operations for forty-eight hours ending 26th . . . [text uncertain] to Germans to evacuate in pursuance of General Niessel's cable.'

⁴ Cf. No. 203, note 2.

No. 205

Report by General Turner (Tilsit)¹

No. 3 [606/2/20/20878]

Sir,

TILSIT, November 25, 1919

I have the honour to submit report on the work of the Mission for the period 18th November to 24th November, both inclusive. The Mission has been established at Tilsit during the last week, and during this time has paid short visits to the frontier control stations.

¹ A copy of this report, addressed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was received by the British Delegation in Paris on December 1 and transmitted to the Foreign Office on December 5.

Reports are rendered under the following headings:—

1. Situation in Latvia.
2. Situation in Lithuania.
3. Progressive evacuation.

Letish and Lithuanian Troops

It will be seen from the detailed reports below that during the last week the Mission has been concerned mainly in restraining the activities of Latvian and Lithuanian troops.

The former, after suffering so long, are anxious to exploit to the utmost their success without considering the difficulties of finally evacuating disorderly bands of German troops or the effects on Lithuania of the passage of German troops retiring in disorder from Latvia.

The latter, who took no part whilst Germans were pressing the Letts, are now eager for their share of the spoils and anxious to prevent the evacuation of German material, and with this object have cut the railway line north and south of Shavli.

The Commission, while in no way desirous of preventing the legitimate success of these forces, cannot lose sight of its ultimate object—to evacuate the Germans from the Baltic States—and considers that a speedy orderly retreat being essential, the cutting of the German line of communication would be disastrous.

German Troops

I am of the opinion that the German forces threatened in rear and on their flank are in an impossible position from a military point of view as long as the Allied Mission refuse to allow further reinforcements leaving Germany. The Commission are, however, prepared to permit the despatch of sufficient reinforcements should the necessity arise for safeguarding the railway line in the case of Lithuanian attacks continuing.

In order to render satisfaction to both sides, the Commission suggested that, in return for uninterrupted use of the Tauroggen Railway, all German stores at Shavli should be handed over to the Lithuanians. The offer will probably be willingly accepted by both parties.

The situation on the 24th November has been wired to you under my cypher telegram X-21.²

Situation in Latvia

Mitau Area. The energetic offensive of the Letts resulted in considerable success and capture of valuable material. The Germans were forced to evacuate Bausk on the 18th and Mitau on the 21st, and the Letts are now holding railway line 10 miles south of Mitau.

The German forces, followed by the Letts, are continuing to withdraw towards Shavli and the Shavli-Murayevo Railway.

Northern Area. The greater part of the small groups previously reported

² Not printed.

in Courland have withdrawn either to Libau or Mitau area. A certain number, having sold their arms to the peasants, are roaming the country.

Most of the purely Russian forces were in the Tuksum area, and the rapid advance of the Letts from Riga isolated a part of these troops and at present there is no precise news of their fate.

It is reported that Russian prisoners are treated well by the Letts.

Libau Area. Resulting from Lettish offensive, most of the von Plehwe group has now started withdrawal towards Memel by road and rail. The movement is under Allied control, which cannot prevent, however, a certain amount of illegal maltreatment of the local population by the Germans.

It has been clearly pointed out to the Lettish Government that their advance, while helping to clear the country, should not be pursued across the frontier nor actually hinder evacuation of orderly bodies of troops really withdrawing.

General Eberhardt demanded an armistice, but the Riga Government have not yet replied to him though they have wired to Berlin to know if the German Government associates itself with this request.³

I think that the clear expression of our policy and the presence of Allied control will suffice to ensure an orderly evacuation.

Situation in Lithuania

The policy of the Mission was clearly explained to Lithuanian functionaries during our visit to Kowno, and has since been repeated. In spite of this, Lithuanian troops and armed partisans have persisted in ignoring the demarcation line as agreed to by them with German authorities on the 31st October, and have continued their advance towards the Tauroggen-Shavli-Mitau Railway.

The exasperation of the people and the lack of communication added to the difficulties of an inexperienced Lithuanian General Staff at Kowno who were endeavouring to arrest this movement.

A Lithuanian battalion occupied Tauroggen (neutral zone) without authority of the Commission, but was permitted to remain there after a conference had been held there between the Mission, the Lithuanian and German officials to fix the conditions regulating movements of Germans and Lithuanians in this area.

This was followed by occupation of Radziviliscki and advance towards Shavli. Large quantities of stores, including twenty-five aeroplanes, were reported as captured.

The railway line was cut both north and south of Shavli, thus temporarily rendering evacuation impossible, and this action might have given rise to serious conflict between German and Lithuanian troops.

On the 21st, permission was given for one German armoured train, accompanied by Allied officers, to cross the frontier to guard railway and bridges.

On the 22nd, at the request of German delegates, Colonel Dosse, Chief of

³ Cf. No. 202, note 2.

Staff, and other Allied officers and Lithuanian officials, accompanied the Delegation towards Shavli in order to control on the spot the movements of German and Lithuanian troops. Admiral Hopman could not guarantee safe passage to the whole Commission.

It is now reported in Kowno, November 24th, that the Lithuanian troops are retiring beyond the demarcation line. The Lithuanian battalion has vacated Tauroggen.

A senior Lithuanian general is proceeding to Shavli to-day. He is fully aware of the views of the Mission.

It is proposed to interpose Lithuanian troops between Lettish and German forces, and to withdraw latter behind the curtain thus formed.

Incident of the Troop Train

On the night of the 22nd a troop train containing four guns arrived at Tilsitt from Koenigsberg. In spite of orders issued by control officers here, and by General Niessel himself, the troops proceeded to the frontier.

The Tilsitt authorities stated that the order for the move emanated from the War Minister at Berlin.

A telegram to this effect was sent to Paris, requesting that strong measures might be taken.

The train, however, did not cross the frontier, being stopped by orders from Koenigsberg.

We are of the opinion that General Eberhardt and headquarters are probably the only people concerned, and that the train was stopped at the frontier by the intervention of Admiral Hopman, information being received that General Eberhardt was expecting considerable reinforcements, and also that Admiral Hopman was opposed to this course.

The question of the German Government approving of the despatch of German troops as considered necessary has been raised again by Koenigsberg authorities, and the Mission has pointed out to Berlin Government that, as Admiral Hopman is its accredited representative, demands for reinforcements must emanate from him.

Details of Evacuation

The German hospitals in the front area were clear on the 18th, and 950 wounded are reported to have passed through Tilsitt. On the 22nd a further 300 wounded were evacuated, probably the result of recent fighting.

No other troops or material worthy of mention have been evacuated.

Little or no information has yet been received from German delegates, nor do they appear to have taken many steps towards making suitable railway arrangements for the evacuation.

Proclamations issued by the Germans and printed in all languages have been countersigned by members of the Mission and circulated throughout the country. These set out clearly the orders of the German Government for evacuation and the conduct of troops towards inhabitants during this movement.

The frontier controls have been installed at Bajohren, Memel, Tilsit and Tauroggen. The non-arrival of the eight control officers from Cologne has greatly hindered the establishment of a really effective control.

The details of railway material to be handed over have not yet been discussed.

Various small instances of obstruction and false information have occurred.

General

Major Keenan, Captain Pearson, Lieutenant Trotter, two cypher officers and one interpreter have reported from Riga.

The French destroyer is remaining at Memel and serves as a medium of communication by wireless from Riga. H.M.S. *Whitley* is remaining at present at Memel pending decision of Mission to move to Riga by sea.

Information having been received that there was a possibility of part of the Baltic Landwehr desiring to join the Germans in their withdrawal, a telegram was despatched to the Lettish Government suggesting that this be stopped, as being likely to cause further disturbances in the country.

Instructions were received yesterday regarding disposal of equipment of Yudenitch's army, and the 20,000 sets duly shipped from England.

I shall be unable to deal with the distribution of these in Esthonia for the present, but I have instructed Reval to refer any proposals to me for approval.

The Allied Mission have been informed that they will be able to exercise control, subject to my final approval, over the distribution of the stores from England, i.e., 20,000 sets. I should be glad, however, of further details as to the disarmament of Russian forces on Yudenitch's front, and also the date and disembarkation of the equipment referred to above.

Before departure from England, I received instructions that the British Missions in the Baltic were in future purely intelligence missions, and that I was to reduce the number of their personnel. The news of the continued despatch of stores from England implies a change of policy, and will render necessary the maintenance of staffs to distribute them.

I have, &c.,

A. J. TURNER

No. 206

Memorandum by the British Delegation to the Peace Conference

No. 2210 [156641/141673/2150]

PARIS, November 26, 1919

The following telegram has been received from the President of the Allied Naval Armistice Committee for the Supreme Council:

'Unless the Supreme Council consider it inadvisable owing to the present state of affairs and the protocol not having yet been signed,¹ it is proposed

¹ The protocol relative to unfulfilled armistice conditions, which was signed by the head of the German Peace Delegation immediately before the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles on January 10, 1920: see Vol. II, Chap. I.

to raise the embargo on German vessels in the Baltic, which has been in force since October 10th, subject to the proviso that German ships should not be allowed to visit Libau and Windau at present. Approval of Supreme Council is requested before raising this embargo. In consequence of navigational difficulties in German territorial waters permission has been granted to-day for all German sailing vessels and motor sailing vessels up to 100 tons to trade generally between German ports on German coast in Baltic.²

² In submitting this telegram to Sir E. Crowe on November 24, 1919, Captain Fuller, then Head of the Naval Section of the British Delegation, observed (on 592/2/3/20891) that 'the only restriction now remaining in force in regard to German shipping in the Baltic is that all vessels have to obtain permission from A.N.A.C. before sailing.' On December 1 he further noted that 'the Admiralty point out that, when the British Naval Forces in the Baltic are reduced owing to ice conditions [cf. No. 200], it will not be possible any longer to retain the embargo, as the Germans will be aware that we have no means of enforcing it.' On December 4 Sir E. Crowe minuted: 'My inclination is to say and do nothing until our general relations with Germany are cleared up by the proposed note.' (For this note see Vol. II, No. 37, note 4.) It appears that the telegram was consequently not discussed by the Supreme Council.

No. 207

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29)

No. 248 Telegraphic [158984/139661/59]

RIGA, November 28, 1919

Lettish representatives had a conference with members of Niessel Commission, November 27th, and came to satisfactory arrangements about German evacuation.

Assume you will receive details through . . .¹ sources.

¹ The text here is uncertain. A variant text reads 'through military sources.'

No. 208

Captain Dewhurst (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received December 2)

No. 255 Telegraphic [157698/61232/59]

RIGA, December 1, 1919

Lithuanian representative, Sliupus, made following representations on instructions from his Government to-day:—

1. He expressed surprise at Niessel's action in taking counsel of Baron Ropp and Mr. Gabrys, both enemies of Lithuania, latter worked for Germany during the war. Sliupus designated both as intriguers and suspects them of working on behalf of Poles.

2. If an Armistice with German troops on Lithuanian soil were desirable they should be disarmed, and all arms, &c., handed to Lithuania, who are badly in need of them. Niessel has stated 'certain arms' will be left behind.

3. Period of fortnight allowed to Germans to evacuate is unjust to Lithuania, whom Letts suspect of pro-German sympathies. Former could have driven out German rabble weeks ago. This concession created bad impression among population and dissatisfaction among soldiers. General Niessel's orders carried out very unwillingly by Lithuania, who fear from former examples that Germans will be allowed to prolong period of evacuation.

4. German troops are still plundering and committing outrages in occupied area, and Lithuanian Government appeal strongly to His Majesty's Government not to consider interests of these German outlaws, but to countenance clearance of their own country by Lithuania in same way as Letts were permitted to clear their territory. They urgently appeal to Great Britain for same justice and support they have always hitherto had from her.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Paris.

No. 209

M. Bisseneek to Earl Curzon (Received December 5)

No. 1008 [158705/61232/59]

LONDON, December 4, 1919

Sir,

Among the countries that have suffered from the ravages of the war, there is none tried more sorely than Latvia whose territory has served as a battlefield during the whole war. Moreover, Latvia has had to submit to the hardships of the German occupation for a long time, and even at the present time Courland is pillaged and devastated by the German troops whose insolence and love of plunder are boundless. It is impossible to give an exact estimate of the damages done to Latvia by these troops, but it is certain that the losses caused will amount to several hundred millions of pounds.¹

The claim of Latvia to reparations and restitutions has been recognised by the Peace Treaty, section XIV, art. 116, and confirmed by a letter of the Peace Conference addressed to the Latvian Delegation on June 10th, 1919.

Meanwhile, considerable properties of German subjects (works, houses, estates) are situated in Latvia. These could serve as a security for at least a part of the reparation until the cessation of the devastation, pillage and illegitimate requisitions of the Germans in Latvia and pending the reestablishing of order in Courland, and the possibility of a definite solution of the question of reparation and restitutions due to the State and the citizens of Latvia.

Considering the above facts I have the honour, in the name of the Provisional Government of Latvia, to request His Majesty's Government to use their influence with the Peace Conference in Paris to sanction the rights of

¹ On December 24, 1919, Captain Dewhurst telegraphed to Lord Curzon from Riga that the total claim submitted by Latvia to General Niessel's Mission in respect of damages occasioned by the evacuation of German forces as from November 1, 1919, was approximately 293 million Latvian roubles.

the Latvian Government on the properties of German citizens in Latvia, with a view to compensating their institutions and citizens of [*sic*] the losses of war suffered by them.

I have, etc.,

G. W. BISSENEEK²

² Mr. Spicer, Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office, stated in reply to M. Bisseneek, in a letter of December 9, 1919, that his letter had been referred to the British Delegation in Paris.

No. 210

*Report by General Turner (Tilsit)*¹

No. 4 [606/2/20/21078]

TILSIT, December 5, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to report as under on the work of the Mission for the period November 25th–December 5th both inclusive.

During this time the Mission has remained at Tilsit and no incidents of special note have occurred.

The evacuation continues slowly but the final success remains doubtful. The centre of the Baltic Adventure has always been the Iron Division and until this unit has been wholly or partially evacuated we shall not feel sure that the Mission will accomplish its work. We have drawn the attention of the German Authorities to the wisdom of dispersing this unit as widely as possible in Central Germany.

Should we find later that the peaceful means at present employed by the Mission to effect its object are insufficient, we may be obliged to resort to a combined offensive on part of Lithuanians and Letts. Preliminary steps have already been taken to ensure co-ordinated action in this eventuality.

Lithuania

The situation remains unaltered. Lithuanian troops are gradually taking over control along the line from Shadow to Murajewo.

At the request of Lithuanian Headquarters the Mission is endeavouring to reduce the neutral zone on either side of the Shavli–Taurroggen railway.

This will be effected in concurrence with German Authorities now at Shavli and since the latter have guaranteed that the evacuation will be confined to the railway only, there should be no objection on their part. This, while calming the rising resentment of the Lithuanians, will also prevent further material damage to their country.

Latvia

The general situation remains unaltered.

Efforts are being made with Lithuanian Government to allow the Letts

¹ A copy of this report, addressed as was No. 205, was received by the British Delegation in Paris on December 8, 1919.

free use of the Libau-Mitau railway and the immediate return of rolling stock by the Germans but the situation was rendered more difficult by the Lettish Government breaking off diplomatic relations with Berlin.

Esthonia

My telegram M. 37² contained the substance of General Burt's verbal report regarding the situation in Yudenitch's Army. I presume you have received full reports from the Mission at Reval, but the latter have not up to date kept me informed. Briefly it appears that Yudenitch's Army with the exception of a few units is practically disintegrated and that the Esthonians are faced with the double problem of holding the additional front and of supporting the mass of humanity which comprises (a) remnants of the army (b) 12,000 Bolsheviks (c) refugees. General Yudenitch still fancies he is in command of his army and ignores the reality of the situation, the Esthonian Command having taken over the complete control of the front.

To deal with the problem of feeding and accommodating the large number of Russians General Burt arranged to concentrate the Russians on the line of the Yebbe, and at the same time set up an Allied Commission with Major Fitzhugh as President to deal with the supply situation. The American relief stores which were handed over in bulk to the Russians and were consequently being squandered were taken in charge by the Commission and the supply of requirements have apparently been temporarily met. But this state of affairs cannot continue—the Esthonians are averse to the presence of this undisciplined mass in their country nor can they arrange indefinitely for the necessary supplies and accommodation. It is beyond the powers of the British Mission to handle the situation. In accordance with my telegram I would like a definite policy laid down for my guidance.

I would however make this reservation that the above is based on verbal information from General Burt. I would suggest that you confirm the facts direct from Reval. I have telegraphed for the information but communication here is very bad and most cipher messages are indecipherable.

Bermondt's Forces

The greater part of the Corps Keller has now passed through Tilsit.

(A) *Keller Corps*. The Germans are carrying out disarmament at Insterburg prior to despatch to Internment Camps.

(B) *Virgolitch Corps*. On the other hand there is a considerable proportion of the Corps Virgolitch amounting to one Squadron of Cavalry, one Battalion of Pioneers and one Battery, the whole under the Command of Colonel Markov, which wishes to serve under Yudenitch. These are being retained in the Tilsit area pending a decision from Paris as to their final disposal. See my cipher telegram M. 48[? 38]² of December 3rd.

The remainder of this Corps are rejoining the other Russians in Germany.

² Not printed.

Details of Evacuation

Up to date the following troops have passed through Tilsit.

<i>Germans and Russians</i>	Officers	.	.	.	400
<i>(Including Plehwe Group)</i>	Troops	.	.	.	9000
Wounded	1800
Horses	1500
Guns	50
Aeroplanes	25

Two or three trains are passing through daily.

The first trains containing elements of Iron Division are expected tonight December 5th.

The Prekuln area is now cleared of German and Russo-German Troops.

The Local Einwohnerwehren

Although no previous warning was given in either case, the Local Administration is in the course of distributing arms to civilian population in the Memel area and a detachment of 1 Squadron Cavalry, 1 Battalion Infantry and 1 Battery of Artillery have been sent there by the Königsberg Command.

The avowed object of both these moves is to avoid local disorder in the case of disorganized bodies of troops crossing the frontier from Lithuania.

The Commission has made no protest against the retention of these troops and arms although General Eberhardt has guaranteed that evacuation will take place by rail only.

The Einwohnerwehr is a species of Civil Police formed in addition to the frontier troops (*Grenzschutz Truppen*) and to the Security troops (*Sicherheit Truppen*); up to the present we have only been able to trace the issue of 110 rifles and 2 machine guns but I think that considerably more arms have been distributed.

We have no evidence that there is any hidden motive for the calling up of these men.

German Coup d'Etat

Colonel Dosse returned today from Shavli with reliable information concerning the plans of a *Coup d'Etat*—the object of which is to overthrow existing Berlin Government, establish a Military Dictatorship and refuse to accept the Peace Treaty. In general the plan is as follows: Spartacist riots will be arranged in Berlin and will be the excuse for the Iron Division in East Prussia and similar formations in Hanover and South Germany to march on Berlin.

Ludendorff is quoted as one of the prime movers in the affair and is known to have visited the Iron Division at Mitau three weeks ago. Von der Goltz, who is now at Königsberg Headquarters, Hindenburg and Mackensen are also concerned in the movement.

The date of execution is unknown but the plan is openly discussed by officers of the Iron Division and has been the underlying motive of their

actions during the past weeks. It explains clearly their continual efforts to delay evacuation until plans are completed and their obvious intention to keep the Iron Division fully equipped and as a formed body and also their present scheme of entraining the Division in three groups each of which is a complete force of all arms.

The substance of these reports has been communicated to the Allied Mission at Berlin and the Supreme War Council.

Conduct of German Troops

Colonel Dosse has also supplied further information as to the conduct of German Troops. This is based not only on his personal observation but also on the facts reported by a small Allied Commission detailed to investigate the reports received.

The Germans throughout the whole area they have occupied have committed wholesale robbery, pillage and destruction. Horses, cows, poultry, carts and even furniture have been removed.

Nothing is left to the peasant but the few things he has been able to hide.

Men, women and children have been shot and illtreated without the slightest pretext.

It is a case of the history of Belgium repeating itself in the Baltic.

The various Frei Corps are the most unruly, outdoing the Iron Division and the Bermondts Troops in violence. They are now bands of cutthroats of the worst type—armed to the teeth and brooking no interference with their actions.

The control of the railways by Allied Officers is in many areas a mere farce as any officer endeavouring to examine a wagon is at once threatened with rifles or bombs. Bombs and stores are thrown at the Allied Officers from wagons, two instances even having occurred in Tilsit.

General Eberhardt's Officers even if they wished could do little to put a stop to it and at times receive similar attentions themselves, two of the Staff Officers having been wounded by bombs.

Today a German Officer spat at a British Officer who was endeavouring to carry out his control duties in Tilsit station and in other stations French Officers have been threatened with bayonets and bombs. Formal protests have been lodged regarding this incident.

German Officers have, with one single exception, made no effort to protect the Allied Officers—in some cases even encouraging their men.

In consequence of these incidents the Allied Officers have now been recalled from Shavli.

Distribution of Material for Baltic States

A suggested scale of distribution has been submitted to me but as this does not altogether meet with my approval I have issued instructions that only material urgently required for Lettish Forces will actually be issued.

The remainder will be stored at Riga where the arrival of the stores ship is now reported.

In the event of my failing to receive the full reports of existing state and future requirements of Estonia I shall probably adhere to the proposed distribution referred to.

Visit to Commodore Duff

During the last few days I was able to visit Libau where I met Commodore Duff. The situation was fully discussed and the policy of the Allied Mission explained.

Commodore Duff promised me all possible assistance especially in the matter of communications.

Colonel Dosse accompanied by Allied officers and two of the German delegates are leaving for Berlin shortly in order to decide what action is to be taken with regard to the Iron Division. The latter has threatened intervention by force should the Berlin Government be determined to punish Major Bischof, the Commander of the Division, and other offenders connected with this Corps. At the same time the question of restitution of stores, equipment and rolling stock to Lithuania and Latvia will be discussed.

I have, etc.,

A. J. TURNER

No. 211

Letter from General Turner (Tilsit) to Colonel Kisch¹ (Paris.

Received December 8)

Unnumbered [606/2/20/21078]

TILSIT, December 5, 1919

My dear Kisch,

We are having great difficulties and every kind of obstacle put in our way. Our control cannot function as with the connivance or at least the non-interference of the German officers—whenever the officers attempt to carry out any supervision, they are treated with great insults and threats of violence. Really all we have managed to do is to allow the Germans every opportunity of withdrawing without difficulty or interference, and of taking away everything of any value in the country practically at their own time. The Letts and Lithuanians are obeying our instructions not to interfere with the withdrawal, but the Germans absolutely ignore their side of the bargain, namely not to pillage and loot and to leave their depots intact. I think had the Supreme Council shown the slightest desire to back us up we would have obtained better results, but they have consistently refused to bring any pressure to bear, except the moral weight of the Commission. Had they permitted the despatch of troops to Memel or even to Libau, to bring pressure to bear, the situation would have been different. The whole country is being devastated and pillaged with horrible cruelties.

You probably have received information from our wires regarding the military plot to overthrow the Government. In my mind there is little doubt of its existence, the officers of the troops at [? of] Bischoff speak quite openly about it.

¹ Member of the Military Section of the British Delegation in Paris.

There will be great need of relief when the Bosch [*sic*] leaves the country. All horses and livestock have been removed and it will be very hard for the inhabitants to get along until these are made good. Reparation in a year's time is not of the slightest use. What is required is to enforce the Germans to return a suitable number of horses and cattle sufficient for the economic needs of the country, and this at once. I doubt if we can effect this insult [*sic*]—we have no force behind us.

Yours ever,

A. J. TURNER

P.S. They have declared the conditions of a *Kriegszustand*² to exist in E. Prussia and are arming the Einwohnerwehr—ostensibly to protect themselves against bands of marauders. What it really means I don't quite know.

² State of war emergency.

No. 212

*General Turner (Tilsit) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received December 7)*¹
No. M 42 Telegraphic [606/2/20/20605]

TILSIT, December 6, 1919

Iron Division contrary to orders is marching on Memel. Eberhardt with last German troops believed to have left Shavli this morning by train for Tilsit.

It is believed that move of Iron Division is carried out with the object of keeping it concentrated for action in connection with plot to overthrow German Government.

¹ This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation in Paris and British Missions in Berlin and the Baltic Provinces.

No. 213

*General Turner (Tilsit) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received December 9)*¹
No. M 46 Telegraphic [606/2/20/20605]

TILSIT, December 8, 1919

December 7th. Evacuation by rail practically complete. Details as follows—

Officers	1,600
Men	14,000
Horses	3,400
Guns	80
Aeroplanes	60
Wounded	1,000
and Civilians	390

¹ This telegram was addressed and repeated as was No. 212.

3,223 S² of Iron Division expected overland in Memel-Heydekknig [? Heidekrug] area within next 48 hours. Remainder which arrives by rail at Tilsit has been sent to Memel by rail by order at Königsberg. Troops sent from Germany to Memel area amount to one battalion, one squadron, one battery. No explanation of concentration of troops has been offered.

3. Number of Russians willing and judged fit for other fronts: 25 officers, 200 men, all leaving for Danzig tomorrow.

² In another text this was corrected to 'Two-thirds'.

No. 214

Report by General Turner (Tilsit)¹

Unnumbered [165327/61232/59]

TILSIT, December 9, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following supplementary report. The evacuation of the German Forces is now nearing completion, and though you have been kept informed of the progress of events by my interim reports, I consider it advisable to give you at this juncture some general impressions with reference to the evacuation and the general situation in East Prussia.

The Baltic Adventure has been entirely controlled and planned by the Military Party. The German War Office, the Reichswehr Commander at Königsberg and the VIth Corps Commander at Tilsit are all thoroughly implicated. Bermondts has been a mere puppet. Their object has probably been threefold:—

To show the German people the impotence of the Supreme Council and the complete indifference of the Military Party towards orders from the Allies.

To make a German Colony in Courland or in any case to embarrass the Allies in their settlement of the Baltic Provinces.

To have ready a striking force at hand to upset the Government.

The ostensible reason—that of fighting Bolshevism—was merely a red herring across the trail, to deceive their own people in Prussia, to gain the support of the gullible Russian Party at Berlin and to help their intrigues in Russian affairs generally. How successful they have been in this is clear to anyone who has been in touch with any of the leading Russians in Berlin, even those of Entente sympathy.

When the Commission first arrived the general attitude of all the Military Commands towards Bermondts's Force was one of complete detachment. Bermondts's troops were no longer regarded as German; they had refused to obey orders and however regrettable such lack of discipline might be it was no longer any concern of the German Command. Then came the successful Lettish offensive and unless Bermondts's troops were reinforced there was every

¹ A copy of this report, addressed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was communicated to the Foreign Office by the War Office on December 24, 1919 (received December 29).

possibility of their being annihilated. This was not at all the intention of the German Military party: the only way in which they could have any right to send them formed detachments was for Bermondts to submit his troops to German authority, which was accordingly done on the 16th November. One was at first inclined to regard this change of attitude as due to the presence of the Commission, but I am convinced that though this may have been a factor it was not the reason for such a complete alteration in the situation as took place within twenty-four hours. The immediate departure of General von Eberhardt, the Corps Commander at Tilsit, to take over the Command of a very critical military situation was the first result of the change. It was clear that unless the Commission restrained the Letts and the Lithuanians, the latter now showing a strong desire to take part, Eberhardt would require reinforcements. General von Nebel's detachment then arrived at Tilsit bound for the scene of hostilities. The Commission however prevented its crossing the frontier, but at the same time promised to do all it could to ensure a safe evacuation of the German troops by rail. The Commission by the intervention of its Control Officers managed to break off the combat, and tried to induce the Lithuanians to respect the previous line of demarkation (arranged between Lithuania and General von Eberhardt on October 31st) but it became obvious that the Lithuanians could not be held back.

This brought about on the 24th of November the offer by Germany of an Armistice between the Germans and Lithuanians, by which an unhindered evacuation was guaranteed in exchange for the handing over of all military stores and a sufficiency of rolling stock. A time limit was given for acceptance failing which reinforcements would be sent. The time limit was such that, owing to delay in the delivery of the telegram, no answer from the Lithuanian Government could be received in time. The offer was not really an honest one but was made merely to thrust the onus of further military intervention on the Lithuanians. This however was prevented by the immediate acceptance of the offer by the Commission on behalf of Lithuania.

Colonel Dosse, who represented the Commission at General von Eberhardt's Headquarters, where the German Delegates were, made various arrangements in accordance with the policy of the Commission:

- (a) The evacuation to be carried out by rail and completed by the 13th—the Germans having asked for six weeks.
- (b) Allied Control Officers to supervise the evacuation and see no stores in depots were removed.
- (c) No pillage, looting or disturbance to take place, and all requisitions to be paid for.

It became evident at a very early date that, except for the evacuation of troops, General von Eberhardt had not the slightest intention of carrying out his obligations. Stores were openly withdrawn, sometimes destroyed *in situ*. The whole country was pillaged and devastated. Remonstrance was useless, the only answer made was that the troops were out of hand. The Allied Officers were treated with every kind of disrespect, threatened with violence, and, being prevented from carrying out their duties, were rendered entirely

useless as a control. In this respect I attach a copy of a document,² describing a gross insult to a British Officer in the performance of his duty, on the part of a German Officer and entirely without provocation. I trust the British Government will not let the matter rest until the German Officer is duly punished.³

² Enclosure printed below.

³ The violent treatment to which Allied officers of General Niessel's Mission had been subjected by certain German military personnel was brought to the attention of the Allied Supreme Council on December 31, 1919: see Vol. II, No. 49, minute 7. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council M. Dutasta on January 2, 1920, addressed a *note verbale* to Baron von Lersner requesting that the German authorities should take the necessary action against the German offenders in question. On January 8 Baron von Lersner replied (translation): 'Legal proceedings against persons who have been guilty of criminal actions towards interallied officers of the Baltic Commission have been begun, and will be completed with all possible speed. More precise information concerning the penalties imposed will be transmitted in due course.' Further, the German Chancellor, Herr Bauer, on two occasions, January 4 and 16, 1920, assured General Niessel in Berlin that he would personally concern himself with ensuring that the necessary action was taken. When General Niessel left Berlin on January 16, 1920, two officers of his mission, Captain Digue of the French Army and Lieut. Lloyd Wilson, remained behind in order to wind up the work of the mission and more particularly to supervise the execution by the German authorities of (a) an agreement concluded on January 6, 1920, between them and the Allied Mission for the delivery of railway and war material in reparation to Latvia and Lithuania (cf. Gen. A. Niessel, op. cit., p. 226 f): (b) their undertaking as regards the punishment of guilty German offenders. On March 11, 1920, Lord Derby, H.M. Ambassador in Paris, telegraphed to Lord Curzon that General Niessel had that day called the attention of the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris to the failure of the German Government to implement its undertaking despite the fact that it had been 'repeatedly urged by General Niessel and his representative in Berlin to expedite the trials. Notwithstanding the assurances given by the German Government no action has yet been taken. It was agreed to address a further note to the German Delegation impressing upon them the necessity of complying at once with the demands set forth in the Supreme Council's note of January 2.' This second note was signed by M. Millerand and dated March 11, 1920. On May 15, 1920, the Foreign Office received a note from the German Chargé d'Affaires in London which stated (translation):

'It is true that the members of the Inter-Allied Baltic Commission, including some Englishmen, have been exposed to affronts on the part of the German Baltic troops. Altogether there are some 20 such cases.

'As the Inter-Allied Commission came to the Baltic at our request, these incidents were particularly painful to the Imperial Government and the then Imperial Chancellor Bauer at the time personally assured the Head of the Commission, the French General Niessel, that he would strive for the speedy carrying into effect of the punishments.

'In practice however the execution of the punishments has encountered difficulties. In several cases the culprits were not discovered at all, in some the wrong persons were arrested, and in others the miscreants were of transitory and unknown abode. Legal difficulties resulted from the fact that a number of the accused were meanwhile discharged from military service and thereby are no longer subject to military jurisdiction. It does not require to be emphasised that the recent disturbances played their part in rendering difficult the carrying into effect of the punishments.

'In the meantime however the prosecution has been taken up with renewed vigour. The Minister of Justice has at the instigation of London appointed a special commissary to superintend the proceedings, and everything (issue of warrants, etc.,) is being done to secure the culprits and bring them to book.'

On May 26, 1920, Captain Digue submitted a detailed report at the termination of his mission in Berlin. On June 21, 1920, General Niessel wrote from Algiers to Marshal Foch

Meanwhile the evacuation was slowly proceeding—every train was filled with loot, war material, stolen horses and cattle—our protestations were useless. Then came indication that the Iron Division were not unlikely to proceed by march route so as to give them every chance to pillage the country. A written undertaking was obtained from General von Eberhardt that such would not be the case and that the Iron Division would be sent down by rail. This undertaking, like every other, was in due course broken by von Eberhardt and two-thirds of the Iron Division finally marched to Memel by three columns, so as to give them every opportunity to carry out their fell purpose. The flimsy excuse for this move was the danger of the Letts interfering with the withdrawal by railway between Murajievo and Shavli, for which there was no cause, as the Lettish troops were in hand and their Commander was carrying out loyally the wishes of the Commission in spite of great provocation.

General von Eberhardt, while never losing an opportunity of drawing attention to what he pleases to call his military honour, has proved himself to be a person who is entirely devoid of any scruples or good faith. His complete neglect of the safety of the Allied Officers entrusted to his charge deserves the strongest condemnation. The lack of any effort to prevent the atrocities committed by the troops under his command merits his inclusion among the number whose personal misdeeds are to become the subject of investigation. The withdrawal by road of the Iron Division is a characteristic example of his bad faith. The move had commenced forty-eight hours before he informed us, and the incidents he brought forward as a pretext for the move took place after the troops had been set in motion.

The evacuation of the Baltic Provinces has been effected, but to say that the Mission has been a success would deceive no one. This has not been the fault of the Mission, but is a result of the policy of the Supreme Council which has consistently refused to give the Mission any other weapon but the moral weight of its presence. The whole country, according to reports of the Allied Control Officers, has been entirely devastated, all live stock removed and the inhabitants systematically robbed and illtreated. The peasants have been left without the means of tilling their fields, and measures of relief will be necessary without delay. Further reparation for the gross insults to Allied Officers, the entire lack of faith on the part of the Germans

concerning this report: 'Il ressort de ce rapport que si ce Gouvernement [allemand], malgré beaucoup de mauvaise volonté et de mauvaise foi, a fini par remettre à peu près tout le matériel qu'il devrait livrer [à la Lettonie et à la Lithuanie], il a tout fait pour ne pas accorder les sanctions réclamées par nous à l'égard des militaires allemands qui s'étaient livrés à des insultes, des violences, et même des attentats caractérisés envers les officiers de la Commission interalliée. . . . La conduite du Gouvernement allemand en cette occasion est une preuve de plus de sa mauvaise volonté et de sa mauvaise foi obstinées dans l'exécution de toutes les conventions consenties par lui. . . . Je profite de cette occasion pour attirer votre attention sur la conduite remarquable, à la fois pleine de tact et de fermeté, de M. le Capitaine Digue.' (Cf. Gen. A. Niessel, op. cit., pp. 263-8.) Under a covering letter of June 26, 1920, Marshal Foch submitted Captain Digue's report and General Niessel's letter to the Conference of Ambassadors. No discussion of this matter has been traced in the subsequent records of the Conference of Ambassadors.

in breaking their agreement, and the return of a sufficiency of rolling stock to both Latvia and Lithuania for economic needs, are matters which require immediate attention. This latter point has been carefully investigated by a special Railway Commission appointed by us, and the precise amount to be handed over has been decided. It is absolutely necessary, both from a point of view of policy and for the necessities of the countries concerned, that immediate reparation be made. To leave this to be settled by the Peace Reparation Committee is perfectly futile. The return of a fixed quantity of horses, cattle and rolling stock and a heavy immediate fine and punishment for crimes committed, should be insisted on forthwith; and unless this is done the German Military Party will realise that the Allies will permit them to laugh at the conditions of the Peace Treaty, and difficulties of a like nature will continue to arise in all the Plebiscite Areas.

East Prussia does not realise that Germany has lost the War. The Military Party is all powerful and Militarism in all its forms is rampant. Personally I have little doubt of the plot to overthrow the Government at the opportune moment, or of the power of the Military Party to do so. They are simply waiting for the time when the Peace shall have been ratified and the whole onus of it can be thrown on the present Government. Propaganda encouraging Militarism is being disseminated everywhere, especially by the Ober President of East Prussia, Herr Winning [Winnig], and takes the form of Anti-Bolshevism, the Germans having stated that all Latvians and Lithuanians are Bolsheviks and by this pretence they are hoping to maintain a large Army in East Prussia. At the same time there is strong reason to believe that the Germans are aiding the Bolsheviks in Lithuania both by propaganda and distribution of arms. To throw dust in our eyes the number of Reichswehr Troops will not be excessive, but with all the forms of Einwohnerwehr Truppen, Sicherheit Truppen, Grenzschutz Truppen a considerable Army the numbers of which it is quite impossible to discover will be available. Königsberg is the centre of all activities; here the General Commanding—von Estoff—an effete old man, [? is] merely a figurehead, and the situation is controlled by his Chief of Staff, Colonel von Burkner, a veritable monumental example of Prussian junkerdom in its highest and most concentrated form. The proposed distribution of the troops from the Baltic Provinces is as follows:—Bermondts Russians to Neisse, and the German contingent to Slade (near Hanover). The Iron Division however has marched to Memel and unless pressure is put on the German Government it is likely to stay there. The selection of both Memel and Neisse is curious from the point of view of future location of Allied Troops when ratification takes place.⁴ As a Police Force, if conditions do not change, I consider the proposed strength of the Allied Garrison of the Memel district to be inadequate, and if it cannot be suitably increased it will be useless, and may be a source of anxiety.

⁴ Note in original: 'Neisse is on the border of a Plebiscite area and Memel in the future does not form part of the German Empire. That such location[s] are intended to embarrass the future action of the Allies cannot be doubted, and if the Iron Division remains at Memel, Supreme Council can with every confidence look forward to future trouble.'

As regards the Russian troops, only a very small proportion was considered suitable for action with anti-Bolshevik forces supported by the Allies, and it is hoped that the Allied Governments will arrange for their support and transfer: the matter has been placed in the hands of General Malcolm. The remainder are worthless and are only useful to the Germans for further propaganda. Their leaders are men of straw, without any conscience or scruples. The Supreme War Council has been asked to ensure that neither Bermondts nor his troops leave Germany to join Denikin.

General Niessel has proved himself a man of exceptional ability—with a wonderful memory and of great eloquence; he is a man of decision but jumps to conclusions. He suffers however from his qualities and his eloquence at times prevents him from adhering to essentials. He has been uniformly courteous to a degree to all members of the Mission, and it has been a pleasure to work with him.

For Admiral Hopmann, the head of the German delegates, I have nothing but admiration. He has throughout acted straight, with candour and yet firmness towards us, but he has had to play a lone hand. The Military Chiefs have uniformly kept him badly informed and have entirely disregarded the full powers entrusted to him by his Government.

Finally I wish to draw the attention of the authorities to the present state of affairs in Prussia.

I hope I am not an alarmist but unless the Allies take stronger measures to enforce respect to their decisions serious trouble may be expected. The only thing respected is the thick stick. The anaemic attitude of the Supreme Council in entirely failing to enforce its decisions has caused it to become the subject of derision amongst the German Military. East Prussia is not tired of war. At present it is enriched with all the horses, cattle and spoil of Latvia and Lithuania. Nowhere in the world to-day are there more horses than in this neighbourhood—notwithstanding the considerable number we see despatched by train to the interior of Germany. Unless swift and adequate retribution is insisted upon for all the misdeeds in the Baltic States—to show the Military Party the game is not worth the candle—the Baltic trouble will prove itself to be only the first act of a well thought out policy which aims at the re-establishment of Monarchy and Militarism which will ever prevent the peace of Europe being on a firm basis.⁵

Copies to British Mission, Berlin, and British Military Section, Paris.

A. J. TURNER

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 214

Translation (from French)

To: General Vincent,

Commission for the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

From: Lieut. Geoffrey E. Lloyd Wilson,

Army Cyclist Corps, British Army.

Sir,

TILSIT, 3. 12. 19

I have the honour to inform you that on the night of the 23rd November

⁵ Cf. the conclusions presented to the Supreme Council in the joint final report of the Allied Commission, as printed by General A. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 240 f.

about one in the morning, a train stopped at the station of Tilsit. Amongst the passengers on this train was a detachment of German soldiers of the 34th Squadron with their aeroplanes, motors and material complete, commanded by the Lieut. Knedel. Having been informed that the German Liaison Officer would be waiting for me on the platform, and as I did not know him, I addressed myself to an officer who was at that moment talking to some German soldiers, asking him if he was the Liaison Officer. This Officer immediately answered me in an extremely insulting manner and having roundly cursed me, finally ordered me to clear off the platform. I went to the other end of the train hoping to find the Liaison Officer. Lieut. Knedel followed me with his men and grasping my shoulder ordered me again to clear off the platform immediately, at the same time he spat on me. He seemed quite mad. As he had with him his soldiers and I had only a French orderly I retired to the Commission's Office where I waited for the German Liaison Officer. I told the orderly who accompanied me to remain on the platform and to see that the train did not leave the station without my having examined it. About twenty minutes later the orderly returned saying that Lieut. Knedel had ordered the platform to be cleared and that the same Lieutenant was placing machine guns on the line. Later Lieut. Knedel refused to leave the machine guns at Tilsit and again spoke and acted in an insupportable manner.

I have, etc.,

Seen and transmitted.

GEOFFREY E. LLOYD WILSON

Commanding Officer, Control Commission, Tilsit.

Seen and transmitted.

V. CHOUCHE, Colonel

9. [sic] 12. 19.

1. I demand that severe action should be taken against Lieut. Knedel, 34th German Aviation Squadron. It is necessary that the Commission should be informed of the actions taken, so that the Officers of Control should feel themselves protected. I find it useless to underline the seriousness of this insult against Officers of the Entente who are unarmed and whose behaviour is an example of correctness.

2. The machine guns on the train had to be left as Lieut. Knedel himself declared they did not belong to his Squadron. Lieut. Knedel refused to do it [sic].

GENERAL VINCENT (French Army)

TILSIT, 4. 12. 19.

No. 215

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received December 10)

No. 271 Telegraphic [160291/61232/59]

RIGA, December 9, 1919

Latvian Government have secured from drawer in Bermont's office at Mitau two sets of highly confidential documents.¹

¹ In a subsequent telegram, No. 275 of December 11 (not printed), Colonel Tallents stated: 'From internal and other evidence I am convinced of the genuineness of these documents, though they might not be legally conclusive.'

I have arranged for Berry, of this mission, to examine them and will send translations as found. From a provisional examination of documents regarded by Letts as (? uncompromising [? compromising] I am not satisfied) that these papers establish connivance either of Yudenitch or Kolchak with Bermont, though statements to this effect are already appearing in press. One document left gives details of an arrangement for sending through Berlin and Copenhagen information about Bermont's movements to Kolchak's naval agency in London, by channels which are described as secure against English detection.

No. 216

*Report by General Malcolm (Berlin)*¹

No. 33 [165433/4232/18]

BERLIN, December 11, 1919

Part I. Political

It may be said that General Niessel has practically brought his Mission to the Baltic Provinces to a successful conclusion, and it now only remains for the German Government to deal with the interior situation which has resulted from it. This, I consider, will now present no great difficulty, although the usual rumours have again been put about that Ludendorff had gone to Mitau, to arrange with Eberhard and his supporters for the immediate overthrow of the Government.

This rumour was, I have little doubt, put about by the Independent Socialists, but it created such an impression at Schaulen that Colonel Dosse, the Chief of General Niessel's Staff, came hurriedly to Berlin on Saturday last² to warn the Government of the impending danger. When he left on Monday, he was, I think, a little reassured. . . .³

Part II. Military

1. During the past week the Great General Staff building has been cleared out; quantities of files and papers have been removed in lorries, and the rooms are now in the hands of the cleaners.

In future the building will be occupied by the Home Office. *Requiescat.*

2. I attach, Paper C,⁴ a memorandum by Lieut.-Colonel Longhurst on the arrangements for the reception, distribution and demobilisation of the German troops returning from the Baltic Provinces. The Russian troops are being sent to Neisse, where they will be disarmed if this has not already been done.

N. MALCOLM

¹ A copy of this report was received in the Foreign Office on December 29, 1919.

² December 6, 1919.

³ The remainder of this section of the report related to other matters.

⁴ Appendix printed below.

*Paper C**Return of the German troops from Kurland*

1. The German volunteer formations, which were participators in the Bermont adventure, were written off the German Army as long ago as November 12, when a detail of them was given in the *Heeres Verordnungsblatt* and all authorities were forbidden to meet any demands made by them.

2. Subsequent events have brought about the withdrawal of these troops from Kurland, and latest reports show that the majority, if not all, of them are on the German side of the frontier. Detailed orders for their reception and distribution were issued in an Army Order of December 5, which also caters for Russian military personnel and civil refugees from Kurland.

3. The following rest camps are named for the primary reception of these troops, etc.:—

For Germans.

Hammerstein.	Ohlau.
Krekau (near Stettin).	Oppeln.
Danzig.	Zittau.
Swinemünde.	Altengrabow.
Stralsund.	Warnemünde.

For Russians.

Neisse.

For civil refugees.

Heilsberg (East Prussia).

It will be noticed that none of these camps are in the interior portion of Germany, whence it is obviously advisable to exclude formations, whose obedience to the orders of the Government is doubtful and which contain the many semi-independent *Freikorps* who appear to be of a most unruly spirit and would be likely to be a cause of disorder in populous districts.

Neisse, the place set apart for Russians, is in Silesia. Bermont himself is there with about 4,000 to 5,000 men; 200 under Wirgolitz are reported at Danzig. With reference to these, the Army Order mentioned directs that they shall be disarmed on crossing the frontier, and accommodated and fed during detention on the same scale as the Reichswehr. Their ultimate disposal is to be the subject of further instructions.

It is doubtful whether the disarmament has so far been carried out, but Noske expresses his fixed intention of having it done, and says he will in no circumstances allow foreign troops to remain armed on German soil.

4. The German troops are to be distributed to the camps by the *Kreis-commando* in East Prussia, whose headquarters are at Allenstein, leaving

behind them all horses, vehicles and stores which can be dispensed with. They are to be re clothed where necessary, and then forwarded for demobilization to the centres detailed in the original scheme for the reduction of the army, for their units, or for the units which may be considered to represent them. Only in the case of complete formations, *which are well in the hands of their leaders*, and the state of whose clothing permits it, these troops may be sent direct to their demobilization centres.

Of such formations the 'Iron Division' is the important one, and with this there may be difficulties; it will probably moreover set the example for the *Freikorps* mentioned. Present information shows the 'Iron Division' as nearly all at Memel; its ultimate destination is in the neighbourhood of Hanover where it should be disbanded and its fragments go towards forming the 7th Reichswehr Brigade. The men, however, are said to insist on remaining in their present formation, halting where they are on the pretext of the necessity of opposing the Bolsheviki, who they say have been following on their heels in the guise of Letts. The situation is not an easy one for the Reichsminister, who, however, expresses himself confident of being able to deal with it and is moving a small force from interior Germany to replace the troops being moved back from the frontier.

Service in the Reichswehr is offered to all individuals who wish for transfer, provided they fulfil the necessary conditions, and that there are vacancies for them.

5. The Commissary of East Prussia has issued an address welcoming the troops on their return, calling on them for obedience to the Government, suggesting that previous offences in this respect will be overlooked and stating that the Government has been asked to liquidate pay made in Bermont's coinage.

A. L. LONGHURST

December 11, 1919.

No. 217

General Turner (Tilsit) to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received December 15)
No. M 56 Telegraphic [606/2/20/20605]

TILSIT, *December 14, 1919*

German report which we believe correct states evacuation now complete with exception of small rear guards due to cross frontier to-morrow.¹

Iron Division expected to remain Memel area for some days.²

¹ It appears that on December 14 the German evacuation was complete with the exception of the *Freikorps* Rossbach which, having passed into East Prussia, recrossed the frontier into Lithuania whence it finally returned on December 16, 1919—the last German formation to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces.

² The Iron Division appears to have completed its evacuation of Memel on January 8, 1920, two days before the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles.

Captain Dewhurst (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received December 29)

No. 149 [165475/61232/59]

RIGA, December 15, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 271¹ of the 9th December last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of translation of the Lettish summary of the first series of 'secret' documents, found in Colonel Bermond's office in Mitau, and part of the second series, marked 'very secret'. The summary of the remainder of the 'very secret' documents will be forwarded by first opportunity.

In addition are enclosed copies of twelve translations of the original documents.

Regarding the signature on documents 9 and 10, which in the Lettish summary is described as undecypherable, Mr. Berry, the translator, states that this signature seems to leave little doubt that it is the same as the signature of J. A. Gutchkof on the Russian Karensky Government War Loan bonds.

Documents Nos. 11 and 12 are those referred to by Colonel Tallents in his telegram referred to above.

Documents considered cardinal are marked as such by a cross and Mr. Berry is examining them in detail, and such documents as prove on examination to be important will be forwarded.

I request that the numbers of any other documents which may be considered important from the summary may be communicated to me in order that full translations may be transmitted.

I have, &c.,
N. DEWHURST

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 218

*Summary-Index made by the Latvian Foreign Office of the Bermond-Avalof
Secret Correspondence*

First Series (labelled 'Secret')

(Translation from the Lettish.)

1. Letter to Bermond, dated the 6th October, 1919, from a close friend, mentioning the names Protopopof, Karzew, Engelhardt, Biskupsky, Durnowo, Skriabin, Gischitzky, Lenitzky, Remmer [Römmer], Knorring and Pahlen as possibly useful in different ways in carrying out Bermond's plans. Also request for money for keeping up intercommunication with Ministries (German). Stating that a letter from Pahlen has been sent to Odessa.

2. Letter to Bermond, dated 7th October, 1919, from same as above, complaining that Remmer is invested with too much authority, calling himself Ambassador and behaving 'suspiciously'.

¹ No. 215.

3. Letter to Bermond, dated the 9th October, 1919, from the Russian Red Cross Mission (Berlin branch), No. 558, stating that the mission is unable to make issues to the Russian troops in the Baltic and that the application has been passed on to the Red Cross representative abroad, M. Klutchinsky.

4. Letter dated the 11th October, 1919, from same as No. 1, relating to the usefulness of Biskupsky and the promotion of Karzew.

+5. Letter dated the 14th October, 1919, from Lieutenant Eberhardt, Berlin, confirming receipt of documents and advising: (1) Official proclamation to the effect that the Western Government consists of Russians only; (2) the immediate attack upon Riga desired by pro-Russian parties in Germany; (3) report to Koltchak, through the Mar Agency members of the Government; (4) intrigue to oppose Great Britain to the Foch-Clemenceau policy; (5) issue of an order to Remmer or Engelhardt to obtain 50,000 M. for acquisition of cars and to send their salaries more regularly.

6. Copy of letter, dated Mitau, the 20th October, 1919, from Count Pahlen to 'Alexander Vasilevich . . .'² with request for financial support for Bermond, and emphasising that Bermond's Volunteer Army, consisting of 60,000 men and including many German engineers, wishes to take Dvinsk and join with the Southern Army, and that Bermond is receiving money and arms from Germany. The Western Government, whose aims are to re-establish Great Russia and to suppress semi-Bolshevik Latvia, is with the army. (Without signature.)

+7. Letter, dated Berlin, the 14th October, 1919, from same as No. 1, requesting money so that, together with Konradi Osten-Saken, the writer may work in the interests of Bermond. The writer's chief, A. von Gamm, was a schoolfellow of Sazonof's and could be made useful in the Russian cause. On the other hand, Biskupsky is working against Bermond.

8. Telegram dated Berlin, the 10th October, 1919, from von der Goltz, congratulating Avalof. With Russian translation.

9. Warrant of the Chief of the German Volunteer Corps, the Courland Baron Karl Heinrich von Diebitsch, dated Shavli, the 17th October, 1919, in which he confers upon Bermond the Prussian Order of Stern von Malplaquet in recognition of services in the re-establishment of Germany and Russia and friendship in arms.

10. Translation into Russian of letter from von der Goltz (see No. 12).

11. Translation into Russian of warrant of Karl Heinrich von Diebitsch (see No. 9).

+12. Original letter, dated the 10th October, 1919, from von der Goltz to Keller-Avalof-Bermond, as commander-in-chief of the combined German-Russian Army, expressing appreciation of the success on the Riga front against the Bolsheviks.³

+13. Letter, dated Berlin, the 15th October, 1919, from a friend with information regarding the activity of the military agent, Colonel Brand[t], carrying on propaganda amongst the French against the British, and stating that Bremen has succeeded in escaping from his former residence and in carrying off his documents from there, having obtained information beforehand of the search from the Foreign Office.

14. Translation of Bermond's reply to Count von der Goltz, in which he expresses gratitude for Germany's help to the Western Army.

² Thus in original.

³ Cf. No. 139, appendix 6.

15. Translation of Bermond's reply to Schwabach's letter of the 10th October, 1919 (see No. 17).

16. Russian translation of letter from Schwabach.

17. Original letter from Schwabach, Berlin, in which he expresses agreement with Bermond in summoning the Central Council of Western Russia.

18. Report of Lieutenant Eberhardt, dated Berlin, the 18th October, 1919, stating that the firm of Götze is prepared to sell eight tanks against the right to import flax from Courland for the sum of 400,000 M. in accordance with a contract signed by Count Pahlen. For the secret transportation of the tanks to Mitau the sum of 50,000 M. must be sent to the writer. Under Allied pressure the German secret police had searched the premises of the representative of the Western Army, Captain Neporotschny, in Berlin. (Document No. 6.)⁴

+ 19. Report of Lieutenant Eberhardt, Berlin, the 25th October, 1919 (information from Baron Korf), stating that: (1) on account of the Allied blockade the German press blames Captain Neporotschny's agency; (2) through English friends it was possible to establish connection with Paris and Koltchak's wife (who entertains many influential people); (3) Gurko has arrived at Berlin and has had confidential conversation with Remmer and Biskupsky; (4) detailed report has been sent to Koltchak through the Mar Agency; (5) twelve tanks of 100-h.p. each are being provided, and 300,000 M. have been already paid.

20. Letter from A. Remmer, dated the 26th October, 1919, stating that General Gurko has informed the financiers [*sic*] that Bermond really is the Russian representative and will remain commander-in-chief. (Document No. 2.)⁵

21. Letter dated the 26th October, 1919, from A. Remmer to Bermond regarding intrigues against him and requesting confirmation of the State Bank project in order to realise the million loan.

22. Letter dated Berlin, the 26th October, 1919, to Boris Vladimirovich . . .² stating that General Gurko has informed the Syndicate that Bermond will remain commander-in-chief of the Western Army and that the contracts to be concluded between the financial group and himself will not be contracts with a 'traitor,' but with the official Russian representative. (Document No. 3.)⁶

23. Letter from A. Remmer to the same person, stating that 62,800 M. have been remitted for needs of the army.

+ 24. Letter from a friend, dated Berlin, the 25th October, 1919, to Bermond informing that the Allies are recruiting agents against him amongst Russian officers and stating that a certain Lieutenant Rebinder, friend of Baron Hahn, has started a bureau supported by Allied funds, and that Gurko is with Bermond's adherents.

+ 25. Letter from a friend (M. Sud . . .²), dated Berlin, the 23rd October, 1919, stating that he had been detained from his intended journey to Riga for the purpose of sending an army of 15,000 strong to Courland with ammunition and entering into negotiations with the British. Captain Krapotkin and General Davidof have left.

26. Letter of thanks from Baron Osten-Sacken, dated Berlin, the 28th October,

⁴ Document 6 in enclosure 3 below.

⁵ Document 2 in enclosure 3 below.

⁶ Document 3 in enclosure 3 below.

1919, No. 813, stating that the first number of the newspaper *Zapadny Kraie* (Western District) was published on the 29th October.

+28. [sic] Statement from Lieutenant Eberhardt, Berlin, dated the 27th October, 1919, containing information furnished by Baron Korf: (1) Sympathetic feeling of Churchill towards Bermondts. Replacing of General Gough by General Henning [? Haking]. The Allied Commission and the importance of the capture of Riga. (2) The cashier of a recruiting bureau in Berlin, Salmann, the assistant to Captain Tcheremisinof, Hildebrand and four others have been arrested. Gurko is negotiating with Biskupsky's men and with Remmer. Gutchkof has arrived from London *en route* for Mitau. (3) Baron Korf is organising Bermondts's press bureau, which will have connection with Burzef, the German and English presses. (4) Tanks cannot be sent, as Tcheremisinof has not provided money.

+29. Letter from Andrew Needra, dated Mitau, the 14th September, 1919, requesting the convening of a meeting which he himself, Dr. Wankin and Engineer Kampe should attend, to discuss Needra's financial scheme for procuring means locally, and also his journey to Lithuania and Berlin with the object of agitating against the participation of Letts and Esthonians with the Bolsheviks.

+30. Communication from Lieutenant Eberhardt, dated the 30th October, 1919, concerning the naval agency of Koltchak in London ('Mar'), whose representative in Berlin, Baron Korf, is in direct relations with Count von der Goltz. Korf undertakes to keep up communication between Bermondts and Koltchak and Denikin, and states that ultimatums of the Allies to Germany are sent only with the object of quietening English and French public opinion. The Allies recognise Bermondts's policy towards Latvia as quite correct, but fear German influence.

31. Letter from A. Remmer, dated the 3rd October, 1919, stating that postage and tax stamps are being printed, that connection between the Americans and the Allies has been established, that Noske's ultimatum is not dangerous, that a power of attorney authorising the signing of the conditions with the director of the bank is necessary. This letter being sent through an American colonel.

+32. Letter from A. Remmer, dated the 4th October, 1919, No. 22, stating that in lieu of the chief of the Berlin branch of the political section of the Western Army, a director of the Orient Bank is willing to start a private commercial industrial bank, with a capital of 50,000,000 M., in the territory occupied by the army. This bank would be at the disposal of Bermondts; stating also that the writer has made the acquaintance of Koltchak's official representative and the directors of the Mar Agency, Baron Korf and Baron Ungern-Stomberg. Recommends Bermondts should proceed to Dvinsk and Smolensk after the capture of Riga, the Iron Division remaining at Riga with the Government.

33. Letter from Lieutenant Prince Popoff-Erbekteisk, Berlin, dated the 18th October, 1919, stating that as searches have again taken place at the recruiting bureau, Russians only will in future be sent. Remmer has founded a political saloon, frequently visited by General Biskupsky, who, in view of his commercial agreements with the firm of Morgan, has entirely discredited the Berlin Western Government. Lieutenant Sawtchenko is probably a Lettish agent, and should therefore be watched.

34. Letter from the same as No. 33, dated the 19th October, 1919, regarding the arrest of Bermondts's agent in Yudenitch's army and the stopping of a Russian echelon on the German frontier.

35. Communication from A. Remmer, dated the 29th October, 1919, stating that after the capture of Petrograd and Moscow the supreme command will be taken by General Gurko, who is in contact with the 'Mar' Party in Copenhagen and Koltchak, Denikin and Yudenitch. Gurko has informed the Syndicate that Bermondts is not a traitor, but a 'link in the all-Russia chain', and that his work is in accord with the all-Russia policy. Gurko's aide-de-camp, Pfeil, and Colonel Durnovo are leaving for Mitau. Oscar Gillert recommended as director of bank. (Document No. 8.)⁷

36. Communication from the Commandant of Illowo (Irlowa) dated the 2nd November, 1919, stating that fifty-seven citizens of Illowo desire him to transmit a message of gratitude to Bermondts.

37. Original message from the inhabitants of Illowo (Irlowa) with fifty-seven signatures.

37 A. Russian translation of same.

38. Letter from P. Durnowo, dated Berlin, the 1st November, 1919, requesting to be enlisted in Bermondts's army, which he knows to be true to the Tsar and Fatherland.

39. Letter from Colonel Kutjko, Berlin, stating that twelve tanks with ammunition can be transported across the frontier on cars, as his adjutant, Captain Bergmann, has connections with the German police at Tilsit.

40. A letter with undecyphered signature, dated Berlin, the 2nd November, 1919, pointing out that Bermondts's attempt will become a pure adventure in the absence of the Allies' sanction, and would then precipitate the climax of the Baltic problem. (Document No. 9.)⁸

+41. Reply from Major-General Hoffmann, dated Berlin, the 2nd November, 1919, stating that he cannot accept Bermondts's proposal to come to Courland without the permission of the Allies, but that he has desired General Gutchkof, who is coming with the Allied Baltic Commission, to speak in his behalf.

41 A. Russian translation of same.

+42. Letter with undecyphered signature from Berlin, dated the 2nd October, 1919, requesting that information regarding the state of Russian affairs in the Baltic be given to Lieutenant Pfeil who will shortly return to Denikin.

+43. Communication from A. Remmer and W. Pop[p]e, dated the 29th October, 1919, stating that as Bermondts has given only to the Barons Knorring, Osten-Sacken and Neporotschny authority to conclude terms in the name of the Western Government, Pahlen has no right to conclude with the financiers the terms of the 6th October, respecting Courland's forests, railways and telegraphs, without the permission of the German Army, and that according to the contract with the Syndicate, the Western Government is receiving 50 millions out of 250 millions upon the signing of the contract. Owing to intrigues, however, the contract cannot now be ratified.

44. Warning by Konstantin Pahlen, dated the 8th November, 1919, against entering into any dealings with the afferist [*sic*] Moisel.

45. Letter from W. Nolde, dated Wirgend, the 7th November, 1919, stating that the Lettish peasantry are against Russia, and that Bermondts's soldiers should

⁷ Document 8 in enclosure 3 below.

⁸ Document 9 in enclosure 3 below.

be attired in Russian uniforms in order to mislead the English; and recommending the concealment of the orders of the German Government for the troops to return home.

45 A. Russian translation of the above.

46. Letter from August Scherl Illustration Company, dated the 27th October, 1919, acknowledging photograph of Bermondts.

47. Letter from a baron, dated the 2nd November, 1919, Berlin, asking forgiveness for previous misunderstandings.

48. Letter from Berlin, dated the 11th November, 1919, stating that Baron Korf, who has connections with Koltchak's staff, has left, together with the Inter-Allied Baltic Commission. Signature undecypherable. (Document No. 10.)⁹

49. Agent's (Lieutenant Gna . . .²) report, dated the 8th November, 1919, Berlin, stating that the German Government has seized paper money to the value of 9,000,000 to 10,000,000 M., which it is thus impossible to forward to Mitau, and that as Remmer's authority no longer exists, the whole financial undertaking has collapsed. Von Brandt is Bermondts's representative on the Baltic Inter-Allied Commission, and Gutchkof, who is under the influence of midshipman Kleinberg, a Bermondist, is the financial representative of Russia.

50. Letter from same agent, dated the 11th November, 1919, desiring to be relieved of his duties.

51. Letter from A. Remmer, dated the 11th November, 1919, regarding intrigues against him by the German barons, Count Pahlen, Baron Knorring, Pilar von Pilchau, who even yet have not abandoned the idea of a union under one constitution with Germany. Remmer has been offered an interview by General Nyessel [*sic*], whose object it is to evacuate the Germans from the Baltic and send Bermondts's troops to the help of Yudenitch. As a measure of coercion, food supplies will be stopped, with which Noske will agree, as he regards the Baltic question in the light of a baron royalist plot.

52. Letter from Captain Siewert, German Legion, dated the 11th November, 1919, explaining the cause of dissension between him and the chief of the garrison in Shavli.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 218

*Summary-Index made by the Latvian Foreign Office of the Bermondts-Avalof
Secret Correspondence*

Second Series (labelled 'Very Secret')

(*Translation from the Lettish.*)

1. Telegram from the German command, dated Mitau, 9th November, 1919, to Avalof's 'group,' requesting names of commanders of military units, with note by Avalof that an Avalof 'group' does not exist, but that there is a Western Army under command of Colonel Avalof.

2. Telegram from Nolken, Berlin, not fully decyphered, undated, urging necessity of an advance on Riga in order to obtain money.

⁹ Document 10 in enclosure 3 below.

3. Telegram from Avalof, Mitau, dated the 16th November, 1919, addressed to Admiral Hofman [sic], Baltic Inter-Allied Commission, Tilsit, instructing him to proceed to the Bolshevik front through the Lettish lines, and stating that the Allied representatives in Riga and Lithuania have given orders to fire at the Russian units.

4. Same in German.

5. Answer of the German representative in the Baltic Inter-Allied Commission, Admiral Hofman, Tilsit, No. 58, dated the 10th November, 1919, to Avalof, Mitau, stating that the Allies have made the whole German nation responsible for the attack of the Western Army on Riga and Libau, and proposing the cessation of military operations.

6. Same in German (certified copy of telegram).

+7. Report of staff officer, 'Flying Bureau,' Western Army, Captain Anichkof, Tilsit, dated the 15th November, 1919, No. 1, concerning the visit of the Frontier Control Commission to General Vincent. General Nyessel is willing to attach Russian officers from the Western Army to his mission. The Commission fears to go to Mitau, in view of possible excesses on the part of German troops. The General spoke with him as with an ally, stating that the plans of the French were different to those of the British.

+8. Report of German liaison officer, Captain of General Staff Fintelmann, Mitau, dated the 17th November, 1919, concerning negotiations between General Nyessel and the Frontier Control Commission and the possibility of bribing the Allies. Recommends the continuation of negotiations with Lithuanians, taking advantage of their wavering policy, threatening them with a Polish-Lettish coalition and the outnumbering forces of the Western Army.

9. Russian translation of same letter.

10. Document of Prince Avalof concerning the delivery of 1,000 poods of flax and 1,200 poods of raw leather. Dated the 17th November, 1919.

11. Document of Colonel Chesnakof and Jacobson, dated the 19th November, 1919, to Lieutenant-Colonel Neporochny, regarding the transfer of 300,000 M. to the Baltic Commercial Bank.

12. Draft telegram, Colonel Chesnakof to Eberhardt, Berlin, concerning the despatch of twelve tanks, payment for which is already sent.

13. Same in German.

14. Confirmation of telegram from Baron Koskul, dated Memel, the 12th November, 1919, regarding Nyessel's Commission and the despatch of delegates.

15. Letter from the Medical Administration of the Western Army, Mitau, dated the 14th November, 1919, regarding Assistant-Surgeons Stolbin and Legachinsky.

16. Copy of telegram from German representative on the Baltic Inter-Allied Commission, Admiral Hofman, to the Western Army, regarding despatch, on the 14th November, 1919, of the Chief of the General Staff and the commander of the separate corps to Tilsit for negotiations with Nyessel's Commission.

17. Same to the Commander of the Iron Division.

18. Report of a political agent in Berlin, dated the 11th November, 1919, on the arrest of recruiting agents by the German police, viz., Salmann, Baron Knorring,

Kornet Bodin, Lieutenant Rosenwaldt, Siewert. The Allied agent, Count Re-binder, has provided Nyessel's Commission with a list of individuals doing harm to the Allied cause in the Baltic.

19. Daily order No. 4 to Count Keller's Corps, dated the 11th November, 1919, concerning attack on Olai.

20. Order to advance on Riga, attached to operation order No. 4 of the 11th November, 1919, to Keller's Corps.

21. Authority given to Colonel Schneidemann, Engineer Iljin, Councillor of State Simin, and Colonel of the General Staff Durnovo, by the 'Flying Bureau' of the Commander of the Western Army, dated the 8th November, 1919, No. 433, to negotiate and to sign conditions in the name of the Western Army with the Lithuanian Government and their military representatives.

22. Copy of Avalof's telegram, dated the 2nd November, 1919, to the Prime Minister of Lithuania, proposing negotiations; for this purpose the Chief of the Staff, Colonel Tchaikovsky, Colonel Tchesnokof and two officers are being despatched.

23. Copy of power of attorney from the 'Flying Bureau' of the Western Army, dated the 1st November, 1919, Nos. 325 and 326, authorising Colonel Tchaikovsky to negotiate with the Lithuanian Government.

24. Copy of a letter of the Commander of the Western Army to the Military Governor, dated the 31st October, 1919, No. 011, drawing attention to the conduct of police officials, as there are rumours that officials of the Contra-Research Agency have been observed in acts of violence and indulgence.

25. Circular of the Commander of the Western Army, dated the 31st October, 1919, to the chiefs of all staffs regarding the despatch to the front of all individuals who have been in Bolshevik service. All Letts who have served in the Latvian army or under the Ullmanis Government are referred to the same category.

26. Covering letter to communication on negotiations with the member of the Italian mission, Count Radschieri, from Baron Osten-Sacken, dated the 17th October, 1919.

27. Statement on negotiations with Count Radschieri, dated the 17th October, 1919, and regarding information given by Baron Osten-Sacken on the Baltic question.

28. Letter from Avalof to a certain Vassilly Josephovitch . . . ,² Berlin, requesting information.

29. Daily order No. 2, the 26th October, 1919, to Keller's Corps regarding military operations against the Letts.

30. Communication from the Director of the Political Section of the Berlin Dépôt of the Western Army, A. Remmer, dated the 14th October, 1919, No. 49, reporting: (1), that the Berlin press awaits news of support for Bermondts from Denikin; (2), that Prince Kropotkin has been appointed Bermondts's representative in Paris with approval of the French; (3), that the Peace Conference has deferred to Russia the decision of the Baltic question, but fears Bermondts's connections with the Barons; (4), that crosses and medals have been received to the value of 500 M.; (5), on the establishment of a trust and syndicate with German, English, Dutch and French capital and the capture of Riga; (6), regarding the political situation in Moscow.

31. Letter from Avalof to Colonel Brand[t], Berlin, dated the 29th October, 1919, No. 0292, concerning the despatch of Russian prisoners of war to the Western Army.

32. Project by A. Remmer for the establishment of a State Economic Council with the Western Army, with appendix, dated the 28th October, 1919.

33. Answer from Chief of the Travelling Office of the Western Army, dated the 28th October, 1919, No. 286, to Count N. Finkenstein concerning authorisation to enter into financial negotiations with America and Japan.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 218

Document 1

(Translated from the Russian.)

BERLIN, September 30, 1919

Highly honoured Colonel,

I have to inform you that the news concerning the war actions begun by the detachments of your army has made a great impression here, and that many who were hitherto your opponents are now supporting your idea. All persons with whom I chance to talk are persuaded by me to keep your side; at the present time everybody acknowledges your authority, which circumstance has rendered the salvage of the financial question to us by far easier [*sic*]. A number of new persons are just now working on this question, and if everything is to go on as well as until now, then we have great hopes for a prompt result.

I have to entrust you with a secret commission from Baron H. Korff. Here Baron Korff occupies the post of informant of the Naval Agency of Koltchak at London. All the information which he chances to obtain is transmitted twice weekly via Copenhagen to the agency at London. All this information is communicated in cypher by German envoys to a neutral person at Copenhagen, and from there they are promptly sent over to the Naval Agency. The only person who reads these communications is the war attaché of Germany at Copenhagen and the naval agency at London. Baron Korff guarantees these communications not falling into the hands of the English. Until now all information was got by Korff immediately from Count von der Goltz, and besides von der Goltz and the Baron nobody knew whatever about this matter.

Taking into regard that at the present time everything in Courland is under your authority and you are the only political dictator in that district, Baron Korff requests you to transmit all the information by my mediation; Baron Korff requests it to be kept a secret, and, from his side, gives a promise to communicate all information issued by the circles of the *Entente* and Germans promptly to me for further transmittance to you. If you give a corresponding order, then all your information will invariably be delivered to Koltchak.

It is most necessary that twice weekly all information is delivered here by envoy, whereas all information from here will be despatched by me by the returning envoy. It is to be wished that all such information is put up after your order by the Field-Chancery and directed twice weekly to my address—Berlin, Augsburger St., 43, boarding-house Wenzel; I shall hand them over to the Baron and get from him his information. Owing to the Baron's influential connections here and at Copenhagen, he is always able to furnish us with rather valuable information,

whereas we, thanks to his support, will have a constant connection with Koltchak. It appears to me that this proposition is a very lucky one, for in this way you will dictate yourself that what you would like to inform officially as well as that of what but certain circles may know, and thus the information of Korff will be founded not on mere rumours but upon real facts. Moreover, you will get exact information about everything concerning you from reliable and well-furnished sources. Like connections could be taken up also with Denikin.

The first communication of Baron Korff is as follows: 'After the declaration of the Allied Mission all the ultimatums concerning the withdrawal of the army standing under the command of Goltz in Courland will have no consequences, and are issued only for the sake of appeasing the general public mind in England and France. Your policy concerning Latvia is acknowledged by the *Entente* as a correct one, but the *Entente* fears the German influence. No great attention should be paid to the ultimatums of the *Entente*. Sir, if you find the organisation of such connections as correct, I should request you to send such collected information by an envoy personally over to me twice weekly.'

Baron Korff asks you to keep everything told you as a secret, and not to mention his family name, as it could harm him in his work of obtaining information. I personally regard Baron Korff as a man of serious character and with great connections, and of course enjoying the German orientation; besides, he is devoted to his work. I am acquainted with him already since a long time.

Awaiting your prompt instructions, I remain, &c.

SUB-LIEUTENANT EBERHARDT

Document 2

Extract from A. Remmer's letter of October 26, 1919, addressed to Paul Mihailovitch (Translated from the Russian.)

...² To-day General Gurko called upon me, who confirmed once more that to-morrow the financiers are to be informed by him that you really are the representative of Russia, and that the commandership of the army is also further on to be entrusted to you. ...²

Document 3

Extract from A. K. Remmer's letter of October 26, 1919, addressed from Berlin to Boris Vladimirovich

(Translated from the Russian.)

...² To-morrow at 3.30 o'clock the Director of the Syndicate will be at General Gurko's, who, after a three hours' conversation, resolved to inform the Syndicate that Avalof-Bermondts remains commander of the Western Volunteer Army, and consequently also the representative of the Government of Russia.

Consequently, the contract concluded between the group of financiers and him by my mediation will not be regarded as a contract with a 'traitor,' but as an official contract between the Syndicate and him—the representative of the future great and indivisible Russia. ...²

Document 4

(Translated from the Russian.)

(Undated.)

My dear and beloved Pavel Mihailovitch,¹⁰

Please believe that I have done the impossible. I congratulate you.

I fear nothing and gossips do not trouble me. I am not afraid of these intrigues which are spread about me.

I congratulate you on your acknowledgement by General Gurko.

Ever yours,

A. REMMER

P.S.—We have opened the frontier. So far, 10,000,000 cartridges have been sent from Königsberg. Further supplies will follow.

Document 5

Report to the Commander of the Western Army

(Translated from the Russian.)

[Undated.]

1. I have succeeded in obtaining General Gurko's acknowledgment of the commandship of Colonel Avalof over the Western Army, regarding which General Gurko has notified commercial and industrial spheres and the Syndicate.

On Monday, at 11 a.m., the President of the Syndicate and the Managing Director, together with General Remmer, will call upon General Gurko to secure his ratification of the plan enclosed herewith (Enclosure No. 1).¹¹ This plan must be signed by Colonel B. as agreed to, and sent back by Captain Herstel.

After having obtained General Gurko's agreement, the Syndicate will conclude a final agreement with A. Remmer for the supply of complete war material as well as money.

The programme of the party is Monarchist-Democrat, accepted by the army of Denikin and South Russia—a fact confirmed by the former Minister Krivoshein and engineer Verhovsky.

On Monday or Tuesday the Syndicate will convey the first 50,000,000 in reimbursement of the shares of the bank. On Wednesday or Thursday (according to when Colonel B. receives the consent) ten or twelve members of the Syndicate will travel to M, the most notable of whom are: Wilhelm Hartmann, Oscar Maier, Paul Baier, Oscar Hertel and Hermann Liliental—all directors of the Commerce-Industry Union, selected by the Syndicate as representatives and managers for the execution of the work of the economic restoration of the country in the rear of the army of B.

These names are well known in Germany, and two of them are members of the National Assembly (Volkspartei). Nidermeyer has been proposed by me as a candidate for the directorship of the bank.

A. Remmer would like to know who will be appointed by Colonel B. to the directorship of the State Economic Council.

¹⁰ i.e. Colonel Bermond-Avalov.

¹¹ Not enclosed in filed original.

Document 6

(Translation from the Russian.)

(No. 23.)

BERLIN, October 18, 1919

Dear Colonel,

2. . . Messrs. Hette are going to deliver us eight tanks against a consignment of flax for 400,000 M.—in accordance with the terms of a contract signed by Count Pahlen and kept by Lieutenant Kumme. We have to guarantee the delivery of the flax by a deposit of 200,000 M.—which sum has been promised by Captain Tcheremisof and is to be deposited in a day or two. To-day I returned from Dessau, where I inspected the tanks, the delivery of which will be commenced at an early date. The most difficult part of this transaction is the transport of the tanks to Mitau. In order to overcome this difficulty I have made an agreement with a firm of forwarding agents, who are going to look after the transport up to the frontier and will send the tanks, declaring them as hay or some other goods. The transport over the frontier is to be organised by myself; all preliminary arrangements have been already completed. The fact is that the transport will cost us a good sum of money, and I have none. The forwarding agents alone are asking a high price for their services, viz., 4,000 M. per tank, which already amounts to 32,000 M. The transport over the frontier will also require ready cash, to be used for bribing officials. Taking all this into consideration, I think that not less than 40,000 M. to 50,000 M. are required to pay the expenses of transport. This amount I must have at once, otherwise I am not in a position to send the tanks off.

I will wire you both the date of delivery and the day they will pass the frontier, and I will use the following code:—

'Wertpaket'¹² (tank);

'Ankommen nach Hause'¹³ (arrived at frontier); and

'Rückkehr nach Hause'¹⁴ (arrival at Mitau).

LIEUTENANT EBERHARDT

Document 8¹⁵

*Extract from Report by A. K. Remmer, dated October 29, 1919, from Berlin,
to the Commander of the Army*

(Translation from the Russian.)

It is quite clear that in future, after the occupation of Petrograd and Moscow, the supreme post will be occupied by Cavalry General W. T. Gurko. Being in

¹² Registered parcel.

¹³ Reach home.

¹⁴ Return home.

¹⁵ Document 7 is not printed. It was an extract in somewhat variant translation from Sub-Lieut. Eberhardt's letter of October 27, 1919, to Colonel Bermond-Avalov, which is printed in full as document 15 in enclosure 2 in No. 219. This extract was immediately followed in the original by two short documents without numbered headings. These documents would appear to be those listed in the Lettish Summary, Second Series, Nos. 11

contact with the Mar Party¹⁶ (in Copenhagen), General Gurko is in close connection with Koltchak and Denikin and, of course, also with Yudenitch.

As I have already informed you, Gurko declared to the introduced delegates of the Syndicate that the commander of the Western Volunteer Army, Count [sic] Avalof-Bermond, is not a traitor, but a link in the general all-Russian chain, and that Count Avalof-Bermond's actions are in accord with the general Russian policy.

With the object of attaining general co-ordination [sic] (with Denikin and Koltchak), and in confirmation of the legislation (after Yudenitch's order),¹⁷ General Gurko is sending over to Mitau to-morrow his own adjutant, Sub-Lieutenant Pfeil. I will report further regarding this in due course.

In addition, General Gurko is sending Colonel Durnovo from Berlin to the front 'to work,' and General Gurko assigns no further object to his journey. The General remarked, 'Colonel Avalof will see himself what to do with Durnovo.' The general opinion is that Durnovo is an idle man; much noise but little profit. Merely for the sake of his name General Gurko has to-day sent Koltchak and Denikin some information concerning the Western front, in which it is stated, amongst other items, that Count Avalof continues as commander of the army. In addition, General Gurko has ordered me to send our Monarchist-Democrat programme to the Denikin front, which has been done.

The information regarding General Gurko's title to supreme command must be kept secret in order that his editorial work to Koltchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch should not be broken off by the *Entente*.

I am sending this list [sic] separately with an order to Sub-Lieutenant Geist. In case of danger, the letter must be destroyed.

In all events, I have to inform your Excellency of General Gurko's request that his future rôle shall not be published. The plan concerning economical restoration has been fully approved by him, and he has expressed his approval that this plan is beginning to take effect on the Western front—the frontier of Germany.

General Gurko remarked, 'This is the stepping-stone to the future Russia.'

Document 9

Lettish Summary No. 40, Series No. 1

(Translation from the Russian.)

Highly honoured Pavel Mihailovitch,

BERLIN, November 2, 1919

I consider that you have not only not acted treacherously to your mother-country, but moreover not changed your original plan to assail the Bolsheviks after and so respectively, although the discrepancy in dating may be noticed. These additional documents read as follows:

- (i) 'To Lieutenant-Colonel Neporoshai [sic],
'Three hundred thousand marks send Berlin. Linitzky and Tolbowitch will come.
Money in Commercial Bank, Berlin.
TCHESNAKOF
JACOBSON
October 17, 1919
- (ii) 'Bayoren: To Friedman for Tulbowitch [sic] and Barenbom,
'Delivered to Jacobson and Co. 1600 [sic] poods flax and 1200 poods raw leather.
'PRINCE AVALOF
JACOBSON'

¹⁶ Note in original: 'Believed to be the political party of Empress Maria, mother of the late Czar.'

¹⁷ This order would appear to be that printed below as Document 11.

having gained strength. I will not speak about the events which have taken place. A lot was probably inevitable. Just a few words on the possible perspectives. Your envoy, Colonel Engelhardt, whom I have kept informed throughout, will report details to you.

There are chances of success, and great success. But there is the risk of ill-success and even of total failure. If it should prove possible to persuade the Allies to permit the formation of a Russian army with German aid, there will be not only a great political and strategical gain, but the most burning question—the question of supplies—the financial question—can be solved in the most satisfactory manner.

If the *Entente* refuses its sanction, then the whole undertaking will become a doubtful adventure.

One of the most important elements of success in obtaining the sanction of the Allies is that the all-Russian struggle with the Russian Bolsheviks should in no way be complicated with another question, also important, but at the same time not a question of the day—the Baltic problem.

I repeat that the game is a very complicated and tricky one. There are chances of a brilliant success, but at the same time all may be lost. Much will depend on you personally.

Yours sincerely devoted,

(Signature: decyphered as)

I. A. GUTCHKOF

Document 10

Lettish Summary No. 48, Series No. 1

(Translation from the Russian.)

Highly honoured Pavel Mihailovitch,

BERLIN, November 11, 1919

My good old friend Baron Korff is proceeding with the Inter-Allied Commission, which is going for the purpose of regulating matters in the Baltic. I strongly recommend him to your attention as an extremely well-informed and fully reliable person, who, further, has connections with General [*sic*] Koltchak's staff.

With deep respects,

(Signature: decyphered as)

I. A. GUTCHKOF

Document 11

Lettish Summary No. [54], Series No. [2]

(Translation from the Russian.)

(To Mitau from Reval.)

Order from the Commander-in-Chief of all armed Forces of the North-Western Front, dated October 9, 1919 (Narva)¹⁸

To Colonel Bermond. (Copy to Colonel Wirgolitch.)

As Colonel Bermond has not fulfilled by the date fixed by me any of my orders, and, according to information received, has even started military operations against

¹⁸ Cf. No. 132, paragraph 8 of enclosure.

the Lettish troops, I declare him a traitor to his mother-country and expel him and the troops under his command from the personnel of the North-Western Front.

I order all officers and volunteers who have remained true to their duty to subject themselves to the senior in rank amongst them, who, with the assistance of the British Mission, should take all measures to join the North-Western Army as early as possible.

(Copy certified.)

General of Infantry, YUDENITCH

General Major WANDMANN.

Draft Reply written on same sheet

To General Yudenitch. Reval.

The counter-offensive against the Lettish and Esthonian troops, with the object of securing the flank and rear of my army, was undertaken so as not to put my army in the same position as yours with an unsecured rear.

Previous orders from you have been followed by explanations from you through your officers that they did not apply to me; I understand this last telegram in the same sense.

By further operations I hope to afford help not only to my mother-country, but also to the troops of the Northern Army. I do not consider myself a traitor to my mother-country; your telegram contains an open incitement to mutiny in my army.

(Added in pencil.) Further, I do not consider myself a traitor because, in their own territory, troops of the Northern Army are being subjected to humiliation and insults, whereas my troops enjoy esteem in all parts of Courland and the Russian flag floats proudly over them.

Document 12

Lettish Summary No. . . . , Series No. . . . ²

(Translation from the Russian.)¹⁹

(No. 04.)

To General Yudenitch. Reval.

October 10

The counter-offensive against the Lettish and Esthonian troops has been undertaken so as not to put my army in the same position as yours with an unsecured rear.

Your previous orders were followed by explanations through your officers that they did not apply to me as you were not the complete master of your actions.

I understand your last order in the same sense. By further operations I hope to afford help not only to my mother-country, but also to the Northern Army.

I cannot believe in the authenticity of your strange accusations, as my army occupies an appropriate position in Courland and is flying the Russian flag in its former greatness, whereas your army labours under conditions unbearably painful to Russian pride.

COLONEL AVALOF

(Received for transmission.)

Liaison Officer STEIN.

¹⁹ Cf. No. 138, paragraph 8 of enclosure.

Captain Dewhurst (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received December 29)
No. 156 [165663/61232/59]

RIGA, December 20, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my dispatch No. 149¹ dated 15th December, 1919, I have the honour to attach hereto the remainder of Series II of the Lettish Summary-Index of documents found in Colonel Bermond't's desk at Mitau, and also further translations of certain of the actual documents, numbered 13 to 20, inclusive.

I would point out that Colonel Bermond't is addressed variously in the documents as Pavel Michailovich, Pavel Rafailovich, Prince Avaloff and Colonel.

As far as has been ascertained up to the present, examination of the documents does not seem to indicate any complicity between General Yudenich and Colonel Bermond't. Documents Nos. 11 and 12, forwarded with my previous dispatch,² appear to be the only ones which the Lettish authorities consider as of an incriminating nature against General Yudenich. They take exception in particular to the following extract from Document No. 12:—

'Your previous orders were followed by explanations through your officers that they did not apply to me as you were not the complete master of your actions.'

addressed by Bermond't to Yudenich; but they have not yet produced anything to substantiate this statement of Bermond't's in any way.

With regard to relations between General Gourko and Bermond't, I beg to draw your attention to documents Nos. 2, 3, 8, 17 and short passages in No. 15.

Relations between I. A. Gutchkoff and Bermond't are indicated to a certain extent by documents Nos. 9, 10 and certain passages in No. 15.

Documents Nos. 41 and 43, Series II of the Lettish Summary will be examined at the earliest opportunity, as they seem [?] to] relate to efforts on the part of Bermond't to obtain the sympathy and support of General Denikin. The Lettish authorities state in this connection that no documents either from General Denikin or Admiral Kolchak to Bermond't have been found.

I would request that the numbers of any documents which appear from the Lettish Summaries to be of importance may be communicated to me, in order that they may be translated and forwarded to the Foreign Office as soon as possible.

I have, etc.,

N. DEWHURST

¹ No. 218.

² Documents 11 and 12 in enclosure 3 in No. 218.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 219

34.³ Letter from Capt. Count Finck Finckenschtein [*sic*] of the Contra-Espionage Bureau of Keller's Corps, dated Memel 17 Oct. 1919, requesting authority for him to negotiate with Japan and America regarding financing the Western Army.

35. Resolution regarding the dispatch of radiogram No. 277 to the Vice-President of the Livonian Consistory.

36. Awaloff's radiogram No. 277 to the Vice-President of the Consistory—Maldon—concerning the shelling of Riga.

37. Copy of same in Russian.

38. Radiogram from the Clergy of Riga with the signature of Maldon and Others to Superintendent-General of Mitau, dated 26 Oct. 1919, No. 0216 [*sic*], requesting the cessation of the shelling of Riga.

39. Bill of exchange from the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Army, dated 27 Oct. 1919, No. 270, issued to A. A. Lubitschew on receipt of . . .⁴ Roubles for the needs of the army.

40. Request for loan to meet the needs of the Army, by Commander-in-Chief of the Western Army to A. A. Lubitschew, Berlin, dated 27 Oct. 1919, No. 269.

+41. Copy of the order of the Commander-in-Chief, Western Army, dated 22 Oct. 1919, No. 3450, to aeronaut Colonel Firsov, with instructions to fly to the Polish Headquarters with representatives of Denikin's Army, Marschalk and Lieut. Scheli, in order to establish friendly connections with Poland.

42. Firsov's acknowledgment of order, dated 25 Oct. 1919.

+43. Report by Awaloff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Southern Army, dated 23 Oct. 1919, No. 228, requesting the issue of 15–20 million roubles to aeronaut Firsov to meet the needs of the Western Army.

44. Avaloff's letter to the Commander-in-Chief on the Polish Anti-Bolshevik front, dated 23 Oct. 1919, No. 225, communicating the composition of his army and requesting that a special Polish Mission be sent to Mitau to establish contact with his forces.

45. Russian translation of Avaloff's letter to the Chief of the French Diplomatic Mission in Berlin, Prof. Huquen [*? Haguenin*], dated 22 Oct. 1919, stating that the Semitan's Bolshevik bands are shelling peaceful citizens of Thorensberg and the American Red Cross, but that the French Colonel Du Parquet has sent him a rude radiogram which he takes to be a mystification.

46. Avaloff's radiogram to the Chief of the American Red Cross, Riga, Mr. Ryan, accepting his propositions.

47. To the same, giving permission to the American Red Cross' representatives to cross over to Thorensberg in order to distribute food to the inhabitants.

48. Radiogram from the Chief of the French Military Mission, Colonel Du Parquet, dated 21 Oct. 1919, to Bermondts regarding the latter's shelling the unfortified town and 'the rope awaiting Bermondts and his councillors'.

49. Russian translation of telegram from the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Galwanowsky, to Avaloff, dated Kovno, 20 Oct. 1919, No. 191, regarding Bermondts's

³ The numbering is consecutive to that in enclosure 2 in No. 218.

⁴ Thus in original.

proposal for dispatch of Lithuanian representatives, pending the evacuation of the German Army from Lithuania.

50. Original telegrams from Galwanowsky.

51. Radiogram from Chief of the American Red Cross, Colonel Ryan, Riga, dated 20 Oct. 1919, No. 0154 and 0153, regarding permission for Red Cross representatives to enter Riga, the impossibility of working in the Petrograd districts and the shelling of a hospital in Thorensberg.

52. German translation of same.

53. English original of same.

+54. Appeal of the North Western Russian Government, No. 1228, to Bermond's troops concerning Bermond's treachery and ordering them to proceed to the Narva front. (Document No. 11.)

55. Avaloff's telegram to the American Red Cross, Riga, dated 19 Oct. 1919, stating that the Letts are shelling the hospitals in Thorensberg.

56. Telegram in Russian from General Simonson, dated 18 Oct. 1919, to Avaloff referring to his treacherous attack upon the rear of the Lettish Army and Bermond's expulsion from the Russian Army.

56A. German translation of same.

56B. French original of same.

57. Telegram from Bermond, dated 20 Oct. 1919 to the Russian Mission, Berlin, No. 193, stating that he has sent part of his troops to the Bolshevik front.

58. Telegrams from Avaloff and Count Pahlen, dated 19 Oct. 1919, to the Prime Minister of Lithuania, requesting passage through Lithuanian territory to Dvinsk-Resekne front (in French).

59. Same in Russian.

60. Telegram from Prime Minister of Lithuania, dated Kovno 18 Oct. 1919, No. 189, to Bermond, asking how many German soldiers there are in the Western Army and if Bermond is prepared to evacuate them to Germany, as demanded by the Allies.

61. Russian translation of same.

62. Receipt from Capt. Biese (staff officer) for 25,000 marks for 'special needs'.

63. Draft communication concerning the composition of and the losses in the Western Army.

64. Draft telegram from Mitau, dated 13 Oct. 1919, stating that at the instigation of foreigners Judenitch has declared Bermond a traitor.

65. Copy of a military communiqué.

66. Telegram from Colonel Efremoff, dated 16 Oct. 1919, to the Commander-in-Chief, concerning the military situation.

67. Telegram from Avaloff-Bermond and Count Pahlen to the French Mission, Berlin, requesting the dispatch of an Allied Commission to the Western Army, and soliciting assistance in their fight against the Bolsheviks.

68. Radiogram No. 190 from British S.N.O., dated 15 Oct. '19 to Bermond, stating that the fire of the Allied ships will continue until Bermond ceases his attacks on the Letts and withdraws from the Riga positions.

68A. English original of same.

69. Letter of the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Army, dated 18 Oct. 1919, confirming the issue of authority dated 2 Oct. 1919 to Remmer.

70. Letter from Bermondts and Pahlen to the Lithuanian Government, dated 16 Oct. 1919, requesting explanation of the concentration of Lithuanian troops in the district of Schadow-Blisagole, stating that the Central Council of the Western Army recognises Wilson's principles and the right of Lithuania to exercise her own will in that country.

70A. French original of the same.

71. Telegram from Bermondts, dated 16 Oct. 1919 to the Admiral of the British fleet at Libau and Reval, requesting assistance to arrange an armistice with the Letts, to cease the fire of the ships and to send representatives to Mitau.

72. Bermondts's telegram from Mitau, dated 16 Oct. 1919, to the representatives of the Allies, stating that the Allied ships are firing on the Russian troops, fighting against the Bolshevik bands of Semitan.

73. Bermondts's telegram from Mitau No. 148 dated 16 Oct. '19 to Baron Knorring, Berlin, requesting to transmit radiogram (see No. 72) to the Representatives of Allies in Paris 7 [? &] London.

74. Bermondts's telegram No. 138, dated 15 Oct. 1919, to the Lithuanian Government, Kovno, stating that General Alfater has been commanded to make inquiries into the disturbances made by soldiers of the Wirgolitch Corps.

75. Bermondts's telegram, dated 10 Oct. 1919? to the Commander-in-Chief of the Lettish forces, with proposal for peace negotiations in Mitau.

76. Fintelman's communiqué, dated 9 Oct. 1919, announcing Bermondts's great success in Thorensberg.

77. Communication from the Chief of the Political Section (Berlin Branch) of the Western Army, Remmer, dated 8 Oct. 1919, No. 31, respecting: 1) Information furnished to the English and American representatives; 2) Establishment of the Bank and the contract made with the agent of the stamp printer; 3) Chief of the British Mission, General Malcolm; 4) Banquet with German military, foreign and financial representatives and Baron Knorring, Engelhardt and Brokan; 5) Dispersion of the Russian Western Army-Council (Berlin); 6) Printing of stamps and interpellation of Spartakists in the Reichstag concerning the reactionary Western Russian Government.

+78. Telegram from Bermondts and Pahlen to Denikin, dated 8 Oct. 1919, concerning the establishment of an Administrative Council in the Western Army and new demarcation line on the Riga front.

79. Receipt, dated 7th October, 1919, signed by Captain Balachovitch acknowledging a radio-telegram for despatch to the Minister-President.

80. Wire to Judenitch, dated 8th October, 1919, stating that in consequence of the attack of the Letts and Estonians, Bermondts has been forced to make a new demarcation line on the Dvina bank.

81. Anonymous letter from some citizens of Libau, dated 7th October, 1919, to Bermondts desiring him to occupy Libau and to clear out the Letts.

82. Data respecting the number and personnel of the Western Army on the 17th October, 1919, No. 620.

83. Data regarding the personnel and number of the Western Army on the 6th October, 1919, No. 126.

84. Agreement between Bermondts and von der Goltz, dated 21 September, 1919, concerning the transference of the General Command in the districts occupied by the German army to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops.

85. Russian translation of letter No. 1267/19 from the General Command of the Western Corps to Bermondts: 1) requesting that the Lettish Government be informed that the demarcation line will be defended in future by Russian troops joining the German volunteers in order to fight the Bolsheviks; 2) stating that the General Command has appointed Major Kesler, Berlin, Chief of the Political and Economical Departments; 3) that von der Goltz has expressed his personal wish that Graf Pahlen, Rimsky-Korsakovsky and Sackit should act as advisers of Bermondts.

86. Report of Chief of the Political Section, Remmer, dated 2 October, 1919, 1) Two Allied representatives have passed through Terioki to investigate the possibility of beginning negotiations with the Soviet Government; 2) The 'Schwere und Gross-Industrie Bank' has declined to provide funds as the capital is in the hands of Jews, who are against the restoration of such a Russia as advocated by Derugin, Belgrad [? Bellegarde] and Rimsky-Korsakovsky; 3) Concerning the view of General-Command's delegate, Major Kessler, on the Courland question; 4) Noske has sent a special officer to Mitau with instructions to inform the Government regarding the state of affairs.

87. Copy of authority issued by Bermondts to A. Remmer, dated 2 Oct. 1919, for the opening of a privat[e] bank with a capital of 50 million Marks in Mitau, to print post and revenue stamps and to conclude agreements with bankers.

88. Letter of Lieut. Popoff and Prince Erbekteisk from Berlin, dated 1 Oct. 1919, concerning the difficulty in obtaining volunteer troops, the sending of Russian prisoners of war to the Don, Siberia and Baltic Provinces and the information in German independent Socialist press concerning the unlawful events occurring in Mitau.

89. Remmer's telegram from Berlin, dated 30 Sept. 1919, stating that Hörschelm has gone to Mitau instead of Capt. Neporoschny, and that money can be obtainable only by the opening of a Bank in Mitau.

90. Telegram from Remmer, Berlin, dated 30 Sept. 1919, informing that Biskupsky has left his place.

91. Memorandum to Colonel Tschesnokoff concerning the Polish question pointing out that the first step towards an Anti-Bolshevik Russia is to approach Germany and that Poland does not recognise the Baltic States. In respect to Lithuania, Poland's aims are to depose the Lithuanian Government and declare Vilna Capital of Lithuania-White Russia, which will be united with Poland.

92. Memorandum relating to secret instructions of the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Latvian diplomatic representative in Berlin—Schreiner—advising him to establish good connections with influential Russian circles in Berlin and Paris.

93. Bermondts's report No. 2, dated 23 Sept. 1919, to the Representative of Russian Military Mission, A. Brandt, Berlin, stating that British Military Mission and von der Goltz have expressed a wish to see him in charge of the Western

Army and that Capt. Neporoschny is the Berlin representative of the army; Brandt is requested to send to Mitau all registered officers.

94. Receipt from a British Lt. Col., dated 20 Sept. 1919, for a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Northern Army.

95. Letter from Bermond (No. 1) dated 22 Sept. 1919, to General Judenitch (see No. 94) stating that the Letts and Estonians are opposing his progress to Narva front, having drawn up large forces near Olai and Riga, and that at the conference of 26 Aug. 1919 in Riga, attended also by General Marsh and General Dessino, an offensive against Dvinsk was decided and not against Narva.

96. Decision about the extraordinary meeting of the Military Council of Western Russia, 10th August 1919, stating that the above-mentioned Council has taken over full power of the State on the front of the Western Army, temporarily appointed Colonel Paul Raphaelowitch Bermond as Commander-in-Chief of the Western Army and appointed Andrei Konstantinovich Roemmer as Civil Governor. This decision is signed by the Chairman of the Council, Baron Ludvig Karlovitch Knorring, and members of the Council; Hermann Vasiljevitch von Berg, member of the IV Russian Duma, George Michailovitch Derugin, Colonel of General Staff, Peter Petrovitch Durnovo, Chairman of the Livonian Nobility, Baron Adolf Pilar von Pilchau, Chairman of the Petrograd Supply Board, Andrei Konstantinovich Roemmer and the Secretary Vasilij Maksimovitch Poppe.

+97. Copy of Bermond's Communiqué to Admiral Koltchak, regarding Bermond's work on the re-establishment of Great Russia and concerning the friendly attitude of Germany towards him and Russia.

98. Letter from the British Commissioner to the Baltic Provinces, Lt-Col. S. G. Tallents, Riga, dated 4th September, 1919, to Colonel Bermond, with the text of declaration, accepted at the Council of the 27th August, requesting him to sign it in order to begin negotiations with the Latvian Commander-in-Chief.⁵

99. Text of the British declaration of the 27th August relating to the aims of the Bermond troops in Latvia.⁵

100. Communiqué of the Chief of aviation, Western Army, Lieut-Colonel Firsoff, dated 18th September, 1919, No. 15, Mitau, with a complaint against the Commander of the German Aviation Park in Courland, Hauptmann Deffler's disagreeable attitude towards the Russian Detachments, refusing to make necessary issues to them.

101. Projected constitution of the Military-Political Council in the Russian Western Army, drawn up by Colonel Avaloff-Bermond and his War Council in Mitau, 17th September, 1919, in connection with the proposition of the Military-Political Council to appoint General Biskupsky Commander-in-Chief of the Western front.

102. Letter of General Dessino, dated 10th September, 1919 stating that Judenitch has appointed Bermond Command[er]-in-Chief of all Russian forces in Courland and Lithuania.

103. Letter No. 63 from General Dessino, Riga, stating: 1) necessary steps should be taken to avoid repressive measures being exercised by Virgolitch's detachments on the inhabitants of Shavli; 2) Lithuanians should be re-assured that Bermond's troops have no aggressive plans regarding Lithuania's right of

⁵ Cf. No. 85, appendix 4.

self-determination; 3) Copies of Bermond's orders should be sent to the British Mission for communication to Judenitch.

104. Copy of letter from General Dessino to Lithuanian Ministry requesting permission for the passage through their territory of Bermond's troops, assuring that as long as Bermond is under Judenitch no violence will happen to Lithuania, and that Russia cannot avert the influence of Germany.

105. Report of the liaison officer attached to British Military Mission in Riga, Cornet Prince Kropotkin, dated 4th Sept., 1919, No. 1, to the Corps Commander regarding a conversation with General Burt with reference to the recruiting of soldiers for Judenitch's Corps, stopping of echelons in Mitau, closing of the German frontier and the Iron Division.

106. Letter from General Dessino, Riga, dated 3 September, 1919, No. 57, to Bermond, suggesting compliance with Judenitch's order for the immediate despatch to Narva front of 900 soldiers of Chabareff's detachment who have been stopped in Mitau and Shavli.

107. Bermond's letter, dated 8th August, 1919, from Mitau to the President of the Lithuanian Republic requesting him to send his representatives to Shavli in order to discuss the subdivision of the Anti-Bolshevik front between the Russian and Lithuanian forces, and acknowledging that he recognize Lithuania's autonomy. (This letter was not delivered. Lieut. Bernhard was stopped at Shavli by the delegation and given another letter, in accordance with instructions (telegraphic) received from Mitau.)

108. Daily order to Keller's Western Corps, dated 6th October, 1919, No. 01.

109. Daily order to the Western Army, dated 23 September, 1919, No. 02/a.

110. Daily order to the Western Army No. 04.

111. Original Agreement in German between von der Goltz and Bermond, concluded in Mitau, 21 September, 1919, regarding the transference of General Command to Bermond after the evacuation of the German troops from Courland and Lithuania.

112. Agreement between Bermond and the Commander of the German Volunteer Corps Diebitch, Lieut-Colonel Diebitch, regarding the position of his corps in Lithuania and the German Legion.

112A. Translation of same in Russian.

113. Resolution of the Union of German non-commissioned officers who have served in Russian regiments with Bermond, stating that on 17th September, 1919, they established their Union with aims of securing besides certain rights relating to better pay and naturalization in Russia, also improvement of discipline.

114. Regulations of the above-mentioned Union.

115. Letter from Minister-President Needra, dated, Riga, 5th June, 1919, to the Allies desiring the relaxation of the blockade of Latvia, upon his promise to assemble the Latvian National Council, not later than the 1 July, 1919.

117. [*sic*] Copy of Bermond's letter to General Denikin, undated, stating that General Davidoff has been sent to meet Denikin's Staff in order to explain why Bermond cannot fulfil the orders of the agent of the Allies, Judenitch, to leave Courland, and also stating that Germans and pro-Russian Letts in Courland consider this decision right.

118. Conditions concerning the passing into Russian service of the German detachment No. 24, signed by the Commander of the detachment, Lieut. Martin and by Bermond. t.

+ 119. Report of the flying officer Captain Tarakus-Tarakusio, dated 9th September, 1919, No. 29, to Bermond. t, Mitau, dealing with the position of the Russian North-Western Army and its Government, with pro-German orientation, chief pro-German agents, the Estonian Government and its relations with the British Mission. (Document No. 16.)

120. Draft agreement by Needra between the Government of Latvia and the Western Army: temporary relations between Latvia and Russia until the summoning of the Russian National Assembly are determined in 22 paragraphs. Appendices: 1) Rules as to the re-establishment of local self-government; 2) Rules as to the election of a national representative in Latvia; 3) Extracts from the agreement of a Union between the Latvian peasants and large landowners.

120A. Typewritten copy of same.

121. Draft of same agreement by Needra, written in pencil.

122. Needra's proposal to Bermond. t concerning the investment of Latvian State Properties and issue of obligations to furnish means for the upkeep of the Western Army. Handed to Col. Tchesnokoff for examination, 11 Sept., 1919.

123. Col. Tchesnokoff's communication to Bermond. t, dated 12th September, 1919, Mitau, concerning Needra's financial proposal (see No. 122), pointing out that the Latvian State properties belong to the Latvian State and therefore cannot be invested by the Western Army as private Russian property.

124. Copy of negotiations between the Western Army and the Lithuanian Prime Minister, 23 September, 1919, relative to the passage of the Russian forces to the Bolshevik front.

End of Summary

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 219

Document 13

Lettish Summary No. 25; Series No. 2.

(Translation from the Russian.)

The Commander
of the Western Volunteer Army.

31 October, 1919.

To the Chief of the Staff.

As the presence of individuals on certain staffs and in certain departments, who have formerly served with the Bolsheviks, is dangerous and is also derogatory to the confidence of the units towards these institutions I order that all individuals who have been in the service of the Bolsheviks shall gradually be sent to the front. Such individuals will only be allowed to remain upon such staffs and in such departments upon the responsibility of the respective Chiefs of these staffs and

Copy.
Very Secret,
Circular.

departments, taking all consequences foreseen by law. Letts who have formerly been in the Latvian Army or in the service of the Ulmanis Government are to be treated in the same way as individuals formerly serving with the Bolsheviks.

(Signed) COLONEL AVALOFF

(Countersigned) Chief of the Military
Field Office:
COL. TCHESNOKOFF

Document 14

*Lettish Summary No. -; Series No. -.*⁴

(Translation from the Russian.)

Secret
Report.

From Chief of the Research Department
of the staff, 2. Western Volunteer Corps,
to
The Chief of the Staff.

8th November, 1919
No. 177.
SHAVLI.

Taking into consideration the present situation by which we are entirely dependant upon the Germans, also the secrecy of the German leading circles which at times amounts to open refusal to advise us upon questions concerning us, it appears necessary to enlighten as much as possible the frame of mind, plans and further intentions of not only our enemies but also of our German troops by the use of agents.

During the past month of my work in this direction it has become quite clear that the Germans who have joined us are out exclusively for their benefit and impudent gain regardless of ways and means.

Condemned to unemployment and starvation in their own country, Germans are joining us in crowds hoping by this means to lead a satisfied and comfortable life.

At the beginning everything was alright as the men were provided with food and money.

Now the crisis has arrived and spirits have fallen.

The vagueness of the future, the return of German units to Germany and the cessation thereupon of that comfort which the Germans understand to create around themselves, the possibility of entire cessation of communication with Germany (the unsettled state of affairs regarding the railways, the termination of the military mail, closing down of the station) are all increasing the discontent and the murmurs not only amongst the mass of the soldiers, but also amongst the remaining Germans.

I have personally witnessed a German officer delivering a long and inspiring speech pointing out to officers and men the absurdity of staying here longer.

The issue of new money has finally undermined the confidence in success and the wish to carry on the work.

In order to evade most undesirable consequences it is necessary at once and as clearly as possible

- (1) to announce the state of affairs regarding railways,
- (2) to organize postal communication,
- (3) to solve the financial question.

The obscurity upon these points is an everlasting source of rumours and gives abundant ground for agitation by unreliable elements.

In the near future we might find ourselves in the midst of a crowd of mutinous soldiers who will not pause to choose their methods of improving their position.

(Signature) . . .⁴
 Captain

Document 15

Lett. Sum. No. 28. Series No. 1.

(Translation)

BERLIN, Oct. 27, 1919

Very esteemed Colonel,

First of all I have to impart to you information received from baron K.

1. At the present time England is taking a particular interest in our army and is discussing this matter from its various points of view, and the sympathy of a great number is on our side. It is even rumoured that Winston Churchill in a conversation with one of our well known politicians said that if he were a Russian he would have acted as Colonel Bermond had done.

2. There is dissatisfaction as to the actions of Marshal [? Marsh] and Gough. They have been recalled to England and General Hening [? Haking] has been appointed in their place, well known in England as a field-general and as a 'Gentleman' in politics.

3. We have but little to expect from the Committee appointed and directed to Courland, as its chief task consists in the evacuation of the German army. Moreover, there is no prospect of a compromise with it.

4. The occupation of Riga would considerably lighten our position. Upon the fall of Riga, even in the opinion of the Allies themselves, our army would occupy a prominent position among the volunteer armies, whilst its reputation would gain much by it.

Just at the present time our position in Berlin is rather embarrassing. Herewith I send you a cutting from a journal⁶ in which you will find Captain Neporoshny's reply to the charge of having escaped after a search at his office. Notwithstanding this, arrests continue. The financier of the office, Saleman, has been already for 3 days under arrest, as well as Captain Tschermisoff's assistant, Hildebrandt (engaged with the machine) and some 4 other persons. Captain Neporoshny and Captain of Cavalry Hershelman have also been threatened with arrest. They are accused of the same offence, namely, the recruiting of German soldiers for the army. Of course, there can be no serious consequences, though it is a hindrance in the work. However, I hope this matter will be settled very soon.

About General Gurko such persons as Biskupsky, Belgardt, Derugin etc. are grouping themselves. Nobody knows what they are plotting, and it seems as even to themselves everything is not yet quite clear. There are plenty of plans, and our army they regard as in their own words 'one of the many others' with which they have to do. I do not like the intimate friendship between A. K. Remmer and Biskupsky. At the same time Remmer is growing very reserved, take[s] no interest

⁶ Not appended to filed original.

in our work, and is constantly negotiating with Biskupsky. In the meanwhile I have no real facts about the activity of Remmer, but the special interest which he takes in Biskupsky involuntarily attracts attention, the more so as after the story of the 'Bank' his name is quite discredited. Judging by news from private sources, General Gurko is well satisfied with events at Mitau and, it is rumoured, has advised Biskupsky to acknowledge the authority of the Commander.

Yesterday Gutchkoff came from London to Berlin. In Gutchkoff's opinion, the most important question of the moment is the occupation of Riga. He shortly leaves for Mitau.

I have already written to you concerning the organization of our Press-Bureau (Telegraph Agency) here. This question has now been cleared up and we are awaiting your instructions. The position is as follows: Baron K. has direct connection with and an influence upon the local Press, he has, moreover, connections with the English Press and the editorship of Burzeff, Paris. All these are taking a lively interest in our case and have promised to publish the information of our Press Bureau. By the aid of this office we shall be able to furnish the Press of all the world with information and to exert a certain influence upon it. Of course, all this can be achieved only with the assistance of Baron K.'s connections and by the aid of the famous German editor of Mr. . . ., ⁴ who has expressed his agreement as in this matter [*sic*], asking nothing for his collaboration. One does not require any special expenses. The only expense would be the rent of the office apartments (about 1000 Mrk. monthly), then salary for clerks and editors (1500 marks per month), expenses for telegrams, and the cost of providing the office with necessary things. Thus, all telegrams sent by the army are to be directed to the office. This organization will be of great use to us, and just now our influence upon the press is of a special importance. If you agree with this, Sir, I await your further instructions.

Respecting tanks, matters are as follows: I have inspected and prepared everything for the delivery of 12 tanks. The delivery is organized so well that there is no doubt as to its proper execution. Even requisition on the way or on the frontier is insured against. Price conditions are extremely favourable (about 70,000 Mks. per tank). Everything was ready, conditions settled, inspected, and Captain of Cavalry Tscheremisoff had promised to bring 300,000 Mks. as deposit, and we were already on the point of dispatching them, when Captain Tscheremisoff failed to get the money, and now I do not know what to do. If within the next few days the money is not brought the transaction will fall through.

Will you kindly attend to this most urgent matter and inform me by wire what to do and where to obtain the required sum of money in order to meet the deposit. I myself have inspected and examined the tanks. They are quite new, of the medium (rather large) type, each tank of 100 H.P. Delivery can be effected within a week's time. The proposition and the whole matter is in the hands of the firm of Hugo Stin[n]es, which in itself is a guarantee as to its genuineness. Anxiously awaiting your reply. Details hereof have been reported personally to Colonel Baron Engelhardt.

Yours most respectfully,
SUB-LIEUTENANT EBERHARDT

Address:
Berlin-Charlottenburg,
Augsburger-street 43.
Boarding-house Wenzel.

Document 16

Lettish Summary No. 119; Series No. 2

(Translation from the Russian. Extracts.)

Flying officer
Staff Captain Taracus-Taracusio.

MITAU, 9th October, 1919.

No. 29.

To the Commander of the
Volunteer Army of Cavalry-General
Count Keller.

Report on the political situation in the territory of the North-Western Army and the state of the North-Western Army at the front.

The North-Western Army, under the command of Lieut-General Rodzianko, consists of two rifle corps, one under the command of Major-General Count Pahlen, the other at the present under the command of Lieut-General Arsenieff.

The army holding the front between Jamburg and resting its right flank on the Pskoff Lake, numbers altogether, according to Colonel Chomutoff's statement, not over 10-12 thousand men including artillery and cavalry; there are in addition auxiliary units, for instance: an aviation detachment, (consisting of 6 machines, 4 of which were supplied by the English and are not fit), a tank battalion, consisting of 3 companies with 6 tanks, one armoured car not counting the machine in Prince Lieven's detachment, which was captured in the fight near Jamburg, 3 armoured trains, whose base, as a result of having no rear, is Gdoff.

The position of the North-Western Army, as a big unit, cannot be called satisfactory. There can be no doubt that the higher commands and authorities are to be blamed for this state of affairs; they show either criminal unwillingness or lack of willpower openly to launch a protest against the derision and mockery which the complete masters of the situation in Estonia—the Entente—and principally the English, do not hesitate to show towards the army.

The result of such relations between the English, who are 'taking care' of the North-Western Army, and the Russian authorities is clear: although the North-Western Army *de facto* counts 10-12 thousand men, this does not mean that it represents a powerful unit, able to fight successfully at the front.

Sufficient arms, well organized supplies of equipment, provisions and the necessary stores for the front, in one word, the existence of those elements which represent the necessary factors in forming an army into a powerful fighting unit, either do not exist at all, or if they do, then only in a very small degree, but in most cases not as it ought to be.

As to armaments the largest percentage of the army, one can say practically the whole army, is armed through its own efforts, if one does not include a little artillery, which has arrived lately, 6 tanks, 4 aeroplanes (unfit), a small number of rifles and arms. The greater part of the arms and equipment represent trophies captures [*sic*] from the Bolsheviks.

One can see how 'conscientious' the English are in supplying armaments by the following fact: every one of the 4 old aeroplanes supplied by them is useless owing to technical deficiencies which they could not have helped noticing (absolutely worn out and unfit engines, nails in the cylinders of the motors); when the tanks arrived no machine-gun ribbons were to be found (the English put the blame for

this on the Estonian railway authorities). These two examples afford a clear and characteristic illustration of a nature which it is difficult to misunderstand.

The same can be observed in connection with the equipment of the army. Until September the army did not receive one full set of equipment; in the middle of September about 20 thousand equipments arrived, of which 4 thousand were for officers. (Only 4 thousand pr. of boots have arrived up to the present.) Pro-ally elements—the North-Western Army, the staff of the Chief-in-Command and the Allies themselves through the press made use of this as proof of help rendered by the Allies to the North-Western Army. But Colonel Chomutoff has reliable information that this equipment was bought in England for cash by an officer especially sent there by General Judenitch from Finland.

The question of provisioning is in the same bad state. The ration issued in the army consists of tinned meat (grease) and bread; 60–65 % of the whole of the provisions is consumed by those working in the rear. It can thus be seen how sad and unsatisfactory the situation in the North-Western Army is with regard to necessary supplies. As a result of this unhappy situation there were still worse effects: out of units which had deserted from the Reds to the Whites there were cases of deserters back to the Reds. There was a period when such cases became frequent and even assumed a dangerous and menacing character.

Now that equipment has arrived cases of desertion have decreased. As a result of the poor conditions of the supply work and the failure at Jamburg the army—an inevitable result—got apathetic and disappointed.

An encouraging factor improving the falling spirits of the army and also an important factor in promoting pro-German feelings in some of the units was the arrival in July of units of Prince Lieven's Corps, when the soldiers of the then yet Northern Army, without boots, clothes and half starving, saw an extreme contrast in the appearance of the units not of pro-Ally orientation.

One of the problems, most painful and difficult to solve for the North-Western Army has been and is still the financial question. . . .⁴

The answer to the question, What is still holding the North-Western Army together?, is that some are hoping to combine with the Volunteer Army of Cavalry-General Keller, some are hoping again for booty in case of an advance, while others have not yet lost hope of help from the 'Allies'. . . .⁴

(Regarding the discharge of General-Major Bulak-Balachovitch; probable results of peace between Estonia and Soviet Russia with regard to The North-Western Army—open conflict.)

The Russian Government⁷ which ought to be the defender of interests of the army is independent only to such a degree as desired by the English. . . .⁴

(Regarding the formation of the Cabinet—according to Col. Chomutoff: *de facto* the Ministers had been chosen by the English and the order to Ivanoff to give a list of candidates was only a farce. Minister Ivanoff, according to Col. Chomutoff, is a Bolshevik agent, and has now after disclosures made by Col. v. Waal been removed from the Cabinet.)

The army has lost all confidence in its Government; its position is worse than precarious, due to: 1) absence of intellectual guidance and consequently lack of ability; 2) bad policy.

Their policy consists in currying favour of the English and the fulfilment of all their wishes. The army is silent, true to discipline. The Commander-in-Chief, General Judenitch is helpless to such an extent that, according to information in

⁷ i.e. the North-West Russian Government.

the hands of Col. Chomutoff, it was expected at one time that he would resign his post. General Gurko was mentioned as his successor but he refused to accept the post of Commander-in-Chief, in consideration of the surroundings and circumstances explained in this report.

The Commander of the army, Lieut-General Rodzianko, is a man of great popularity with the army; up to the present he has kept to pro-Ally orientation. It is difficult to judge to what degree his convictions are preserved, but as will be seen a change in his views and orientation is not impossible.

As mentioned above, the relations between Estonia and the North-Western Government in general and with the army in particular are very unsatisfactory.

The Estonian Government is going through a crisis at the present moment in connection with the resignation of the Right Ministers. The remainder of the Estonian Government consist of Left parties, which undoubtedly is a great minus [sic] in the general situation and directly injurious to the North-Western Army.

In its relations with the North-Western Government and army the Estonian Government with its cunningly concealed hostility towards everything Russian finds support, in addition to the assured support of England, in provocation and in the hostile relations of the masses and the troops evinced in the form of street excesses and also in the press.

The feeling of the troops and population towards everything Russian is not only provocative, but openly hostile. The disposition of the troops of the Estonian Republic is nearly or even quite Bolshevik. Their opinion of the North-Western Government and Army is therefore quite definite—they regard it as a reactionary movement; the inevitable results are assaults on Russian officers by Estonian soldiers, the tearing off of shoulder straps and more important, in the opinion of Col. Chomutoff, facts as the eviction of the Russian Government to the other side of the Narova. . . .⁴

The only element which keeps them from making peace with the Bolsheviks is fear of the English but, in Col. Chomutoff's opinion, this is most likely a mutual fear, or, to be more correct—English fear of growing Bolshevism in Estonia is stronger than the Estonian Government's fear of the English. In general the frame of mind in Estonia is an alarmed and expectant one.

The progress, indicated above, in the change of the feelings of the North-Western Army towards a pro-German movement is to a great extent the result of the work of the leader of the pro-German movement in Estonia, Colonel Chomutoff.

Appointed Chief of the North Corps Territory in May, Col. Chomutoff appointed individuals previously known and with clearly defined views and orientation for all the responsible duties, analogical to the same in Count Keller's Volunteer Corps. At the same time officers of our orientation were being, as far as possible, appointed and sent to units at the front, to prepare the necessary surroundings. As a result of this Col. Chomutoff, as head of the organization, had officials of civil departments in the right places and also units which had changed their views in favour of pro-German orientation.

As was to have been expected, individuals of entirely different orientation could not agree with and reconcile themselves to the orders given by Col. Chomutoff, as Chief of the Military and Civil Administration. Thanks to the efforts of Major-General Krusenstern, an individual without clearly defined views and political convictions, Col. Chomutoff was removed from the duties of Chief of the Military and Civil Administration and entrusted with the formation of the 'Colonel Chomutoff Detachment'.

By a further intrigue, the formation of this detachment was stopped and Col. Chomutoff was appointed Commander of a tank battalion.

Thus Col. Chomutoff, thanks to the clever intrigues of his enemies, was converted from an important worker to an officer of the line; this has a ruinous effect on his further work in promoting German orientation on Estonian territory as he is not able in the position of chief of a comparatively small unit to influence events to such an extent in the direction we desire.

Notwithstanding persecutions, the German organization is strong enough to continue its work, especially as Major-General Prince Dolgoruky has come to Narva and Lieut-General Arsenieff was already there.

Colonel Chomutoff hopes to secure the cooperation of Major-General Rodzianko who has so far changed his views that in consultation with the above-mentioned persons, he is directing operations in the direction of Pskoff, with the object of breaking through at Pskoff and joining Cavalry General Count Keller's Volunteer Army, in case of the conclusion of peace between Estonia and the Bolsheviks. As usual the weakest point of the organization is the financial question. Col. Chomutoff has absolutely no money, and this of course hinders and paralyzes the success of the work in the North-Western territory. Col. Chomutoff requests that help and greater support with money should be given as soon as possible, so as to enable him, in case of a catastrophical position of the army in general and the organization in particular, to evacuate the people required for further work.

That the position is getting worse every day can be seen from the fact that enquiries have been made both in the Estonian and Russian Government and even the arrest of Col. Chomutoff, Major-General Prince Dolgoruky and Lieut-General Arsenieff was proposed.

For reasons unknown his arrest was put off, though whether temporarily or definitely is unknown. Colonel Chomutoff requests that serious attention should be paid to the question of money, as up to the present he has sent all couriers at their own expense which, of course, is a matter of luck.

An inevitable consequence of the money crisis is entire lack of communication. This last circumstance paralyzes the work, because not having any instructions Col. Chomutoff is not in a position to give information on the aims, tasks, sources of income and means of units, which have become followers of German orientation, to the units interested.

Being thus unable to furnish desirable information, he is deprived of the possibility of finding adherents among the masses; the result of this is loss of interest in the solution of the question of infusing the units with German orientation.

Already a difference is to be observed in the manifestation of interest in the question of orientation—in July when units of Prince Lieven's Corps arrived, as compared with the present moment.

The units in Count Keller's Volunteer detachment are under the impression that no interest is shown in them, and if Col. Chomutoff would in future offer no explanation, there is no reason to doubt that this impression will gain ground, and the entire breakdown of the organization may be expected.

This organization on Estonian territory, being on a minor and more modest scale, is awaiting instructions from the larger organization, Count Keller's Volunteer Army.

Col. Chomutoff requests that connection with Narva should be organized as soon as possible. For the success of the work and especially in conjunction with events in Latvia I beg to request that such connection should by all means be

established in the immediate future, so as to enable Col. Chomutoff, in accordance with your instructions, Colonel, to take respective measures and come to decisions.

Besides I have the honour to request that Col. Chomutoff should be financed for the reasons mentioned above.

Colonel Chomutoff requests your permission to come to Mitau so as to report in detail. Please inform Col. Chomutoff as soon as possible whether you agree to his coming to Mitau.

Staff-Captain
TARACUS-TARACUSIO

Document 17

Lettish Summary No. 42, Series 1.

(Translation from the Russian.)

BERLIN, 2 Oct. '19

Dear Konstantin Konstantinovich!

This letter will be forwarded to you by Lieut. Alexie A. Pfeil.

As he is shortly returning to the South of Russia to the district under General Denikin's administration, it is in your interests as well as in those of the Russian cause in the Baltic Provinces, to give him the opportunity of making himself acquainted on the spot with the situation and to describe it in a desirable light on his return to the South of Russia.

A letter from you has been forwarded to me by Cornet Pahlen; I have also received an answer to it. I wonder whether Count Pahlen will tell you this verbally.

Yours sincerely
(deciphered as) VASILIJ GOURKO

Document 18

Lett. Summary No. 5. Series 1.

(Translation from the Russian.)

BERLIN, 14 Oct. 1919

Highly esteemed Colonel,

I have the honour to confirm the receipt of your letter and documents, which I have forwarded to the Naval Agency. The local Branch of the Naval Agency forwards the following information:

1. The blockade of Sovjet Russia, declared by the Entente, which is contrary to the note demanding the evacuation of German troops from Courland, has made a deep impression in Germany and has still more convinced local circles, sympathizing with us, that the real plans of the Entente are not favourable to a restoration of Russia within her former boundaries. For this reason we can expect more energetic help from institutions known to us, but we must emphasize the point and by every possible means make it known abroad that the new Administration created in Mitau is purely Russian. All [? An] official statement to this effect should be made.

2. Local political parties sympathizing with us are very much afraid of the blockade, especially of consequences which may be made use of by the Left Parties. They attribute special importance to decisive and swift actions by our troops in Courland, as everything depends on this last circumstance. And again great importance should be attached to widespread publication in neutral countries of the events.

3. It is necessary immediately to send a precise report to Omsk and also a list of Ministers of the Cabinet. The report can be forwarded through myself and the Naval Agency. We can undoubtedly count on full approval, if the purely Russian composition and program of the Government are again underlined.

4. The whole policy of the Entente towards us is by no means a general one—it is the Foch-Clemenceau policy. If ever in England they had correct information, not intentionally mutilated by the English and French press, the whole policy of the Entente towards us might be a different one.

5. Chiefly for these reasons I intend to try to organize an official Russian Telegraph Agency here. I will inform you of details later.

Col. Rudnizky is reporting in detail on the purchase of cars; I on my part consider it necessary to add that we will probably achieve little and receive goods of indifferent quality through the mediation of Mr. Flint? [*sic*] Should it prove possible to get money—Baron Engelhardt hopes to get it—then we ought to purchase, if not all, then at least part without intermediaries. We have had many reasonable and suitable offers.

So as to receive the 50,000 Marks according to your order for purchases to meet the needs of the Staffs, I request that a corresponding order may be given to A. K. Remmer or Baron Engelhardt, as I have only a document for General Biskupsky.

Further I request that money should be forwarded to me if possible, or an order sent here, as my work here require[s] means, and I have not received my salary since the 10 Septb.

I am awaiting your further instructions and orders,

With high respects,

SUB-LIEUT. EBERHARDT

Document 19

Lett. Summary No. 41; Series 1

(Translation from the German.)

His highness Col. Prince Avaloff, Mitau

BERLIN, 2 Nov. 1919

I desire to express my sincere appreciation to your highness for the offer made to me. It would be a great honour for me to devote my energy and experience to the struggle with Bolshevism, as assistant of Your Highness. But I fear that I cannot follow your call without the sanction of the Allies. Were I to go to Courland without obtaining the Allies' sanction it would, I think, create far greater difficulties for your Highness than the services I could render.

Therefore I have requested His Highness Mr. Goutchkoff, who is going to the Baltic Provinces with the Inter-Allied Commission, to procure a permit for me.

At the same time I hardly think that he will be successful, as the Entente is not favourably inclined to the participation of Germans in the struggle of the Russians for the liberation of their country.

With expressions of highest esteem,

HOFFMANN

General-Major⁸

⁸ Document 20, immediately following in the original, is not printed. This document was a letter, dated October 10, 1919, from General von der Goltz to Colonel Bermond-Avalov (Lettish Summary, No. 12 of Series I), which, apart from certain variations in translation, was the same as that in No. 139, appendix 6.

Captain Dewhurst (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received January 5, 1920)
No. 163 [167822/61232/59]

RIGA, 27 December, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 271¹ of December 9th, I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of four further translations of original Bermondts documents. Documents Nos. 7 and 25 in the Lettish Summary (Series I)² were deemed upon examination to be unworthy of forwarding as not being of sufficient interest, and are not therefore enclosed.

I have, etc.,

N. DEWHURST

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 220

Document 21

Lettish Summary No. 19; Series 1

(Translation from the Russian.)

BERLIN, October 25, 1919

Most esteemed Colonel,

Referring to the news received from Baron Korff, I have to inform you about present circumstances in Berlin:

1. At the present time the press is absolutely against us. During the last days even the most 'Right' papers have shown their opposition to us, especially against the office of Captain Neporoshny. The cause is the blockade effected by England, which, notwithstanding its small extensions, is yet to be felt. All our efforts here, especially in the question of supply, have to meet with great obstacles. However, Baron Korff hopes to be able to change press opinion in our favour. Partly, of course, it depends upon A. K. Remmer and upon the possibility of supplying the necessary sum of money.

2. At the present time through the mediation of my English friends, who are fully 'russianized' and sympathetic to us, we have had the opportunity of opening up connections with Paris, and I think that by their help it will be quite easy to obtain recognition by the Paris Conference and Koltchak. Koltchak's wife, round whom very influential individuals are grouping at present in Paris, is living at Cannow [*sic*]: if not to-day, then to-morrow I will open communications. It is very probable, that for this reason Baron Korff will be obliged to travel to Paris. Via the same frontier we shall get a part of the French and neutral press.

3. It is to be regretted that we are getting but scanty information from Mitau. Baron Korff requests to be furnished with information oftener, and, if possible, by wire.

At the present time General Gurko has come over to Paris. Just now he is very reserved and I have had no opportunity of getting any news from him. He is visited by Biskupsky and A. K. Remmer. It appears to me that there is something brewing. At all events, I shall inform you about everything. Today A. K. Remmer

¹ No. 215.

² No. 218, enclosure 1.

will be at Gurko's; yesterday Biskupsky made his report. To-morrow I shall find out everything in detail and as soon as possible inform you. In order to control letters delivered and received, I am going to number them, whereas for more important and pressing reports it is necessary to use a small cyphering system, which I enclose herewith.

It is with regret that I have to inform you of not having yet got your reply concerning tanks. Everything is ready, the only obstacle consists in money matters. The delivery of tanks is settled and, of course, there will be no difficulty in bringing them across. There are 12 quite new middle-sized tanks of 100 H.P. each. Captain Tscheremisoff is bringing some 300,000 marks as deposit for their final acceptance and delivery; for the purchase of the indispensable auto-equipment, necessary for a tank-detachment, I need some 500,000 marks, after the payment of which all 12 tanks will be at Mitau within a week's time. Concerning this matter I request you for a prompt reply.

I have already informed the Naval Agency that a detailed report will be sent to Admiral Koltshak.

I am awaiting your further instructions and orders.

Will you kindly pay attention to the question concerning tanks, for just now this matter can still be settled.

Yours respectfully,

SUB-LIEUTENANT EBERHARDT

Document 22

Lettish Summary No. 29; Series 1

(Translation from the Russian.)

MITAU, September 14, 1919

Your Excellence,

You of course know that according to the English plan the conclusion of peace between Soviet Russia and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is being prepared. The object of this temporary peace is to make the Baltic fighting forces available for a struggle against Goltz and the sincere followers of Koltchak-Denikin in case it should not be possible to bring these on the side of the English. All this is being conducted by the renowned Osol.

The only reason hindering the carrying out of this plan is that Lithuania has not yet given her consent.

In our opinion these circumstances demand immediate counter-action. With such intention I am travelling to Janishki, Kovno and Berlin to-morrow or the day after. Before my departure I should like to consult you and your political Staff. Therefore I beg your Excellence to summon a meeting which on our part will be attended by Dr. Wankin, engineer Kampe and myself.

Now to another question. I have the impression that your army in the question of finances is too dependant on organizations abroad. In my opinion this is not right and restricts your freedom of action. Your army should by all means dispose of her own sums besides those which are being received from organizations abroad.

It is not difficult to arrange this. The draft project which was forwarded to your Excellence 3 days ago indicates one method. Besides there are other ways.

I would again request information as to with whom I could negotiate before my departure on the practical side of this question.

The answer of Your Excellence will be forwarded to me to my flat, Schulen Strasse No. 8, apartment 8, by my son.

Yours truly,
A. K. NEEDRA

Document 23

Lettish Summary No. 41; Series No. 2

(Translation from the Russian.)

Commander-in-Chief
of the Western Volunteer Army.

22. October, 1919.

No. 3450.

MITAU

To Flying Officer
Lt-Col. Firsoff.

Upon receipt of this, I order you to proceed by aeroplane to the Head-Quarters of the Polish Commander-in-Chief at the anti-Bolshevik front, where you will introduce yourself to the Commander-in-Chief as head of the Mission consisting of the following members: the representative of General Denikin's Volunteer Army, accredited to me, 2nd. Lieut. Marshalk, of Korniloff's regiment, and Lieut. Shell. The object is to establish friendly relations for mutual action against the Bolsheviks,—between Poland on one side, and the Russian Western Volunteer Army, entrusted to me, on the other.

You will appoint your own pilot and mechanic. The time of your intended departure is to be reported to me.

Enclosed: Report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish troops.

Chief of the Staff
Colonel . . .³

Document 24

Lettish Summary No. 43; Series No. 2

(Translation from the Russian.)

Commander
of the Western Volunteer Army.

No. 228.

23. October, 1919.

MITAU

To His Excellency

The Commander of All Armed Forces in the South of Russia.

The army placed under my command has the sole object of fighting Bolshevism in Russia, and has up to the present been sustained upon credit obtained from the Germans (financial circles). In view of the army increasing in number expenses are continually growing, whilst the German financial support, under the pressure of the Entente and in fear of the establishment of a blockade of the German coast, cannot at the present moment render us help; besides, the German Government was forced to close the Russian-German frontier. Not being in possession of the

³ Thus in original.

necessary financial resources to cover the expenses of the upkeep of the Army, especially the providing of the units with the necessary complement of horses, at the same time not having facilities for printing my own money, I request the issue to me of 15-20 million Roubles, which I beg to be handed over to Lt-Col. Firsoff.

COLONEL PRINCE AVALOFF

Chief of the Staff
COL. TCHAIKOVSKY

(Sent 24th October, 1919, by Col. Firsoff, per aeroplane)

No. 221

*Memorandum by Colonel Maude (Berlin) on certain aspects of
Russo-German Relations¹*

[170992/4232/18]

BERLIN, December 31, 1919

I. I wish to bring to your notice certain aspects of Russo-German relationships as observed during the last six months. The sources of information are private conversations with leading men of the commercial world, international Jews, ex-officers now engaged in the dispersal of ammunition, Russian secret agents, as well as casual remarks made in the course of official interviews on Russian prisoners of war and other subjects, with officials of the German War Office, Foreign Office, Shipping and Finance Departments.

Co-ordinating these various conversations and pieces of information, the conclusion is arrived at that the militarist movement in Germany is closely bound up in Russian affairs.

To account for the apparent lack of common policy on Russian questions, I wish to bring to your notice three points:—

- (i) Under the old régime, German stability was based on two rival factors: the military and the commercial.

The Government existing since the revolution has ignored both factors with the result that they are now united. The union has been slow in materialising owing to mutual distrust, but a chain of circumstances has made it now an accomplished fact.

- (ii) The changes which have taken place within the German War Office itself. In order to carry on with mere routine, the Government have continued to employ old officials. The revolution, however, introduced into the War Office one individual who is really a dominant personality, viz., the former head of the Soldiers' Councils in Germany, a Jewish non-commissioned officer named Schlesinger. His official duty is nominally the care of German prisoners of war in Russia and Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

¹ This memorandum was originally addressed to General Malcolm and was enclosed in his weekly report No. 36 of January 1, 1920, of which a copy was received in the Foreign Office on January 16.

The German War Office, on its reorganisation, has been split up into three Administrative Departments, Prussian, Bavarian and Saxon. Of these three, the Prussian Department predominates, and it is in the Prussian Department that Schlesinger operates. For more than a year he has been in communication with the Soviet Government. At first for the exchange of views on mutual prisoners; subsequently he negotiated on questions of the disposal of the large stocks of German war material in Moscow. (Rothkagel, arrested some six weeks ago in Kovno, was one of the intermediaries between Schlesinger and the Soviet Government in this connection.) He is now frankly corresponding on any questions that may arise. Incidentally it may be mentioned that he has amassed a large private income, that he has spies all over Germany, and that no documents, other than purely office routine, leave the German War Office unless countersigned by him.

The rest of the permanent officials are of the new military type, i.e., Monarchists who wish to re-establish a Hohenzollern, though neither the Kaiser nor the Crown Prince; latterly they appear to have agreed upon Eitel Fritz.

The other personality in the Reichswehrministerium is von Gilsa, Noske's adjutant, who is a strong Royalist. One War Office official practically admitted that von Gilsa has been steadily working to convert Noske ever since the latter assumed office. There are indications that as the result of Noske's recent illumination into the real meaning of von der Goltz and Bermont's affair in the Baltic, von Gilsa has now succeeded. It may be mentioned that it is fairly clear that Noske was deliberately kept in ignorance of the military character of the Baltic incidents, until the evacuation of the Baltic began. That von Gilsa knew is reasonably certain. The Military Party, rather as the result of a series of coincidences than by design, have placed Noske in the invidious position of either going into retirement, or accepting responsibility for the acts of his nominal subordinates, i.e., throwing in his lot with the Monarchists. It is probable, from the character of the man, that he will refuse the former alternative.

- (iii) The fact that there is no real Russian Embassy or Mission in Germany. Colonel Bran[d]t, who is nominal chief of a Russian Mission in Berlin, is discredited by all sections of loyal Russians. Russian officers of Entente sympathies mistrust him as much as do the German officials and Germanophil Russians. He also has attempted to play the Entente Missions off, one against the other. His chief-of-staff, Colonel Sialski, was at one time a staff officer in the Red army. This is one of the main reasons why the Russians form themselves into cliques and political groups, each wasting most of its time in finding out what the other groups are doing, and thereby playing into the hands of the Germans.

2. Parallel with the above developments, commercial Germany has undergone a change. With the delay in the ratification of peace, and the refusals of the Entente and the neutrals to come forward with commercial and financial assistance, German business men began to consider, independent of the Government, the best way to straighten themselves by other means than assistance from the West. It is true that the occupied zone is still turning its attention to the West, but this is because of the occupation and greater facilities for transport, whereby her factories are in running order. The rest of Germany, owing to difficulties of communication with the Rhine area, has practically become separated in mind and activities from the occupied zone.

Last September, when Bermont's financial situation was acute, the German Militarist Party approached leading German business houses and found them ready. Additional factors were:—

- (a) The encouraging lead given to German financiers by neutral financial houses who were lending money to Bermont in exchange for concessions in Courland.
- (b) Erzberger's taxation scheme, which made capitalists choose to risk money on the chance of getting it back, rather than hand it over to the Entente via Erzberger.
- (c) The realisation by German business men, other than Ministers, that though individuals can make fortunes by 'Schieberei', national economic balance can only be restored by reconstruction at the expense of a nation worse off, so far as valuta is concerned, but of unlimited natural wealth like Russia.
- (d) Mistrust as to the financial stability of the neutral countries to which large parts of their fortunes had been transferred. As a ground for this distrust, the following instance may be given. There are many banks in Germany whose special business is the accepting of mortgages on house property and the reissue of these mortgages to the public in the form of shares. Both banks and public transferred their mortgages and shares during the war to Switzerland, and the Swiss banks opened up the same type of business on their own account. The transactions were done with the mark standing at par. Swiss banks are now in the awkward position of holding say 100,000,000 German marks-worth of securities with the mark out of sight, and paying interest at the old rate in francs at par. This type of dilemma is not confined to Switzerland.

On these four points combined, the leading business men were inclined to support any venture which offered a possibility of success.

The actual point of contact between the militarist party and the commercial and financial houses was through the Deutsche Schwere Industrie's support of the Bermont-von der Goltz movement, and arose as follows:—

Under the peace terms all the ammunition and war material, above a certain scale, on charge of the German Government is to be handed over to

the Entente, either for demolition or restoration: in the case of Russian material, restoration. The German Government adopted the simple expedient of selling all their war material to private syndicates and munition factories like Krupp's and the Roechlyn Werke, thereby serving the double purpose of giving the factories something to do and recouping their own exchequer. Krupps, however, when there was a likelihood of peace being ratified early in October, found themselves with a lot of material still unbroken, and converted material ready for export, but with no recognised market. They passed this over to Bermont and von der Goltz. (Small quantities of it went to the Ukraine for Petloura.) The German Government Departments certainly knew this and shut their eyes to it. German ex-officers were employed in the consortiums controlling demolition and issue, with representatives of Krupps. The supplies handled consisted of munitions, aeroplanes, aeroplane engines, U-boat engines and army stores of all descriptions. Bleichröder's² were the bankers, with Dr. Schwabach (the real head of the bank) taking an active interest. Early in October, through Bleichröder's agency, Russo-German commercial syndicates sprang up as well. At first, these commercial syndicates appear to have dealt in army equipment, agricultural implements, &c., as at that time this type of goods was ready at hand. When Bermont's prospects, from the German point of view, i.e., the colonisation of the Baltic, were good, these commercial syndicates limited their attentions to the Baltic. With the collapse of Bermont, and the establishment of relations with Denikin, both the commercial and munition syndicates transferred their attentions to Denikin for ammunition, and to South Russia for trade.

As a specimen of this, one may instance the Rustow consortium at Hamburg. The members of this are Bleichröder junior, Weitzmann and Franzen, amongst others. Warburgs are their bankers. Gourko is their agent for South Russia, Trepoff in Paris. The banks now in the movement, in addition to those mentioned, are the Darmstadt, Dresdner and National.

Their methods in some cases are very clumsy. Certain Russians in Berlin approach this mission for permission to transfer 'Red Cross stores urgently required by General Denikin' on one of our ships repatriating Russians to the Black Sea. On special permission being granted, cases begin to appear at the docks at Hamburg. On examination they are found to contain everything but Red Cross stores, and on enquiries being made, it is easily ascertained that the stores were merely ordinary cargo between German firms here and their corresponding houses in South Russia, e.g., cutlery, glass, leather goods, dyes, agricultural implements, &c. Owing to our controlling the departure of the ships, we can so far stop the dumping of these goods in South Russia. But there are several thousand tons only waiting ratification of German and Turkish peaces for shipment. Goods are already dribbling through via neutrals.

² Note in original: 'Bleichröder's figure consistently in all Russian intrigues. The reason for this is that the bank bears the name of the Bleichröder family, but none of them now administer the bank. They all have shares in it, are very wealthy and have intermarried with the Baltic barons. The bank still has a good name.'

A third party which, so far as information goes, is acting independently, at present, is the Intelligence Department. Their business apart from collecting information, appears to be to foment disorder. They are in communication with the Bolsheviks by air, and via Stockholm and Finland. That they are still intriguing in Lithuania is certain. A Russian, by name Romantschensky (now in Berlin at Kleich Strasse, 23), is in daily communication with a German general staff officer by name, Fernbaum. Romantschensky was formerly in the Russian police service, he was subsequently in Bolshevik employ. He is now receiving money from Lithuanian sources. His orders appear to be to encourage Bolshevism and disorder in Lithuania. This policy of the General Staff (Intelligence Branch) has been consistently adopted. Disorders are intended to serve a double purpose (a) to show (or, as they say, expose) the powerlessness of the Entente, (b) to provide an excuse for the employment of Royalist troops as re-establishing law and order. That the General Staff were implicated in the disorders in Silesia last July,³ for this purpose, is reasonably certain. That this was their object in the Baltic is beyond dispute. The reports of the scattering into groups of the Iron Division, and the detaching of special contingents for Lithuania, all tend the same way. Already existing Bolshevik organisations are exploited, and alarmist stories of Germany going Bolshevik are made full use of for home and foreign consumption. This also gives an apparent common ground for communication with the Soviet Government in Russia.

Some of the Intelligence Branch are in touch with the Bleichröder commercial groups, and with the ex-officers referred to earlier, who are engaged in dispersing arms and ammunition. Information, awaiting verification, is that the General Staff wish to establish direct military relations with Denikin, as distinguished from indirect liaison through Germanophil Russians and commercial assistance.

C. R. MAUDE

³ For these disorders in Silesia, see Vol. I.

No. 222

Captain Dewhurst (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received January 23)

No. 3 [172870/61232/59]

RIGA, January 9, 1920

My Lord,

Further to my telegram No. 271¹ of Dec. 9th, 1919, I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of 8 translations, numbered 25-32, of original Bermondts documents.

Documents considered cardinal and marked by a cross in the summary have been examined in detail and all those found of real importance have now been translated and forwarded.

I have, etc.,

N. DEWHURST

¹ No. 215.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 222

Document 25

Lettish Summary No. 13; Series I

(Translation from the Russian.)

BERLIN, October 15, 1919

Dear Pavel Michailovitch,

I thank you most sincerely for the hospitality extended to me in Mitau. I am under the same pleasant and favourable impression of everything I saw there.

Truly you are working on a large scale. God help you to bring this big Russian undertaking to a successful conclusion.

Here in Berlin all are gradually taking your part; they explain their former attitude by not having understood us in the right way—therefore they could not coordinate their actions with ours.

After my arrival here I saw Col. Brandt, the military agent; he stated in a precise form that the capture of Riga could be justified if even a small number of volunteers were sent to the Bolshevik front—this would untie his hands. He promises in a most convincing manner to defend us in the eyes of the English by explaining to them that it is only possible to advance after having secured the rear.

The French apparently do not approve of the English policy towards Russia, and we are doing our best to incite them against each other.

I must say that your precise policy and especially your decisive actions are creating a very good impression here; all sympathies are on your side.

This morning we could not find Remmer anywhere, he had disappeared. As it happened he had been warned the day before from the Foreign Office that his flat (Ronstr. 13) would be searched to-day between 4 and 5 p.m. He of course took the necessary steps and went to a secluded place. I heard by phone just now that a superficial search had given no results. We are again in communication with Remmer. Thus our work is continuing successfully. I have fulfilled all your orders.

Victoria Victorovna sends her kind regards and congratulations on your military successes. I am sending you a bottle of scent.

With love and kind regards

Your sincerely devoted and loving

A. HOERSCHELMANN

Document 26

Lettish Summary No. 24; Series I

(Translation from the Russian.)

BERLIN, October 25, 1919

Dear Pavel Michailovitch,

My brother Kolia is going to Mitau to-day, and I have asked him to take this letter for you. He will personally report to you on everything. Owing to the German 'Left' Press having traced us, we have accelerated our removal from 5 Karlsbad, and are now living in a new flat in Charlottenburg, 9 Roscherstr. Neporoshny and brothers Bodik will also live there.

We have now to work under very difficult conditions, all the more so as the Entente is now making use of Russian officers—their agents—against us, as, for instance, Lieut. Count Rehbindler, a friend of Baron Hahn who, following our

example, has started his bureau here. We are taking steps to paralyze their work here.

Now that it has become quite clear that Judenitch's position near Petrograd is very serious and that his troops are insufficient to capture the City, people in Berlin are convinced that you and your army will decide to take part in the fight with the Bolsheviks on the North-Western front. All are awaiting with impatience the decision of Riga's fate and your advance on the Moscow road.

General Gurko has already been in Berlin several days, but unfortunately neither Neporoshny nor myself have been able to see him yet.

According to secret information I have, General Gurko has entirely taken your part. I will by all means try to meet Gurko who must remember me from the war, for during our campaign in East Prussia I was his personal adjutant (from the 16th Hussar regiment).

Hauptman Merker returned to Berlin 3 days ago; he is negotiating to work with us again. Our work is continuing successfully.

Victoria Victorovna sends her compliments and also a bottle of French scent, which she obtained here by chance.

God preserve you.

Your loving and devoted
A. HOERSCHELMANN

Document 27

Lettish Summary No. 117. Series 2

(Translation from the Russian.)

(Apparently intended for Denikin)

General Judenitch and the North-Western Government, formed at the instigation of the Entente, have already—without counting with the future United Russia—definitely recognized the independence of the small Republics Estonia, Latvia and others, headed by Governments with an evasive policy, ready to stop the fighting with the Bolsheviks.

Such actions cannot reckon upon the support of those masses of Russian people who[se] aim it is to abolish entirely Bolshevism and to re-establish the power of a United Russia.

The fulfilment of General Judenitch's order by the Commander of the Western Army and the evacuation of the troops from Courland would immediately exclude this territory from Russian influence and would create favourable ground for the speedy development of Bolshevism; further the evacuation of this territory would deprive the Western front of its natural base for actions in the direction of Dvinsk-Polotzk-Smolensk-Moscow, which is the connecting and necessary link between the troops of the Southern Armies and those operating in the direction of Petrograd.

The Commander of the Western Volunteer Army together with the Territorial Administration did not consider it possible—for reasons mentioned above—to fulfil General Judenitch's order and to follow his directions, all the more as the interest[s] of Russia do not permit the severance of the Baltic Provinces, which afford Russia an outlet to the sea and whose interests have always been with a Great Russia. The troops of the Western Army and the whole Administration finds support with the part of the population—Balts and Letts—which sees that the welfare of the Baltic Provinces lies in close contact with Russia.

So as to enlighten the situation impartially and to explain the aims of the Commander of the Western Volunteer Army and the Territorial Council it has been decided to detail Major-General Davydoff (of the General Staff), as especially trustworthy, so that General Denikin and his Government may hear the true voice and sincere intentions of Russia's sons, who have already formed a strong determination and that he may express his sympathy for this sacred work.

Such signs of sympathy, expressed by a representative of the army which first began the struggle with the Bolsheviks, will be of great moral support and help in the common cause—the speedy liberation of our long suffering Mother Country from the oppressors and plunderers.

(undated and unsigned)

Document 28

Lettish Summary No. 7. Series 2

(Translation from the Russian.)

To the Commander of the Army!

From Rotmister [? Rittmeister] Anitchkoff—Officer for Commissions,
Field Office of the Commander,
Western Volunteer Army
Tilsit 15. Nov. 1919.

Report

I arrived in Tilsit on the 14th, p.m. Already on our journey we heard that the Allied Commission had left for Kovno. This morning we heard that there is another Mission (General Vincent) here, which will control the frontier. I immediately went to the General and was received in a very friendly way. He remarked that General Niessel would be very pleased to attach Russian officers of the Western Army to his staff. The General introduced me to those of General Niessel's officers who had remained in Tilsit. From conversations with them I gathered that the Mission wished to go to Mitau, but feared hostility from the German soldiers. After I had assured them of the friendly feelings of our Army towards them, they remarked that the Mission would probably go to Mitau. The Mission will be in Tilsit in the course of the next few days.

According to instructions received I will do my best to persuade them to come to Mitau. On my part I should like to remark that their arrival in Mitau is hardly desirable. It would be better to negotiate in Tilsit, there it will be much easier to convince them that the Army is a Russian one, that the Germans have only joined us as volunteers and that there is no German Command and influence. The French Colonel did his best the whole time to speak to me as an ally. He remarked that the French plans did not coincide with the English, but that General Niessel in this case was unfortunately only the executor of orders given by the Supreme Allied Council and therefore could not take the purely French point of view and justify our actions. The possibility of an Ultimatum demanding the exclusion of all Germans should be reckoned with—then we are promised all blessings. I remarked that this demand is absurd, that the army would cease to exist and with the army the main bulwark against Bolshevism in Western Russia.

ROTMISTER [? RITTMEISTER] ANITCHKOFF

Address: Tilsit, Hotel Kaiserhof.

Document 29

Lett Summary No. 43; Series 1

(Translation from the Russian.)

BERLIN, October 29, 1919

Dear and beloved Prince Pavel Michailovitch!

It is difficult to imagine one's sensations when the whole finished work unexpectedly comes to a standstill owing to an announcement in the Russian and German papers to the effect that agreements with the Government of the Western Army are valid only when sanctioned by Baron Knorring, Baron Osten-Sacken and Neporoshny. This appeared in all German newspapers and in the *Golos Rossie*. Where it originated I do not know, but my Syndicate logically ask: What part is Remmer playing? I had to try and convince all that this announcement was a hoax of the Entente's.

But I did not expect the last blow! Mauricius arrived here and stated that the agreement could be concluded without the consent of the German troops. I persuaded Mauricius not to speak about that convention, because the Germans would most decidedly disclaim the question of the Bank already practically settled, if they heard that the Commander of the Army was tied by obligations.

It would be still worse if this arrangement with the German troops were to become known in Berlin and to the Entente. I insisted that Mauricius should not show to anyone his power of attorney and agreement before the Germans had paid the 50,000,000. But he has already spoken about it to several people; I am sitting at the telephone and waiting for an answer from Poppe who was summoned by the chairman of the Syndicate to explain how it came that besides Remmer, Knorring, Osten-Sacken, Mauricius, Neporoshny, Engelhardt, von Berg and others were negotiating in Berlin and that it was therefore possible that at the moment Remmer was signing the contract with the Syndicate these individuals might sign similar agreements with other concerns.

What will happen now I do not know. . . .² All the more as all are shouting that so many people have powers of attorney from the Commander and from his Government. . . .²

(So far this letter was written by A. Remmer. Poppe continues the letter)

I have just returned from the representative of the Syndicate. When I was in Mitau not a single word was said about the existence of any agreement with the German troops in Courland, although Count Pahlen spoke to me for over an hour. And this was not all! Having on the 6th October given the German troops a promise not to conclude any contracts with regard to forests, railways and telegraph without the consent of the German troops—they go and send F. F. Niedermeyer to Berlin on the 17th October with instructions to sign a railway agreement. What does this mean? Can such things be tolerated? We implore you, dear Pavel Michailovitch, to put an end to such impossibilities.

I have with very great trouble succeeded in appeasing and convincing the representatives of the Syndicate this time, but I do not guarantee that it will be possible next time.

Your sincerely devoted

W. POPPE

(Beginning of letter continued—of no interest—and signed by A. Remmer.)²

² Thus in original.

Document 30

(*Translation from the Russian.*)

Commander,
Western Volunteer Army.

22nd October, 1919.

MITAU.

No. 771/1.

To The Commander-in-Chief
of all Armed Forces in South Russia.

Report

I sent a report to Your Excellency on the 4th November³ No..020, on the subject of the formation and the plans of the Western Volunteer Army, a copy of which I again enclose.⁴

The situation has very much changed since I made the last report. It has not been possible to come to any peaceful agreement with the Lettish Government and to get from it guarantees necessary to secure my rear during the movement of units of the army to the Bolshevik front. The concentration of the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Lettish Infantry regiments, cavalry and armed units in the Riga sector is beginning to threaten the district in which units of the Western Volunteer Army are being formed. The demarcation line no longer provides protection from molestation, as Lettish scouting detachments have crossed it and skirmishes have resulted on several occasions.

These circumstances have induced me to take the necessary precautionary measures of a defensive character. For this purpose I decided to reach the line of the Duna by means of a counter-attack, and by this river to protect myself from further attempts by the Latvian Government. At the same time I expected that the representatives of the Allies would take measures with the Latvian Government to remove the invariable causes of the armed encounters, but to my regret these steps were not taken.

On 8th October, after an encounter with the Lettish advance guard, units of the army entrusted to me began to push back the Letts to the Duna on the front between Kekkau and the estuary, thus having the river between themselves and the Lettish army.

To avoid further unnecessary bloodshed and in the desire to spare Riga from destruction, I issued an order to my troops to abstain from further actions and not to fire across the river, all the more so, as the main object—to secure myself from Lettish attempts—had been achieved. It was now only a question of coming to a peaceful agreement so as to avoid further unnecessary bloodshed, and I made an appeal to the Lettish Government.

Notwithstanding all this and also the entire cessation of firing from our side, the Letts did not cease fire. On the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th October they even made several attacks, attempting to force the Duna at various points and I was forced to launch several short counter-attacks to make them retire to the other side of the river; in this I succeeded. At present it is quiet on the Duna front.

³ Evidently in error for October (cf. below).

⁴ Not annexed to filed original.

It is to be regretted that during this period no steps were taken by the Allies to avert actions on the front of the Lettish troops so as to avoid unnecessary sacrifices; on the contrary they assisted the advance of the Letts, giving them good opportunity to land a party by using the artillery of their fleet lying on the Dünamünde roadstead. The fire of the Allied ships involved extremely heavy losses to my troops, who did their duty. In several units the losses amounted to 50% (I. Battalion of the I. Plastunsky regiment).

Notwithstanding the difficulties in forming units, I am steadily continuing to work towards the realisation of my original plans, to the fulfilment of which the Western Volunteer Army has bound itself and which I have stated in my report of the 4th of October.

To facilitate General Youdenitch's operations in the Pskoff sector, I have decided, notwithstanding all difficulties and obstacles put in my way in the formation of new units of my army, gradually to start sending units to the Bolshevik front as far as the security of my rear from a Lettish attack and the supply of these units, now entirely dependent on the Allies permits it.

It must be regretted that the Entente is showing its aversion to the Western Volunteer Army pursuing the common cause with the other Russian Volunteer Armies. The Allies put all possible obstacles in the way of further development of the army, its completion and supply.

I openly confess to your Excellency that I myself and all ranks of the army entrusted to me pursue the same aim and have the same hopes and longings as the ranks of those armed forces in the South of Russia who are in the lucky position to be under the command of your Excellency.

In spite of the vain attempts of the Entente to strangle my formations by representing my actions in a wrong light, by closing the frontier with the purpose of stopping reinforcements, equipment, etc., I still feel strong enough to overcome all obstacles. The source of this strength is the sympathy of individuals with great experience and knowledge, devoted to their duty to their Mother Country, aspiring together with other well intentioned men to give to her once again her former greatness, men enjoying the trust and sympathy of everybody—a pure military element—and thanks to this, I have full confidence in the final success of the formation on the Baltic territory of an army of 60–70,000 men, well equipped and organised.

Under these circumstances the efforts of the Entente which are exclusively directed to making use of small states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in their own interests, do not trouble me so much. Firm belief in the justice of my cause gives us all the energy and courage which will help us to overcome all obstacles and to gain our solemn object—the former greatness of our Mother Country.

In conclusion, I regard it as my duty to report to your Excellency that under the existing circumstances any approval and encouragement addressed by you to the army entrusted to me and the recognition by you of my efforts in the common cause of creating a Russian army would double the energy and efforts and would increase the courage and belief in a final success.

If your Excellency should have the kindness to take under your command the Western Volunteer Army entrusted to me, this would strengthen our hopes for a bright future. I myself and the Army lay this petition before your Excellency.

Document 31

Lettish Summary No. 97; Series 2

(Translation from the Russian.)

(Undated and unsigned)⁵

To Admiral Koltchak,
Supreme Administrator.

After the departure of your Excellency from Petrograd I continued the work and have now achieved perceptible results. Herewith I forward a detailed report.

During my sojourn in the capital I worked together with Professor Pletneff.

Then I continued to work as far as possible at the front endeavouring to retard the decomposition of the regiment.

After the final decomposition of the Army I considered that my further presence would be of no use and therefore I transferred my activity to Kieff where I succeeded in uniting several individuals known as public workers. With their help I was able to collect officers of the former Russian army under the flag of the Southern Army, which was intended to fight Bolshevism.

Upon the appearance of Cavalry-General Count Keller and the Northern Army formed by him in the district of Pskoff, I got into connection with him and transferred a number of officers from my disposition to him.

As disturbances began in the Ukraina and the defence of Kieff from Petliura's troops was being organized I worked in the formation of 'Fatherland' unit.

All this created wide connections with officers who at that time were in Kieff and in the South of Russia.

After the capture of Kieff by Petliura I was arrested—the 5th time during the above described period—and put into the Lukianoff prison for my endeavours to rebuild a United and Indivisible Russia.

The 'Allies' awaited by the inhabitants of Kieff with deep faith never came; now Kieff was already being enthreatened [*sic*] by the Bolsheviks.

By order of the German Ober-Kommando all the disarmed and also arrested officers of volunteer organizations, I was in the same category, were taken to Germany together with echelons of German troops returning home.

Already during the journey and also after my arrival in the camp near Salzwald I again succeeded in uniting around myself the most energetic elements, most irreconcilable with Bolshevism. I awakened in them the idea of forming a partisan detachment to participate in the struggle for the benefit of our Mother Country.

In order to realize this idea I opened connections with German commercial circles and the German Command; both were favourably impressed and rendered great support and cooperation by supplying the detachment with everything necessary. The commanding authorities even allowed their volunteer pro-Monarchist organizations to join these partisans, which they did in great numbers.

German society also showed its sympathy. To my regret I met with very little support and cooperation on the side of the Russian Military Mission in Berlin and its Chief, General Monkevitz, who paid more attention to the passive officer elements. These however devoted more attention to their own well-being at German Spas or they chose distant fronts connected with long journeys to reach them, instead of applying their services in the nearest direction so as to paralyse the vital arteries of the enemy.

⁵ From internal evidence it appears that this dispatch was written by Colonel Bermond-Avalov. The biographical particulars contained therein may be compared with those given by him in *Im Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus, passim*.

These elements formed special groups and were sent to Spas together with their families, where they enjoyed special care from the Mission.

Meanwhile my idea of forming a partisan detachment was developing and attracting other camps and greater numbers of officers.

Money, equipment, armaments and munitions were required. These were supplied by the German command and capitalists.

As I did not consider it fair to sacrifice exclusively officers I decided to make use of the most reliable prisoners, who, thanks to the help of the German command, joined my detachment.

As a suitable place for the concentration of this detachment I chose territory occupied by German troops; here I am awaiting instructions from Your Excellency so as to coordinate my actions with your general plan.

After all heavy trials which Germany has had to suffer, she does not wish for more than the re-establishment of the frontiers of 1914; she has no aims of conquest upon the Russian front and does not advocate the separation of small nations; this can be observed here better than anywhere else.

Military, commercial and society circles aspire to co-operate hand in hand with your Excellency against the common foe of Russia and Germany—Bolshevism, so as to crush their Spartacists after having defeated Bolshevism in Russia.

Certain public circles in Germany have rendered most valuable help in the form of money, equipment, armaments and even volunteers after the proposition made to them of forming a North-Western front, which is very important to you. Thus they have shown their sympathy and good-will towards the aims of your Excellency and have proved that they understand the necessity of compatible work against Bolshevism for the benefit of both countries.

The, to a certain degree, restricted size of the formation is due to the wish to learn your attitude towards this undertaking. If your approval is accorded it, then this front can be enlarged to a degree desired by you; reserves will be sent from prisoner-camps in Germany and will be supplied from Germany with the same abundance as they have been up to the present. Prince Lieven's Corps has now been sent to another front and is in a much worse condition with regard to every kind of supplies since this was taken over by the Entente; you will probably already have received reports of this from General Yudenitch.

For above-mentioned reasons I think it necessary to point out that the presence of my corps in Courland is most desirable; we are in direct and close connection with our base—Germany, from where we receive in abundance not only all necessities, but also everything useful in our work and existence. Besides, this sector of the front is very important in operative respects and it is most imperative to keep it in Russian hands.

These considerations are keeping me here until the Corps is definitely formed and I receive instructions from you.

Document 32

(Translation from the Russian.)

Order to the Western Volunteer Army.

MITAU, 24th October, 1919.

No. 54.

Not to be published.

This is not the first time that in words and in orders to the army I have indicated and explained the reasons which compel our army, instead of a speedy advance

towards Central Russia, to be detained here, where Russian authority is ignored and those have taken power who wish to tear the Baltic coast which has belonged to Russia from ancient times away from her.

I have the same object as the troops under the command of the valorous General Denikin in the South and in the Ukraine and I cannot allow those to be masters of Russian territories who wish to deprive Russia of these territories.

Officers and Soldiers!

You must understand how important the coast (Baltic) is for Russia. It is not only an outlet for the Lettish and Estonian territories but also for the whole of Russia beginning with the Urals. It was not without a weighty reason that Peter the Great fought his way to the coast with the aid of Russian blood and so made Russia a Great European Power.

Remember that if you let Russia's enemies have the coast it will be necessary to shed much Russian blood to reconquer it. Russia will not forget those who will maintain for Russia the free outlet to the sea.

Notwithstanding all difficulties of fulfilling this task I always remember the necessity of hurrying to the help of Central Russia and I am transferring units to the Bolshevik front so as to see our relatives who are suffering under the Bolshevik yoke, and to afford them help.

A person who does not secure his rear and does not protect the peaceful and laborious population, which would otherwise suffer the same lot as our brothers in Central Russia, does not deserve to be named Commander.

I order the senior officers to explain this in detail to the junior ranks, also to explain to them the great task which they are destined to perform to the good and benefit of their Mother Country—a Great and Undivided Russia.

A soldier true to Russia,

Sincerely devoted to his Mother Country
and to you, my friends.

Commander of the Army

COL. PRINCE AVALLOFF

Copy correct:

(signed) for Chief of Staff

Colonel . . .²

CHAPTER II

Policy of His Majesty's Government in relation to developments in Russia

May 26, 1919—March 12, 1920

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

ON April 16, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George, in the course of a speech on foreign affairs in the House of Commons, stated the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards developments in Russia in the following terms:

'I should like to say, before I come to the other work of the Conference,¹ a few words about Russia. I have read, and I have heard of very simple remedies produced by both sides. Some say, "Use force!" Some say, "Make peace!" It is not easy; it is one of the most complex problems ever dealt with by any body of men. One difficulty is that there is no Russia. Siberia is broken off. There is the Don, one of the richest provinces of Russia, the Caucasus, and then there is some organization controlling Central Russia; but there is no body that can say it is a *de facto* Government for the whole of Russia. Apart, then, from all questions of whether you could, under any circumstances, recognise the Bolshevik Government, you cannot recognise it as the *de facto* Government of Russia, because it is not, and there is no other Government you can call the *de facto* Government of Russia. You have that vast country in a state of complete chaos, confusion and anarchy. There is no authority that extends over the whole. Boundaries advance and boundaries recede. One day a large territory is governed by one authority, and the next day by another. It is just like a volcano; it is still in fierce eruption, and the best you can do is to provide security for those who are dwelling on its remotest and most accessible slopes, and arrest the devastating flow of lava, so that it shall not scorch other lands.

'It is very easy to say about Russia, "Why do you not do something?" I would like to ask each man consecutively what would he have done. To begin with, let me say at once, there is no question of recognition. It has never been discussed—it was never put forward, and never discussed for the reasons I have given. I can give two or three more. There is no Government representing the whole of Russia. The Bolshevik Government has committed against Allied subjects great crimes which have made it impossible to recognise it, even if it were a civilised Government, and the third reason is that at this very moment they are attacking our friends in Russia. What is the alternative? Does anyone propose military intervention? I

¹ The Peace Conference at Paris.

want to examine that carefully and candidly. I will not say before the House, but before any individual commits his conscience to such an enterprise, I want him to realise what it means. First of all there is the fundamental principle of all foreign policy in this country—a very sound principle—that you should never interfere in the internal affairs of another country, however badly governed; and whether Russia is Menshevik or Bolshevik, whether it is reactionary or revolutionary, whether it follows one set of men or another, that is a matter for the Russian people themselves. We cannot interfere, according to any canon of good government, to impose any form of government on another people, however bad we may consider their present form of government to be. The people of this country thoroughly disapprove of Tsarism—its principles, its corruption, and its oppression—but it was not our business to put it down. This is a question for Russia itself. We certainly disagree—I believe I may say every man in this House wholly disagrees fundamentally—with all the principles upon which the present Russian experiment is based. We deplore its horrible consequences, starvation, bloodshed, confusion, ruin and horror. But that does not justify us in committing this country to a gigantic military enterprise in order to improve the conditions in Russia.

‘Let me speak in all solemnity, and with a great sense of responsibility. Russia is a country which it is very easy to invade, but very difficult to conquer. It has never been conquered by a foreign foe, although it has been successfully invaded many times. It is a country which it is easy to get into, but very difficult to get out of. You have only to look at what has happened in the last few years to the Germans. They rolled up the Russian armies, they captured millions of Russian prisoners, they took Russian guns. The Russians had no ammunition, there was barely anyone to resist them, and at last the Russian Army fled, leaving their guns on the field. There was no Russian Army. Neither M. Kerensky or any of his successors could get together 10,000 disciplined men, and yet the Germans to the last moment, whilst their front was broken in France, while their country was menaced with invasion, while they themselves were being overwhelmed with disaster, had to keep a million of men in Russia; and why? Because they had entangled themselves in the morass, and could not get out of it. Let that be a warning. At that time the Bolshevik Army was comparatively feeble. May I put it in another way?

‘If we conquered Russia—and we could conquer it—you would be surprised at the military advice which is given us as to the number of men who would be required, and I should like to know where they are to come from. But supposing you had them. Supposing you gathered together an overwhelming army, and you conquered Russia. What manner of government are you going to set up there? You must set up a government which the people want; otherwise it would be an outrage of all the principles for which we have fought in this War. Does anyone know for what government they would ask, and if it is a government we do not like, are we to reconquer Russia in order to get a government we do like?

'Look at it in another way. We have an Army of Occupation.² I know what it costs. You cannot immediately leave Russia until you have restored order. It will take a long time to restore order in Russia. It is not a highly organised community. Has anyone reckoned up what an Army of Occupation would cost in Russia? The Rhine is accessible; it is not so very far from Great Britain. But what about Russia, with its long lines of communication, with its deficient transport, and its inadequate resources?

'I read how hon. Members in this House showed a natural anxiety to control the expenditure in this country on railways and canals. But my right hon. Friend (Sir Eric Geddes), with all his energy, could not in a quarter of a century spend as much money on railways and canals in Britain as a single year of military enterprise in Russia would cost.³ I share the horror of all the Bolshevik teachings, but I would rather leave Russia Bolshevik until she sees her way out of it than see Britain bankrupt. And that is the surest road to Bolshevism in Britain. I only want to put—and I must put quite frankly to the House—I should not be doing my duty as Head of the Government unless I stated quite frankly to the House my earnest conviction—that to attempt military intervention in Russia would be the greatest act of stupidity that any Government could possibly commit. But then I am asked if that be the case, why do you support Koltchak, Denikin, and Kharkow?⁴ I will tell the House with the same frankness as I put the other case. When the Brest-Litoff treaty was signed, there were large territories and populations in Russia that had neither hand nor part in that shameful pact, and they revolted against the Government which signed it.

'Let me say this. They raised armies at our instigation and largely, no doubt, at our expense. That was an absolutely sound military policy. For what happened? Had it not been for those organisations that we improvised, the Germans would have secured all the resources which would have enabled them to break the blockade. They would have got through to the grain of the Don, to the minerals of the Urals, and to the oils of the Caucasus. They could have supplied themselves with almost every commodity of which four or five years of rigid blockade had deprived them, and which was essential to their conducting the War. In fact, the Eastern Front was reconstructed—not on the Vistula. It was reconstructed at a point that hurled the German Armies to their own destruction, and, when they got there, deprived them of all the things they had set out to seek. What happened? Bolshevism threatened to impose, by force of arms, its domination on those populations that had revolted against it, and that were organised at our request. If we, as soon as they had served our purpose, and as soon as they had taken all the risks, had said, "Thank you; we are exceedingly obliged to you. You have

² In the Rhineland.

³ The reference was to a debate in the House of Commons on April 1, 1919, on financial questions relative to the establishment of the proposed Ministry of Ways and Communications. Sir E. Geddes, Member of Parliament for Cambridge, was at that time Minister Designate of Ways and Communications.

⁴ The reference to Kharkow was apparently in error. No prominent Russian personality of that name was then active in Russia.

served our purpose. We need you no longer. Now let the Bolsheviks cut your throats", we should have been mean—we should have been thoroughly unworthy indeed of any great land. As long as they stand there, with the evident support of the populations—because wherever the populations are not behind them every organised effort to resist Bolshevism has failed—in the Ukraine, where the population is either indifferent or, perhaps, friendly, we have there populations like those in Siberia, the Don, and elsewhere, who are opposed to Bolshevism—they are offering a real resistance. It is our business, since we asked them to take this step, since we promised support to them if they took this step, and since by taking this stand they contributed largely to the triumph of the Allies, it is our business to stand by our friends. Therefore, we are not sending troops, but we are supplying goods. Everyone who knows Russia knows that, if she is to be redeemed, she must be redeemed by her own sons. All that they ask is—seeing that the Bolsheviks secured the arsenals of Russia—that they should be supplied with the necessary arms to enable them to fight for their own protection and freedom in the land where the Bolsheviks are anti-pathetic to the feeling of the population. Therefore I do not in the least regard it as a departure from the fundamental policy of Great Britain not to interfere in the internal affairs of any land that we should support General Denikin, Admiral Koltchak and General Kharkoff [*sic*].⁴

In pursuance of this policy Great Britain at that time had no representative accredited to the Soviet Government at Moscow, but maintained diplomatic and military missions in Siberia, under Sir C. Eliot and General Knox respectively, and in North Russia, at Archangel, under Mr. Lindley and General Sir E. Ironside respectively; General Ironside was Commander-in-Chief of the British forces stationed in North Russia since the Allied landing there in 1918. In the Baltic Provinces British diplomatic and military missions, under Colonel Tallents and General Sir H. Gough respectively, were shortly to assume their functions (cf. the Introductory Note to Chapter I). A military mission under General Briggs was attached to the headquarters of General Denikin, and General Thomson was in command of British forces in the Caucasus; there was no British political representation in South Russia apart from consular posts in such cities as Batoum and Novorossisk.

The Russian Government of the Northern Region at Archangel and the administration of General Denikin in South Russia both recognized the Government of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia as the supreme authority in Russia, and in May 1919, as indicated in the first document in this chapter, the Allied Supreme Council at Paris was considering the conditions on which it should proclaim its support of the regime of Admiral Kolchak.

In continuation of his above-quoted statement as regards British support of Admiral Kolchak and his adherents Mr. Lloyd George proceeded: "The next item in our policy is what I call to arrest the flow of the lava—that is, to prevent the forcible eruption of Bolshevism into Allied lands. For that

reason, we are organising all the forces of the Allied countries bordering on Bolshevik territory from the Baltic to the Black Sea—Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. There is no doubt that the populations are anti-Bolshevist. . . . If Bolshevism attacks any of our Allies, it is our business to defend them. For that reason, we are supplying all these countries with the necessary equipment to set up a real barrier against an invasion by force of arms. The Bolsheviks may menace or they may not. Whether they do so or not, we should be ready for any attempt to overrun Europe by force. That is our policy. But we want peace in Russia. The world will not be pacified so long as Russia is torn and rent by civil war.’

The Prime Minister then gave a brief statement of his version of the abortive Prinkipo and Bullitt peace proposals. (For these proposals, and also that of Dr. Nansen, see document No. 320.) In concluding the section devoted to Russian affairs in his speech of April 16, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George stated:

‘There are unmistakable signs that Russia is emerging from the trouble. When that time comes, when she is once more sane, calm, and normal, we shall make peace in Russia. Until we can make peace in Russia, it is idle to say that the world is at peace. . . . On one thing I am clear. I entreat the House of Commons and the country not to contemplate the possibility of another great war. We have had quite enough bloodshed.’

No. 223

Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris

C.F. 31¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Saturday, May 24, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present: United States of America: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Orlando.

Japan: Viscount Chinda.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey, Count Aldrovandi and M. Saburi.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

1. *Policy towards Russia.* The Council had under consideration a draft despatch for Admiral Koltchak prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr at the request of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. (Appendix 1.)

PRESIDENT WILSON explained to Viscount Chinda that he and his colleagues

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (Washington, 1942 f.), vol. vi, p. 15 f. Records of earlier discussions in the Council of Four with regard to the Allied note to be sent to Admiral Kolchak are printed in these Papers.

had felt some misgivings lest Admiral Koltchak might be under reactionary influences which might result in a reversal of the popular revolution in Russia. They also feared a Military Dictatorship based on reactionary principles, which would not be popular in Russia and might lead to further bloodshed and revolution. This despatch had been prepared for consideration in order to lay down the conditions of support for Admiral Koltchak and the groups working with him at Archangel and in South Russia. Should Admiral Koltchak accept the conditions, he would continue to receive the countenance and support of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, otherwise he would not. The substance of the document was contained in the six conditions laid down in the last half.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he had only received the document a short time before leaving the Embassy, and consequently had not been able to study it in detail. Unfortunately, Baron Makino² was on a visit to the devastated regions, and would not be back until the following day. He would be very much obliged if he could be allowed time to discuss the despatch with his colleagues before giving a final reply. Nevertheless, speaking personally, he felt that in all probability his Government would be prepared to associate themselves in this despatch. His reason for this belief was a despatch which had recently been addressed by his Government to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington, London, Paris and Rome, which he proceeded to read not as a proposal, but only as a matter of information. The gist of this despatch was somewhat as follows: More than six months have elapsed since the provisional Government under Admiral Koltchak was organised at Omsk to restore order in Siberia. It has so far accomplished its extremely difficult task with admirable tact and determination. Its position had lately been strengthened by its recognition by other anti-Bolshevist groups in Russia as the central organisation in Russia. Having regard to the general desire to see the restoration of an orderly and efficient Government in Russia, and believing that official recognition will materially conduce to this end, the Japanese Government feels that the time has come for a provisional recognition to be accorded, on condition of a promise by the Omsk Government to safeguard the legitimate interests of the Allied and Associated Powers, and that it will assume responsibility for the debts and financial obligations of the former Russian Government.

The message concluded with an instruction to bring this declaration to the notice of the Governments to which the Ambassadors were respectively accredited, and to suggest to them that the question might conveniently be discussed among their delegates at Paris. On concluding the reading of this despatch Viscount Chinda remarked that the policy in the draft despatch which had been handed to him seemed to be a preliminary step towards the policy proposed by the Japanese Government. This was the reason for his confidence that the Japanese Government would accept it. Nevertheless, he would like to discuss the matter with his colleagues.

² Former Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

One point of detail in the despatch to which he wished to draw attention was the following statement:—

‘Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on the 27th November, 1918, in regard to Russia’s national debts.’

He asked what the declaration was to which this referred.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, who had sent for the document containing the declaration, read the following:—

‘Telegram from M. Klioutchnikoff³ to the Ambassador in Paris

‘November 27, 1918

‘Please communicate the following to the Government to which you are accredited:—

“The Russian Government at the head of which stands Admiral Koltchak remembering that Russia always kept all her obligations towards her own people as well as other nations to which it was bound by conventions, presumes it necessary to announce in a special declaration that it accepts all obligations incumbent to the Treasury and will fulfil them in due time when Russia’s unity will be again achieved. These obligations are the following: payments of interests, redemption of inner State debts, payments for contracts, wages, pensions and other payments due by law, and other conventions. The Government declares at the same time all financial acts promoted by the Soviet Powers as null and void, being acts edicted by mutineers.”’

(Sir Maurice Hankey undertook to send a copy to Viscount Chinda.)

VISCOUNT CHINDA supposed that the responsibility for sending supplies to Russia would be divided between the various Governments according to their respective capacity.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that up to now Great Britain had supplied the great bulk of the war material. He would be very glad to adopt Viscount Chinda’s proposal, as then the United States of America would have to supply the greater part.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he had only mentioned it because of the limited resources of Japan for such supplies.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was a matter for Congress. He hoped, however, he might induce Congress to take a share when the whole matter was explained to them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that substantially the conditions in this despatch had been read to the British Trades Unionists, who had been satisfied on the whole.

VISCOUNT CHINDA then drew attention to the following passage in the despatch:—

‘They are therefore disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies, food, and the help of such as may volunteer for their service, to establish themselves as the Government of All Russia,’ etc.

³ Then Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of Admiral Kolchak.

He thought that Japan, having a standing army, might find it difficult strictly to conform to the letter of this proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not understand this phrase to mean Government help. It had not been in contemplation to send formed troops. His interpretation of the words was that it meant such individuals as might volunteer.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the phrase had been inserted to meet the case of Great Britain. There was a very strong feeling against sending forces to Russia, and it was necessary to give guarantees to the soldiers that they would not be sent. Nevertheless, a good many men in the British Army had volunteered to go to Russia to take part in the operations; indeed, sufficient numbers had volunteered to supply the Archangel force. That was the reason for this provision.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said it would be very difficult for the Japanese Government to undertake their help in that sense. There were technical difficulties in the way of employing Japanese forces as volunteers. They could only send regular troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON said Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation showed that he had not read it aright. He understood it had been agreed that the Allied and Associated forces should be withdrawn from Archangel.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the difficulty in withdrawing the men who had volunteered from England was that they were mostly men in technical services, such as artillery and aircraft, who could not well be spared. If they were withdrawn, it would place both the Archangel forces and Denekin in great difficulties.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the Japanese forces in Siberia were regulars, and they could not be converted into volunteers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the answer was that the United States and Japanese troops who were in the rearward services were not affected. This phrase only concerned the troops taking part in regular operations. The United States and Japanese forces were on the lines of communications. He suggested that the difficulty should be met by the substitution of some such words as the following:—

‘Such other help as may prove feasible.’

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought the phrase had better be left out rather than amended.

(It was agreed that the words: ‘and the help of such as may volunteer for their service,’ should be omitted.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he learnt that the Japanese had furnished a considerable amount of munitions to Admiral Koltchak, but he could not specify the exact amount.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the whole he thought it would be better to omit the following words from the second paragraph of the letter:—

‘The total cost of which exceeds £100,000,000.’

(It was agreed to omit the above words, and to substitute the following: ‘at a very considerable cost.’)

Conclusion

(It was agreed that the draft despatch should be provisionally approved, subject to the above corrections, but that no action should be taken until it had received the formal approval of the Japanese Delegation.

Viscount Chinda undertook to notify Sir Maurice Hankey if the despatch was approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed in that event to submit a copy for signature by the representatives of the Five Powers, after which it would be dispatched in their name to Admiral Koltchak by M. Clemenceau.)

(Colonel Kisch was introduced.)

2. *The Military Situation in Siberia.* COLONEL KISCH gave a description with a map of the military situation in Siberia. He explained that Admiral Koltchak's main operations were on his northern wing with the immediate object of effecting a junction at Kotlas with the forces based on Archangel. His subsequent objective would be Viatka. The Bolsheviks had been forced back in this district, and, in order to meet the menace, had withdrawn 20,000 men from opposite the forces at Archangel. With these reinforcements they would be able to oppose Koltchak's 36,000 men on his northern wing with about double strength, though the morale of the Bolshevik troops, who had been severely handled, was low. The Bolsheviks had countered this attack by Admiral Koltchak by a counter-attack against his southern wing, where they had made a total advance in the region of Samara, which had been threatened by Koltchak, of some 60 miles. Denekin was creating a diversion to check this counter-attack by an advance towards Tzaritzin, and Admiral Koltchak was putting in his last reserves to check this Bolshevik advance, and meanwhile was pressing on in the north. On the west the Estonians had made a considerable advance, and, if aided by a rising in Petrograd, might even hope to capture that city. The inhabitants in the districts recently overrun by Admiral Koltchak had received him favourably. In the northern part of Russia there was close affinity between the population west of the Urals and the Siberian population, but before long Koltchak, if he continued his successes, would be entering the really Bolshevik regions of Russia.

(Colonel Kisch then withdrew.)

3. *The next Stage in Russian Policy.* MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if a satisfactory answer was received from Koltchak, the following decisions would have to be taken:—

- (1) Whether the Allied and Associated Powers should confine themselves to rendering him assistance.
- (2) Whether they should recognise the Omsk Government as the Government for the area occupied by Koltchak's troops.
- (3) Whether the Omsk Government should be recognised as representing the whole of Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he hoped, before Koltchak's reply was received, to have Mr. Morris's report.⁴

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that someone ought to be sent to see Dene-kin. . . .⁵

APPENDIX I TO No. 223

Draft Despatch to Admiral Koltchak

(Prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr for consideration at the request of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, May 23, 1916[1919].)

The Allied and Associated Powers feel that the time has come when it is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they propose to pursue in regard to Russia.

It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Their original intervention was made for the sole purpose of assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from German rule, and in order to rescue the Czecho-Slovaks from the danger of annihilation at the hands of the Bolshevik forces. Since the signature of the Armistice on the 11th November, 1918, they have kept forces in various parts of Russia. Munitions and supplies have been sent to assist those associated with them, the total cost of which exceeds £100,000,000. No sooner, however, did the Peace Conference assemble than they endeavoured to bring peace and order to Russia by inviting representatives of all the warring Governments within Russia to meet them in the hope that they might be able to arrange a permanent solution of Russian problems.⁶ This proposal and a later offer to relieve the distress among the suffering millions of Russia⁷ broke down through the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept the fundamental condition of suspending hostilities while negotiations or the work of relief was proceeding. They are now being pressed to withdraw their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia on the ground that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early settlement. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it will really help the Russian people to liberty, self-government, and peace.

The Allied and Associated Governments now wish to declare formally that the object of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs through the instrumentality of a freely elected Constituent Assembly and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the

⁴ Mr. Morris, Ambassador of the United States in Tokyo, had been instructed by the State Department on May 15, 1919, to proceed on special mission to Omsk. This mission was subsequently postponed until July, 1919.

⁵ The Supreme Council passed to discussion of other matters.

⁶ The so-called Prinkipo Proposal: cf. No. 320.

⁷ The offer made to the Soviet Government through Dr. Nansen in connexion with his proposal for relief work in Russia: cf. No. 320.

boundaries of the Russian state and its relations with its neighbours through the peaceful arbitration of the League of Nations.

They are convinced by their experiences of the last year that it is not possible to attain these ends by dealings with the Soviet Government of Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates with munitions, supplies, food, and the help of such as may volunteer for their service, to establish themselves as the government of All Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same object in view as that of the Allied and Associated Powers. With this object they would ask Admiral Koltchak and his Associates whether they will agree to the following as the conditions upon which they accept continued assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the first place, that, as soon as they reach Moscow they will summon a Constituent Assembly elected by a free, secret and democratic franchise as the Supreme Legislature for Russia to which the Government of Russia must be responsible, or if at that time order is not sufficiently restored they will summon the Constituent Assembly elected in 1917 to sit until such time as new elections are possible.

Secondly, that throughout the areas which they at present control they will permit free elections in the normal course for all local and legally constituted assemblies such as municipalities, Zemstvos, &c.

Thirdly, they will countenance no attempt to revive the special privileges of any class or order in Russia. The Allied and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction the solemn declarations made by Admiral Koltchak and his associates that they have no intention of restoring the former land system. They feel that the principles to be followed in the solution of this and other internal questions must be left to the free decision of the Russian Constituent Assembly; but they wish to be assured that those whom they are prepared to assist stand for the civil and religious liberty of all Russian citizens and will make no attempt to reintroduce the régime which the revolution has destroyed.

Fourthly, that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognised, and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations.

Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between these *de facto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.

Sixthly, that as soon as a government for Russia has been constituted on a democratic basis, Russia should join the League of Nations and co-operate with the other members in the limitation of armaments and of military organisation throughout the world.

Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on the 27th November, 1918, in regard to Russia's national debts.

The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates are prepared to accept these conditions, and also whether in the event of acceptance they will undertake to form a single government and army command as soon as the military situation makes it possible.

No. 224

Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des États-Unis, Paris

C.F. 32¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Monday, May 26, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Orlando.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey and Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

. . . 3.² *Russia: Policy of Allied and Associated Powers.* With reference to C.F. 31,³ Minute 1, Sir Maurice Hankey stated that the Japanese Delegation had agreed to the draft despatch to Admiral Koltchak (Appendix III),⁴ subject to two very small amendments, namely, in paragraph 2 instead of the words 'they are now being pressed to withdraw,' &c., was substituted the following: 'some of the Allied and Associated Governments are now being pressed to withdraw,' &c., and paragraph 4 instead of the words 'the last year' was substituted 'the last 12 months.'

(These alterations were approved and the letter was signed by the Four Heads of States. The letter was then taken by Mr. Philip Kerr to the Japanese Embassy, where it was signed by the Marquis Saionji.⁵ Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate the letter to the Secretary-General with instructions to dispatch it in the name of the Conference to Admiral Koltchak.

Note.—The Marquis Saionji, when appending his signature, particularly asked that the letter should not be published until a reply was received. Sir Maurice Hankey made a communication in this sense to the Secretary-General.) . . .²

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 25 f.

² The remainder of these minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

³ No. 223.

⁴ Not printed. The final text of this dispatch is printed in Appendix I to No. 233.

⁵ Former Japanese Prime Minister and Head of the Japanese Delegation to the Peace Conference.

Sir C. Eliot¹ (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 1)
No. 485 Telegraphic [82411/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, May 26, 1919

Telegram from Tokio to Foreign Office No. 221.²

If before recognizing Kolchak Government conditions are made respecting internal administration, I think most important is an assurance that arrests will be made only on definite charges and be followed by speedy and (? public) trial.

It might also be well to have an assurance that old forms of municipal and local Government such as Zemstvos will be respected. There is a tendency in Eastern Siberia to deprive such representative institutions of funds and (? impede) them in practice by a bureaucracy but I am told things are different in west.

I doubt the advisability of making further stipulations about free speech.

Your Lordship will doubtless bear in mind two features of present position:

1. Misdeeds which create trouble are committed chiefly by officials over whom Kolchak has imperfect control. When he is recognized he will have greater prestige and authority.

2. Peasantry are sometimes unjustly punished for being Bolsheviks when they are merely discontented. On the other hand in many localities they refuse to pay taxes or serve as soldiers if they have any chance of resisting successfully or receiving support from Bolsheviks or others.

Kolchak's proclamation sent to War Office in Military Mission's telegram No. 2919³ has not yet been published. It may impress United States

¹ H.M. High Commissioner and Consul-General in Siberia.

² Not printed.

³ This telegram of May 26 transmitted the text of a proclamation which read in part: 'Neither vengeance nor persecution is my object. Those who have perpetrated no atrocity and committed no crime have nothing to fear from me and all who have been forced against their will to help the Bolsheviks in their work will receive from the Government a complete amnesty. I have assumed office in order to establish in the country order, justice and freedom and to give security and bread to the harassed and famine-stricken population. . . . The office I have assumed is a heavy burden and I have no intention of retaining it for a single day longer than the interests of the country demand. As soon as Bolshevism is finally crushed my first care will be to call for a General Election to a national constituent assembly. A Commission is busily engaged at the present moment in drafting of general regulations for the elections. My desire is that the elections should be conducted on the basis of universal suffrage. To this constituent assembly I shall hand over all my powers in order that it may decide on the future form of government. I have already signed a law guaranteeing for the current year to all workers the produce of the land they have cultivated and sown. With the object of assisting in every way the small peasant holders I intend in future enactments to transfer to them by due legal process the lands of the large landowners who will in their turn be paid a suitable compensation. I am profoundly convinced that Russia will be prosperous and strong only when the many millions of Russian peasants are fully provided with land. I am equally convinced that the law should provide protection for the workmen in order to secure their self-organisation on lines similar to those of the west. A special labour department is preparing data for future legislation on this subject.'

favourably which . . .⁴ but in Eastern Siberia people will simply say they are surfeited with liberal proclamations and want to see some change in practice.

⁴ The text here is uncertain.

No. 226

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Mr. Bosanquet (Reval)

No. 2 Telegraphic [83461/67181/38]

PARIS, May 26, 1919

Your telegram to Foreign Office No. 59.¹

As stated in my telegram No. 1² Council of Foreign Ministers have adopted proposal of Supreme Economic Council that all areas of Russia not in Bolshevik hands should be supplied with food. This would cover Petrograd if recaptured and troops operating in non-Bolshevik areas.

Confidential. In replying to chief of staff, Northern Corps, you should state that above is general policy of Allies but great care should be taken to avoid committing them specifically to relief of Petrograd as Allied Governments do not want to be in any way responsible for military operations against that city.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of May 21 (received May 22) transmitted information from the chief of staff of the Russian Northern Corps with regard to military successes obtained against Soviet forces during the Corps' advance towards Petrograd, and an urgent request from him, supported by Mr. Bosanquet, for Allied supplies of food for the Northern Corps, the local population, and that of Petrograd should it be captured. ² Not printed.

No. 227

Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des États-Unis, Paris

C.F. 34¹ [Secret/General/162]

Monday, May 26, 1919, at 4.15 p.m.

Present: United States of America: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Orlando.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey and Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.²

. . . 6.³ *Polish-Ukrainian Armistice.* SIR MAURICE HANKEY handed round a copy of a letter addressed by the Ukrainian Delegation to General Botha, together with General Botha's reply (Appendix II).

(It was agreed that this question should not be discussed until M. Paderewski's arrival.⁴) . . .³

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 45 f.

² Certain members of the Committee on New States and Experts were also present.

³ The remainder of these minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

⁴ M. Paderewski was due to arrive in Paris from Poland.

APPENDIX II TO NO. 227

Document I

M 196. *Armistice with the Poles*

(Reference C.F. 22 and C.F. 25)⁵

Copy of letter from Ukrainian Delegation to General Botha and reply

DÉLÉGATION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE UKRAINIENNE,
37, RUE LA PÉROUSE,

PARIS, May 24, 1919

To His Excellency the President of the
Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission
of the Peace Conference.

In accordance with the message of the 9th March of the Council of Four⁶ the State Secretariat of Western Ukraine delegated us to Paris to arrange an armistice with the Poles.

On our part we did everything in our power to have the armistice concluded. At the session of the Armistice Commission on the 13th May, we declared our acceptance of the armistice plan proposed by the Armistice Commission, notwithstanding the fact that according to this plan one-third of our national territory was given over under the Polish administration.

Our spirit of conciliation however was fruitless.

As we have not been requested by the Armistice Commission to sign the Armistice convention we are led to the conclusion that the Poles have not accepted the Armistice disregarding the responsibility for the continuation of the war.

At the same time we have been receiving information that the Poles undertook against us a brutal offensive in which they won some success.

This is nothing to be wondered at. The Poles received everything from the Entente: clothing, shoes, munitions and even military force in the form of Haller's army. Of course, they give lame explanation that Haller's army is fighting in Volynia not in Galicia. But there is a Ukrainian army in Volynia also which is faced on one side by the Bolsheviks and Haller's army on the other. So Haller's army is fighting the Ukrainians, thus aiding the Bolsheviks.

On the other hand Haller's army reinforced Polish troops thus helping the latter to attack our army with greater force. While the Poles obtained from the Allies all means requisite for a successful conduct of the war, our people lacking in all material for clothing, shoes and in ammunition factories, is compelled to defend itself by the remnants of means which had been confiscated by our authorities from the former Austrian army.

We have not obtained anything from the Entente or from anybody else, while the Poles have got from the Entente everything necessary for the conduct of the war.

⁵ These records of meetings of the Council of Four on May 21 and 22, 1919, respectively illustrate the background to the course of the negotiations with regard to a Ukraino-Polish armistice. The records are printed op. cit., vol. v, pp. 775 f., 859-60.

⁶ This reference should have been to a message of March 19 from the Council of Ten. The message is printed op. cit., vol. iv, p. 412.

No wonder then that our army is compelled to retreat before the Polish offensive.

We wanted no war with the Poles; we proclaimed and began to put into effect our right for self-determination claiming only those territories which belong indisputably to us.

The Poles were the ones who attacked us the first. The Poles are destroying our country, our fertile fields, the Poles are killing our soldiers fighting in defence of our fatherland, the Poles are ruining our villages, killing our peasants for no other reason than their unwillingness to remain under the Polish yoke.

If there is justice in the world it must rise in our defence against Polish invasion.

And cherishing the hope that the Powers of the Entente would show us justice we came to Paris.

The Armistice Commission told us: 'Accept this delimitation line and the permanent frontiers will be established by the Peace Conference.'

We accepted this though with a heavy heart as it was painful to leave millions of our brothers fighting for liberation, under the Polish subjugation. We accepted the proposition believing in the spirit of justice on the part of the Peace Conference.

We accepted the proposition desiring [to] save our country from ruin, to save the lives of our fathers, and mothers, of our brothers and sisters, of our wives and children from Polish menace.

Ten days have passed since the time we announced our acceptance of the plan of the Armistice Commission and the war in our country is going on.

Our government and our people are waiting favourable news from us, but we can tell them nothing. They are bleeding there, but we can do nothing to help them.

Therefore we, feeling a heavy responsibility before our government and our people are turning to you, Mr. President, for an interview. We want to hear from you, as the President of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, an authoritative word whether the armistice will be concluded or not, whether our country will be saved from Polish conquest or not, whether the Powers of the Entente will order the Poles to stop fighting and retreat beyond the demarkation line, marked by the Armistice Commission or permit the Poles, with the help of the means obtained from the Entente to strangle us.

We must tell our government and our people as soon as possible what we have achieved here and what they can expect to obtain.

Therefore we request you, Mr. President, to grant us an interview in order to receive your reply to transmit it to our Government and our people.

Special Delegates
of the State Secretariat of
Western Ukraine:

DR. MICHEL LOZYSKY
DYMITYR WITOWSKY

His Excellency M. Lozynsky,
37, rue la Pérouse, Paris.

May 26, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 24th May, and in reply thereto to state that the question of the establishment of an armistice on the Polish-Ukrainian front is now in the hands of the Council of the Principal and Allied Powers. As the draft armistice proposed by the Armistice Commission has not been accepted by the Poles, the mandate of the Commission is at an end, and the matter has been referred to the Council for such action as they deem fit under the circumstances. In view of the above, I cannot see the advantage of an interview, nor do I think such interview would at the present time be advisable.

I am, however, doing my best to attain the much-desired cessation of hostilities.

Yours faithfully,
L. BOTHA

No. 228

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 27)

No. 813 [79984/1015/58]

PARIS, May 26, 1919

My Lord,

M. Toptchibaschef, President of the Azerbaijan Delegation to the Peace Conference, and M. Jalinsky, a Minister in the present Azerbaijan Government, and a member of the delegation, called on Sir Louis Mallet¹ on the 23rd May, bringing with them M. Sakarof as interpreter.

2. They stated that they would submit a detailed statement of their desiderata in due course to the Conference and to this delegation. Their territorial desiderata appeared to comprise the two Russian departments of Elisabetopol and Baku. They asked whether His Majesty's Government would support their claim for a recognition of their independence, and whether there was any possibility of His Majesty's Government accepting a mandate for Azerbaijan. No hope was held out in the latter direction, and they were informed that their claim for a recognition of their independence and the question of mandates were not matters which concerned His Majesty's Government alone, but must be decided by the Conference. It was impossible to say when or in what manner, however, the question of the Caucasus was likely to be discussed by the Conference.

3. In reply to an enquiry as to their relations with the rest of Russia, M. Toptchibaschef stated that they did not expect a stable Government to be established in Russia for some time, but that they were prepared to await the march of events, and in the meanwhile hoped that the four separate

¹ An Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and member of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference.

Governments in the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan) might form some kind of confederation on the lines of that formed in 1917 and destroyed by the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus.

4. In the course of further conversation the delegates emphasised their intention of dealing fairly with any racial minorities which might be left within the boundaries of their future State, and pointed out in this connection that, when they left Azerbaijan, the Armenians were represented in the Azerbaijan Government by three Ministers and twenty members of the Assembly.

5. In conclusion, M. Toptchibaschef paid a special tribute to General Thomson² and the British military authorities, with whom the Azerbaijan Government had excellent relations, and from whom they had received advice and assistance. M. Toptchibaschef said that they had heard rumours of the departure of General Thomson and the withdrawal of the British troops, both of which possibilities they viewed with great misgivings.

6. The delegation intend shortly to visit London and to call at the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.,

(For Mr. Balfour)

LOUIS MALLET

² General in command of British forces in the Caucasus until May 1919.

No. 229

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 5)

No. 896 [84449/11067/58]

PARIS, June 4, 1919

Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copy of the undermentioned paper.

Name and Date.

Subject.

To Italian Delegation. May 26th.

British evacuation of Georgia.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 229

The British Delegation at the Peace Conference to the Italian Delegation

PARIS, May 26, 1919

1. The Secretary to the British Delegation to the Peace Conference presents his compliments to the Secretary to the Italian Delegation to the Peace Conference and begs to refer to the decision taken at the meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles on April 9th that Italian troops should replace the British troops now maintaining order in the Trans-Caucasian countries.¹

¹ For the background to this decision, cf. the records of the Council of Four printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. v, pp. 4 and 467-8.

2. In accordance with this decision arrangements have been made to withdraw the British crews from the war vessels on the Caspian and to evacuate the British troops from the Caucasus. The withdrawal of the Naval personnel must precede the evacuation of Baku and as the latter, according to present arrangements, is to commence on June 15th, dispositions for the disposal of the Caspian fleet must be taken at the earliest possible date.

3. In these circumstances Lord Hardinge would be most grateful to be furnished, at Monsieur de Martino's earliest convenience, with precise information as to the plans of the Italian Government and in particular as to the date upon which the Italian authorities will be able to take over the units of the Caspian fleet now manned by British crews.

No. 230

Mr. Hoare¹ (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received May 28)

No. 347 Telegraphic [80620/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, May 27, 1919

General Grogan's B[rigade]² arrived yesterday and formal reception took place this morning. General was met on quay by Governor General and General Officer Commanding Russian troops. After inspection of guard of honour representatives of municipality, Zemstvo and other public bodies were presented under specially constructed arch and after offering bread and salt made short speeches of welcome to which General made suitable reply. Two Battalions then marched past.

All arrangements were made by Russian authorities who did not invite Allied troops to take part, wishing ceremony to be purely Anglo-Russian.

Population displayed considerable enthusiasm.

¹ Mr. R. H. Hoare was Chargé d'Affaires at the head of the British Diplomatic Mission at Archangel in succession to Mr. Lindley.

² General Grogan was in command of a contingent of British volunteers for the North Russian front.

No. 231

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the
Place des États-Unis, Paris*

C.F. 35 A¹ [Secret/General/162]

Tuesday, May 27, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Secretary: Sir M. Hankey.

1. *The Polish-Ukrainian Armistice*. MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that General Botha had come to him that morning and had indicated that he was very

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, pp. 60-2.

dissatisfied with the attitude of the Poles in regard to the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice. He had asked M. Clemenceau to discuss this alone with President Wilson and himself because, to speak quite frankly, he had some reasons to believe that M. Clemenceau was not fully informed as to the attitude taken by the French authorities. He had grounds for the belief that the French Minister in Warsaw had encouraged the Poles in their recent attack on the Ukrainians. A fact which rather confirmed these suspicions was that General Botha reported that he had been unable to secure the attendance of the French representatives at meetings of the Armistice Commission, and this had occurred so frequently that it was difficult to believe that it was not deliberate. Then he quoted General Haller's highly indiscreet speeches, indicating among other things, that Danzig must become Polish. Further, he said that he had that morning received a report to the effect that General Franchet d'Esperey² on the 20th May had ordered forces up towards Czernovitz with a view to junction with the Poles, which seemed to indicate an attempt to squeeze out the Ukrainians. Finally, he thought it very curious that the Council had been informed that M. Paderewski was returning to Paris last Friday³ and they had been put off from day to day and almost from hour to hour with reports that he was expected immediately, whereas in fact he was now in Prague. He was anxious that M. Clemenceau should ascertain whether the agreed telegram had ever been despatched to General Haller.⁴ It was very curious that no reply had been received.

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled the old plan of the so-called sanitary cordon which the Military Authorities had proposed to establish against the Bolsheviks, and which had been rejected. He thought it possible that the Military Authorities were, nevertheless, trying to carry out this plan in fact.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed incredulity, but promised to make the fullest possible enquiry.

(It was agreed—

- (1) That Colonel Kisch should attend at the Ministry of War at 2.30 in the afternoon where General Albi and General Mordacq⁵ would also be present.
- (2) That the attached telegram, drafted by President Wilson, the despatch of which had been reserved pending M. Paderewski's

² French General in command of the Allied Army of the Orient in Eastern Europe.

³ May 23, 1919.

⁴ On May 21, 1919, the Council of Four had agreed that M. Clemenceau should send to General Pilsudski a telegram, to be repeated to the French liaison officer with General Haller for the latter's information, asking for information concerning reports that troops of General Haller's army had recently participated in operations against Ukrainian forces in disregard of previous undertakings given by General Haller not to engage in such operations. The text of this telegram is printed *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 783.

⁵ General Albi was Chief of French Army Headquarters Staff. General Mordacq was *chef de cabinet* to M. Clemenceau.

return, should be sent at once to Warsaw. Sir Maurice Hankey was directed to take the necessary action.)

*Villa Majestic, Paris,
May 27, 1919.*

APPENDIX TO NO. 231

*Telegram from the President of the Peace Conference to General Pilsudski,
Head of the Polish State, Warsaw*

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers feel that it is their duty to call the attention of the Government of Poland to facts which are giving them the greatest concern and which may lead to consequences for Poland which the Council would deeply deplore. The boundary between Poland and the Ukraine is under consideration and is as yet undetermined, and the Council has more than once informed the Polish Government that they would regard any attempt either by Poland or by the Ukrainian authorities to determine it, or to prejudice its determination, by the use of force, as a violation of the whole spirit and an arbitrary interference with the whole purpose of the present Conference of Peace, to which Poland, at least, has consented to leave the decision of questions of this very sort. The Council has, therefore, more than once insisted that there should be an armistice on the Ukrainian front, arranged in Paris and under the advice of the Council itself. Full conferences in that matter have been held between a carefully selected Inter-Allied commission and representatives of Poland and the Ukraine, and terms of armistice drawn up which have been formally approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The representatives of the Ukraine have accepted those terms, but the Polish military authorities, while acquiescing in principle, have in effect insisted upon such conditions as would amount to a settlement of the very questions in controversy, and have continued to use force to maintain their claims. This has inevitably made the impression on the minds of the members of the Council that the Polish authorities were in effect, if not in purpose, denying and rejecting the authority of the Conference of Peace. The Council feel it their duty, therefore, in the most friendly spirit but with the most solemn earnestness, to say to the Polish authorities that, if they are not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters, the Governments represented in the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments will not be justified in furnishing Poland any longer with supplies or assistance. If it is her deliberate purpose to set at naught the counsel proffered by the Conference, its authority can no longer, it is feared, be made serviceable to her. The Council will, of course, insist upon an absolute cessation of hostilities on the part of the Ukrainian military forces.

Paris, May . . . ,⁶ 1919.

⁶ Omission in original.

*Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the
Place des États-Unis, Paris*

C.F. 36 A¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Tuesday, May 27, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George, Lieutenant-Colonel Kisch.

France: M. Clemenceau, General Mordacq.

Secretary: Sir M. Hankey.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

I. *The Polish-Ukrainian Armistice*. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had made a very full investigation in regard to the various points raised by Mr. Lloyd George at the morning meeting. The first point related to the dispatch to General Pilsudski.

GENERAL MORDACQ said that on the 22nd May, M. Clemenceau had given him the dispatch, which he had sent to the Head of the French Mission at Warsaw, with instructions that it was to be given both to General Pilsudski and to General Haller, and that he was to telegraph when he had done this. On the 23rd May, the Head of the French Mission had replied, asking for the dispatch to be repeated. This had been done and an acknowledgement had been asked for. No reply was received on Saturday and so a telegram had been sent asking whether the dispatch had been received. The reply had been that the dispatch could not be deciphered and it turned out that the wrong key had been used for deciphering. The right key to the cipher had then been communicated. On Sunday no reply was received, and a telegram was sent to ask whether the message had been received, deciphered and understood. It was only on Monday, the 26th, that a telegram had been received to say that the dispatch had been deciphered and understood, and the necessary action taken.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had a telegram which showed that General Henrys² said that General Haller had now done the right thing and sent his troops to the German front. He was not satisfied, however, about the treatment of the dispatch.

COLONEL KISCH said that General Henrys said that General Haller's troops had first been sent to the North of Lemberg but now they had been brought back to the German front.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Lloyd George's story that the French Minister had supported the employment of General Haller's Army on the Ukrainian front probably had its foundation in the fact that the French Minister presided at a Committee, one of the recommendations of which by a large majority was that the Allied and Associated Powers should not make

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, pp. 69-70.

² Chief of the French Military Mission in Poland.

a reservation about the employment of General Haller's Divisions. General Henrys had said that M. Dmowski³ wanted the whole matter transferred to Marshal Foch, and this probably was the foundation of the idea that the French were supporting the action of the Poles. Rightly or wrongly the Poles believed that they had the support of Marshal Foch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that Marshal Foch had wanted to send General Haller's Army to Poland through Lemberg. He said he was perfectly satisfied now that the matter was in M. Clemenceau's own hands.

Villa Majestic, Paris,

May 27, 1919.

³ President of the Polish National Committee and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

No. 233

*Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House,
Place des États-Unis, Paris*

C.F. 37¹ [Secret/General/162]

Tuesday, May 27, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson, Hon. R. Lansing; Secretary, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour; *Secretary-General*, Sir M. Hankey; *Secretary*, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; *Secretaries*, M. de Béarn, Capt. de St. Quentin.

Italy: M. Orlando, Baron Sonnino; *Secretary-General*, Count Aldrovandi; *Secretary*, M. Bertelé.

Japan: Baron Makino, Viscount Chinda; *Secretary*, M. Kawai.²

...^{2,3} *Russia. The Despatch to Admiral Koltchak.* It was pointed out that the question of Bessarabia had been omitted from the despatch to Admiral Koltchak, and that this would probably cause difficulties with Roumania, when the despatch was eventually published.

(After some discussion, the following addition to the despatch was approved:—

'Sixthly, the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Roumanian part of Bessarabia be recognised.'

The original Article 'Sixthly' to be renumbered 'Seventhly'.)

A copy of the complete despatch is attached in the Appendix. . . .³

Villa Majestic, Paris,

May 27, 1919.

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 71 f.

² There were also present a number of advisers, members of the Joint Secretariat, and Professor Mantoux as interpreter.

³ The remainder of these minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

(M. 190. Final Revise.)

Despatch to Admiral Koltchak

PARIS, May 26, 1919

The Allied and Associated Powers feel that the time has come when it is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they propose to pursue in regard to Russia.

It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Their original intervention was made for the sole purpose of assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from German rule, and in order to rescue the Czecho-Slovaks from the danger of annihilation at the hands of the Bolshevik forces. Since the signature of the Armistice on the 11th November, 1918, they have kept forces in various parts of Russia. Munitions and supplies have been sent to assist those associated with them at a very considerable cost. No sooner, however, did the Peace Conference assemble than they endeavoured to bring peace and order to Russia by inviting representatives of all the warring Governments within Russia to meet them in the hope that they might be able to arrange a permanent solution of Russian problems. This proposal and a later offer to relieve the distress among the suffering millions of Russia broke down through the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept the fundamental condition of suspending hostilities while negotiations or the work of relief was proceeding. Some of the Allied and Associated Governments are now being pressed to withdraw their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia on the ground that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early settlement. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it will really help the Russian people to liberty, self-government, and peace.

The Allied and Associated Governments now wish to declare formally that the object of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs through the instrumentality of a freely elected Constituent Assembly and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian state and its relations with its neighbours through the peaceful arbitration of the League of Nations.

They are convinced by their experiences of the last twelve months that it is not possible to attain these ends by dealing with the Soviet Government of Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the government of all Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same objects in view as that of the Allied and Associated Powers. With this object they would ask Admiral Koltchak and his Associates whether they will agree to the following as the conditions upon which they accept continued assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the first place, that, as soon as they reach Moscow they will summon a

Constituent Assembly elected by a free, secret and democratic franchise as the Supreme Legislature for Russia to which the Government of Russia must be responsible, or if at that time order is not sufficiently restored they will summon the Constituent Assembly elected in 1917 to sit until such time as new elections are possible.

Secondly, that throughout the areas which they at present control they will permit free elections in the normal course for all local and legally constituted assemblies such as municipalities, Zemstvos, &c.

Thirdly, that they will countenance no attempt to revive the special privileges of any class or order in Russia. The Allied and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction the solemn declaration made by Admiral Koltchak and his associates that they have no intention of restoring the former land system. They feel that the principles to be followed in the solution of this and other internal questions must be left to the free decision of the Russian Constituent Assembly; but they wish to be assured that those whom they are prepared to assist stand for the civil and religious liberty of all Russian citizens and will make no attempt to reintroduce the régime which the revolution has destroyed.

Fourthly, that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognised, and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations.

Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between their *de facto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.

Sixthly, the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Roumanian part of Bessarabia, be recognised.

Seventhly, that as soon as a Government for Russia has been constituted on a democratic basis, Russia should join the League of Nations and co-operate with the other members in the limitation of armaments and of military organisation throughout the world.

Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on the 27th November, 1918, in regard to Russia's national debts.

The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates are prepared to accept these conditions, and also whether in the event of acceptance they will undertake to form a single government and army command as soon as the military situation makes it possible.

G. CLEMENCEAU
D. LLOYD GEORGE
V. E. ORLANDO
WOODROW WILSON
SAIONJI

No. 234

*Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House,
Place des États-Unis, Paris*

C.F. 37 B¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Wednesday, May 28, 1919, at 11.45 a.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Secretary: Sir M. Hankey.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

. . . 4.² *Polish-Ukrainian Armistice*. M. CLEMENCEAU reported that, as agreed to on the previous day, he had instructed the French Diplomatic Representative at Warsaw that he was to let the Polish Government know that the four Principal Allied and Associated Powers were unanimous in stopping the advance of the Poles against the Ukrainians, and that they were not supported by the French Government any more than by any other Government. He said he had bad news from that front. He then read a despatch from Bucharest, according to which the Polish offensive had been pushed as far as Stryj, the objective being Stanislau. The Roumanians were pushing north with the same objective. A desperate resistance must be expected on the part of the Ukrainians. If Poland was to receive Galicia, it would be a great scandal and due to the British and French munitions that had been sent there.

(It was agreed that M. Paderewski should be seen at once on the subject. Captain Harmsworth was sent in a motor-car to try and bring him before the end of the meeting. Captain Harmsworth, however, had not returned by 1 P.M., when the meeting was adjourned.) . . .²

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 82 f.

² The remainder of these minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

No. 235

*Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the
Place des États-Unis, Paris*

C.F. 42¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Friday, May 30, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Orlando.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey and Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 115 f.

... 8.² *The Polish-Ukrainian Armistice. General Haller's Position.* With reference to C.F. 41, Minute 8,³ MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked leave to refer to the despatches from Poland handed round by M. Clemenceau on the 29th May. (Appendix V.)

The point to which he wished to call attention was the statement that General Haller had said he had no recollection of any promise made by him to anyone not to use his Army against the Ukrainians. This raised the question as to whether Marshal Foch had ever carried out his instructions to notify General Haller that he was not to do so. He recalled that Marshal Foch had, at one time, been exceedingly desirous of sending General Haller's Army to Lemberg.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to make full enquiry into the matter.

PRESIDENT WILSON read a report from a United States Officer, a Lieutenant Foster, who had visited Sambor and Stanislaw, and reported that in the districts he had visited, the peasants, who were Ukrainians by nationality, had returned to the land and showed no antipathy to the Poles; the Poles had behaved with great tact and judgment, and had released all their prisoners; the Ukrainian Government, according to this report, had proved most unsatisfactory—had been unable to keep order and had made many requisitions mainly at the expense of the Polish population. The Ukrainian transport had been disorganised and the currency system hopeless. The Ukrainian troops had perpetrated many outrages on the Poles, and this Officer marvelled at the restraint shown by the Polish troops. In his view, the Ukrainians were not capable of self-government, but he qualified his report by stating that he had only visited a limited part of the country, and this only applied to what he himself had seen. . . .²

APPENDIX V TO No. 235

Translation of Despatches from the French Minister at Warsaw

(Circulated at the request of M. Clemenceau)

Document 1

Telegram No. 97, dated Warsaw, May 27, 1919, 19.18.—Received May 28, 1919, 11 hours

I hastened immediately on its receipt to transmit to General Pilsudski Telegram No. 68 which Your Excellency had sent me on the subject of the employment of Haller's Army in Galicia.

On learning the contents of this document the Head of the Polish State immediately stated that he had never heard of the engagement taken by the

² The remainder of these minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

³ Not printed. This minute in the record of a meeting of the Supreme Council held on May 29 at 11 a.m. stated only that 'M. Clemenceau handed to Sir Maurice Hankey, for translation and circulation, two despatches from the French Minister at Warsaw, in regard to General Haller's Army'.

Head of the late Polish Army in France to which the Supreme Inter-Allied Council referred. On the afternoon of the same day Mr. Udderewski [Paderewski] made to me a similar statement. Thereupon the Head of the Polish State decided to make enquiries from General Haller.

The following reply was given to me yesterday evening by General Pilsudski for transmission to the President of the Peace Conference:—

'From General Pilsudski to M. Clemenceau

'On the 11th May at the time of Mr. Paderewski's return from Paris, a part of Haller's troops were grouped close to our frontier in the vicinity of Belz. Having been informed by Mr. Paderewski of the reservations which one of the Powers of the Entente had insisted upon in regard to the said troops, I at once ordered a fresh regrouping in order to avoid the possibility of a conflict between Haller's troops and the Ukrainians. As a result, one part of Haller's troops was transferred to Volhynia in the direction of the Bolshevik Front, and another part was withdrawn from the Front and placed in reserve with a view to its transfer to the Western Front. I would particularly draw attention to the fact that these movements were extremely difficult to carry out quickly, and called for great efforts both on the part of the troops and on the part of the Commanders.'

PRALON

Document 2

*Telegram No. 98, dated Warsaw, May 27, 1919, 23 hours 40.—Received
May 28, 1919, 8 hours 15*

(Continuation of telegram No. 97)

It will not escape the notice of Your Excellency that in his telegram the Head of the Polish State only mentions the provisions which he has made in order to conform, as far as the situation permits, with the promise made in Paris by Mr. Paderewski to President Wilson, and to comply with the wishes directly expressed by the British Government in the stipulations which were reported to the Department in my telegram No. 60.

On the other hand, General Pilsudski refrains from making any mention of General Haller and of the precise engagements which the latter may have taken.

Now I have been able to learn that the Head of the Polish State sent one of his aide-de-camps to General Haller and that the latter plainly stated that he had no recollection of any promise made by him to any one on the lines indicated by the Supreme Inter-Allied Council.

General Pilsudski decided to give the reply above quoted in order to avoid transmitting General Haller's flat contradiction to the Supreme Council.

PRALON

Document 3

*Telegram No. 99, dated Warsaw, May 27, 1919, 23.43.—Received
May 28, 1919, 9 hours*

(Continuation of telegram 98)

Furthermore I would add for the information of your Excellency that the sequence of events appears to have been as follows:—

The original position of Haller's Divisions was along the portion of the Volhynia front opposite to the fortress of Lustk and extended beyond this on Galician territory opposite Rawa-Ruska north-west of Lemberg.

On Mr. Paderewski's return, Col. Haller, the chief of the Polish General Staff, reported that the Grey Divisions of Iwaskiswiewicz were alone advancing in Galicia in the sector south-west of Lemberg. But as a matter of fact Haller's Divisions in front of Rawa-Ruska also took part in this movement. It was only later that Haller's second Division left its position north of Lemberg in order to take up a position along the Silesian frontier in front of Czentochau; and it was only yesterday that the Polish General Staff reported that Haller's 1st Division had left this sector of Volhynia in order to take up a position on the right of the 2nd Division on the Silesia front.

PRALON

No. 236

*Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received June 2)
No. 87 Telegraphic [82871/82871/38]*

LIBAU, June 1, 1919

On May 23 Herr Zommerle [Zimmerle], Civil Governor of Lithuania, left for Berlin with an Esthonian engineer named Covert who is a Bolshevik Commissary and had recently reached Kovno from Moscow. From well informed sources I learn Germans are still negotiating with Bolsheviks because they do not expect Koltchak will reach Moscow this year and they hope by agreement with Bolsheviks to safeguard their left flank in case of hostilities with Poland.

No. 237

*Mr. Stevens¹ (Batoum) to Sir R. Graham (Received June 23)
No. 24 [92815/11067/58]*

BATOUM, June 2, 1919

Sir,

At the risk of repeating one or two of the statements I made in previous correspondence on this subject, I consider it my duty before the false step connected with the withdrawal of our troops from this country actually takes

¹ H.M. Consul at Batoum.

place, to again dwell with some stress on the immense political importance which the great bulk of the population of the Caucasus attaches to our remaining and continuing to perform the duties we have been engaged in during the past six months.

It is maintained that national and party divisions are still prevalent in the Caucasus and have not been operating to advantage and for the public good since the outbreak of the revolution if judged impartially and from what is taking place in most localities of the recently formed Republics. This is a statement which I believe admits little dispute.

Again for the past year the laws and institutions of the Trans-Caucasian Republics, as they are applied by their Central and Local Governments, have been very much of a failure. This is also generally admitted.

Furthermore diversity of opinion upon almost all principles of politics have drawn a strong line of separation between parties and nationalities.

The present restraints upon trade, traffic and other conditions which the Governments of the Republics seem bent on maintaining, tend to place obstacles in the way of progress and reform and should therefore be modified or completely discontinued.

Administrative and fiscal reforms should occupy more serious consideration and should receive more prominent places in the programme of the Republican governments, than they have hitherto done.

The taxation imposed on the exportation and importation of goods lies as a regular burden on trade and as long as this sort of policy endures it obviously remains a menace to the development of commercial relations with the outside world.

Railway rates must be reduced. They are far too excessive at present and out of all proportion to the distances run and over which goods have to be transported.

Independent taxation by the various Republics does not present itself as a working problem. A uniform fiscal system must be devised. The States taken singly are far too small for separate taxation.

The resources of the Trans-Caucasus are great and their development offers possibilities of the utmost importance provided they are judiciously handled. I can here safely say it is difficult to find another part of the world which possesses so much latent wealth as this country does and in the hands of a sound State could be rendered one of the most prosperous and happy corners of the universe. It is felt by all that Great Britain alone can achieve this end and reinstate the political and economic equilibriums which at present are so shaken.

I feel sure that all traders of British nationality who have visited the Trans-Caucasus recently and have had an opportunity of observing the situation will fully agree that the economic conditions obtaining may well excite great anxiety and apprehension² and as I have already said a fatal blunder will be made if we relinquish our hold of the country at this stage.

² Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe, British High Commissioner at Constantinople, had reported to Lord Curzon in a dispatch of May 27, 1919 (received June 7), the views of a prominent

A point of interest in the question of the withdrawal of our troops from the Trans-Caucasus at the critical period of its history we have reached, is that our departure is calculated to be misconstrued by Eastern people and especially by Moslem society all round us who strongly lean towards a policy of British orientation, and by being interpreted into weakness and incapacity to continue with the task we undertook at the end of last year to restore order, a heavy and probably irreparable blow will be dealt at our prestige. Nothing will dissuade the people that we are not accountable for the unsatisfactory and dangerous state in which the country is being handed over to another power and strenuous efforts should be made to avoid the consequences of such misinterpretation. To abandon at the present juncture, in favour of another power, a country with a people willing to respect equitable laws and to enter upon an era of complete tranquillity if only allowed to by a mere handful of adventurers, a country that possesses unlimited fertile soils, varied climates, mineral resources, natural facilities for the development of great industries and vast commerce, at a moment when it most needs nursing by giving it sound advice, prudent handling, judicious institutions and the introduction of other pressing reforms, is universally regarded as a mistake which undoubtedly will produce consequences to the peace and resources of the Trans-Caucasus.

As an instance in support of the statement made in the last paragraph of this despatch, I am compelled to draw attention to the movements, during the last few days, of the Volunteer Army along the Western shore of the Caspian Sea and the reported occupation of Baku by troops belonging to it.³ These movements indicate that in no circumstances are Denikin and his followers prepared to suffer the presence of other than our forces at that important point and serve as a prelude to a series of events which forebode naught else but evil results in the immediate future for this country should the contemplated withdrawal take place.

I have, etc.,
P. STEVENS

British representative of a private firm, just arrived in Constantinople from Batoum. Admiral Calthorpe stated: 'He makes the strongest representations imaginable on the question of replacement in the Caucasus of the British troops by Italians. He says that the situation was most unsatisfactory at first, but during the last month or six weeks an immense improvement has set in. Without dwelling on his statements as regards political and military conditions or question of relief, which he states is very grave in the Northern part of Trans-Caucasia, he affirms that the loss to British Commerce due to the withdrawal of British troops will be immense. . . . These considerations are in my opinion very weighty, and as so much depends in the future on our foreign commerce, I venture to call Your Lordship's serious attention to them.'

³ This report proved to be incorrect. It was considered in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office that it was 'probably merely an exaggerated account of Denikin's recent push to Derbent'.

Colonel Robertson¹ (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 9)
No. 511 Telegraphic [86390/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 3, 1919

Following from Mr. Hodgson² (? at) Omsk.

General situation is not satisfactory. A month ago extraordinarily rapid advance³ along whole of front brought armies to Glazov. General Hangin [? Khanzhin] commanding Western Army had however overreached himself and allowed his forces to get out of touch with its reserves. They were unable to withstand attack of heavily reinforced Red Army. Situation was aggravated by treachery of a Ukrainian regiment going over to the enemy after murdering its officers. Retreat along its whole front has (? brought) Western Army beyond very strong natural defensive line, gorge by river Ik and in close proximity to Ufa. (? Orenburg) is again in red hands. Moral of newly formed and hastily trained troops has not withstood the strain put upon it: even [Kap]pels Corps in which with its British training complete confidence was placed became infected and eight companies went over to enemy: desertions became so frequent that it has been necessary to issue special Army order condemning them.

Siberian Army under General Gaida has maintained its position and is slightly advancing. It is hoped that (? Conqutka, *sic*) and (? Kotfus, *sic* [? Kotlas]) will shortly be freed and route to Northern ports opened.

Latest news from Western Army is better, trouble is . . .⁴ though rot has now been stopped. Bad military situation would be only of momentary import (? so long as) position in rear were sound. It is not. Government in order to maintain it must be able to give population better (? conditions of existence) than those obtaining in territory under Bolshevik rule. It can do this (? neither from individual) nor from economical point of view. At present official and bourgeois classes alone have (? reason) to be grateful for overthrow of Bolsheviks: peasants are without clothing or essential supplies; many of them have money but can do nothing with it. Working class which is only (? numerous) in Urals finds cost of living continually rising with no hope of material conditions of life improving. Both classes wherever they have had experience of desolating effects of Bolshevism welcomed arrival of liberating Siberian Army; they expected much from them and have got nothing (? hope) . . .⁴ destroyed gives place to mistrust and apathy. Horses of peasantry are requisitioned (? just) when they are wanted for ploughing,

¹ Deputy to Sir C. Eliot; Colonel Robertson was temporarily stationed at Vladivostok.

² British Consul at Vladivostok then employed on special service at Omsk.

³ By the forces of Admiral Kolchak. These forces were at that time grouped in three armies: the Siberian Army under the Czechoslovak General Gaida on the northern sector of the front; the Western Army in the centre under General Khanzhin; and the Southern Army commanded by General Belov.

⁴ The text here is uncertain.

young men are taken from fields and factories at a time when their labour is indispensable; leather even in big centres hardly exists, in country districts there is not even machinery for dispensing it.

And present Government has no means of bettering situation for neither has it capable men at its disposal for inaugurating internal reforms nor owing to complete breakdown of transport can it procure material necessities which by improving (? economic) conditions would reconcile population to new regime. Ministers are men of small outlook and not (? good), unsuited for dealing with fundamental problems involved in reconstruction of the country. Higher officials are either of old bureaucratic school or else without experience. Fabric rests wholly upon personality of Koltchak. It is upon his (? ability) to hold together various elements which support him that success depends. Obviously with weakness all round him uninterrupted and rapid success in field is essential for (? serious) failure might jeopardize very existence of his administration.

Under these conditions open and avowed support of Koltchak by Allied powers is a matter of vital and immediate necessity. Lack of support now is liable to cause sharp anti-Omsk revulsion and throw country into hands of military group of reactionary tendencies susceptible to German influence.

No. 239

Note by Sir E. Howard of a Conversation in Paris with Count Kokovtsoff and Prince Troubetskoi¹

[598/2/1/11645]

PARIS, June 3, 1919

I met last night at dinner Count Kokovtsoff and Prince Troubetskoi.² They said that Admiral Koltchak's reply to the communication respecting recognition of his Government had now been received in Paris and that while agreeing to the first conditions respecting security for Liberal Government in Russia, he said he must defer replying to the latter conditions respecting securities for nationalities. Count Kokovtsoff stated that the note to Admiral Koltchak was in effect a contradiction in terms. In the first place it asked him to call a Constituent and then secondly to bind the Russian Government on matters of vital importance such as the nationalities with regard to which the Constituent alone could decide. I said I could not agree with this point of view. Admiral Koltchak's assurances could not of course be considered as binding the Constituent but his own Government alone. Only as it was impossible to say when a Constituent could be assembled, the Allied Powers

¹ This note was submitted to Lord Hardinge.

² Count Kokovtsoff was a former Russian Minister of Finance and (1911-14) Prime Minister. He and the Russian Prince N. Troubetskoi were both at that time resident in France.

had thought it necessary to ask for these assurances from Admiral Koltchak now for so long as a Government remained which was not based on a properly elected Constituent. Prince Troubetskoi argued that Admiral Koltchak would only be entitled to give such assurances once he had reached Moscow and was master of the great part of Russia. I replied that as it was a question of recognising Admiral Koltchak's Government now it did not matter whether it was situated at Omsk or at Moscow.

The gist of all this is that the Russian parties of the right represented here by Messrs. Kokovtsoff and Troubetskoi will evidently do all in their power to prevent Admiral Koltchak from giving any assurances respecting the nationalities. But M. Maklakoff³ seems much less intransigent in this respect. Count Kokovtsoff also spoke to my wife with considerable bitterness about his own personal treatment. He said that although during the ten years when he was Minister in Russia he had always supported the Entente and refused up to the last in 1918 to be drawn into the German camp, no person in authority had cared to see him or hear his views since he had come to Paris.

I venture to think this is unfortunate. It may not be always agreeable to listen to the complaints of the *émigrés*, but I understand their feeling hurt by being shown the cold shoulder now that they are down in spite of the fact that they were loyal adherents of the Entente when in office. We may entirely disagree with their views as to how Russia is to be reconstituted, but I cannot help thinking that a little more personal sympathy would prevent them from becoming enemies and we shall want every friend we can get in Russia in the future.

Baron Leo Rosen of the Russian Embassy who dined with me last week told me that the Russian refugees from Odessa and the Crimea were one and all full of gratitude for what the British had done to help them and that also Russians coming from the Denikin front were full of praise of the British while there is a corresponding coolness towards the French since the Odessa *débâcle*.⁴

ESME HOWARD

³ Appointed Russian Ambassador in Paris by the Russian Provisional Government in 1917. M. Maklakoff had been relieved of his position by the Soviet Government and was at that time a member of the Russian Political Conference in Paris in the interest of the government of Admiral Kolchak.

⁴ Early in April 1919 the Allied forces (which included no British contingent) stationed at Odessa under French command had effected a withdrawal in the face of the advance of the Red Army against that city.

*Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the
Place des États-Unis, Paris*

C.F. 44¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Tuesday, June 3, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Orlando.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey and Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

... 4.² *Russia*. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had received information that Koltchak had received a bad reverse.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Koltchak had made a speech that went far to meet the demands of the Council. He had given instructions for a despatch to be circulated to his colleagues to the effect that Koltchak's reply would be received in a few days. He heard that M. Sazonoff³ was strongly opposed to the memorandum that had been telegraphed to Koltchak.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had heard of this, and as he understood M. Sazonoff was likely to advise Koltchak not to send a favourable reply, he had asked Mr. Churchill to telegraph to General Knox⁴ to urge Koltchak not to listen to Sazonoff.

5. *The Polish-Ukrainian Armistice*. PRESIDENT WILSON read a telegram from the French Minister at Warsaw, dated the 31st May, from General Pilsudski. (Appendix I.)

(It was agreed that this was thoroughly satisfactory.) . . .²

APPENDIX I TO NO. 240

Telegram to M. Pichon⁵ from the French Minister at Warsaw

(Translation.)

WARSAW, May 31, 1919

I handed to General Pilsudski the telegram which the President of the Peace Conference meant to be given to him.⁶ As directed by Your Excellency, I made every effort to indicate to the Head of the State that my action was taken in virtue of a decision arrived at in perfect agreement by all the Allied Governments. The Chief of the Polish Armies replied that in regard to the

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 147 f.

² The remainder of these minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

³ M. Sazonov, then in Paris, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of Admiral Kolchak.

⁴ Chief of the British Military Mission in Siberia.

⁵ French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

⁶ See appendix to No. 231.

military measures suggested by this telegram, he was quite disposed to cease hostilities which were already in fact suspended.

'My only military objective,' said General Pilsudski, 'was to effect a junction with Roumania which is all the more necessary at the present moment in that the attitude of Germany might cause me to fear being suddenly cut off from communication with the Allies; the contact of the Polish troops with the Roumanian Army having freed me from this threat, I gave the order to withdraw from the Volhynia-Galicia front, not only Haller's divisions but also other regiments, so as to constitute reserves which may be utilised on the western Polish front.' When I pointed out to the Head of the State that the decisions of which he had informed me, and the execution of which was confirmed by General Spire, were not in harmony with the order of the day of General Haller, published that very morning in the newspapers, and concluding with the expression 'forward,' the Head of the State replied: 'I was as much surprised as you at such language, and I have recalled this too talkative General, who shall not return, either to Eastern Galicia, or to Volhynia.'

Coming next to the observations contained in M. Clemenceau's telegram concerning the foreign policy of Poland, the Head of the State promised me to do immediately what was prescribed by the Polish Constitution in such cases, that is to say, to submit the suggestions of the Entente to the examination of . . .⁷ of the Diet, of the Ministers and of the (Parliamentary) Commission for (Foreign Affairs) in order that counsel might be taken (which) would be at once transmitted to M. Paderewski, the responsible Head of the Government, and the only person qualified to take a decision in the last resort. After these declarations, General Pilsudski continued the conversation and confirmed the attitude which I have previously reported, by laying great stress on the fact that he had never been personally a partisan of the policy advocated by the Diet, acting under pressure of the very influential politicians of the Right. In conclusion General Pilsudski expressed the firm hope that the present German menace would be a means of momentarily bringing the National Democrats to reason; he promised me that he would in any case do his utmost to bring this about. At my request the General is to give me to-night his reply to M. Clemenceau on the question of the suspension of hostilities.

PRALON

⁷ The text here is uncertain.

No. 241

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby¹ (Paris)

No. 891 Telegraphic [76591/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 3, 1919*

Please request Colonel Cartier of the Eiffel Tower to transmit the following message to Tsarkoieselo,² begins:—

M. Tchitcherin, Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Moscow. With reference

¹ H.M. Ambassador in Paris.

² Soviet wireless station.

to paragraph 3 of the reply of His Majesty's Government as forwarded to you by my radio of May 7, I have not yet received any reply from you, except statement in your radio of the 15th³ that the question is very intricate.

His Majesty's Government wish to secure as soon as possible the release of remaining naval, military and civilian prisoners in the hands of the Russian Soviet Government, as well as permission for all British subjects, male and female, detained in Russia, who wish to do so, to return to England. They are ready in exchange to release persons detained by His Majesty's Government whom Soviet Government are anxious to see released, but they can make no definite suggestion until you telegraph names and whereabouts of such persons. Please telegraph these and make a proposal for exchange as soon as possible.

³ Not printed. The two wireless messages under reference related primarily to arrangements for a limited exchange of prisoners whereby M. Raskolnikov, Soviet Naval Commissar, and another Soviet prisoner in British hands were on May 26 repatriated in exchange for Major Goldsmith, head of a British Mission formerly in the Caucasus, and certain other British prisoners in Soviet hands. H.M. Government had further raised the question of a general exchange of prisoners and had received the answer from M. Chicherin here indicated.

No. 242

Mr. Bosanquet (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received June 4)

No. 75 Telegraphic [84109/70514/38]

REVAL, June 3, 1919

There appears to be danger of anti-Jewish pogroms if Petrograd is recaptured.

I think any new Government formed should be reminded of this possibility with a view to taking preventive measures.

No. 243

Mr. Bosanquet (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received June 5)

No. 79 Telegraphic [84727/67181/38]

REVAL, June 4, 1919

Following from General Sir H. Gough for C.I.G.S., begins. H.G. 1. June 4.

Have had conference with Prime Minister of Esthonia, also visited Headquarters of Northern Russian Corps. Following decisions arrived at: Northern Russian Corps to become independent of . . .¹ Esthonia and to be responsible for administration of country and (? military operations) east of Esthonian frontier under General Rodzianko's command. Neither Estho-

¹ The text here is uncertain.

nians nor Northern Russian Corps favour Udenich's presence on this side because of political reasons. Esthonia agree[s] to allowing use of Reval for landing supplies for Russians. Supplies for Russians therefore should be allocated to them direct. Small British Staff to receive and forward these stores also required early. Views of Russian Headquarters very opposed to any advance of Finns on Petrograd as it creates serious difficulties amongst their own troops and also will certainly encourage Bolshevik forces, naval and military, to offer strenuous resistance instead of surrender which is always possible to Russians. Russian Headquarters are anxious to advance on Petrograd and if they could arm all their available men are confident of success. Northern Russian Corps approximately 13,000 armed men but require another 12,000 stands of arms. Supplies for them are required for 25,000 troops and approximately for 400,000 inhabitants. Russian Headquarters also urge necessity of sending them Russian officers as well as . . .¹ civilians for administration and finance. The most urgent requirements after food and rifles are boots, motors, lorries, petrol and tyres and a dozen tanks. Reports from Esthonian southern front indicates that German and Baltic Landwehr troops are advancing northwards and north-eastwards from Riga and conflict is probable. Germans have ordered Esthonian advance to stop and are preventing establishment of Lettish Civil Government in Northern Latvia. Esthonians will not submit to German orders. As previously pointed out presence of Germans is a serious menace to all and I again urge that they should be ordered to evacuate Latvia without delay. Orders from Allies to deal with present local situation near Riga are urgently required.

No. 244

Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received June 4)

No. 95 Telegraphic [84134/82871/38]

LIBAU, June 4, 1919

My telegram No. 87.¹

Intercepted Bolshevik message from Poniewecz dated May 16 contains order to revolutionary Soviet, Dvinsk, to place railway wagons at the disposal of German Mission travelling to Russia.

Translation following by post.

It would seem from recent events that it is Germany's policy to act in concert with Bolsheviks as long as latter remain in power but at the same time to support Balts and assist them to establish their hegemony in these provinces. It is chiefly through Balts that Germany hopes to establish her influence in Russia.

Repeated to Copenhagen.

¹ No. 236.

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 5)
No. 1015 Telegraphic [84851/67181/38]

PARIS, June 5, 1919

With reference to Mr. Bosanquet's telegram No. 67¹ I understand from Mr. Hoover² that since this was despatched 3,000 tons of foodstuffs have arrived at Reval. Mr. Hoover also informs me that vessels with 13,000 tons of foodstuffs will be arriving at Reval, Libau and Riga for orders or discharge within next ten days and there is no question in his mind as to adequacy of supplies being on the spot by this time. Mr. Hoover's representatives in Baltic States and at Helsingfors have been instructed to co-operate closely with General Gough and British Senior Naval Officer with regard to revictualling of population in recaptured areas. In event of reoccupation of Petrograd other vessels will be available for orders at Danzig and within next fifteen days there will be in Baltic some fifty-five thousand tons flour, which in case of necessity could be diverted from German ports to Petrograd.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of May 27 (received May 29) repeated previous urgent requests (cf. No. 226, note 1) for Allied supplies of food for the Russian Northern Corps and the population of areas occupied by it, stating that the 'question of food for reoccupied Russian districts is now most pressing and I have just received a deputation of inhabitants of villages in Jamburg district begging for food supplies to save population from starvation'.

² Chairman of the American Relief Administration, and of the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

No. 246

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)
No. 812 Telegraphic. By bag [79951/88/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 5, 1919

Your telegram No. 956¹ (of May 26th. Food supplies for North Russia).²

¹ Not printed.

² The position as regards Allied supplies of food to North Russia was set out in a note of May 16, 1919, addressed to General Miller, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government at Archangel, by Mr. Lindley shortly before his return from Archangel to London. This note stated in part:

'As you are aware, supplies of several kinds have, up to now, been furnished by the Allied Governments who have secured repayment by collecting the price from those Russian organisations who have actually delivered the commodities to the consumer. The programme was drawn up in such a way as to ensure to the population a ration of all necessities until the end of June of this year, a date calculated to coincide with the opening of navigation. That date is now approaching and it is regarding the new programme that I have the honour to address you.

'In the opinion of my Government it will be necessary to make the following two changes in the procedure hitherto followed: (1) The Allied Governments will supply flour only, leaving to the Provisional Government the duty of importing all other foodstuffs. (2) Payments will be made by the Provisional Government out of their foreign balances, instead of the Allies financing the whole operation subject to repayment in roubles on distribution.

'As regards 1, it is proposed at present to supply 4,375 English tons of flour monthly. I am

In memorandum accompanying my despatch No. 316¹ (of February 1st) request was made that 'a definite procedure should be laid down to cover requirements from April onwards in the case of Murmansk and from July onwards in the case of Archangel'.

I fail to understand suggestion that my despatch No. 2301³ (of April 16th) substantively disposes of the question. Shipment by S.S. *Seidrecht* of 3,200 tons merely covered requirements of Murmansk for approximately 3 months from April onwards, and did not touch provisioning of Archangel from opening of the port or provisioning of Murmansk after *Seidrecht* cargo had been exhausted.

Result is that no provision of any kind has been made to meet requirements of either Murmansk or Archangel after end of June.

Flour is now only requirement in question, but Mr. Lindley who has arrived in London from Archangel states this must be met at all costs, as only cereals available after July 15th at latest will be such part of 6,400 tons of seed barley which it has not been possible to sow. Were however whole 6,400 tons used as foodstuffs, it would only provide 2 months supply at the outside.

As regards Dr. Taylor's opinion (see your telegram under reply),⁴ Mr. not at present able to say whether this amount can be increased but any increase must depend on a number of considerations, including the power of the Provisional Government to find the necessary funds. In this connection it should be observed that on July 1st there will be sufficient stocks of sugar and tea left in the hands of the Allied Supply Committee to furnish the Northern Region with a ration of these commodities for the best part of twelve months subsequent to that date.

'As regards 2, I should be gratified if Your Excellency would lay the matter without delay before the Provisional Government and let me know in what way the latter propose to find the necessary funds.'

³ Not printed. In his telegram No. 956 Mr. Balfour had suggested that Lord Curzon's inquiries as to arrangements for food supplies to North Russia had been 'substantively answered by your despatch No. 2301, from which it is clear 3,200 tons of foodstuffs were shipped to Murmansk from the United States on April 4. Since that date 3,257 tons of seed barley have been sent from United States and further 3,150 tons are loading in American ports. If position is critical and if policy is, as I gather, only to meet emergency these 6,400 tons of seed could be used for human consumption.'

⁴ In his telegram No. 956 Mr. Balfour had further stated that at a meeting of the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council on May 21, 1919, 'Hoover put in following statement by Dr. Alonzo Taylor, formerly of United States War Trade Board, and intimated that he agreed with its conclusion: "The shipments of flour to Archangel and Murmansk suggested by the British Government will provide practically a normal bread ration for 350,000 people. The War Trade Board has fulfilled the obligation undertaken by the State Department and has neither funds nor legal authority to commit the United States Government to any further program. In my humble opinion there are food needs elsewhere in Europe as urgent as in this district that present a prior claim upon the limited funds of the American Relief Administration, even though it be assumed that the program outlined will only extend until the coming harvest and that after the withdrawal of the troops of the Allied nations, this region would be provisioned from the grain-bearing areas of Russia."' Dr. Taylor was further reported as having stated that consideration was being given to the possibility of applying for relief purposes American military stocks which might remain when American forces were withdrawn from Archangel. He had not been able to ascertain the extent of these stocks, and was asked to pursue the matter.

Lindley points out that Allies are in occupation of district in question and cannot safely or properly leave population to starve so long as this is the case. In short whole military situation depends now as it has done from first moment of occupation on population being supplied with food.

I should be glad if question could again be taken up by Food Section.

In the meantime in view of great urgency of question we are asking War Office whether they could make shipments out of W.O. stocks. This will however have to be at sole risk of His Majesty's Government though Russian Government have assured Mr. Lindley that they could pay for shipment out of foreign balances accruing on account of timber sales.

As regards final paragraph of your telegram,⁵ Treasury have authorised shipments which are being arranged by Ministry of Food in consultation with War Office.

Repeated to Archangel, No. 337.

⁵ Mr. Balfour there stated that he noticed that sugar, tea, and meat were being shipped to North Russia from the United Kingdom, and asked through what departments these supplies had been procured and what financial arrangements had been made regarding them.

No. 247

Extract from a Stenographic Report of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des États-Unis, Paris

C.F. 48¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Thursday, June 5, 1919, at 11.30 a.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Orlando.

M. Paderewski, Premier of Poland.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey and Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

Stenographer: C. J. Swan.

... M. PADEREWSKI:² Mr. President and Gentlemen, I call your attention to

¹ This document is published in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 191f.

² At the beginning of this meeting President Wilson had explained to M. Paderewski that the Council of Four was 'trying to go over the various counter-proposals and objections made in the German reply' concerning the draft of the peace treaty presented to the German Delegation. President Wilson continued: 'The main point, I take it, is not so much the slight redrawing of the boundary so as to leave as many Germans outside of Poland as possible, but the question of Upper Silesia. My own judgment is that, notwithstanding the fact that they admit that it has an overwhelming Polish population, the very great mineral rights of Silesia are of great concern to them. We have been considering a plebiscite under international supervision and under such rules as an international commission should set up, to get the German troops out and any German officials who might be inter-

the fact that the changes which you intend to introduce into the treaty might endanger the whole situation, not of my country alone, but of Eastern Europe. For the last few months Poland has been a stronghold of peace and order in the East. We have had no sign of revolution, no sign of Bolshevism, and if there is fighting, it is unfortunately fighting on the borders. It is not due to our people. It is due to the necessity of defending ourselves. We have not attacked anyone, and I am ready to prove the truth of my statement by facts and at any moment.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: There was a telegram this morning which I read that you are still advancing in the Ukrainian part of Galicia.

M. PADEREWSKI: There is some misunderstanding concerning Ukraina and Galicia. There are two Ukrainias and there is only one Galicia. The people in Galicia pretend to be Ukrainians on account of the similarity of their language with the real Ukrainian people. These people are not Ukrainians. They are under the influence of Germany. There is an accusation of the Poles persecuting the Ruthenians in Galicia. There is an influence there of Germany, there is an influence of Austria, and altogether the people are not in harmony with the real Ukraina. Galicia represents a territory, a small territory comparatively speaking, with the population of . . . ³ Ruthenians and 4,700,000 Poles. On the other side, there is the real Ukraina, which represents eight provinces, each of them being much larger than Galicia itself; and there are two distinct governments. There is the former government of Stanislaw, and the government of Ukraina, directorate formerly of Kiev and Odessa, and at last of Rovno, which is under the leadership of Petliura.

We have been asked to stop that fighting, or, to put it more clearly and precisely, I have been asked by General Bliss on behalf of you, Mr. President, to agree to an armistice, which I did in principle. The Commission was appointed and some deliberations have taken place. Then I was told by you, Mr. President, that I should avoid or prevent Haller's army from taking any part in the fighting in Ukraina, to which I also agreed and I notified the Government of Poland. I beg to call your attention to the fact that during the time the negotiations were going on for an armistice here in Paris, the bombardment of the unfortified city of Lemberg was still in progress, and that many people were being killed by these so-called Ukrainian Armies in Galicia. Upon my arrival in Warsaw, I went immediately to the Chief of the State and told him about your wishes. Haller's army was still in the neighbourhood of Galicia, not in Galicia itself, but on the Volhynian front, and the offensive—not the offensive, but rather the defensive advance, to put it properly—was ordered by General Iwaszkiewicz. When I was talking to the Chief of the State we received the telegram of General Pawlenko, the Commander of the Ukrainian forces, notifying us that the Ukrainian army

fering with it, and it was on that general series of subjects that we were anxious to have your views.' Some discussion then ensued.

³ Note in original: 'Figures indistinct in M.S. The Austrian census of 1910 gave 3,208,000 Ruthenians and 4,676,000 Poles.' (The text printed loc. cit. here reads '3,300,000 Ruthenians'.)

would stop all the hostilities in view of the negotiations then taking place in Paris, and that they hoped on our side we should cease also every hostility. We gave orders to General Iwaszkiewicz to stop every preparation for that advance on the 11th of May. I must not forget that the situation of the country was really very dangerous. The excitement and the discontent of the people when they learned that the offensive was called off, and every movement against the Ukrainians was postponed, reached such a pitch that we were really on the verge of revolution. I called together all the leaders of the party and I offered them my resignation, which they, however, did not accept. Hundreds of meetings took place in the country protesting against that action, and we were really in a very dangerous position. Fortunately, or unfortunately, however it may be called, on the 12th May the Ukrainians, in spite of these telegrams sent to us, wanted to improve their position anyhow and they attacked us on two places which were quite new in their military action, but they attacked us also north of Lemberg. However decisive were our efforts, we could not keep back those boys of twenty years of age. They went on. They simply marched like a storm. They made thirty-five, forty kilometers a day without any opposition, and they took back that territory, and if you are interested in the fact that there should be no bloodshed in the country, I am able to tell you that the whole offensive in Galicia has not cost us a hundred people in killed and wounded. There were no battles. In many places, the population, stimulated by the news of Polish troops advancing, took the matter in hand themselves. The Polish population is very numerous there—about a third of the inhabitants being Poles—about thirty-seven per cent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Does Poland claim the whole of Galicia?

M. PADEREWSKI: Historically, yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do they claim that the whole of Galicia should be annexed to them?

M. PADEREWSKI: We have given autonomy to this country. We claim the whole of Galicia. We claim it for the simple reason that it is absolutely impossible to define ethnographically this country, because, curiously enough, and we should rather be proud of the fact, in the centre of Galicia there is more of a Ukrainian population than on the border. The fartherest districts of Galicia are more Polish than the immediate surroundings of Lemberg. There isn't a neighbourhood of Lemberg which contains eighty per cent.

THE PRESIDENT: Pomerania is German, isn't it?

M. PADEREWSKI: It has been Polish, but it is more German now. It has been Germanised.

THE PRESIDENT: If Upper Silesia voted as a unit, do you think the influence of these portions (illustrating on map) would outvote that part?

M. PADEREWSKI: I am afraid it would.

I suppose that as the system of voting has been already adopted in Prussian Mazuria and in this part of Eastern Prussia, it should also be applied to the Upper Silesia, by communes.

THE PRESIDENT: Then your expectation would be that the agricultural communes would go to Germany?

M. PADEREWSKI: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Then your frontier would probably be the Oder?

M. PADEREWSKI: Yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: If you took the opinion of Silesia as a whole, it would be German?

M. PADEREWSKI: Yes, as a whole it would be German.

If there is any essential change in that which has been already granted to Poland, I should immediately resign, because I could not return to my country if there is any such change as a plebiscite here, or any essential change in the disposition of the territory which has been already made public as granted to my country. If there are such changes, I couldn't have anything more to do with politics, because it would be absolutely impossible to rule my country. You know that revolutions begin when people lose faith in their leadership. These people have belief in me now, because they were told by me, and most emphatically, that these things promised to them would be given to them. Well now, if something is taken away from them, they will lose all faith in my leadership. They will lose faith in your leadership of humanity; and there will be revolution in my country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: No promises were made. We made certain proposals to the Germans. Nobody ever suggested that those were an ultimatum, and that the Germans must accept them, every line without alteration. We are actually considering now certain questions which affect my country and France. If we thought that this was an absolute ultimatum, there would be no use discussing it.

Here is Poland that five years ago was torn to pieces, under the heel of three great powers, with no human prospect of recovering its liberty; certainly without the slightest chance of recovering it by its own exertions. Why, during the four or five years of the war the Poles were actually fighting against their own freedom in so far as they were fighting at all. We were capturing Poles on the Western front, and capturing them on the Italian front. That was the condition of things. Now, you have got at the very least, even if you took every one of these disputed parts away—you have got twenty millions of Poles free, you have got an absolutely united Poland. It is a thing which no Pole could have conceived as possible five years ago; and in addition to that, they are claiming even populations which are not their own. They are claiming three millions and a half of Galicians, and the only claim put forward is that in a readjustment you should not absorb into Poland populations which are not Polish and which do not wish to become Polish. That is the only point that is put. The Poles had not the slightest hope of getting freedom, and have only got their freedom because there are a million and a half of Frenchmen dead, very nearly a million British, half a million Italians, and I forget how many Americans. That has given them their freedom, and they say they will lose faith in the leadership which has given them that, at the expense of millions of men of other races who have died for their freedom.

If that is what Poles are like, then I must say it is a very different Poland to any Poland I ever heard of. She has won her freedom, not by her own exertions, but by the blood of others; and not only has she no gratitude, but she says she loses faith in the people who have won her freedom.

M. PADEREWSKI: I am very sorry I gave you that impression. Perhaps I did not express myself precisely enough. If I say that I would not be able to lead these people any more because they may lose faith in my leadership, I don't mean to imply that they are losing faith in your leadership.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I was only referring to what you said. We won freedom for Nations that had not the slightest hope of it—Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and others. Nations that have won their freedom at the expense of the blood of Italians and Frenchmen and Englishmen and Americans. And we have the greatest trouble in the world to keep them from annexing other Nations and imposing upon other nations the very tyranny which they have themselves endured for centuries. You know, I belong to a small nation, and therefore I have great sympathy with all oppressed nationalities, and it fills me with despair the way in which I have seen small nations, before they have hardly leaped into the light of freedom, beginning to oppress other races than their own. They are more imperialists, believe me, than either England and France, than certainly the United States. It fills me with despair as a man who has fought all his life for little nations.

M. PADEREWSKI: I beg to protest emphatically against the accusation that we are imperialists. I am a representative of a nation which has fought for liberty for others; where other nations were oppressed, Poland was always there to fight for liberty—wherever liberty was fought for. As a proof, I may perhaps read to you the resolutions adopted by the Diet, which absolutely denies the accusation of imperialism. We are not imperialists and we do not want to annex any country or any people. We have never imposed upon any nation or foreign language. We never persecuted any religion. We never imposed upon the people different customs, and the proof of it is this, that after six hundred years of common life with primitive people, like the Lithuanians, like the Ruthenians, even like the Ukrainians, these people are still existing and even with our assistance, with our practical help—are regaining their individual character. These accusations are entirely based upon rumours which are spread by our enemies—in the newspapers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Newspapers attack me just the same.

M. PADEREWSKI: If we are fighting in Galicia, it is because we must defend ourselves. Yesterday, I received a letter from one of the noblest men in my country, though he is a Catholic archbishop. There are some Catholic people who are very honest and very good. I ask your permission to read it.

(M. Paderewski reads the telegram, which requests him to protest to the Peace Conference against the outrages committed by the Ukrainian armies, the killing of defenceless priests, &c.)

M. PADEREWSKI: You wanted us to make an armistice with the Ukrainians in Galicia, and we thought that your information was not correct, that you

had been misled by some reports; that the Ukrainians of Galicia were not the people to address for an armistice. Instead of addressing ourselves to a fraction of a nation, which represents only 3,300,000, we thought it would be better and more proper to talk to the people who represent 27,000,000. I think that we were right and this is the proof of it. This is a document which shows that we are not such imperialistic people. It reads as follows:—[*sic*]

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I ought to say that you and I have been very good friends, M. Paderewski. I don't want to have any dispute with you. What I mean by imperialism is the annexation of peoples of a different race against their will, or even a people of the same race against their will. I consider the annexation of Alsace, though the race was German, as culpable as the annexation of Lorraine, where the people were French. It is the annexation of people against their will, whether it is by a big race or a small race.

M. PADEREWSKI: Mr. Lloyd George, you admit that the representatives of a nation should be believed, if they speak as representatives, as of a constituent assembly of a country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: If they represent that particular population, certainly.

M. PADEREWSKI: The resolutions which have been unanimously adopted by our constituent assembly ought to be a proof of what our intentions are and what our character is, don't you think so?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: You mean that the intentions of the Poles are not imperialistic. I am just hoping that they will not be, and that they do not mean to annex foreign populations. That is all I want.

M. PADEREWSKI: They don't; but you must find it natural that we try to protect people of our own speech and our own blood if they are attacked, if they are murdered, if they are slaughtered, in Ukraina and by those people under the Bolshevik régime.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: They are making the same accusations against your troops. I only saw a Ukrainian once. The only Ukrainian I have ever seen in the flesh was upstairs. I haven't seen another. It is the last Ukrainian I have seen, and I am not sure that I want to see any more. That is all I know about it.

M. PADEREWSKI: On the day I left Warsaw a boy came to see me, a boy about thirteen or fourteen years old, with four fingers missing on this hand. He was in uniform, shot twice through the leg, once through the lungs, and with a deep wound in his skull. He was one of the defenders of Lemberg. Do you think that children of thirteen are fighting for annexation, for imperialists? I saw girls in the same position, also wounded through the chest, through the lungs, through the legs, also with fingers missing; they were all defending Lemberg. Do they fight for territory, or for oil, or for annexation, or for imperialism?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Lemberg, I understand, is a Polish city. They were undoubtedly fighting for a Polish city.

M. PADEREWSKI: There is one district near Lemberg which has an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, but on the other side there are five big

districts, at the extreme point of Galicia, which are overwhelmingly Polish. That is the reason why we consider it so very difficult to decide that question.

I would like to read you the resolutions which will give you an idea about the character of my country:—

‘The Polish Republic aspires to be a factor of international peace, founded on the right of all nations to independence and self-determination.

‘Poland supports the idea of a League of free and equal nations, with the view of avoiding wars and of realizing lasting peace between nations.

‘The Polish Republic tends to the union of all Polish territories, and guarantees to all national minorities equal rights as well as national and cultural autonomy, on territories with mixed population. The Diet states that the principles expressed and supported with great moral courage by Mr. Wilson, President of the United States, have found a loud echo and appreciation in this country.

‘In accordance with these principles, the Republic aims at creating a peace with all states and nations, which will safeguard all important national and economical interests of the Polish Nation.

‘It is the tendency of the Polish Republic to liberate the territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania from foreign oppression, and to render possible to the nations inhabiting these territories the exercise of the right of self-determination concerning their future, as well as their relation to the Polish State. The Republic tends to a junction with the nationalities of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania on the basis of mutual political, economical and cultural interests. The legal and political basis of this junction shall correspond to the right of all nations to determine their own future. The principle of self-determination must, accordingly, also be applied to that part of Lithuania and White-Ruthenia in their historical limits, in which the Polish population forms a majority and which aspires to a union with Poland.

‘The Diet declares that the Polish Republic does not intend to incorporate to the Polish State the territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania solely on the basis of a decision of the Polish Constitutional Assembly.

‘The Diet recognises the application of the principle of self-determination to the nations of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania as stated in the report of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, voted by the Diet on the 4th April, 1919, as well as stated in the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief issued in Vilno on the 22nd April, 1919, without precisising, for the time being, the way in which this principle shall be applied.’

M. CLEMENCEAU: About the plebiscite: let us suppose that we wouldn't ask for a plebiscite immediately and that in the meantime the country would be occupied by troops of the Entente—suppose Americans, we should say—don't you think that then in that country there would be a great chance to have a fair vote?

M. PADEREWSKI: There will be a fair vote in that industrial part of Upper

Silesia, but there will be no fairness in the western part, because the officials and the land owners, and the clergy especially, would take the matter in hand. And, besides, there is a tremendous element of provocation in that country already. They are trying to create a revolutionary movement in order to have an excuse for suppressing it. The Germans are shooting every day some guns.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: That is an excuse for clearing them out.

M. PADEREWSKI: On the tenth of May there was a sitting in Berlin, at which were present the representatives of Saxony, of Bavaria, of Gutenberg [? Württemberg], of Baden, and all the ministers, of course—Mr. Scheideman,—and a Colonel Hiser was the representative of the General Staff; and Mr. Scheideman said that their economical position was absolutely desperate, but their political situation had greatly improved on account of their secret treaty concluded with Trotsky. He said that Trotsky promised him all the assistance needed provided he would send immediately three thousand instructors—officers and sergeants—to Russia, which he did; whereupon Colonel Hiser confirmed that report, adding that the spirit of the troops at this very moment was just as good as in 1914 and that they expected to receive through their mobilization at least one million good troops. As to the others, they gave up the hope of making anything out of them, because they are too demoralized, but one million more men can be got at any moment. As to the munitions, they have been manufacturing them here (chiefly in these districts) in Upper Silesia, and the chief factor is, of course, poisonous gases. We have had already, a few days ago, some experience with it, because they sent a few shots of poisonous gas into the villages and killed a great many people. The day before yesterday there was an attack made here (illustrating) on a village. Several peasants were killed and several houses destroyed. Of course, it is not yet real war, but there are symptoms, and at any moment war may be a reality. And we have no munitions, we have no equipment.

*(End of Meeting.)*⁴

⁴ For the subsequent course of Ukraino-Polish relations and the eventual conclusion of an armistice, see Chap. III.

No. 248

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 12)

No. 521 Telegraphic [87759/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 7, 1919

Your telegram No. 371.¹

Sir Charles Eliot to whom above telegram was repeated at Irkutsk asks me to reply that he will send answer after arrival at Omsk and in the meantime add any remarks of my own.

¹ This telegram of May 24 to Sir C. Eliot at Vladivostok read: 'Please inform me to what cause you attribute the increase of Bolshevism in Siberia.'

Evidence obtained here indicates that increase of Bolshevism is largely due to propaganda by Bolshevik agents financed by Moscow and to terrorism by Bolshevik bands; propaganda succeeds because population is disappointed with present conditions of life as compared with those under Bolshevik regime. Terrorism succeeds because Government troops are neither strong enough to protect villagers nor to rouse [? round] up and disarm Bolshevik bands (largely composed of ex-convicts etc.) who have emerged from their winter hiding places.

Following conditions existing in Eastern Siberia are favourable to Bolshevik propaganda.

1. Bolshevik regime in Siberia was overthrown before its evil effects had been fully experienced and only recollection of high wages, little work and comparative freedom from taxation and from compulsory military service now remains.

2. Distribution of articles of prime necessity has been almost at a standstill owing to disorganisation of railway and rouble has fallen in value to such an extent that in absence of articles for barter purposes the peasants will not exchange their food supplies except at exorbitant prices. Cost of living has thus gone up enormously.

3. Taxes are unpopular, peasants believing term 'temporary Government' to imply that taxes already imposed will be collected again when next Government comes into power.

4. Compulsory mobilisation is resented. Population is tired of war and does not understand what is to be gained by fighting for a safety which has not bettered economic conditions.

5. Uncertain situation makes peasants unwilling to give up their arms and attempts to carry out disarmament cause them to join Bolsheviks.

6. Population is irritated by many illegal acts of some Government troops and by repressive measures of some Government officials.

7. Government is considered reactionary in many quarters (especially where social revolutionary influences are strong) owing [to] its interference with representative institutions such as Zemstvos and Siberian Duma.

No. 249

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 12)

No. 522 Telegraphic [87760/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 8, 1919

Sir J. Jordan's telegram No. 302.¹

Chinese High Commissioner is anxious His Majesty's Government should know details of how negotiations regarding command of Chinese troops on Chinese Eastern Railway are being conducted.² He informs me question

¹ Not printed. (Sir J. Jordan was H.M. Minister in Peking.)

² For the general question of Allied operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway see No. 256.

was first brought up at Council of Allied military representatives (Inter-Allied Railway Committee having intimated it was not concerned with question of railway guardianship) but that since this Council would not place Chinese troops under General Otani,³ Japanese steadily refuse to discuss question at Vladivostok, saying it is a political question for respective Governments to decide. He thinks they are now endeavouring to give the impression Chinese are obstructing working of railway and he tells me effect of placing Chinese troops on Chinese Eastern Railway under General Otani would be to give the Japanese *de facto* military control of railway (? as they would claim that Sino-Japanese military Convention gave them actual command over troops and not merely a general control (? such as) is exercised (? by) General Otani over foreign troops in Eastern Siberia.

Repeated to Peking and Tokio.

³ General in command of the Japanese expeditionary force in Siberia.

No. 250

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 12)

No. 523 Telegraphic [87761/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 8, 1919

(? Following from Mr. Hodgson) at Omsk. Begins.

Minister for Foreign Affairs¹ to-day discussed subject of joint note of Allied Governments laying down conditions on which recognition would be accorded to Omsk Government. His attitude was generally favourable but he considers as entirely unacceptable stipulation that Constituent Assembly of 1917 shall be regarded as representative National Organ in event of circumstances not permitting calling of a new Constituent Assembly when Government shall arrive at Moscow. Idea that Assembly presided (? over, omitted) by Tchernoff represents Russia at present moment is indeed entirely erroneous. Tchernoff is personally discredited and his party—Social Revolutionaries—has in many parts of Siberia dissolved itself. More sensible of its component group ('s have' omitted) (? dropped) party (? politic)s and are devoting themselves to reconstructive work: Left groups have lost influence and have largely been merged in Bolshevism. To Kolchak's Government party headed by Tchernoff is peculiarly obnoxious since it intrigued against directorate in Siberia and endeavoured to disorganise Siberian Army. Appeal to Kolchak to become Supreme Ruler² was an answer to these intrigues.

Views expressed above are fully endorsed by Professor Pares who has had

¹ The reference was to M. Soukin, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of Admiral Kolchak during the absence in Paris of M. Sazonov (cf. No. 240, note 3).

² On November 18, 1918, Admiral Kolchak had assumed the title of Supreme Ruler with full powers as a sequel to the *coup d'état* which overthrew the moderately inclined anti-Soviet Directory at Omsk (cf. No. 613).

excellent opportunities of acquainting himself with prevailing currents of thought in Siberia.³ Ends.⁴

³ Professor Sir B. Pares was at that time on an official lecture tour in Siberia.

⁴ In a telegram of June 10 from Omsk (via Vladivostok; received June 17) Sir C. Eliot reported that he had that day had a conversation with Admiral Kolchak on the same subject and along lines very similar to that between Mr. Hodgson and M. Soukin. With regard to the Allied conditions 'only point on which he [Admiral Kolchak] showed anxiety was stipulation that if there was danger of delay in electing a new Constituent Assembly, old Constituent Assembly of 1917 is to be again convoked. . . . I think his objections are reasonable and so do all officials both British and foreign with whom I have spoken of matter.' On June 2 Mr. Hoare had reported in this connexion in Archangel telegram No. 358 that the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of the Northern Region considered that 'while some of the conditions such as those dealing with Lithuania etc. were disquieting and were, as he described them, too "Wilsonian", realization by the Powers of cardinal factors of Russian problem naturally gave the Government great satisfaction.' (Text as in Archangel Archives/F.O. 175/1.)

No. 251

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 15)

No. 528 Telegraphic [88935/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 10, 1919

My telegram No. 521.¹

Following from Sir Charles Eliot from Siasnoyarsk. Your telegram No. 371.²

Reasons for increase of Bolshevism in Siberia.

The continuance of conditions unsatisfactory to working classes and peasantry makes (? itself) felt more and more as time goes on and active manifestations of Bolsheviks are easier in summer than in winter. The Government promises much but does little to improve things.

(? It can) point to no great military successes and is often arbitrary and unjust in its attempts to repress revolutionary movements. Continual agitation is kept up by Bolshevik leaders who (? moreover) were driven out of (? towns) along railway but not out of Siberia.

The following special causes may be mentioned:

1. Prices have risen enormously since last year in consequence of depreciation of rouble.

The population attributes this to Government and contrasts present prices with those which prevailed under Bolshevik regime a year ago.

2. The Government of Lenin and Trotsky has instituted a most active propaganda in Siberia. Every effort is made to win over soldiers. Deserters and prisoners are well treated. Bolshevik agents represent that Omsk Government is handing country over to Czechs and other foreigners, whereas Bolsheviks wish to drive them out.

3. Many Russian prisoners are returning from Germany via European Russia tainted with Bolshevism.

¹ No. 248.

² See No. 248, note 1.

A large percentage of Germans, especially Magyar prisoners in Siberia also have Bolshevist sympathies. They are reported to be under very little supervision now. Ends.

No. 252

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 15)

No. 531 Telegraphic [88937/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 10, 1919

Your telegram No. 353.¹

Following from Mr. Hodgson, Omsk. Begins.

I am informed by Minister for Foreign Affairs that nature of measures taken for repression of Bolshevik outbreaks in Yenesei district is occupying attention of Government and that action of Military authorities in the district is being examined. Government is entirely against arbitrary and unjust measures such as those to which Vice-Consul at Krasnoyarsk alludes. Joint force of Czechs, Italians and Russians is now engaged in clearing region in a systematic manner. I pointed out harmful impression created abroad by ruthless methods of repression so far employed. Minister for Foreign Affairs quite agreed and gave me assurances that steps will be taken to prevent their recurrence.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of May 16, 1919, stated that it was desirable that Colonel Robertson should take steps to draw the attention of the Government at Omsk to the repressive measures, such as infliction of the death penalty without trial and the holding of hostages, reported to have been adopted by the Governor-General of Yeniseisk against Bolshevik sympathizers; Colonel Robertson was requested to point out that 'arbitrary acts of this kind can only have effect of complicating Admiral Kolchak's already difficult task'.

No. 253

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received June 10)

Telegraphic: by wireless [86708/9/38]

[MOSCOW]¹

Replying to your radio of June 7th,² the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wishes to state that the Russian Government is³ prepared to proceed immediately with the exchange of all Allied privates, non-commissioned officers and seamen taken prisoners during the present hostilities against all Russian Red armies [? armymen] and seamen taken by the Allies. Regarding general exchange Russian Government unable formulate definite demands for since Mr. Litvinoff left London⁴ it had no means of ascertaining situation of Russians in Great Britain, more especially of those forcibly and illegally enlisted in British Army and labour battalions now probably without any protection at the mercy of British police, military authorities and

¹ The original date of dispatch is uncertain; the telegram was transmitted by wireless from Tsarskoie Selo on June 10.

² Transmission to Moscow of No. 241.

³ The text of the preceding passage was defective as originally received and was supplied subsequently.

⁴ M. Litvinov had acted as Soviet political agent in London in 1918.

reactionary former officials of the Tzar, while the British Government could hear from British subjects through their own representatives or Danish Red Cross. Question of general exchange can therefore only arise if the Russian Government is allowed to send to London or alternatively to some neutral country a commission enabled to get in touch with Russians in Great Britain, receive their complaints and enquire into their position. Failing an agreement on this point the Russian Government will feel justified in detaining all subjects of a country which has been waging a merciless war for nearly twelve months and is now widening its military operations against Russia by sending its naval forces to attack the Black Sea coast and the Russian Fleet in territorial waters of the Gulf of Finland. People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs.

TCHITCHERIN

No. 254

Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot (Vladivostok)

No. 44 [85208/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 11th, 1919*

Sir,

Monsieur Nabokoff¹ called on the 5th instant and raised the question of the offer made to Admiral Kolchak by the Allied and Associated Delegates in Paris. He said that some of the conditions laid down would be difficult for Admiral Kolchak to accept, especially in regard to summoning the Constituent Assembly of 1917. The Peace Delegates in Paris had probably forgotten, if they were ever aware of it, that Lenin and Trotsky and other notorious Bolsheviks had been members of that Assembly. Was it proposed that Admiral Kolchak should summon them and assure their safety?

Sir R. Graham urged the extreme importance of Admiral Kolchak making every possible effort to accept the conditions proposed to him. Sir R. Graham pointed out the long time that it had taken to bring the Allied and Associated Governments up to the point of recognising Admiral Kolchak under any conditions whatever, and expressed serious apprehension as to the effect which an evasive or unsatisfactory answer from the Admiral might have. As Monsieur Nabokoff was well aware strong pressure was being exercised against any recognition or assistance being given to Admiral Kolchak by the Allies, and there was a grave risk that in the event of an unsatisfactory reply the question of recognising him might be definitely dropped and Russia left to fight out her own battles without Allied intervention or assistance.

Monsieur Nabokoff said that he perfectly realised this danger, but that he feared that Admiral Kolchak, and more especially the ultra-conservative elements surrounding him, did not. Moreover, Monsieur Sazonoff, when in London,² had not shown a complete grasp of the situation, and had appeared

¹ Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London in the interests of the Government of Admiral Kolchak.

² M. Sazonov had recently paid a visit to London. Cf. note 3 below.

to think that the conditions proposed might be considerably modified or even refused without serious risk. In regard to Finland, Monsieur Sazonoff had said 'The Finns are asking for a great deal, but they shall have nothing, absolutely nothing!' Monsieur Nabokoff added that he himself was in a difficult position. He would have liked to have warned Admiral Kolchak as to the urgent importance of closing with the Allied offer as soon as possible, but Monsieur Sazonoff had telegraphed on the subject from London, and his advice had not been altogether in this sense. Moreover, Monsieur Sazonoff had told Monsieur Nabokoff that Mr. Balfour had informed him in Paris that the Foreign Office did not have complete confidence in Monsieur Nabokoff and would welcome his being replaced here by Monsieur Sevastopolo. Sir R. Graham said that this was news to him.

I am, etc.,

[CURZON OF KEDLESTON]³

³ This dispatch (repeated to the British Delegation at Paris as No. 3903 and to Archangel as No. 56) was based upon a note of the conversation in question, dated June 5, 1919, which Sir R. Graham had submitted to Lord Curzon. Lord Curzon minuted upon this note as follows: 'I was too busy the other day to leave a record of my talk with M. Sazonoff. But I may say that he left upon me the precise impression which M. Nabokoff here confirms. I read the terms of the proposed recognition to M. Sazonoff, and so far from exhibiting any satisfaction at the contemplated recognition by the Powers, he seemed inclined to cavil at the conditions, and to claim for Admiral Kolchak the right of modification or revision.

C. 5/6/19.'

No. 255

Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des États-Unis, Paris

C.F. 60¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Wednesday, June 11, 1919, at 5.45 p.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Orlando.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey and Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

... 10² *Russia*: *The Reply from Admiral Koltchak*. PRESIDENT WILSON read the reply from Admiral Koltchak which had been repeated and was now practically complete. (Appendix II.)

It was particularly noted that Admiral Koltchak had given satisfactory assurances that there would be no return to the régime which existed in February, 1917.

(It was agreed that, subject to the consent of the Japanese Delegation,

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 316 f.

² The remainder of these minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

the telegram to Admiral Koltchak and the reply should be published. Sir Maurice Hankey was directed to communicate a copy to the Japanese Delegation.³

Note.—Sir Maurice Hankey handed a copy to M. Saburi, the Secretary of the Japanese Delegation, at the Villa Majestic immediately after the meeting.) . . .²

APPENDIX II TO No. 255

Telegram from Mr. de Martel, French Chargé d'Affaires at Omsk, to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Received Paris, June 5)

(Translation from French as finally amended in the light of a repetition of the telegram.)

(Most Urgent.)

OMSK, June 4, 1919

Admiral Koltchak, to whom I handed at the station of Tiumen the telegram of Mr. Clemenceau, requests me to communicate the following reply to Mr. Clemenceau:—

‘The Government over which I preside has been happy to learn that the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Russia is in perfect accord with the task which the Russian Government itself has undertaken, that Government being anxious above all things to re-establish peace in the country and to assure to the Russian people the right to decide their own destiny in freedom by means of a Constituent Assembly. I appreciate highly the interest shown by the Powers as regards the national movement and consider their wish to make certain of the political convictions with which we are inspired as legitimate; I am therefore ready to confirm once more my previous declarations which I have always regarded as irrevocable.

‘1. On the 18th November, 1918, I assumed power, and I shall not retain that power one day longer than is required by the interest of the country; my first thought at the moment when the Bolsheviks are definitely crushed will be to fix the date for the elections of the Constituent Assembly. A Commission is now at work on direct preparation for them on the basis of universal suffrage. Considering myself as responsible before that Constituent Assembly I shall hand over to it all my powers in order that it may freely determine the system of Government; I have, moreover, taken the oath to do this before the Supreme Russian Tribunal, the guardian

³ At a meeting of the Supreme Council held on June 12 at 11 a.m. (C.F. 61) ‘Baron Makino said he was willing to have the despatch of the Allied and Associated Powers published, together with Admiral Koltchak’s reply. He suggested, however, that some indication should be given to the press that Admiral Koltchak’s reply was considered satisfactory.

‘Mr. Lloyd George suggested that a reply in this sense should be sent to Admiral Koltchak, which could be published.

‘(Mr. Philip Kerr was instructed to draft a reply, but no final decision was taken as to publication.)’

of legality. All my efforts are aimed at concluding the civil war as soon as possible by crushing Bolshevism in order to put the Russian people effectively in a position to express its free will. Any prolongation of this struggle would only postpone that moment; the Government, however, does not consider itself authorised to substitute for the inalienable right of free and legal elections the mere re-establishment of the Assembly of 1917, which was elected under a régime of Bolshevik violence, and the majority of whose members are now in the Sovietist ranks. It is to the legally elected Constituent Assembly alone, which my Government will do its utmost to convoke promptly, that there will belong the sovereign rights of deciding the problems of the Russian State, both in the internal and external affairs of the country.

'2. We gladly consent to discuss at once with the Powers all international questions, and in doing so shall aim at the free and peaceful development of peoples, the limitation of armaments, and the measures calculated to prevent new wars, of which the League of Nations is the highest expression.

'The Russian Government thinks, however, that it should recall the fact that the final sanction of the decisions which may be taken in the name of Russia, will belong to the Constituent Assembly. Russia cannot now and cannot in future ever be anything but a democratic State where all questions involving modifications of the territorial frontiers and of external relations must be ratified by a representative body which is the natural expression of the people's sovereignty.

'3. Considering the creation of a unified Polish State to be one of the chief of the normal and just consequences of the world war, the Government thinks itself justified in confirming the independence of Poland, proclaimed by the Provisional Russian Government of 1917, all the pledges and decrees of which we have accepted. The final solution of the question of delimiting the frontiers between Russia and Poland must, however, in conformity with the principles set forth above, be postponed till the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. We are disposed at once to recognise the *de facto* Government of Finland, but the final solution of the Finnish question must belong to the Constituent Assembly.

'4. We are fully disposed at once to prepare for the solution of the questions concerning the fate of the national groups in Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and of the Caucasian and Transcaspian countries, and we have every reason to believe that a prompt settlement will be made, seeing that the Government is assuring us from the present time, the autonomy of the various nationalities. It goes without saying that the limits and conditions of these autonomous institutions will be settled separately as regards each of the nationalities concerned.

'And even in case difficulties should arise in regard to the solution of these various questions, the Government is ready to have recourse to the collaboration and good offices of the League of Nations with a view to arriving at a satisfactory settlement.

'5. The above principle, implying the ratification of the agreements by

the Constituent Assembly should obviously be applied to the question of Bessarabia.

'6. The Russian Government once more repeats its declaration of the 27th November, 1918, by which it accepted the burden of the national debt of Russia.

'7. As regards the question of internal politics which can only interest the Powers in so far as they reflect the political tendencies of the Russian Government, I make a point of repeating that there cannot be a return to the régime which existed in Russia before February 1917. The provisional solution which my Government has adopted in regard to the agrarian question aims at satisfying the interests of the great mass of the population and is inspired by the conviction that Russia can only be flourishing and strong when the millions of Russian peasants receive all guarantees for the possession of the land. Similarly as regards the régime to be applied to the liberated territories, the Government, far from placing obstacles in the way of the free election of local assemblies, municipalities and zemstvos, regards the activities of these bodies and also the development of the principle of self-government as the necessary conditions for the reconstruction of the country, and is (already) actually giving them its support and help by all the means (at its) disposal.

'8. Having set ourselves the task of re-establishing order and justice and of ensuring individual security to a persecuted population, which is tired of trials and exactions, the Government affirms the equality before the law of all classes. . . .⁴ and all citizens without any special privilege . . .⁴ all shall receive, without distinction of origin or of religion, the protection of the State and of the law.

'The Government whose head I am is concentrating all the forces and all the resources at its disposal in order to accomplish the task which it has set itself; at this decisive hour I speak in the name of all National Russia. I am confident that, Bolshevism once crushed, satisfactory solutions will be found for all questions which equally concern all those populations whose existence is bound up with that of Russia.

'KOLTCHAK.'

⁴ Punctuation as in original, evidently indicating a defect in the transmission of the text.

No. 256

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 3779 [86860/61232/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 11, 1919*

Sir,

I transmit herewith for your consideration copies of a memorandum which has been prepared in the Russia Department, drawing attention to certain points which arise in connection with the recognition of Admiral Koltchak's

Government by the Allied Powers, and should be grateful if I could learn your views at an early date.

I have, etc.
[for Earl Curzon of Kedleston
W. TYRRELL]¹

ENCLOSURE IN No. 256

Memorandum by Mr. Selby

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 6, 1919

Recognition of Admiral Kolchak raises some important points to which it may be worth while to draw attention.

(A.) *Instructions to Allied Representatives in Russia, the Baltic States, Poland, and Finland*

It must be assumed that the action now decided upon by the Allied Governments is directed to achieve the overthrow of the Russian Soviet Government at the earliest possible moment, and that all other considerations are subservient to that policy. This assumption is based on certain passages which occur in the declaration which has been addressed to Admiral Kolchak, which are as follows. . . .²

In view of the difficulties which have arisen in the past few months owing to conflicts of opinion between the representatives of the Allied Powers as to the scope of their action, it would be exceedingly useful if the Allied Governments could now come to some agreement among themselves as to the tenour of the instructions to be sent to their respective representatives in Russia, Siberia, and the other territories concerned, which would result in these representatives co-ordinating their efforts in carrying out the policy agreed upon.

(B.) *Spheres of Activity*

It is presumed that the system of division of spheres of activity will be continued, but this problem requires careful consideration. At present the position is as follows:—

1. Under the agreement of the 23rd December, 1917, between ourselves and France we assume responsibility for the Cossack territories, Armenia, the Caucasus, Georgia, and Kurdistan, while the French control is extended to Bessarabia, the Ukraine, and Crimea (Annex A.)

2. Northern Russia is recognised by the French Government as under our control.

3. Poland falls to France, owing to a theory which has arisen, that since France undertook the arrangements for equipping General Haller's army, she is now responsible for meeting all other Polish requirements.

¹ Signature supplied from the archives of the British Delegation at Paris.

² There followed the third and fourth paragraphs of the Allied note of May 26 to Admiral Kolchak: cf. No. 233, appendix I.

4. No definite arrangement has yet been come to as regards the Baltic States, although the French Government put forward a proposal in February last that His Majesty's Government should provide for the needs of these States and also of Finland.

5. In Siberia the position is nebulous.

West of Lake Baikal there is a French General, General Janin, who is Commander-in-chief of the Allied troops in that region. East of the lake, Great Britain and France have recognised the authority over the Allied troops of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, General Otani, but the American General Graves disputes this and claims that the American troops are solely under his control, and that he is responsible for their distribution to the United States Government alone.

As regards the reorganisation of the railway, an Inter-Allied Committee has been set up (see Annex B), largely through the initiative of His Majesty's Government, which has the effect of recognising the practical dictatorship of the American engineer, Mr. Stevens, in all matters of a technical nature. The British representative does not seem to be altogether satisfied with this arrangement, as he considers it places him in a false position. We have not, however, given any encouragement to this view, as we have pointed out that we did not wish to do anything which might have the effect of interfering with the reorganisation of the railway.

The continuance of these divisions of responsibility in their present form cannot be regarded as likely to achieve the efficient and expeditious execution of the policy now decided upon by the Allied Government[s]. The agreement of the 23rd December, 1917, with the French in regard to South Russia and the arrangements in Siberia call for special attention.

French action at Odessa and in the Ukraine have so embittered French relations with the Russians that it is inconceivable we shall ever be able to co-operate successfully with them again in those regions.

We have always maintained that we could not regard the Ukraine independently of Russia, and that General Denikin's Government was the only one in South Russia worthy of support. This contention was admitted at a meeting held in Paris on the 4th April, 1919, and the French Government have now formulated their instructions to their authorities in South Russia accordingly (Annex C).³

The Ukraine, when it is reconquered, should properly fall within General Denikin's sphere of influence, and consequently under our control, and we should make a strenuous endeavour to obtain a modification of the existing agreement with the French to secure the elimination of their activities in those regions forthwith.

As regards Siberia, it would seem only reasonable, seeing the number of Japanese troops now in Siberia largely exceeds the total forces of all the other Allied Powers, with the possible exception of the Czechs, that a Japanese commander-in-chief should be accepted for all Allied troops in Siberia. The

³ The annexed instructions in this sense to the French command in South Russia issued by the French General Staff in agreement with the British War Office are not printed.

Japanese are not now likely to raise any difficulties as regards the extension of their activities west of Lake Baikal, which was the original reason for the appointment of General Janin; while so far as General Janin is concerned, his removal could not but be considered as advantageous from every point of view, having regard to the fact that he has succeeded in embittering his relations with the Russians owing to the preposterous claims he has put forward to command Russian as well as Allied forces.

There can be no doubt that we shall experience some difficulty with the Americans in securing the acceptance of a Japanese commander-in-chief, but as they have acquired practical control of the railway on its technical side, through Mr. Stevens, we are surely justified in urging some counter-concession to the Japanese.

Dual, or as it is at present triple, control of the Allied forces should not be perpetuated in the interests of efficiency.

As regards North Russia no modification seems to be required. The arrangements in that region are working more or less smoothly, and in any case the preponderating role we are playing at Archangel justifies us in retaining control.

If a redistribution of activities in Russia and Siberia on the lines indicated is attempted, the question arises, how can the proposals be put palatably to the French?

Could not their jurisdiction be confirmed in Poland, where they are more popular than we are? And if anything further is required they might be associated with us in the Baltic States and in Finland, where we should be in a position to watch their activities.

(C.) *Finance*

The division into spheres of activity raises prominently the question of finance.

1. In North Russia we have an agreement with the French to pool, and eventually share, all expenses connected with the operations in those regions. (See Annex D.)

2. Similarly in South Russia the agreement of the 23rd December, 1917, stipulates that expenditure should be divided and regulated by a central inter-Allied body (see Annex A). (This body has never been called into existence.)

Neither in North nor in South Russia have we any agreement with our other Allies, although as regards North Russia we have endeavoured, hitherto without success, to bring in the Italian and United States Governments in virtue of article 11 of the Murmansk Agreement, to which the Italian and United States representatives were parties. (See Annex E.) This article stipulates that 'all expenses which may be incurred by the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, as the result of this agreement, are to be set down to the account of the respective Powers.'⁴

⁴ Note in original: 'Italy has since become a party to the agreement.'

No definite agreement yet exists as regards Poland and the Baltic States or Finland, although, as has been pointed out, we have always regarded Poland as coming specially under French care, as the result of the equipping of General Haller's divisions by the French.

In the case of the Baltic States and Finland, while the French proposed that His Majesty's Government should assume the burden in those territories, a recent proposal was made to the Supreme Council that a credit of £10,000,000 sterling to the Baltic States, to be divided between the Allies, would seem [*sic*] to indicate that there should be joint responsibility between all the Allied Governments.

It is in Siberia where the financial situation is at the present moment most unsatisfactory, leaving aside possibly General Denikin's area.

His Majesty's Government have always assumed that the United States Government were responsible for currency and finance, but from a recent application we have received from the United States Government to assist in financing the Siberian Railway—the joint credit required is 20,000,000 dollars of which we are asked to advance 4,000,000 dollars—it is evident that the United States Government are not prepared alone to undertake the task. Some arrangement must therefore be discussed which will place matters on a definite basis without delay. It is from Siberia that we are expecting the main blow at the Russian Soviet Government, and it is therefore to Siberia that our main efforts, financial and otherwise, should be directed.

Immediate consideration of the whole problem is required, not only with a view to elucidating existing agreements, but to the adoption of measures for future operations.

Whether the Allied Governments adopt the principle that their financial commitments should be limited to the sphere of operations which may be allotted to each, or poll [pool] all expenditure incidental to carrying out their policy in Russia, it would seem expedient and useful if a central financial board of the Allies could be created, to whom all questions of finance could be referred for decision.

(D.) *Executive Action*

Assuming that the Allied Governments are prepared to afford the support which follows on their policy of recognition, and the division of responsibility for carrying out that policy is made, the question arises as to how the executive work, so far as His Majesty's Government is concerned, can be best carried out.

It would be desirable that it should be laid down that this work should be carried out from London, and a revival of the Russia Committee,⁵ under the chairmanship of possibly the Secretary of State, would provide the most satisfactory machinery. We should in any case avoid continuous reference to our Peace Delegation in Paris, who would, it must be assumed, be only too glad to be relieved of dealing with questions which cannot be regarded as coming properly within the competence of the Peace Conference.

⁵ A former Interdepartmental Committee concerned with Russian affairs.

(E.) *The Appointment of British Representatives to the Russian Governments*

This question is really of vital importance, as it is essential that we should have representatives with the necessary authority to keep in check the reactionary tendencies with which Admiral Kolchak, and particularly General Denikin, are surrounded.

The policy of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin must attract and not repel; and if there are any inside Bolshevik Russia who are ready to secede from the Bolshevik ranks, it is the business of His Majesty's Government to do all that is possible to make the way easy for them, and secure so far as they can that General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak do not spoil their own chances. There are many indications that they are not as far-sighted in this respect as we would have them be. As regards Siberia, Sir C. Eliot can be relied upon to exercise the necessary influence, while Mr. Lindley at Archangel has also done exceedingly well in managing affairs with the Northern Provisional Government. There is no similar political officer at present attached to General Denikin, and it would be desirable that we should at once consider the appointment of a British Commissioner to reside at Ekaterinodar.

Mr. Bagge is going out under the auspices of the Department of Overseas Trade, and the question of his appointment as British Commissioner might now be considered, unless a more suitable nominee can be found.

He has been fourteen years in Russia, knows the Russians well and gets on with them, which is the main consideration.

ANNEX A TO No. 256

Terms of the Convention agreed at Paris, dated the 23rd December, 1917

Present: M. Clemenceau, Président du Conseil; M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs; M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London; General Foch; M. de Margerie, Political Director, Foreign Office; Lord Milner; Lord Robert Cecil; Major-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh; Sir George Clerk; Lieutenant-Colonel Spears, Interpreter; Captain Kisch.

Convention entre la France et l'Angleterre au sujet de l'action dans la Russie méridionale⁶

1. L'action dirigée par la France se développe au nord de la mer Noire (contre l'ennemi).

L'action dirigée par l'Angleterre se développe au sud-est de la mer Noire (contre les Turcs).

2. Le Général Alexieff, à Novo-Tcherkask, ayant proposé l'exécution d'un programme visant l'organisation d'une armée destinée à tenir tête aux ennemis et ce programme ayant été adopté par la France, qui a alloué à cet effet un crédit de cent millions et prescrit l'organisation d'un contrôle interallié,

⁶ An English translation of this convention is printed by L. Fischer: *The Soviets in World Affairs* (London, 1930), vol. ii, p. 836.

il y aura lieu de continuer l'exécution dudit programme jusqu'à ce que de nouvelles dispositions soient arrêtées de concert avec l'Angleterre.

3. Cette réserve admise, les zones d'influence affectées à chacun des Gouvernements seront les suivantes:

Zone anglaise: territoires cosaques, territoire du Caucase, Arménie, Géorgie, Kurdistan.

Zone française: Bessarabie, Ukraine, Crimée.

4. Les dépenses seraient mises en commun et réglées par un organe centralisateur interallié.

ANNEX B TO No. 256

Document 1

Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon (Received May 2)

(No. 302.)

My Lord,

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON, *April 29, 1919*

With reference to my note No. 110⁷ of the 12th February last regarding the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways, with which I transmitted a copy of the text of the plan as received from the American Ambassador to Japan, together with a copy of the memorandum as agreed upon by my Government and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States,⁸ I now have the honour, under instructions from the Department of State in Washington, to enclose herewith a copy of the text of the plan as submitted by the Japanese Government, together with a copy of the memorandum as received from Ambassador Morris, at Tokyo, both of which documents my Government have adopted as the official texts.

I venture to point out that, save some very minor alterations, these copies appear to be the same as the texts submitted with my note of the 12th February, except that in the second caption of the memorandum the words 'to be discussed' appear in the official text.

I have, &c.,

JOHN W. DAVIS

Document 2

Plan for the Supervision of the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian Railways in the zone in which the Allied Military Forces are now operating⁹

¹ The general supervision of the railways in the zone in which the Allied forces are now operating shall be exercised in a special Inter-Allied Committee, which shall consist of representatives from each Allied Power having

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ The text of a note of February 22, 1919, from the Foreign Office to the American Ambassador in London, notifying him of the concurrence of H.M. Government with regard to the agreement in question is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, pp. 254-5. Cf. *ibid.*, *passim*, for negotiations relating to this agreement.

⁹ This document is printed, *ibid.*, pp. 239-40.

military forces in Siberia, including Russia, and the chairman of which shall be a Russian.

The following boards shall be created to be placed under the control of the Inter-Allied Committee:—

(a) A technical board consisting of railway experts of the nations having military forces in Siberia for the purpose of administering the technical and economic management of all railways in the said zone.

(b) An Allied military transportation board for the purpose of co-ordinating military transportation under instructions of the proper military authorities.

2. The protection of the railways shall be placed under the Allied military forces. At the head of each railway shall remain a Russian manager or director with the powers conferred by the existing Russian law.

3. The technical board shall elect a president to whom shall be entrusted the technical operation of railways. In matters of such technical operation the president may issue instructions to the Russian officials mentioned in the preceding clause. He may appoint assistants and inspectors in the service of the board chosen from among nationals of Powers having military forces in Siberia to be attached to the central office of the board and define their duties. He may assign, if necessary, corps of railway experts to more important stations. In his assigning railway experts to any of the stations, interests of respective Allied Powers in charge of military protection of such stations shall be taken into due consideration. He shall distribute work among the clerical staff of the board, whom he may appoint at his discretion.

4. The clerical staff of the Inter-Allied Committee shall be appointed by the chairman of the committee, who shall have the right of distributing work among such employes as well as dismissing them.

5. The present arrangement shall cease to be operative upon the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Siberia, and all the foreign railway experts appointed under this arrangement shall then be recalled forthwith.

Document 3

*Memorandum prepared by American Ambassador at Tokyo and approved by Viscount Uchida*¹⁰

That Viscount Uchida¹¹ will forward the amended plan to Viscount Ishii,¹² with instructions to present it to the Department of State, and to explain that it is submitted with the understanding that Mr. Stevens be named as president.

2. That Inter-Allied Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of the following Governments: China, France, Great Britain, Italy,

¹⁰ Viscount Uchida was Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹¹ A slightly variant text of the present document is printed, *ibid.*, pp. 242-3. That text begins as follows: 'As the result of informal conversation with Viscount Uchida, it is understood: First, that Viscount Uchida, etc.'

¹² Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

Japan, Russia, and the United States, leaving the question of the Czecho-Slovaks to be discussed.

3. That each of the above-named Governments shall select one technical railway expert for membership on the technical board.

4. That Mr. Stevens' selection as president shall not prevent his selection as a member of the technical board.

5. That the Governments of Japan and the United States shall at once advise the above-named associated Governments of agreed plan, including the understanding in reference to the selection of Mr. Stevens, and request their adherence and cordial co-operation.

6. That this plan shall be interpreted as a sincere effort to join the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways in the interest of the Russian people, with a view to their ultimate return to those in interest, without the impairing of any existing rights.

7. That in trusting to Mr. Stevens, as president, the technical operation of these railways, it is understood the Governments of Japan and the United States are both prepared to give him the authority and support which will be necessary to make his efforts effective.

ANNEX D TO No. 256

Entente pour les dépenses en Russie

Par sa note du 15 [16] juillet [1918], l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a bien voulu transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, des propositions tendant à une répartition des dépenses à engager en Russie par les deux Gouvernements pour l'action interalliée.

Cette proposition est fondée sur les mêmes principes que ceux qui avaient inspiré l'accord du 23 décembre concernant l'action de la France et de l'Angleterre dans la Russie du Sud, ainsi que les arrangements spéciaux du mois de janvier relatifs aux unités tchèques et serbes de la même région.

Aux termes de l'accord proposé, l'Angleterre se chargerait de toutes les dépenses (autres que celles résultant de l'entretien des troupes françaises et anglaises) dans la région nord de la Russie (Mourmansk et Arkhangel), et la France dans la région de Moscou. D'autre part, conformément à la décision prise dans la réunion interalliée de Paris du 2 juillet, le Gouvernement français continuerait à avancer ainsi qu'il l'a fait jusqu'ici les fonds nécessaires pour le maintien des forces tchéco-slovaques et des autres forces allogènes, polonaises, serbes, en Russie, le Gouvernement anglais assurant les frais de leurs transports éventuels sur le front occidental.

Les frais ainsi supportés par les deux pays seraient ensuite mis en commun et partagés par parts égales entre la France et l'Angleterre; les États-Unis devait [sic] être ensuite invités par le Gouvernement britannique, avec l'appui du Gouvernement français, à en prendre le tiers.

M. Pichon a l'honneur de faire connaître à Lord Derby que le Gouvernement français accepte l'arrangement proposé, sous réserve que la porte ne

serait pas fermée à une revision, dans le cas où l'expérience ferait constater que le fait d'avances à la charge de la France devient nettement disproportionné.

Quant à l'ajustement final, le Gouvernement français comprend que le partage, en deux parts égales ou en trois si, comme nous l'espérons, le concours des États-Unis est obtenu, doit remonter au 1^{er} janvier 1918, et englobe depuis cette date toutes les dépenses qui ont été faites pour maintenir l'influence des Alliés en Russie, pour lutter contre l'emprise allemande et préparer ainsi l'intervention actuelle, ce partage global qui répond à l'équité, simplifierait beaucoup les comptes à établir.

En ce qui concerne l'effort financier immédiat, la part très lourde à assumer par les Français en vertu de l'accord du 2 juillet pour l'entretien intégral ces [?] des] forces allogènes opérant en Russie, trouvera dans les frais assumés par la Grande-Bretagne dans la Russie du Nord, un élément de compensation qui prendra la place des frais de transfert du front occidental (puisque ce transfert ne paraît plus devoir être envisagé dans un délai rapproché).

Le Gouvernement français croit pouvoir interpréter l'accord proposé par le Gouvernement britannique dans le sens qu'il appartiendra à ce dernier de financer l'action militaire dans le nord de la Russie pour tout ce qui n'est pas troupes anglaises ou françaises, c'est-à-dire notamment pour l'entretien des forces tchéco-slovaques qui pourraient être dirigées dans cette région.

Dès maintenant, le Gouvernement français donne à son Ambassadeur à Washington l'instruction d'appuyer son collègue d'Angleterre pour toute démarche tendant à obtenir la participation du Gouvernement américain aux dépenses politiques en Russie, tombant sous les termes des arrangements franco-britanniques.

Le 15 août, 1919 [1918].

ANNEX E TO NO. 256

Allies on Murman Coast. Agreement with Local Council

The Text

The following has been transmitted through the wireless station of the Russian Government:—

The Agreement between the Allies (the Entente) and the Murman Council

Under this heading in to-day's news¹³ the following communication is published:—

The General Assembly of the Murman Regional Council has sanctioned, without opposition, the following agreement, which is temporary in character and made necessary by special circumstances, between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, and the presidium of the Murman Regional Council:—

Item 1. The present agreement, which has to be sanctioned by the Governments of the Allies, is concluded between the representatives of Great

¹³ For the date of this agreement see at foot of this document.

Britain, the United States of North America, and France, on the one side, and the representatives of the Murman Regional Council, on the other side, with the object of securing co-ordinated action on the part of those who have signed this agreement, for the defence of the Murman region against the Powers of the German coalition. For the purpose of obtaining this aim, both the signing parties take upon themselves the obligation to support each other mutually.

Item 2. The Murman region is composed of the former Alexandrovsk district of the province of Archangel.

Item 3. All detachments of Russian armed forces of the Murman region, alike those which already exist and those which will be formed, will be under the direction of the Russian Military Command appointed by the Murman Regional Council. (Remark.—It is recognised as very desirable that an independent Russian army should be created, but with the object of obtaining more speedily the principal aim of this agreement, the admission of Russian volunteers into the Allied forces is permitted. In the case of such admissions it is to be taken as recognised that of these volunteers no independent Russian detachments shall be formed, but that, as far as circumstances permit, the detachments should be composed only of an equal number of foreigners and Russians.)

Item 4. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France will give to the Russian Command necessary help in equipments, supplies, and transports, and for the instruction of the Russian armed forces which are formed.

Item 5. The whole authority in the internal administration of the region belongs, without qualification, to the Murman Regional Council.

Item 6. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, and their agents will not interfere in the home affairs of the region. In all matters in which it may be found necessary to have the support of the local population, the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, and their agents, will address themselves to the respective Russian authorities, and not directly to the population, excepting in the belt along the front, in which the orders of the Military Command, justified by the conditions of field service, must be obeyed unconditionally by all. The conditions for entrance into and departure from the Murman region will be determined by the Murman Regional Council, which will take into consideration the state of war in which the region is involved, and the necessity for most energetic precaution against espionage. Salaries and the standard of labour productively [*sic*] will be established by the Murman Regional Council.

Item 7. In view of the impossibility of importing the necessary food from Russia, the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France promise, as far as it shall be possible, to secure food to the Murman Regional Council for the whole population of the region, including all immigrant workmen with their families, the rations to equal in food

value the rations which the privates of the Allied armed forces in Murman are receiving.

Item 8. The distribution of food among the population is to be carried out by trustworthy Russian troops.

Item 9. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France promise to secure, as far as may be possible, the importation of manufactured goods and other articles of the first necessity.

Item 10. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, promise, as far as may be possible, to secure to the Murman Regional Council all necessary materials and implements for technical equipment and supplies, so that it may carry out its programme of construction which has been elaborated by mutual agreement. In this agreement, first, the requirements of war-time are taken into consideration; secondly, the development of international trade intercourse; and, thirdly, the local fisheries.

Item 11. All expenses which may be incurred by the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, as the result of this agreement, are to be set down to the account of the respective Powers.

Item 12. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France recognise that their Murman Governments¹⁴ must give the necessary financial assistance to the Regional Council.

Item 13. The present agreement comes into force from the moment of its ratification by the Murman Regional Council, and will remain in force as long as normal relations between the Russian central authority, on the one side, and the Murman Regional Council and the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, on the other side, are not re-established.

Item 14. Before signing this agreement the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France, in the name of their Governments, again affirm the absence of any purpose of conquest in respect of the Murman region as a whole or in regard to any of its parts. The Presidium of the Murman Regional Council, before the Russian people, and the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of North America, and France declare that the only object of this agreement is to guard the integrity of the Murman region for a great united Russia.

The original of this agreement has been signed by the Presidium of the Murman Regional Council and by the representatives of the above-named Powers.

The agreement was sanctioned by the Murman Regional Council on the 7th July [1918].

¹⁴ The word 'Murman' was transposed in error. The original of this text read '... recognize that their Governments must give the necessary financial assistance to the Murman Regional Council.'

*Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the
Place des États-Unis, Paris*

C.F. 62¹ [*Secret/General*/162]

Thursday, June 12, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Orlando.

Japan: Baron Makino.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey and Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

1. *Russia. Further Telegram to Admiral Koltchak.* With reference to C.F. 61, Minute 4,² the attached telegram prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr to Admiral Koltchak was approved and signed.

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it immediately to the Secretary-General to be telegraphed, on behalf of the Conference, to Admiral Koltchak (Appendix I).

It was further agreed:—

That the whole of the telegrams interchanged between the Allied and Associated Powers and Admiral Koltchak should be published in the newspapers the following day.

BARON MAKINO while assenting with his Colleagues to the above telegram said he would like to have gone further and to have recognised Admiral Koltchak. Nevertheless it was a step in the right direction.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Allied and Associated Governments could not yet recognise Admiral Koltchak for the whole of Russia. . . .³

APPENDIX I TO No. 257

M. 190 A.

June 12, 1919

The Allied and Associated Powers wish to acknowledge receipt of Admiral Koltchak's reply to their note of the 26th May. They welcome the tone of that reply, which seems to them to be in substantial agreement with the propositions which they had made, and to contain satisfactory assurances for the freedom, self-government, and peace of the Russian people and their

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 348 f.

² See No. 255, note 3.

³ The remainder of these minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

neighbours. They are therefore willing to extend to Admiral Koltchak and his associates the support set forth in their original letter.

D. LLOYD GEORGE
WOODROW WILSON
G. CLEMENCEAU
V. E. ORLANDO
N. MAKINO

No. 258

General Denikin to General Briggs¹ (Ekaterinodar)

[116451/1089/38]

EKATERINODAR, le 30 mai/12 juin 1919

La récente décision des Gouvernements Anglais et des États-Unis d'Amérique de reconnaître l'indépendance de la Finlande² a produit une impression pénible sur les éléments russes qui travaillent en cette heure d'épreuve à l'œuvre patriotique de la régénération de leur Patrie.

Une décision de la question finlandaise en dehors de la Russie et sans égard pour ses intérêts stratégiques, ne saurait être accueillie par le peuple russe.

Cette argumentation s'applique également à toutes les questions touchant à la souveraineté de l'État Russe, telles que la fixation de ses frontières, son régime intérieur etc. L'ensemble de ces questions d'importance capitale doit nécessairement être réservé jusqu'au moment où la volonté nationale aura pu se manifester par l'institution d'un Gouvernement définitif. Il serait en effet inadmissible de régler de pareilles questions en dehors du problème russe et de la participation de la Russie, surtout à un moment où une partie essentielle du peuple russe se trouve sous la domination des bolshévistes.

Le Commandant en Chef des forces armées au Sud de la Russie serait vivement reconnaissant à M. le Général Briggs de vouloir bien faire part des considérations susexposées au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique en faisant appel à son haut sentiment d'équité pour apprécier leur valeur et leur importance.

A. DENIKIN

¹ General Briggs was at that time Chief of the British Military Mission attached to the headquarters of General Denikin. The present note was communicated by General Briggs to the Foreign Office on August 14, 1919.

² The independence of Finland had been accorded British recognition on May 6, 1919.

No. 259

*Note of a Conversation in Paris between Mr. Balfour and
MM. Poska and Piip*

[597/1/6/12880]

PARIS, June 12, 1919

The Esthonian delegates, Messrs. Poska and Piip, called on Mr. Balfour on the 11th June, Sir E. Howard being present.

The object of their visit was to urge the necessity of an immediate recognition of the independence of Esthonia. They stated that the Esthonian National Assembly which was freely elected under democratic suffrage had once more declared the complete independence of Esthonia; that it was in accordance with the principle of self-determination of peoples that their independence should now be recognised; that the Esthonian people had proved by its prolonged struggle against Bolshevik Russia on the one hand and against German domination on the other that they were worthy of independence; that they only wished to live in peace with their Russian neighbours and were ready to give them all possible guarantees as to free ports, a free transit for Russian commerce; and lastly that, inasmuch as the army and nation of Esthonia had been encouraged in their struggle against Bolshevism by the hope that their independence would be recognised, it was to be feared that unless some satisfaction was now given to their national aspirations, this would lead to such discouragement as would seriously imperil the organisation of the army and its power of maintaining an effective defence.

They were told in reply that while His Majesty's Government regarded with the greatest sympathy the struggle of the Esthonians, and had shown their sympathy by supplying them with arms and munitions of war, yet His Majesty's Government and indeed the other Allied Governments felt strongly that no satisfactory or final settlement of the status of the Baltic States could be secured without the consent of the Russian Government, whenever a Government was set up in Russia which could be recognised by the Allied Powers. As this was not yet the case, it seemed impossible now to meet altogether the wishes of the Baltic States by recognising their independence forthwith. At the same time, their position as *de facto* independent States had been acknowledged and semi-official diplomatic relations had been established. The Esthonian delegates were further reminded that assurances had been given them in Mr. Balfour's letter of May 6, 1918, that His Majesty's Government would support, as far as possible, a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the population, and on these assurances the Esthonian Government might confidently rely.

Mr. Piip then said that it was impossible to foresee when a recognised Government would be established in Russia; or indeed if Russia, which was now split up, would be reunited. He said that it was possible that the Esthonians, if they saw that a democratic Russia was really established on a federal basis, would not be unwilling to join in such a Federation. But they wanted to see what the new Russia would be, and felt that they would be in a better position to negotiate with the future Russia if they could do so as one independent State with another, as was done in the case of the United States of America and the Swiss Federation, where the Federation was not imposed from above but entered into voluntarily by the different parties to it. He further pointed out that it was difficult for the Esthonian State to organise itself or to elaborate a constitution so long as the Esthonians were uncertain as to their ultimate status.

Mr. Balfour pointed out in reply that, on the contrary, the more they organised themselves and showed themselves capable of self-government the better would be their case when the final settlement came up for decision.

Mr. Piip then said that the uncertainty of their international situation was a cause of considerable inconvenience to their shipping and citizens abroad, as they had no recognised authorities to protect them. Mr. Balfour replied that this was a new point which had not yet been raised and that he would have the question looked into, to see if these temporary inconveniences could not be overcome. Mr. Balfour concluded by assuring the Estonian delegates of the warm sympathy felt by His Majesty's Government for their nation and of the admiration with which their gallant struggle against the Bolsheviks had been watched by us.¹

ESME HOWARD

¹ On June 17, 1919, the Estonian Delegation in Paris associated itself with the delegations of the Republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Latvia, the North Caucasus, White Russia, and the Ukraine in addressing to Mr. Lloyd George and other members of the Supreme Council a joint note requesting that the political independence of those states might be recognized without delay. This note is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, pp. 380-1. (On October 8, 1919, a further similar joint request for recognition was made by the same delegations in Paris except that this request included signatures of representatives of Lithuania and of the Kuban Republic, but lacked the signature of a representative of White Russia.)

No. 260

Mr. Gorvin¹ (Paris) to Sir R. Graham (Received June 14)

S.E.C./28 [88592/88/38]

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL, PARIS, *June 13, 1919*

Sir,

I am directed to refer to the telegram dated 5th June, No. 812,² to Mr. Balfour, respecting the food requirements of Murmansk and Archangel.

I am to inform you that this question was considered on 11th June by the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council, who have decided that in view of the military importance of continuing supplies of food to the civilian population, the War Departments of the Associated Governments should undertake this provision. Mr. Hoover, the Director-General of Relief, stated at the meeting of the Food Section, that the American Army had already taken steps to furnish certain supplies. The American relief funds are becoming exhausted and the remaining relief ships must be utilised in taking care of the programme in Poland and other liberated countries. Mr. Hoover therefore finds himself unable to do anything further at Archangel or Murmansk from American Relief funds. The pressing claims received from Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Serbia by the British Director of Relief Missions would, if fulfilled, much more than exhaust the small balance remaining of the £12,500,000 granted for British Relief in Europe.

I am, etc.,

J. H. GORVIN

¹ British member of the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

² No. 246.

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 27)
No. 547 Telegraphic [94770/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 15, 1919

Following from Sir Charles Eliot. Begins:—

Confidential.

Omsk. June 12th.

Military situation is admitted by all to be extremely bad. In last month Western Army have had to fall back along whole line losing Ufa and all gains made earlier in year and exposing southern flank of Northern Army which cannot at present advance safely in direction of Viatka and may have to retire. This deplorable collapse seems due not so much to superior Bolshevik forces, as to bad management. Rash advances were made in too many directions at once with half-trained troops and no reserves and several generals were incredibly careless and indolent. Both General Knox and General Januba [? Janin] think that little can be expected from Koltchak's (? troops) this summer unless they are helped by successes on other fronts or by revolts against Bolshevik Government in Russia. *Morale* of troops is not good: recent recruits come chiefly from middle classes because peasantry resist conscription. Men have little confidence or enthusiasm: food and pay have been irregular and desertions have occurred on a considerable scale. One reason for this is that whereas Bolshevik propaganda in Siberia is extremely efficient, Koltchak has practically none. Siberian troops know that if they desert to Bolsheviks they will have a good reception, whereas Bolsheviks fear they will be shot if they attempt to come over to Siberian side.

There is one good sign however, namely that Siberian politicians and generals are endeavouring to work in greater harmony. Gaida has been appointed Commander of both Northern and Western armies. He has telegraphed saying a few days ago there was (? revival of) wholesale desertion.

General Knox has addressed letter to Koltchak recommending him to entrench all along front and organise an active defence until reserves are sufficiently trained to assume offensive with a better chance of success, which he thinks will not be before August. Koltchak did not like the letter but it produced a considerable impression on him. Russians are showing a great disinclination to accept foreign advice in military, financial and railway matters but I think General Knox has real influence with Koltchak and principal generals. But idea of an Anglo-Russian regime is not popular.

Russian view is that Bolsheviks are concentrating their troops on Siberian front which suffers in consequence, whereas Denikin and others are advancing successfully. They also think that Bolshevik Government is breaking up but there is little definite evidence of this though a new and serious revolt is said to have begun in Chernigoff. Reports received indicate that Bolshevik Government has abandoned terrorism and persecutions of Church and is endeavouring to conciliate bourgeoisie: also that Red Army is led by former Imperial Officers in interests of Germany but opinion is divided on this point.

Siberian Railway is working well from Vladivostock to Irkutsk and reflect great credit on Technical Board but further West there is a section roughly speaking from Nijne Udinsk to Kra[snoyarsk] where trains are subject to attack and can go only by day and under escort. Hence all transport from Vladivostock to front is slow and uncertain. We saw remains of 5 trains which had been recently derailed. Czechs are operating against Bolsheviks in this section and have proved satisfactory on the whole, though they have occasionally refused to fight. Some maintain that this trouble on line should be described as brigandage rather than Bolshevism but best evidence indicates that peasantry, though caring little for politics, are not really well disposed to Government. They hold that it has done nothing for them and that things would probably have gone better if Bolsheviks had been given a longer trial last summer.

Seminoff difficulty has been settled¹ but Koltchak did not give Seminoff's agent here a good reception and Seminoff shows no sign of going to front though his troops are said to desire it.

¹ Ataman Semenov, a Far Eastern White Cossack leader, had been engaged in disputes with Admiral Kolchak, notably over the former's claim to exercise an independent command. At the end of May a settlement had been reached whereby Ataman Semenov renounced this claim and was appointed to command the Fifth Army Corps of Admiral Kolchak's forces.

No. 262

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 3943 [85807/26579/56]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 16, 1919*

Sir,

I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter, together with copies of telegrams which have been received from the Director of Military Intelligence regarding the question of a combined Russian and Finnish advance on Petrograd. I am of opinion that the reply to General Gough should be to the effect that His Majesty's Government cannot countenance any advance on Petrograd by Finnish forces unless:—

1. The Finnish Government are prepared to give a binding undertaking that they have no intention of permanently establishing themselves in Russian territory particularly in Karelia, and
2. This undertaking is accompanied by an understanding between the Russians represented by Admiral Kolchak and the Finnish Government.
3. Only on these conditions would His Majesty's Government be prepared to consider proposals for assisting the Finns with money, stores and food.

I should be glad to be informed whether you would concur in a reply being returned to the Director of Military Intelligence on the above lines.

I have, etc.,

[CURZON OF KEDLESTON]

General Thwaites to Sir R. Graham

B.M. 6063 (M.I.R.)

WAR OFFICE, June 7, 1919

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward copies of telegrams Nos. B.S. 11, 16 and 17,¹ together with the following observations:—

1. In forwarding these telegrams, Major-General Thwaites would draw the attention of Sir Ronald Graham to two requests made by General Gough:—

(a) For instructions as to whether he is to change his attitude of polite persuasion on the Finnish Government for one of economic or formal pressure,²

(b) For a decision as to whether His Majesty's Government is prepared to recognise in principle a combined Russian and Finnish advance against Petrograd, and to assist the Finns with money, military stores and food.

Both these requests appear to require a decision by His Majesty's Government before a categorical reply can be made. Although it is realised that it may be necessary to discuss the matter in Paris, Major-General Thwaites hopes that an early statement will be made as to the nature of the answer to be sent to General Gough.

2. Major-General Thwaites desires to point out that the tone of General Mannerheim's conditions contained in B.S. 11³ and the weight of evidence

¹ Not printed. These telegrams of May 28, 30, and 31 respectively, from General Gough in Helsingfors to the War Office raised the questions indicated below.

² This request for instructions was made in telegram B.S. 16 with reference to the fact that 'the required assurance has not yet been given by Regent [Mannerheim] that Finnish Government will give back to Russia any Russian territory which Finnish troops are occupying or may occupy. Chief of the Staff has stated frankly to me that although operations now being conducted by Finnish Volunteers in Karelia and Olonets are not officially recognised by Finnish Government nevertheless a Finnish General Staff Officer is directing and advising the Volunteers from within the Finnish frontier and that Government adopt the attitude that it is not possible to interfere with the wish for self-determination which is being so energetically expressed by the inhabitants of Olonets province.'

³ General Mannerheim was there reported as stating that Finnish forces 'would be available [to attack Petrograd] on following conditions four of which are political and five military, namely:—

'Political. 1. Neutralization of Baltic limited to Russian fleet, demolition of Cronstadt and corresponding Finnish fortresses.

'2. Establishment of neutral zone on land between Petrograd and Finnish frontier.

'3. Cession of Petchenga and narrow strip connecting that port with Finnish territory.

'4. Plebiscite to determine wish of population adjoining Finnish frontier as to whether rule to be Finnish or Russian in area exact limits to be discussed.

'[Military.] 1. Allies to supply Finns with aeroplanes, tanks and other necessary war material.

'2. Financial support of ten million sterling was mentioned but which would need further discussion.

given generally by General Gough's telegrams make it appear that it is undesirable at present for His Majesty's Government to do more than to make it clear to the Finnish authorities once and for all that the co-operation of any Finnish troops in fighting the Bolsheviks can only be accepted after receipt of satisfactory assurances to the effect that there is no intention of annexing Russian territory in Karelia, or of permanently occupying any of the area which may be recovered from Bolshevik control, and in addition, that any Russian territory which may be occupied will be placed under Russian administration.⁴

'3. Allied food for Petrograd and vicinity.

'4. Area round Petrograd, limits of which to be discussed, to be administered by Finns until General Yudenitch ready with sufficient force to take it over.

'5. Yudenitch not to concentrate on Russians in Finland but to wait until Finnish forces consolidated across frontier and then concentrate on Russians in Russia.'

⁴ In a personal letter to Lord Curzon, dated at Helsingfors, June 1, 1919, General Gough had written as follows:

'I have been here over a week but have managed to digest a good deal of information on political questions in the Baltic. . . .

'Perhaps the main point of interest at the moment is whether we should encourage or even sanction an advance by the Finnish Army on Petrograd. From a purely military point of view there can be no doubt that it would be very advantageous to do so; one can never be too strong in war! But from the political point of view I do not think we ought to allow it. There are many disadvantages and dangers in such action especially to Finland itself, but which would react on us.

'The party for an advance are purely the personal adherents of Mannerheim, and even the Cabinet is sharply divided. The army is not a very reliable machine and has about 50% "Red" in its ranks, some people say 75%. Half the population are Socialist and "Red" and would be in violent opposition. Considerable internal troubles might easily arise and the position of Great Britain as the author of this policy would be much shaken. In any case a great and lasting friction between the Finns and Russia is likely to be created, even though Yudenitch and his surroundings here should agree to such action in the original instance.

'Of course the whole situation in the Baltic teems with interesting and thorny questions, but I thought you might like to have my views on the most pressing one as I am on the spot.'
(*Curzon Papers/Russia.*)

No. 263

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 3986 [80166/49797/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 17, 1919*

Sir,

I have to inform you that I have received a letter from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in which it is stated that the Omsk Government have recently approached a leading London bank with a view to obtaining an advance against gold when deposited in the name of that bank and to its order in Hong Kong. M. Nabokoff goes on to say that should His Majesty's Government recognise the right of the Omsk Government, as a *de facto* Government, to deal with public property under their control, it would facilitate the transaction.

I should be glad to know whether, in view of the Notes which have recently been exchanged between Admiral Koltchak and the Allied and Associated Governments, in Paris, on the subject of the recognition of the Omsk Government, M. Nabokoff may be informed that His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise the right of the Omsk Government to deal with public property under their control.

[I have, etc.,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON]

No. 264

Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot (Vladivostok)

No. 37 Telegraphic [89346/46019/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 17, 1919*

My telegram No. 28 Overseas.¹

Arrangements have now been made by the Merchant Trading Company acting on behalf of Zakupsbyt² and Centrosoyuz³ to make an expedition via Kara Sea route this year carrying about 7,000 tons of imports which are to be exchanged for equal amount of exports. Necessary arrangements regarding river tonnage, etc. are in the hands of the Co-operative Societies' representatives in Omsk and you should impress upon Siberian Government that every facility should be accorded to this expedition in view not only of present military, political and commercial advantages but also of possible future development of trading between Siberia and this country.

¹ Not printed.

² Russian purchasing and selling organization.

³ Russian co-operative organization.

No. 265

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received June 19)

No. 409 Telegraphic [91278/88/38]

ARCHANGEL, *June 19, 1919*

Your telegram No. 812¹ to Astoria. I have at last received from Provisional Government note stating they expect value of timber exported to amount to some £1,700,000. 25% of this they propose to allot under credit of Chancery Regulations to purchase flour, sugar and tea. Note states 'Provisional Government therefore consider it would be practicable that as sales of timber and other goods proceeded, foreign currency for payment of supplies should be taken from such sum in shape of bank guarantees on 25% of currency realised'.

I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that (? this) appears to me very vague and urged him to do what he can to obtain something more

¹ No. 246.

substantial from co-operatives and that I did not understand estimate of £400,000 to cover food purchases as value of flour imported last autumn was over 1½ millions. He replied he would enquire and as regards co-operatives he had mentioned matter to Minister of Finance when Mr. Lindley first spoke to him on the subject, see my telegram No. 318,² and would revert to subject at once.

With regard to question of export there is some improvement of labour situation owing to measures adopted by Government. I am urging them to do all they can to increase supply of labour and requesting them to inform me of their programme.

Stocks of flour at present in hand will be sufficient to feed present population of 360,000 till about the end of August but it is practically certain that additional 1(?40),000 will require feeding at an early date. 2,000 tons of seed barley have not been sown: if milled they would only last a fortnight and I understand it would be most wasteful procedure as it is high class seed and should be kept for sowing.

As pointed out in your telegram referred to above supply of food is absolutely essential if military operations are not to be seriously hampered and we are morally bound to feed population (? while) we control.

I should be grateful for information as to present state of negotiations on (this subject) (? the result) with report.

² Not printed.

No. 266

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 20)

No. 1015 [91494/26579/56]

PARIS, June 19, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 3943¹ (85807/W/56) of the 16th instant, respecting the instructions to be given to General Gough as to the attitude he should take up on the question of the Finnish advance against Petrograd, I consider that the best reply that could be made to General Mannerheim would be that His Majesty's Government would only continue to support and assist the Finnish Government in case they advanced on Petrograd on condition that

- (1) Such a policy was clearly approved by the Finnish Diet: and
- (2) General Mannerheim had previously received the sanction of Admiral Koltchak for such a step.

It seems to me that the condition required by the Director of Military Intelligence, viz: that the Finns should give an assurance that they have no intention of permanently establishing themselves in Russian Territory and particularly Karelia, would be covered by the conditions above specified,

¹ No. 262.

in as much as Admiral Koltchak would certainly not sanction any Finnish advance against Petrograd unless he had previously received assurances to this effect. It would no doubt also be most satisfactory to Admiral Koltchak if he were consulted in advance and the assurances given direct to him, while we could inform the Finnish Government that we had taken note of their assurances and considered them binding so far as we were concerned. On the other hand all responsibility for declining Finnish assistance would be thrown on Admiral Koltchak; and the French Government if, as it seems, they favour General Mannerheim's plans, could not accuse His Majesty's Government of making unnecessary difficulties.²

I am, etc.,

(For Mr. Balfour)

LOUIS MALLET

² The subsequent action taken by the Foreign Office in this matter was that noted in No. 272, note 3.

No. 267

Sir C. Eliot (Omsk) to Earl Curzon (Received August 21)

No. 07 [118913/118913/38]

OMSK, June 19, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith memoranda furnished by Professor Sir Bernard Pares, K.B.E.,¹ which comprise:

(a) A letter addressed to M. Soukine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, entitled, 'British co-operation in the work of Russian reconstruction'.²

(b) A 'Note on a Ministerial Conference, held at Omsk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 12th, 1919,' held on the subject of the above letter.

(c) A 'Supplementary Note on a Ministry or Commission on Reconstruction'.

I have, etc.,

C. ELIOT

ENCLOSURE 2³ IN NO. 267

Note on a Ministerial Conference, held at Omsk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 12th, 1919

The Minister of Foreign Affairs in the chair; Present, The Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Finances and also of Trade and Industry, the Minister of Public Instruction, the Minister of Agriculture, the President of the Provincial Zemstvo, and two other gentlemen; also the British Consul

¹ A brief telegraphic summary of these documents was sent to the Foreign Office from Omsk, and transmitted from Vladivostok on June 24 (received July 1).

² Not printed. This letter is printed by Sir Bernard Pares: *My Russian Memoirs* (London, 1931), pp. 613-17.

³ For the omission of enclosure 1 see note 2 above.

(Mr. Hodgson), and Professor Pares. A letter was read from the British High Commissioner expressing his sympathy with the object of the conference, and his wish to assist it by all means in his power.

The subject of the conference was a letter of Prof. Pares to Mr. Soukine, Minister of Foreign Affairs (appended).²

Prof. Pares pointed out a few inaccuracies in the Russian translation of his letter.

The Minister of the Interior (Mr. Pepelaiev) expressed himself as in principle entirely for such co-operation between the two countries as was suggested in the letter. In particular, his Ministry was in need of expert assistants in town-planning, in drainage and in water-supply. Lecturers on such subjects were required in Russia.

Prof. Pares mentioned the existence of an English School of Town Planning, and suggested a delegation of experts to England to see in what departments [? they] might have most to borrow from England.

The Minister of the Interior spoke of associating with the work not only representatives from the lately formed Siberian Zemstvo, but also experts from the Zemstva of European Russia, now in Omsk. He had then to leave the conference to report to Admiral Kolchak.

The Minister of Public Instruction (Prof. Preobrazhinsky) said that the suggestion contained in the letter was very expedient and fruitful, and that he was very grateful for it. He was already, after conversations with Prof. Pares, preparing a memorandum for the President of the Board of Education in England on questions of detail, in which British help could [? be] valuable to Russia, and he felt sure that the Minister of Finance (Mikhailov) would give the necessary credits for this purpose. He suggested the possibility of a special British loan for financing educational work in Siberia. In the training of Russians, Germany had in the past practically had a complete monopoly among foreign nations, and it was in the highest degree necessary to get rid of this monopoly. Educational and laboratorial apparatus had in the past come almost exclusively from Germany, and Russian attempts to secure an initiative of British firms in this matter had so far failed, fear being expressed of deteriorating the quality of the goods by accepting Russian orders. Books are a pressing need of Siberia, also printing presses, although it is proposed to mobilize most of the existing presses for educational purposes, also textbooks and even paper. All kinds of requests for school-books are coming in from the northern areas of Siberia, and cannot be met. In particular, it is urgently desirable to secure without delay a special press for printing school-books. These are only some of the more urgent and immediate needs; but it is desirable to carry out the ideas suggested in the letter of Prof. Pares as widely as possible.

Prof. Pares asked whether the machinery used in technical schools for demonstration was largely German, and whether, in consequence students training with German machinery later introduced German machinery into works in which they were in charge. This the Minister confirmed as a very common occurrence.

The Minister of Agriculture was strongly in favour of the co-operation suggested. It was very desirable for his department in the following fields:—horticulture, engineering, scientific agriculture, teachers for schools for agriculture, model farms, forestry, road-making in forest areas, fisheries, wild game. Hydraulics are especially necessary, as large areas of Siberia are barren, and others marshy. School apparatus is also required. He said that he not only sympathised with the ideas under discussion, but would meet them with the fullest confidence.

Prof. Pares explained that in England, owing to the co-operation of institutions for various educational specialities, it would not be difficult to transfer to the proper quarters, the task of training in any given speciality, and that where (as in the case of Englishmen) a knowledge of Russian and of Russia was required, this could be given by the University Schools of Russian Studies; also that it would be possible to combine practical training with theoretical work.

The Minister of Finances and also of Trade and Industry (Mr. Mikhailov) expressed himself as especially interested in the generous help suggested, and said that he would be very ready to propose the necessary credits for this work. Instructors of many kinds were absolutely necessary to Russia, and the general principles of the proposed co-operation were clear beyond discussion. He would himself, like other Ministers, submit a detailed list of matters in which these principles could be applied. Meanwhile, he would deal with a question on which the suggestions had caused him much thought. As a Russian he felt ashamed that while there existed in England the fitting organisation to help Russia (as outlined at the end of Prof. Pares' letter), there did not yet exist in Russia the proper organ for availing oneself of such help. He considered there should be established a special Minister or Department of Reconstruction. If England had need of such an organ, Russia's need of it was far greater, and there was enormous work of study and of drafting of reforms which would lie before it. He thought they should propose to the Cabinet to propose such an organ, and a part of its task could be to carry on the work arising out of the present discussion.

Prof. Pares said this suggestion, though entirely a matter of internal Russian politics, could only have the warmest welcome of English opinion. It would be a further step in the establishment of a common language between the two countries, it would represent the association of all the constructive forces in the country, and it would also supply the best possible organ for the work now under discussion.

The President of the Provincial Zemstvo (Akmolinsk) expressed his warm appreciation of the suggestions in the letter, especially for cultural work. The Province was terribly short of school teachers, of text-books (for which it depended on Shanghai), and even of copy books. He supported the suggestion of securing special loans to the Government for defined educational objects. Technical specialists were essentially needed, and, however distinctive the tasks of local self-government in Russia, foreign technical help must be obtained. Irrigation in particular is a matter of life and death to the

Province. He assumed that under the suggestions put forward, it would be possible for Siberia to utilize the experience of Canada, which had to deal with so many similar problems, and in this respect the Canadian Government had already been approached. Siberia was not in a position in which she could afford to move slowly in the matter. Whatever the advantages of slow evolution, it was at present necessary to put public service on such wide foundations as exist in the West of Europe. Agricultural instruments are a specially immediate need.

Prof. Pares said that the suggested steps offered the means of putting a Siberian or Russian Zemstvo in direct communication, through its Government, with the British local government authority, and that direct ties with Canada also fell fully within the aims of the suggestions.

The Minister of Public Instruction now returned to the proposal put forward by the Minister of Finances for the creation of an organ of Russian reconstruction, which he heartily supported. He would gladly have seen such an organ connected with his own Ministry, but its work would be far wider. It might either be a special Ministry, or an inter-departmental organ.

In the discussion which followed among the Ministers present, it was resolved that this should be an organ uniting the Government with the best forces of the public (for instance, the Zemstva and the Co-operative Societies), for constructive work; and the Ministers of Finance and Public Instruction were asked to draft a definite proposal to be submitted as early as possible to the Cabinet.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs summed up the discussion and expressed the entire agreement of those present on the main subjects discussed. A letter expressing this agreement would be sent by him to Prof. Pares. Details of the suggestions of the various Ministries and public bodies would be sent direct to Prof. Pares. A detailed project for a Government organ of reconstruction, which should co-ordinate action both of the Government and of the public bodies, would be submitted to the Cabinet without delay.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 267

Supplementary Note on a Ministry or Commission on Reconstruction

OMSK, June 14, 1919

The idea is suggested by the work of reconstruction, which is proceeding everywhere else, notably in England, and which is far more needed in Russia than anywhere.

A whole mass of study and drafting work is required for Siberia, and, when European Russia is recovered, this task, as all admit at once, will be gigantic.

Among the Siberian population is noticeable a marked tendency away from parties towards practical constructive work and ordered economic life. The Siberian Government has dealt, though only very partially, with this need through some special commissions. By an adequate organisation of this work, it would definitely take up its proper position at the head of the movement back to common sense, and would claim the co-operation of the best

forces of the public for responsible and constructive work. It would also take a great step towards recovering the direction of its own internal affairs. It would give stronger reason for the adhesion of the population in European Russia, where really little is being done except sheer destruction. It would also establish a strong claim to the support of other States engaged in similar constructive work.

The work of reconstruction in Russia falls in the main into three categories:—(a) Military, (b) Economic, (c) Social Reconstruction. This last, as admitted everywhere, for instance by Admiral Kolchak, is fully as large a field as either of the others. The mechanism of Society was always very weak, and has been almost entirely destroyed. The reorganisation has to be begun exactly from that part of the State (Siberia), to which the autocracy had denied all local self-government, and it is complicated by military claims on all persons of education for the front.

No other country but Germany has appreciated the importance of this field of social reconstruction in Russia. Consequently Germany has made definite attempts to capture the whole machinery of the Siberian Co-operative Societies, the one existing great social organisation in the country, and I have evidence of the continuance of such attempts even since the armistice.

A Russian Ministry (or Standing Commission) of Reconstruction, which would lean on the support of all friendly Powers, would be a very considerable step towards putting Russia on her own legs, and enabling her to play her part in that settlement of the world which is so necessary to peace.

The proposal of Mr. Mikhailov (Minister of Finances and also of Trade and Industry) at the conference on June 12th, was the outcome of several conversations which I had with him, and with other Ministers, and was an initiative taken on the grounds above described.

BERNARD PARES

No. 268

Mr. Ferram¹ (Novorossisk) to Earl Curzon (Received July 14)

No. 7 [102666/102666/38]

NOVOROSSISK, June 20, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to call your attention to the extraordinary wave of enthusiasm for Great Britain and the English, that is noticeable amongst the Russians in this district. One hears on every side the statement that England is the only country that understands Russia and that gives her any real assistance. One is no longer pestered with enquiries as to when the great army that is to free Russia from Bolshevism may be expected from Great Britain, but one is loaded with expressions of gratitude for the substantial and moral support given to the Volunteer Army.

The example and bearing of the British soldier, and the appearance of good British cloth on the backs of the Russian soldier, are having quite as

¹ Acting British Consul at Novorossisk.

stimulating an effect on Russian officers and men as the tanks and aeroplanes with which they are rapidly being supplied. Soldiers of the Red Army are beginning to doubt their wisdom in fighting against an enemy, that is casting off the rags it has worn for four years, to don clean uniforms of excellent English material.

Much interest is being shown in England and English life. Articles in English appear frequently in several of the newspapers of the district, and paragraphs full of good feeling towards Great Britain appear almost daily. I enclose translation of a typical article that appeared lately in the *Chernomorski Mayak*,² published at Novorossisk.

The splendid work done by the British Fleet in the evacuation of the Ukraine and Crimea, and the sympathy shown to Russian refugees by officers and men of British warships and naval transports, will never be forgotten by the present and coming generation.

Great Britain has shown a lack of self-interest and a warm and active sympathy towards the Russian situation that is in marked contrast with the apparent egoism and distant attitude of our neighbours, who have entirely failed to grasp the true spirit or gain the sympathies of a people, who for the better part of a century have gazed yearningly towards the Parisian Mecca of the West, in constant admiration of an enlightened culture, in which they have lately experienced the most complete disenchantment.

It is unlikely that that nation will ever recover her lost status in the minds of the Russian people, who will turn to Great Britain as preceptor with respect combined with warm affection.

It must be the task of Great Britain—as much in the interest of international and social concord as from an amicable desire for the welfare of the future Russia—to refrain from any action that will detract in any way from this saner and healthier spirit of enthusiasm for British principles and for her well-balanced outlook on life. For in this connection it is essential to remember that the only nation besides Great Britain which has given any real help to large tracts of Russia in her struggle with Bolshevism, and for whom an increased sympathy is felt in wider classes than formerly of the Russian people—is Germany.

I have, &c.,

C. B. JERRAM

² Not printed. The article was entitled 'First Aid Ambulance' and was a warm eulogy of 'England in her role of First Aid Ambulance of world-wide altruism'.

No. 269

Note of a Conversation in Paris between Sir E. Howard and the Carpatho-Russian Delegation

[609/4/1/13143]

PARIS, June 20, 1919

Sir Esme Howard saw yesterday Messrs. Markoff, Gladick and Dzwonchyk of the Carpatho-Russian Delegation.

They claimed to speak on behalf of four and a half million people, i.e. the Little Russians of Galicia and on the south slopes of the Carpathians in Hungary and the Bukovina. These people had been officially designated by the Austro-Hungarian Government as Ruthenes, but they were really Little Russians, and the vast majority of them only desired reunion with Russia.

The Ukrainian Delegation which claimed to speak for the Ruthenes of Galicia really represented only a class of politicians and lawyers. The great majority of the peasants considered themselves as Russians and had no sympathy for the movement for the establishment of an independent Ukraine. The whole Ukrainian idea owed its origin to Bismarck who had started Ukrainian propaganda in Ukraine with a view to weakening the Russian position, and this had been taken up and developed by the Austrian Government who had also supported it in Galicia to counteract the Russian Pan-Slav movement.

The Carpatho-Russians claimed reunion with Russia, and as this was at present impossible they wanted that for the time their territory should be neutralised.

Sir Esme Howard said that he would submit their remarks to the competent authorities and that he could assure them that whatever political arrangements might, for the time being, be applied to these territories, full consideration would be given to the rights of minorities.

E. H. CARR¹

¹ A member of the British Delegation at Paris.

No. 270

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 28)
No. 557 Telegraphic [95349/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 21, 1919

Following from Sir Charles Eliot, Omsk, dated June 16th. Begins.

Second Note of Allies¹ was handed to Koltchak yesterday and Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me about it at considerable length this morning.

He said Omsk Government noticed Powers studiously avoid the word 'recognize'.

When first communication was made Sasonov advised them to take up this point and enquire whether assistance promised might not be described as recognition. But Koltchak had refused to do this and said that if Allies offered him assistance it was undignified to ask them what was their opinion as to his exact status.

Nevertheless it is clear to me that Omsk Government and Koltchak himself are greatly disappointed at not receiving any definite statement about recognition and I understand their difficulty. Army and public are familiar with idea that recognition will mark a turning point in fortunes of Government. No proclamation describing new attitude of Allies and assistance

¹ See No. 257, appendix I

which they are ready to give will be satisfactory if it does not include this word, for it will be believed they are not at all reasonable (? in) refusing to give Omsk Government the status which it expected to have. Moral of troops is very poor at present. They do not know what they are fighting for and they hardly know why they are fighting against Bolsheviks. Something would be gained if they could be told that they are fighting for a Government which is recognized by the Powers as proper Government for all Russia or simply recognized without further qualification. Minister for Foreign Affairs went on to ask whether Omsk Government would now be able to discuss matters of general Russian policy, military and other, with (? Allies). Hitherto this had not been the case: they knew hardly anything of our relations with Denikin and Yudenich and even in Siberia they had merely heard unofficially and not as a Government of advance or achievement of our troops.

Though Siberian army hoped to advance into European Russia this autumn, yet it was necessary to face possibility that military situation would not be changed materially until after next winter. In view of this following questions suggested themselves to him.

1. Would Powers be ready to discuss with Omsk Government a general military plan of action on all Russian fronts?
2. Would supplies of equipment and ammunition continue? Would all Powers contribute and would Russians be given credit, or required as usual to pay cash?
3. Could Russia obtain loan from Powers?

He had already discussed with United States Consul General possibility of America giving a modest loan.

No amount had been mentioned but American Consul General had stated support given to Koltchak might include financial assistance.

4. Could Omsk Government count on foreign troops for garrisoning Far East and guarding line? He did not think that it could maintain order in Vladivostock district without foreign aid. He thought certain number of volunteers might be found among Czechs but that majority would have to be repatriated before winter and that portion of line now guarded by them would have to be handed over to Japanese or American troops.

No. 271

Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot (Omsk)

No. 430 Telegraphic [89561/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 21, 1919

Note addressed to Admiral Kolchak's Government by Allied Powers has made clear their policy and has given a valuable momentum to his cause. But I think it very important that he should realize the exact conditions which underlie and to some extent qualify acceptance of that policy. There is a considerable section of opinion in this country which regards it with great

suspicion on the ground that the Allies are supporting the extreme reactionary elements in Russia who stand for no smaller programme than the restoration of Russia on the basis of 1914.

Every act of Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin or their representatives tending to confirm this view is used as an argument to prevent H.M. Government from adhering to their present attitude. It is of supreme importance that this should be fully appreciated by Admiral Kolchak.

While we are satisfied that he himself stands for principles which accord with the traditional policy of this country, and that we are accordingly justified in supporting him in spite of the criticism which is directed against us, it is desirable that he should lose no opportunity of impressing upon his entourage the momentous issues involved in the positions which they may assume, and should warn them that the continued assistance of Great Britain in the matter of supplies and other material support, without which he can hardly hope for success, is involved. It would be impossible for any Government in this country to continue for long a policy which had not public opinion behind it.

You may use your discretion as to how to convey to Admiral Kolchak a communication in the above sense, but I am sure he will appreciate that our wish is to be able to give him the maximum support possible, consistent with the limitations which are imposed upon us by the feelings of our own people.

In particular he should be careful as to the wording of the proclamations issued by him from time to time. These are widely read in this country, and anything which can be interpreted as supporting the opponents of Allied policy is used by the latter in their attacks. His proclamations should in fact be worded with as much regard for opinion in this country, and incidentally in America, as for opinion in Russia itself.

No. 272

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 21)

No. 1072 Telegraphic [92233/26579/56]

PARIS, June 21, 1919

With reference to telegram sent me by War Office on 19th¹ repeating

¹ This telegram reported that 'Finnish Government and Russian Provisional Government of north-west front represented by Political Council President General Yudenitch at Helsingfors, which recognises Admiral Kolchak as Supreme Regent of Russia, have agreed together that following terms shall be basis of ultimate treaty between Russia and Finland as soon as circumstances permit, begins:—

'Article 1. Unconditional recognition of independence of Finland.

'Article 2. Determination of following legal questions inherited from former connexion of Finland with Russia (A) Reciprocally (*sic*) state to be liable for public debts or military expenses other than state and Russia not to be responsible for dismantling on Aland Islands. (B) Finland to retain all previously Russian ordnance stores and buildings in Finland but to submit question of other kind of Russian military property to a Special Commission with a view to payment of compensation. (C) All property not of military nature to be bought by State where it is situated unless such property had been acquired

telegram from Helsingfors stating terms of agreement between Finnish Government and General Yudenich as to conditions agreed to between them for Finnish advance on Petrograd, I consider that before we approve, sanction of Admiral Kolchak should be obtained in writing (see my despatch No. 1015² of June 19). If terms of this agreement have not been communicated to him, please do so through Sir C. Eliot.³ Subject to his approval I have no objection. C.I.G.S. agrees.

without payment originally in which case no payment now to be made. (D) Peace Conference or League of Nations to decide exact manner in which Russia is to carry out Russian Imperial Decree of February 15th, 1864, regarding exchange of territory by which Finland gains access to winter port on the Arctic Ocean.

'Article 3. (A) Recognition of right of complete national self-determination for Karelia and Olonets. League of Nations or Peace Conference to decide when and how and within what territorial limits this right to be exercised. (B) Russian subjects of Finnish nationality living near Petrograd to reserve and use their own language, religion, schools, law-courts and magistracy. (C) Russian pilgrims to have free access to Monasteries, barracks Walaam on Lake Ladoga and Monks of foreign nationality to reserve their own several nationalities. (D) Finnish shipping to have access to Lake Ladoga under same regulations as Russian but to pay transit dues on cargoes. (E) Neither State to have men-of-war on Lake Ladoga. (F) Compensation for loss of private property in Russia to be paid to Finnish subjects on the same terms as to subjects of Allied Powers: Finland to reciprocate Russian subjects. (G) Neutralization of Baltic and of Finland to be decided by Peace Conference or League of Nations.

'Article 4. Finland to have preferential commercial and tariff treatment from future Government of United Russia but until establishment of latter existing regulations hold good.

'Following conditions for Finnish military advance on Petrograd: (A) General Mannerheim to direct entire operation. (B) Russian fugitives from Russia to be admitted across frontier and Russian forces to be collected and organised when mobilization ordered in Finland. These to be allotted a definite section of front at commencement of advance and to receive orders direct from General Y[udenitch]. Russian officers to be attached to Finnish staff and units down to regiments and to receive and sort prisoners and deal with requisitioning and billets. (C) Regiment of Finnish White Guards to support Russian forces in maintenance of order in Petrograd but all occupation of Russian territory to be completed under Russian authorities. (D) Railways north of river (? Nev)a to be administered by Finnish forces to remain in Russia until relieved by Russian forces which are to be raised by General Y[udenitch]. (E) Finnish-Russian frontier to be closed and transit under control of Russian or Finnish Governments respectively (ends).

'Note by British Mission—in view of decrease of exorbitant Finnish demands and concessions to Russians who will be in complete co-operation with Finns, do you now agree with projected operation in principle?'

² No. 266.

³ On June 24, 1919, Lord Curzon telegraphed to Sir C. Eliot at Omsk requesting him to 'obtain sanction of Admiral Kolchak in writing to terms of agreement'.

No. 273

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors)

No. 3 Telegraphic [612/5/1/13800]

PARIS, June 23, 1919

Following from C.I.G.S., Paris. Begins:—

A telegram just received from Vladivostock shows that Kolchak will raise no objection to a Finnish military occupation of Petrograd provided Russian

forces participate in the operation and Yudenitch takes administration of Petrograd on occupation. This being so you will make our attitude clear which is that we strongly support Kolchak's views. Ends.

Repeated Vladivostock No. 1 and War Office No. 70.

No. 274

Mr. Bell¹ (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received June 26)

No. 345 Telegraphic [94174/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, June 25, 1919

I understand His Majesty's Government's reply regarding proposal that Finnish troops should occupy Petrograd has made favourable impression in Finnish official circles.

I should like to add General Mannerheim seems inclined to negotiate directly with Russians under Admiral Koltchak whereas Cabinet considers it impossible to obtain majority in Diet without having agreement with Allied countries which would protect all Finnish interests.

Finns are not willing to trust any Russians and would prefer to be associated directly with Allied countries.

Please telegraph to me direct.

Repeated to Paris.

¹ British Consul and acting Chargé d'Affaires at Helsingfors.

No. 275

M. Sazonov to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received June 26)

[612/5/2/13675]

PARIS, le 25 juin 1919

Monsieur le Ministre,

Ci-joint j'ai l'honneur d'adresser à Votre Excellence un exemplaire de l'aide-mémoire que les Ambassadeurs de Russie près les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés sont chargés de remettre aujourd'hui aux Gouvernements auprès desquels ils sont accrédités.

Copie de ce document sera adressée au Foreign Office par le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Londres.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

SAZONOV

ENCLOSURE IN No. 275

Aide-mémoire

A la veille de la signature par les Puissances Alliées et Associées de la Paix avec l'Allemagne, le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie a le devoir d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement Britannique sur la situation qui sera créée de ce chef à la Russie.

Le Gouvernement Russe n'ayant pas encore été officiellement reconnu et ses délégués n'ayant pas été admis à participer à la Conférence, le Traité de Paix a été élaboré sans le concours de la Russie et ne portera pas sa signature. D'autre part, la Russie nationale n'a jamais reconnu le Traité conclu par les bolchéviks à Brest-Litovsk, auquel, d'ailleurs, l'Allemagne elle-même a été contrainte de renoncer. Il n'existe donc pour le moment aucun acte qui mette fin à l'état de guerre existant entre la Russie et l'Allemagne. Cette situation ne pouvant se prolonger indéfiniment il faudra nécessairement qu'un traité intervienne à ce sujet entre les deux pays.

Les délégués russes à Paris ont exposé à la Conférence de la Paix dans deux Mémoires consécutifs, en date du 9 avril et du 22 mai,¹ les conditions

¹ The Russian memorandum of May 22, 1919, was addressed to M. Clemenceau and signed by Prince Lvov and MM. Tchaikovsky and Maklakoff on behalf of the Russian Political Conference at Paris. The more important portions of this memorandum read as follows:

'Dans leur mémoire du 9 avril 1919, les soussignés ont au nom de la Conférence Politique Russe attiré l'attention de la Conférence de la Paix sur la part qui dans l'ensemble des revendications à présenter à l'Allemagne revient légitimement à la Russie. Ils ont rappelé que, par sa contribution à la préparation de la victoire, la Russie avait le droit d'être traitée sur un pied d'égalité avec ses alliés pour tout ce qui touche le règlement de comptes final avec l'ennemi commun, tant pour les questions d'ordre politique et militaire que pour celles d'ordre financier et économique.

'Ayant pris connaissance des conditions de Paix présentées par les Puissances alliées et associées à l'Allemagne, les soussignés, tout en renouvelant leurs déclarations du 9 avril, ont l'honneur de présenter à la Conférence de la Paix les observations suivantes:

'I

'La Russie, n'étant pas partie contractante au présent Traité, se trouve, de ce fait, privée du bénéfice de la plus grande partie des droits privés et des avantages stipulés dans les Conditions de Paix en faveur des Puissances alliées et associées.

'Les soussignés ont l'honneur de demander de vouloir bien introduire dans les conditions de Paix une déclaration spéciale assurant à la Russie l'exercice des droits, avantages et privilèges de tout ordre stipulés par le traité en faveur des principales Puissances alliées et associées.

'Comme conséquence, afin d'assurer l'exécution des stipulations ci-dessus, la Russie sera représentée dans toutes les institutions ou commissions de contrôle ou d'exécution et toutes autres prévues par le traité de Paix sur un pied d'égalité absolue avec les principales Puissances alliées et associées.

'Les droits de la Russie ayant été expressément réservés, il en résulte que les délais pour la présentation des revendications, demandes de réparations, constatations de dommages, recouvrements de valeurs, biens mobiliers, etc., les délais pour la désignation des délégués aux commissions créées par le traité de paix, ceux pour l'institution des offices russes de compensations, etc., commenceront à courir à partir d'une date à fixer ultérieurement. . .

'II

'Le Pacte de la Société des Nations ne prévoit pas la participation de la Russie comme membre originaire de la Société. En vertu de l'alinéa 2 de l'article 1^{er}, la Russie ne pourrait devenir membre de la Société que si son admission était prononcée par les deux tiers de l'Assemblée.

'Or, la Russie a le droit de siéger dans la Société des Nations. On ne saurait oublier le rôle que la Russie, initiatrice des Conférences de la Haye, a joué dans l'orientation du monde vers la Paix. D'autre part, c'est l'intensité de cet effort et les sacrifices énormes que la Russie s'est imposés dans cette guerre pour la libération de l'humanité qui l'ont

essentielles qu'il était urgent d'insérer dans le Traité de Paix pour garantir les intérêts russes. Le texte du Traité contient, en effet, quelques stipulations en ce sens, mais les vœux exprimés par les délégués russes n'ont pas été pris suffisamment en considération pour permettre à la Russie de régulariser, le moment venu, ses rapports avec l'Allemagne en adhérant simplement au Traité signé par les Alliés. Par conséquent, pour obtenir satisfaction et sauvegarder ses intérêts légitimes, la Russie sera obligée par la force des circonstances de conclure un traité spécial avec l'Allemagne dans des conditions particulièrement défavorables pour elle.

PARIS, *le 25 juin 1919.*

précipitée dans la terrible crise actuelle. Il est enfin évident qu'une Société des Nations, à laquelle ne participerait pas la Russie, serait privée de la stabilité nécessaire.

'Par conséquent, les soussignés ont l'honneur de demander à la Conférence de la Paix que soit inséré dans le Traité un article réservant à la Russie le droit d'accéder au Pacte de la Société des Nations sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité avec les membres originaires de la Société.

'III

'L'alinéa 2 de l'article 116 porte: "L'Allemagne reconnaît définitivement l'annulation des Traités de Brest-Litovsk ainsi que de tous autres accords ou conventions passés par elle depuis la révolution maximaliste de novembre 1917 avec tous Gouvernements ou groupes politiques formés sur le territoire de l'ancien Empire Russe". D'autre part, il a paru dans la presse une version nouvelle modifiant la fin de ce paragraphe comme suit:

'"L'annulation du Traité de Brest-Litovsk, ainsi que de tous accords conclus avec les Gouvernements maximalistes de toute la Russie". Cette modification implique la validité des accords ou conventions passés par l'Allemagne avec des Gouvernements ou groupes politiques qui n'étaient pas maximalistes (Ukraine, Lithuanie, etc.). Une pareille rédaction serait en contradiction manifeste avec les intérêts de la Russie, et les soussignés demandent le maintien du texte primitif.

'En ce qui concerne l'alinéa 3 de l'article 116, les soussignés, en se référant aux observations présentées sub I, demandent que soient assurés à la Russie aussi bien le droit à toutes les restitutions et réparations basé sur les principes de ce Traité, que l'exercice des droits, avantages et privilèges de tout ordre stipulés par le Traité en faveur des principales Puissances alliées et associées.

'IV

'L'article 117 mentionne les Etats qui se sont constitués ou se constitueront sur tout ou partie des territoires de l'ancien Empire de Russie. Les soussignés tiennent à déclarer qu'ils interprètent ce texte dans le sens qu'il s'agit d'Etats dont l'existence aurait été reconnue par la Russie.

'V

'Afin d'assurer le recouvrement des sommes dues par l'Allemagne dans les conditions analogues à celles établies pour les principales Puissances alliées et associées et leurs ressortissants, les soussignés demandent que les dispositions contenues dans la partie IX des clauses financières sous la rubrique "transferts de biens allemands à l'étranger", soient modifiées, en ce qui concerne la Russie, de la façon suivante:

'"L'Allemagne acquiert tous droits ou intérêts des ressortissants allemands dans toute entreprise d'utilité publique ou dans toute concession en Russie et transfère la totalité de ces droits ou intérêts, possédés en Russie, à la Commission des Réparations qui les prendra en charge pour compte de l'Etat Russe, auquel ils seront remis dès que faire se pourra. La valeur de ces intérêts ou droits sera portée au crédit de l'Allemagne à valoir sur les sommes dues à la Russie au titre des réparations."

The concluding sections VI and VII of this memorandum related to the safeguarding of Russian interests in respect of measures designed to meet the economic contractual consequences of the annulment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

No. 276

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received June 25)
No. 420 Telegraphic [93840/88/38]

ARCHANGEL, June 25, 1919

My telegram No. 409.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs has now explained that sum of £400,000 was sterling, which Provisional Government were fairly confident would be available for food purchases and no (? further details of) steps required.

As you are pressing for immediate decision of food question, it may be useful that I should report that in order to reach some more remote areas before winter sets in, it is necessary to ship 7,000 tons of flour from Archangel not later than September 15th.

As our stocks will be exhausted by end of August, and local crops will not yet be available it is imperative that we should receive 10,000 tons before end of August, and further supplies shortly afterwards.

It would be very advantageous if small extra rations could be issued to peasants for about two months, during hay and corn harvest, as work will be specially heavy this year, owing to mobilization of all young men; until further supplies are in sight, it is not possible to do so.

My United States colleague is (? telegraph)ing in similar sense.

¹ No. 265.

No. 277

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received June 27)
No. 426 Telegraphic [94717/46019/57]

ARCHANGEL, June 26, 1919

My telegram No. 392.¹

Intercepted telegram from Russian Minister in London reported a few days ago that Inter-Departmental Conference decided to send 5,000 tons of munitions of war to Admiral Koltchak via Ob.

I have consulted various persons who have good knowledge of transport conditions generally and not one of them considers scheme sound assuming that munitions of war are required at front and not to protect lines of communication.

Sea voyage is hazardous but assuming vessels arrive experience, especially in 1915 before there was British Staff here to expedite matter, shows that subsequent delays will be endless. Captain Proctor who is now in England could probably furnish interesting details. Though preference in matters of transport is stipulated for munitions of war, private interests of co-operatives

¹ Not printed.

in civil supplies which will arrive simultaneously² are likely to prevail unless British officers accompany expedition from start to finish. At best munitions of war would not reach front before November, at worst they would as happened frequently in part [? past] be lost on the way.

Commodore does not expect to be able to transport more material than he already has in view but even so munitions of war in question appear to be more likely to reach Koltchak if held here than if sent to Ob.

² Cf. No. 264.

No. 278

Earl Curzon to Mr. Hoare (Archangel)
No. 382 Telegraphic [91701/60734/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 26, 1919

Your telegram No. 330.¹

In order to assist Anglo-Russian trade His Majesty's Government have decided to undertake insurance of British exports on British imports lying in Russia awaiting delivery to purchasers and on Russian exports after purchase by British firms whilst awaiting shipment. At present insurance cannot be obtained on the latter and on the former insurance facilities are available only for limited periods, limited amounts, and whilst goods are lying in Russian ports. Premiums charged will be such as to balance any anticipated losses.

This insurance arrangement will be put into force on June 21 [*sic*].

It is expected that provision of insurance facilities will enable British banks to make advances to British exporters on commercial lines and it is hoped that Banks will open up business by making arrangements for bringing exporters and importers together.

There is no intention of showing preference to co-operative societies, but as the currency position in Russia makes it practically impossible to do business except on barter lines, it has been pointed out that the network of co-operative societies offers a means of collecting the required Russian produce.

I should be glad to receive your observations as to desirability of extending measure to North Russia. It is not desired to compete with ordinary insurance market or to assume greater liabilities than can be avoided, but I understand that considerable difficulties are experienced in insuring goods after unloading.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of May 20 (received May 21) asked for information about a report that 'His Majesty's Government are considering reopening trade with Russia through Co-operative Societies. . . . Preference shown them would make bad impression on majority of dealers who are friendly to us.'

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)
No. 936 Telegraphic [91815/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 26, 1919

Please request Colonel Cartier to transmit following from Eiffel Tower.

Monsieur Tchicherin, Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Moscow.

With reference to your radio of June 10,¹ it is quite impracticable for me to arrange exchange on the basis of all Allied military prisoners against Russian Red military prisoners in hands of Allied Governments because His Majesty's Government have no power to negotiate for exchange of prisoners other than those in their own hands. On humanitarian grounds however it is clear recent exchange of Raskolnikoff and Ninuik for a number of British subjects² was a good thing and that something further should now be done. Following course is suggested.

(a) Exchange of all British military and naval prisoners, officers and men, against equivalent number of Russian Red military and naval prisoners or Russian supporters of Soviet Government now prisoners in hands of His Majesty's Government. I understand negotiations for a partial exchange are going on between Soviet commander and British G.O.C. Archangel.

(b) That you should give permission for any other British subjects who desire to do so to leave Russia in return for permission for any other Russians in hands of His Majesty's Government who desire to do so to return to Soviet Russia.

As regards (b) your radio of June 10 says no progress can be made unless Soviet Government is allowed to send to London or some neutral country a commission enabled to get into touch with Russians in Great Britain to receive their complaints and enquire into their position. I cannot agree to a commission formed of Russian supporters of the Soviet Government coming to the United Kingdom for this purpose, but I would agree to allow some Swiss citizen or Norwegian, Danish or Swedish subject with proper qualifications to come here as soon as possible and to get into touch with all Russian supporters of Soviet Government referred to in (b) above, if you will immediately carry into effect proposed exchange at Archangel of 43 [prisoners] on each side³ and will also immediately proceed to exchange of the British military and naval prisoners, both officers and men, who would then still remain in hands of Soviet Government.

In order to effect (b) mentioned above the Swiss citizen or Norwegian or Swedish or Danish subject would have to be a person of the very highest standing and his name would have to be agreed upon between us.

¹ No. 253.

² See No. 241, note 3.

³ This proposed exchange was the subject of the local negotiations in North Russia referred to in paragraph (a) above.

No. 280

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received July 1)
No. 567 Telegraphic [96505/75411/38]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 26, 1919

Following from High Commissioner, Omsk. Begins:—

Your Lordship's telegram 366¹ repeating telegram from Berne about Prince Lubomirski.²

Idea of Russian-Japanese-German Alliance no doubt exists. Minister for Foreign Affairs maintains that it is not prevalent in Siberia but rather among Russians living abroad in various European capitals, particularly Stockholm. His language is not however quite consistent, as he once said to me that if Allies make Esthonia, Latvia, and Caucasus independent they would force Russia to seek support of Japan and Germany. (? Koltchak) is said to have used similar language to others but has always assured me he would not listen to Japanese overtures. I think Siberians have a natural dislike for Japanese and Germans, holding latter to be largely responsible for Bolshevism, but that when . . .³ Western Powers they dally with idea of an Alliance which will upset existing International relations.

¹ This telegram of May 22 transmitted the substance of the following telegram (No. 830) of May 17 (received in Foreign Office, May 18) from Lord Acton in Berne: 'Prince Lubomirski informed me yesterday that he has ascertained that Russian reactionary parties in Siberia and elsewhere who cannot forgive Entente for not having stifled Bolshevism at the outset, are in communication with Japanese, with a view to restoration of Russia at the price probably of a portion of Siberia. The Russian reactionaries have also entered into conversations with leaders of German republic. Result for Poland of success of these two-fold negotiations will be disastrous, as unless Great Britain forms a close alliance with Poland which will secure to her military protection, she will one day be at mercy of a restored Germany, and of a new Russia, both of which will endeavour to grind her out of existence.'

² Probably the Polish Prince Ladislas Lubomirski, at that time resident in Switzerland.

³ The text here is uncertain. The sense would suggest some such phrase as 'dissatisfied with'.

No. 281

Colonel Robertson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received June 28)
No. 569 Telegraphic [95378/95378/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, June 27, 1919

Following from Sir Charles Eliot, Omsk, No. 210. Begins:—

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Koltchak intends to despatch an urgent telegram to Finland begging General Mannerheim to advance on Petrograd.

At the same time he will address an appeal to Powers asking them to support this request.

He is taking this step because information received from (? West) Russia indicates that Bolsheviks are hurrying troops from Siberian front to Petrograd.

Food is also being sent. Grain is unobtainable but cheese and potatoes are being despatched in large quantities. Ends.

Following from High Commissioner, Omsk, No. 215, begins:—Secret. Confidential. My telegram No. 210.

Minister for Foreign Affairs showed me telegram to General Mannerheim and has just sent a note marked *very urgent and confidential* asking for (? concerted action of) His Majesty's Government.

Neither note nor telegram enters into much detail. Note says recent information proves the great importance attached by Bolsheviks to holding Petrograd capture of which would mean collapse of their power. Russian staff think that an attempt ought to be made to take Petrograd before reinforcements which Bolsheviks are sending from other fronts can arrive there. Admiral Koltchak has therefore telegraphed to General Mannerheim requesting Finnish Government to order its troops to make immediate attack on Petrograd and support Russo-Esthonian offensive.

Russian Government hope that His Majesty's Government will support (? policy of that) *démarche* and persuade General Mannerheim to commence operations without delay.

It must be understood that active aid from Finland and a (? joint) advance into Russian territory cannot be regarded as a ground for political aspirations, but should serious difficulties occur, Russia would be glad to accept friendly co-operation of League of Nations.

It is considered indispensable that a Russian detachment should take part in Finnish operations and that in due time a Russian Administration must be established at Petrograd for which purpose General Yudenich has received full powers. Ends.

No. 282

Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des États-Unis, Paris

C.F. 97¹ [*Secret/General/162*]

Saturday, June 28, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: Baron Sonnino.

Japan: Baron Makino.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey, Count Aldrovandi and Captain Portier.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

... 9.² *Co-operation by the Czecho-Slovaks with the right wing of Koltchak's Army.*
The Council had before them the attached draft telegram to Admiral Kolt-

¹ This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. vi, p. 740 f.

² The earlier minutes recorded discussion of other matters.

chak in connection with the proposal for the use of the Czecho-Slovak forces in Siberia to co-operate with the right wing of Admiral Koltchak's Army³ (Appendix II).

(It was agreed that subject to the approval of the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, who, with the addition of representatives of Japan and Czecho-Slovakia, are considering this subject, the telegram should be despatched on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers by M. Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference, to Admiral Koltchak.)⁴

Villa Majestic, Paris,

June 28, 1919.

APPENDIX II TO NO. 282

M. 327 A.

Telegram to Admiral Koltchak

Following for Admiral Koltchak:—

'I. The Principal Allied and Associated Governments have under consideration the following scheme for repatriating and utilizing Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia:—

- '(a) Allied and Associated Governments will find shipping to move all Czecho-Slovak troops who can reach Archangel before the closing of the port by ice, and to do their best to find shipping at Vladivostock.
- '(b) 30,000 men to take part in an operation on right wing of Koltchak's army with a view to establishing a junction with Archangel forces at Kotlas, whence they would be repatriated before end of current year.
- '(c) Remainder of Czecho-Slovak troops to be moved gradually to Vladivostock, and thence embarked for Europe as shipping becomes available.
- '(d) Sector of railway now guarded by Czecho-Slovaks to be taken over by Americans or by Japanese, or by both conjointly.

'II. Apart from the very substantial advantages which it is hoped to obtain by enabling you to effect a junction with the Archangel forces, above scheme offers prospect of relieving dangerous situation now developing in Central Siberia through the discontent which has arisen among the Czecho-Slovak troops.

'III. It is recognised that the morale of these troops is at present low, and success of scheme is obviously dependent on sufficient men being willing to fight the Bolsheviks with a guarantee of earning repatriation as a reward for success.

³ This proposal had been made by Mr. Churchill in a memorandum of June 24, 1919, based upon an exchange of views between himself and Dr. Beneš: cf. op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 674, 684-6.

⁴ On July 9, 1919, the Military Representatives reported to the Supreme Council (Heads of Delegations) upon this proposal and upon factors affecting its execution: see Vol. I, No. 7, minute 10. Cf. also, however, No. 315 below.

‘IV. It is also recognised that transportation of Czecho-Slovaks by rail to Perm will interfere with your normal despatch of supplies and munitions unless running of increased number of trains can be arranged for the purpose.

‘V. It is obviously impossible to guarantee success of proposed operation, and even assuming success, there is a risk of the Czecho-Slovaks reaching Archangel too late for repatriation before the port is ice-bound. It has, however, been calculated that there is a reasonable possibility of Czechs reaching Kotlas by middle of October provided the military operations involved are successful, in which case repatriation this year would be possible.

‘VI. The Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers wish you to consider this project carefully in all its aspects, and to telegraph your views on the various points raised above with the least possible delay, since, if the project is to be carried out, every day is of importance. The project is, of course, dependent on the consent and co-operation of the Czecho-Slovak Government, which the Powers will endeavour to obtain if you consider this scheme both practicable and desirable. To avoid subsequent misunderstanding, it is pointed out that there can be no question of retaining any of the Czecho-Slovak troops once their junction with Archangel forces has been effected.’

No. 283

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received June 29)

No. 432 Telegraphic [95396/60734/38]

ARCHANGEL, June 28, 1919

Your telegram No. 382.¹

As regards imports situation is materially different in northern region for two reasons.

One is existence of new roubles² which makes (? import) so profitable as to be a source of embarrassment to Government. One British trawler has disposed of cargo for two million new roubles which means loss of 1,300,000 old roubles to revenue of Government. Other is absence of export of goods. One American, one French merchants have been active for several months collecting produce. American's efforts were a complete failure. Frenchman has secured a parcel of furs at very high prices. I doubt if there is anything left except timber and small quantities of pitch and tar.

In the circumstances facilities of import ought not to be amplified until economic position has improved and larger area is open. This view is prevailing in Government and I should therefore deprecate extension of insurance scheme to imports at present. Application of [? to] timber exports would on the other hand be of greatest assistance to Government in expediting sales and I hope I may be allowed to announce it at once.

¹ No. 278.

² The reference was to new roubles of the stabilized local currency introduced under British auspices in the Northern Region of Russia in November 1918 at the rate of 40 roubles = £1. The notes of this currency were issued under Russian Northern Government authority at Archangel through a State Emission Caisse under a British President.

No. 284

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 925 Telegraphic [92379/11067/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 28, 1919*

(Italians and the Caucasus and Caspian.)

My telegram No. 755¹ (of May 23rd).

Admiralty are again pressing me to urge the Italian Government to expedite the despatch of their naval personnel to take over control of the fleet in the Caspian. Am I to understand that question of transfer of the fleet as well as of the military command of the whole Caucasus is now definitely settled and that I am to approach the Italian Government officially on this basis?

I would point out that an occupation of Georgia alone such as appears to be contemplated by Signor Tittoni (see Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 438)² would constitute an entirely new proposition and would, in my opinion, be open to the gravest objection from the military as well as from political point of view.

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed. This telegram of June 24, 1919, reported a general conversation which Sir R. Rodd, H.M. Ambassador in Rome, had had with Signor Tittoni, the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which the latter was reported as having said that 'as regards Asia. Minor what Italy needed were facilities for obtaining raw material and her sphere of influence must secure access to mineral areas. I suggested danger of undertaking tasks beyond her resources. He agreed but argued that she would only place herself in hands of League of Nations. She did not wish to be brought into ultimate conflict with Russia. But he thought she could contemplate protection of an autonomous Georgia. If eventual League of Nations called upon her to retire he would be quite ready to do so provided she were guaranteed permanent interest in exploitation of such minerals etc. as had been developed during her mandate.'

No. 285

Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received June 30)

No. 448 Telegraphic [95854/11067/58]

ROME, *June 29, 1919*

Your telegram No. 925¹ to Peace Conference.

I think name Georgia was only used vaguely by Tittoni as reported in my telegram No. 438² and that there was no intention to suggest occupation of Georgia alone.

Having no instructions as to what it may be contemplated that Italy should take over, whether by mandate or temporarily, I have no means of controlling statements of this nature made in conversations with Italian Ministers and have to disguise my ignorance of matters on which they suppose me to be informed rather than discourage their tendency to be communicative by disclosing it.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

¹ No. 284.

² See No. 284, note 2.

Mr. Bell (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received July 2)
No. 352 Telegraphic [97157/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, June 30, 1919

Paraphrase of General Gough's telegram from B.S. 97¹ of 28th June (to) War Office has been shown to me and I beg (to) make following observations:

1. I regard all Russian agreements with Finns as made by former in light of temporary expedients and should therefore not attach any weight to agreement between General Udenitch and General Mannerheim.

2. Unless generously supported by Allied forces and materials any advance of General Mannerheim on Petrograd would probably end in a (? fiasco).

3. I am of opinion Mannerheim is unconsciously being urged forward by Finnish Jaegers but I regard this as German intrigue calculated to cause chaos and embarrassment to Allies, inevitable consequences of an abortive attack on Petrograd.

4. I consider arrangements sound policy [*sic*], for His Majesty's Government would be supporter of Finnish Cabinet and Dr. Holsti.² Under these conditions should Entente find it expedient for Finns to advance on Petrograd Finnish Government would probably be agreeable to following terms:

A. Guarantee by Allies of Independent Finland against any policy of resuscitated Russia.

B. Support by Entente with necessary finances and material.

5. In view of Finland's past achievements in (? crushing) Bolshevism and her position as a bulwark against Bolsheviks I consider she should be openly treated as an Ally (? because of) movements made against Petrograd.

¹ The word 'from' was evidently inserted in error. Telegram B.S. 97 is not printed. In this telegram General Gough reported that 'owing to recent developments in the constitution of the [Finnish] Government' (cf. note 2 below) General Mannerheim, despite the agreement concluded with General Udenitch, 'will be unable to force Government to undertake war of aggression on the terms of that agreement alone. . . . Policy of new Cabinet is one of peace and constitutional reform: on the other hand if the present Cabinet can convince Diet (A) that advance on Petrograd will deal death-blow to the Bolshevik men and stop present ceaseless conflict on the Finnish frontiers and (B) that any agreement signed by Russians and Finland will be guaranteed by Allies against any backsliding on part of Russia restored and (C) that the Allies will assist Finland with money and munitions then Diet will consent to advance. . . . Notices have appeared in both Finnish and London newspapers for some time past which lead public to believe we are (?)urging Finland to war. If Finland marches and the venture is a failure allies alone will be blamed and the Udenitch-Mannerheim combination will be entirely discredited. Therefore it is essential that the allies ensure success of operation if allies wish Finland to advance. . . . Matter for decision appears to be (A) Are we to support the M[annerheim]-Y[udenitch] combination who are without the consent of the present cabinet undoubtedly planning operations or (B) Are we to support present cabinet who require allied assurances and participation or (C) Are we to stand aside and give no assistance, allow Mannerheim and his government to settle their own differences and say we have no objection to Finns advancing on Petrograd?'

² Dr. Holsti was Foreign Minister in the Finnish coalition government representative of bourgeois parties which had been formed in April 1919 under the premiership of M. Castren.

Such a policy would serve at the same time to counteract effect of German intrigues in Finland and assist in her emancipation from German influences.
Repeated to Paris.

No. 287

Mr. Rattigan¹ (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received July 10)
No. 95 [100843/1089/38]

My Lord,

BUCHAREST, July 1, 1919

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note sent by the Russian Legation to the Allied Representatives² relative to the urgent necessity of forwarding to General Denikin the Russian military stores left in Roumania at the time of the dispersal of the Russian Armies in 1917.

At a meeting held by the Representatives to discuss this question it was decided to address an identic note to the Roumanian Government pointing out that General Denikin was in urgent need of such stores in his struggle against the Bolsheviks, and that, while we did not feel justified in asking for the surrender of such military stores and equipment as had already been utilized by the Roumanian forces, we urged them, in the interests of the common good, to release without delay everything of this nature deposited in the Government stores as in the latter case it was clear that General Denikin's need was greater than their own.

I should add that the American Representative was of the opinion that nothing should be done in the matter, pending receipt of instructions from our respective Governments, but I argued that the consequent delay would be a serious matter for General Denikin and that we knew enough about the views of our respective Governments in regard to the necessity for assisting General Denikin, to be able to send a note to the Roumanian Government without waiting for instructions. My French and Italian colleagues supported this view, and the American Representative finally agreed. I have the honour to transmit copy of the note in question.³

I have, etc.,

FRANK RATTIGAN

¹ H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Bucharest.

² Not printed. This note, dated June 21, 1919, and communicated by the Russian Legation under a covering note of June 26, was as indicated by Mr. Rattigan.

³ This Allied note, dated June 30, 1919, is not printed. In dispatch No. 102 of July 10 (received July 22) Mr. Rattigan transmitted a copy of the reply of the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs under date of July 9. This reply stated that the Rumanian Ministry of War represented that 'les besoins de l'armée roumaine, qui a à faire face à des nécessités multiples sur plusieurs fronts, sont tels qu'il est obligé d'être extrêmement prudent, et de veiller avec le plus grand soin sur l'emploi des munitions qui se trouvent encore dans les dépôts déjà très diminués. Nous sommes privés de tous nos dépôts qui se trouvaient en Russie et il nous faut ménager ce qui reste. Le Ministère de la Guerre a déjà donné ce qu'il a pu et il va faire un nouvel examen des ressources qui sont encore à sa disposition et cela dans un esprit le plus favorable aux propositions de l'Entente; s'il peut encore se priver d'une partie des munitions, il ne manquera pas d'entrer dans les vues de votre lettre du 30 juin 1919.' (For subsequent references to this question see Vol. I, No. 72, minute 10, and Vol. II, No. 30, minute 8.)

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)**No. 4398 [96109/61232/38]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 1, 1919

Sir,

I desire to call attention to the fifth condition attached by the Allied Governments to the continuance of support to Admiral Kolchak in which it is stipulated that 'if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Caucasian and Trans-Caspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between the *de facto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.'

I do not know if there is any intention on the part of the Allied Governments to encourage the suggested 'solution by agreement' by bringing the representatives of the various border States of the late Russian Empire, now in Paris, into touch with the Russian Political Committee, representing Admiral Kolchak, and securing their full co-operation in the Allied policy of assisting Admiral Kolchak to establish himself in supreme authority in Russia.

There can be no doubt that the question presents formidable difficulties, since many of these States are now putting forward claims to the recognition of their sovereign independence, and view with misgiving the intentions of Admiral Kolchak and his adherents in regard to the liberties to which they have so long aspired.

Having regard, however, to the fact that Admiral Kolchak has indicated in his reply to the Allied Powers that he is prepared to go a considerable way in the direction of meeting the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire, and that the latter, notwithstanding their present claims, do not ignore the fact that some accommodation with Russia must ultimately serve their best interests, the basis of a compromise would appear to be not altogether lacking, and it would, in my opinion, be well worth while to investigate whether it cannot actually be achieved.

From the point of view of the Allied Governments an agreement between the Russian Political Committee on the one hand, and the representatives of the border States in Paris, would present undeniable advantages. At present the Allied Governments are impeded in the policy which they are pursuing in Russia by the fact that there is widespread suspicion in this country, in France, and the United States of America as to the intentions of Admiral Kolchak and those by whom he is surrounded, and it is suggested that, in assisting him, the Allied Governments are committing themselves to the support of elements in Russia which stand for nothing less than the re-establishment of Russia on the basis of 1914, a policy which public opinion in this country would, with scarcely an exception, condemn.

On the other hand, were an agreement between Admiral Kolchak and the border States achieved, much of the criticism which is at present directed

against the Allied Governments by their own people would be weakened, since those Governments would be in a position to point to the acceptance of Admiral Kolchak and the principles for which he stands by large sections of the population which were lately a part of the Russian Empire. The task of the Allied Governments would accordingly be much lightened.

Notwithstanding their present claims, indications are not wanting that several of these border States would be prepared to consolidate their interests with Russia on a federal basis, and it is suggested that an effort might with advantage be made to solve the problem along some such lines.

The first step would seem to be to inform the Russian Political Committee in Paris that the Allied Powers intend to use their good offices to bring about the 'solution by agreement' accepted by Admiral Kolchak, and with that end in view, propose to summon a conference of the representatives of the border States at present in Paris, in order to ascertain their views as to their future relations with Russia and the conditions on which they will be prepared to unite their interests with those of Admiral Kolchak in pursuance of the common aim of the overthrow of the Russian Soviet Government.

Such a proposal could scarcely be rejected by the Russian Political Committee without throwing suspicions on the intentions of Admiral Kolchak, and indicating insincerity in his acceptance of the principles at issue.

The next step would be to approach the representatives of the border States, inform them officially of the conditions which have been attached by the Allied Governments to their continued assistance to Admiral Kolchak, and request them to consider among themselves a programme on the lines of the policy adopted by the Allied Governments which can subsequently be discussed with the Russian Political Committee.

Such a step would be perfectly consistent with the policy hitherto pursued towards the border States.

At no stage in their negotiations with the latter have the Allied Governments committed themselves to a promise of complete independence. In the communications which have been addressed by His Majesty's Government to the Esthonian, Latvian, and Georgian delegations in London, the question of their future has been specifically reserved for the decision of the Peace Conference, and in approaching these delegations on the lines suggested the Allied Governments would be merely carrying their previous policy to its logical conclusion.

I shall be glad to be furnished with your views on the above proposals.

Failing some immediate agreement, I think it would at least be desirable that the representatives of Esthonia, Lithuania, and Georgia, to whom communications have been made by His Majesty's Government, shall be induced to accept the solution already agreed to by Admiral Kolchak, namely, that the whole question be settled in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations.

I have, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON¹

¹ No reply to this dispatch has been traced; it may perhaps have been answered privately.

The dispatch was, however, considered by the British Delegation in Paris in a number of minutes of which the final, by Sir E. Crowe, read as follows:

'I have discussed this further with Mr. Balfour. He is opposed to our taking any action towards bringing about the suggested conference. He considers that there is too little common ground between the parties to make success a reasonable possibility.

'E. A. C.
'Aug. 2.'

No. 289

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay¹ (Washington)

No. 1411 Telegraphic [92772/3669/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 2, 1919*

My telegram No. 1103² (May 3rd).

G.O.C. Archangel telegraphs that United States railway troops are to be withdrawn about July 15th. Please bring matter to attention of United States Government and press them to allow these troops to remain pointing out at same time that withdrawal might entail the collapse of whole Archangel force.

¹ First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Washington.

² Not printed.

No. 290

Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received July 4)

No. 1124 Telegraphic [97821/3669/38]

WASHINGTON, *July 3, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1411.¹

As a result of unofficial enquiries there is no chance of United States Government acceding to this proposal. I will telegraph again as soon as I receive official reply.

¹ No. 289.

No. 291

General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received July 4)

No. G. 38 Telegraphic [612/5/1/14471]

HELSINGFORS, *July 3, 1919*

Following for C.I.G.S. personal.

1. British policy regarding Finnish intervention¹ has been communicated

¹ On July 1, 1919, the War Office had telegraphed as follows to General Gough in reply to his telegram No. B.S. 97 of June 28 (see No. 286, note 1): 'The British Government have not sought to initiate the project for the capture of Petrograd. We were told that Mannerheim wanted to advance on his own account. We have obtained from Admiral Koltchak Russian approval of Mannerheim's advance subject to Judenitch advancing in concert, and other conditions which you know, but direct responsibility for this operation or for inviting the Finnish Government or General Mannerheim to undertake it was never assumed by us. We should be glad to see it done, and, if it succeeds, arrangements have been made to supply a certain amount of food for the population. We cannot promise the assistance

to General Mann[er]heim and Yudenitch, Minister Holsti. Having heard their view my opinion is as follows:

2. Military situation on N.W. front has completely changed since my arrival here at the end of May. Bolshevik forces are now pressing back Russian Northern Corps whose collapse is imminent. Bolshevik success in Olonetz due to German organisation in Petrograd. Mann[er]heim thinks Bolshevik attack on Finns probable.

3. Political factors affecting Finnish intervention have also changed since my arrival here. Finnish government and Yudenitch having come to terms objection to Finnish operations of Russians disappears, secondly return of Holsti and complete accord between regent and cabinet eliminates objection on the ground of possible arbitrary compulsion by regent on Finnish people.

4. Above concerns only Finland, but vital feature of present situation is that the Bolshevik victory on N.W. front will sweep away not only Finland but the whole of this corner of Europe.

Entente will lose all that we have gained or retained during recent war. In the event of that we must be prepared for surprises in Latvia and Esthonia especially of [*sic*] former since the Letts are less hostile to Bolsheviks than to their local enemy the Balts. In these countries success and initiative carries all these before them [*sic*], conversely inactivity invites failure: hence advantage of Finland would have [*sic*] in carrying war into Bolshevik territory. German domination is only alternative and I have pressed upon you already seriousness of this menace.

5. Finns ask from Allies only immediate loan of £15,000,000 which will prove to the world extent of their interest to deal death-blow to Bolshevism on N.W. front: in order then to buy war stores which will arrive late for the first move but will be essential as operation develops.

6. I cannot impress too much upon you that this financial aid which can be rendered immediately by telegraph and therefore doubly valuable is only means of getting a United Finland to march and to save situation which will otherwise be irretrievable.

in arms and munitions asked for by the Finns. You are therefore limited to your alternative "C" in paragraph 8 of your B.S. 97 of 28th June. The difficulties of your Mission are fully recognised by us, having regard to the limitations which are imposed upon our action, but it is really safer to remove all ambiguity or illusions from the minds of the various parties with whom you are in touch.'

No. 292

Letter from Colonel Kisch (Paris) to Mr. Selby (Received July 7)

Unnumbered [98911/61232/38]

PARIS, July 4, 1919

Dear Selby,

I enclose a copy of our observations on your memorandum of June 6,¹ as submitted by D.M.I. to Mr. Balfour.

¹ No. 256.

I hope you will not think us very critical, and your paper has certainly helped to crystallize a great deal of vague thought and talk.

I hope it will also lead to some constructive reorganisation, particularly as regards a Central Executive body for Russia.

Simpson² has done great work here.

Yours ever and ever busy,

F. H. KISCH

ENCLOSURE IN No. 292

Observations on Mr. Selby's Memorandum

(A) The success of Allied policy in Russia would certainly be promoted if the Allied Governments could come to some agreement as to the tenour of the instructions to be sent to their respective representatives in Russia, Siberia, Baltic States, etc., so as to co-ordinate their efforts in carrying out the policy agreed upon.

As a first step to this end it is, however, necessary that the Governments concerned should definitely adopt a single policy. To some extent this result has been achieved by the recent correspondence in connexion with the status of Admiral Koltchak's Government, but from a military point of view it is unfortunate that the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference was limited to a promise of continued support. The recent disturbances and difficulties in Vladivostock and Eastern Siberia would not have occurred had Admiral Koltchak's Government been formally recognised by all the Allies as the rightful Government of Siberia, and in the absence of some such recognition, there can be little hope of combined action between the various allied military forces in Siberia. If it were found politically possible to recognise the Government of Admiral Koltchak as the *de facto* Government of Siberia and those parts of Russia administered by his Government, and those local governments which have recognised his authority, there can be no doubt but that the realisation of Allied military policy in Russia would be greatly facilitated.

(B) (*Spheres of Activity*.) Mr. Selby proposes a modification of the existing agreement by which the Ukraine was recognised as a French sphere. To propose that the Ukraine should now be appointed to Great Britain would certainly increase the bitterness already felt by the French in connexion with their failure at Odessa, and would strengthen the ill-feeling shown by the French towards the Volunteer Army and General Denikin personally. As the matter now stands, General Denikin is rapidly extending his front into Ukraine territory, and it does not seem likely that the French will dispute our right to exert a controlling influence over Denikin in regard to the regions occupied by his troops. Thus it appears desirable to avoid any action in relation to this question.

As regards Siberia, the consideration of any Allied Commander-in-Chief

² Professor J. Y. Simpson was attached as an expert on Russian affairs to the Political Section of the British Delegation in Paris.

is futile, but it is necessary that all the Allies should recognise Koltchak as the supreme commander and should meet his wishes as far as possible. Unfortunately, this has not been the case hitherto. I, therefore, find it impossible to support Mr. Selby's proposal for the appointment of a Japanese Commander-in-Chief over all Siberia. Apart from the fact that such an appointment would be distasteful to the Americans, the extension of the powers of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief would be a valuable weapon in the hands of the Bolshevik Propaganda Bureau.

(C) & (D) (*Finance and Executive Action.*) The General Staff have already drawn attention to the importance of setting up a Supreme Inter-Allied Council for Russia, comprising political, military, economic and financial sections. It seems to them essential that such a council should be allowed the fullest possible measure of executive authority within the limits of a united policy to be laid down for it by the Allied Governments. Had such an executive body existed, many of the set-backs to Allied policy in Russia might have been averted and the need for heavy items of expenditure would have been avoided by the prompt payment of smaller sums. Further, with the existing complications of separate organisations, the greatest difficulty is experienced in ensuring that economic policy should march parallel with military policy. These factors greatly retard the restoration of law and order and normal economic life in Russia.

It is considered that the seat of the proposed central executive body should be in London since Great Britain is playing the greater part in carrying out the restoration of Russia, and since our machinery is more comprehensive than that of any of the other Allies.

Mr. Selby's proposal for the reconstitution of the (purely British) Russia Committee has much to recommend it, but questions of sufficient magnitude for reference to such a Committee would generally affect all the Allied and Associated Governments, and it is therefore considered that the constitution of an Inter-Allied body would be preferable. It would always be possible for the British or any other Allied section of the Inter-Allied Council to meet independently in connexion with questions affecting one power only.

(E) (*Appointment of British Representatives to the Russian Government.*) The attachment of a Senior British Political Officer to General Denikin, is, from a military point of view, most desirable, and has been urged more than once without as yet obtaining success. It is felt that such a Political Officer, thoroughly acquainted with the currents of public opinion in Great Britain, would be able to give General Denikin real guidance and enable him to avoid the numerous pitfalls to which he is, by his very position, exposed.

At the same time, such a Political Officer would relieve the British Military Mission of a great deal of work which requires long political training and which is, at the present time, taking up a great deal of the time and efforts which should be devoted to the military problems for which the Mission was originally despatched.

In this connection it is urged that as a logical sequence to the limited measure of recognition which has been accorded to Admiral Koltchak, the

relations between His Majesty's Government and Admiral Koltchak's representatives in Paris and London should be placed on a more regular basis than hitherto. It is submitted that by such action, much could be done to minimise the possibility of reaction in Russia. A matter of urgent importance that I have in mind is the question of the administration of Petrograd should that city be occupied by anti-Bolshevik forces. As things stand at present it is understood that General Yudenitch contemplates setting up an administration from among his own entourage, but were the Allied Governments in direct and official relations with Admiral Kolchak's representatives in Paris and London, it would be possible to press for the establishment in Petrograd (should occasion arise) of a Government under some personality such as Mr. Tchaikowsky,³ who could be relied upon to introduce a moderate and democratic régime.

[W. THWAITES]
Major General
Chief of Military Section

³ President of the Russian Government of the Northern Region (Archangel).

No. 293

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received July 9)
No. 587 Telegraphic [100502/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 4, 1919

Following from High Commissioner, begins:—
Ekaterinburg. June 29th.

Having received alarming reports from General Blair¹ and (? British Consul), I arrived here on 26th. Admiral Koltchak is expected to-morrow. Situation is serious.

Strategic position is not considered bad and causes of collapse are poor morale of troops and mismanagement of higher authorities.

I am told that advance from Perm on . . . off² ought not to have been sanctioned unless support from the south was assured.

Things went from bad to worse in south and a strategic retreat was ordered which could have been easily effected by (? season)ed troops. But it was not understood by (? inexperienced) Siberian Army and retirement became a rout. Statements differ as to strength of Bolshevik forces but it is probable that they are concentrating against Perm and Kungur. All accounts agree that most of Siberian troops run before they are attacked and that percentage of deserters and self-inflicted wounds is very high.

Officers are said to be very bad. They are insufficient in number and promoted much too soon . . .² capacity. Appointments at Omsk are more sought for than service at the front.

¹ General Blair had been supervising the training in Siberia of an Anglo-Russian Brigade (cf. No. 294).

² The text here is uncertain.

There are no reserves to restore situation and since neither Czechs nor Semenoff's troops are likely to go to the front, it is not easy to see how panic can be stopped.

Some 92,000 men were recruited on a six months' term which expires in August and it is feared that any attempt to retain them will make them turn Bolshevik. Classes from 1902 to 1907 are to be called up without exemption.

It is probable that Bolshevik troops suffer from much the same defects as the Siberian, but greater inducements such as permission to loot and promises of land and money are offered them. General Dietrich is attempting to turn conflict into a holy war but I am told that religious feelings of peasantry are not strong at present.³ Number of refugees arriving by rail from Perm indicates that there is a strong anti-Bolshevik feeling in that district, but it is thought Bolshevik advance on Ekaterinburg would be accompanied by pro-Bolshevik movement here, mass of population being simply desirous to conciliate probable victors and escape punishment. On both sides soldiers and peasantry seem tired of fighting but no one has come forward to suggest a compromise. I have, however, just received a Bolshevik leaflet addressed to peasantry which considerably modifies the earlier Bolshevik doctrines. It explains that there is no objection to peasants owning a moderate amount of property and no intention of interfering with the (? property) if people wish to keep it. It is most unfortunate that at this moment the higher command should be distracted by personal questions, issue of which is still obscure. At Omsk I was positively informed by Minister of Foreign Affairs that Gaida was superseded by Dietrich and would leave for ? Europe. Gaida however is still (? acting as) commander of Siberian Army. Dietrich is very hostile to him but finally told me he would work with him if Koltchak desired it. Gaida is very influential here, especially with parties [? of] left and his removal might drive many over to Bolsheviks. No movement against Koltchak is discernible but it is generally felt he allows himself to be surrounded by a clique of reactionaries and does not take sufficient pains to ascertain or influence popular sentiment. Moderate political parties and public organisations of Ekaterinburg held a coalition meeting to-day and sent a resolution to Government saying they considered following watchwords indispensable.

1. Constituent (? Assembly).
2. Grants of land to soldiers.
3. Foreign policy in close agreement with Allies.
4. Removal of General Lebedeff, Chief of Staff and Acting Minister of War.

Dietrich informed me his plan of campaign is to abandon Perm and

³ In a telegram of even date (No. 589 from Vladivostok) Sir C. Eliot reported that 'General Dietrichs has issued an order declaring that present (? war) against Bolsheviks is not political but religious. Wording of order, if carefully considered, is not anti-Jewish, but I fear it may be interpreted in that sense, especially as anti-Jewish sentiments of General Dietrichs are well known. I shall warn General (? Dietrichs) and also Koltchak, who arrives here tomorrow, of danger(? s) of anti-Jewish propaganda.'

Kungur in order to save Ekaterinburg and to make the South the principal front instead of the North.

In this way he hopes to effect a junction with Denikin in the autumn, but foreign officers think Koltchak's troops cannot make any serious offensive this year. There was much to be said for a southern offensive in the beginning but a sudden change now must create mistrust and also impair value of any allied advance from Archangel.

No. 294

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received July 9)
No. 588 Telegraphic [100507/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 4, 1919

Following from High Commissioner, begins:—

Ekaterinburg 29th.

Koltchak's orders have been successful in stopping acts of violence against British-trained soldiers but Anglo-Russian brigade continues to be very unpopular. British officers consider that (? though) present brigade could not be given up without loss of (? prestige) experiment should not be extended. So far as I can discover, our officers are not to blame and failure is due entirely to jealousy of Russians. Soldiers of Anglo-Russian Brigade are better fed than others, simply because they receive whole of the ration assigned to them whereas Russian officers are accustomed to make a considerable sum out of supplies. They hence (do their best to) represent Anglo-Russian Brigade as pampered and undisciplined. Russians really dislike all forms of foreign assistance except gifts of money or materials which they can use as they choose.

Preparations are being made for removal of Hampshires¹ and Anglo-Russian Brigade to Omsk. General Dietrichs admits that this is a military necessity but it will produce an unfortunate impression and be interpreted simply as meaning that British troops leave Russians as soon as position becomes dangerous. Russian officers also remember that advance beyond Perm, which was original cause of present collapse, was dictated by a desire to effect a junction with British forces from Archangel.

¹ The 1/9th Hampshire Territorial Battalion had been stationed in Siberia and was shortly to be evacuated (cf. Nos. 313 and 613).

No. 295

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received July 5)¹
Telegraphic: by wireless [98686/9/38]

Replying to your radio of June 29th completed on July 1st² we have to inform you that General Ironside having rejected our proposals regarding

¹ The date of dispatch of this wireless message is uncertain. It was presumably relayed from Moscow to Petrograd, whence it was transmitted. The wireless message was picked up in England on July 5, 1919.

² No. 279.

a general exchange of all British military men taken prisoners by Soviet troops, excluding officers, against all Russian Red military men in the hands of the British Command on the North of Russia, those negotiations were broken off.³ It is quite obvious that negotiations by way of exchange of radiograms cannot lead to any satisfactory results, more especially when such an intricate question is involved as a general exchange of all prisoners of war and civilians, including the demobilization of tens of thousands of Russians forcibly enlisted in the British army and scattered over all the British Colonies and Dominions. The civil war in Russia, sustained and prolonged by the Allied Governments, and the incessant discoveries of surreptitious plots hatched by Russian and foreign agents of these Governments compel the Soviet authorities carefully to discriminate between Russian citizens wishing to return home for honest and harmless purposes and those who may have put themselves at the disposal of our enemies for carrying out their sinister counter-revolutionary designs. This would necessitate a watchful control of the repatriation of Russians which could not be done by wireless but exclusively by representatives loyal to the Soviet Government enjoying its full confidence and also empowered to take decisions on their own initiative and responsibility on unforeseen questions which may arise during the negotiations. You will understand that the task cannot possibly be entrusted to any neutral citizen still less to persons representing privileged classes whom the British Government may deem to be of high standing with proper qualifications. Our conceptions of high standing and responsibility will certainly be different from that of the British Government. Notwithstanding counter-revolutionary activities of many a foreigner in Russia, the Soviet authorities allowed Col. Parker and Miss Adams⁴ to carry on their humanitarian work of giving help to their fellow-countrymen without ascertaining whether they supported their Government and its policy or not and we should think that the British Government too might trust our representatives that they would not deviate from the special tasks of their mission. Anticipating however the objections of the British Government to our representatives coming to England we propose to enable them to come to some neutral country. We feel sure that the neutral countries which have broken off relations with Russia only under pressure of the Entente will raise no objections to this proposal if accepted by the British Government. It might also help to settle the question of repatriating neutral subjects from Russia. The Soviet Government regrets to be unable to make or accept any other proposals on the subject.

³ In telegram No. 446 of July 7, 1919 (received that day) from Archangel, Mr. Hoare reported: 'G.O.C. [General Ironside] has received no reply to his offer to exchange 43 Bolsheviks for 43 N.C.O.s and men. He is pressing matter.'

⁴ Mr. Parker and Miss Adams had been engaged in relief work on behalf of British prisoners in Russia in the first half of 1919.

No. 296

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 7)

No. 1126 Telegraphic [98881/11067/58]

PARIS, July 6, 1919

From what Tittoni said to me recently (in a) private conversation, I do not think Italians mean to go to the Caucasus. In any case, I think it would be well to base our policy on this assumption.¹

¹ On July 2, 1919, the Foreign Office had received a telephone message from the War Office stating that 'the Italian Military Representative in Paris' had informed the Chief of the Imperial General Staff authoritatively that Italy had abandoned all idea of sending a military force to the Caucasus. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff was taking steps to inform Mr. Balfour. In telegram No. 1155 of July 15 (received July 16), replying to Lord Curzon's telegram of June 28 on this subject (No. 284), Mr. Balfour referred to this communication and that reported in the present telegram, but stated that 'no answer has been received from Italian Delegation in reply to official enquiry addressed to them'.

No. 297

Letter from Mr. Selby to Colonel Kisch (Paris)

Unnumbered [99642/61232/38]

My dear Kisch,

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 7, 1919

I have been meaning to answer your letter to me¹ for some time, but as I was asked to put forward officially the views expressed to you in my private letter,¹ and did so in a memorandum² on which you have now commented to Mr. Balfour officially, I thought it better to await further operations [*sic*] from Paris.

I am very grateful to you for having allowed me to see a copy of your comments³ on the official memorandum, to which I have nothing to say. My whole object was to raise the issue of the many difficulties we have encountered in dealing with the Russian problem in the course of the past nine months, with a view to drawing attention to them and eliciting a considered opinion as to how they could be dealt with. I hope we may now be successful in laying down some procedure, but the point which must first be determined is through what channel Russian problems are to be dealt with in future, and whether we are to regard the Peace Conference in Paris as having washed its hands of Russia with the despatch of the Koltchak note. From certain indications I have received, it looks to me very much as if the Paris Conference will not now have either the time or the inclination to pursue the subject, and I am sure you will agree with me that if that is the case, it should be laid down that Russia should be dealt with through the ordinary diplomatic and military channels, or such new machinery as it may be decided to create for the purpose.

For your own confidential and private information, I may let you know that I have drawn the Secretary of State's attention to the inconvenience which results from the present more or less dual control, and have suggested that he should consult the Prime Minister as to his wishes in regard to the future.

¹ This private letter was apparently not entered on Foreign Office files.

² No. 256.

³ No. 292.

No. 298

Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received July 9)

No. 1143 Telegraphic [100008/3669/38]

My telegram No. 1124.¹

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1919

State Department inform me that this question is one which was settled by Supreme War Council and suggest it be again taken up with General (Ta)sker Bliss.²

¹ No. 290.

² This telegram was minuted as follows by Mr. Selby: 'The troops are to be allowed to remain till September.'

'W. H. S.

9. 7. 19.'

No. 299

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)

No. 1435 Telegraphic [94332/775/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 8, 1919

Lord Reading's telegram No. 639.¹ Subvention to Archangel Government. Archangel Government are in urgent need of further advance. Failing it they must either issue further confidence bonds or fail to pay workmen. In first case their financial position, which Associated Governments have rendered fairly satisfactory, is ruined. In second case strikes and mutiny of Russian workmen and troops are anticipated.

Result of this would be to destroy efficacy and possibly safety of allied expeditionary force at Archangel and to break down the economic life of the district.

His Majesty's Government and French Government have advanced 2,500,000 roubles each during each of first six months of this year, and they are considering further subsidy.

It is however urgently desirable that United States Government should be induced without further delay to make similar contribution as suggested in my telegram No. 816¹ of March 21st.

Addressed to Washington No. 1435 and Rome.²

¹ Not printed.

² An identical telegram, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent to Sir R. Rodd at Rome as No. 627 with regard to the desirability of inducing the Italian Government to make a contribution.

No. 300

Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot (Vladivostok)

No. 452 Telegraphic [97040/956/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 8, 1919

The United States Government request that His Majesty's Government will issue instructions to their representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Committee and to the Military Representative in Siberia to join with their

colleagues in representations to Semenoff to discontinue interference with traffic on the railway.¹

They state that a similar request has been addressed to the French and Italian Governments.

You may authorize our respective representatives to join in proposed representations by Inter-Allied authorities concerned.

Repeat to Tokyo.

Repeated to Rome, No. 626; Paris, No. 963; Washington, No. 1430.

¹ This request was made in a note of July 1, 1919, from the Embassy of the United States in London to the Foreign Office.

No. 301

Earl Curzon to Mr. Hoare (Archangel)

No. 410 Telegraphic [98903/46019/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 8, 1919

Your telegram No. 426¹ (of June 26).

The question of sending vessel carrying military supplies for Admiral Kolchak in conjunction with expedition was considered but it was decided that nothing could be done as there was not sufficient time to procure the supplies.

This decision does not affect in any way sailing of expedition carrying civil supplies referred to above.

¹ No. 277.

No. 302

Earl Curzon to Mr. Bosanquet (Reval)

No. 101 Telegraphic [95500/61232/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 8, 1919

Your telegram No. 113 (May [June] 28th),¹ last three paragraphs.

Please ask General Gough to draw General Yudenitch's attention to the Allied Note addressed to Admiral Kolchak and to point out that we expect him to adhere scrupulously to its principles, as we attach the utmost importance to maintenance of good relations between border states and Admiral Kolchak under whose supreme authority Russian troops in the Baltic States are operating.

Repeated to Vladivostok, No. 453.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram Mr. Bosanquet had expressed the opinion that the Russian Northern Corps was 'politically unreliable and any influence which it may have upon formation of a government is in my opinion likely to be bad. As Northern Corps will necessarily take large share in recapture of Petrograd danger exists of immediate infiltration by German influence. . . . Meanwhile relations between Northern Corps and Estonian Government have never been (? satisfactory).'

No. 303

Earl Curzon to Mr. Hoare (Archangel)

No. 408 Telegraphic [95577/88/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 8, 1919

Food Supplies for Northern Russia.

We have arranged for shipment of 6,300 tons of flour by S.S. *Clare Hugo Stinnes* which is now proceeding to White Sea. We presume this shipment will partly meet requirement of 10,000 tons referred to in your telegram No. 420¹ (of June 25th), and Treasury point out that this shipment should satisfy your requirements for Murmansk and Archangel till the end of September.

In the meantime please telegraph whether your estimate of 10,000 tons of flour allows for extension of territory under control of Northern Provisional Government by possible advance to Kotlas, which if successful will add about half as much again to population to be fed, and what is exact amount of flour which must be shipped from Archangel to remote areas before the rivers freeze.

Please telegraph programme of shipments of flour which would be required before Archangel closes, to stock district till July 1920,

1. On present basis of occupied territory of Murmansk and Archangel.
2. Allowing for advance to Kotlas.

From your telegrams it would not appear that the Northern Provisional Government are financially in a position to make any arrangements on their own account for shipment of flour, and that these must be made against advances either by His Majesty's Government or Allied Government.

If Kotlas is occupied can we count on any food supplies becoming available other than those imported by sea?

As you are already aware, we have abandoned all intention of arranging for import of foodstuffs for civilian population of Murmansk and Archangel other than flour.

Repeated Murmansk No. 65.

¹ No. 276.

No. 304

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 10)

No. 449 Telegraphic [100856/88/38]

ARCHANGEL, July 9, 1919

Your telegram No. 408.¹

I am greatly relieved to learn first shipment of flour is on the way. I do not however understand why Treasury think this shipment will carry us on

¹ No. 303.

to end of September as my telegram No. 420² appears to me to make it clear that in order to (? ship) 7,000 tons to remote districts and also to carry us here and at Murmansk to end of September we must receive 10,000 tons before end of August at end of which month our present stocks will be exhausted. Therefore, arrival of a smaller quantity than that which we propose to send away cannot carry us through an extra month.

As regards winter supplies my estimated requirements for 10 months September to July is 120,500 tons.

Your telegram No. 182³ proposed monthly ration as follows in tons:—

Murmansk 818, Archangel 3,200. In his reply telegram No. 187³ Mr. Lindley pointed out experience has shown flour ration to be insufficient and suggested it be doubled. Your telegram No. 255³ accepted this recommendation but your telegram No. 259³ stated Ministry of Food regarded ration as excessive and proposed 625 for Murmansk and 3,750 for Archangel. Mr. Lindley protested against reduction of flour ration in his telegram No. 293.³

In view of the fact that we are going to supply nothing but flour I trust higher figure will be accepted. My estimate is based on it and allowances for an increase of 50% in population to be fed. 10,000 tons mentioned above did not allow for increased population and was on basis of present ration.

Prospects of harvest are at present unusually favourable and within next fortnight it should be possible to obtain more or less reliable estimate of local production.

I would suggest for the present we work on my figures. I will telegraph further as soon as possible and reply to your other questions, but it is worth bearing in mind that if the country is opened up Archangel railway would be as good as any other means of carrying food to Central Russia, see paragraph 4 of Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 244.³

² No. 276.

³ Not printed. The telegraphic correspondence under reference extended from March 27 to May 8, 1919.

No. 305

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)

No. 1153 Telegraphic [111582/45455/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 9, 1919*

Following for Colonel MacAlpine,¹ Ekaterinodar.

His Majesty's Government attach great importance to promotion of economic well-being in General Denikin's area, and as you are aware have already taken certain measures to that end. Past Russian failure[s] in economic as in other spheres have been largely due to lack of organising ability, and we think it probable that organisation of conduct of trade and finance and of distribution and collection of goods is very important factor in any measures for Russian economic rehabilitation. You should investigate and report as

¹ Chief of an economic mission attached by the British Section of the Supreme Economic Council to the headquarters of General Denikin.

soon as possible what steps you think should be taken to help provide such organisation, indicating:

- (1) What should be done by private enterprise; it is probably desirable that governmental action should so far as possible confine itself to facilitating rather than restricting private enterprise, and that the latter should be encouraged to develop and organise trade itself in every way.
- (2) What direct measures should be taken by His Majesty's Government, giving an estimate of their cost and
- (3) What measures should be taken by the Russian Authorities, and what can be done to induce them to take the necessary action.

As regards (2) establishment of an Economic Mission or Commercial Attaché with adequate staff could perhaps do much to remedy Russian lack of experience and organising ability, but in reporting you should indicate extent to which measures proposed are likely to be welcome to the Russians.

General Briggs has stated that theft is rife, and you should in particular endeavour to make recommendations on action to be taken to safeguard goods, stating by whom action should in your opinion be taken. As economic restoration is one of the most important military needs, provision of adequate guards even at expense of combatant forces seems justifiable.

Steps are being taken by this country to improve transport in General Denikin's area and British Military Mission will be asked by War Office if they can arrange for equal treatment with war-like stores and equipment to be given in the transport of necessities and of the exports required to pay for the import of these necessities.

You should of course consult General Holman² before reporting.³

² Chief of the British Military Mission in South Russia in succession to General Briggs.

³ A memorandum of August 6, 1919, from the Department of Overseas Trade stated that no reply to this telegram had then been received and that 'Colonel MacAlpine is expected back in this country next week'. Thus it appears probable that Colonel MacAlpine reported in person upon this matter to the Department of Overseas Trade.

No. 306

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 12)

No. 1259 [101537/28011/55]

My Lord,

PARIS, July 10, 1919

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 3982¹ of the 17th ultimo regarding the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Petlura² and the future status of Galicia, the policy of His Majesty's Government has always been to assist such Russian forces as are engaged in fighting the Bolsheviks, and they would therefore be prepared to assist any forces under Petlura's

¹ Not printed. This was a formal covering despatch transmitting a request from the Director of Military Intelligence for guidance as to 'what is precisely the policy of H.M. Government as to Petlura and also Galicia's future'.

² Head of the Ukrainian Directory and Commander-in-Chief of Ukrainian forces.

command which might be engaged in such operations, provided any practical means of doing so could be devised. It is not, however, the policy of His Majesty's Government to recognise the independence of the Ukrainian Government or to encourage separatist tendencies in the Ukraine.

Your Lordship is doubtless aware of the decision as to the position of East Galicia taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 25th.³ By that decision Poland was authorised to occupy the whole of the Province, and a treaty is to be negotiated between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland providing for the establishment of a temporary civil Government in the country until such time as a plebiscite can be taken to regulate its ultimate status.

I am, etc.,
(for Mr. Balfour)
EYRE A. CROWE

³ See No. 701.

No. 307

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 12)

No. 1290 [102004/49797/57]

My Lord,

PARIS, July 11, 1919

With reference to your despatch No. 3986¹ of the 17th ultimo (80166/W57) regarding a proposed loan to the Omsk Government, I have the honour to suggest that a reply should be returned to the effect that the exact legal position is difficult to define, and that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to express any definite opinion on it, but that they will raise no objection to a London Bank on its own responsibility making a loan to the Omsk Government on the security of public property under their control.

I am, etc.,
(for Mr. Balfour)
EYRE A. CROWE

¹ No. 263.

No. 308

Mr. Kerr (Paris) to Sir R. Graham (Received July 21)

Unnumbered [105169/43654/38]

PARIS, July 11, 1919

With reference to your minute in regard to the *Morning Post* article quoting from the *The Call* in regard to the Bullitt mission to Russia¹ the following are the facts so far as I can recollect them. Some time in February, Mr. Bullitt

¹ On June 25, 1919, the Foreign Office had transmitted to Mr. Balfour in Paris a copy of an extract from the *Morning Post* of June 20, 1919, quoting from *The Call*, a British socialist organ, a wirelessly transmitted Soviet statement giving particulars of Mr. Bullitt's recent mission to Russia. The Foreign Office, anticipating questions in Parliament upon this matter, asked in the covering dispatch of June 25 that it might 'receive from you any observations you may be able to furnish in regard to the alleged proposals'.

who was on the staff of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and specially attached, I understand, in some confidential capacity, to Colonel House, told me that he contemplated making a rapid visit to Russia with the object of finding out what the local conditions were, and what was the real attitude of the Soviet Government towards the Allies and the question of peace. He asked me my opinion of this project, and I told him, as my personal opinion, that I thought it would be a good plan to get first-hand information from Russia. Thereafter I saw Mr. Bullitt several times and we discussed, always in a perfectly unofficial manner, the possible basis of a settlement with Russia. At that date the Prinkipo proposal, though it had failed of success, was the only one in the field. I told him that, in my opinion, the essential condition of any settlement was the immediate cessation of hostilities on all fronts, the acceptance of all existing Governments as the *de facto* Governments of the territories they controlled, and an agreement that the Allied forces should be withdrawn from Russia as soon as the Bolshevik forces were demobilised or disarmed, subject to the necessary safeguards against political retaliation and proscription. Throughout I made it clear to Mr. Bullitt that any opinions which I expressed were purely my own.

Thereafter, Mr. Bullitt, while still a member of the American Delegation went, unofficially, to Russia. When he returned he immediately came to see me and gave me copies of his report together with the proposal of the Soviet Government. Mr. Bullitt had an interview with the Prime Minister during which the Prime Minister cross-examined him closely in regard to conditions in Russia, and the attitude and personalities of the Bolshevik leaders. This ended the matter so far as I am aware. Mr. Bullitt presumably made his report to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, but President Wilson, so far as I know, never raised the question of entering into peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks or discussed the Bullitt proposals in the Council of Four.

I ought to add that I asked Mr. Bullitt why, if the Bolshevik leaders were so anxious to make peace on the terms he suggested, they were unwilling to make an offer of peace to the Allies. Mr. Bullitt replied that he has asked the Bolshevik leaders the same question, but that they had refused to make an offer of peace on the ground that it would cause misunderstandings in Russia. They wished the Allies to make the proposal. Their proposal amounted to an informal declaration conveyed through Mr. Bullitt that if the Allies proposed peace on the terms outlined before April 10th they would accept them.

I append a copy of the Bullitt 'proposals' for reference.

P. H. KERR

ENCLOSURE IN No. 308

'*The Bullitt Proposals*'²

The Allied and Associated Governments to propose that hostilities shall cease on all fronts in the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland

² This document is printed, together with certain minor drafting amendments, in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, pp. 78-80. Cf. *passim* for particulars of Mr. Bullitt's mission.

on (see footnote one)³ and that no new hostilities shall begin after this date, pending a Conference to be held at (see footnote two)³ on (footnote three).³

The duration of the armistice to be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent, and all parties to the armistice to undertake not to employ the period of the armistice to transfer troops and war material to the territory of the former Russian Empire.

The conference to discuss peace on the basis of the following principle[s], which shall not be subject to revision by the conference:—*First.* All existing *de facto* Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to remain in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, except in so far as the conference may agree upon the transfer of territories; until the peoples inhabiting the territories controlled by these *de facto* Governments shall themselves determine to change their government. The Russian Soviet Government, the other Soviet Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire, the Allied and Associated Governments, and the other governments which are operating against the Soviet Governments, including Finland, Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan and Afghanistan, to agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing *de facto* governments which have been set up on the territories of the former Russian Empire and the other Governments signatory to this agreement (footnote four).³

Second. The economic blockade to be raised and trade relations between Soviet Russia and the Allied and Associated countries are made available on equal terms to all classes of the Russian people.

Third. The Soviet Government of Russia to have the right of unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports which belong to the former Russian Empire and to Finland, and are necessary for the disembarkation and transportation of passengers and goods between their territories and the sea; detailed arrangements for the carrying out of this provision to be agreed upon at the Conference.

Fourth. The citizens of the Soviet Republics of Russia to have the right of free entry into the Allied and Associated countries as well as into all countries which have been formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland: also the right of sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of those countries (footnote five).³

Nationals of the Allied and Associated countries and of the other countries above named to have the right of free entry into the Soviet republics of Russia; also the right of sojourn and circulation and full security, provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of the Soviet republics.

The Allied and Associated Governments and other governments whenever set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to have the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into the various Russian Soviet republics. The Soviet Governments of Russia to

³ See at end of this document.

have the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into all the Allied and Associated countries and into the non-Soviet countries which have been formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland.

Five [sic]. The Soviet Governments, the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland, to give a general amnesty to all political opponents, offenders and prisoners. The Allied and Associated Governments to give a general amnesty to all Russian political opponents, offenders and prisoners, and to assist their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia. All Russians who have fought in, or otherwise aided the armed forces opposed to the Soviet Government, and those opposed to the other governments which have been set upon the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to be included in this amnesty.

All prisoners of war of non-Russian powers detained in Russia, likewise all nationals of those powers now in Russia, to be given full facilities for repatriation. The Russian prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be, likewise all Russian soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all foreign armies to be given full facilities for repatriation.

Sixth. Immediately after the signing of this agreement, all troops of the Allied and Associated Governments and other non-Russian Governments to be withdrawn from Russia and military assistance to cease to be given to anti-Soviet governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire.

The Soviet Governments and the anti-Soviet Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to begin to reduce their armies simultaneously, and at the same rate, to a peace footing immediately after the signing of this agreement. The Conference to determine the most effective and just method of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous demobilisation and also the withdrawal of the troops and the cessation of military assistance to the anti-Soviet Governments.

Seventh. The Allied and Associated Governments, taking cognizance of the statement of the Soviet Government, in its note of February fourth in regard to its foreign debts, propose as an integral part of this agreement that the Soviet Governments and the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognise their responsibility to the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire to foreign states, parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states. Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts to be agreed upon at the conference regard being had to the present financial position of Russia. The Russian gold seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan, or taken from Germany by the Allies, to be regarded as partial payment of the debt due from the Soviet republics of Russia.

Footnote one: The date of the armistice to be set at least a week after the date when the Allied and Associated Governments make this proposal.

Footnote two: The Soviet Government greatly prefers that the conference should be held in a neutral country and also that either the radio, or a direct telegraph to Moscow should be put at its disposal.

Footnote three: The Conference to begin not later than a week after the Armistice takes effect, and the Soviet Government greatly prefers that the period between the date of the armistice and the first meeting of the Conference should be only three days duration if possible.

Footnote four: The Allied and Associated Governments to undertake to see to it that the *de facto* governments of Germany do not attempt to upset by force the *de facto* governments of Russia. The *de facto* Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire to undertake not to attempt to upset by force the *de facto* governments of Germany.

Footnote five: It is considered essential by the Soviet Government that the Allied and Associated Governments should see to it that Poland and all neutral countries extend the same rights as the Allied and Associated countries.

The Soviet Government undertakes to accept the foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April 10th 1919.

It was understood, in regard to article No. 2 that Allied and Associated countries should have the right to send inspectors into Soviet Russia to see to it that distribution of supplies is equitable.

It was specifically understood that the phrase in regard to 'official representatives' in article 4 does not include diplomatic representatives.

In regard to footnote two, the Soviet Government hopes that the Conference may be held in Norway.

No. 309

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Mr. Bell (Helsingfors)
No. 20 Telegraphic [612/5/1/15070]

PARIS, July 12, 1919

A telegram has been sent to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Helsingfors, in the name of the Peace Conference, instructing him in conjunction with his Allied colleagues to inform the Finnish Government that if they desire to accede to Admiral Koltchak's request for action against Petrograd, the Allied Governments without wishing to exercise any pressure on the Finnish Government, have no objection to raise to such an operation.¹

You should join your Allied colleagues in making this communication. Please inform General Gough as from Head of Military section.

Copies to Foreign Office and War Office by bag.

¹ For the approval of this telegram by the Supreme Council see Vol. I, No. 4, minute 4.

No. 310

*General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris).
Received July 15)*

No. G 78 Telegraphic [612/5/1/15334]

HELSINGFORS, July 14, 1919

From perusal of all my telegrams since my arrival in Finland I submit that it is evident that Finland as a whole is not attracted to war with Russia and march on Petrograd.

I trust Government hold no illusions on this subject. Interests of Finland are then our first consideration.

Finland has no money for war with Russia: risks of such action financially and politically are:—

It is absolutely certain that Finns will not march against Petrograd without any guarantee of definite support of Allies, trusting merely to the vague expression of approval so far offered by the Allies.

If Allied and Associated Powers desire to participate in Finland in the capture of Petrograd this summer a definite immediate offer of support is necessary. Without this the Diet and people of Finland will not agree to such operation: majority of Government is now against it. With such support however it is probable that agreement could be reached. If Petrograd is not taken this summer danger of growth of unrest in Russia and reappearance of German power are grave. In my opinion most desirable early method is immediate announcement of Allied loan to Finland: without their [*sic*] assistance Petrograd cannot be taken now.

Addressed Astoria, repeated Troopers.

No. 311

Mr. Ramsay (Stockholm) to Earl Curzon (Received July 15)

No. 1138 Telegraphic [103162/26579/56]

STOCKHOLM, July 14, 1919

My telegram No. 1134.¹

Official announcement July 11th from Helsingfors states that Government of Finland has concluded no agreement with Admiral Koltchak for co-operation in capture of Petrograd nor have Cabinet moved (? in the) matter. Rumoured secret understanding between Finnish Army leaders and Koltchak also officially denied.

Politiken sees confirmation (? in) Mannerheim's alleged commitments to Entente in the fact of complete exclusion of latter from above dementis.

Repeated to Helsingfors.

¹ Not printed.

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 16)
No. 470 Telegraphic [103666/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, July 15, 1919

I have had (long) conversation with General Officer Commanding whose recent correspondence with War Office has presumably been communicated to your department.

From his account I gather evacuation in early autumn is being considered whether or not junction is affected with Siberians which General Officer Commanding now regards as out of the question.

We are therefore in same position as in March. My views have not changed since that date and I venture to refer you to my despatch No. 36 and to Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 157.¹ There has recently been lamentable mutiny in Dyer's Battalion at the front which General Officer Commanding has reported fully to War Office. It was more of the nature of murder by eight resolute fanatics than mutiny. Two of them were Bolshevik officers who had deserted to us presumably with the sole object of seizing favourable opportunity to bring off some coup. Though (withdrawal) of 90 per cent of the Battalion when called on (to) mutiny after the murder had been committed and murderers called them to desert to Bolsheviks was (deferred) [*sic*]² General Officer Commanding is convinced by failure of Russian officers on this occasion and collapse of their moral that it is not possible to continue to enrol Bolshevik prisoners in fighting units. His hope was that two or three battalion(s) of these men specially trained by British officers would constitute by the autumn backbone of Russian forces. Episode confirms our opinion that without British support Russian troops could not be held together through the winter now that junction with Siberians cannot be affected. On the other hand General Officer Commanding is confident that with two British Brigades he could hold approximately the present front.

So far as I can judge situation public opinion at home will largely influence the decision of His Majesty's Government. From papers and statement by Mr. Clynes³ which appeared in *Observer* of June 15th I understand that sober labour opinion is genuinely disturbed and cannot believe our intervention in Russia is calculated to promote ultimate (welfare) of Russian people and of the world in general. A minority of labour opinion appears to be frankly

¹ In his dispatch No. 36 of March 13, 1919 (received April 15), Mr. Hoare had argued against Allied evacuation of North Russia as being 'not in accordance with national honour' and tending 'greatly to prolong the existing misery in Russia'. In his telegram No. 157 of March 17 (received March 18), Mr. Lindley had stated that Allied evacuation at that time would 'mean the collapse' of the government at Archangel, and urged that complete evacuation be deferred at least until the autumn.

² This mutilated passage read as follows in the text as sent from Archangel: 'Though behaviour of 90 per cent of battalion when called upon to mutiny after murder had been committed and murderers called upon them to desert to Bolsheviks was good', etc. (Archangel Archives/F.O. 175/26).

³ Privy Councillor and Labour Member of Parliament for the Plattin Division, Manchester.

Bolshevised. There can be no parley with these people. If we believe that Bolshevism is a parasitic growth which owing to special circumstances has been able to change whole character of Russian revolution and turn it into a ruthless tyranny with world-wide ramifications, we must do nothing to encourage Bolshevik element at home to think that by threats they can turn His Majesty's Government from their policy. I cannot but feel that withdrawal from Archangel would be distinct encouragement to Extremists at home to press for withdrawal of help both from Siberia and the South. If this pressure were successful and if we then continue to help Letts and other nationalities, claim which the Bolsheviks put forward when it suits them that they are defending Russia from foreign aggression and partition would be strengthened (see Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 238⁴ paragraph 2).

I submit that His Majesty's Government should now decide definitely whether or not they can resist growing pressure to withdraw from Archangel.

If they do decide that they cannot persist in their policy without a reasonable measure of labour and Socialist support I suggest that they invite labour party to send here mission of inspection. Past experience of such tours is not altogether encouraging and though the circumstances in present case are not altogether the same as in the past I make suggestion as a last resort. General Officer Commanding points out that best moment for evacuation is the end of October when state of ground and of river which begins to freeze up-stream before it does here would render serious Bolshevik attack impossible. Earlier in the year evacuation would be hazardous, later it would be virtually impossible.

If proposed mission were sent public attacks on His Majesty's Government would presumably be suspended while it was here and while its report was being discussed and I feel that reasonable force of (sic) confidence⁵ report would be in favour of continued occupation if matter were properly handled. This point I propose to discuss by despatch.⁶

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Text as sent: '... and I feel reasonably confident that ...'

⁶ In Archangel dispatch No. 108 of July 16 (received July 25), Mr. Hoare recapitulated the main arguments of the present telegram and, in particular, submitted 'the following considerations in justification of a course of action which may be regarded as a departure from the established traditions of Government. The course of the war has shown that the working classes in Great Britain are prepared to accept all kinds of restrictions on their personal liberty and encroachments on Trades Union practices once they are satisfied that these measures are essential to the national welfare but that they have to be very fully convinced that such measures are not a veiled attempt to exploit them. Although recent developments of the labour situation in England might be superficially regraded as indicating that there has been a profound change in the working classes since the conclusion of the armistice, it is nevertheless impossible that this should really be the case. It is therefore permissible to maintain that if matters are presented in the right light, the decision of the proletariat in England will be in favour of adopting the course of action which national duty demands. It may be doubted whether all that is possible and desirable has been done to convince organised labour that we have an urgent duty in North Russia. So far we have failed to convince the people that our action in Russia is not simply interfering in the affairs of a people who are struggling to be free. Anti-Bolshevik propaganda has perhaps failed to convince because we have appeared to over-state the case. Working men in England have been reluctant to believe that their peers in Russia could, under Bolshevik guidance, be

Rumours of early evacuation are already current and are producing bad effect. Minister for Foreign Affairs has told me that his conversation with General Officer Commanding on July 9th left impression that British troops might be withdrawn at any moment; in that case second Odessa was inevitable. Had I any information? I replied that I had not but that if he wished to have my personal opinion it was that there would be no evacuation before the autumn and that I understood end of October (was) the most suitable time. Did Minister for Foreign Affairs think that if evacuation were deferred until then Provisional Government could hold out through the winter? Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed opinion that if certain offensive operations were successfully carried out by Russian troops stiffened by British troops in reserve it would be possible to do so. His manner lacked conviction but even if it had been convinced it would not have changed my opinion that Archangel will fall (unless) British troops are here to prevent it.

Moral is everything in Russia at present and uncertainty as to future will rapidly destroy whatever moral has been created by personality of General Officer Commanding.

I therefore earnestly request:

- (1) That I may be authorised at once to state that there is no intention to evacuate British troops before the end of October.
- (2) That I may be informed forthwith whether His Majesty's Government have decided to maintain troops here through the winter and whether if decision depends on public opinion they are prepared to leave decision to (? proposed) Labour Mission. Early decision is essential as military dispositions cannot be made until decision is taken.

Would it not be possible to bring public opinion to separate question of continued occupation of Archangel from that of general policy in Russia on the ground that we occupied area as part of war with Germany, that we have fed people who would otherwise have starved and that we cannot abandon them to certain starvation and probable Bolshevik reprisals?

guilty of the horrors of which they have been accused, just as educated people in neutral countries could not believe that the atrocities in Belgium and Northern France really were part of a definite policy of terrorism, organised by the German General Staff.'

No. 313

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received July 18)

No. 622 Telegraphic [104694/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 15, 1919

Following from Consul at Ekaterinburg begins:—

Following sent to High Commissioner, July 9th.

Begins. In interview between Admiral Koltchak and General Gaida which took place July 7th, Koltchak accused Gaida (? of) demoralising army (? and) encouraging Bolshevism in it. Gaida told Koltchak that fault lay with Koltchak's generals like Lebedeff who was of Japanese (? orientation, not) Allied and others who robbed the country and were not punished for it.

This interview ended by very heated quarrel in which [Kolchak] after threatening Gaida with (? court martial) finally dismissed him.

Military crisis will take place during (? next few days); all available reserves are being removed from here to theatre of eastward area; success attending this effort will decide (? fate of) this town and probably Tchelyabinsk.

Evacuation of town in full swing. Panic which has caused this evacuation brought about by nervousness shown by staff of Siberian army.

21 British subjects among other foreigners leaving to-day. Ham(?pshire) regiment and General Blair and staff left July 7th.

No. 314

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received July 18)

No. 628 Telegraphic [104511/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 15, 1919

Following from High Commissioner July 12th. Begins:

Confidential. I saw Koltchak to-day on his return from Front. He was nervous and excited. He made remark (? stating that his) troops felt pressure of Bolsheviks at only a few points but yet retired continually. It might have been necessary to evacuate Ekaterinburg but he would make every effort to hold Cheliabinsk. Though moment was not propitious, I (? felt) bound to speak to him in the sense of your Lordship's telegram No. 430¹ urgent, as he may return to Front any day. But I had little success. The idea of speaking and acting with a view of influencing British or American opinion is outside his horizon. He said he had defined his position in his answer to Powers, which had apparently met with (? approval) and he proposed to abstain from making further statement or proclamations. He spoke with scant courtesy of his Ministers but asked where he could get better ones; people talked about them being reactionary but could not cite 'concrete facts'. (? But he) seemed impressed by Your Lordship's language about the supreme importance of his appreciating situation. I shall take any opportunity which may offer to speak again in the sense of Your Lordship's telegram.

¹ No. 271.

No. 315

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received July 19)

No. 632A Telegraphic [104712/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 16, 1919

Following from High Commissioner, July 13th. Begins:—

Your Lordship has doubtless received copies of Clem(en)ceau's telegram to Koltchak of July 2nd proposing that Czechs should fight their way to Archangel¹ and of reply dated July 12th saying sufficient volunteers are not forthcoming and that Czechs ought to return by sea. . . .² Minister for

¹ See No. 282.

² The text here is uncertain.

Foreign Affairs has addressed a note to me expressing hope that His Majesty's Government will take into consideration urgency of guarding line³ and suggesting that this should be done by Japanese and American troops. Japanese troops in Siberia will probably be reinforced, American troops simply shifted.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said confidentially Omsk Government would not be willing to see Czechs replaced by Japanese troops only but (? remarked) there would be no danger if both Japanese and Americans were stationed between Irkutsk and Omsk. Ends.

³ i.e. the Trans-Siberian Railway.

No. 316

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received July 19)

No. 633 Telegraphic [104713/26579/56]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 16, 1919

My telegrams Nos. 599 and 623.¹

Following from High Commissioner. Begins.

Omsk. July 11th. I discussed Finnish agreement² to-day with Koltchak. He described it as fantastic and said one would suppose that Finland had conquered Russia. He was prepared to deal with Finnish Government and show it every friendly courtesy but he was not a monarch and His Majesty's Government who objects to return to supposed reactionary tendencies could not expect him to usurp powers which ought to belong only to the future constituent assembly.

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 272. On July 8 General Gough had telegraphed to the War Office and the British Delegation in Paris (received July 9) the following telegram from General Yudenitch for transmission to Admiral Koltchak:

'1090. July 8.

'1. Weakness of Northern Corps, absence of indispensable war stores, impossibility of direct co-operation with troops of Murmansk group, strength of the enemy, imminent danger of their advance on Finland with the view to spreading Bolshevism westward, incredible sufferings of Petrograd have obliged me to elucidate possibility of using Finnish forces to save Petrograd and carry out indispensable extension south from Petrograd.

'2. Mannerheim, thoroughly Russian, can intervene only with assistance of political circles and popular masses on whom he is entirely dependent. In order to arouse people and cure them of their obstinate desire for policy of strict self-defence General Mannerheim requires first secret political preparation and subsequently publication of national advantages which will be sufficiently attractive to public opinion.

'3. Terms of proposed political agreement communicated to British War Office by British Mission, Helsingfors, have, I understand, been communicated to you. Condition regarding neutralisation of Baltic and Finland has been eliminated from draft of agreement.

'4. Finnish advance impossible without the full acceptance of this agreement, moreover it is imperative to obtain from Great Britain direct invitation to M[annerheim] to advance with a promise to assist him with money and munitions of war. Finnish mobilisation prepared but any delay may create internal political situation rendering his intervention impracticable: new President may be elected within a fortnight.

'5. In view of above and of possible delay in receiving your reply regarding acceptance of agreement I report to you that extraordinary circumstances may oblige me to make the decision to sign the agreement and undertake combined intervention. 640 Yudenitch.'

Apart from this general attitude, details of proposed agreement raise many difficulties because there are no archives here (? and) their precise significance is uncertain. It is not for instance clear what is meant by section B of Article 3 which provides that Russian subjects of Finnish nationality living near Petrograd shall preserve their own law courts and magistracy.

Koltchak will give written answer after further careful consideration, but I do not think I can obtain anything more than assurances of his readiness to treat with Finnish Government as a practically independent power.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that because his present military situation is critical and he has something to hope from Finnish help that he will make concessions to Finns. His attitude is that if he is asked to make concessions when he is in difficulties he would rather fight alone, whatever the risk may be. He said emphatically that he had two convictions: that Russia could suppress Bolshevism herself without other aid and that Russia must remain united. Ends.³

³ In a subsequent telegram of July 21, transmitted on July 24 by Mr. O'Reilly as No. 662 from Vladivostok (received July 26), Sir C. Eliot reported: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that Yudenich had communicated summary of (? Finnish Agreement) and asked Koltchak to approve it as it stands. Koltchak had refused and requested Yudenich not to (? sign) it. At the same time a Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been appointed (? in Finland) in order to show Koltchak's readiness to (? accept) present Government. Koltchak was greatly grieved that Allies had not urged Finns to march on Petrograd.

'I said that I had no information as to your Lordship's views but it seemed to me that if Finns occupied Petrograd at request of Allies and then refused to move or believed [? behaved] in a way disagreeable to Russian Government a very awkward situation would be created.'

No. 317

Earl Curzon to Mr. Bosanquet (Reval)

No. 110 Telegraphic [100729/140/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 16, 1919

A report of the Esthonian staff on the military situation on July 4 transmitted by the Esthonian Representative here, states that the Russian Northern Corps have established the old laws of the Czarist regime in the liberated districts and that this is not approved by the population.

Please call the attention of General Gough to this and request him to watch carefully for any reactionary tendencies, which should be immediately checked.

No. 318

M. Nabokoff to Sir R. Graham (Received July 18)

No. 788 [104417/3669/38]

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, July 17, 1919

Dear Sir Ronald,

General Ironside, having intimated to General Miller, the Governor-General at Archangel, of [*sic*] the impending recall of British troops in the

near future, General Miller has forwarded to me the enclosed telegram¹ which he has asked me to transmit to His Majesty's Government. General Miller expresses the earnest desire that the contents of his message be communicated to the Prime Minister.

I have sent a personal telegram to General Miller in which I mentioned the statement made by His Majesty's Secretary of State for War to the effect that all troops in Russia, except those who volunteered to join the Military Missions, will be brought home before the winter, and those who were in North Russia during last winter will, it is anticipated, start for home in September, excepting always such men as may volunteer to stay.²

In view, however, of the alarm which the news of the impending withdrawal of British troops has caused, may I express the hope that His Majesty's Government will endeavour to dispel the anxiety which may be caused by the impression that Great Britain intends to withhold all further assistance in the north of Russia.

Yours sincerely,
C. NABOKOFF

¹ Not printed. This message was in terms similar to those of the note summarized in No. 358.

² This statement was made by the Secretary of State for War in a memorandum on the then position of demobilization in the British Army. This memorandum was published in *The Times* on July 17, 1919.

No. 319

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received July 21)

No. 635 Telegraphic [105147/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, July 17, 1919

Following from Consul at Ekaterinburg. Begins:—

Following sent to Omsk, July 11th.

With dismissal of General Gaida the reactionary military party have removed their most formidable obstacle. I am convinced, however, that duration of (? existence) of their authority will be very short; in fact the continued disasters at the front and frequent rising of Ural labourers in sympathy with oncoming Bolsheviks are ample proof of this shortsightedness of military reactionaries, who cannot see that their methods irritate (? people) is [*sic*] positively ludicrous. Demoralisation which has set in is strikingly reminiscent of collapse during revolution in 1917. It would seem to be no exaggeration to (? assume) that whole of the Urals are to be subjected to second dose of Bolshevik rule. Refugees who daily stream in from the west consist very largely of peasants (landowners) but labourers remain at home and wait for Bolsheviks. Recent events have completely shaken prestige and authority of Admiral Koltchak whom, unless things change, the masses will now regard as having yielded to influence of reactionaries.

It would seem that if tide of Bolshevism is to be prevented from flowing from Urals into Western Siberia and Omsk Government preserved, immediate

steps will have to be taken for (? raising) moral of Siberian Army as also its reinforcement from Siberia with troops not tainted with Bolshevism; the questions of command (? which) if possible should include harmonious co-operation of Gaida, Koltchak and Dietrich, and that of propaganda should first be dealt with. It is not likely that (? anything) in direct solving of these questions will be arrived at unless Allies take up firm position. Ends.

No. 320

Foreign Office Memorandum¹

[106809/43654/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 17, 1919

I. *Bolshevik Russia*

Although the reports of recent developments inside Bolshevik Russia lack definite confirmation, for the reason that all official means of communication either directly or through neutral Powers are severed, indications are not lacking that the Russian Soviet Government have been compelled by force of circumstances and experience to modify many of the theories for which they are generally understood to stand, and that they are now embarking upon a policy more in accordance with the adopted principles of international comity and intercourse.

The following examples may be given of the present trend of opinion in Russian Bolshevik governing circles:—

1. *Land and Peasantry*

Notwithstanding their previous extreme attitude, the Soviet Government now permit the peasants to hold land, and have declared that their policy is gradually and systematically to include the middle class peasantry in the work of socialistic reconstruction. As a safeguard they insist that the peasants must be separated from the well-to-do classes and drawn to the side of the working classes. Lenin himself is a supporter of this departure, and has declared in a recent speech to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party that 'we should especially emphasize our persevering attitude towards the middle class peasantry, and devise a whole series of increasingly concrete measures which would immediately give something to the middle class peasantry'.

2. *The Bourgeoisie*

The Bolshevik Government now admit the necessity of using the resources of bourgeois science and technical knowledge. As an example of their present attitude may be cited the fact that when the labour commune of agriculture ended in failure, the authorities decided to organize large agricultural under-

¹ Lord Curzon circulated this memorandum to the War Cabinet under cover of the following undated note: 'The following is the memorandum which I was instructed by the War Cabinet to prepare with regard to the political and social aspect of Bolshevik policy in Russia at the present moment.'

takings which were to be worked on capitalistic lines. Farmers with scientific knowledge were entrusted with full powers for obtaining labour and maintaining discipline. On this point also Lenin has declared that 'without the bourgeois specialist it is impossible to raise up the productive forces. . . . They must be surrounded by an atmosphere of comradely co-operation. . . . To force a whole class to work by means of the strike is impossible. . . . We must draw them into our apparatus, and for this we must sometimes make sacrifices.'

3. *Attitude of the Soviet Government to other Parties in Russia*

Reports have been received that the Soviet Government have entered into relations with the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary Parties, and have even concluded some kind of alliance with them. The evidence is not conclusive, but merits attention notwithstanding.

4. *Concessions to Foreign Capitalistic Organisations*

Concessions have been offered by the Russian Soviet Government in various parts of Russia to capitalistic firms of non-Russian nationality in return for trade facilities. So far as our information goes, nothing has definitely resulted from these offers, but the fact that they have been made shows that the Russian Soviet Government are prepared to abandon some of their previous theories in this direction.

5. *Debts*

In practically all the recent negotiations which have been initiated with the Soviet Government, they have admitted that they are responsible for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire and have agreed to meet their obligation.

Writing to the *Morning Post* on July 14, Mr. Tchaikowsky furnishes confirmation of the change of attitude on the part of the Russian Soviet Government. He points to a series of concessions which have been made by Lenin on behalf of the Government he represents. According to him, bourgeois specialists have been placed at the head of many civil departments, and the German engineer, Krassin, formerly manager of the German firm of Siemen and Halske, of Moscow, on being offered the management of three Bolshevik Ministries, demanded as conditions of his acceptance of the post—

1. The appointment of German specialists, regardless of political opinions.
2. The abolition of all committees of control of workmen and employees, and the appointment instead of responsible individual managers with practically unlimited powers.
3. The introduction of piece work instead of time work, and overtime when necessary, regardless of the eight-hour day.

These conditions are said to have been accepted by the Russian Soviet Government, and Mr. Krassin is now working at the head of a vast organisation of German technical experts. Indeed, all evidence points to a sustained German effort to organise Bolshevism on revised Teutonic lines.

In connection with the trend of opinion among the leading luminaries of the Russian Soviet Government, it may be of interest to give a brief summary of the recent negotiations which have been entered into between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Russian Soviet Government.

At the end of December 1918 a declaration was addressed to the Allied and Associated Governments through M. Litvinoff, to the effect that the Russian Soviet Government were prepared to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the Allied countries for the settlement of all outstanding questions. The terms proposed by the Soviet Government were roughly as follows:—

1. No compensation or regulation of frontier. (Presumably this meant no compensation to Russians by the Soviet Government and no regulation of frontiers by the Allies.) Liberty of small States, such as Esthonia, to make their own arrangements.
2. Bolsheviks to pay compensation for foreign property and securities in Russia 'to such an extent as may be consistent with the Bolshevik Government's principles'.
3. No reprisals on Russians who had joined the Allies. Such Russians would, however, be submitted to the same treatment as other bourgeois.
4. Introduction of almost universal suffrage and freedom of press by gradual stages till the Bolshevik Government becomes stable.
5. Abstention by the Allies from interference with internal affairs of Russia.

Before any reply had been made to this offer, the Allied and Associated Powers came forward in January 1919 with a proposal that all the Russian groups should assemble at Prinkipo for the purpose of discussing their differences. The following were the conditions set out by the Allied Powers:—

- (i) The Allies recognised the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside.
- (ii) They declared that it was not their wish or intention to assist any one of the organised groups contending for the leadership of Russia as against the others.
- (iii) They accordingly invited representatives of every organised group exercising, or attempting to exercise, power in Russia, to send representatives to Prinkipo, provided that hostilities should in the meanwhile cease.

The Soviet Government replied to the following effect:—

- (i) They expressed their willingness to acknowledge the financial obligations of the old Russian Empire as regards creditors belonging to the Governments of the Entente, besides guaranteeing payment of interest on its debts by a certain quantity of raw material.
- (ii) They declared themselves prepared to place concessions of mines, forests, etc., at the disposal of the citizens of the Entente Governments,

provided the social economic order of Soviet Russia was not affected by internal disorders connected with these concessions.

- (iii) The extent to which they were prepared to meet the Entente must, however, depend on the military situation, which they emphasised was improving from their point of view daily.
- (iv) As regards the question of revolutionary international propaganda, the Russian Soviet Government, while unwilling to limit the liberty of the revolutionary press, declared their readiness to enter into a general agreement with the Entente Powers on their undertaking not to interfere in Russian internal affairs.
- (v) Subject to the acceptance of the foregoing conditions, the Soviet Government declared their readiness to begin conversations immediately either at Prinkipo or elsewhere.

This reply has remained unanswered to this day, and no further action has been taken in regard to it by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Subsequently in March, 1919, the so-called Bullit [*sic*] Mission proceeded to Russia, with the approval of Colonel House, in order to investigate the situation on behalf of the American Government, Mr. Bullit being a member of the United States State Department. We have no official information as regards the objects or results of this Mission,² but two articles on the subject appeared in the Swedish Socialist newspaper, *Politiken*. According to the account given in the *Politiken*, some sort of preliminary agreement which was to form the basis of a future conference was drawn up and approved by Mr. Bullit and the Soviet Government. The terms of this agreement were given as follows:—

1. The Russian Soviet Government, the other Governments of the Russian Empire and the Allied and Associated Governments were to undertake jointly and severally not to attempt forcibly to overthrow any of the *de facto* Governments established in the territories of the former Russian Empire.
2. The raising of the economic blockade, and the resumption of commercial relations between the Entente Countries and South Russia.
3. A general amnesty to all political opponents and political prisoners. All Russians who fought in or supported the armies opposed to the Soviet Government to be included in this amnesty.
4. The mutual repatriation of Russian and Entente prisoners of war.
5. The withdrawal, on the signature of the agreement, of all Entente troops, with the withdrawal of military support from anti-Soviet Russia; and the reduction of both the Soviet and anti-Soviet Governments' armies.
6. The recognition by the Soviet and other Governments of the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire.

Like the Prinkipo proposal, the Bullit agreement has become a dead letter and nothing further has been heard of it.

² Cf. No. 308, received after this memorandum had been written.

Lastly, there has been the Nansen proposal.

In April 1919 Dr. Nansen addressed a letter to President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando, calling attention to the terrible condition of Central Russia, and proposing the organisation of food and medical relief on a non-political basis. A reply was sent on April 17 to Dr. Nansen, in which the President and his colleagues expressed their sympathy with the sufferings of the population of Russia, and declared that the organisation proposed by Dr. Nansen appeared to offer a practical means of coping with the situation. A proviso was, however, added that a cessation of hostilities and complete suspension of the transport of troops and war material to and within Russia was an indispensable condition.

The comments of the Russian Soviet Government on the exchange of notes between Dr. Nansen and the heads of States of the Allied and Associated Governments were in due course received through the Russian Government wireless. They complained that this purely humanitarian proposal of Dr. Nansen had been distorted by the Western Powers into a political one; referred to their acceptance of the Prinkipo proposal which had been frustrated by the protégés of the Associated Powers; and pointed to the anti-Bolshevik propaganda and anti-Jewish measures which had been carried out by Polish and Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries under the direction of Entente officers. Attention was called to the manifesto of Admiral Kolchak, dispossessing the peasants of the land they had taken from the nobility, again with the approval of the Entente. Finally, the Soviet Government declared that they would only discuss a cessation of hostilities if the whole problem of their relations with the opposing Governments was discussed at the same time.

II. The Situation in Siberia, and the Sympathies of the Population in that Country

The defeats which have been inflicted by the forces of the Russian Soviet Government on those of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia have brought the unrest in the territories under the control of Admiral Kolchak to a head. But although many peasants in Siberia are now loudly proclaiming that they would prefer 'Bolshevism' to the régime to which they are at present subjected, it would be inaccurate to deduce from this that they are in favour of Bolshevik rule in the form which it assumed in its early stages in Russia proper. The present discontent may rather be attributed to a general feeling of war-weariness and to a sense of disappointment and hopes deferred. In addition to this there is much mistrust of the intentions of Admiral Kolchak and those by whom he is surrounded. The unwieldy bureaucracy of the Omsk Government, which consists of many members of the former Russian Imperial Government Offices, and the gross mismanagement of public affairs generally, are largely responsible for the present feeling. Unpaid wages and compulsory military service assist in fanning the flames.

In a recent telegram Sir Charles Eliot diagnosed the situation in the following terms. . . .³

³ There followed a six-point recapitulation of paragraphs 2-7 of No. 248.

As against this, General Dietrichs, the Commander-in-Chief of the Siberian Army, maintains that the *moral* of the new drafts which are coming into the depots of Admiral Kolchak's armies is excellent, and that the population in the area where the Siberian armies are operating is friendly towards Admiral Kolchak's troops. In the districts to the west of Omsk the population is reported by Brigadier Jack⁴ to be working well, although living is dear and raw material scarce.

There can be no doubt that such trouble as exists in Siberia is concentrated mainly east of Lake Baikal, the sympathies of the population of the Lake in the zone of operations of the Siberian armies being more or less favourable to Admiral Kolchak.

III. *Deductions to be drawn from the Present Attitude of the Russian Soviet Government in Russia and in Siberia*

What deductions can be made from the preceding summary of developments in Russia and Siberia?

So far as Siberia is concerned, the difficulties which confront Admiral Kolchak's Government in that territory are no safe guide to the attitude which the Allied Powers should assume to the Soviet Russian Government.

The population of thirteen millions all told is in any case negligible as compared with the masses in Russia proper, while the state of public feeling in Siberia is only that which ordinarily makes itself manifest in countries which have been subjected to defeat in war.

As regards Russia proper, it would seem to have been sufficiently shown that the Russian Soviet Government are prepared to negotiate on conditions which may appear attractive at first sight. They agree to recognise the debts of the late Imperial Russia, to restrict Bolshevik propaganda, to grant concessions in Russia, to amnesty Russians in the anti-Bolshevik armies and even to maintain the border States of the late Russian Empire permanently in their present jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the note addressed to Admiral Kolchak promising that leader continued assistance towards establishing himself in supreme authority in Russia, coming, as it has, after the Prinkipo, Bullit and Nansen proposals, would seem to make it impossible for the Allies to abandon his cause, even if they felt any inclination to do so; while the acts of the Bolshevik Government and forces continue to be in sharp contradiction to their professions.

It may be that should we fail to carry through our present policy the effect will be to bring about some reconciliation between moderate opinion on either side in the contending groups in Russia, and that from this will result some new party with new men at its head, with whom we may be able to come to some understanding. But for the Allies at this juncture to adopt a policy favourable to the Russian Soviet Government would be disastrous, since the effect could only be that we should forfeit our good name with all

⁴ General Jack was the British representative on the Technical Board of the Inter-Allied Railway Board in Siberia.

our friends in Russia for many years to come, if not for ever, play the game of the Soviet Government, and ultimately lose our whole hand in the country to Germany, who is only waiting to derive advantage from the uncertainties of Allied policy.

It is also more than likely that such concessions as the Soviet Government may seem to be making would only be maintained long enough to enable them to secure a firm hold on supreme power, and that when they had served their purpose the policy of violent propaganda and detestable deeds would be revived.

No. 321

Earl Curzon to Mr. Bell (Helsingfors)

No. 551 Telegraphic [96625/26579/56]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 18, 1919*

Your telegram No. 352¹ (of June 30th—Finnish advance on Petrograd.)

Finnish representative has communicated note² stating that Finnish Government are anxious that he should ascertain whether an agreement between Finnish Government and Admiral Kolchak for co-operation of former in occupation of Petrograd could be preceded by an agreement between Entente Powers and the Finnish Government, by which Finnish Government would be guaranteed financial support, and the supply of the necessary war material to ensure the success of the operations. Mr. Donner states that the Finnish Government is of opinion that such an agreement is necessary before they can finally consider the question of assisting in the capture of Petrograd and decide whether they should take action or not.

In reply Mr. Donner has been informed that co-operation between Finnish and Russian forces was agreed upon by Generals Judenitch and Mannerheim independently of His Majesty's Government who in the interests of future good relations between Finland and Russia instructed their representative at Omsk to ascertain whether Admiral Koltchak approved. The final answer has not been received, but it is known Koltchak approves of the proposed advance provided Judenitch acts in concert with Mannerheim, and General Gough has been instructed³ to inform the Finnish Government and Judenitch accordingly. His Majesty's Government never assumed any direct responsibility for the arrangements nor can they give the undertakings asked for by Finnish Government, although they would be glad to see the advance proceed. Their attitude, which is inspired by no lack of sympathy for Finland, has been explained to General Gough and by him no doubt to the Finnish Government.

¹ No. 286.

² Dated July 1, 1919; received in Foreign Office on July 2.

³ See No. 273.

No. 322

Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received July 20)
No. 1178 Telegraphic [104813/775/38]

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1919

Your telegram No. 1435.¹

Acting Secretary of State informs me that at the present time United States Government have no funds whatever available for assistance of Provisional Government of Northern Russia. He will let me know if any prospect arises of securing necessary funds (and if so) whether United States Government can see their way clear to using them.

¹ No. 299.

No. 323

Sir C. Eliot (Omsk) to Earl Curzon (Received July 22)
No. 5 Telegraphic [106212/11/57]

OMSK, July 19, 1919

General Takayanagi arrived here on July 14th and was received with unusual honour. He informed me he was not a Special Commissioner but merely head of Japanese Military Mission in succession to General Muto and others: he was however confronted with special task of dealing with Russian request for despatch of Japanese troops to replace Czechs as guards of railway west of Irkutsk in conjunction with American troops. He thought public opinion in Japan was not prepared for this step and, that if Japanese Government decided to take it, they must give explanations and expect discussion. Apart from this request to replace Czechs, he had received no request for despatch of Japanese troops to front, but he thought if Japanese troops were stationed at Omsk (it would be) necessary to post some further west, but on this side of Urals, because Omsk might shortly be captured by Bolshevik advance.

In spite of General Takayanagi's statement it is currently reported that Koltchak's Government have asked Japanese to send troops to front and many Russians (would), especially (? in view of present) menace, earnestly advocate this course as only means of avoiding an invasion from Urals and insurrections at Omsk and elsewhere. I therefore asked Minister for Foreign Affairs if he could give me definite information and he replied categorically that no request had been made for Japanese troops to replace Czechs although he made same reservation as General Takayanagi that it might be necessary to send some a little further west to guard line. He also (? stated) idea of a Russo-Japanese-German Alliance was growing stronger amongst public although Koltchak and his Government were strongly (? opposed) to it.

General Takayanagi assured me Japanese support Semenoff not as a rival to Koltchak but as best means of helping Koltchak, because they consider

Siberian Army is worthless and that Cossacks are the only troops in Siberia of any military value.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Semenoff was behaving loyally. It was not true he would be made Governor General of Trans-Baikal province but both he and his namesake General Semenoff would probably be appointed assistants to Rozanoff, new Commander-in-Chief at Vladivostok. Ataman Semenoff would remain at Chita and had promised to send troops to the front. He had recently been accused of robbing trains, but he merely confiscated money from Chinese who were endeavouring to export it in contravention of law.

No. 324

Sir C. Eliot (Omsk) to Earl Curzon (Received July 23)
No. 7 Telegraphic [106769/11/57]

OMSK, July 19, 1919

Koltchak spoke to me to-day about the prevalent rumours respecting an agreement for sending Japanese (? troops) to Ural front. Only two people, he said, could make such an agreement, himself or his Minister for Foreign Affairs. Neither of them had made any such proposal to Japanese or received any such proposal from Japanese. His negotiations as to Japanese troops had been (? exclusively) concerned with question of replacing Czechs who at present guarded part of lines by Japanese and (? American)s. (Very) positive statements have been made by Russians to the effect that high military officials asked General Takayanagi on what terms (they) would send troops to Urals and Your Lordship will notice form of (Koltchak's) disclaimer does not exclude possibility of such conversations.

I was struck by the harsh and ungrateful manner in which Koltchak spoke of (Czechs). He said that they were no good and the sooner they cleared out the better.

No. 325

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon¹ (Received August 8)
No. 113 [113652/102080/38]

ARCHANGEL, July 21, 1919

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 472² of July 15th, I have the honour to report that I recently had a conversation with General Miller on the subject of the proposal that the Provisional Government should resign and that all authority should be concentrated in the hands of a Governor General,

¹ This dispatch was, by an error in form, addressed to Mr. Balfour, instead of Lord Curzon, at the Foreign Office.

² Not printed. This telegram reported the proposal referred to below.

thus bringing the administration of the Northern Region into harmony with the acceptance of the supreme authority of the Siberian Government.

I began the conversation by asking General Miller whether he could tell me exactly what significance was to be attached to the information contained in telegram No. 605³ of July 10th from the High Commissioner in Siberia announcing that the Omsk Government now regarded the 'former Archangel Government' as entirely dependent upon them financially. General Miller replied that he did not understand the message and that though the Provisional Government had kept the Omsk Government informed of their financial situation there had been no correspondence with a view to the latter taking effective control of the finances of this Region. I said that in the present circumstances such a course did not appear to me to be practicable and there were questions, such as the status of the National Emission Caisse, which would have to be discussed first.

I then asked General Miller how it was intended, assuming that the Omsk Government approved the proposed change in the Constitution here, to inform the local population. I suggested that it might be well to consider the desirability of calling a meeting of the Zemstvo and explaining the reasons for the change, as I thought that this method would have a better effect on public opinion than if it were simply announced by an order of the Provisional Government. General Miller replied that there could be no question of consulting the public as to whether the change should be made or not in view of the fact that the Omsk Government had been accepted as the Supreme Government of Russia. I said that this was not what I intended: I merely meant that the representatives of the popular assemblies should receive from the Provisional Government verbal explanations of the action to be taken. What had brought the idea into my head was an article, of which a summary is enclosed herewith,⁴ by M. Ivanov (see Mr. Lindley's despatch No. 61⁵ of December 19th, 1918) in the *Vozrozhdenie Severa* of July 15th. General Miller said he would consider the proposal which I had made. I may mention that the article is the result of a conversation between M. Ivanov and the United States Chargé d'Affaires.

I then went on to say that I considered the views expressed in M. Ivanov's

³ Not printed.

⁴ Not printed. The summarized article, entitled 'The Topic of the Day', referred to 'the feelings of apathy and despair and even panic' occasioned in Archangel by the course of military operations in Russia, and to 'the rumours now current of changes in the Government, and which seem just now to be demanded by military circumstances, also the complications involved in our relations with the All-Russian Government and the incapacity of certain of our authorities. . . . To stop all this we think the present is the time when all changes in the Government should be made with the participation of the population. To the blindest it is now evident that the fundamental mistake of those fighting bolshevism is the squeezing out of public opinion (institutions) from government. . . . We therefore consider essential the immediate calling together of the Zemstvo and Town Council, which would be the only means of dispelling the present apathy.'

⁵ Not printed. In this dispatch Mr. Lindley reported that M. Ivanov was President of the Provincial Zemstvo at Archangel 'and a prominent member of the municipality. He has considerable influence with the peasants.'

article as very sound. It appeared to me that enough was not being done to enlist the sympathies of the population in the work which was being done here. Greater efforts should be made to gain the confidence of the public by keeping them informed of the situation and by showing confidence in the future. General Miller replied that this was not an easy matter. Bolshevik propaganda was active in the town and the population was prepared to believe any wild rumour. A great mistake had been made in not announcing the retreat of Kolchak's forces even when it had been a matter of public knowledge for a considerable time. The matter had escaped his personal notice but he intended that such mistakes should not be made in the future. I reminded him that I had drawn his attention some little time ago to the fact that Admiral Kolchak's forces were shown on the map displayed by the Russian Propaganda Bureau to be still west of Glazov when they were already almost back to Perm, and had said that I did not consider propaganda on those lines to be of the slightest value. I then asked him whether he did not think it might be a good thing to signalise the change of régime here by relaxing some of the restrictions now in force; for instance, was it essential to maintain the system of night passes? He replied rather vaguely that the situation in the town was not too satisfactory and he doubted the wisdom of adding to the opportunities of Bolshevik agitators: (he had been compelled to order the execution of four men that morning). I said I quite understood that the latter were a constant danger but could he tell me, firstly, how much indigenous bolshevism there was in the town and, secondly, how many of the really fanatical agitators who had been executed during let us say the last three months were inhabitants of Archangel and not men who had passed through the lines. He appeared to think that the majority of the dangerous characters, by which I explained to him I meant men of the type of the two deserters who were mainly responsible for the mutiny reported in my telegram No. 470⁶ of 15th July, came from outside. As regards bolshevism in the town, the volume varied in accordance with the state of the political and military situation. Just at present the retreat of Admiral Kolchak and rumours of the impending withdrawal of the British forces had caused an appreciable increase. There was a growing readiness to listen to agitators and panic-mongers. I replied that after all the Russian was always ready to listen to a speech and it did not appear to me to be a very dangerous symptom. How did he deal with agitators of this type? General Miller replied that they were brought up before a court martial and received heavy sentences. I suggested that probably the most effective deterrent would be to take a few people who expressed bolshevik sympathies at their word and put them over the lines. It was probably the last thing in the world they wanted. I also said that I thought that the proceedings of the courts martial should be reported as fully as possible in the press. I regarded it as of great importance, from the point of view both of internal and external politics, that everything possible should be done to satisfy the public generally that the verdicts were just and that there was no return to former methods.

⁶ No. 312.

General Miller received these observations in good part, and promised to give them careful consideration. He observed, however, that I must not assume that he would be selected by the Omsk Government to be Governor General. It was true that he had been appointed Commander in Chief but knowing that he had no experience of administration until he came here, the Omsk Government might quite possibly select some other person for the post of Governor General.

Confidential

My reason for speaking to General Miller on the above lines was that the Russian Staff is in a state bordering on panic at the prospect of the withdrawal of the British troops and their fears are not unlikely to cause them to see Bolshevik agents at every corner. General Miller himself will, I think, do all he can to maintain the moral of his officers and men, but he makes no attempt to conceal his grave anxiety with regard to the future.

I have, etc.,
R. H. HOARE

No. 326

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 22)
No. 482 Telegraphic [106205/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, July 22, 1919

General Officer Commanding has reported to War Office successful revolt on Onega front which was held entirely by Russian troops and plot in 6th Russian Regiment on railway which has been successfully dealt with.

I share his view that these developments show that absolutely no confidence can be placed on Russian troops unless in close and constant contact with British. Further that either British troops here must be reinforced or evacuation should take place in accordance with lines contemplated in March.¹ If evacuation is decided on the sooner it takes place the better from a local point of view as causes of collapse of Russian troops were inefficient officers, retreat of Kolchak and agitation by Labour Party in favour of evacuation.

If it is possible to reinforce General Officer Commanding adequately it should be done unless His Majesty's Government contemplate reversal of their whole attitude towards Russian problem or unless they can counteract moral effect of evacuation throughout Russia by increased support in Baltic and South.

If evacuation is to be effected decision should be taken without delay. In that case I think best course would be that Allied representatives should proclaim General Officer Commanding military dictator (and) evacuate and inform population that before we leave they will be given an opportunity of establishing whatever Government they desire. This point I will discuss with

¹ Cf. No. 312.

my Allied colleagues when French Chargé d'Affaires returns from country this evening.

I will submit proposals for dealing with civilian food and other supplies without waiting for decision of His Majesty's Government on subject of evacuation.

No. 327

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)

No. 1489 Telegraphic [100856/88/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 22, 1919*

We are being pressed to facilitate further shipments of flour to Archangel to enable Provisional Government of North Russia to maintain itself after the evacuation of the territory by Allied troops.

Question has been considered by the Supreme Economic Council, as well as by United States authorities, who have stated that they are not in a position to afford any assistance. In spite of this decision I should be glad if you would approach United States Government and urge the propriety of their sending assistance, since it must be agreed that it would be unfair that His Majesty's Government should have to bear the whole burden of despatching these supplies at their own expense.

Repeated to Archangel No. 438.

No. 328

Earl Curzon to Mr. Hoare (Archangel)

No. 440 Telegraphic [100856/88/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 22, 1919*

Your telegram No. 449¹ (of July 9th, food supplies for North Russia).

Arrangements are being made for further shipment of flour to complete 10,000 tons required by you before the end of August.

Question of further shipments is under review, in connection with your telegram No. 470² (of July 15th), but in any case, after careful consideration of all the factors involved, we do not think we should be justified in accepting your estimate of 10,000 tons a month from September to July, and that if supplies are despatched, we cannot go beyond rate of 5,000 tons a month, or, say, 50,000 tons all told.

Repeated to Washington No. 1490.

¹ No. 304.

² No. 312.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop*¹

[102622/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 22, 1919

Sir,

I have to inform you that you are appointed to proceed on a special political mission to Transcaucasia, with the title of Chief British Commissioner.

Although the *de facto* authority of the Governments of Georgia, the Armenian Republic of Erivan, and of Azerbaijan has not as yet been formally recognised by His Majesty's Government, you will be required to keep in close touch with these Governments, who will be informed of your mission through their Delegations at the Peace Conference in Paris.

You will be accompanied by a staff composed of Mr. Vice-Consul T. E. Milligan Grundy, Mr. Vice-Consul J. A. Waite, and another secretary to be selected.

The objects of your mission, in addition to that already mentioned, will be—

(a) To report on the political situation in Transcaucasia.

(b) To do your utmost to prevent friction between the volunteer army and the Transcaucasian Republics, and to ensure respect for the line to be drawn between their respective spheres.²

Should this line at any time in the future be so defined as to leave the territory of Daghestan, or the North Caucasus Republic, on its southern side,

¹ Formerly H.M. Consul-General at Moscow.

² On July 17, 1919, the War Office, in agreement with the Foreign Office, had sent a telegram to the British military representatives at Ekaterinodar and Constantinople instructing them that General Denikin should be informed that 'his troops must not penetrate south of the following line (Reference Map of Caucasia, 32 miles to one inch): from mouth of Bzyb river northwards along that river to the frontier of Sukhum province, thence eastwards along northern frontiers of provinces of Sukhum, Kutais, Tiflis, thence south-eastwards along the southern boundary of province of Daghestan. In informing him of this division Denikin must be made to understand that the continued support of H.M. Government depends upon the loyal observance of this line. The Caucasian States must be informed that they must abstain from all aggression against the Volunteer Army and co-operate with Denikin at least to the extent of supplying oil and other supplies for the Caspian Fleet and withholding them from the Bolsheviks. They should be warned that if they fail to comply with these conditions they will be deprived of British goodwill and it will be rendered impossible for H.M. Government to insist upon the retention of Denikin's troops north of this line.' The line hereby established represented a modification of a line of demarcation previously notified by the War Office on June 6, 1919, in that Daghestan was now included within the area of the Volunteer Army. In this connexion the above-quoted telegram added as confidential information: 'The uncertainty regarding the despatch of Italian troops to replace the British in the Caucasus has considerably altered the situation since the original line of demarcation was defined and it is felt that it would not be wise now to attempt to dislodge Denikin's troops from Daghestan since British troops will shortly be withdrawn and it is improbable that they will be replaced by Allied troops.' The announcement of the new line of demarcation was arranged for August 4, 1919.

you will be required to maintain relations with its Government in the same way as with those of the three Transcaucasian Republics already mentioned, and in any case you should endeavour to obtain information as to the political situation in Daghestan and report from time to time to His Majesty's Government.

(c) So far as the personnel at your disposal and the circumstances permit, to advance the interests of British trade in Transcaucasia and to report on trade matters.

(d) So long as British military forces remain in Transcaucasia, matters of a purely military character will, of course, continue to concern the General Officer Commanding; but in political matters, especially in the advice to be given to the Governments of the various States mentioned, you will be independent of the British military command, though you should make a point of consulting the General Officer Commanding in the various questions which may arise. It will at the same time be the duty of the General Officer Commanding, in so far as political questions may affect his work, to consult with you, and not to act without your advice and consent.

You will correspond direct with the Foreign Office, with the exception that, in matters of supply and relief, your communications should be made direct to the Supreme Economic Council in Paris, and in matters of trade to the Department of Overseas Trade. Copies of your communications with these bodies should be sent to the Foreign Office and also, in the case of relief and supply, to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople, for communication to the representative of the Supreme Economic Council at that place.

Detailed accounts of the expenditure of the mission should, of course, be kept, and it will be convenient that the first account should be rendered in respect of the period from the commencement of the mission to the 30th September next. Accounts should be rendered quarterly thereafter. Suitable forms of accounts and vouchers will be supplied by the chief clerk to the member of the mission who will be charged with the preparation of the accounts.

I have, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 330

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 4970 [107336/11067/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 23, 1919*

Sir,

In the course of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador to-day, I asked if he could give me official confirmation of the intimation which had reached me some time ago from Paris that the Italian Government had

abandoned their intention to take charge either of the Caucasus or the Caspian (see your despatch No. 1257¹ (14809) of the 10th instant).

I told him that we were proceeding upon the hypothesis that this was the case, and were accordingly making arrangements to hand over the Caspian flotilla to General Denikin prior to the withdrawal of the military forces from the Caucasus.

The Marquis Imperiali replied that he believed me to have correctly represented the decision of his Government. There had been a change of policy when M. Tittoni became Foreign Minister. He would, however, telegraph to his Government to obtain official confirmation of the fact.²

I have, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

¹ This dispatch transmitted a note by Mr. Balfour of an informal meeting held in Paris on July 3, 1919, between the heads of the American, British, French and Italian delegations at which general questions affecting Italian policy and interests were discussed. At this meeting the question of Italian intentions in the Caucasus was briefly raised by Mr. Balfour and answered by Signor Tittoni in the sense here indicated. (For the text of Mr. Balfour's note of this meeting see Vol. IV, Chap. I.)

² The Italian Ambassador called on Sir R. Graham at the Foreign Office on August 1 and, according to a minute of that date by the latter, referred to Lord Curzon's request 'for a definite statement as to whether or not the Italian Government intended to despatch Italian forces to the Caucasus. The Marquis Imperiali had consulted Signor Tittoni, and was authorised to state in reply that the Italian Government had definitely abandoned any such intention. They had, however, at the present moment a Military Mission in Georgia and Azerbaijan. In view of the important economic future of the Caucasus and the possibilities for Italian commercial activities in that region, the Italian Government did not intend to withdraw this Mission and they might even develop it to a certain extent but only from the commercial point of view.'

No. 331

General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris).

Received July 24)

No. G. 105 Telegraphic [612/5/1/16201]

HELSINGFORS, July 23, 1919

Following for C[hief of] M[ilitary] S[ection], Astoria, Paris.

Finns will not advance on Petrograd without a loan which would afford tangible proof of Allied support.

As this is not forthcoming it is useless for General Yudenitch to wait longer on north bank of Gulf of Finland. Now more essential than ever to concentrate all Colonel Nauondle's [*sic*] army. General Yudenitch is therefore transferring his H.Q. from Helsingfors to Narva, July 26. British branch Mission already established. If forced to retire Yudenitch intends to avoid Esthonia and to transfer his H.Q. to Pskov. It is evident that Russians' need of material assistance in money, equipment and other warlike stores is so acute that they will undoubtedly take it from any source, even from Germans. Yudenitch professes to repudiate latter eventuality but his hand will be

forced. No funds yet received from Kolchak who appears to have handed over affairs of North-West Front to questionable discretion of Sazonoff in Paris. Present effective strength 21,000 rifles and 70 guns: more guns will be captured from Bolsheviks; but ammunition will not be available from that source. Thousands of deserters will be coming over but without any rifles, equipment or ammunition. Please therefore make every possible effort now to supply North West Army with money and medical stores especially S.A.A.¹ and shell for Russian rifles and 3-inch guns. Essential to inform me when consignment may be expected in order to support Yudenitch's personal authority.

Addressed War Office. Repeated Paris.

¹ Small arms ammunition.

No. 332

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 26)
No. 491 Telegraphic [108224/91/38]

ARCHANGEL, July 24, 1919

Following is summary of despatch which leaves by bag today.

Reports from French Chargé d'Affaires in Siberia who has recently visited the fronts show that collapse is due to utter indifference of Russian officers to their duty resulting in endless mutinies and desertions. Moreover they talk freely of re-establishing old regime. These facts utterly stultify allied policy in Russia and when known will produce movement of opinion against further assistance to Admiral Kolchak and his associates as strong as there now is against continuance of occupation of Archangel.

Behaviour of Russian officers here is similar though naturally not so bad.

Manner in which Denikin's force resisted disintegration in spite of disasters of spring appears to show that spirit is very different to elsewhere but if it can hold its own when main body of Bolsheviks attacks it will probably do well.

I have at various times expressed fear that partial intervention would be disastrous. See Mr. Lindley's despatch No. 24,¹ September 27, which owing to fortuitous circumstances was expression of my views rather than Mr. Lindley's, memorandum in his despatch No. 58,¹ December 6, and my despatch No. 36.² These fears have been justified.

Even if we can continue to support Kolchak civil war will inevitably last at least another year and danger to world civilization is very great.

If he won, which is far from certain, it seems unlikely in view of temper of his officers that Kolchak would be able to keep his pledges to Allies. Result would inevitably be further revolutionary troubles.

As regard[s] Archangel my conclusion is that unless public opinion at home changes evacuation will undoubtedly take place. Under first impression of news of disaffection of Russian troops I was inclined to think it in

¹ Not printed.

² Cf. No. 312; note 1.

some measure released us from obligation to continue feeding and protecting northern region. I am now convinced that this view is utterly wrong and that our duty in this respect is absolved (? absolute).

In all circumstances I submit only course open to us is to endeavour to mediate on following lines.

Ask Bolsheviks whether they will accept conditions accepted by Admiral Kolchak with such modifications as circumstances may indicate. If so we will do all we can to render negotiations possible using virtual compulsion on Whites by threat to punish [? publish] all available details of failure of officers. We would inform Bolsheviks that while negotiations were proceeding we should be prepared to provide week by week minimum rations, rations of flour for Petrograd and Moscow which would cease if negotiations broke down, rations to be distributed by Danish Red Cross. We would remain at Archangel while negotiations continued and would not evacuate if they failed.

People of Petrograd and Moscow want food and 90 per cent. of soldiers want nothing but to go home. If Bolsheviks refused offer we should be (? able) by means of leaflets from aeroplanes to conduct deadly propaganda against them.

It is painful to admit failure of our policy but failure is evident and absolute. I also realise (? increasing) difficulty of attempts to negotiate with Bolsheviks and outcry that will be raised by Russian upper and middle classes who have as a whole conspicuously failed to deserve our support.

I trust before any final decision regarding evacuation (? 'is' omitted) taken this proposal may receive consideration.

No. 333

Earl Curzon to Mr. Hoare (Archangel)

No. 445 Telegraphic [103666/3669/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 24, 1919*

Your telegram No. 470¹ (of July 15th: Evacuation of North Russia).

Altered situation on Northern Front leaves no alternative to His Majesty's Government but to proceed with as little delay as possible with already accepted policy of evacuation.

While some arrangements must in all probability be made for evacuation of friendly inhabitants of Murmansk and Archangel, estimates furnished in March (see Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 157² of March 17th) would appear to have been considerably affected by recent events.

Five thousand troops locally enlisted in British and French Legions³ probably admit of great reduction. Some have mutinied, others have disappeared. Large numbers of them, as well as of Russian inhabitants, will very likely prefer to make terms with the Bolsheviks sooner than emigrate. In latter case, in view of impossibility of receiving them here, sole available

¹ No. 312.

² Not printed.

³ This figure had been given by Mr. Lindley.

alternative is that they should be transported to Denikin's area in South Russia. This will raise difficult shipping problem and will probably not attract emigrants themselves.

On the other hand I presume that the four thousand Finns, Lithuanians, Poles, Esthonians and Letts, can if necessary be returned without much difficulty to their own countries.

Please telegraph your observations urgently and give absolute minimum of figures in each case.

In the meantime I do not propose to make any arrangements for further shipments of flour (see your telegram No. 449).⁴

Repeat Murmansk.

Repeated to Helsingfors No. 560, Reval No. 115, Libau No. 87 and Warsaw No. 176.

⁴ No. 304.

No. 334

Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received July 25)
No. 1196 Telegraphic [107794/88/38]

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1919

Your telegram No. 1489.¹

United States Government are sending 5,000 tons of flour partly white partly rye to Archangel by ship leaving New York now. I understand that (? there are no) funds available for any further assistance to North Russian Government and I expect that it would be difficult to induce buyers [*sic*] to vote any.

¹ No. 327.

No. 335

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 26)
No. 493 Telegraphic [108226/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, July 25, 1919

Your telegram 445¹ crossed my telegram 491² and though I presume decision of evacuation is irrevocable I venture to point out once again that misconduct of Russian troops which only began after rumours of impending evacuation got about do not materially affect situation so far as our obligations in this area are concerned.

It must be remembered that population of this region has not suffered severely at hands of Bolsheviks and that they therefore have no desire to fight. Natural result is that under bad officers and under influence of Bolshevik propaganda they should be ready to mutiny and desert when they hear British protection will be withdrawn, in order to put themselves right

¹ No. 333.

² No. 332.

with Bolsheviks who have been represented to them as ruthless towards those who resist them.

Whatever view is taken of conduct of Russians fact remains that many persons will be done to death and thousands will be reduced to starvation because we refuse to meet obligations which we have incurred.

Is it too late to make real endeavour to act on last paragraph of my telegram No. 470?³ Mr. Young⁴ leaves for England tomorrow to consult Treasury on various matters regarding liquidation of Emission office. I beg decision be suspended until verbal description of situation can be received from him.

³ No. 312.

⁴ Mr. G. M. Young was President of the National Emission Caisse of the Provisional Government of Archangel.

No. 336

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)

No. 994 Telegraphic [104918/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 25, 1919

Please request Colonel Cartier to transmit following to Tsarskoe Selo.

To Tchicherin, Peoples' Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Moscow.

Are we to understand your reply of July 5th¹ to our radios of June 29th and July 1st² to mean that you would be ready at once to exchange the fifty-five British Naval, Military and Air Force prisoners and the three British civilian prisoners for equivalent number of Bolshevik prisoners, provided we agree that a Russian representative of Russian Red Cross Society should proceed to Denmark or some other neutral country to investigate position of other adherents of Soviet Government in British jurisdiction with a view to exchange of these against other British subjects in Russia? You would through this agency be able to control persons whom we proposed to return to Russia. As regards the fifty-eight Bolsheviks referred to above we would meet point made in your telegram of July 5th by telegraphing in advance their names and particulars regarding them.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

¹ No. 295.

² No. 279 (cf. No. 295, note 2).

No. 337

Mr. Bell (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris, Received July 28)

Unnumbered. Telegraphic [612/5/1/16459]

HELSINGFORS, July 26, 1919

Ministry for Foreign Affairs state in reply to representations made by myself and H.M. Chargé d'Affaires and colleague in accordance with your telegram No. 20¹ of July 12 to effect that in view of impending changes in

¹ No. 309.

Cabinet as a result of Presidential election,² the present Government does not consider itself competent to enter upon negotiations in question.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 379.

² In the first presidential election held in the Finnish Diet in July, 1919, Prof. Ståhlberg was elected with 143 votes; General Mannerheim received 50 votes; he resigned his post of Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, and the Finnish Government subsequently resigned on August 14, 1919.

No. 338

Mr. Bosanquet (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)

No. 166 Telegraphic [108897/67181/59]

REVAL, July 27, 1919

Absolutely imperative from political point of view to know whereabouts of following ships containing (? war) material for Russian North-West Army and Esthonia namely *Huntsman*, *Hunstman* (*sic*), *Dania*, *Beheia* (*sic*), *Kodouma*. If no definite statement can be made regarding arrival of these, Russian Northern Army express intention to apply elsewhere than to Allies for help (? in) armaments and equipment.¹

¹ Cf. No. 33. On July 31, 1919, M. Nabokoff addressed a letter to Sir R. Graham at the Foreign Office in which M. Nabokoff stated that he did not doubt that H.M. Government were fully informed 'of the piteous state in which the Russian Forces on the North Western Front find themselves to-day. They completely lack clothing, boots, and equipment. They receive no pay, and their food is most inadequate. The question of supplying these Forces is being dealt with by the Russian Military representatives in London. May I therefore venture to draw your attention to the extremely critical situation and renew the expression of a confident hope I have always entertained that His Majesty's Government, in dealing with the position which has arisen in North Western Russia, will bear in mind that the capture of Petrograd is a matter of the most vital importance.'

No. 339

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)

No. 497 Telegraphic [108991/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, July 28, 1919

My telegram No. 493.¹

1. Gradual withdrawal from forward positions will begin in three or four weeks if immediate evacuation is to take place.

2. All Russian troops except volunteers will be disarmed simultaneously before withdrawal begins.

3. Evacuation can no doubt be safely effected as purely military operation or

4. It can be effected after negotiation with Bolsheviks.

5. If 3 is adopted we shall presumably destroy all semi[?military]² material such as sixty railway engines, 1,800 wagons, cranes, barges and such food as we cannot distribute to population owing to difficulties of military situation, strikes and sabotage.

¹ No. 335.

² The text here is uncertain.

6. If 4 is adopted it would have the advantage of enabling us to establish in agreement with Bolsheviks (? an) authority which could be trusted to (? maintain) order and at any rate semblance of decent administration until we had left. Disadvantage would probably be that Bolsheviks would insist on conditions such as surrender intact of railway (? material to use) on other fronts.

7. His Majesty's Government should decide forthwith whether 3 or (? 4) is to be adopted.

8. Adoption of 3 and wholesale destruction resulting from that policy is likely to entail serious strikes and sabotage on railway and in port which would have to be suppressed ruthlessly to ensure safe withdrawal of troops. This policy would also greatly increase (? scope of) Bolshevik reprisals against bourgeois elements and reputed sympathisers with Allies. Its effect on public opinion at home would no doubt be considered. Nevertheless if evacuation of Archangel is to be regarded as merely phase similar to evacuation in Gallipoli in a war against Bolsheviks it appears to be right course from military (? point of view).

9. Nature of decision taken is likely materially to influence question of how many persons will have to be evacuated. In any case I do not see any great prospect of numbers being less than estimate of 13,000 given in Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 157.³ We have now been here longer and consequently more persons have been brought into contact with us.

10. General Officer Commanding, Senior Naval Officer (? and I) are disposed in all circumstances to recommend 4.

11. We have not yet informed Provisional Government that immediate evacuation is contemplated. General Officer Commanding and I had long conversation with General Miller yesterday in course of which he stated almost definitely that even if British troops stayed here up to close of navigation he saw no hope of holding out through winter. He proposes however to attempt one or two small operations such as recapture of Onega as final test of moral of Russian troops. In the circumstances a definite pronouncement regarding date of withdrawal should not yet be made by us as members of Government would certainly fail to keep matter secret until right moment which would be when Russian troops were disarmed and withdrawal began.

³ Not printed. Cf. No. 333.

No. 340

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)

No. 498 Telegraphic [109368/88/38]

Your telegram 445.¹

ARCHANGEL, July 28, 1919

It is not quite clear to me whether intention is to cancel orders for flour to complete 10,000 tons mentioned in your telegram 440.² I think balance—i.e. 3,700 tons—see your telegram 408,³ should be sent if not on general

¹ No. 333.

² No. 328.

³ No. 303.

primary grounds then in order to forestall Bolshevik propaganda that we have left the people to starve. Unless our plans miscarry we shall distribute all foodstuffs to population leaving no stocks which Bolsheviks could remove in bulk. Southern shore of Kola peninsula and Pechora region will absorb considerable quantity.

No. 341

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 29)
No. 500 Telegraphic [109369/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, *July 28, 1919*

My telegram No. 497.¹

General Officer Commanding met Provisional Government to-day to explain military situation, and he gave acting Minister for Foreign Affairs memorandum on lines of conversation of yesterday.

Memorandum asked three questions.

1. Can Provisional Government with forces at their disposal hold northern region without support of British troops?
2. If so what measures do they contemplate taking to strengthen their position?
3. If not what representations do they wish General Officer Commanding to make to His Majesty's Government for submission to Allies?

Long discussion followed and Provisional Government eventually decided that failing striking success in south or elsewhere, resistance would be hopeless.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told me the same thing this afternoon. He said there was some question of Trades Unions here appealing to labour party to suspend agitation for total withdrawal of British troops.

¹ No. 339.

No. 342

Memorandum by Mr. Harvey
[108847/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 28, 1919*

Allied Policy in Russia

In the course of July Admiral Kolchak's forces who, six weeks ago, were advancing from the East and were within an ace of reaching Moscow, have suffered such reverses as will take them many months to recover from. It is in fact doubtful whether recovery is possible before winter sets in. In the North, the major part of the Russian troops co-operating with the Allied contingents have mutinied and gone over *en masse* to the Bolsheviks they were fighting. In the North West the Russian Corps, who were within sixty kilometres of Petrograd, are being steadily forced back for want of munitions.

In the Baltic States, except for the Estonian Army, there are no troops fit to repel a determined enemy offensive. In the South alone at the present time are the anti-Bolshevik forces in the ascendent. Here General Denikin, with the aid of British tanks and technical staff, has been able to make considerable progress. Whether, if the enemy concentrates against him large forces reinforced from Siberia, he will be able to continue, or at least to hold on, remains to be seen. Admiral Kolchak's prospects six weeks ago, it must be remembered, were no less promising.

Whilst anything in the nature of temporary setbacks should be the last reason for altering our policy in Russia, the sudden reversal of the very favourable conditions of two months ago justifies a close revision of that policy in the light of our recent military and political experiences.

The most significant feature of these events is the desertion of Russian troops from the anti-Bolshevik to the Bolshevik ranks. These men, after having been well fed and well paid and having seen anti-Bolshevik methods and realised what the anti-Bolshevik authorities stand for, have deliberately chosen the other side. Is this the result of political conviction or is it due to more tempting prospects of loot? In any case, both in North Russia and in Siberia, where Allied troops and Allied material were being employed on a large scale, the anti-Bolshevik campaign has failed because of the defection of the Russians.

It can be assumed that, whereas hitherto public opinion in the Allied countries and in America has acquiesced uneasily in the measure of assistance afforded the anti-Bolshevik forces, there is no question of increasing our support either in men or material. No Government in Europe or America is strong enough to undertake an extensive military expedition in Russia. We are faced with the alternative of continuing our present support or of withdrawing it altogether.

It has been decided to evacuate North Russia. There remain, however, our commitments in Siberia, South Russia and the Baltic States. It may be said that if Admiral Kolchak was unable to overthrow the Soviet Government this summer in spite of Allied support when the Bolshevik Government were said to be tottering, it is very improbable that he will be able to do so now. Lenin's Government is stronger than ever, Kolchak's troops are thoroughly demoralised and winter is not three months ahead. General Denikin has recently had remarkable success but he has not had before him very large Bolshevik forces. If he is able to continue his drive right up to Moscow, so much the better, but with the sudden downfall of Admiral Kolchak before us, we must admit that it is extremely doubtful. It follows then that, if it is decided to continue our present support to the anti-Bolshevik forces, we must be prepared to stay in Russia another winter and another spring. By remaining, we may reasonably expect to keep the forces of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin (should the latter suffer a reverse or cease to advance) at least in being by means of an active defensive. It must be decided whether in return for this the expenditure, the prolongation of war, the consequent devastation and continued unproductiveness are justified,

whether in fact the cause of Admiral Kolchak is so sure of ultimate success and so hopeful for Russia that it is worth while.

Admiral Kolchak is surrounded by many reactionary men, although he himself is credited with enlightened views. The Omsk Government is remarkable only for its inefficiency. It may be said that a leader in a civil war cannot afford to be overnice in the choice of his assistants, he must take what he can get, *force majeure* may compel him to take desperate measures unjustifiable in ordinary times, but this argument applies with equal weight to the case of Lenin. What, however, does Admiral Kolchak stand for, what does he intend to do if he reaches Petrograd? He does not stand for monarchy, or indeed for any definite policy. He intends, he tells us, to summon a Constituent Assembly which shall decide what form the future Government of Russia is to take. But how is he to be sure that Russia, summoned to the polls, will not again return Bolsheviks? He declares that he will free Russia, but are we quite certain that Russia is enslaved? If so, it is at least remarkable that Russian soldiers, presumably peasants, should desert in large numbers from the ranks of the liberators to those of the oppressors.

It is the wish of the Allied and Associated Powers that Russia, whatever the case be now, should have a Government acceptable to the whole people. They refuse, however, to give Admiral Kolchak overwhelming forces to enable him to enter Petrograd at once and summon his Constituent Assembly. They have lent him only a half-hearted support with the tacit implication that he and his Russians must bear the brunt of the work. But it has been proved as clearly as military events can prove that Admiral Kolchak will not be able, even with this half-hearted support, to reach Petrograd until at least next spring. Therefore the proposition is to continue our support in the hope that Admiral Kolchak will then be able to cut his way to Petrograd and summon a Constituent Assembly. We are to fight not to impose any definite policy but to enable Kolchak to call an assembly which will decide the policy. We have no knowledge of what that policy will be; we hope it will be moderate, but it may be Bolshevik. For this uncertain prospect it is proposed to incur heavy financial obligations, to help prolong the civil war and the industrial and agricultural chaos of Russia.

The Bolshevik Government has now held power for over eighteen months. A gentleman who has recently returned from Moscow testifies to the general orderliness of that city. The Bolshevik forces have proved themselves efficient soldiers, and their artillery practice is admittedly good. The considerable success which they have won in Siberia and in North East and North West Russia postulates efficient work both on the lines of communication and in the munition factories. We know that German engineers and technical experts have been given high posts in the administration. It is impossible to account for the stability of the Bolshevik Government by terrorism alone. A handful of violent men may terrorise a city, or a small and compact country, but they cannot infuse ardour into farflung armies or hold down millions. When the Bolshevik fortunes seemed to be at the lowest ebb, a most vigorous offensive was launched before which the Kolchak forces are

still in retreat. Not terrorism, not even long-suffering acquiescence, but something approaching enthusiasm is necessary for this. We must admit the fact then that the present Russian Government is accepted by the bulk of the Russian people.

The Allied and Associated Powers declare as their policy that Russia should have the Government most acceptable to the Russian people, and should this turn out to be Bolshevik, they would presumably have to consent. To achieve this, they announced their readiness to aid Admiral Kolchak to reach Petrograd. If Admiral Kolchak can ever reach Petrograd is uncertain, the outcome of the Constituent Assembly he proposes to summon there is uncertain, and in the meanwhile the Soviet Government receives the tacit acquiescence of the greater part of the Russian people. The existence of a state of war puts exceptional powers in the hands of M. Lenin and his associates; necessity of state enables him to justify many acts of violence whereas in a state of peace his Government would have to be progressive and constructive or it would fall. It is respectfully contended that the surest way to get rid of Bolshevism, or at least to eradicate the vicious elements of it, is to withdraw our support of the Kolchak movement and thereby end the civil war. If Admiral Kolchak is unable to overturn the Bolsheviks with our aid, it is most unlikely that he will do so without it. If the mass of the Russian people were really hostile to Lenin they would long ago have definitely rallied to Kolchak.

Having gone so far in encouraging the anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia as well as in South Russia, the Baltic States and North Russia, the Allies could hardly confine themselves to the mere withdrawal of their support. It has never been the policy of the Allies to support this or that form of Government but to secure the self-determination of the Russian people, and their withdrawal from supporting the anti-Bolshevik forces can be justified by the total failure of the latter to win the assistance of any considerable section of the people in Soviet Russia. At the same time we cannot allow either the leaders or the rank and file to suffer from our support. On four separate occasions since last December the Soviet Government have declared their readiness to treat for peace; once the Allied and Associated Powers as a whole issued an invitation to all Russian Governments and once the United States Government unofficially sounded Lenin on the subject.

Bolshevism, there is good reason to suppose, has undergone considerable modification. The Soviet Authorities have declared their readiness to treat on what must be admitted are quite entertainable conditions. They are prepared to accept the old Russian debts, to restrict their propaganda, to grant favourable treatment to the border States, to grant commercial concessions and even to grant amnesties to political offenders. If the Allies merely withdrew from Russia, the Soviet Authorities, there is little reason to doubt, would take a swift and terrible revenge on the rank and file of the anti-Bolshevik armies, although the leaders would probably effect their escape. But if negotiations were proposed whilst the Allies were still in the country, they would exert very great pressure indeed and there is little doubt

that very favourable conditions could be made securing amnesties, apart from acceptable general conditions, for the anti-Bolshevik armies and wide local powers for the Baltic States.

The Russians would then be left to themselves and the Government of Lenin would have to justify itself in the light of its works. If it proves unacceptable to the bulk of the people, there is no reason to fear that Lenin and his friends will not share the fate of the Romanoffs, of Miliukoff and of Kerensky.

O. C. H[ARVEY]¹

¹ A line of argument generally similar to that of this memorandum was advanced in a memorandum of July 29 by Mr. O'Malley, another member of the Russia Department of the Foreign Office. This latter memorandum was minuted in part as follows by Mr. Spicer, Acting Under-Secretary of State superintending the Russia Department: 'Seeing that the War Cabinet have had all these considerations before them and have now decided on their course of action I do not propose to send in either this memo. or 108847 [No. 342] as it seems unnecessary to trouble Lord Curzon with them.'

'G. S. S.
31.7.'

The reference to the decision of the War Cabinet was evidently to certain decisions with regard to policy in Russia taken at a cabinet meeting on July 29, 1919. These decisions notably included the following: (i) to adhere to a policy based upon the Prime Minister's speech of April 16, 1919 (see Introductory Note); (ii) the officers in command at Archangel and Murmansk should not be authorized at present to take any steps to arrive at an arrangement between the Northern Russian Government and the Soviet authorities; (iii) no British mission should be left at Murmansk; (iv) supplies of food in Archangel and Murmansk should not be destroyed on evacuation; (v) assistance to General Denikin should be continued on the same lines as previously; (vi) Lord Curzon to arrange to attach a political officer to General Denikin; (vii) Lord Curzon to draw up for cabinet consideration a draft dispatch to the Allied Powers with a view to a concerted policy towards Russia (see No. 399).

No. 343

Sir G. Eliot (Omsk) to Earl Curzon (Received July 30)

No. 12 Telegraphic [110398/11/57]

OMSK, July 29, 1919

Military and political situation is critical. Official theory that troops which have been withdrawn from front will recuperate and take offensive in about a month finds little credence outside Government circles. Although a vigorous struggle for Cheliabinsk continues and according to Czech reports the moral of troops at Kurgan is fairly good, it is generally thought that Bolsheviks can advance on Omsk, if they wish (? to do so). After capturing coal and mines of Urals they may think it wise to concentrate attention on Denikin, but it is easy to imagine motives for conquering Siberia. Nevertheless they appear not to be strong. Collapse is due to appalling weakness (? in matter of) military organisation.

Report(?s of) Preston,¹ Pares, General Jack and many others who have been at front condemn officers as stupid, selfish, cowardly, profligate and

¹ Lately H.M. Consul at Ekaterinburg.

corrupt. There are a few good troops but majority of soldiers are panic-stricken and weary: utterly apathetic in politics but beginning to say that they will not fight for officers who desert their regiments and make money out of men's food. Kolchak has published proclamations reproaching upper classes and also prescribing severest penalties for agitation and alarmist rumours. Bolshevik outbreaks are reported from Tobolsk district and even in Omsk temper of masses is uncertain. Preparations are being made for a preliminary evacuation of Omsk but this does not necessarily indicate that Government contemplates flight, for hospitals and military buildings require and need providing for influx of refugees justify measures taken [*sic*].

Mr. Morris's arrival² and outspoken declarations that American funds advanced for railway and all other contributions will be stopped if Government do not mend their ways had a salutary effect and (? ultimately) things may be a little better if Kolchak weathers the storm.

He is still respected as an honest and brave man and there is no movement against him personally but I do not think his character is improving and he shows no sign of understanding his task is to provide an administration which people will feel to be preferable to Bolshevism. When he was recently at . . .³ he inspired no enthusiasm and could not diminish panic. During his visit to Ekaterinburg he never left his train. He gives way to uncontrolled fits of anger and has dismissed Gaida and Horvat.⁴ Both are influential men and have great merits as well as faults. No prudent politician would have made enemies of both at such a time. In matter of foreign policy his language is generally decorous but I learn from Minister for Foreign Affairs that in private he raves against Allies and says they give him no help when he is in difficulties but if he succeeds will support him whatever he does. He will therefore take no trouble to meet their views nor go beyond what he has said in his answer to powers.

He will no doubt have occasion to modify these sentiments but I think they represent his dominant mood.

² Mr. Morris had recently arrived in Omsk: cf. No. 223, note 4.

³ The text here is uncertain.

⁴ General Horvat was the director of the Russian administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

No. 344

Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Copenhagen)

No. 1307 Telegraphic [104918/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 29, 1919

My telegram No. 994¹ to Lord Derby repeated to you.

In the event of the Soviet Government sending a favourable reply, I propose suggesting to the Danish Government that the meeting between the Russian representative of the Russian Red Cross and ourselves should take place in Denmark. I think it the most suitable place in view of the activities

¹ No. 336.

in Russia of the Danish Red Cross Society. I presume that the Danish Government would be able to take adequate measures to supervise the activities of such a Russian representative in order to prevent his indulging in political propaganda of an undesirable nature; and that they would reserve to themselves the right of immediate expulsion should this occur. What are your views? You might sound Danish Government privately.

No. 345

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)

No. 1514 Telegraphic [104813/775/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 29, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1178.¹

Our point is that the United States Government are morally committed to share in subvention (see my telegram No. 816² of March 21st). It is no answer to this for the Administration to say they haven't got funds 'available'. Please press them for a full and definite statement of their position.

Memorandum for your confidential information follows by bag.

¹ No. 322.

² Not printed. This telegram drew attention, in particular, to article 12 of the Murmansk Agreement of July 1918: see No. 256, annex E.

No. 346

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 31)

No. 503 Telegraphic [110437/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, *July 30, 1919*

My telegram No. 500.¹ General Officer Commanding has now received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs reply to his memorandum. It states that after full discussion Provisional Government feel bound on general grounds to endeavour to hold Archangel front after departure of British troops, and disarmament of Russian forces without exhausting all means of defence would amount to premature capitulation which might have a disastrous influence on course of general struggle against Bolsheviks. Provisional Government was here not only on behalf of local interests but more especially to play their part in struggle for Russian salvation. Provisional Government were therefore resolved to continue struggle trusting that His Majesty's Government would furnish necessary supplies.

During interval before departure of British troops an offensive must be launched in hope of restoring moral of Russian troops and of gaining ground, thereby obtaining further recruits. Other necessary measures were to send out more Russian officers with a view to having up to ten officers in each

¹ No. 341.

Company and also to hasten departure of Siberian troops due from Germany. Presence of British Volunteer Brigades to hold base and furnish moral support would be invaluable and Provisional Government earnestly beg that General Officer Commanding would make representations in that sense to His Majesty's Government. Moreover it was 'indispensable' that warships should remain in port during winter.

General Maynard² and Yermoloff³ arrived this morning and we had a conference with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on basis of his memorandum. We told him while we entirely appreciated moral factors which influenced decision of Provisional Government there were material considerations peculiar to northern region; port was virtually ice-bound for eight months which meant that if Archangel district were to be held something like 50,000 tons of flour must be brought in. Same thing applied to munitions of war, and both these would act as a magnet to Bolshevik attacks.

Though positions around town were undoubtedly strong it would be idle to pretend that Russian troops recruited from villages outside that area would be prepared to fight. These facts being so, would it not be preferable to evacuate Archangel and endeavour to maintain present Murmansk front with assistance of volunteers in Slavonic British Legion?

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs replied he would consider matter in conjunction with Provisional Government but that he felt reluctant to adopt such an extreme measure without first attempting to re-establish the moral of troops in hope of holding present front.

Immediately after conference I saw Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on other business and at the end he asked me for my personal opinion on the subject of evacuation. I repeated what had been said before and stated that if there appeared to be a good prospect of holding out for four months after withdrawal of British troops I should consider attempt was worth making, but I did not consider there was any hope of such a lengthy resistance.

Yermoloff subsequently lunched with me and he expressed strong opinion [that] with smallest assistance in shape of British administrative personnel and supplies at Murmansk and one or two ships in port present Murmansk front could be held by Russian troops who would have to volunteer with many officers serving in ranks. He speaks with a conviction and directness which is not found in Archangel. General Maynard expressed similar opinion in course of discussion this morning, provided reasonable contingent of Slavonic British troops and volunteers were obtainable here.

If there is no change in general policy of His Majesty's Government I strongly recommend this solution.

We had further conference this evening when General Miller said that Provisional Government had decided to attempt to hold out here.

I pointed out that this would mean that both fronts would collapse, but failed to convince him. I shall try again to-morrow.

² G.O.C.-in-C. Allied Forces at Murmansk. (Cf. Major-General Sir C. Maynard: *The Murmansk Venture*—London [1928]).

³ M. Yermoloff was the Russian Deputy Governor administering the Murmansk area.

No. 347

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)
No. 1044 Telegraphic: by bag [105556/105556/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 30, 1919

Messenger arrived at Kashgar on 6th July having left Tashkend on 13th June. He reports that persistent rumour has been spread at Tashkend that Russian Turkestan has been given to British for 25 years to guarantee the repayment of British loans to Russia. I have received no information on this subject, and if as I presume it is untrue, I think steps should be taken to deny the rumour, as the Bolshevik Government have made use of it as anti-British propaganda.

No. 348

Lord Kilbarnock (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon
(Received August 1)

No. 1436 Telegraphic [110688/67181/59]

COPENHAGEN, July 31, 1919

I hear from well-informed Russian source that Northern Russian Army on Narva front is very short of supplies. I venture to suggest that they may be given some British (? reserve) stores which are still at Copenhagen.¹

¹ In reply Lord Kilbarnock was informed in Foreign Office telegram No. 1330 of August 12: 'Director of Military Operations hopes to be able to arrange for these stores to be sent to the Russian North West Army.'

No. 349

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received July 31)

No. 505 Telegraphic [110554/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, July 31, 1919

My telegram 503.¹

I have written personal letter to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs strongly urging concentration of all available loyal troops on Murmansk Front and evacuation of Archangel on line previously contemplated. I shall see him this evening but do not expect him to reverse decision taken.²

In the circumstances I recommend that situation be fully and urgently represented to Admiral Kolchak and that he be advised or ordered to

¹ No. 346.

² Mr. Hoare subsequently reported in telegram No. 506 of August 1 (received August 2): 'After reading my letter Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said that considerations advanced in it were undoubtedly weighty, and he would submit them to Provisional Government. Nevertheless to decide immediately that defence here was impossible would be an act of treachery to cause of Russia. I merely said that best advice available was that Murmansk position could be assured if small but reliable reinforcements were received at an early date. Now that Admiral Kolchak had retired importance of Archangel was gone, and Murmansk was a far more favourable field of activity.'

evacuate Archangel and (make an . . .³) effort to maintain Murmansk front. Disposition of population in neighbourhood of Lake Onega is remarkably good and recruits are coming in well, but without re-enforcements retreat to neighbourhood of Kem will be inevitable as soon as we withdraw, and then final collapse, with or without Bolshevik pressure, is inevitable.

Matter is urgent as much work will have to be done to consolidate Murmansk front before we leave.

³ The text here is uncertain.

No. 350

Earl Curzon to Mr. Hoare (Archangel)

No. 462 Telegraphic [108991/3669/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 31, 1919

Your telegram No. 497¹ (of 28th July).

You should withdraw with all your Mission at the moment which you consider desirable after consultation with the military authorities to whom full instructions are being sent as to the evacuation.

¹ No. 339.

No. 351

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)

No. 1012 Telegraphic [108880/1089/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1919

General Denikin has requested a British Staff for base of new army in Crimea, which he hopes to open this month either in Sevastopol or Theodosia. You should inform French Government of Denikin's desire and say that while we maintain the old agreement of December 23, 1917,¹ in principle, pending any revision that circumstances may necessitate, we are acceding to the request in view of the desirability of giving all the assistance we can to Denikin. You should add that we presume that as the French Government recognises that it falls to us to assist him, they will have no objection to our having taken this step as the matter is urgent.

¹ See No. 256, annex A.

No. 352

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 3)

No. 1225 Telegraphic: by bag [111518/105556/38]

PARIS, August 2, 1919

Your telegram No. 1044.¹

Rumoured cession of Russian Turkestan to Great Britain.

I concur in your suggestion that a denial should be issued.²

¹ No. 347.

² On August 22, 1919, the Foreign Office communicated this telegram to the India Office for appropriate action.

No. 353

Earl Curzon to Mr. Bosanquet (Reval)

No. 125 Telegraphic [108897/67181/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 2, 1919

Your telegram No. 166.¹

S.S. *Hunsgate* left Brest July 28.

S.S. *Dania* left London July 30, due Reval August 4. Nothing known of S.S. *Behaia*. S.S. *Korduma* now loading in London. As she is under the control of the Esthonian Government cannot say when she will sail.

¹ No. 338.

No. 354

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received August 5)

No. 697 Telegraphic [112079/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 3, 1919

Following from Omsk, July 30th:—Following information comes from a trustworthy person who remained in Ekaterinburg after Bolshevik occupation.

Immediately before arrival of Bolshevik troops, rabble of town looted shops and houses and killed between 200 and 300 persons. But as soon as Bolsheviks had definitely established themselves they issued a proclamation saying they were not against 'Intelligensia' or middle classes and waged war only on capitalists. Also that all are free to practise any religion they choose. Only two arrests were recorded. In Perm also arrests and executions were (? few). Discipline is said . . .¹ (? good). Bolsheviks are not sure of Ural workmen (? as a whole) and are (? making no) attempt to mobilise them.

If this report is correct and Bolsheviks establish an administration tolerably satisfactory except to capitalists they will naturally increase the feeling already prevalent that there is not much to choose between them and Koltchak's Government. It is true that most well-to-do peasant(s) (? left) had fled from (district)s of Perm and Ekaterinburg before arrival of Bolsheviks but still latter have shown much greater moderation than on previous occasions.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

No. 355

M. Litvinov to Earl Curzon (Received August 3)¹

Telegraphic: by wireless [111507/9/38]

In acknowledging receipt of your radio of July 19th² which reached us from Paris only yesterday we wish to confirm that the Soviet Government has no desire whatever and is rather loath to detain in Russia British prisoners

¹ The date of dispatch of this wireless message was apparently July 30 (cf. No. 402). It was presumably relayed from Moscow to Tsarskoie Selo whence it was wirelessly.

² Probably a mistake for July 29: see No. 336.

of war or civilians longer than it is absolutely necessary for safeguarding the interests of Russians within British jurisdiction. It is to that end that the Soviet Government proposed as a preliminary step to send to some neutral country, preferably to Norway, a small commission of representatives, having full powers to negotiate with the British Government for the exchange of their nationals, and settle all questions appertaining thereto. It is most essential that the British Government guarantee the following conditions.

Firstly, safe passage for our Russian representatives through the various intermediate countries on the way from the front held by Soviet troops to their place of residence and vice versa.

Secondly, immunity from arresting or any kind of molestation during their stay abroad³ as long as they abide by the general laws of the respective countries.

Thirdly, on no account should they be detained as hostages, and that all necessary facilities should be given for the return to Russia at any moment they choose to do so.

Fourthly, as the complete repatriation of the many thousands of Russians in Great Britain may take a longer time than the repatriation of (? Britishers), representatives should be allowed to remain abroad as long as they deem it necessary in the interests of their fellow countrymen even ? after the Britishers have left Russia.

Fifthly, no obstacles should be placed in their carrying out postal and telegraphic facilities for communication with Russians in Great Britain.

Sixthly, free use of some wireless station for communication with the Soviet Government both *en clair* and in code.

Seventhly, unhindered carriage of some funds to pay expenses and of documents and material relating to the question of exchange.

Confident that the full acceptance by the British Government of the above stipulations will obviate all the difficulties of coming to an understanding satisfactory to both sides, and materially contribute to the shortening of the sufferers [? sufferings] both of British and Russians forcibly detained away from their homes, we would suggest that a British representative meets our representatives on the front line and accompanies them through the territory occupied by the [? anti] Soviet forces.

³ The text of this phrase was uncertain in the original and was subsequently established by repetition.

No. 356

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame¹ (Paris)

No. 1015 Telegraphic [109345/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 5, 1919

Please request Colonel Cartier to transmit following to Tsarskoe Selo.

To Tchicherin, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Moscow.

With reference to statement in your Wireless News message of 20th July that prisoners of the British Volunteer Armies would be treated differently

¹ Minister in H.M. Embassy at Paris.

from other Allied prisoners,² I wish you clearly to understand that you and Messrs. Lenin and Trotsky and all other persons concerned will be held strictly and personally responsible for the treatment accorded to all British prisoners and to other British subjects in your hands. The favourable treatment given by us to Russian prisoners will be dependent upon the treatment given by you to British prisoners.³

² This wireless broadcast, as received in the Foreign Office, read as follows: 'A message from Petrograd to Paris, for transmission to Carnarvon, of July 19, states that the British prisoners of war in Russia refuse to be (? placed) with prisoners belonging to British volunteer detachments operating in the north of Russia. They consider the latter to be the cause of the prolongation of the war, and threaten to lynch them. The message states that the volunteers will certainly be treated differently from other Allied prisoners who were forced into the war by their Governments, who told them that they were to fight against Germany. The (? privileges) they enjoy will not be accorded to those who came of their own free will and for the sake of money to kill Russian workers and peasants.'

³ This telegram was dispatched at the instance of the War Office.

No. 357

Lord Kilminster (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received August 8)
No. 1444 Telegraphic [113448/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, August 7, 1919

Your telegram No. 1307.¹

Danish Government agree to meeting taking place at Copenhagen if desired and will take all necessary steps to prevent Russian representative abusing his position to carry out Bolshevik propaganda.

¹ No. 344.

No. 358

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received August 9)
No. 512 Telegraphic [113983/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, August 7, 1919

Provisional Government have addressed me and my colleagues long note reviewing favourable results obtained from Allied occupation and effect which will be produced throughout Russia by withdrawal of Allied forces.

Main points are that order and security have been assured but that in view of great extent of territory, scarcity of population and poverty of region, Northern Russia cannot possibly stand alone either from military, financial or food point of view.

Presence of Allied forces has given population assurance that liberation of Russia will be definitely accomplished. Withdrawal of Allied forces would be represented in Bolshevik propaganda as a victory over the Allies. Apart from moral effect reduction of military forces at the front would necessitate shortening of line and abandonment of population to Bolshevik vengeance.

If Bolsheviks succeeded in capturing Archangel as result of withdrawal disastrous effect on feeling towards the Allies would be (? produced).

In view of these considerations Provisional Government consider it absolutely necessary that British volunteer brigades and French contingents and a certain number of war vessels should remain here and trust question may be re-examined. They do not ask that troops should be employed in firing line but to safeguard line of communication etc.

I am replying that though I am forwarding this communication to you I have every reason to believe decision to evacuate all Allied forces before port closes is final.¹

¹ Lord Curzon telegraphed in answer (Foreign Office telegram No. 490 of August 13): 'I approve your reply.'

No. 359

Earl Curzon to Mr. Hoare (Archangel)

No. 473 Telegraphic [111722/3669/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 7, 1919

Your telegrams Nos. 506¹ (of August 1st) and 503² (of July 30th). (Evacuation of Archangel.)

War Office have instructed General Officer Commanding Archangel to prevent offensive pending General Rawlinson's arrival³ and request that you will associate yourself with representations General Ironside has been instructed to make to Northern Provisional Government.

Please act accordingly.⁴

¹ See No. 349, note 2.

² No. 346.

³ In telegram No. 475 of even date from the Foreign Office, Mr. Hoare was informed that General Sir Henry Rawlinson had been 'appointed to co-ordinate the military measures for the evacuation of Archangel and Murmansk'. Mr. Hoare was instructed that, as soon as he had completed arrangements for the evacuation of his staff, he should place himself at General Rawlinson's disposal as diplomatic adviser.

⁴ In telegram No. 513 of August 8 (received that day) Mr. Hoare replied: 'General Officer Commanding had already stopped proposed Russian offensive as troops could not be relied upon.'

No. 360

Sir C. Eliot (Omsk) to Earl Curzon (Received August 10)

No. 16 Telegraphic [114411/46019/57]

OMSK, August 8, 1919

North Sea Route Committee have despatched by Obi to Bukhka and Nohodka about 700 (*sic*)¹ square poods of cargo of which 100,000 for England, balance for Archangel. They are afraid War Office having refused to send

¹ In error for 700,000.

6,000 tons of military supplies as arranged² sufficient tonnage will not be sent to carry all export cargo. They beg that Steamship *Novorissiya* now understood to be in England be despatched without fail to Obi.³

² Cf. No. 301.

³ In telegram No. 517 of August 18 from the Foreign Office Sir C. Eliot was informed in reply: 'S.S. *Novorissiya* cannot possibly complete discharge of her inward cargo at English port in time for her to take part in Kara Sea Expedition. The icebreaker *Bruce* leaves Liverpool in ballast for the mouth of the Obi river on the 18th instant.' In a further telegram, No. 548 of September 10 from the Foreign Office, Sir C. Eliot was informed that 'eleven ships capable in all of carrying about 7,000 tons of cargo left Archangel middle of August for Kara Sea'.

No. 361

M. Nabokoff to Sir R. Graham (Received August 9)
[113883/1089/38]

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, August 8, 1919

Dear Sir Ronald,

With reference to the conversation you had yesterday afternoon with M. Neratoff,¹ he has asked me to enclose a short memorandum in which he has endeavoured to express the guiding principles by which General Denikin and his Military and Political Advisers (to whom M. Neratoff, in his capacity of Director of the Foreign Affairs Section, belongs) are inspired in their work. He has also endeavoured to indicate the lines upon which the support of Great Britain would appear most valuable and effective.

Yours sincerely,
C. NABOKOFF

ENCLOSURE IN No. 361

Memorandum

The fundamental aim of the struggle which is now being carried on in the South, East, North and North-West of Russia is the restoration of law and order and the establishment of a United Russia upon new lines. These lines would essentially differ from the old régime. As General Denikin's armies, which from a small group of 200 officers have now developed into a powerful army of 200,000, occupy new territories, not only do they not suppress the self-government of these territories, but they re-establish such representative bodies as are in a position to draft local constitutions. In fact General Denikin and the Volunteer Army are already putting into practice the idea of a federation of peoples under the supreme authority of the Russian State. General Denikin has negotiated with and acted towards Georgia, Azerbaijan and other national groups in the Caucasus in the same spirit. They were repeatedly given definite assurances that the Volunteer Army had no intention whatsoever of infringing upon their rights provided they, in their turn, did not fall a prey to Bolshevik propaganda and by attacks in the rear impede

¹ No record of this conversation has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

the advance of the Volunteer Army into Russia. These principles and methods have been whole-heartedly endorsed by Admiral Kolchak. In the opinion of the political leaders who surround General Denikin the same principle applies to all the nationalities inhabiting the borders of Russia, viz. that under the new Russian régime they will receive the fullest measure of self-government, but as integral parts of the Russian State. General Denikin believes that in so doing he is in full accord with the spirit of the League of Nations.

The second principle which the Russian leaders are anxious to lay down is that in their political work they are guided by feelings and [? of] whole-hearted devotion to the ties of friendship and alliance with the Powers of the Entente to which they have invariably adhered in their adversity. At this grave moment, when His Majesty's Government have come to the all-important decision of withdrawing British troops from all parts of Russia, the Russian leaders deem it their duty to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the situation which would arise should this withdrawal be effected without a corresponding effort to encourage and support the policy and spirit outlined above. No doubt exists in their minds that the withdrawal of British troops will be used as a powerful weapon by the enemies of Russia. The Russian people will be told that the Entente has discontinued the support hitherto given to loyal Russians because they have realised their inability to break the power of the Soviet Government. Should the small nationalities, which now claim complete independence, continue to be encouraged whilst Russia is deprived of material and moral support, this would constitute another powerful argument, viz. that the Powers of the Entente are treating Russia in the same fashion as they have treated Austria and Turkey.

The ardent wish of all Russian patriots can, therefore, be expressed in the following terms:—that the material support which the victorious Powers of the Entente are still in a position to give Russia should not cease, and that it should be directed to those parts of Russia where it is most urgently needed. The proclamation of General Denikin on May 30, by which he recognised Admiral Kolchak as the head of the All-Russia Government, meant much more than a spectacular gesture. General Denikin intended, and his intention has been fully realised, to impress upon the 40,000,000 Russians over whom his authority now extends, that his aim is to re-unite Russia, and that it is impossible to achieve this re-union without recognising one central Authority. The moral support which this act seems to call for is the recognition by Russia's friends of this idea of a United Russia. The two great Russian leaders require this support in the same measure—General Denikin as the most potent factor in the regeneration of Russia owing to the success of his Army, Admiral Kolchak as the man who has already achieved the reunion of Siberia and who now needs fresh stimulus in his work of liberation. Ample documentary evidence exists to prove that both these leaders are supported not merely by the military but by combinations of political parties in Russia which include most advanced liberals and socialists. The Russian leaders believe that they are continuing in their sphere of action the task

which has been victoriously achieved in the West. They are determined to save Russia from the tyranny which was imposed upon her by Germany and to resist all efforts of support from Germany. These efforts have been made repeatedly, but no true Russian patriot remains blind to the ultimate aim of such proposals. Anti-Bolshevik Russia remains anti-German in spite of many disappointments and of the failure on the part of the Powers of the Entente to formally recognise in them the representative of a friendly power whom it is their sincere desire to welcome into the League of Nations.

No. 362

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received August 12)
No. 711 Telegraphic [115258/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 9, 1919¹

Following is an (? opinion) of situation as seen from here after a month's stay.

After beginning with general goodwill, Koltchak Government is (? now) discredited by failure not so much of military campaign as of internal administration. We must continue to do our best for them but there is no reason to accept their view of what is best. They must be forced to deserve recognition. Much may be done by Conferences with High Commissioner and United States Ambassador but essential thing is to regain popular confidence by establishing representative assembly of some sort. Any Government based on such an assembly must *ipso facto* be an improvement, for permanent material of any reconstruction is mass of peasants and middle class anxious only for any moderate democratic regime which can restore decent conditions (? but) at present either disillusioned and inert or else driven to what is wrongly called Bolshevism but is in fact mainly outlawry due to poverty and conscription.

It is therefore with this mass that it is really important that we should stand well and make them feel their wishes are ours and that with our help an effort is still worth while.

Only people in the country at present who are both sound and energetic are the Czechs. They are angry, disillusioned and anxious to leave but would still make an effort for a reformed Government which would fulfil the promises they made to people when they entered Siberia.

(? We have) treated Siberia as mainly a military problem and we have failed. We have now to begin again and build on a sounder foundation.

Following message has been agreed on by diplomatic representatives here (? and) sent to representatives Omsk.

'We are strongly of opinion that Government should make an effort to gain confidence of people by inviting assistance (? of a) representative body. We are disposed to think that safest and most representative body would be

¹ The file copy of this telegram was originally dated in error July 9, 1919.

one chosen by and from Zemstvos and Municipalities, that it should (? have a) voice in Government (? and that) Ministry should be responsible to it.'

If Koltchak could be made to accept support of Czechs to carry out this reform and to survive reactionary kick (? which would be first) result it is possible that within a measurable time we might be justified in recognizing his Government and find ourselves able with confidence to leave Siberia to itself.

Repeated to Omsk.

No. 363

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)

No. 1328 Telegraphic [113944/113944/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 9, 1919

Following for Major Pinder,¹ Ekaterinodar.

With reference to General Holman's telegram No. G. 256² of July 30 to the War Office you should take all steps you consider possible and desirable in support of General Holman's action to secure postponement or material modification of new rates for royalties and surface rents at Grosny oil fields.³

¹ Member of the British economic mission at Ekaterinodar (cf. No. 305, note 1).

² This telegram read as follows: 'Rates for royalty and surface rent fixed every twelve years by Ministry of War for Grosny oil fields, which being in Cossack territory come under that Ministry, expired on June fourteenth. 2. New Terek Krug [i.e. assembly] has fixed new rates at two hundred times old rates though exchange value of roubles is only one twentieth prewar rate; no company can work under new rates. Penalty for failing to agree to new terms by fourteenth August is confiscation with right to companies to remove plant within three months. Owing to labour and transport situation no installation can be removed. 3. British companies concerned are Spies Petroleum Company and North Caucasian Oilfields value of whose installation amounts to about four million pounds. 4. New rates involve complete ruin of industry and serious damage to prosperity of South Russia. I have asked Denikin to endeavour to persuade Terek Krug to cancel these suicidal rates. Acknowledge.'

³ Major Pinder replied in a telegram, probably of August 18, 1919, to the War Office for the Department of Overseas Trade (received in Foreign Office, August 27): 'Arranged conference Rostoff, August 20, with Terek Krug, Grosny Companies, Denikin Government and Economic Section to discuss royalties and surface rents.' A general report of October 8, 1919, by General Holman referred to what was evidently the conference of August 20 (date not there given), and stated that the Terek Cossacks 'did not appear, but sent a delegate to General Denikin, who did not receive him. It was left to the British Economic Mission to act, and a resolution was sent to the [Terek Cossack] Ataman, inviting a friendly discussion with a view to finding a reasonable solution. A fresh conference took place at Rostov on 25th September, and was attended by three delegates from the Terek Krug. The delegates were informed that the Allied Powers did not recognize their existence apart from a United Russia, and that their unreasonable attitude was preventing the proper development of their own oil lands, which had been so great a source of revenue to them in the past. The Economic Mission suggested that, if the Terek Krug were in need of immediate funds, a noncommittal payment might be levied on account, pending the final adjustment of the rates by arbitration and subsequent ratification by the Minister of War, at the moment represented by General Denikin: or that a temporary rate for one year should be fixed, as

in the case of the Maikop properties on the Kuban. The delegates left to report to the Ataman, and the question will probably remain in abeyance until it can be dealt with by the Russian Government. A fire broke out at Grozny on 6th September. 20 reservoirs were burnt out, with the loss of 3,000,000 poods of crude oil and mazout, and of about 2,200,000 poods of benzine and kerosene. Four locomotives and some other rolling stock were destroyed.'

No. 364

Letter from Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Mr. Lloyd George
No. G.T. 7949 [Confidential/General/229/4]

PARIS, August 9, 1919

My dear Prime Minister,

I am concerned about the situation in the Caucasus. Evidence is reaching us from every quarter that the withdrawal of British troops will be followed by the most appalling massacre of the Armenians and general bloodshed throughout the Caucasus. I am entirely in favour of the policy of withdrawal. In fact I think it is essential from every point of view. But I confess that I do not like to look forward to the day when it will be said that while they had the fullest warning beforehand, the British precipitated a massacre of Armenians by deliberately withdrawing their troops in the face of the advice of all local authorities as to the probable consequences. Coming on the top of the withdrawal from Archangel I do not think it will make a very pretty story.

There is only one way out and that is that America should take charge. It is right that she should do this because she has always professed interest in Armenia, and always given the Council the impression that she intended to take a mandate for that country. But I am quite certain that she will not do anything so long as we are prepared to carry the burden ourselves. On the other hand, I do not think it is a good plan that she should be induced to go in through a massacre precipitated by a British withdrawal, unless she has been given the opportunity to save the situation herself and has refused it.

I should like, therefore, to be able to say to Mr. Polk¹ on behalf of the British Government that we are just as much concerned as are the Americans about the possible consequences to Armenia and the Caucasus from a withdrawal of British troops, but that for various reasons it is quite impossible for the British troops to remain; that our intention of leaving was made known to the '4' as far back as March and April; that if the Americans are prepared to undertake to find the necessary officers and men to protect the Armenians by the 30th September the British Government will allow its troops to remain there until that date; but that if America cannot relieve the situation by that time there is nothing for it but for the withdrawal to proceed as from August 15th.

Obviously, however, I cannot make this statement to Polk without your authority, because it involves the retention of British troops in the Caucasus

¹ Representative of the United States on the Supreme Council.

for a further six weeks, and I appreciate fully the objections to this course. I am most reluctant to recommend it. But I think the consequences of a general massacre precipitated by our withdrawal must inevitably be more serious than any that can follow a further delay of six weeks in evacuation. Moreover, I understand, that if the British withdrawal begins on August 15th it will not be completed till October 8th. If that is so the Americans ought to be able to move in gradually, thus only involving a comparatively short prolongation of our stay.

As usual it is the Italians who have got us into this mess. Ever since April they have said they were going to the Caucasus, and now they say they cannot. But, if as a result, we can secure the Americans in their place, we shall have made a good exchange. I am sending a copy of this to Curzon.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

No. 365

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received August 11)
No. 520 Telegraphic [114718/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, August 10, 1919

My telegram No. 506.¹

Throughout the past week Government have been in consultation with small committee representing all parties in Zemstvo and municipality who have laid aside party differences. Committee have no real illusions as to possibility of raising moral to a point which would render it possible to hold Archangel district after we have gone but they hope to accomplish something to facilitate orderly evacuation and strengthen the position on Murmansk front should it be decided to hold out there. I am encouraging them to work on these lines. They have asked whether there is any hope that British troops or military mission will after all remain. I have replied decision to evacuate all British may be regarded as final.

Today reconstruction of Government as the result of recommendations of Committee is announced. Three unpopular Ministers resign and the Mayor who has good reputation becomes Minister of the Interior while representative of the Town Councils and Zemstvos respectively is to be included in Government, they will be selected at meeting of these bodies with Government on August 12th . . .² convince public opinion that Government is on real democratic basis are that Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs drops title and functions of Governor General and that Director of Labour is appointed.

These measures may have good effect in calming the town population but things have gone so far in the Army that it is difficult to believe anything short of announcement that British troops will remain here would restore moral.

I have perhaps failed in the past to establish sufficiently close touch with Socialist opinion here but I now realize as I did not before the full effect of

¹ See No. 349, note 2.

² The text here is uncertain.

initial mistakes made by (? General Poole).³ His conduct of affairs neutralized for many months the work done by Mr. Lindley and the present General Officer Commanding and it is only in the present extreme that Socialists have finally realised that we have endeavoured to live up to our professions as regards internal politics. Though they appreciate in a measure the reasons which have decided us to evacuate they will always hold the opinion that had these initial mistakes not been made reasons for evacuation would not have arisen. Every conversation with Socialists comes back at one time or another to Chaplin episode.⁴

It may be now in some respects outside my province but I trust His Majesty's Government will not exclude the possibility of maintaining a strong mission at Murmansk to support the Russians should they endeavour to maintain themselves on that front. Appeals for support are about to be sent to the Prime Minister, French President of the Council and President Wilson direct by Zemstvo and Municipalities while Socialist organisations will send similar messages to Labour organisations in Allied countries. It is further intended to send deputation representing Bourgeois and various Socialist parties to Great Britain at an early date.

³ Former British G.O.C. North Russian Expeditionary Force.

⁴ For this episode, which concerned a local and temporary *coup d'état* effected at Archangel on September 5-6, 1918, against the social-revolutionary government of M. Tchailovsky, cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: Russia*, vol. ii, p. 521 f.

No. 366

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)

No. 459 [115267/512/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 11, 1919*

Sir,

The American Ambassador called upon me at his own request this afternoon in order to enquire about the position in the Caucasus.

By a fortunate coincidence, there had arrived only twenty-four hours before a letter from Mr. Balfour,¹ in Paris, in which, anticipating the massacres that were almost universally prophesied as certain to follow our contemplated evacuation of the Caucasian regions, he had suggested that, while our troops were being withdrawn, an attempt should be made to interest the American Government as the possible future mandatory for Armenia, in the subject of the Caucasus, and that we might even delay the concluding stages of our withdrawal if we could induce the American Government to send military forces to take the place of ours.

I accordingly explained the situation with complete frankness to Mr. Davis; told him the circumstances in which we had decided to withdraw our troops; explained the stage which arrangements for withdrawal had already reached; referred to the abortive attempt to introduce the Italians on to the scene, and

¹ No. 364.

confirmed Mr. Balfour's apprehensions as to the local consequences that might be expected to follow the departure of our troops.

I then asked the Ambassador these questions: Did he think that the American Government were at all likely to entertain such a request if it was made to them? Had they the troops available in Europe or elsewhere who could be used for the purpose? Was it likely that Congress would be willing to accept a mandate for Armenia or any other portion, larger or smaller, of the Turkish Empire? If so, what was the earliest date at which such a decision might conceivably be reached? If the American Government decided to assume responsibility for Armenia, was it probable that they would extend their interest to the Caucasus as well?

The Ambassador was very careful to explain in reply that he could not speak authoritatively or officially for his Government on any of these matters. In so far, however, as he was entitled to express an *a priori* opinion, he had very little difficulty in doing so. In the first place, he said that the Americans now had only 100,000 troops remaining in Europe, the bulk of whom were under orders to return to their country, and any of whom it would be impossible, in existing conditions, to move to the Caucasus. Indeed, any despatch of American troops to that region could not be attempted without the knowledge and consent of Congress. As regards the larger question of a mandate, although he was aware that, on humanitarian and philanthropic grounds, the American people were deeply interested in Armenia, yet he personally did not believe that these considerations would induce his country to depart from the twofold traditional basis of its foreign policy, namely, (a) the refusal to be entangled in foreign alliances or commitments; (b) a strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover as soon as the American public began to realise—which they probably did not at present—the inherent difficulties, political, ethnographical, physical, and otherwise, of the Armenian problem, he felt very doubtful whether philanthropy would survive in the contest with expediency. As to an American mandate for Constantinople or any other portion of the Turkish Empire, while it was conceivable that the American nation might be attracted by such an idea, here again, expressing his personal opinion, he did not believe that, in the last resort, it would take effect.

Summing up the situation, therefore, the Ambassador said that, while he saw no reason why the request suggested by Mr. Balfour should not be made to the American Government if we wished to make it, he did not anticipate that it would be attended by any practical results.

In reply to further questions which I put to him, he informed me that he did not think it probable that the American decision on the mandatory question would be reached in a period of less than three months from now.

With this very uncertain and rather disquieting forecast of events, which promised little relief from our impending anxieties in respect of the situation in the Caucasus and of the position in Asiatic Turkey in general, the American Ambassador took his leave.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Letter from Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)
Unnumbered [Confidential/General/229/4]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 12, 1919

My dear Balfour,

I received the copy of your letter to the Prime Minister,¹ about the situation in the Caucasus, on the evening before last, and have been dealing with it in concurrence with him since then.

Personally, I am a little surprised that Paris has awakened so late in the day to the seriousness of the impending situation, because on many occasions during the past six months I have taken the liberty (though quite ineffectually) of pointing it out to the Cabinet: having even, I believe, on several occasions rendered myself unpopular by the notes which I have written about the disorder, anarchy, and bloodshed which were in my view certain to result from the Allied policy in Asia Minor.

As regards the Italians in particular, I remember pointing out as soon as the plan of sending them to the Caucasus was announced that it was incredible that they should either take it up or be encouraged to take it up; and here, at any rate, we have never proceeded upon the hypothesis that they were in the least likely to go to the Caucasus at all.

Nothing, therefore, that has happened, or is likely to happen in that region strikes me with any surprise. Very likely it may be the same with you also, but I cannot help suspecting that the final fillip to your apprehensions must have been dealt by General Bridges² on his recent passage through Paris.

However, as regards the policy which you suggest of a postponement or suspension of evacuation pending an appeal to the Americans, which is the real point, I will tell you exactly what has happened.

Upon receipt of your letter, I got into touch with the C.I.G.S., who told me that, whatever might be said for it, suspension or postponement of evacuation was no longer possible. In the first place, the ships in the Caspian have already been handed over to Denikin, and he is now believed to be in full control. Secondly, the British troops in the Caucasus are all demobilised men, who have a right to come home, who have been assured that they are about to come home, and who cannot in any circumstances be persuaded to stay. The only forces that might be left behind are the Indian battalions; and it would hardly be politic or desirable to have an occupation of the Caucasus undertaken by such troops alone. Thirdly, the greater part of our military stores and depots have already been withdrawn. Lastly, the shipping programme has already been arranged so as to provide for evacuation within the dates mentioned by you.

For these reasons, Wilson regarded the plan of remaining longer in the Caucasus as out of the question.

¹ No. 364.

² Chief of the British Mission to the Allied Armies of the Orient.

I then asked him whether it would be possible to maintain a reduced garrison for a period.

Apart from the obstacles to such a course which I have already mentioned, he pointed out that the existing army, now being withdrawn, was inadequate for the purpose; and therefore no general would accept the responsibility, in the conditions certain to be produced by partial evacuation, of leaving even a substantial residuum of troops behind.

As regards the Americans, Wilson did not for a moment believe that they would be willing to undertake the task, or that they had the troops available for the purpose. In his opinion, he went on to say, the considerations against the contemplated evacuation might have been anticipated, and ought to have been in our minds for months past. Nothing had happened to make the situation more urgent or more full of peril, and it was impossible to take at the last moment precautionary steps which, if undertaken at all, ought to have been authorised months ago.

Just after receiving this rather disheartening report from the C.I.G.S., I came over to the Foreign Office, as the American Ambassador had asked to see me there. He came upon the instructions of his Government to enquire about the position at Batoum.

I seized the opportunity to give him the substance of your letter about the Caucasus, together with the suggestion which it contained. After our conversation, I made a note of what had passed between us: a copy of which I enclose herewith.³

This morning the matter came before the Cabinet. There was one of the usual rather discursive discussions; but, in view of the opinions expressed by the C.I.G.S. and the American Ambassador, it was deemed impossible to take any responsibility such as that involved in a reversal of policy now. On the other hand, it was felt that if, in spite of what I am writing, you thought it desirable to approach Mr. Polk in the matter, there was no objection to your doing so, although it would be impossible to base your suggestion upon any postponement by us of the dates of withdrawal.

This afternoon, as I am dictating this letter to you, there has just come in a further letter from the American Ambassador, to the effect that last night, after seeing me, he received instructions by cable from his Government, urging the British Government with all earnestness not to withdraw their troops from Batoum for the time being, having in view the evident gravity of the situation. Mr. Davis adds, as a probable explanation of the sudden interest of his Government in the matter, that the American Commission for Relief in the Near East has a large force of workers who have recently been scattered through the Caucasus, and for whose personal safety in the event of evacuation grave fears are entertained.

I am not certain that the Americans have a very clear apprehension of the geographical features of the situation. Even if we adhered to our dates, the period of leaving Batoum would not come until the first week in October; and further, the retention of forces at Batoum till then, or even till later, will

³ Copy not attached to filed original; cf. No. 366.

not ensure the safety of parties in other parts of the Caucasus, or prevent Armenians from being massacred at Karabagh and Nakchivan. Nothing, indeed, can prevent the anticipated outbreaks now, except the retention in the country of the forces we are about to remove. This policy I have consistently advocated for the last nine months; and you may perhaps remember my expounding it at length at meetings of the Eastern Committee,⁴ which you, among others, attended. At that date I proposed that we should remain in occupation of the Caucasus for a limited time: a year or more, as might be required, until the local Republics were able to stand on their own legs. But I obtained no sympathy or support for this idea, which was not shared by my Colleagues; and when I made this sort of suggestion in the Cabinet, I was invariably 'turned down'.

I see, therefore, no adequate or satisfactory solution of the present problem, nor any means of averting the disasters which you anticipate.

I am sending out Wardrop with as little delay as possible to Tiflis; and I am quite prepared to despatch either political or diplomatic representatives to Baku and Batoum. It may even be desirable to leave small military escorts of a hundred men or more with each of them, at these places. They may exercise some sort of influence, and even of restraint, and may perhaps prevent some of the worst atrocities from occurring. But this is the limit of my own hopes, and the situation is not one from which I can otherwise extract any light to relieve the prevailing gloom.

You will no doubt exercise your own judgment as to whether, in these circumstances, you desire to talk to Mr. Polk, and as to what you should say to him.

Yours sincerely,

CURZON

⁴ An interdepartmental committee upon eastern affairs.

No. 368

Earl Curzon to Mr. Hoare (Archangel)
No. 486 Telegraphic [108015/88/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 12, 1919

United States Government have purchased 5250 tons of rye and coarse wheat flour for shipment to Archangel to be sold for new roubles and proceeds to be returned to Department of State.¹ United States Government enquire whether His Majesty's Government and that of France will participate at once with \$1,000,000 each. We propose to reply that His Majesty's Government cannot participate as evacuation of N. Russia has now been decided on.

Repeated to Washington No. 1567.

¹ This was the shipment referred to in No. 334 and confirmed in an *aide-memoire* received in the Foreign Office from the American Embassy in London on July 25. This *aide-memoire* contained the inquiry reported below. A note of August 11, 1919 (received in the Foreign Office, August 12), from the French Embassy in London stated that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had given the same reply to this inquiry as that proposed by the Foreign Office.

Sir C. Eliot (Omsk) to Earl Curzon (Received August 17)
No. 19 Telegraphic [117156/11/57]

OMSK, August 13, 1919

As result of a series of conferences held with Russian Minister[?] and Mr. Morris, French High Commissioner and myself agreed on substance of recommendations to be submitted to our respective Governments. General Takayanagi, principal . . . [?] Japanese]¹ representative here, expressed his concurrence but Japanese have several official agents in Siberia . . .¹ It is not known whose report has most influence in Tokio.

Immediately after I had come to an understanding with my colleagues General Knox communicated to me telegram 80.251 of August 5th from Troopers² which announces that we intend to limit our military and financial support in future to Denikin's theatre while apparently hoping other Powers 'will make good recent declaration to continue supporting Admiral Koltchak'. This decision of Military Authorities appears to me extremely wise, since America and Japan have greater interests in Siberia than we have and can intervene more easily (?) joint (?) recommendation[s] to (?) action[s] [*sic*] now become little more than a statement of what Mr. Morris thinks that United States of America ought to do. He throughout assumed United States must provide majority of troops and money required and that they would be willing.

He changed his opinion about the Omsk Government several times since his arrival here finally took a favourable view in two telegrams despatched to Washington which he showed me.³ In first he came to conclusion that if a policy of anti-Bolshevik intervention in Russia is adopted, Admiral Koltchak's administration deserves the support of United States since in spite of its present imperfections it is capable of becoming an orderly and democratic Government. In second he enquired what is best way to help and make use of it and submitted . . . s.¹

First, Koltchak's Government should be recognized as soon as possible. He admitted recognition would be a gamble but urged it would greatly strengthen Omsk Government's position in public opinion both here and in European Russia at a critical moment and that it would not matter much if Koltchak collapsed in spite of recognition. I told him that I could recommend recognition only if Omsk Government succeeded in stopping Bolshevik advance. Should it do that and has a reasonable chance of effecting a junction with Denikin I should be in favour of recognition, as I was in April last, because if Powers give active support to Koltchak . . .¹ logically to admit that he has a right to the position which he claims. I cannot recommend any form of recognition which would make Koltchak and his present Ministers (?) rulers of) United Russia, if such a union ever takes place, but I do not see what harm would be done by recognizing arrangement made between him

¹ The text here is uncertain.

² The War Office.

³ For telegrams, as indicated below, from Mr. Morris to the Secretary of State in Washington, see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, pp. 407-10.

and Denikin,⁴ provided this Government is not driven out of Omsk and separated from Europe by a broad band of Bolshevism. In such a case its claims to be all Russian Government would become ridiculous.

Secondly, Siberian Military Authorities ask for war material costing about 90,000,000 gold dollars. This includes 40 tanks and equipment for 600,000 men. But at present Government cannot raise such a force since in many districts its authority is limited and also requisite number of officers and N.C.O.'s would be hard to find. There was considerable discussion as to amount of control necessary if Allies give grants. Mr. Morris thought there ought to be 300 Allied Inspectors.

Thirdly, a credit of 75,000,000 gold dollars is recommended for buying urgently needed commodities such as agricultural implements, woollen and cotton goods, paper and kerosene. Such commodities are to be bought in countries providing funds. A commission of Russian and Allied Representatives should be appointed with authority to allot credits amongst responsible firms and organisations in Siberia who have negotiated contracts abroad. Commodities delivered should be consigned direct to firms selected but sale and distribution should be supervised by allied inspectors. Russian Government will repay credits thus advanced and will endeavour to arrange with selected firms a plan whereby proceeds of any exports made by them shall remain on deposit in (allied) countries to meet this obligation in part . . .¹ undertakings to modify existing restrictions on import and export.

Fifthly. Careful investigation confirmed estimate of 20,000,000 gold dollars as necessary for working inspection of railway up to Omsk. If it is ever possible to operate line between Omsk and Volga, another ten million dollars will be required.

This means a total grant of 185 or 200 million gold dollars from Powers but a large part of this sum consists of credits for purchases to be made in allied countries.

I think Mr. Morris in making these proposals was chiefly influenced by idea that United States have interests in Siberia which would suffer from predominance of either Bolsheviks or Japan.

⁴ Cf. No. 361.

No. 370

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received August 14)

Telegraphic: by wireless [116194/9/38]

August 13, [1919]¹

It is with disgust and indignation that the Soviet Government have learnt of the horrible inhuman treatment to which Russian prisoners of war are subjected by the British Command of Archangel. If the British Government have made themselves indirectly responsible for untold atrocities and

¹ This wireless message was noted on the file as being 'from the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Petrograd, to Paris, intercepted by wireless at Seaham'. It appears probable that the message was relayed from Moscow to Petrograd.

brutalities committed on Russian workers and peasants by their agents the Kolchak[s], Denikins, Judenichs and Hallers, brutalities compared to which the methods of the Spanish inquisition were mere child's play, proofs have now been obtained of similar treatment received by Russian war prisoners directly at the hands of British Commanders on the North of Russia. Some who have escaped from British captivity have reported that many of their comrades have been shot immediately when taken prisoners that they themselves have been mercilessly beaten with butt (? ends), (placed in) prisoners [sic] and made to work to utter exhaustion while insufficiently fed and (? threatened) with being shot in case of their refusing to enlist in the Slav-British Counter-Revolutionary Legion and to turn traitors to their former brethren in arms and that in a number of cases such threats have been actually carried out. It is hereby brought to the notice of the British Government that in consequence of the above statement the Soviet Government have found themselves compelled to withdraw the many privileges and liberties hitherto accorded to the British officers war prisoners in Moscow as well to those recently brought from the Onega front. Seeing that protests can be of no avail and knowing the indifference of the British Government to the sufferings of Russians who do not support the Counter-Revolutionary Movement the Soviet Government had to resort to this course in the hope that it may induce the British Commanders to give Russian war prisoners a more human treatment thereby improving the conditions of life of their own fellow officers. The Soviet Government will however continue to treat most liberally British soldiers war prisoners of the labouring classes except those who volunteered for service in Russia in the cause of European action in monarchical restoration. As to the insolent threats contained in the radio of Lord Curzon of Kedleston of August 10th² the Soviet Government declare that no blackmail can have any effect on their policy. Any repetition of such threats addressed personally to members of the Russian Government and characteristic only of the mentality of their authors will cause the Soviet Government to consider whether they can entertain further negotiations with the present British Government even on questions like that of the exchange of prisoners.³

² No. 356.

³ No reply was made to this wireless message.

No. 371

Lord Kilbarnock (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received August 14)
No. 1453 Telegraphic [116250/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, August 14, 1919

Your telegram No. 1325.¹

I have seen Dr. Martiny who states in reply to your question.

1. Reason for arrest of all foreigners in Russia was political. It was due to

¹ Not printed. On August 5, 1919, Lord Kilbarnock had telegraphed that Dr. Martiny, a representative of the Danish Red Cross lately arrived from Moscow, stated that 'Boshevik police searched all Legations and Consulates in Petrograd, Moscow, Samara and Homel

extreme Red section of Bolsheviks under Peters and Dersinsky getting upper hand over Lenin who (with Trotsky in a lesser degree) represents moderate wing. Lenin stands for policy of negotiation with allied powers but as he had no success on these lines and in view of military successes of Red Armies his influence has dwindled and policy has swung again towards a fresh terror. First step is arrest of foreigners and ransacking of all Legations and Consulates. This will be followed by persecution of Russians accused of having had intercourse with foreigners, which is represented as reactionary. Measure has however aroused such considerable opposition Lenin has again gained some ground.

2. There are not now many British informers under arrest and Dr. Martiny will give me a list as soon as he has had time to unpack his papers.

3. British soldiers who are now prisoners of war are (? well) treated by Bolsheviks who hope to influence them with a view to propaganda. They are fed on little better² than Red soldiers but this does not amount to much as food is very scarce.

Dr. Martiny left half a million roubles in hands of British chaplain North and a Danish delegate named Eigtved for their help. This was calculated to last one month but must be nearly exhausted. Proposals will probably shortly be submitted by Danish Government to His Majesty's Government in conjunction with Red Cross for remitting further funds for this object.

on June 3 as also houses of all foreigners in Russia. Many hundreds foreigners were arrested and interned in concentration camps at Moscow. Majority were subsequently released through intervention of Danish Red Cross. Latter were also arrested for short time.' In reply the Foreign Office instructed Lord Kilmarnock in telegram No. 1325 of August 8 to inquire of Dr. Martiny: '(1) Reasons for the arrest of all foreigners at Moscow. (2) How many British civilians are still under arrest. (3) Present condition of British prisoners of war in Russia and what arrangements have been made for their relief.'

² This phrase was corrected to '(? a) little better' in a repetition of the telegram on August 21.

No. 372

Colonel Pirie-Gordon (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received August 15)

No. D.C. 11 Telegraphic [116696/116696/38]

REVAL, August 14, 1919

After negotiations lasting for four days during which pressure was consistently exerted by British Military and Diplomatic Missions and Representatives of France and United States, a North-West Russian Government for Provinces of Pskoff, Novgorod and Petrograd has been formed.¹ Cabinet consists of:

1. Lianosow, Prime Minister, Finance and Foreign Affairs.
2. General Yudenitch, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief.
3. Alexandrov, Minister of the Interior.
4. Margulies, Minister of Commerce, Public Health and Food.

¹ For the reasons for this action cf. Nos. 378 and 383.

5. Bogdanof, Agriculture Department.
6. Pilkin, Minister of Marine.
7. Eischinski, Supplies.
8. Ern, Education.
9. Philippeo, Posts and Telegraphs.
10. Butlerov, Reconstruction of Factories.
11. Konderev, Public Welfare.
12. Horn, State Control.
13. (? Seev), Religion.
14. Iwanow, without portfolio.²

Some of these have not yet arrived at Reval but numbers (1) (2) (3) (4) (9) (12) and (14) have signed a declaration recognising Independence of Esthonia and inviting His Majesty's Government in common with France and United States likewise. New Government requests that this may be communicated to *Times*.

Ends.

D.C. 12.³ following.

² In a further telegram of August 16 (received August 17) Colonel Pirie-Gordon stated that a fifteenth name should be added to this list: 'Senator Ivanov, Minister of Justice, omitted yesterday [*sic*] owing to similar name with 14.'

³ This telegram of even date (received August 15) requested that 'recognition of Estonia may be made conditional upon good behaviour of Estonian Government, Constituent Assembly. At present both are drifting towards policy of confiscation, and individual officials are becoming peculative and corrupt. If British representative here can have recognition up his sleeve to use as a lever in compelling local Government to adopt satisfactory attitude with regard to land bill and trade regulations, Estonia will perforce have to modify their [*sic*] extreme attitude.'

No. 373

Colonel Pirie-Gordon (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received August 18)
No. D.C. 14 Telegraphic [117664/116696/38]

REVAL, August 14, 1919

My telegram No. 13.¹

Newly constituted North West Russian Government decided to make its Headquarters for the present at Reval. I am assured that majority of members fear to establish themselves in Pskoff as they are convinced that Balachovich² would in that case attempt *coup d'état* from which their lives would certainly be in grave danger. In view of presence of new Russian Government in Reval General Gough has invited me to take over all political

¹ Not printed. This telegram of even date (received August 15) reported that the 'newly formed North West Russian Government have decided to convoke a Congress of representatives of people in order that it may benefit by co-operation of its ablest citizens and make public demonstration of its truly democratic principles, both to its own people and soldiers and the world at large'. The new Government requested that this fact might be publicized in the British press.

² See No. 59, note 1.

negotiations with it. Therefore I request chief British Commissioner for Baltic provinces may be accredited with new Government as soon as you have recognized it. I venture to emphasize the necessity of immediate recognition of North West Russian Government on footing similar to that accorded to General Denikin's Government in order to enable Allies here to counteract enemy intrigue. Ends. My telegram No. 15³ follows.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Riga.

³ Not printed. This telegram of August 15 (received August 16) contained the text of a declaration made by the North-West Russian Government. This declaration is printed in appendix L to No. 385.

No. 374

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 5339 [113402/11067/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 14, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of two telegrams from General Headquarters Constantinople to the War Office Nos. I. 6690 of August 4th and I. 6695 of August 6th.

On August 2nd when the Georgian Cabinet handed to Mr. Cory¹ the notes to which reference is made in the former telegram, they had probably already received news that His Majesty's Government intended to send a Mission to Tiflis; and it will doubtless be advisable to endeavour to maintain the attitude of good-will towards Great Britain which is so clearly evident in these notes.

The offer of a coaling-station at Batoum will need careful handling, and it may hardly be expedient to accept it too readily. For while Batoum is undoubtedly Georgian and Georgia, once her independence is recognized, might be assumed to enjoy full liberty to dispose of this port as she sees fit, yet any definite arrangement at the present juncture could hardly fail to raise ill-will against us among our Allies. There seems, however, no reason why we should not continue to occupy the port and use it for naval purposes.

I venture to suggest that a generally friendly but non-committal answer should be made to these communications through the medium of the Georgian Delegation in Paris, with an additional statement to the effect that Mr. Wardrop is on his way to Tiflis, where on his arrival—about a fortnight hence—he will take an early opportunity of discussing these various points.

I have, etc.,

(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

[GERALD SPICER]²

¹ General Cory was in command of the British 27th Division stationed in the Caucasus.

² Signature supplied from the files of the British Peace Delegation.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 374

Telegram from British G.H.Q., Constantinople, to War Office

Dispatched 20.30, 4.8.19. Received 12.45, 6.8.19

I. 6690 Aug. 4th.

Cory reports that prior to statement by Italian Government to Trans-Caucasus Governments that British troops now in Trans-Caucasus would not be replaced by Italian troops Georgian Cabinet decided to issue 2 notes to British Government. Cory was handed these notes on Aug. 2nd. First requests following be brought to notice of British Government.

1. Georgian Government requests British Government to allow British troops now in Georgia to remain there.
2. Georgian Government is prepared to grant important economic concessions to British industrial and commercial concerns.
3. Georgian Government asks British Government to take necessary steps to defend Georgian independence and to obviate possibility of an attempt on their independence by Volunteer Army.
4. Georgian Government thank British Government for loyal conduct of British troops in Georgia and for assistance already rendered by them.

In 2nd note British are offered Batoum as coal station if it is allowed to become part of Georgia.

Cory further reports Ghambashidze, late Georgian representative in London, interviewed him urging that Georgia and Azerbaijan be given a chance. He maintains that our withdrawal will mean incursion by Russians for which conditions are not suitable. States Russia has great desire to resume hold on Trans-Caucasus but (?) lacks necessary strength. If troops remain he offered payment of expenses for them by local Governments and stated this offer would probably hold if troops were replaced by those of another ally, at any rate in the case of America or France. Cory comments that all the Trans-Caucasus countries are greatly disturbed that British are leaving without relief and state that extensive disturbances will probably break out.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 374

Telegram from British G.H.Q., Constantinople, to War Office

Dispatched 20.40, 6th August, 1919. Received 09.00, 7th August, 1919

Priority A

I. 6695. August 6th

Continuation of my I. 6690 of August 5th [4th]. Following is precis of note B which Georgian Government request be communicated to British Government. Begins:—

1. By Treaty of Brest Litovsk the province of Batoum of which 90% of population are Georgian was taken from Georgia. Now that this treaty has been annulled and as it is the wish of its population and in the interests of

province itself from economic point of view Batoum province should be . . . ed³ to Georgia.

2. Batoum town was always essentially Georgian until Turks took it over when large number of Georgians left. Conditions in Batoum now (?) abnormal owing to foreign elements which are carrying out vigorous political campaigns there. Georgian Government state Batoum town as well as province should be returned to Georgia to re-establish normal conditions in Batoum, but they ask that town be given to them at once as temporary measure pending final decision of Peace Conference.

3. At same time Georgian Government propose that British continue to use Batoum as coaling station and as naval and military base.

4. If above agreed to Georgian Government hope that Great Britain would undertake the guarding of Georgian Black Sea coast. Ends.

³ The text here is uncertain.

No. 375

Sir C. Eliot (Omsk) to Earl Curzon (Received August 16)

No. 24 Telegraphic [117155/11/57]

OMSK, August 14, 1919

Troopers telegram 80.251¹ August 5th to Military Mission makes me anxious to (? receive) instructions about Your Lordship's intentions as to High Commissioner.

There is a tendency here to interpret War Office instructions as a complete (? abandonment) of Koltchak which does not seem to follow from Koltchak's own interests to give material help to Denikin rather than him in his present perilous position by making him feel that he is (? forsaken) by his Allies especially as French intend to withdraw subsidies they have hitherto given [*sic*].

I told Mr. Morris confidentially [? that while] I had no instructions from Your Lordship about any change of policy, certain military telegrams indicate that as we can only give a limited amount of assistance it was considered better not to divide it but concentrate on Denikin. He said that this sounded wise but that United States Government disliked idea of spheres of influence: they would not wish Denikin territory to be an Anglo-French sphere, Siberia to be an American-Japanese sphere.

His chief object in energetically supporting Koltchak Government was to prevent Japanese from obtaining exclusive rights. He did not wish to have a *tête-à-tête* with Japan in Siberia and hoped that Great Britain and France would continue their interest. He admitted however that in framing recommendations reported in my telegram Urgent No. 19¹ he had calculated on America being ready to . . .² at least half funds (? and) men required . . .² expected other countries to do (? more than) give credits for goods he bought in their own territories.

¹ See No. 369.

² The text here is uncertain.

Mr. Morris is (? confident) that public opinion in America is ripe for his recommendations. I think that he is inclined to make a striking programme and leave others to execute it.

Situation here has not changed. Only encouraging signs are that public realise its gravity and that general mobilisation is proceeding with some success. Also Bolsheviks are credibly reported to be short of arms and transport and to be dispirited by news from Europe. But danger in rear is perhaps graver than at the front. Alarming reports as to temper of troops and workmen continue to arrive from all large towns on lines. There have been Bolshevik outbreaks at Tara and Barnaul and Japanese are ceasing to support Koltchak and again backing Semenov.

No. 376

Sir P. Wyndham¹ (Warsaw) to Mr. Balfour (Paris)²

No. 125 [591/5/2/17965]

WARSAW, August 14, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from the Polish Government drawing attention to the very serious state of affairs which will ensue for Poland as a result of the evacuation of Allied troops from the Murman and Archangel front.

I am forwarding a copy of this note to the British Military Mission at Warsaw.

A copy of this despatch, No. 224, has been sent to the Foreign Office.

I have the honour, etc.,

PERCY C. WYNDHAM

ENCLOSURE IN No. 376

M. Skrzynski to Sir P. Wyndham (Warsaw)

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.

SOUS-SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT.

D. No. 1119. T. 19.

VARSOVIE, le 13 août 1919

Monsieur le Ministre,

C'est avec grande anxiété que j'ai reçu l'information donnée à la Chambre des Communes sur l'évacuation projetée par les Alliés des régions de la Russie du Nord.³ Dans les plans des campagnes de l'État-Major Polonais le coopération des troupes alliées à Mourman et Archangel était naturellement

¹ H.M. Commissioner at Warsaw.

² The date of receipt in Paris is uncertain.

³ On July 29, 1919, Mr. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Air, had made a statement upon the proposed evacuation of North Russia in the course of a speech in the House of Commons: see *Parl. Debts. 5th series, H. of C.*, vol. 118, cols. 1985-2002.

prise en considération. Il est évident que cette évacuation, à laquelle le Gouvernement Britannique s'est vu contraint, aura pour conséquence une affluence inattendue des troupes bolchevistes sur notre front et un prolongement de notre guerre avec le bolchevisme. Un tel fait pourrait avoir des conséquences des plus fâcheuses pour nous. Je me permets donc d'attirer là-dessus la bienveillante attention de Votre Excellence en La priant de bien vouloir faire part de nos craintes au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Pour éviter des complications qui pourraient avoir de graves conséquences pour toute l'Europe en fortifiant le pouvoir bolcheviste, il serait utile, peut-être, au cours de l'évacuation, d'agir de concert avec le commandement de l'armée polonaise de façon à ne pas l'exposer à d'inattendus changements de plans stratégiques. Il est évident qu'un renforcement des troupes bolchevistes sur notre front nécessiterait une augmentation considérable de nos moyens de défense, surtout qu'il est de moins en moins probable que la Pologne puisse éviter une campagne d'hiver. Aussi le Gouvernement Polonais espère-t-il que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique voudra bien s'employer pour intensifier l'aide en matériel de guerre, en ravitaillement et surtout en équipements pour l'hiver portée jusqu'à présent par les Alliés à l'armée polonaise.

Je profite de cette occasion pour renouveler à Votre Excellence l'assurance de ma parfaite considération.

Le Sous-Secrétaire d'État:

L. SKRZYNSKI

No. 377

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 16)

No. 1622 [116972/93/38]

PARIS, August 15, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 5194¹ of the 5th instant, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Ukrainian Mission in London, I have the honour to observe that according to information here no organised Ukrainian army can be said to exist. Both Petliura and Petrushevitch have a certain following, but the suggestion² that complete agreement exists between them appears to be unfounded. Gregorieff who is also referred to in the Ukrainian note is an independent adventurer who is understood not to own any allegiance to the so-called Ukrainian Government.

In reply to the points to which Your Lordship draws attention,³ no

¹ Not printed.

² In the communication from the Ukrainian Mission in London.

³ Lord Curzon had asked what reply should, in Mr. Balfour's opinion, be made on the following points raised in the Ukrainian note: '(1) the request for formal recognition of the Ukrainian Republic and *de facto* Government. (2) The request for war material for the Ukrainian Army. (3) The request for the despatch of a British Military Mission to the Ukraine.'

encouragement has been given by the Peace Conference to the idea of an independent Ukrainian State, and existing information goes to show that most of the elements for the formation of such a state are lacking. Points 2 and 3 principally concern the War Office, but it would seem to be undesirable to enter into further commitments as to the supply of munitions to anti-bolshevik forces in Russia, especially as in the present case there would be a serious probability of any supplies sent falling into Bolshevik hands, and in these circumstances the despatch of a military mission to the Ukraine would not be likely to serve any useful purpose.

I am, etc.,
For Mr. Balfour,
EYRE A. CROWE

No. 378

Colonel Pirie-Gordon (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received August 17)
No. D.C. 20 Telegraphic [117192/116696/38]

REVAL, August 15, 1919

Request that you will impress Russian Political Conference in Paris that Government North West Russia has been formed as result of allied pressure. This is necessary in order to prevent council from considering action of Lionosow and Udenich as an act of insubordination against Kolchak. Formation of this new Government was absolutely necessary in order to preserve co-operation of maximum of army.¹ Without such co-operation campaign against Bolsheviks as well as political existence of N.W. Russian armies would have been compromised. Furthermore, Bolsheviks have been trying to open negotiations with Esthonian Government and I am convinced that if resistance on North West Russian front had collapsed owing to withdrawal of Esthonian support, Esthonians and Bolsheviks would have come to agreement as to mutual recognition.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Paris; Tallents, Riga; and General Gough, Helsingfors.

¹ In the text of the telegram as received by the British Delegation in Paris this phrase read: '... co-operation of Esthonian army.'

No. 379

Colonel Pirie-Gordon (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received August 17)
No. D.C. 21 Telegraphic [117193/117193/38]

REVAL, August 16, 1919

After discussion with North West Russian Government and in view of urgent requirements I have provisionally consented to their purchase of

certain stores in Germany. If you disapprove of such action on their part please arrange that they receive adequate financial assistance to enable orders to be transferred to British firms. I do not think this action indicates the slightest inclination on the part of Russian Government to subject itself to German influence but is dictated by the necessity of obtaining supplies on credit wherever this can be obtained.¹

Addressed to Foreign Office, Paris, Riga, Helsingfors.

¹ On August 17 General Gough telegraphed from Helsingfors to Colonel Pirie-Gordon (repeated to British Missions at Narva and Riga, Stockholm, War Office and British Delegation at Paris): 'Under Peace Treaty Germany forfeited to us all military stores; any sale of such stores therefore by Germany is violation of Treaty. But I have no objection to obtaining such stores from Germany provided that they are not paid for and that any intending purchasers undertake to observe this condition.'

No. 380

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received August 18)

No. 725 Telegraphic [117539/117539/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 16, 1919

Following from High Commissioner, Omsk, 379, August 12.

Many causes combined to make Omsk Government wish to appear more democratic. Now that Mr. Parkris' [? Morris'] recommendations are known they expect (? great things) from America and desire to prove that they are not reactionary. Growing power of Social Revolutionaries shown in recent municipal elections compels some concession and civil members of Government are also afraid that present crisis may throw whole power into the hands of a few Generals. They therefore support arrangements likely to limit military authority. Two new bodies have been formed. First a 'committee of law and order' consisting of Ministers of Interior, Justice, and War. They are empowered to examine all cases of arbitrary action, all citizens can appeal to them and they can override military orders. Secondly . . .¹ Defence Committee, a (? sort of) War Cabinet composed of Minister of War, another General, Prime Minister and Minister[s] of Interior, Finance and Foreign Affairs.

There are also two vaguer proposals. One is to extend membership and functions of economic congress and make it a sort of Parliament, although it was only recently reprimanded for meddling in politics. Other is to call an Assembly of heads of Volosts. Volost is an administrative unit consisting of several villages.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that it is proposed to issue a declaration about individual liberty, guaranteeing that no one will be arrested without a definite and speedy trial.

I think all these measures are too late.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

No. 381

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received August 19)
No. 726 Telegraphic [118049/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 16, 1919

My telegram No. 711.¹

There are unusually persistent rumours of an impending movement here in favour of more democratic internal policy, whether by overthrow or by reform of Koltchak Government is not clear. Apparently local action (cannot be) contemplated as American staff have been questioned as to their prospective attitude. They have replied that they must protect the railway and in other matters would act as circumstances required. They are sceptical of the movement having much strength (behind) it.

It is clear that Czechs, whether independently of above movement or in sympathy with it, are contemplating some action with the same object. I hear they have already decided whom they would wish to be made Minister of War, Minister of the Interior, and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Czech representative told me representative body referred to in my telegram No. 711¹ could be convened here in a few weeks if the Allies (would) guarantee (? them) against arrest. I said that I thought it incongruous that they should meet anywhere but at seat of Government, that I could not predict attitude of His Majesty's Government and that I thought that if the Allies were going to handle international politics it was matter for Omsk and I would not touch it.

It seems worth considering whether proposals referred to in High Commissioner's telegram No. 379² might not after all be in time if active Czech support were available to tide new régime over initial period.

Recognition of a popular and therefore intrinsically stable Siberian Government even though it were driven back to Irkutsk would really be less risky than recognition of present régime even at time of its apparent success.

Repeated to Omsk.

¹ No. 362.

² No. 380.

No. 382

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received August 19)
No. 727 Telegraphic [117980/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 16, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Following are quotations from despatch from British Liaison Officer at Omsk and from memorandum from General Knox which are going as enclosures in latter's despatch No. (? 62) to D.M.O., August 3rd.

'At present everything is centred under Lebedev who controls everything from Vladivostock to front.

¹ No. 381.

'He is undoubtedly in strongest position in Siberia at present moment, that is to say he has more influence over Admiral than any one else. After downfall of General Gaida he has strengthened his position by giving one of highest posts to his best friend, namely Sakharev, and retaining Burlin as his assistant. He has also made his influence felt in Ministry by (? cultivating) friendship of Sukin who with Michailov, Minister of Finance, practically control[s] Ministry. Above combination are now running country from both military and civilian point of view and I suspect Admiral is not always told the truth about real state of things or at any rate gets his information given to him in such a manner as is likely to mislead him. Generally speaking Lebedev's increased power has brought about rapid turn to extreme (? right) which is supported by a handful of Lebedev's closest associates and a few hangers on of Cossack officer type who believe men provided they are beaten and flogged enough will fight for present Government. Latter have learnt nothing from revolution and are rottenest, most harmful element in country. Unless some attempt is shortly made to rectify this evil which is being aggravated by series of defeats this Government will fall just as M. Kerensky's did, as 90% of the population, I am informed, are daily growing more and more bitter.'

First quotation ends, second quotation begins.

'I am of opinion it would be useless to send any more military [? assistance] to Siberia unless we have some guarantee that it will be used with ordinary common sense and unless Government can prove by acts rather than by mere proclamations that it has resolved to rest on goodwill of broad masses of population.'

No. 383

General Sir H. Gough (Helsingfors) to Mr. Balfour (Paris.

*Received August 19)*¹

No. G. 174 Telegraphic [607/4/1/18133]

HELSINGFORS, August 17, 1919

During last few days complete reorganisation of political and military Russian N.W. army has taken place at my instigation. This was necessary for following reasons:

- (a) Critical condition of Russian N.W. army.
- (b) Seriousness of threat of the Esthonian soldiers refusing to participate further against the Bolsheviks unless granted independence.
- (c) Need for fusion of reactionary and democratic parties into whole-hearted attack on Bolsheviks.

This would have been impossible under old régime. Feeling in this respect between different factions in army was acute and due to undesirable attitude of few persons in influential positions, assisted by probable intrigues.

¹ This telegram was addressed to the War Office and repeated to the British Delegation at Paris and the British Senior Naval Officer, Baltic.

To combat above Government of N.W. province of Russia comprising Petrograd, Pskov and Novgorod areas has been formed which guarantees

- (a) Independence of Esthonia.
- (b) Recognition of rights of people and convoke congress of representatives of the people.
- (c) Whole-hearted offensive in conjunction with Esthonian forces to capture Petrograd and clear N.W. Russia from Bolsheviks.
- (d) General Yudenitch to be Commander-in-Chief and War Minister for Russian Forces, and to work in conjunction with General Laidoner, Commander-in-Chief of Esthonian Forces.

I will submit shortly purely military appreciation of situation and of possible capture of Petrograd in October or November.

In the meantime it is essential

- (1) for the Allies to recognise *de jure* independence of Esthonians, without which disaster is to be expected.
- (2) to continue supply of arms and ammunition, and if possible money, liberally to N.W. army remembering that I can always divert these to Esthonia, Latvia or Lithuania. Full particulars of new Government have been wired to Foreign Office. Military situation depends on events of next few days.

At present there is good reason to believe that really useful military weapon will result from co-operation and settlement of differences between Esthonians and Russians.

In this respect it must be remembered that any military prediction of actual Russian or Bolshevik strength in this part of the world will be impossible as at any moment whole districts may come over *en masse* or vice versa.

Real solution is political propagandist [? propaganda] re independence of Esthonia and enforcement of democratic reform in influential Russian circles.

If this is done I hope to assist, at least materially, Koltchak and Denikin by keeping up pressure and containing Bolsheviks' forces and may even effect decisive result in Petrograd.

No. 384

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 1096 Telegraphic [116698/116696/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 18, 1919

Statement in *Times* of August 16th¹ causes us utmost surprise. Telegrams Nos. 12 and 13² from Deputy Commissioner, Reval, had informed us of formation of North West Russian Government and in his telegram No. 11³ he definitely states that this was due to consistent pressure exerted amongst

¹ On August 16, 1919, *The Times* had published a report on the negotiations in connexion with the formation of the North-West Russian Government.

² See No. 372, note 3, and No. 373, note 1.

³ No. 372.

others by British military and political missions. *The Times* says the agreement reflects signal credit on General Marsh and includes in its tribute General Gough, Colonel Pirie-Gordon and Mr. Bosanquet. The whole of these officers acted not only without authority but without our knowledge, Colonel Pirie-Gordon being only *remplaçant* of Colonel Tallents in the absence of the latter.

Subject to your approval we think that these officers should be informed that they acted *ultra vires* and that H.M. Government cannot approve decisions of such importance being taken without reference to them.

No. 385

Colonel Pirie-Gordon (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received August 28)

No. D.C. 132 [122010/116696/38]

REVAL, August 18, 1919

My Lord,

1. I have the honour to report that the fourth detachment of the British Commission for the Baltic Provinces under my command arrived in Reval on August 5th. On communicating with Mr. Consul General Bosanquet who is the Assistant Commissioner in command of the Reval Branch of the Commission, I was informed that Colonel Tallents, the Chief Commissioner, had left the Baltic Provinces and that I was Acting Commissioner.

2. On August 6th, in company with Mr. Consul General Bosanquet, I called upon the Esthonian Prime Minister, the Esthonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Senior Naval Officer and the United States Representative.

3. On August 8th General Gough arrived from Finland and invited me to attend a Conference on board H.M.S. *Galatea*, at which the leading members of the Esthonian Government and the Allied Representatives, with the exception of the Japanese, were present. At this Conference, a request was preferred for close co-operation between the Esthonian and the North West Russian Armies. As this Conference dealt more particularly with the military situation and only secondarily affected the political existence of the Esthonian Government, I do not feel it incumbent upon myself to trouble your Lordship with an account of the Conference, beyond recording the fact that I did not in any way intrude upon the discussion of military questions. Mr. Consul General Bosanquet at my request however acted as Russian interpreter to General Gough, as it was considered appropriate to make use of a fully qualified British Representative of high rank in that capacity rather than a junior officer.

4. The Esthonian Government requested to be allowed time to consider the demands made for military co-operation. The position in which the Esthonian Government found itself was I gather as follows. The Esthonians were afraid that any reconstructed Russia would at the first opportunity extinguish the independence of Esthonia. This appears to be a definite

ambition in the programme of pro-German Russians and no satisfactory assurances had then been received, either by word of mouth or in writing, from any authoritative group of pro-Ally Russians that Esthonian independence would be respected.

5. Whatever may be their differences of opinion on other points, I find, as far as it is possible to discover, that the Esthonians are united in a determination to preserve their independence against either Russia or Germany. Consequently the Esthonian Government was unable to entertain any proposal for establishing by force of Esthonian arms any Russian Government which might at an early opportunity turn round and destroy the independence of Esthonia.

6. The issue was further complicated by the fact that Bolshevik Emissaries have been in communication with the Esthonian Government offering to recognise the independence of Esthonia on the sole condition that the Esthonians should cease to co-operate any further with the North West Russian Army and undertaking that on no account would any Bolshevik attack be launched against Esthonia.

7. This opinion was so widely held in Esthonia that the Government intimated to General Gough that no steps would be taken unless a guarantee of Esthonian independence were first obtained from the Russians. The Esthonians refused to accept General Yudenitch's guarantee and said that it must come from a regularly constituted Russian Government.

8. In consequence of this, General Gough decided to form a Russian Government and invited me to attend various Conferences held in connection with this scheme.

9. Independently of General Gough's action, I was waited upon by representatives of a number of Russian Liberals and Socialists who invited me to obtain Your Lordship's approval of a convocation of a Congress of Russian Statesmen.

10. With the assistance of Mr. Consul General Bosanquet, I discovered that the proposal involved the selection of the members of this Congress by a self-appointed Committee and that the avowed intention of the Congress was to meet at Dorpat or some other place outside the jurisdiction of General Yudenitch and there to criticise the administration of the liberated area by his officers. A schedule of grievances was then to be prepared and the intention of the organising Committee was that the grievances were to be notified to the General with an intimation that failing redress, the Congress would denounce General Yudenitch as a reactionary and appeal to all democratic Russians to refuse to give him their support.

11. I further elicited the information that this Committee considered itself impelled to take the proposed course as it was of the opinion that failing such action on its part the extreme Socialists would take a similar course which would tend to implicate the democratic centre groups in the unpopularity of the General as having failed themselves to denounce him.

12. I informed the delegates that as General Yudenitch enjoyed the confidence and support of the Allies, no countenance could be given to attacks

made upon him, but I intimated that I would endeavour to induce the General himself to convoke a democratic assembly in order to make clear to the world at large that he was unjustly accused of being reactionary.

13. When on August 11th, it became apparent that a North West Russian Government would be formed I impressed upon the Ministers and those gentlemen who were about to become Ministers that the summoning of such a Congress was an important necessity. My address on this occasion is contained in Appendix H¹ of the enclosed Report.² I further indicated the lines on which I considered it best that the Congress should be formed and distributed copies of the scheme in Russian. The scheme is contained in Appendix J.³

14. Mr. Pollock, correspondent of *The Times* newspaper, was of the greatest assistance in discovering the private views and prejudices of the Ministers and the gentlemen who were likely to become Ministers and gave me much good advice.

15. This together with the information which I had elicited with the help

¹ Not printed. In the course of this address Colonel Pirie-Gordon stated that it was 'not only desirable but necessary that your Government should publicly refute the accusations [as regards reactionary tendencies] of its enemies. I am invited to inform you that in the opinion of your Allies one of the best means of achieving this end is for the Government of North West Russia to publish a proclamation emphasizing the truly democratic nature of your principles by convoking a Congress of Representatives of the People.'

² Not printed. Enclosed in the original was a report containing summary records, with appendices, of the 'political conferences' held at Reval in connexion with the formation of the North-West Russian Government, as reported in the covering dispatch. The recorded meetings were as follows:

(i) Meeting on August 10 at 6.15 p.m. at headquarters of British Military Mission, Reval: attended by General Marsh and Russian representatives including M. Lianosov and other future members of the North-West Russian Government.

(ii) Meeting on August 10 at 7.15 p.m. at the same place: attended by representatives of Great Britain (General Marsh, Colonel Pirie-Gordon, Mr. Bosanquet, Captain Nasmith), United States (Colonel Warwick Greene), France (Colonel Hurstel), Esthonia, and the North-West Russian Government.

(iii) Meeting on August 11 at 9 p.m.: attendance as at (ii) except that Colonel Dawley (U.S.) replaced Colonel Warwick Greene, and that Captain Nasmith and the Esthonian representatives were absent.

(iv) Meeting on August 12 at 6 p.m. at headquarters of the British Military Mission, Reval: attendance as at (iii) except that Captain Nasmith was present.

(v) Meeting on August 13 at noon at the British Consulate-General, Reval: attendance as at (iv).

(vi) Conversations on August 14 at 8 p.m. during an entertainment given by Colonel Pirie-Gordon for the members of the North-West Russian Government in Reval: 'the Senior Naval Officer and the Representatives of France and the United States as well as all British Consular Officials in Reval were also present.'

³ Not printed. Under this scheme members of the 'Congress of Representatives of the People' were to be partly selected from certain categories by the North-West Russian Government and partly 'selected by the governing bodies of the central and subsidiary co-operative societies of North West Russia'. The Government was to undertake to dissolve this Congress within one year 'and sooner if the success of the Russian Arms makes it possible to hold public general elections before that date for the choice of members of the Constituent Assembly of North West Russia'.

of Mr. Consul General Bosanquet from the members of the Committee above mentioned in Paragraph 10 enabled me to make a variety of suggestions and recommendations to General Marsh, who acted for General Gough in these constitutional negotiations. The greatest care was taken to induce representatives of as many parties as possible to unite in the forming of Mr. Lionosov's Ministry.

16. General Yudenitch greatly assisted the efforts of the Allied Representatives by voluntarily telegraphing to Admiral Koltchak that he not only recognised the new Government, but that he considered himself to be its servant and announced that he was willing to take orders from the Prime Minister.

17. Furthermore, General Rodzianko was so moved by the Commander in Chief's action, that he also welcomed the Government in a telegram, a copy of which I communicated to Your Lordship on August 16th.⁴

18. At the suggestion of General Marsh, I entertained the Allied Representatives and Members of the new Government at the Headquarters of the British Commission for the Baltic Provinces and with great difficulty I succeeded in persuading Mr. Ern, a member of the Cadet Party, to co-operate with the Socialists. This was a direct reversal of the refusal which he had given earlier in the day.

19. I also succeeded in persuading Mr. Eischinski, the Mayor of Pskoff, to accept office provided the consent of his Town Council could be obtained. I was informed that such consent was in point of fact necessary as according to the statutes of the city, the Mayor of Pskoff cannot accept other employment during his year of office. At the request of the Socialist Members of the Ministry, who are very eager to secure the inclusion of Mr. Eischinski, a request which was repeated by the Prime Minister himself, I agreed to write a letter to the town of Pskoff, inviting the Municipal Council to grant the necessary permission. My letter, which was translated into Russian by members of the new Cabinet, is contained in Appendix Q.⁴

20. After the formation of the Russian Government, a Declaration of which I enclose a signed copy and an English translation (Appendix L) and a Note from General Gough⁵ were handed to me with a request, made on behalf of both the Russian Government and of General Marsh, that I should present them to the Esthonian Minister for Foreign Affairs. This I did in the presence of the Russian Prime Minister, Mr. Lionosov, on August 13th but as Mr. Poska, the Esthonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was absent I was obliged to give the documents to his representatives.

21. Simultaneously with the negotiations for the formation of a Russian Government, the Esthonian Cabinet underwent an internal crisis, due to a difference of opinion on the question of the admission of the representatives of more parties into the Ministry. The more extreme members of the Cabinet appear to have resisted the proposal which was welcomed by the less extreme elements. I deliberately use this description 'the less extreme elements' as it is impossible to consider any of the present Ministry as politically deserving

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ See appendix N below.

of the appellation 'moderate'. This crisis appears to have been acute and was of such a nature as to delay the reply to General Marsh's Note until August 16th, when Mr. Poska handed me a communication of which I enclose a copy in Appendix P. When I had read the communication, Mr. Poska asked me what I thought of it, to which I replied that as the document was addressed to General Gough, it was not for me to express an opinion upon it.

22. In the case of this reply however, I venture to draw Your Lordship's attention to the fact that the Esthonian Government is evidently trying to bargain for the Allied recognition of its independence when in the first instance it merely demanded Russian recognition thereof.

23. In view of the character of the Esthonian Ministers, I am persuaded that unconditional recognition of Esthonian independence by the Allies would at once put an end to Esthonian co-operation with the North West Russians as the Ministers would argue 'Why should we compromise our popularity by making the Army fight for the Russians when our independence is already recognised?'

24. I suggest therefore that His Majesty's Government should at most announce that independence will be recognised immediately upon the capture of Petrograd, providedly [*sic*] that the Esthonian Army has whole-heartedly co-operated. This policy, which is also recommended by Mr. Consul General Bosanquet who has much more experience of Esthonians than I have, is elaborated in my telegram D.C. 38⁶ of to-day's date.

25. For Your Lordship's convenience, I here recapitulate the conditions as enumerated in the telegram, subject to which recognition of independence may be granted.

- (A) Esthonia affords immediate military support to North Western Army and co-operates whole-heartedly with North West Government.
- (B) Esthonia will draft a Constitution giving effective guarantees for protection of rights of personal liberty and property.
- (C) Esthonia will sign a Convention with Allied Governments furnishing similar effective guarantees and defining Esthonia's relations with the Allied Powers. Details to be elaborated by representatives of Allied Governments and Esthonia conjointly.
- (D) Esthonia will accept Allied expert assistance in drafting Constitution as above.
- (E) Esthonia will accept for a term of years Allied legal, financial, commercial and educational advisers, who shall report to the Council of the League of Nations.

⁶ Not printed. This telegram (received August 19) advanced the arguments here indicated in connexion with the following telegram, No. G. 186 of August 18, from General Gough to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff: 'Esthonian Government have given formal answer that they cannot co-operate with Russians unless and until Allies recognise complete independence of Esthonia. Unless this can be given at once it becomes impossible to control situation of North West Front and we may expect collapse of Russian army.'

- (F) Esthonia will adopt Free Trade for all nations and allow free transit of goods passing to and from Russia at rates of freight to be settled by a Joint Commission comprising Representatives of North West Russian Government, Esthonia and the Allies.

26. Other questions which were raised during this period were that concerning the new issue of North West Roubles by the Russian Government and that having reference to the friction caused by the alleged seizures of flax by the Esthonian Army in the Pskoff district.

27. As the latter question involved British interests in that the Russian Government has contracted to sell all available flax to a British firm at £160 per ton payable on delivery at Reval, I have sent a Commission of Enquiry to Pskoff to look into the matter on the spot.

28. This Commission has been charged with the further duty of enlisting support for the new North West Russian Government among the military leaders in that area who appear, according to reports, to have devoted much time and energy to political intrigue to the detriment of their military duty.

29. My Sailing Orders to Commander Smythies R.N. in command of the Commission of Enquiry are contained in Appendix R.⁴

30. In the matter of the issue of North West Roubles I was invited, before the formation of the North West Russian Government, by General Yudenitch's then financial adviser M. Lionosov, now Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, to obtain from the Esthonian Government a notification that North West Roubles are to be recognised as Russian money having the same status as the Romanoff Rouble.

31. I declined to do this as the North West Rouble is based upon no foundation or reserve other than hope and the action demanded of the Esthonian Government would have been tantamount to a guarantee of an indefinite quantity of foreign money. Moreover the Romanoff Rouble was then quoted at approximately 100 to the Pound Sterling while experience shows that the current quotations of such North West Roubles as have actually appeared are about 1500 to the Pound Sterling.

32. I agreed however to invite the Esthonian Government to issue a proclamation recognising North West Roubles as Russian money and leaving its price to be determined on ordinary commercial lines, and this was thrice explained to M. Lionosov. I am informed that such a proclamation has been issued at Narva but I have not yet received copies from the Esthonian Minister of Finance. M. Lionosov however complains that the proclamation is most disappointing.

33. The financial situation of the North West Russian Government is deplorable; roubles to the value of £1,600,000 (Romanoff quotations) are required to pay the Army its arrears up to the end of this month and a further £1,200,000 worth to pay it to the end of September. The Army is in a state of unrest owing to lack of pay and strongly objects to being given the almost worthless North West Roubles in lieu thereof.

34. On August 16th I was informed that the Americans had brought their distribution of food to the People and Army of North West Russia to an abrupt close, that their Mission had been disbanded and that, failing further action by Congress, there was no prospect of any further supply of food from American sources.

35. This means that within a fortnight the Petrograd Reserve at Viborg will have to be broached. If this be consumed and not renewed it will be idle to recapture Petrograd as failure to provision the capital would have most disastrous political results. Consequently I venture to recommend most strongly that His Majesty's Government should agree to victual the Russian Army and supply food for the civil population against repayment for a period of six months and that an allowance of sterling amounting to £2,000,000 per month, at suitable interest, be paid into the account of the North West Russian Government at the Bank of England. This would enable them to obtain good local exchange for the North West Roubles and so make the new paper acceptable to the troops and available for local payments in Esthonia and Russia.

36. I must warn Your Lordship that without Allied assistance on these lines, the North West Russians are liable, in desperation, to turn to the Germans who are making every difficulty for us in order that they may be able to reap the future credit of having been responsible for restoring Petrograd to the Russians.

37. On the evening of August 17th I received a telegram from Riga announcing the arrival of the Chief Commissioner, Lieut. Col. S. G. Tallents C.B., whereupon I ceased to be Acting Commissioner.

I have the honour, etc.,
HARRY PIRIE-GORDON

APPENDIX L TO No. 385

Translation.

Declaration

To the Esthonian Government and to the Representatives in Reval of the United States of America, France and Great Britain

In confirmation of our preliminary declaration regarding the recognition of the independence of Esthonia, as a group undertaking the functions of Government authority of the North West Province as a part of United Russia, we make the following supplementary declaration:—

With a view to active Military assistance to the Russian Army of the North West Front in the field on the part of the Esthonian Government, and in view of the declaration of the Esthonian Government with regard to their agreement to sign a treaty on this subject only with a Democratic Government of the North West Province, a government which it is essential to form for this purpose, we, the undersigned, appreciating the circumstances involved by the problems of saving our country and freeing it from the tyranny of the Bolsheviks, circumstances which pointed to the complete

impossibility of further assistance from our Allies under existing conditions, hereby declare:—

I. That we have formed the Government of the North West Province of Russia, comprising the former governments of Petrograd, Pskov and Novgorod and also those which shall be freed in that area from the tyranny of the Bolsheviks.

II. That we have undertaken full responsibility for the decision of all the provincial questions.

III. That we rely upon the Esthonian Government to give immediate aid to the Government of North West Russia with armed force for the deliverance of Petrograd, and of the Petrograd, Pskov and the Novgorod governments from Bolshevik tyranny, so that the Government may establish in Petrograd firm democratic order and initiate a democratic policy, founded on the respect for the Rights and Liberties of Man.

IV. That we believe that the Allied Military Mission which is supplying the Russian Army with warlike stores will continue that supply and also that of Food, Munitions and other equipment through the War Minister and will also give us financial assistance.

V. That independently of this it is unavoidable to commence negotiations with the Esthonian Government as to obtaining for the New Province an outlet to the sea in the ports of Esthonia in order to receive mutual commercial relations.

VI. In full confidence that the All-Russian Government of Admiral Kolchak will appreciate as we do the situation which has been created, we, while informing the Supreme Government of Admiral Kolchak of what has occurred and of the decision made by us, pray the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain to obtain from their Governments a recognition of the absolute independence of Esthonia.

Prime, Finance and Foreign Minister
Minister for Internal Affairs
War Minister and Commander-in-Chief
Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister
Minister⁷
Minister⁷
Minister⁷
Minister⁷

Signed LIANOZOV.
Signed K. ALEXANDROV.
Signed YUDENICH.
Signed M. MARGULIES.
Signed M. PHILIPPEO.
Signed B. GORN [*sic*].
Signed N. IVANOV.

Witness: Signed F. G. MARSH.
Brig. Gen.
British Army.

REVAL.

7. . . . August 1919.

⁷ Thus in original.

APPENDIX N TO No. 385

General Sir H. Gough to M. Poska

To the Esthonian Government (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Lieut.-General Sir Hubert Gough, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., etc, etc, has received your notes dated 11th August 1919 addressed to Brigadier General F. G. Marsh C.M.G., D.S.O.

1. He welcomes your assurance that the Esthonian Government is prepared to extend every support possible to the newly-formed Russian North West Government and expects that you will give instructions to your Commander-in-Chief to proceed at once to discuss details of co-operation with General Yudenich and to put the plan, decided upon, into immediate operation. He prefers at the present moment not to state his apprehensions as to what will happen if these expectations of his are not realized.

2. The Russian North West Government, formed of a coalition of members of various parties, presents herewith through its Prime and Foreign Minister, Mr. Lionozov, a note to you simultaneously with a note to the representatives in Reval of the United States of America, France and Great Britain. Colonel Pirie-Gordon who represents the British Foreign Office is representing your claims to recognition of absolute independence. I have already assured you of my warmest sympathy and again assure you of its continuance, provided you give also your support to the political as well as to the military aspirations of this new democracy in North West Russia.

3. My representative Brig. Gen. Marsh is returning to my General Headquarters on August 14th, and although I recognise that you will not have had time by then to give me a formal reply, I beg you to realize that I expect a favourable agreement to be arrived at between you and the Russian Government at a very early date.

F. G. MARSH. Br. Gen. for
Lt. General Sir Hubert Gough
Chief of Allied Military Mission, Finland,
Baltic States of N.W. Russia.

REVAL.

13/8/1919.

APPENDIX P TO No. 385

M. Poska to General Marsh

To Brigadier General F. G. Marsh, C.M.G., D.S.O.

With reference to your letter of the 18th [13th] inst., I beg to acquaint you with the following.

The Estonian Government came to a decision on the 16th inst. to propose to the Commander in Chief of the Estonian forces, General Laidoner, to enter into a discussion with the Commander in Chief of the Russian North-Western Army, General Yudenitch, in regard to the possibilities of co-opera-

tion, and, if possible, to immediately make preparations to carry out the operations mutually agreed upon.

On account of the reasons, given in my letter of the 11th inst.⁸ it has been impossible up to the present for us either to charge General Laidoner with the duty or even to give him the authorisation to commence such operations. The Estonian Government is only able to enter into such an engagement at the very moment when the Allied Powers recognize the complete independence of Estonia; without such a recognition it would be quite impossible to carry out such an engagement, and the Government has the firm conviction, that if they should attempt to take such a step, it would undoubtedly lead to a failure. Such a failure would mean the break-down and ruin of our army and with it our country and nation.

Remembering the benevolent attitude which the Allies have constantly shown towards Estonia and bearing in mind your own personal friendliness towards our country and nation, we hope that our present position will be properly understood and appreciated.

J. POSKA
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Republic of Estonia.

TALLINN, 16th of August 1919.

No. 511.

⁸ Cf. appendix N above.

No. 386

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 5486 [108122/8/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 18, 1919

Sir:—

As I understand that the question of the future status of Esthonia and of Allied policy towards the Baltic States in general has been under discussion at the Peace Delegation in Paris, in connection with General Gough's telegram No. G. 112¹ of the 25th ultimo, addressed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the moment would appear to be opportune to call attention to the position of Lithuania with a view to the possible reconsideration of the policy of His Majesty's Government towards that country.

As you are aware the Provisional Governments of Esthonia and Latvia have received *de facto* recognition from His Majesty's Government, and there would seem to be no reason why a similar measure of recognition should not now be extended to the Provisional Government of Lithuania since such a step might be calculated to regularise the position of Lithuania in the Baltic States and would seem to be justified by the fact that there is no special reason why Esthonia and Latvia should be placed in a more favourable position than Lithuania.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram General Gough advocated recognition of Esthonian independence.

I would accordingly suggest that the question should be given immediate consideration with a view to the necessary steps being taken to place Lithuania on the same footing as the other Baltic States.

I have, etc.,

(for Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

[GERALD SPICER]²

² Signature supplied from the files of the British Peace Delegation.

No. 387

Letter from Mr. Carr (Paris) to Mr. Gregory (Received August 20)
Unnumbered [118225/82871/38]

PARIS, August 18, 1919

Dear Gregory,

You may be interested in the enclosed extract of a letter from Malcolm at Berlin to Twiss of the Military Section here which is the clearest and soundest thing I have seen lately on the Russian-German position.

Yours ever,

E. H. CARR

ENCLOSURE IN No. 387

Extract from letter from General Malcolm (Berlin) to Colonel Twiss (Paris) dated August 7, 1919

First with regard to Russia—

You ask to what extent is real Bolshevism disappearing and being replaced by socialism. The answer to this question is—what do you exactly mean by Bolshevism? If you mean anarchy and terrorism, it is disappearing; if you mean Government by Soviets, which I suppose you really do, I should say that it is gathering strength and extending its influence rather than the reverse, and that Lenin, who is comparatively moderate, is gaining in authority.

It is true that the Bolsheviks are enlisting the help of the bourgeois classes more and more, especially as directors and managers in big industries. I expect you know that there is in Moscow a large central office of control of industry and transport. This is under Rykov. It is responsible for collection and distribution of material, running the railways and water-ways, etc. It does not, however, interfere in the internal affairs of industries such as hours of labour and so on. Here, as well as in the industries themselves, the old managers and experts are employed at high salaries. The old idea that all men should receive equal pay, has, of course, disappeared, and to that extent the old system has come back; but there is the great difference that the directors of industry have no say in the distribution of profits. Something of the same kind is going on in the agricultural districts, and so far as I can make out there is less conflict going on between the towns in [? and] the country in the matter of food supply. The whole population is, as you suggest, more united in its conflict against Koltchak and Denikin.

As to your enquiries about communication between Germany and Lenin's Government, my opinion is as follows:—

It is not true that numbers of German officers and N.C.O.'s are leaving Germany to train Bolshevik forces. Few, if any, have actually done so: on the other hand, a certain number are undoubtedly going to join Bermont in the Baltic States to fight against Bolsheviks. This number will probably increase now that the control of the prisoners is to be handed over to Germany.¹

I do not think that there is, at present, any communication between German Government circles and Lenin.

An Industrial Mission left Germany about three months ago, to study industrial conditions in Moscow. It is said that Rathenau of the A.E.G. was the prime mover in the organisation of this Mission. One member of the Mission, Herr Albrecht, came back about three weeks ago, and was recently in Weimar. His report is said to have been discouraging, but I cannot vouch for this.

To sum up, I think it is true to say that there is at present very little communication between the two countries; on the other hand, all classes in Germany are looking towards Russia for one reason or another. The extremists of the Left look upon her as the realisation of their own political ideals: the Pan-Germans look upon her as providing the only possible outlet for surplus population, and compensation for loss of her colonies. Officers think that she may provide employment, which is no longer possible in their own country. Industrialists think that she will provide employment for capital, and ultimately be the means of paying off the War Indemnity. The realisation of these ideas, however, lies in the far future, and, for the present, communication is much too difficult to make any practical steps possible. So much for Russia.

¹ See No. 44.

No. 388

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)

No. 477 [118250/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 18, 1919*

Sir,

... Having¹ barely recovered from a conversation lasting an hour and a half with Mr. Walter Smith, an American gentleman officially interested in the American effort in Armenia, and deeply concerned at the risk to the Armenian people involved by our intended evacuation, I mentioned to Mr. Davis in supplement to our recent conversations on that subject, two points which I thought ought to be borne in mind.

The first was this. In reality the Powers in Paris and we in London were

¹ The first part of this dispatch related to other matters discussed during a conversation with the Ambassador of the United States on the afternoon of August 18, 1919.

waiting for the American people to make up their minds whether they would take a mandate for Armenia or not. Mr. Davis had himself told me that he thought the chances were much against their taking it, and this information had been borne out by what I had heard from America. Were we then to reverse our evacuation policy, and to incur very heavy expenditure on the chance of America making up her mind in three months from now; and, if she did so in favour of taking a mandate, what, I asked, was the Armenia for which she would make herself responsible? Did it include or exclude the Caucasus? Was America aware that Armenia could not be kept alive by dollars only, but would have to be sustained by men, and was she prepared to mobilise and send to the Black Sea the very considerable army that would be required for the purpose?

The second point was that, if American public opinion was as deeply aroused as he represented it to be—and I did not deny that this might be the case—I was surprised that these representations should come from private individuals rather than from the American Government; and, if charges were to be made against the British Government of deserting the Armenians or imperilling their future, it seemed to me that they ought more properly to come from Government to Government, in which case those who were really responsible for the delay might be able to explain and justify it.

Mr. Davis then asked me whether I thought that a direct appeal from the American Government would induce His Majesty's Government to reverse their policy?

This I said I had no right to forecast or assume. There were strong influences at work in this country in favour of liquidating our commitments in distant parts of the world and withdrawing our troops. We were doing all that lay in our power to tranquillise the situation and to mitigate the consequences of evacuation; but, if we were to be asked to wait till America made up her mind, that request ought to come from responsible quarters, and some indication should be given to us of what the result of such a postponement would be.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 389

Sir P. Cox (Teheran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 20)
No. 563 Telegraphic [118562/11067/58]

TEHERAN, August 19, 1919

I have before reported that replacement of our troops in Caucasus by Italians was contemplated with dismay by Persian Government and other elements in Northern Persia.

News that we are evacuating for certain and are not to be replaced by any other of Allies has caused general (? despondency).

Persian Government have now made official representation urging me to apprise you of their misgivings and to enquire whether in our joint interests and in those of all elements affected our decision to evacuate cannot be reconsidered or at all events postponed until situation is regulated by action of Peace Conference.

Our withdrawal will probably mean closure of Caucasian route for mails and passengers to and from Europe; and spread of Bolshevism to Northern Persia will be greatly facilitated.

Is it not possible for us at any rate to maintain sufficient troops to keep communications open?¹

¹ No reply was made to this telegram. On August 23, 1919, the Persian Minister in London communicated to the Foreign Office a telegram from the Acting Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a sense similar to the above.

No. 390

Note by Mr. Gregory of a conversation with M. Nabokoff

[149756/116696/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 19, 1919

N.W. Russian Government

M. Nabokoff has just been to say that M. Sazonoff is much concerned at the report that has appeared in the press of the formation of the North West Russian Government, and has instructed him to make a formal protest to H.M.G. as regards the part played by General Gough and Colonel Pirie-Gordon in bringing it about under pressure.

M. Nabokoff said that the only information he had was the report in *The Times* and that of course he could not make any protest; but he did wish to say that what had been done was most objectionable in the eyes of M. Sazonoff, and would, he was sure, be equally so to Denikin and Kolchak. The latter, he said, could, for instance, never confirm the agreement contemplated between the North West Government and Esthonia. Moreover, M. Sazonoff objected to certain personalities who formed part of that Government; and he did not even know what rôle General Yudenitch had played in the negotiations—whether he approved or whether he had been forced into it by threats from General Gough of withholding his supplies. In fact, M. Nabokoff said, he and his friends were completely in the dark, and all they could say was that they strongly disapproved of action of this sort being taken independently, and without reference to the policy of the other Russian leaders.

He asked if we could obtain, through our Representatives, a report from General Yudenitch on the whole proceeding, in order that M. Sazonoff and the others might judge it on its merits.¹

J. D. GREGORY

¹ M. Shébéko (see No. 88, note 2) shortly afterwards proceeded to Helsingfors on behalf of M. Sazonov in order to investigate the situation created by the formation of the North-West Russian Government.

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 20)

No. 1285 Telegraphic [118185/116696/38]

PARIS, August 19, 1919

Your telegram No. 1096¹ (of August 18th).

News from Esthonia has come here as an absolute surprise and in a form that is scarcely intelligible. The Americans and the French appear to know even less about it than we do. Representatives of all three Powers seem to have been acting without instructions, and without giving to their Governments any adequate opportunity of sending instructions. If this be so, they undoubtedly deserve most serious reprimand but whether it is judicious to reprimand them at this particular moment is not so clear.

I do not profess to understand the situation but following appear to be the leading facts.

The Russian North Western Army have proclaimed a great mass of Russian territory with Petrograd as its centre, an independent group in a United Russia and have announced their intention of summoning a Congress. I do not know that it is our business to object to this procedure but on present information it looks rather like prospect² of a bubble company. There is no evidence that army occupies any important part of the territory they claim to rule. Only town in their possession seems to be Pskoff which is on its extreme edge. Their talk about a Congress is to me therefore very (? suspicious).³ Esthonians have apparently been bullied by Allies into co-operation with the scheme previously being⁴ that our representatives are in their turn going to bully us into recognition of complete Esthonian independence.

The third party in this triangular intrigue are Allied (? representatives). Their motive (? appears to be to) obtain harmonious action between the Esthonians and North West Russians, in the absence of which they fear an arrangement between Esthonians and Bolsheviki. Their procedure is certainly most irregular and I am not so far convinced that it was necessary or is in fact likely to be successful. At the same time the whole position is so obscure that I am unwilling summarily to put a stop to a scheme which apparently has the warmest approval not only of our Representatives but also of the American and Frenchman who are both acquainted with the local circumstances. Would any harm accrue from sending a telegram expressing our extreme surprise that such momentous action should have been taken without our approval, but adding that we withhold final judgment until we get fuller information?

¹ No. 384.

² The text of this telegram as sent from Paris here read 'the prospectus'.

³ The text as sent from Paris here read 'suspect'.

⁴ The text as sent from Paris here read 'the price being'.

We have received Reval telegrams Nos. 11,⁵ 12,⁶ 13,⁷ 15,⁸ 19,⁹ 20,¹⁰ 27,¹¹ 30.¹¹ Some of the missing telegrams more particularly No. 14¹² would probably throw a clearer light on the situation.

⁵ No. 372.

⁷ See No. 373, note 1.

⁹ Not printed. This telegram of August 15, 1919, transmitted the text of the note in appendix N to No. 385.

¹⁰ No. 378.

¹¹ Not printed.

⁶ See No. 372, note 3.

⁸ See No. 373, note 3.

¹² No. 373.

No. 392

Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot (Omsk)
No. 522 Telegraphic [117155/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 20, 1919

Your telegram No. 24¹ (August 14th).

You have interpreted our views correctly and office and functions of High Commissioner remain unchanged.

¹ No. 375.

No. 393

Letter from M. Nabokoff to Mr. Gregory (Received August 21)
No. 905 [118874/3669/38]

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, August 20, 1919

Dear Mr. Gregory,

With reference to our conversation of yesterday and my letter to Sir Ronald Graham of the 14th inst. (No. 887)¹ may I draw your attention to the serious situation which has arisen at Archangel as a consequence of the decision to withdraw the British forces now in that region.

I have received several telegrams from the Military Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, General Miller, informing me of

¹ In this letter (received August 14) M. Nabokoff had communicated the following telegram from General Miller: 'General Rawlinson has informed me upon his arrival at Archangel that he has been instructed to remove all military stores from Archangel, and that Russian ice-breakers now in Great Britain are to proceed to Reval instead of Archangel. I urgently request you to represent to His Majesty's Government that without war material and ice-breakers it will be impossible for us to defend the Archangel region.' M. Nabokoff observed that General Rawlinson's instructions 'appear to be in contradiction with the general trend of Mr. Churchill's statement in the House of Commons on July 29th, when he pointed out that due regard should be had to the obligations the British Government have contracted with every class of the population of Archangel and Murmansk, and with the local Russian Army and local Russian Government they have called into being. I would therefore most earnestly ask His Majesty's Government to give this matter their serious consideration before taking a step which must inevitably have the gravest consequences.'

the urgent necessity of further cargoes of supplies being sent to Archangel, and of the grave peril to which the Russian troops would be exposed should the British High Command carry out their decision to remove from Archangel all military stores. There are several ships at present in American and British harbours loaded with supplies for Archangel awaiting orders to sail.

I am to-day sending to His Majesty's Foreign Office, under separate cover, an appeal addressed to His Majesty's Government and the Allied Powers by Representatives of the Zemstvos and Municipalities of Archangel, pleading for the retention of British contingents at Archangel.

I understand that there is no possibility of His Majesty's Government altering their decision to evacuate Archangel as an outcome of official representations or appeals from public bodies of the Northern Region. In these circumstances it is extremely difficult for me to arrive at any decision with regard to the further despatch of goods to Archangel. It seems obvious that in accordance with the declaration made by the Secretary of State for War a sufficient quantity of supplies, necessary for the existence of the local population remaining at Archangel, will be left there. In view of the fact that General Rawlinson has been given full powers to deal with the situation and to decide in accord with the Russian Chief Command upon the extent of the evacuation, it seems to me that the only possible solution to this question is to request that General Rawlinson arrive at a mutual understanding with the Russian Authorities. Both the British High Command and the Russian, being on the spot, are in a better position to form a judgment of the requirements of the Russian Army and of the population than the Embassy.

I should be very grateful to you if you would let me know on behalf of His Majesty's Government, whether they agree with the views stated above, in which case I would telegraph instructions to General Miller in this sense.

Yours very sincerely,

C. NABOKOFF

No. 394

Sir C. Eliot (Omsk) to Earl Curzon (Received August 24)

No. 28 Telegraphic [120201/120201/57]

OMSK, August 21, 1919

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Koltchak has just sent orders to General Miller who is at Archangel with 9,000 men to stay there at any risk until winter 'even if he perishes with his troops'. He may (? however) move to Murmansk before winter sets in.

In these circumstances Omsk Government makes two requests.

First, that His Majesty's Government will supply General Miller with (? necessary) war material and foodstuffs.

Second, that in event of General Miller moving to Murmansk that port may be retained by Great Britain.

I said that it did not seem to me reasonable to order General Miller to hold an untenable position and to (? throw) on other people responsibility for feeding him. He could only reply that Koltchak was inflexible in insisting that Miller must resist till last and that all Russians would think that we had deserted him if we refused assistance.

Minister for Foreign Affairs (? also) said that General Dietrichs has received from European Russia further convincing information about the imminent collapse of Bolshevik Government and that overtures have been made suggesting a compromise. Koltchak has refused to accept these overtures.

No. 395

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Reval)
No. 13 Telegraphic [119660/116696/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 21, 1919

Deputy Commissioner's telegram No. 12¹ and subsequent telegrams relative to North-Western Russia Government.

His Majesty's Government cannot refrain from expressing their extreme surprise that such momentous action should have been taken by Deputy Commissioner without any reference to or authority from them, and they cannot assent to the proposals which have been made.²

¹ See No. 372, note 3.

² This telegram was sent in accordance with a decision of the Cabinet on the morning of August 21, 1919.

No. 396

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Reval)
No. 17 Telegraphic [119660/116696/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 21, 1919

My telegram No. 13.¹

Proposals referred to are—

- (1) Recognition of North West Russian Government.
- (2) Recognition of complete independence of Esthonia and communication to Russian Political Conference and Admiral Kolchak with a view to their taking similar action.
- (3) Financial assistance to the North West Russian Government and guarantee of issue of rouble notes.
- (4) Purchase of military stores in Germany and communication to a Liverpool firm with regard to a contract for medical stores.

¹ No. 395.

Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
(Received August 22)

No. 1695 Telegraphic [119686/11067/58]

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 21, 1919

The Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a long conversation with me yesterday spoke in strongest terms concerning imminent withdrawal of our troops from Caucasus which he views with greatest apprehension. He called my attention to the dismay with which local Governments in Caucasus await our evacuation. At Baku he was authoritatively informed that a considerable Bolshevik (? element) exists in the town, that general strike was imminent, and that Tartars were awaiting (? opportunity to) fall on Armenia. At Elizabethtopol it was generally considered that massacre of Armenians was likely to follow on our withdrawal. At Tiflis authorities expressed the view that state of chaos would rapidly ensue on departure of British troops.

After studying question on the spot His Highness feels certain that if we evacuate communication between Persia and Europe and Caucasus will be interrupted and that whole of Caucasus will relapse into a state of chaos. This he points out will prove grave menace to security of (? neighbourhood of) Persian provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan Mazanderan, and Astrabad. He wishes to lay stress on the following points, firstly, the Bolsheviks will probably endeavour to spread their propaganda and form centres on Persian soil and are likely to find fruitful field for such operations in certain portions of above provinces. Secondly, that refugees from Caucasus of varying nationalities and religions would prove a source of danger and would place unbearable strain on food resources. He further points out that Bolshevik menace is increased by great length of frontier bordering on the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea which Persian Government would be quite unable to guard securely.

Should British Government persist in carrying out evacuation in face of these objections he would suggest that question be considered of handing over a certain portion of Caspian fleet to Persia to (? enable) her to police her coast line and in case of necessity (vide recent descent of Bolsheviks on Ashuraden) to effect rapid concentration of troops at threatened points. He has heard we intend to hand over the Caspian fleet to Denikin but in view of animosity with which peoples of Caucasus regard the volunteer army, (? an) attitude which was apparent whenever and wherever he was able to discuss situation with Caucasians, he cannot believe Denikin would succeed in maintaining order in Caucasus and controlling Caspian. This he urges provides additional reason for handing over portion of Caspian fleet to Persia.

In the event of this proposal meeting with favourable consideration His Highness thinks it would be desirable to place a nucleus of officers and men at the disposal of Persian Government on basis similar to that of instructors shortly to be sent to Persia to organise uniform (? military) force.

Sent to Foreign Office. Repeated to Teheran.

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received August 24)

No. 460 Telegraphic [120166/11/57]

PEKING, August 21, 1919

Siberia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me yesterday about situation in Siberia which was he said causing much anxiety and perplexity to Chinese Government. Allies had apparently changed their policy and were (? no longer) prepared to offer active opposition to Bolshevism. Italian Chargé d'Affaires had notified (? former) of withdrawal of Italian troops and it was reported that American troops would also be shortly withdrawn. Minister hinted spread of Bolshevism might prove source of embarrassment to China and said he would be grateful if His Majesty's Government could give him some indication of their policy for guidance of his Government.

Repeated to Vladivostock.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)

No. 5556 [118716/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 21, 1919

Sir,

The situation in the different parts of the former Russian Empire is so disquieting, and the need for a co-ordinated policy among the Allied Powers is so urgent, that His Majesty's Government feel compelled to address an expression of their views to those Allied and Associated Powers with whom they are acting, and to invite a reconsideration by them of the problem in the form which it has now assumed.

Allied military intervention in Russia was originally undertaken exclusively as a war measure. In whatever region it was attempted, it was designed to prevent the German armies from overrunning the country and acquiring materials and supplies of which they had been deprived elsewhere. Gradually, however, the area of these operations extended; the necessity of supporting those Russian troops or communities which were engaged in fighting the common enemy, and struggling to maintain the independence of Russia, increased as time went on; upon the borders of the old Russian Empire States of non-Russian nationality broke away from the disrupted Empire, and commenced a struggle, sometimes for their own independence, sometimes against the Germans, by whom their existence was threatened, sometimes against the Russian Soviet Government, which endeavoured to strangle their new-found liberty, and the methods and procedure of which they regarded with the utmost horror.

Little by little, therefore, the intervention of the Allies has assumed a wider aspect. In some cases, as in the north of Russia, Allied armies have found themselves vigorously fighting against Bolshevik troops. Elsewhere, without actually engaging in the struggle, immense contributions of military arms, munitions, and stores have been made to the cause of those who were fighting for a reconstituted Russia, freed alike from German pressure from without and Bolshevik misgovernment within. Immense sums of money have been expended; a relative degree of success has in some cases been obtained; but the general impression left, after more than a year of these endeavours, is one of disappointment, in some cases of admitted failure.

It cannot be said that an altogether consistent policy has been pursued. Even now, the principles upon which that policy rests in the last resort are in some respects in dispute. Action is taken sometimes by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments sitting in Paris or by the institutions which they have set up, sometimes by the Governments themselves. The situation is so complex, and the difficulties of arriving at a decision which is acceptable to all are so great that, in some instances, it would be no exaggeration to admit that there is no policy at all.

In these circumstances, the Great Powers where they act—and too often it must be confessed that refuge is taken in inaction—adopt an uncertain line of conduct; the financial burden tends to fall almost exclusively on the shoulders of those who either have the greatest capacity or the least unwillingness to pay; the independent States or groups or communities, with the fortunes of which we have associated ourselves, do not always make the best use of the help which they get, and are constantly clamouring for more; it remains a matter of almost weekly disputation whether recognition shall or shall not be extended to this or that community; Allied Missions despatched in every direction endeavour to produce something like order out of the prevailing chaos; advice is accepted where it is supplemented by substantial material assistance, elsewhere it is apt to be ignored.

Meanwhile, with some notable exceptions, the Russian forces whose cause we have espoused seem to be fighting with imperfect vigour and no small lack of success. In some cases the Governments by whom they are directed are suspected of reactionary opinions and desires. It seems uncertain whether they can appeal to the populations of the districts where they are fighting by the offer of a protection more secure, or an administration less unpopular, than that of the Soviet forces against which they are contending. Simultaneously the Bolshevik armies appear to be gaining in military spirit and efficiency. The Soviet Government, though its administration is stained by acts of the vilest cruelty and by the most abominable crimes, and though it is constantly alleged upon trustworthy evidence to be on the verge of collapse, is apparently stronger than it was six months ago.

The general conclusion is suggested, therefore, that the results produced by Allied intervention have so far been incommensurate either with the objects for which they were undertaken or with the enormous expenditure involved.

Such would appear to be a fair—though it cannot be described as a roseate—view of the situation. It may be desirable to review this in somewhat greater detail before proceeding to the recommendations with which this despatch will close.

In August 1918 a combined military occupation, first of Murmansk and then of Archangel, was undertaken by the Powers with the objects of closing these ports against Germany, of preventing the establishment by the Germans of a submarine base in the Arctic, and of keeping a door open for the Allies to Northern Russia. For a time these operations were entirely successful, and they enabled a local Government, entitled the Northern Provisional Government, to establish itself in position of some security in Archangel. Even at that date it was not contemplated that the Allied occupation should be other than temporary, but it was hoped to give sufficient encouragement and stability to the forces with whom we were acting to enable them to stand after the Allied contingents had withdrawn. Furthermore, as time went on, and as the star of Admiral Koltchak appeared to be in the ascendant, and his forces were steadily pushing their way towards the west, it was hoped to establish contact between his armies, operating from Siberia, and those of the Northern Provisional Government. Accordingly, within the last few months, His Majesty's Government despatched a fresh relief force to Archangel, with the view of facilitating an advance by the forces of the Archangel Government to Kotlas and Viatka, where it was hoped that a junction with the Siberian forces would be made. This operation has had to be abandoned, in consequence of the series of disastrous reverses sustained by Admiral Koltchak; and was now more than doubtful whether,¹ when Archangel and Murmansk have been evacuated by the Allied forces, the Northern Provisional Government will continue to exist. Meanwhile, the arrangements for the promised evacuation, which for many reasons it is impossible to postpone beyond the forthcoming autumn, are far advanced. Steps are being taken to withdraw those classes of the native population which will be placed in serious danger by our withdrawal, and it appears certain that, before the winter has closed in, the military front that has been maintained in this region against the Soviet forces will for the most part, if not entirely, have vanished.

In Siberia the situation has undergone a decided change for the worse. Some months ago the prospects of Admiral Koltchak appeared to be promising. The recognition of his Government had long been pressed for by the Allied representatives at Omsk as a solution of many of his difficulties and as calculated to consolidate his power. It was not, however, till June of this year that an exchange of notes took place between the Allied Powers and Admiral Koltchak, and even then all that the latter [*sic*] undertook was the continuance of support to him on certain conditions. This action on the part of the Powers was, at first, generally interpreted in Siberia as a formal recognition of the Omsk Government, and its immediate result was to increase the prestige of Admiral Koltchak and to produce a very considerable rise in

¹ This phrase should read: 'and it is now more than doubtful whether, ...'

the value of the rouble. But when it was realised that the step taken by the Powers did not involve recognition, but merely 'continuance of support', the reaction was correspondingly marked. Admiral Koltchak has lately suffered a series of continuous reverses, and his forces are still reported to be in full retreat.

The situation has not been eased by the action of the Omsk Government in the administration of its internal affairs, and there is evidence that the dissatisfaction which has been created will assume dangerous proportions unless the Allied Governments can assist in stabilising the position, and can exercise the necessary pressure on Admiral Koltchak to conform his policy to principles acceptable not only to the Allied Governments, but also to public opinion among the populations whom he rules or aspires to rule.

In South Russia the position is much more favourable. Though driven back in the spring of this year by the Soviet armies, General Denikin has recently succeeded in inflicting numerous severe reverses on the forces opposed to him, and has made a deep advance into Russia. According to the reports which have been received, this advance has been welcomed by the population in the occupied territory, and there seems to be good ground for the belief that, provided General Denikin can be assured of the necessary material assistance, and will keep in view the central object of his endeavour, which is on the one hand to effect a junction with the forces of Admiral Koltchak on the Siberian side, and on the other to drive the Bolshevik armies back upon Moscow, he may attain a success which has been denied to his chief.

Up to the spring of the present year Allied troops were in occupation of Odessa, and of considerable tracts of territory surrounding that port. Their unfortunate withdrawal, however, in April enabled the Soviet Government to establish themselves both at Odessa and in the Crimea, and to constitute a threat to General Denikin's flank in the Donetsk basin. It is as yet too early to predict with any confidence whether this misfortune can be retrieved.

The situation in the Ukraine is at present obscure. It is certain, however, that the authority of the Russian Soviet Government is not generally recognised in these areas, where an independent Ukrainian Government, under the leadership of General Petlura claims to exercise jurisdiction. None of the Allied Governments has hitherto recognised General Petlura's authority, and there have been no dealings with his Government. His Majesty's Government have always regarded the Ukraine as an integral part of Russia, and they have felt very strongly that the utmost care should be taken to avoid any steps which might commit them to encouraging the separatist tendencies of certain sections of Ukrainian opinion. Economically, the Ukraine can never be separated from Russia, and this must always be a predominant factor in considering Russo-Ukrainian relations.

On the Western Russian front, Poland and the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia are conducting military operations against the Russian Soviet Government. So far as the Baltic States are concerned, continuance of their resistance depends largely on the amount of material assistance which they may be able to obtain, as well as upon the attitude which the Allied

Governments may decide to adopt in regard to their national aspirations. Politically, the present situation is in the highest degree unsatisfactory. His Majesty's Government have recognised the *de facto* authority of the Provisional Governments of Esthonia and Latvia established at Reval and Libau respectively, and the Allied representatives in Paris have, in the fifth condition attached to the recognition of Admiral Koltchak, laid down that 'if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement, the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that, until such settlement is made, the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between their *de facto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.' Yet no further steps have been taken to endeavour to secure the co-operation of the Border States of Russia in the policy laid down by the Allied Powers, and no communications have been addressed to the representatives of these States in Paris, in spite of their repeated requests to be informed of the intentions of the Allied Governments. Grave dissatisfaction has consequently resulted in Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia. In the north of Esthonia a Russian corps, formed out of the relics of the old Russian Twelfth Army Corps, has been operating partly in conjunction with the Esthonian forces. This corps is badly in need of arms and material, but on the whole has succeeded in maintaining its position. The relations of the leaders of this corps with the Esthonians are not altogether satisfactory on account of the suspicions entertained by the Esthonians concerning the intentions of the Great Russians; but no breach has yet occurred, and the Esthonian forces have recently assisted the corps in meeting the attacks of the Russian Bolshevik forces on this front.

On the other hand, the hopes that were at one time so widely entertained of an advance upon Petrograd by the combined forces of Esthonians, Finns, and the Russian armies still operating in this neighbourhood have had to be abandoned. Furthermore, the Germans exhibit a calculated reluctance to withdraw from these parts of the Baltic States which they were rashly permitted to occupy with their forces; and the general situation on this front cannot be described as otherwise than disquieting.

In Finland the situation is complicated. While certain Finnish leaders were strongly in favour of co-operating in the advance on Petrograd with the forces under the command of General Judenitch, a considerable and influential section of Finnish opinion has throughout been opposed to this course, unless the approval and assistance of the Allied Governments could first be secured. Loans and war material on a considerable scale have been solicited by the Finnish Government for this purpose. His Majesty's Government have not hitherto seen their way to do more than approve the agreement concluded between General Mannerheim and General Judenitch for the projected advance on Petrograd, and they have refused to assume the additional responsibility demanded by the Finnish Government. With the fall of General Mannerheim the project has received its *coup de grâce*.

The lack of a clear and decisive policy has been not less manifest in the dealings with the Border States on the Caucasian front. Since the retirement of the German and Turkish forces from those regions, various republics, with a greater or less degree of encouragement from the Allied Powers, have there maintained an independent or quasi-independent existence. Of these the most considerable and the most promising has been the Republic of Georgia. The next in potential range and resources has been the Republic of Azerbaijan. Smaller groups have sustained a more precarious autonomous livelihood in Russian Armenia and in Daghestan; but of these it has been generally conceded that the former will in all probability be incorporated in a larger Armenia, should such be created, while the latter has already, to a large extent, been absorbed in the area controlled by General Denikin's troops.

Here, as elsewhere, the policy of the Allied Powers has hovered between recognition and polite indifference, and the efforts of the British representatives who have been in military occupation of this territory prior to a withdrawal, which is now on the eve of being carried out, have been mainly directed to the preservation of order, the avoidance of inter-statal or inter-racial conflicts, the prevention of collision between the forces of the republics and those of General Denikin, and the recognition by the latter of the incipient liberties of the various national groups.

Although these republics are in each case represented at Paris, and although it is understood that their future status is in the hands of the Peace Conference, no definitive decision appears to have been reached as to the form of recognition to which they are entitled, or the degree of autonomy which they are to be permitted to enjoy. All is in flux and uncertainty, and with the withdrawal of the only Allied forces to the south of the Caucasus, serious disturbance, if not worse, may be expected to ensue. Indeed, as these words are being written, alarming rumours continue to be received as to the imminence of a general reign of bloodshed in the evacuated territories, with the probable extirpation by massacre of large numbers of the Armenian population in the former province of Russian Armenia, about and around Nakchivan.

It will be seen from this brief survey of the situation on the various Russian fronts that, with the sole exception of South Russia, where General Denikin is operating, the military situation is the reverse of satisfactory. The almost complete collapse of Admiral Koltchak's army and the withdrawal from Archangel will release large Bolshevik forces which the Soviet Government will be able to throw either south or west against the fronts on which most reliance had hitherto been placed. Whether these will be able to withstand the shock it is as yet too early to determine.

It would perhaps be an unjustifiable deduction from the untoward developments that I have described, to argue that they have been mainly due to lack either of political vision or harmony on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers. But it would not be unfair to attribute the set-back in part to the fact that single Powers have, to a considerable extent, dissipated on various theatres such resources as they have been in a position to give to the whole,

instead of pursuing an organised policy whereby effort could be concentrated and a due co-ordination established between political, military, and financial measures.

In this respect His Majesty's Government feel it incumbent on them to submit a clear statement of the share—as it appears to them a wholly disproportionate share—of the Russian burden, which they have borne, more especially since the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution in November 1917.

Their commitments in Russia date back, indeed, to a much earlier period, and it is public knowledge that the vast sums, which were contributed by His Majesty's Government in the form of loans to enable Russia to maintain her armies and prosecute campaigns against Germany in the early stages of the war, amounted to the prodigious figure of £565,000,000.

It is, however, to the contributions made by this country since November, 1917, that His Majesty's Government desire particularly to draw attention.

In North Russia they have maintained forces since August 1918 of approximately 14,000, recently increased to 18,000 men, at a cost up to the period of evacuation of £5,600,000; to which must be added the cost of the naval operations connected with this expedition, amounting to £7,800,000. They have further equipped the Russian troops in this area, fed the civilian population, subventioned the Provisional Government, and established a sound currency system, at a total additional cost of £15,000,000. While this expenditure may eventually, under various agreements that have been concluded, be partly recovered from the Allies, the initial cost has fallen almost entirely on the shoulders of His Majesty's Government.

In Siberia they have supplied equipment to the forces of Admiral Koltchak to the value of £14,600,000. They have also maintained two regiments in Western Siberia, and have assumed responsibility for expenditure on material for the Siberian railway to the amount of 4,000,000 dollars. They have during the last six months maintained a considerable staff for this purpose in Siberia at the cost of £9,000 a month.

In South Russia they have despatched material to General Denikin to the value of more than £26,000,000, and have maintained forces, in the Caucasus at a cost which will have amounted, when evacuation is completed, to over £4,000,000. They have further maintained naval forces in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea at a cost in the same period of £4,000,000.

In the Baltic they have furnished arms and material to the forces of Esthonia, Latvia, and the Russian Northern Corps at a cost of £2,800,000, in addition to maintaining strong naval forces in the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland.

The above are the chief commitments which have been accepted by His Majesty's Government. The total cost of their intervention in Russia will, it is estimated, have exceeded £94,000,000 before the close of the present year.

As a result of all these efforts His Majesty's Government have practically exhausted their resources in respect of war material, at the very moment

when increased demands are being made upon them in Siberia, South Russia, Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland.

They feel therefore that the moment has arrived when, not merely in their own interests, but in view of the larger general considerations that have been already urged, a revised and more concerted arrangement is required among the Allied and Associated Powers as to their future political, military, and financial responsibilities in Russia, if these are still to be maintained. Whether it is desirable to effect a new redistribution of the shares to be assumed by each Power; whether the financial and military burden should continue to be borne, and, if so, by whom, and in what proportions; whether the best plan will be to allot definite spheres of activity to particular Powers; or whether there should be a revision of policy over the entire field of action in every part of the former Russian Empire: these are questions which, it seems to His Majesty's Government, call for immediate examination, and without an early reply to which it can hardly be expected that better results can be obtained.

With this object in view, His Majesty's Government desire to propose to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Paris that an early Conference should take place there, at which each of the Powers should be represented by one of its foremost statesmen, with the aim of arriving at a decision on this important subject. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to place before such a Conference their idea of the general policy which it is desirable to pursue, and the part which they themselves are prepared to take in it. They confidently hope that the other Powers will enter the Conference, should this proposal be accepted, with similar plans. In any case, if this procedure be adopted, there will at least be some hope that the present *impasse* may be brought to an end, that a policy to which all would adhere may be thought out and accepted, and that the sacrifices, in some cases overwhelming in character, to which all have submitted in the cause of a free and recovered Russia will not have been made in vain.

I am, etc.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON²

² This dispatch had been drafted in accordance with the Cabinet decision of July 29 (see No. 342, note 1) and had been approved by the Cabinet. (The present text may be compared with the extracts from the draft of this dispatch, dated August 16, 1919, printed by the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill: *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*—London, 1929—pp. 236–7. Cf. also, *ibid.*, pp. 251–3, the survey of the situation in Russia presented by Mr. Churchill to the Cabinet on September 22, 1919, and the memorandum by Mr. Churchill on policy towards Russia at pp. 256–9.) The present dispatch was minuted as follows by Mr. Balfour: 'There are some passages in this despatch from which I dissent. Nobody is less disposed than I to overrate the qualities of statesmanship shewn by the Allied Powers in this collection [? connexion]—even in their individual capacity. But to attribute the apparent and real fluctuations in Allied policy in Russia merely to Allied stupidity and indecision is to misunderstand the situation.'

'A. J. B.'

No. 400

Sir G. Grahame¹ (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 22)
No. 969 Telegraphic [119672/1089/38]

PARIS, August 22, 1919

Your telegram No. 1012² of August 1.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs replies as follows:—

French Government which has never intervened in exercise of action conferred on British Government in zone of Caucasus and Kuban, understands the reasons which His Majesty's Government gave . . .³ to establish at General Denikin's request a staff at new military base to be erected in Crimea, and makes no objection thereto since it is a question of military support to be given to General Denikin against Bolsheviks and on the understanding that no obstacle will be placed in the way of efforts of French Government's agents and in zone reserved by agreement of 1917.

French Government moreover reserve right, in regions of French zone of action to west of Kertch and mouth of Don, to proceed to reinforce their military or other representatives attached to General Denikin, as well as to establish French organisms which may be necessary, particularly in Crimea and basin of Donetz, where very considerable French interests required appropriate protection.

Copy to Peace Delegation.

¹ Minister in H.M. Embassy at Paris.

² No. 351.

³ The text here is uncertain.

No. 401

Earl Curzon to Sir P. Wyndham (Warsaw)¹
No. 231 Telegraphic [117099/117099/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 22, 1919

As you are no doubt aware from the Press, a new North West Russian Government has been proclaimed by the Russian authorities of the North West Army and the complete independence of Esthonia has been recognised by it. General Gough and Colonel Pirie-Gordon, rempalcant of Colonel Tallents during his absence, took a leading part in the formation of the new Government, and have made certain proposals involving financial support for the new Government and recognition of Esthonian independence. They acted entirely without any reference to or authority from His Majesty's Government and we cannot assent to the proposals which have been made.

The matter is now the subject of correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Peace Delegation, and until a decision has been reached by His Majesty's Government all action connected therewith must be suspended.

¹ This circular telegram was also sent as No. 1061 to Stockholm, No. 1225 to Christiania, No. 1351 to Copenhagen, No. 528 to Omsk, and No. 506 to Archangel.

*M. Litvinov to Earl Curzon (Received August 25)*¹
No. 12/1156 Telegraphic: by Wireless [120545/9/38]

August 24, 1919

With further reference to our radio of July thirtieth No. 1078² we wish to mention that even in case of the British Government agreeing to our proposal there may be some difficulty in securing sufficient safety for our representatives during the passage through Russian border states where irresponsible counter-revolutionary Russian officers and detachments exercise their own authority and power. We would therefore suggest that our representatives be enabled to take the sea route availing himself [*sic*] of the opportunity offered by the Swedish steamer *Eskiltuna* 3 now lying in Petrograd shortly to leave for Stockholm, in which case a safe conduct from the British Government on behalf of the Allies, Finland and Esthonia would be required. The number of British war prisoners is increasing and they evidently find it hard to endure the privations imposed upon all inhabitants of Russia by the Allies. Your prompt decision in the matter would certainly shorten the time of their captivity and suffering.

12/1156. Member of Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

LITVINOFF

¹ This message was wirelessly from Tsarskoie Selo, having evidently been relayed from Moscow.

² Evidently No. 355.

No. 403

Sir C. Marling (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received August 26)
Unnumbered. Telegraphic [120809/116696/38]

COPENHAGEN, August 25, 1919

Your telegram No. 1351.¹

From conversation I had with General Gough yesterday I cannot help thinking report of his action which has reached you has arrived incorrect possibly owing to mutilation of telegram. He assures me he has in no way pledged His Majesty's Government to recognize independence of Esthonia or to give financial support to new North West Russian Government but on the contrary was careful to warn it that such support must not be expected.²

¹ No. 401 (cf. note 1 *ibid.*).

² On August 27, 1919, General Gough, on his return from the Baltic, had a conversation with Sir R. Graham at the Foreign Office. In a note of this conversation Sir R. Graham stated that General Gough 'expressed astonishment at the feeling which had been aroused here by the formation of the N.W. Russian Government, and said that it must all be founded on a misunderstanding. He declared that no pressure had ever been brought to bear on General Yudenitch in the matter, and that that General had taken the initiative

owing to his deplorable military situation which rendered it absolutely necessary for him to come to terms with the Estonians. . . . I pointed out to General Gough the reasons which had caused surprise and apprehension, and showed him certain of Colonel Pirie-Gordon's telegrams which did not seem to bear out his statement that the new arrangement had been made on the initiative of General Yudenitch and without pressure from the Allied Representatives. General Gough said that he had not seen Colonel Pirie-Gordon's telegrams before their despatch, and that they were in many respects very inaccurate.' On September 2 Sir R. Graham recorded that M. Nabokoff had left with him a copy of the following telegram, dated August 30, 1919, from General Yudenitch (the telegram was presumably either addressed or repeated to M. Nabokoff):

'We have abandoned Pskoff. The difficult position in which the Army is now placed is the result of the interference of the British Military Mission and more particularly of General Marsh in the internal affairs of the Army. The General, not understanding the surroundings and not being a good judge of men, has taken hasty and drastic steps which have limited my powers of appointing officers, has promoted men of doubtful character to high posts, and has thus discredited in the eyes of the Estonians as well as with the army my office which I hold from the Supreme Ruler, Admiral Koltchak. The Army has thus been demoralised at the moment when the position at the front is most critical. The deeply humiliating conditions under which the local Russian Government was formed have made the recognition of Estonia by this body utterly worthless. The demand made by the British Military Mission upon Estonia regarding an advance on Petrograd was therefore scorned by the Estonian Government and by the population, and the Estonian troops retreated prematurely from Pskoff. The Army is being badly supplied. The soldiers and officers are naked, bare-footed and hungry; typhoid fever is rampant, and in this condition they have been fighting uninterruptedly for three months. Arms are scarce. There are no machine guns with the tanks. There is no money and the army has not been paid for three months. All this has led to a catastrophe and the front may collapse. In order to retrieve the situation and to prevent all the sacrifices from being made in vain: (1) The army must be supplied with ample arms, clothing and food, and (2) The British Military Mission must be instructed to refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of the Russian Army.'

No. 404

*Letter from Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Mr. Gregory
(Received October 11)*

Unnumbered. [140080/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 25, 1919

Dear Gregory,

I have been waiting to write to you till my typewriter arrived, but it is not yet in sight. So this will be short. Enclosed letter from Smith,¹ the American Representative on the Inter Allied Railway Committee, to Lansing, may interest you. . . .² He³ certainly is not a master of liquid prose, but I and everyone I see down here think he is jolly sound. Anyway he is absolutely straight and we work together like brothers.

In general the Americans are most friendly and satisfactory. The old régimiers called them Bolsheviks because

- (a) Washington would not let them go beyond railway guarding.
- (b) They did not agree with old régime bullying of the population.

¹ Not printed. The letter contained Mr. Smith's 'Views on the Russian Situation'.

² A reference to Sir C. Eliot's opinion of Mr. Smith's capacity is here omitted.

³ Mr. Smith.

The Allies here work together far better than I expected to find, at least in the Railway Committee. Even the Jap. He is a bit of a puzzle because he obviously does not agree with the policy of the Jap military and one wonders just what he really represents. You will have gathered from telegrams that I have not been seeing precisely eye to eye with the H[igh] C[ommissioner]. He is very nice about it and I wish I could have met him, but it does seem to me that he is too much taken up with the idea of pleasing the Omsk Government at all costs, regardless of their real interests, and also of our position in the eyes of the population generally, who are the permanent factor in the situation. However, it is very hot here and I am not going to stay, so I shall not let it worry me—shall ease off a bit, now I have said my say and eased my conscience.

La Paz rather smiles on me⁴ and it will be a real comfort to settle down somewhere.

No more now. Lord, how I sweat!

Sincerely yours,

W. O'REILLY

⁴ Mr. O'Reilly was to be transferred to La Paz as H.M. Minister to Bolivia.

No. 405

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 28)

No. 1306 Telegraphic [121662/91/38]

PARIS, August 27, 1919

I quite agree with general policy suggested in your despatch No. 5556.¹ I think that there ought to be a Council meeting here or in London to deal with Russian situation and that this should if possible be separate from present Council of five who have at moment as much to do as they can manage. I am not sure however that circulation amongst Allied representatives of Foreign Office despatch No. 5556 is best way of approaching subject. In first (? place) Russian situation changes so rapidly that in some respects despatch is already a little antiquated. In second place I doubt expediency of explaining at length to representatives of Allied and Associated Powers how incompetent they have been. Although each may comfort himself that fault was with the other four the consolation may prove insufficient; and it has in fairness to be remembered that an (? unvarying) policy is impossible and even inappropriate when we are dealing with ever-varying phase of Russian tragedy.

Probably the best plan will be for me to explain to the five the British view of situation basing myself upon your despatch and making it clear how much we had already done, what we are prepared still to do and what we are determined not to do. I think it probable that if all this were made clear the Supreme Council would accept your substantive proposal.

¹ No. 399.

Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received August 29)
No. 1310 Telegraphic [122411/775/38]

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1919

Your telegram No. 1514.¹

I understand view of State Department to be that their representatives only signed Murmansk agreement *ad referendum* and stated so at time; that it was only concluded to meet emergency of moment caused by danger of a German advance to North, a danger which quickly vanished; that necessity of confirming Murmansk agreement never arose as Murmansk was (? soon) absolutely absorbed by Northern Russian Provisional Government; that they would never have regarded Murmansk agreement as applying outside very narrow limits to which it purported to apply and that it certainly did not cover far wider commitment involved in financial support to Archangel Government.

United States Government has authority from Congress to make advances only to recognized co-belligerent Governments. State Department (? consider) themselves unauthorised to lend to North Russian Government and state that they certainly would be unable to get Congress' sanction to do so.

¹ No. 345.

No. 407

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)
No. 497 [122311/11067/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 29, 1919

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 459¹ of the 11th instant, I have to inform you that the American Ambassador called on Sir R. Graham on the afternoon of the 26th instant to speak about the evacuation of the Caucasus. Mr. Davis said that he had received an answer from the United States Government to the enquiry which he had addressed to them after his conversation with me on the 18th instant, which was embodied in my despatch to you No. 477² of that date and the letter which I had sent to him on the following day, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

This reply was, that the United States Government had no funds at their disposal from which provision could be made to defray the expenses of the continued presence of British troops in the Caucasus. To obtain such funds they would have to ask Congress for an appropriation for this purpose. In view of the present political situation in America such action would be most inopportune and injudicious and might prejudice the prospects of the Peace

¹ No. 366.

² No. 388.

Treaty being accepted. Nor could the American Government give any assurance whether, or at what date, they might be able to send American troops to relieve the British forces. Such an assurance would be regarded by the Senate as prejudging their ultimate decision on the question of Mandates, and would be deeply resented. Mr. Davis was, however, instructed by the United States Government to make an official appeal to His Majesty's Government not to withdraw the British forces in the Caucasus at the present moment, as such a withdrawal must result in chaos, and in the massacre of the Christian population, and although the United States Government fully realised the difficulties of His Majesty's Government in the matter, the latter would be held responsible in the eyes of the civilised world.

Sir R. Graham said that this reply meant, in effect, that the United States intended to do nothing, but required His Majesty's Government to continue to bear the whole burden in spite of the warning which had been given seven months ago that they would not be in a position to do so. I had, in my conversations and correspondence with his Excellency, explained the whole situation, and especially the position of His Majesty's Government, so fully to him that there was no necessity to recapitulate what had passed. No Government were more anxious, or indeed so anxious, to avoid the state of affairs which was foreshadowed as the result of British evacuation, and His Majesty's Government would no doubt do everything that was possible to prevent such a catastrophe arising, but their powers in this respect were strictly limited, and they were placed in a most unfair and unenviable position.

Mr. Davis replied that he realised this perfectly well and could only express his sympathy.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 407

Earl Curzon to the American Ambassador

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August 19, 1919*

My dear Ambassador,

You may remember that, in our conversation yesterday afternoon² about the Armenian question and the Caucasus, I expressed some surprise that, if American opinion was as deeply stirred as I was led to believe on the subject, no official representations had reached me from the American Government, and I was left to gather American sentiment from the reports and appeals and protests of private individuals. I further said that, anxious as we were to do everything in our power to satisfy American opinion and to protect the Armenians, it was difficult to modify our announced and already inaugurated policy of evacuation, unless we knew for certain for how long a period we were requested or expected to remain, and what part the American Government were prepared to play at its close.

Later in the evening Mr. Bonar Law, speaking on the same subject in the House of Commons, used the following words:—

‘I can assure my noble friend that, if any sign of help were coming from America, as he suggests, we would only too gladly welcome it. Indeed, I think I might say more, with the consent of my right honourable friend. It is, if I may be permitted to say so, an American problem rather than a British. They are in a better position to deal with it. They have interests as great as ours—I think, greater. I can assure the House that if the President of the United States were officially to say to the British Government, “We wish you to hold the fort for a little until we can make arrangements,” we would certainly do our best to meet him.’³

Mr. Bonar Law meant to add, what I may here be permitted to add on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, that, in the event of the American Government addressing us in the sense indicated, it would seem only reasonable that the financial burden of retaining our forces in the Caucasus beyond the period already fixed by us should not be borne by Great Britain, but should be assumed by the State which expects to be, or is likely to become, the mandatory for the Armenian people. Our own financial responsibilities in those regions have already been so overwhelming that we should not feel justified in continuing them for a further period.

May I suggest to your Excellency that you should telegraph in this sense to your Government, since the matter is one that calls for very early decision?

I have, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

³ See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th Series, *House of Commons*, vol. 119, cols. 2086–7.

No. 408

Mr. Alston¹ (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Received October 17)

No. 354 [142494/11967/57]

TOKYO, August 29, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 313² of the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to Your Lordship herewith copy of the minutes of a meeting which was recently held at the Japanese Foreign Office to discuss the formation of a combined British, American and Japanese Corporation for extensive industrial operations in Siberia.

Your Lordship will recollect that Mr. Metcalf, who handed me these minutes on the eve of sailing for England, has been the prime mover in attempting to promote various schemes of considerable magnitude in the Far East and that he has, apparently, obtained the support of certain very influential business men in London. As on former occasions he has kept this Embassy fully posted and has in an indirect way tried to elicit some measure

¹ H.M. Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo.

² Not printed.

of approval from me. Bearing in mind the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the original venture, which lapsed automatically on the termination of hostilities with Germany,³ I have limited myself to an expression of opinion that if a scheme of this magnitude with Japanese, British and American cooperation should eventuate it would surely be welcomed by all the Governments concerned, but that it was unlikely that any special recognition would be afforded by our Government. The Japanese promoters, who are all of exceptionally high standing, are also anxious that His Majesty's Government should be favourably disposed towards the undertaking.

At the present stage negotiations are to be confined to British and Japanese: it is the particular object of Mr. Metcalf's journey to England to establish the British interests in the concern and when the desired British participation is assured American cooperation will be invited.

I have, etc.,
B. ALSTON⁴

ENCLOSURE IN No. 408

Memorandum of Meeting held at the Foreign Office, Tokyo, on the 8th Day of August, 1919

Present: Baron Megata, Messrs. M. Fujise, C. Kadono, C. Koike and H. E. Metcalf.

The meeting was held to discuss the formation of a combined Japanese, British and American Corporation, having as its primary object contracting, mining, railway and industrial development in Siberia, working with the approval and under the auspices of the proper Russian authorities.

As Siberia is still in a very unsettled condition and it may be some considerable time before order is sufficiently restored for the Corporation to commence operations there, it was proposed that the initial capital of the Corporation should not be more than say Yen One Million (Yen 1,000,000), the same to be equally divided between the Japanese, British and American interests, one quarter of this sum only to be paid up at first.

The Corporation would be a Japanese Limited Company, registered in Tokyo, having in addition to the usual Japanese Company Articles—see specimen attached⁵—its own comprehensive bye-laws, which would be subsequently drawn up by the Board of Directors and ratified by a shareholders meeting.

There would be, say five or six representative firms of each of the three

³ In the latter half of 1918 Mr. Metcalf had approached certain British and foreign official quarters with a view to the formation of an international corporation under the designation of The Russia and Siberia Trade and Finance Corporation.

⁴ Copies of this dispatch were forwarded to the Department of Overseas Trade and to the Board of Trade on October 23, 1919. No further action was taken on this file in the Foreign Office.

⁵ Not attached to filed copy of enclosure.

countries taking part in the corporation, the names suggested being as follows:—

- Japanese: Mitsui, Mitsu Bishi, Okura, Kuhara, Furukawa and Sumitomo.
British: British Trade Corporation, Babcock and Wilcox, Pearsons, Metropolitan, North British and one other.
American: American International Corporation, U.S. Steel Corporation, Guggenheim and say three others.

Subsidiary companies may be subsequently formed, as decided upon by the Board of Directors.

There would be nine Directors—three Japanese, three British and three American, the Chairman elected out of this number having a casting vote.

It was agreed that the British interests should be approached first by Mr. Metcalf on his return to London, and that on their consent to participate on the present understanding having been obtained, the American interests named above be then approached by the Japanese and British simultaneously.

Desire was expressed that, if possible, confirmation of the names and agreement of the British interests be sent by the Overseas Trade Department to the Japanese Foreign Office.

If all parties are agreed, the Corporation would be inaugurated forthwith and an office opened in Tokyo with one Japanese, one British and one American representative for commencing business as soon as conditions in Siberia warranted.

No. 409

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received September 4)
No. 1 Telegraphic [125051/1015/58]

TIFLIS, August 30, 1919

My reception by Georgians has been of very cordial nature. At Batoum yesterday I was met by numerous deputations, official and unofficial, who made speeches of welcome. Moslems and Christians were equally friendly.

I was provided with the special train formerly reserved for ex-Emperor. All the stations were decorated with flags and (? local) traffic was suspended.

On arrival at Tiflis this morning, August 30, I was met by Acting Prime Minister Gegechkori and Members of Government. Municipality, clergy, representatives of learned, artistic and . . .¹ societies, foreign missions and a very large crowd of people of all classes.

Guards of honour were provided by British and Georgian military authorities.

All my movements were cinematographed and I was prey of photographers. Bands played British national anthem at railway station, opera and magnificent house placed at my disposal. For about 2 miles my route was decorated with flags and oriental carpets and lined with onlookers.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

Public buildings were illuminated in the evening; the day was held as a holiday.

The extraordinary reception accorded to me is due to fact of Georgians being aware of affection I have felt for them during last 32 years . . .¹ my appointment to this post as a sign that His Majesty's Government are inspired by most friendly feelings towards their country and that a new era has begun for Georgia.

No. 410

Earl Curzon to Sir J. Jordan (Peking)
No. 392 Telegraphic [120166/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 1, 1919

Your telegram No. 460¹ (of August 21st).

We have not changed our policy of active opposition to Bolshevism.

¹ No. 398.

No. 411

Mr. Lambert¹ (Murmansk) to Earl Curzon (Received September 4)
No. 99 Telegraphic [124959/88/38]

MURMANSK, September 3, 1919

In view of imminent evacuation I request instructions as to disposal of British Supply Mission food and other stores which will remain undisposed of.

I (? calculate) that at end of this month I shall have on hand approximately following quantities of foodstuffs.

Meat and vegetables.	.	.	.	365,000 tins
Preserved meat	.	.	.	550,000 tins
Bacon	.	.	.	365,000 lbs.
Lard	.	.	.	530,000 lbs.
Milk	.	.	.	70,000 tins

It is very doubtful whether I shall be able to dispose of these stores for cash especially as Russian organisations are already well stocked with these particular commodities but I do not anticipate difficulty in obtaining an official certificate of acceptance from Governor General which would hereafter serve to substantiate claim against Russian Government for value of stores delivered. As regards manufactured goods I am disposing of as much of these as possible but I foresee a large proportion, say about 150 tons, must remain unsold. In view of diverse nature of consignment it would be impossible accurately to estimate value of unsold balance. I might however be able to transfer such unsold balance to Governor General at an agreed upon price against an official certificate of acceptance. Alternatively it might be

¹ British political representative and Chief of the British Supply Mission at Murmansk.

arranged for unsold goods to be dispatched to Black Sea in the same way as I understand similar goods are being treated from Archangel. As regards food situation here no further meat products will be required but position in so far as flour is concerned is serious. I have no reserves on which to draw and by middle of this month stocks of flour held by Russian Organisations will be exhausted.

Army cannot help.

I understand General Rawlinson is in communication with War Office on this subject insomuch as suggested 6,000 tons should be sent which would cover requirements until end of year. So far however, I have no advice (? as to the) consignment having been arranged for.

I have asked Archangel for 500 tons which would meet requirements until end of this month.

On receipt of instructions from you on these points I will make necessary arrangements to liquidate British Supply Mission in time to evacuate British staff with our troops.²

² In reply to this telegram Mr. Lambert was instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 77 of September 16, 1919: 'Unsold balance of manufactured goods should be transferred to the Governor General at an agreed upon price against official certificate of acceptance. Question of disposal of foodstuffs has been referred to the War Office.' In reply to a further telegram of September 6 Mr. Hoare and Mr. Lambert were informed in a Foreign Office telegram (No. 536 to Archangel, No. 76 to Murmansk) of September 11 that '6,000 tons of flour are being shipped to Murmansk as soon as possible'.

No. 412

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received September 8)

No. 4 Telegraphic [126879/1015/58]

TIFLIS, September 4, 1919

Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, acting for Prime Minister, who is ill, asked me to-day to give him an opportunity of explaining present situation, and I had with him a conversation of which he has promised to hand me a written memorandum which I shall communicate to you by bag.

The following is substance of his remarks:—

Owing to fact that military authorities have been the only representatives of His Majesty's Government in Georgia, the Government, to their regret, have not been able to get into close touch with Great Britain though, during his short stay, General Cory has succeeded in establishing something like normal relations. To him they made certain proposals (see telegram to War Office from General Headquarters, Constantinople, No. 16690¹ of 4th August), to which they eagerly await an answer.

Though Georgia is well able to preserve internal order, she could not cope with an attack from outside.

¹ Enclosure 1 in No. 374.

In her present situation she must have the support of some Great Power, and only possible orientation for her is British. She cannot stand alone; she begs Great Britain to help her, and she wishes to know what compensation she could give for this indispensable aid.

The departure of British troops is causing greatest anxiety to Georgians, who fear that an attack from outside may ruin their country. She has already addressed to British Government appeals for retention of some of British troops; these might be at any place in Transcaucasia, even in Armenia if necessary. She also requests assistance by supply of food and general merchandise in exchange for her own produce, and would be grateful for financial expert advice. As regards Batoum and its districts, these would fall into a state of anarchy on withdrawal of our army, for there has been no regular administration, municipal or judicial, for some time, and many undesirable persons have found their way there. Georgian Government are ready to take over administration, but they offer to His Majesty's Government complete control over port as a naval base or coaling station.

I refrain from commenting at length on above at present, but I venture to renew the respectful objections which I made before leaving London to complete evacuation of Transcaucasia. Even a small force at Batoum would be of greatest use, and in view of our new relations to Persia² it would seem most desirable to keep at least a footing in this country, the present importance and possibilities of which it would be difficult to exaggerate.

The present Government is, to the best of its ability, repressing all Bolshevik tendencies due to a few Jews and other foreign propagandists, who find very little sympathy amongst Georgians, who are quite as well fitted for self-government as many of the European peoples.

The British troops of all ranks are popular here, and are sorry to leave.

² On August 9, 1919, an Anglo-Persian Agreement had been signed at Teheran and was accompanied by an exchange of letters: see Cmd. 300 of 1919.

No. 413

Earl Curzon to Sir J. Jordan (Peking)

No. 400 Telegraphic [118111/956/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 6, 1919*

In view of present situation, War Office propose that Japanese should be asked to despatch troops to Siberian front. They consider, however, that Japanese will not consent unless given control of railways. In order to induce Japanese to send troops War Office suggest pressure should be brought to bear on Chinese Government to agree to Japanese troops guarding Chinese Eastern Railway, as a temporary measure and under guarantees for restitution by the Powers.

Please report your views on this proposal.

Please repeat to Tokyo.

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received September 18)

No. 103 [130900/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, September 8, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that at General Mannerheim's request I called upon him on the 6th instant.

General Mannerheim left no doubt as to the subject with which he wished to deal and started to speak immediately of his plans for a Finnish advance on Petrograd. He stated:

- (1) that he was sure of the loyalty of the Army.
- (2) that he had but to start a campaign in the Press and work up public feeling in order to win over the Centre and Right here in support of a military campaign against Petrograd.
- (3) that the objections which had been raised by Russian statesmen in Paris and London to the capture of Petrograd by Finnish troops must be discounted as the Russians were not in a position to do it themselves—Denikin, even if he continued to be successful, would be too late and the Northern Army could not be depended on.
- (4) that it had been erroneously maintained that operations against Petrograd could not be undertaken in winter. The sixty thousand men he would put into the field on snow-shoes could operate with greater advantage in winter than at any other season of the year.

In reply I confined myself exclusively to calling the General's attention to the proviso that he made throughout in his observations to me, namely 'that the help of the Allies would be forthcoming' and I pointed out that there had been no definite pronouncement on this score.

It is, I think, worthy of note that during the interview General Mannerheim referred to the plans he elaborated as 'operations against Petrograd'. I notice this point here because it has been brought home to me on numerous occasions in conversation with Swedish-Finns and the advocates of an activist policy here that attention in these circles is concentrated exclusively on the actual capture of Petrograd. So much has been thought out and planned; but to the subsequent question: would the taking of Petrograd have such a decisive effect on the Soviet regime, little or no attention appears to have been paid. Among the most extreme advocates of a Finnish advance on Petrograd, whose voices are raised the loudest here, arguments are used that betray that the guiding consideration in these quarters is to provide General Mannerheim with an opportunity of playing his life role. A certain class recognise in General Mannerheim a Finnish Garibaldi and without examining the countless complications with which a military adventure in Russia is fraught for Finland see in it alone the prestige that would accrue to their national hero by the capture of Petrograd. It is further freely stated that with

this feat of arms to his credit great weight would be lent to General Mannerheim's word in dealing with future Russian statesmen.

I have ventured to record this point because General Mannerheim, although at present holding no office, continues undoubtedly to be the centre figure in the present situation in Finland. The Government's avowed policy of non-intervention has to a great extent closed the ranks of the various factions which for one reason or another desire to see Finland intervene this winter in Russia and these diverse elements have now more closely than before rallied round General Mannerheim. It has thus occurred that the German and pro-German interests here—through no fault of General Mannerheim's—are now supporting him.

As to whether or not General Mannerheim is likely to embark on military operations against Russia without a definite promise of help from the Allies I am not yet in a position to judge. From the information that has reached me so far I do not consider it likely that the Press campaign on which the General laid stress would have the prophesied effect. Outside the military and the circles that revolve around him the need of Finland to put her own house in order is recognised as the most pressing, and full account is now taken, as I had the honour to note in my despatch No. 100¹ of September 4th, of the dangers in which the policy with which Mannerheim is identified would involve the country. It must be remembered, however, that General Mannerheim's prestige stands very high and I gathered clearly from the whole tone of his remarks to me that he considers himself strong enough, with the support of the Army, to take action independent of the Finnish Government if he so decides. His continued presence in Finland thus constitutes a source of great embarrassment to the present Administration.

I have, etc.,

COLERIDGE KENNARD

¹ Not printed.

No. 415

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)

No. 773 Telegraphic [128907/116696/38]

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 11, 1919*

Following from Mr. Hodgson, Omsk, dated September 7th. Begins.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has put before me the following points for consideration of His Majesty's Government.

1. Omsk Government attaches great importance to maintenance of front against Petrograd and hopes that it will be possible to develop operations before winter. This move will materially assist Denikin and at the same time deflect pressure (from) Archangel region.

(? 2. omitted) Koltchak (?) having appointed Yudenich...¹ Commander-in-Chief wishes that all assistance in Baltic region be rendered through him

¹ The text here is uncertain.

realising situation has become so involved that it is impossible to control (it) from here.

(? 3. omitted) Koltchak is prepared to give to Yudenich the necessary latitude in decision of questions arising out of conflicts between different nationalities engaged and in political matters generally.

4. The situation which has arisen as a result of creation of N.W. Government is too obscure for Omsk Government to adopt as yet a definite attitude towards it. Consequently Koltchak proposes to take up neutral position neither protesting against the Government nor recognising it.

It is understood that as a result of differences among their leaders, a process of disintegration has set in among troops. On the other hand Koltchak is anxious to continue such assistance to army as may be possible but wishes to learn views of His Majesty's Government as to advisability and (? method of) rendering it.

It is his particular desire to coordinate his action with that of His Majesty's Government but he trusts that this will not entail his following a course leading to further dislocation of army.

Minister for Foreign Affairs would be grateful for reply as soon as possible.²

² This telegram was answered by replying to Omsk No. 445.

No. 416

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received September 13)

No. 772 Telegraphic [128906/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 11, 1919

My telegram No. 767.¹

United States Ambassador has arrived and received representatives of movement who received encouraging impression. He tells me to make it an effective barrier to Bolshevism Koltchak Government would require impracticable amount of assistance of (? new) popular (? Government).

He therefore regards latter as preferable and is prepared to recommend

¹ In this telegram of September 6, 1919 (received September 10), Mr. O'Reilly had reported with reference to No. 381 that the movement at Vladivostok in favour of a more democratic policy 'has taken definite shape with full sympathy of Czechs. Many members of proposed new Assembly have already arrived here and remainder are coming. . . . I . . . have told Czech representative here that to establish a new Government without Koltchak means delaying recognition indefinitely and that to start it here involves danger of separation between Eastern and Western Siberia. He said that any Government under Koltchak would have forfeited public confidence in advance and that Assembly would be as representative of West as of East. . . . If it could be arranged that Koltchak should adopt Assembly into his régime all would be for the best but difficulties on both sides seem insuperable. United States Ambassador is due to arrive from Omsk very shortly however and may be able to help. Czechs apparently have sufficient local forces to protect Assembly from interference without embarrassing other Allies by request for intervention. They are incensed by treatment of General Gaida whom there was proposal to arrest recently and who has now been dismissed and degraded by order from Omsk. He himself says he intends to do nothing against Koltchak but must insist on opportunity to justify self.'

that if securely established it should at once be recognized and assisted economically. He said that he had advised his visitors that in the event of their success they should not make mistake of getting rid of men whom he knew to have been serving with Russian(? s) capably in present administrations and whose loss would involve great confusion. He evidently expects and hopes that they will succeed.

Representatives afterwards came to me. They said they had Committee here and an organisation throughout Siberia and expected to supersede present Government practically without resistance whenever word was given them by their adherents at Omsk. A congress of Delegates from Zemstvos and municipalities would then be convened either here or at Irkutsk to (? choose) a provisional Government which would take measures for reforming internal administration, defending front and preparing election of a constituent assembly for Siberia. They were confident of initial success also ample support from all ranks of Army and they hoped to establish closest relations with Denikin who would, they felt sure, recognize failure of dictatorship and draw moral. They were only anxious to be assured of Allied support after they were established.

I replied that object of Allies was to help Russian people to liberty, self-government and peace and that we sympathized with all Russians who had that object at heart.

Koltchak Government had been established by Russians for that object and we had supported it on that account and because being *de facto* Government it was organization through which alone we could effectively assist people. I had hoped that their proposed assembly might be made compatible with Koltchak's leadership but now regretfully recognized that to be impossible and that it was now a question of judging between merits of Koltchak Government and of that which they proposed. This I said was a question of internal politics on which I must be excused from pronouncing. I could only assure them that His Majesty's Government would always desire to help Russia. I have since heard that they were quite satisfied having evidently expected less impartial attitude.

They have interviewed other Allied representatives and I am suggesting to United States Ambassador that we should all meet to decide on a common line of action as matters may come to a head any day.

Repeated to Tokyo and Omsk.

No. 417

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame (Paris)

No. 1077 Telegraphic [120135/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 11, 1919

Following for Colonel Cartier for Litvinoff:

With reference to your radios of July 30th¹ and August 24th² we have been

¹ No. 355.

² No. 402.

in communication with Danish Government who agree to proposed meeting taking place in Denmark provided that

- (1) they may decide place of meeting.
- (2) they may decide route by which delegates enter Denmark.
- (3) number and names of delegates are approved by them in advance.
- (4) right of delegates to remain in Denmark ceases automatically as soon as either party breaks off negotiations.

Suggestion that Russian delegates should sail on Swedish steamer *Eskiltuna III* is impracticable as Gulf of Petrograd is not navigable owing to mines. We therefore suggest that Russian Representatives should be met at Esthonian or Lithuanian front by representatives of His Majesty's Government and accompanied by them thence to Reval or Libau whence they would be conveyed by His Majesty's Government by sea to Copenhagen. We are provisionally suggesting this route to Danish Government and asking Esthonian and Lithuanian Authorities for Safe Conducts for Russian representatives both coming from and returning to territory under control of Soviet Government.

Danish Government take no exception to your condition that your representatives should not be molested so long as they give them no cause for complaint nor to your condition that your representatives should be enabled to return to Russia as soon as they like. Duration of stay in Denmark of Russian representatives must however obviously depend on course of negotiations and is not a point in regard to which an indefinite but binding commitment can be entered into. Danish Government do not take exception and we agree to your 5th, 6th and 7th conditions.

Please inform me of names of your representatives in order that I may submit them to Danish Government.

Repeated to Copenhagen, No. 1381.

No. 418

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 14)

No. 101 Telegraphic [129066/67181/59]

RIGA, September 12, 1919

1. A Conference between Ministers and military representatives of Esthonia and Latvia was held here September 11th. Lithuanians and Finns were prevented by defective communications from attending.

2. Esthonian Prime Minister Strandmann told me to-day that meeting of their representatives with Bolsheviks was postponed till September 15th.¹

¹ At the end of August a joint offensive by the Russian North-West Army and Esthonian forces had failed, and Soviet forces occupied Pskov (cf. No. 403, note 2). In a telegram of September 3, 1919, from Reval (received September 4) Colonel Pirie-Gordon had reported: 'Esthonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Poska, informed me that Government, unable at present to rely on Army, has decided to open negotiations for peace with Bolsheviks. He states Esthonian Government only intend to play for time in order to restore moral of army. There is at present no question of armistice and negotiations are to take place probably at Pskow.'

They would not send Ministers to Pskoff but probably members of constituent assembly and an officer of General Staff. They contemplate conveying refusal to negotiate till corresponding offer had been made to Latvia. Otherwise delegates would merely report Bolshevik proposals for consideration of Government. He said they were negotiating on grounds of political expediency and they emphatically state that² negotiations were being opened because their troops could not be trusted. This is contrary to earlier statement made to Colonel Gordon by General Laidoner but moral of army may have improved since. Strandmann told me Laidoner personally regarded any arrangement with Bolsheviks as impracticable. His Government had decided not to accept any terms without concurrence of Latvian Government but had not yet decided how far same consideration would apply to Lithuania, Finland and Poland. He desired to know the views of the Entente on the whole question.

3. Ulmanis and Meierowicz, Latvian Ministry [Minister] for Foreign Affairs, called on me privately September 11th. They showed me a written statement on behalf of Esthonian Government undertaking not to make terms without Latvian Government's concurrence. They had not then received overtures from Bolsheviks. They regard overtures to Esthonia as sign of weakness and without it peace proper out of question.³ If overtures were received Bolsheviks would be required to retire beyond Latvian frontier before negotiations were opened. Maximum possibility in their view would be permanent armistice with neutral zone between two forces. No agreement involving communication between Latvia and Bolshevik Russia would be permitted. They cannot disregard view that such an arrangement with resulting opportunities for peaceful reconstruction within Latvia would do more to prevent internal Bolshevism than continued fight against Bolsheviks while policy of Allies remains ill-defined. They mistrust ultimate intentions towards their freedom of Russian forces operating on this flank. Recent events and information have greatly increased their fear of German-Russian alliance of which union of German and Bermont's forces is a standing object lesson. In speech on September [11th]⁴ Meierowicz spoke of prospects of German-Russian alliance as chief danger to Baltic states and referred to counter measures against this as chief object of present conference.

4. They asked me what view British Government would take (a) of negotiations between Latvia and Bolsheviks, and (b) of an agreement on lines indicated above. They enquired whether in either case (i) blockade would be imposed, (ii) British support would be withdrawn, (iii) in particular negotiations now proceeding in London between Minister of Finance and English group⁵ would be prejudiced.

² This passage was apparently falsified in transmission. The correct text would appear to be as received by the British Delegation in Paris: '... and denied emphatically statement that ...'

³ The text of this passage as received by the British Delegation in Paris read: '... sign of weakness and peace under these circumstances out of the question.'

⁴ Date supplied from text received by the British Delegation in Paris.

⁵ Cf. No. 91, note 3.

They indicated that recognition of Latvian independence by British Government on⁶ a promise by British Government to support that independence before League of Nations would give them strongest justification possible towards their people for refusal to meet Bolsheviks.

5. After above conversation early September 12th Latvian Government received wireless from Moscow on lines of that addressed to Esthonia. Paraphrase will follow. Latvian Government will probably reply declining all negotiations until Bolsheviks leave Latvian territory. Meeting between Esthonians, Finns, Letts and Lithuanians is now arranged for September 15th at Reval. Expect to proceed to Reval with Ulmanis September 14th.

6. There is no apparent fear of hasty action upon Bolshevik offers unless precipitated by German-Russian developments. Morale right⁷ and confidence in Government has sensibly improved during last ten days. Present events do not imply any leaning towards Bolsheviks on the part of Lettish Government. Arrival outside Riga September 12th of ship with equipment and hoped withdrawal of Bolsheviks, especially under Polish persons,⁸ may combine to solve present questions automatically. But I request that any necessary instructions may be telegraphed to me at Reval and Riga especially indication of answer as to questions raised in paragraph 4 above. Any possible indication that part expected from Baltic States in strategy of allies against Bolsheviks would be confined to defence of their frontiers would apparently go far to strengthen position of Governments with their peoples as removing present feeling that they are asked by allies to take aggressive action in support of Russian forces whose intentions they distrust. Unless otherwise instructed I should not convey your answer to Governments concerned except in so far as need for some declaration actually arose.

Repeated to Paris.

⁶ The text received by the British Delegation in Paris here read 'or'.

⁷ The text received in Paris here read: 'Morale in Riga . . .'

⁸ The text received in Paris here read: 'Polish pressure'.

No. 419

Letter from General Yudenitch to Mr. Balfour (Received October 8)¹

No. 5 [138249/116696/38]

REVAL, September 12, 1919

Sir,

From the moment of the final victory of the Allied Powers over Germany, a thorough revision of the whole strategic plan of the fight against the Russian Bolsheviks proved to be necessary and realisable. On the fronts existing until that time—the Eastern (now Admiral Koltchak), South-Eastern (Volunteer-Army) and Northern (Archangel and Murman) front, it was not possible to develop sufficient activity to crush in a short time, during the present year, Bolshevism in its vital centres. The occupation of

¹ Date of entry on the files of the Foreign Office, to which the letter was remitted direct.

the Ukraine by the Bolsheviks in the beginning of this year opened to them enormous resources for the continuation of the fight and at the same time put the South-Eastern Front with regard to strategy and supply in a critical position. At the same time the break-down of Germany and the opening of the Russian coast in the Baltic sea made it possible to establish a new front against Bolshevism—the Baltic front—the objective of which was the vital centre of Bolshevism—Petrograd.

The immense strategical importance of this front is quite evident. With the taking of Petrograd and Moscow Bolshevism would be crushed. Already, Bolshevism may be said to have lost its force in the North-Western corner of Russia.

The Russian Army, notwithstanding its small size, if well supplied and having to its disposal sufficient stores of equipment and arms, could mobilize a sufficient number of men, as the local population is only awaiting the possibility to join the 'White' Army and fight for liberation from the hated yoke of Bolshevism. Thousands of people hide themselves in the woods in order to avoid forced mobilization by the Sowjet-power. They are called the 'Green Army' and they join as soon as they are able the advancing 'White' Army.

The strategic advantage of this front has been proved by the success attained in the first operations, which began in the first days of May. The Russian forces, which grew out of a small detachment, the s[o] c[alled] 'North-Army', joined by some 'Reds' and a small quantity of mobilized local inhabitants, amounted in all to 2,700 fighters, unsufficiently [*sic*] dressed and armed, having 4 guns and 6 machine-guns. Beginning its advance on the 13th of May from the Narova-river, this small army numbered in two-weeks time 35,000 men, with 38 guns and 250 machine-guns, and it advanced to within 70 versts of Petrograd. Between the Army and Petrograd there remained no enemy forces that could be considered serious. Further advance was stopped by doubt as to whether it should be possible to keep Petrograd after its taking, and to nourish the inhabitants. This pause gave to the 'Reds' the chance to transfer to this front considerable forces from other fronts and to fortify the surroundings of Petrograd.

My representatives and the representatives of Admiral Koltchak were negotiating from the beginning of this year with the representatives of the Allied Powers about the organization of the North-Western front.

It is known to me, what deep sympathy you had for the struggle against Bolshevism and how clearly you realised the state of affairs. A whole program of measures was elaborated, which promised quick and sure success: enlisting men from among the Russian prisoners-of-war in Germany, supply of equipment and arms, securing of food-supply to the population of the liberated districts and at last, cooperation with those new states, which formed themselves on the coast of the Baltic sea.

Unfortunately this program has been carried through neither with sufficiently completeness [*sic*] nor quickly enough.

The use of Russian prisoners-of-war, with the exception of officers, has altogether been put aside.

The supplies for the army came extremely late and were insufficient.

The new States, formed on the Baltic coast, which fully owe their existence, their liberation from the German yoke, as well as their armed forces to the Allied Powers and especially to the magnanimous assistance of England, do not consider themselves obliged honestly to fulfil the engagements put on them in the common fight against the Bolshevism.

The strength of the North-Western Army is at the present moment the following:

18,200 fighters.

21,700 sick, wounded, rear-service, railway-men, guards-men, unloading detachment.

14,200 men used for remounts of roads and bridges and digging trenches.

Total 54,100

Strategically the Army occupies the district on the East shore of the Peipus-Lake which can be used as base for a new advance on Petrograd.

The number of the 'Red' troops on this front amounts to about 35,000 men.

Such is in general outline the state of affairs at this front. You will get details from Mr. A. I. Gutchkoff, who will hand you this letter.²

In spite of mistakes, failures and delays notwithstanding the unfavourably late period of the year and the fact that the Bolsheviki have considerably strengthened their position during recent months, the state of affairs cannot be considered hopeless.

The spirit of the army, in spite of all the sufferings it has to endure through insufficient food and lack of clothes, linen and boots, is excellent. And if the necessary supply of equipment and war-materials could arrive in the next few weeks, an advance on Petrograd could be started with a chance for success.

The first successful advance would make possible a considerable increase in the size of the Army if sufficient supplies and arms were at hand. The harvest will make easier the food-supply to the Army and the population in the near future.

But there is one condition, without which success is impossible and the fulfilment of which depends only upon England and the high authority which she has in this country.

If it is impossible to get active military support from Esthonia and Latvia for the advance of the North-Western Army, the neutrality of these countries must be fully guaranteed in any case. A success can be expected only with a fully-secured rear, free use of ports and railways, and with the possibility of directing all forces towards the front. I do all that is in my power to establish friendly-neighbouring relations with the newly formed States, but still a strong pressure from the British Government, a categorical order by its representatives here is necessary in order to make the position secure.

There is one condition more, with which the success of the whole operation

² For M. Guchkoff's visit to London, cf. No. 102.

on Petrograd would not be only possible and probable, but certain: that is the active participation of Finland with her troops in this operation. In this matter only strong and continued pressure by England can play the deciding part. At the present moment conditions in Finland are favourable for such participation. But without a pressure from England, Finland will remain a passive spectator in a fight, on the outcome of which, depends entirely her own fate.

The last weeks approach, perhaps the last days, in which this whole plan can be carried through. Very soon it will be too late. And then the fight against Russian Bolshevism must be postponed until next year, when quite changed conditions in the world will probably confront us. And Russia will be forced to suffer another winter under the yoke of the Bolshevism, which will cause innumerable sufferings and carry away millions of human lives.

I have the honour to be, etc.

N. JOUDENITCH

No. 420

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received September 14)

No. 12 Telegraphic [129090/512/58]

TIFLIS, September 12, 1919

Armenian Prime Minister, M. de Khatissian, with whom I had slight personal acquaintance many years ago, was good enough to call on me officially this afternoon and (? give) me at length his views on situation which I summarize (? as follows).

1. Prestige of Paris Conference in Transcaucasia is at present very (? low) on account of British evacuation, and Colonel Haskell¹ is in despair of doing (? anything) without force to (? back) him up.

The Mussulmans look upon Colonel Haskell as a sort of harmless American Missionary.

2. By arrival through Georgia of one million cartridges yesterday Armenia is enabled through her mobilisation of all adult males up to 32 years of age to make good fight and carry on for (? two) months but she (? can) ill (? spare) her depleted population and last month over 40 officers were killed.

3. (? It is) most . . . (? that)² Great Britain or (authorities) *sic* should send a strong military mission (? to) Erzeroum to control Turkish action against Armenia.

4. Departure of such British officers as Charles and Plowden has had a deplorable effect by encouraging Turks and depressing Armenian(s).

M. de Khatissian told me he had almost wept when British flag was lowered at Erivan and he begged me to entreat from you permission for these officers to return. I know them both and realise high value of their work.

¹ Colonel Haskell of the United States Army was Allied High Commissioner in Armenia: cf. Vol. I, No. 3, minute 3.

² The text here is uncertain.

5. He insists on necessity of complete separation from Russia for all Transcaucasian Republics. Russia has always shown her unfitness to govern other races and will now become more (? reactionary) than ever. He has a strong mistrust of Azerbaijan and says that Government and people of that Republic openly declare they will not suffer disintegration of Turkey demanded by Armenia's vital interest. Armenia must therefore depend upon assurances and military support of Great Britain or failing her France or (? America) for some time to come. I told M. de Khatissian that I hoped very soon to visit him at Erivan (he leaves for home September 13) with Captain Pemcey whom I would leave there: and that meanwhile I was communicating an abstract of (? his) remarks to Your Lordship. I gather from conversation that Great Britain still (? enjoys in) Armenia a greater (? popularity) than any (? other power) and that keen disappointment is felt at probability (? of their) . . . [? mandate] (? being)² given to another friendly Government.

No. 421

Letter from Mr. Gregory to M. Sabline¹

[127073/3669/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 13, 1919*

My dear Sabline,

I forwarded copies of Nabokoff's Notes Nos. 905,² 926³ and 941⁴ of the

¹ Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London in succession to M. Nabokoff. ² No. 393.

³ Not printed. This note transmitted a copy of a memorandum dated August 12, 1919, and addressed by M. Sazonov to representatives in Paris of the British, French, and United States Governments. This memorandum stated in part: 'In a communication we have received from General Miller, the Governor of Northern Russia, he states that owing to the limited number of troops and the unsatisfactory state of the moral of a certain section, it will be impossible to hold the present front if the British and other Allied forces withdraw. . . . The whole question should be considered from a general standpoint, to wit, whether it would not be more advantageous to hold a portion of the Bolshevik forces during the coming months on the Archangel front, which would entail the retention of officers and men gathered there, as well as material and stores, rather than abandon it in the beginning of October. In the latter eventuality the forces could be used elsewhere as reinforcements, say on the Murmansk front, thereby gaining the defensive object of retaining the unfrozen port, or the possibility of advancing between the lakes, which would be useful in case of an offensive on Petrograd by the Finns or General Youdenitch's forces. In transmitting the whole question to Admiral Koltchak's consideration it is General Miller's desire that the entire problem be submitted to the judgment of the Allied Governments. The Russian Embassy in Paris begs to draw attention to the extreme gravity of the above position due to the proposed withdrawal of British and other Allied Contingents from Northern Russia, and expresses the hope that the situation will be reconsidered in conjunction with other complex aspects of the Russian problem.' In his covering note M. Nabokoff further stated: 'General Miller most earnestly requests that the withdrawal of the British troops from the Front, which has been fixed for the 1st of September, be postponed for a fortnight at least, in order that they may assist in the operations which are being undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the military position on our front.'

⁴ Not printed. In this note M. Nabokoff, on instructions from M. Sazonov, communicated to Sir R. Graham the decision and requests of the Government at Omsk as reported by Sir C. Eliot in No. 394.

20th, 25th and 29th ultimo respectively, concerning the evacuation of North Russia, to the War Office, as the questions raised in these were principally of a military nature.

I can now reply that while the War Cabinet have already decided against despatching more supplies and against retaining Murmansk, General Rawlinson is in communication with General Miller as to leaving such military stores and supplies as are available, and six thousand tons of flour, which should carry Murmansk over till Christmas, are being shipped to that port at the first possible moment.

Yours sincerely,

J. D. GREGORY

No. 422

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received September 15)

No. 499 Telegraphic [129354/956/57]

PEKING, September 13, 1919

Your telegram No. 400.¹

I have repeated above telegram to Harbin to ascertain local opinion and in the meantime record my own views.

Suggestion seems to me to show strange lack of appreciation of the whole political situation in Far East. Chinese Government would keenly resent any pressure of the kind and I can conceive nothing more calculated to arouse an anti-British agitation in this country. No assurance that measure was temporary one and no guarantee of restitution would carry the least weight for the Chinese know by long experience that temporary occupation generally crystallises into permanent possession and that all this part of Asia is strewn with broken (? pledges).

It is not clear whether pressure on China is to come from the Allies collectively or we are . . . ed² to bring pressure independently, but it is hardly conceivable that we should undertake to bear all the odium of the step, or that we should propose to take any action of the kind without full co-operation of America. It is well known that Japan's main object is to obtain control of Chinese Eastern Railway and if she could secure this through agency of the Allies she would score great success. What Japanese seem to be aiming at is a semi-independence for Eastern Siberia under a Military Government limited on the West by Irkutsk and rounded off by inclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia (? in . . . Japanese)² system of administration. For this purpose control over Chinese Eastern Railway is a vital necessity.

Repeated to Tokyo.

¹ No. 413.

² The text here is uncertain.

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received September 15)
No. 501 Telegraphic [129485/956/57]

PEKING, September 14, 1919

My telegram No. 499.¹

Following is repetition of telegram from His Majesty's Consul, Harbin (Begins.)

Your telegram No. 29.²

Unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to regard with equanimity following consequences, I am strongly opposed to transfer of military protection of Chinese Eastern Railway from Chinese to Japanese, whose troops already guard Amur Railway.

1. Political and economic control by Japan of whole of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Eastern Siberia, to be followed by complete absorption or by another Russo-Japanese war, in which probably China, and possibly other Powers, would be involved.

2. Increased embittered feeling in China against Japan, leading, it may be, to an outcry against all foreigners and possible repetition of Boxer movement, together with Bolshevism.

Previous experience of Japanese assurances regarding Manchuria dispose me to place no reliance on Japanese good faith in present case. All is now comparatively quiet along Chinese Eastern Railway and I see no reason why Japanese troops should not be moved in peace and security over that line provided following measures are taken.

1. Japanese and Chinese superior Officers to be held personally responsible by their respective Governments for any clash between Chinese and Japanese troops.

2. Semonoff to cease his interfere(?nce) with working of railway between Lake Baikal and Manchurian station, the junction point with Chinese Eastern Railway.

3. (? Payment of) workmen on Chinese Eastern Railway on a sufficient scale and in an acceptable currency. This can be done in Russian currency for a short time longer by purchase of Romanoff and Kerensky notes with foreign gold but cannot be continued unless (? Omsk) Government quickly settles question of currency reform and places on market a uniform rouble which will be accepted by foreign banks. (Ends.)

Repeated to Tokyo.

¹ No. 422.

² Evidently the repetition from Peking to Harbin of No. 413.

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received September 16)

No. 775 Telegraphic [129878/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 14, 1919

My telegram No. 772.¹

General Gaida has admitted to (? General) Blair that he is definitely associated with new movement of whose success he is confident, though possibly not without bloodshed. Commandant of fortress here also sympathises and is . . .² is tolerably (*sic*) informed, but afraid to act and disposed to hedge.

Diplomatic representative of Omsk (? Government) begged me (? not to) believe that movement was (? capable of) any success. I said I thought it was quite serious and repeated to him exactly (? what I had) said to representatives who called on me adding that (? I thought) combination of French with leadership of Koltchak would be best solution. He thought this might not be impossible if people here were reasonable. I said they seemed prepared to work with good men of all parties.

Czech representative told me later that they would in fact be (? capable of) work even with Monarchists. I (? pointed out then) to him great embarrassment which (? overthrow) of Koltchak would cause, especially to French Government and begged him to urge combination if possible. It seems Zemstvos' leaders are apprehensive of being to some extent dishd by a democratic movement of Koltchak's (? front) which they think would not be genuine or useful but might withdraw some support from them.

Thus there are some elements (? trying) to work for compromise, (? meanwhile) Japanese Government profess neutrality and seem unlikely at present (? to) take any line liable to increase friction with Americans.

United States Ambassador says his favourable inclination to movement should not be understood as final, as he is still making enquiry as to its strength and character. He is convinced that present Government has not got a friend from Omsk to Vladivostock, and that if it falls, as it apparently must, it would be well that it should be succeeded by a régime well organised in advance (? and) capable of taking over with least possible disturbance. Mr. Hodgson more than deprecates movement, and everything about it, and thinks that it should be met by uncompromising opposition on the part of Allied representatives.

He says Koltchak has now every prospect of winning on front, unless army again breaks up as result of dissensions in the rear. He adds that movement on the part of Government in favour of broaden . . .² is in good hands and is making progress. French High Commissioner at Omsk at first made light of situation but is now much agitated and telegraphing that Allies should on no account encourage Zemstvo movement by a passive attitude. It seems to me that we supported Koltchak not for his own sake but for what we had good reason to hope from him.

¹ No. 416.

² The text here is uncertain.

He has failed largely owing to disregard of our advice, and we are, however unreasonably . . .² with odium of his errors.

To support his Government against any serious democratic movement (? would be) to (? declare) responsibility for its mistakes, past as well as future, without any corresponding control of it, if it survived, while if, as is quite possible, it fell notwithstanding our (? support) we should naturally be down and out. Present movement is certainly well intentioned, it claims wide support in military and middle classes and (? its) power is evidenced by reluctance of Government authorities to tackle it.

(? In the) circumstances I think we should best be advised to maintain a neutral and expectant attitude, and take advantage of every opportunity for encouraging conciliation and compromise.

Repeated to Tokyo and Omsk.

No. 425

Colonel Tallents (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received September 16)
No. 106 Telegraphic [129838/67181/59]

REVAL, September 15, 1919

Reference my telegram 101¹ and Paris No. 35.

1. Conference held Reval September 14th and September 15th. Lithuanian representatives received during journey to Reval offer from Bolsheviks in same terms as that addressed to Latvia reference my telegram 103,² and Paris No. 37. Finland received similar offer shortly before conference. Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries and Military Representatives (? of) each country attended except that Professor Chimkous replaced Lithuanian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and no military representative of Finland was present. Delegates were not plenipotentiaries and must refer to their Governments for confirmation.

2. Proceedings were confidential but after conference an official note was given to me (? of which) substance follows in separate telegram.³

3. In addition to points covered by this note I learn from sure source that conference in general agreed:—

(a) That no arrangements would be safe which allowed Bolshevik fleet to

¹ No. 418.

² Not printed.

³ Colonel Tallents's telegram No. 107 of even date (received September 17) summarized the note (in part) as follows: 'Conference has decided that necessary preliminary to negotiations with Bolsheviks is that all four States act together. If this condition be accepted by Bolsheviks delegates of the four States will meet at Dorpat 10 days hence to deliberate on proposals to be made jointly; any other preliminary conditions to be laid down by any one State can only be admitted to general discussion with Bolsheviks after being debated previously. . . . As it is impossible to conclude real peace with Bolshevik Russia there can be only question under these circumstances of permanent cessation of hostilities.'

put to sea. General Laidoner suggested its surrender to Entente. This solution was favourably regarded but not formally adopted.

- (b) That a demand by Esthonia for 'safety' of North-West Russian Army was accepted though its implications were not discussed. Immediate meetings between delegates and representatives of North-West Russian Government are to follow conference.
- (c) That views of Entente, especially Great Britain, must be ascertained and would carry greatest weight.

4. Conference will be resumed at Dorpat in about 10 days. I am asked to urge great anxiety of conferring parties to know views of Entente especially Great Britain before then. I had informal conversations with most of (? chief) delegates and in particular discussed situation with General Laidoner at his request. Telegram follows giving substance of his views. I arrive Riga September 16th and will wire survey of situation immediately on arrival (? there).

5. Please convey any (? necessary) information to Warsaw as I have no safe communication with them.

6. Difficulties of transport are specially serious at this critical time. Can you arrange any temporary communication by air for me, especially between Riga and Reval and Helsingfors?

Repeated to Paris (? and) Helsingfors for General Marsh.

No. 426

Earl Curzon to the British Mission at Riga

No. 44 Telegraphic [130875/855/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 16, 1919

The Latvian Government have consented to enter into Peace negotiations with the Soviet Government and are already in communication with the latter with regard to the appointment of delegates.

You should at once make representations to the Latvian Government, and say that His Majesty's Government request that they will take no action in the direction of peace. His Majesty's Government would deplore individual action being taken by them, and trust that they will, as heretofore, conduct their foreign policy only as part of a concerted plan with the Allied Governments. They will however, be happy to listen to any suggestions which the Latvian Government may have to offer on the existing situation and to tender such advice as they can.

Reval has been instructed¹ to make similar representations to the Esthonian Government.

¹ By telegram No. 41 of even date to Reval. This telegram was repeated to Helsingfors as No. 628.

No. 427

Lord Kilmarnock (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received September 16)
No. 1512 Telegraphic [129886/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, September 16, 1919

A secret source which is generally reliable has received information that at a recent conference of independent socialists at Berlin (? 3) Russian Bolsheviks were present who expressed (? warmly) strong desire to conclude peace with Germany and subsequently with Proletariat of Entente countries. They boasted that they would soon cause grave troubles in Egypt and Morocco, and declared that by means of Red Cross and under cover of Delegation from that institution they would soon send abroad agents who would work for development of these plans.

Above (? seems to indicate) that they intend to take advantage of proposed meeting of British and Bolshevik delegates in Denmark to discuss exchange of prisoners.

See your telegram No. 1383.¹

¹ Not printed. This telegram of September 12, 1919, instructed Lord Kilmarnock to thank the Danish Government for their co-operation in facilitating the negotiation in question.

No. 428

Mr. Lambert (Murmansk) to Earl Curzon (Received September 16)
No. 104 Telegraphic [129888/3669/38]

MURMANSK, September 16, 1919

I have had several conversations with Vice-Governor who has just returned from visit of inspection to southern districts and front.

His opinion (? is) that, now that food is assured (see your telegram No. 76¹), it will be possible to hold area successfully unless there is some considerable revival of Bolshevik power in centre and south Russia, which however he regards as unlikely.

He reports that army is in good spirits and that in southern districts peasant population are determined to fight for their good[s] and their homes.

I have always found M. Yermolov's judgment good, and he is generally recognised as most capable Russian in north. In present instance I am disposed to share his optimism. As you are aware feeling in this area has always been better, and relations between civil and military authorities more cordial, than in Archangel. Extinction of Provisional Government, which will presumably follow on evacuation will give him substantial (? support) which he is capable of using effectively. Much of course depends on development of situation in rest of Russia, but if position there is really as hopeful as it appears to be, it would be a pity to lose any opportunity we may have of helping this area over interim period between evacuation and establishment of non-Bolshevik Government in Petrograd.

¹ See No. 411, note 2.

There is no doubt that weakest point in area is zone of military administrative services. So far as actual distribution of food to civilian population is concerned, I think that Russian organizations to whom I am handing over will function reasonably well. They have had considerable experience and being constructed on representative bases they have interest in doing their work well. Trouble will be with railway and with supply, transport and ordnance services of Army.

For this reason abandonment of proposal to leave British military mission in this area was a bitter disappointment to Governor and he has begged me most earnestly to represent to you that if few officers were allowed to remain here for administrative (? services) with Russian forces it might make all the difference. I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs of success and failure in this area [*sic*]. I understand there are certain number who would be prepared to volunteer for such service provided that their pay were guaranteed and I venture to commend Governor's request to serious attention of His Majesty's Government.

No. 429

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)

No. 14 Telegraphic [125946/512/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 17, 1919*

Armenians are appealing urgently to us for arms and equipment and express willingness to place their forces under British or Allied officers. War Office are opposed to issue of further armament as they consider this would only aggravate the situation.

What are your views on this point and on the general question of how far it would be possible or desirable in present circumstances to assist the Armenians?¹

¹ Mr. Wardrop replied in Tiflis telegram No. 33 of September 23, 1919 (received September 26): 'There is much to be said in support of War Office view. . . . On the whole the suggestion I venture to make subject to your Lordship's approval is: That a sympathetic reply be given to Armenian appeal and that so far as equipment (boots, clothing, etc.) is concerned arrangements might be made to supply demand. I would prefer to leave supply of arms and ammunition to Americans and gather from my conversation with M. Khatisian (see my telegram No. 12 [No. 420]) that there was no urgent need of these. As to loan of British Officers I am inclined to think in this respect (we might) do well to give conditionally (? favourable) reply. Such officers should be very carefully selected. . . . To use our officers as actual combatants would involve some risk to our prestige and might have many disadvantages: they should rather be expert advisers and administrators.' In reply to this telegram Foreign Office telegram No. 85 to Tiflis, dated November 15, 1919, stated: 'We presume any officers it may be possible to send would have status of advisers to Armenian Military Authorities and that they would be paid by the Armenian Government. But we should be glad of confirmation and also to know number and seniority you consider would be required and approximate rate of pay.' (Sir Eyre Crowe made certain personal observations upon this question in a letter of November 17, 1919, from Paris to the Foreign Office; this letter related more particularly to Turkish affairs, and is printed in Vol. IV.)

No. 430

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received September 20)
No. 507 Telegraphic [131955/956/57]

PEKING, September 17, 1919

My telegram No. 499.¹

Sir C. Eliot whom I consulted here² regarding proposed occupation by Japanese of Chinese E. Railway informed me he would not have approved of proposal had it been submitted to him.

I consider question is essentially a political one of far-reaching importance and cannot be treated purely from military point of view.

Repeated to Tokyo and Vladivostock.

¹ No. 422.

² Sir C. Eliot passed through Peking on his return to England upon the relinquishment of his office of High Commissioner in Siberia prior to his being appointed H.M. Ambassador in Tokyo.

No. 431

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received September 18)
Unnumbered. Telegraphic [131006/956/57]

PEKING, September 17, 1919

Following received from Tokyo yesterday No. 369.

Very Confidential.

Your telegram No. 400¹ to Peking.

Military Attaché was informed some time ago in the course of conversation at War Office that any invitation to Japan to send troops west of Lake Baikal would have to come from combined Allies. This is confirmed by General Knox's telegram of September 5 from Omsk to War Office and appears to be present attitude of Japanese Government (see Military Attaché's . . .² to-day to War Office). I understand that in any case control of railways will be *sine qua non*.

As regards suggestion to press Chinese Government as an inducement to Japanese Government to send troops (? I venture to) associate myself entirely with view expressed in third paragraph of Sir J. Jordan's telegram No. 499³ to Foreign Office and to suggestion that, if it is decided to carry out War Office proposal that *combined Allied Governments* (with) full co-operation of America, should frankly place it (? before) Japanese Government and invite their . . .² at leaving latter to exact their own conditions.

On September 14 Viscount Kato⁴ made another political speech in which he took gloomy view of (? plan of operation)s in Siberia, pointing out that present Japanese force there was too small to establish firm Russian Government but too large if it was only intended (? protection of loyal) residents.

¹ No. 413.

² The text here is uncertain.

³ No. 422.

⁴ Former Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and member of the House of Peers.

He called on Government to (engage) in full consultation with the other Allies in order that definite Siberian policy might be established.

Repeated to Vladivostock.⁵

⁵ In the light of the replies received from Peking and Tokyo with regard to the proposal contained in No. 413, Lord Hardinge on September 30, 1919, sent a letter to the Director of Military Intelligence enclosing copies of the above-mentioned replies and of a note of September 2, 1919, received in the Foreign Office from the American Ambassador in London. (For a summary of this note see No. 613. The full text of the note is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, pp. 574-8.) The Director of Military Intelligence was informed that 'in view of the information contained in the enclosed telegrams and in the United States Ambassador's note, Lord Hardinge considers that no useful purpose would be served by making the proposals as to the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway' which had been suggested by the War Office (cf. No. 413). 'In the meantime however, Lord Hardinge proposes to address a further note to the United States Ambassador inquiring whether the United States Government would agree to keep their troops in Siberia.' This 'further note' constituted the British reply, under date of September 30, 1919, to the American note of September 2. The text of the British note of September 30 is printed in substance, *ibid.*, p. 585. (In telegram No. 784 of September 21 from Vladivostok—received September 25—Mr. O'Reilly had referred to a Foreign Office telegram transmitting to him the substance of the American note of September 2, and stated that in the circumstances 'I feel sure that Americans would take proposal [in No. 413] unkindly'.)

No. 432

Earl Curzon to Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok)

No. 558 Telegraphic [129878/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, September 18, 1919

Your telegrams Nos. 772¹ and 775.²

You should do nothing in any way to weaken position of Koltchak to whom the Allies accorded their support, who is still the only figure who represents a possible Russian Government and whom Denikin recognizes as his Chief. You should not give any encouragement to Czechs or other rivals or allow them to suppose that we are prepared to accept them as an alternative to Koltchak.

¹ No. 416.

² No. 424.

No. 433

Colonel Pirie-Gordon (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received September 18)

No. 49 Telegraphic [131008/67181/59]

REVAL, September 18, 1919

Your telegram No. 41.¹ Have communicated sense of your instructions to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Poska. He assured me by unanimous decision Estonian Cabinet had decided not to make peace without permission of Great Britain. He again emphasised necessity for entering into peace negotiations for internal reasons as blind to satisfy public opinion. Do not . . .²

¹ See No. 426, note 1.

² The text here is uncertain.

any Ministers will make actual peace as it is generally believed here that peace will be prelude to Bolshevik insurrection. Consequently utmost point to which Government is at present prepared to go is a cessation of actual hostilities provided Bolsheviks withdraw from wide belt of country to be constituted a neutral zone. Poska has undertaken on behalf of his Government not even to do this without permission of the British Government. It must however be remembered that at present moment Esthonian Army is not to be entirely relied on and one regiment especially is becoming remarkably undisciplined. If His Majesty's Government have any interest in maintenance of struggle against Bolsheviks on this front, as would appear to be the case from fact that it is not considered expedient that Esthonian Government should enter into peace negotiations with Bolsheviks, submit it is desirable that some encouragement be given to Baltic States to continue war. Again suggest easiest way to hearten Esthonians is to (? tell) them at once that Great Britain will either recognise their independence as from date Petrograd is taken with Esthonian co-operation or if it does not (lie in the) power of His Majesty's Government to recognise independence of any new State, to assure them that . . .² and support of proposal for such recognition by whole of Allies in Paris. It is not necessary recognition should have form of guarantee to maintain such independence against all comers. Poska asks His Majesty's Government to advise as to possibility of forming a Baltic alliance of Four States represented at a recent Reval Conference and (told) me that no official overtures have been made by any fifth party to enter into such alliance if formed.

Sent to Helsingfors and Riga.

No. 434

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received September 19)
No. 471 Telegraphic [131320/67181/59]

HELSINGFORS, September 18, 1919

My telegrams Nos. 465 and 469.¹

At their request I saw Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs today.

I can summarise interviews by stating that Finnish Government are at present prepared (? 'to' omitted) decide their policy in regard to Soviet Russia in absolute accordance with wishes of His Majesty's Government.

Failing however intimation in nearest future of what is required of them it will be believed that His Majesty's Government have disinterested themselves from Finnish attitude to Russia.

In reply to these statements I have informed Finnish Government that His Majesty's Government on September 17 requested Esthonian Government to take no action in direction of peace but to direct their foreign policy,

¹ Not printed.

in future as heretofore (? only) as part of a concerted plan with Allied Governments. I could not suppose there was any justification for this belief.²

² On September 19, 1919, the Finnish Legation in London addressed a note to the Foreign Office (received September 22) requesting that the Finnish Government might be informed as to the attitude of 'the Allied Powers' with regard to possible developments in connexion with 'the reports that the Soviet Government of Russia is making overtures for peace to Esthonia, Lettland and Lithuania'.

No. 435

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received September 20)

No. 20 Telegraphic [131980/1015/58]¹

TIFLIS, September 19, 1919

Your Lordship's telegram No. 10² of 11th September.

I believe Germans are trying to send not only consul but a duly accredited diplomatic representative to this country, whose independence, as you are aware, was long ago recognised by them.

It will put Georgian Government, who have never been so friendly towards England, in a very awkward position if German officials, consular or diplomatic, succeed in reaching Tiflis, and I hope this may be prevented, for general public are overwrought and impatient at waiting so long for a sign from us, and might in despair welcome any outside offer of assistance, especially as Germans were on their good behaviour here³ and perfidiously posed as friends and protectors of Georgians against the Turks.

Municipal authorities have already received from Germany numerous tempting offers of water-pipes and other material, for which nine months' credit would be given. So far, only goods actually received from Germany were those *ex* steamship *Christian Indeel*, bought last year.

Germany is also trying by every possible means to attract young men to her educational and technical institutions, but, on the other hand, ten youths are leaving as soon as possible for England for technical training at their own expense with a British officer at present here; many more would go, but journey and cost of living and teaching are appreciably higher than in Germany.

Whole future of this country seems to me to depend upon speedy action calculated to clear political atmosphere by some authoritative statement on the part of His Majesty's Government or Allies generally regarding political future of Transcaucasia. It would be sufficient if this were a merely provisional recognition of *de facto* Governments, subject to final decision by Peace Conference, but with some assurance that acts of republics would not be disavowed.

¹ The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

² Not printed. This telegram briefly transmitted a report that a German Consul and staff were due to arrive shortly at Tiflis.

³ i.e. during the German military occupation of the Caucasus in the latter part of the First World War.

This would result in—

- (a) Flow hither of British capital, which is only waiting for some guarantee of reasonable safety to take up great industrial and commercial schemes announced, which would immediately steady exchange. I understand there are in circulation about 1 milliard roubles of paper currency, which, at present rate, are equal to only about £2,000,000, while one concession alone, in which Crisp has been interested for several years (electric work connected with Aragva and Saliek Rivers), is estimated to require about £15,000,000.
- (b) Complete establishment of public order and security for life and property. I should mention that impartial observers like Captain Gracey are deeply impressed by enormous improvement in this respect which has taken place since this republic declared its independence. Within last few days it is true there have been daily attacks on railway trains; but this is mere organised provocation, which is being vigorously dealt with, *e.g.*, 800 Bolshevik Ossets,⁴ Jews and Russians have been arrested, I am informed, during last few days, and a very drastic policy, including military law for railways, is on the point of being adopted.

Agrarian question is a contributory fact to this unrest, for if once peasants knew Government was recognised as competent to deal with land-ownership they would readily pay tax, which, under Bolshevik influence, they are now frequently indisposed to do, and they would themselves see to suppression of brigandage. At present agitators (yesterday a Russian monk was arrested at Gudaut with a large supply of Bolshevik propaganda and letters from Denikin's army to well-known intriguers in Batoum) tell buyers of land that their titles are worthless, as Denikin will come here and restore monarchy and reactionary rule.

Your Lordship is well aware that, despite ratification of peace with Germany, that country is determined to carry on war against us here by political and economic methods, and it would seem desirable that public of Great Britain should be made fully aware of this fact. German agents are busy with most unscrupulous propaganda against us, using Bolsheviks and Jews for the purpose, and they are also trying underhand way[s] to capture trade and secure concessions. We need experienced financial and commercial men of standing to cope with situation. It is urgent that we should stimulate British manufacturers, merchants and capitalists to come in and dominate this market, where they would be received with open arms.

Italians have officially offered to provide free of charge twenty experts to advise all the departments of the Georgian Government, but latter, realising that this is merely disguised manœuvre on behalf of German (who has already begun introducing his goods under Italian marks), have declined offer. They have been also offered a regiment to garrison Batoum, if we evacuate that place.

Vigorous action on the part of His Majesty's Government can alone save this country from falling into orbit of Germany.

⁴ A Caucasian people.

We have now an excellent chance which we may lose by procrastination, thus jeopardising our prestige and power in Persia and East generally.

Recognition of republics seems to me matter of urgency. Whatever may happen to Russia, I venture to take view that independence of Transcaucasia (which Germany and Turkey have already recognised as far as Georgia is concerned) is a British interest of prime importance for the sake of India and Persia, where Russia in future, whether she be under German influence, or Bolshevik or Denikinist, will inevitably give us continual trouble.

No. 436

*M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received September 22)*¹

No. 12/1232 Telegraphic: by wireless [131991/9/38]

[September 19, 1919]

Stipulations of the Danish Government tending to limit our free choice of representatives and to assign to the latter some special place of abode in conjunction with the treatment of our various representatives by the Danish Authorities and the expulsion of our Red Cross Delegates compel us to reject Denmark as place of meeting. We wish to make it clear that we cannot allow our representatives to be placed in humiliating conditions of semi-arrest similar to those in which our Red Cross Mission found itself in France. We suggest therefore Sweden, Norway or Holland. Anticipating no objections on the part of the Governments concerned we would agree to send instead of a Commission only one representative with a small staff of one or two secretaries in which case our Representative would be Mr. Litvinoff who takes great interest in the exchange of prisoners and is familiar with this question. We accept the rest of your suggestions as laid down in your radio number 55 of September Fifteenth.² 1232.

People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs,

TCHITCHERINE

¹ This message was wirelessly via Paris from Tsarskoie Selo, having evidently been relayed from Moscow.

² Wireless relay from Paris of No. 417.

No. 437

Colonel Pirie-Gordon (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received September 23)

No. 56 Telegraphic [132800/140/59]

REVAL, September 21, 1919

Following note has been received from Esthonian Government.¹

Begins. Esthonian Government has always endeavoured to conduct its

¹ This note of September 21 from M. Poska to Colonel Pirie-Gordon (original text received in Foreign Office on October 4) was in reply to a note of September 19 which Colonel Pirie-Gordon had addressed to the Esthonian Government in accordance with instructions in No. 426.

foreign policy in accordance with desire of Allied and Associated Governments. I must confess that this task has been by no means easy, in fact at times almost impossible, as we have been in receipt of no authentic information with regard to plans which Allies have agreed on amongst themselves nor as to part which Esthonia was expected to play.

With regard to acceptance of peace proposals put forward by Soviet Government of Russia, Esthonian Government does not see its way clear to refuse to treat for following reasons:—We were obliged to take up arms against enemy numerically much stronger than ourselves in order to defend our country against Bolshevik hordes and to secure our independence against designs of Russians. As soon as enemy departed from his design of occupying our country and declared his readiness to recognize our independence, Government had no valid reason which it could place before the people and army for sanctioning further bloodshed and economic sacrifices. Esthonian Government, being responsible for welfare of people, is obliged to ascertain whether Soviet Government of Russia is in a position to supply necessary guarantee for fulfilment of their promises so that in case of non-compliance army and people may clearly understand task is not yet concluded and that struggle must continue, whereas in case of compliance it [*sic*] would apply to Allied and Associated Governments for their assent.

It is obvious that the very best guarantee against further invasions would be downfall of Bolshevik rule in Russia and establishment of Government which would recognise our independence, for if this latter condition is wanting Esthonia would see itself obliged to take up arms again to defend its independence against any future Russian Government. Unfortunately Russian forces who have made it their task to overthrow Bolshevik rule, viz. [Ko]lchak and those who have gathered round him, with sole exception of North West Russian Government are tooth and nail against recognition of Esthonian independence. By adopting this attitude they rob our people of all desire to assist them in their struggle and more especially as we have been officially informed Great Britain, to whom we are bound by ties of immense gratitude, has decided to withdraw her assistance, and although France is ready to lend her aid, she looks for recompense in exports or cash, neither of which we are able to supply.

For these reasons Esthonian Government would be pleased to know what role Esthonia is expected to perform in plan agreed on by Allied and Associated Governments, whether it would not be possible to inspire our people and troops to undertake fresh sacrifices to bring about overthrow of Bolshevik rule, by formal acknowledgement of our independence, and finally what steps it is proposed to take to enable our troops to obtain supplies and equipment.

Sent to Riga and Helsingfors for the information of General Marsh.

Colonel Tallents (Riga) to Earl Curzon (Received September 23)

No. 131 Telegraphic [132426/855/59]

RIGA, September 22, 1919

In reply to invitation for suggestions contained in your telegram 44¹ Latvian Government have addressed letter to me expressing readiness to continue fighting Bolsheviks provided His Majesty's Government will:

1. Recognise *de jure* independence of Latvia.
2. Enforce evacuation of German and Russian troops.
3. Secure gradual supplies of complete military provisions for 75 to 100 thousand men.
4. Ensure long term loan of about £15,000,000.

I have suggested informally that their attitude towards Bolshevik proposal cannot so lightly be defined before coming meeting at Dorpat in view of their engagement to act in concert with other Baltic States. I have also pointed out complete replies cannot be expected to these questions by next Conference of Baltic States on September 28.

They have however been driven to ask them by internal agitation which point[s] to failure of Allies either to expel Germans from Courland or to support Latvian Government adequately against them. I request urgently that I may be informed by evening of September 26 what interim assurance I may give to Latvian Government on above points and may receive report on progress of unofficial financial negotiations now proceeding with Fortington in London.²

Repeated to Paris.

¹ No. 426.

² See No. 91, note 3.

No. 439

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received September 25)

No. 785 Telegraphic [133665/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 22, 1919

Since my telegram No. 775¹ Mr. Hodgson telegraphed details of Democratic measures contemplated at Omsk, and Czech representative here assures me that Czech Command would in no circumstances give physical support to anti-Government movement. I told representative . . .² that as Omsk Government was taking steps in the direction his friends desired, it seemed to me to be their duty as patriotic Russians to work with and not against Government and that they should not count upon presence of Allied troops here to prevent their arrest in certain circumstances. He said that they would do nothing violent or precipitate (? and that) their programme

¹ No. 424.

² The text here is uncertain.

now was to call a conference of Zemstvos before doing anything further. I pointed out that this was just what Admiral Koltchak was doing.

I have told representative of Omsk Government here all about the above in writing to avoid any misrepresentation.

Admiral Koltchak has published a rescript dated September 16th direct- (? ing) Prime Minister to work out (? in the) near future a project for organization of a state Zemstvo conference as a legislative advisory organ having right to interpellate Minister and to express desire as to necessity of inaugurating legislative and administrative (? measures).

Situation seems much improved, movement here having doubtless stimulated action at Omsk and latter having damped down movement here so that things are moving the way we want.

United States Ambassador thinks that they may now want just leaving alone. He is impressed with good sense of Czechs. He is preparing recommendation on whole Siberian situation.

Repeated to Omsk and Tokyo.

No. 440

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received December 4)

No. 431 [158349/11/57]

PEKING, September 22, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 498 and 509¹ of the 12th and 19th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from the Acting British consul-general at Mukden, reporting such facts as could be ascertained concerning Ataman Semenov's recent visit to that place.

General Horvat informed His Majesty's consul at Harbin that the object of Semenov's visit was to secure his recognition by Chang Tso Lin² as a Prince of Mongolia, involving the right to safeguard that territory and to station troops along the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It is naturally difficult to discover what actually passed at Mukden, though various rumours are current of an understanding between the Japanese, Chang Tso Lin and Semenov.³ Both the latter are generally believed to be financed by, and under

¹ Not printed.

² Chinese Military Governor of Mukden.

³ In a later telegram of October 8, 1919 (Peking No. 533: received October 10) Sir J. Jordan repeated a telegram from H.M. Consul at Harbin stating in part: 'General Horvat also told me that on day following Seminov interview with Military Governor of Mukden, Japanese Consul General (? there) called on Military Governor and asked that Chinese should not interfere in any measures Seminov might take along Chinese Eastern Railway.' Sir J. Jordan commented on this telegram: 'There can hardly be any doubt that all these intrigues with Seminov are undertaken to further object at which Japanese intervention in Siberia has aimed from outset. That object has been eventual control of Chinese Eastern Railway and reversion of Russian rights in Manchuria and Mongolia and Japanese influence will always be found on side of whatever party most likely to lend itself to attainment of these ends.'

the control of the Japanese who at present practically dominate the whole situation east of Irkutsk.

(Copy to Tokyo.)

I have, &c.,
J. N. JORDAN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 440

Mr. Porter (Mukden) to Sir J. Jordan (Peking)

No. 63

MUKDEN, *September 16, 1919*

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 15¹ of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report what little I have been able to gather concerning the recent visit of the Ataman Semenov to Mukden.

The Ataman arrived here on the evening of the 8th September, accompanied by a staff of twenty-eight persons, including two Chinese officers attached to the Military Governor of Kirin.

The party put up in the Miyako Hotel, and on the following morning the Ataman had a lengthy interview with the Military Governor, Chang Tso Lin. In the evening the whole party, including some Japanese officers and a large number of Chinese officials who were in Mukden for the funeral ceremonies of the mother of General Sun-lieh-chen, the Military Governor of Heilungkiang, were entertained to dinner by the Military Governor. On the 10th instant the Ataman and his party returned to Harbin by the noon train.

According to the Manchuria *Daily News*, the object of the visit of Ataman Semenov to Mukden, which had been made at the suggestion of the Military Governor of Kirin, was to place his relations with Chang Tso Lin on a more cordial footing, the Ataman's recent actions in Mongolia having not unnaturally aroused Chinese suspicions. Semenov is stated to have made the following proposals to Chang: '(1) the Harbin-Kwangchengtzu section of the Chinese Eastern Railway should be placed under the control of the Semenov troops in place of Lieutenant-General Horwath; (2) support in the independence movement of the Semenov troops was asked for the military inspector; (3) defensive measures should be taken jointly against the Bolsheviks; and (4) the Semenov troops were desirous of enlisting raw recruits in Outer Mongolia and North Manchuria.'

Chang is stated to have replied that (1) and (4) of the above proposals were outside the pale of his authority and should be referred to the Central Government, that (2) was at the discretion of Ataman himself, while he expressed concurrence with (3).

The Ataman is stated to have been somewhat dissatisfied with the result of his interview with Chang Tso Lin.

The Russian consul-general here, to whom I applied for information regarding Ataman Semenov's visit, stated that he was unacquainted with Semenov, and that the latter had not troubled to notify him of his intended visit. He gave me the impression that he considered Semenov a mere adven-

turer who had been placed by circumstances in a position for which he was scarcely qualified, the result of which had been to foster an overweening vanity which made him very difficult to deal with. He also considered that Semenof was now little more than a paid Japanese agent.

The Ataman did not call upon any of the foreign consuls during his stay in Mukden, but just before he left, the Japanese consul-general visited him in his hotel, and remained half an hour. A considerable number of Chinese and Japanese officials went to the railway station to see him off.

A somewhat romantic episode occurred when the Ataman was leaving his hotel for the railway station. A woman, said to be a notorious gypsy woman with whom the Ataman had for some time past been living in intimate relations, and who appears to have been discarded by him on the arrival in the Far East of his own wife, who is now in Japan, suddenly ran forward and, addressing reproaches to him, swallowed some poison and immediately collapsed. She was removed to the Japanese hospital for treatment, and appears to have survived.

I have, &c.,
HAROLD PORTER

No. 441

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Riga)

No. 59 Telegraphic [132416/8/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 23, 1919*

Announcement of readiness of His Majesty's Government to recognise provisional Government of Lithuania as a *de facto* independent body on the same footing as Governments of Esthonia and Latvia has just been made to Lithuanian Representative here.¹ You should make similar announcement to Lithuanian Government.²

Repeated to Helsingfors, Warsaw, Stockholm, Christiania and Copenhagen.

¹ This announcement had been approved by Mr. Balfour in reply to No. 386.

² In a telegram of September 30 (Reval No. 265: received October 1) Colonel Tallents reported that Lithuanian representatives had informed him that the 'announcement of their national independence having been recognised by England was received with greatest enthusiasm. It was celebrated by spontaneous crowd of 15,000 in Kovno and in small country places throughout Lithuania on Sunday [September 28].'

No. 442

Earl Curzon to Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors)

No. 643 Telegraphic [131320/67181/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 24, 1919*

Your telegram No. 471¹ (of September 18).

Please inform Finnish Government that His Majesty's Government welcome the proposal of the Finnish Government to act only in accordance with their wishes and that for the present policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Russia remains unchanged.

¹ No. 434.

No. 443

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received September 29)
No. 786 Telegraphic [135026/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, September 24, 1919

Your telegram 558.¹

I have just (? seen) Diplomatic representative of Omsk Government who had received letter in which as reported in my telegram 785² I had related all that had passed between me and representatives of anti-Government movement. He thanked me warmly. I said he would always find me ready to fight battles of Admiral Kolchak's Government if they would supply ammunition as they were now doing, but that it was an uphill business so long as they made provincial Governors out of brigands like Kalmykow, who lately shot ten men without trial at Habarovsk. Kalmykow and his Cossacks are now here, having been brought in by Governor-General in view of possible disorders. They kidnapped in broad daylight in main street a Cossack Colonel who possessed (? evidence of) Kalmykow's atrocities. Body was found mutilated in suburbs.

I respectfully submit line taken by me is in best interests of Admiral (Kolchak) and calculated to strengthen his hand. By letting his Government think that we are committed to supporting them regardless of their (? behaviour) we should encourage them in courses which (? evidently) only lead to their destruction and discredit.

Repeated to Tokyo and Omsk.

¹ No. 432.

² No. 439.

No. 444

M. Litvinov to Earl Curzon (Received September 27)¹
No. 12/2124 Telegraphic: by wireless [134572/9/38]

MOSCOW, September 25, 1919

Referring to our radio of September nineteenth number 12/1232² I intend taking with me three wounded British prisoners of war who are in need of speedy orthopaedic treatment. It is expected that the necessary arrangements will be made for the free passage of these men through the Esthonian front line. Nr. 12/2124.

LITVINOFF³

¹ This message was wirelessed via Paris.

² No. 436.

³ On September 29, 1919, a telegram was sent from the Foreign Office to Sir G. Grahame at Paris containing a message for wireless transmission to M. Litvinov. This message acknowledged receipt of his communication of September 25, stated that the Esthonian Government was being approached with a view to securing the necessary free passage, and requested the names and regiments of the three prisoners.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Bosanquet (Reval)

No. 157 Telegraphic [132426/855/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 25, 1919*

The numerous requests for assistance in different forms and for a definite declaration of policy that are continually addressed to His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Baltic States, have required the former to reconsider the question in its broadest aspect. It now appears that none of the States concerned wishes or intends to act separately, and that concerted action is in contemplation. Indeed, a conference has been summoned for the purpose on the 29th September, at which the replies to the overtures of the Soviet Government will be duly considered.

His Majesty's Government have no right to anticipate what the decision of the Conference may be. It will doubtless be arrived at from a consideration of the future interests of the States as a whole, as well as of the preservation of the liberties of the individual States who with the aid of the Allies have fought so bravely for their freedom. This has in each case been successfully achieved; and it remains to be decided by what means it may be most effectively safeguarded in the future.

His Majesty's Government have already recognised the autonomous existence of the Governments of the Baltic States, and have dealt with them as such. The question of the *de jure* recognition of the independence of the States is one which it is impossible for them to decide upon their own responsibility, or in severance from their Allies. The Peace Conference alone or the League of Nations sitting in sequel to the Peace Conference can arrive at a definite decision on a matter, in which interests more comprehensive than those of any individual State or community are concerned. In any such decision His Majesty's Government may be relied upon to exert such influence as they possess to secure the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of Esthonia, so far as may be consistent with a final and peaceful settlement in North-East Europe.

The principal menace by which this settlement is now threatened and delayed is the presence of German forces under General von der Goltz. The retirement of these forces is the first condition of the achieved liberation of the States. Marshal Foch, acting on behalf of the Allies, has already requested the German Government, through the Armistice Commission, to order their immediate withdrawal, and in view of the failure of the German authorities to comply with this request, steps are now being taken to apply definite measures of coercion, by which the speedy evacuation of these territories may be secured.¹

His Majesty's Government are asked whether they can continue to supply military material and stores to the States whom they have assisted in their struggle for freedom. The reduction of the available stocks of material

¹ See Chapter I.

consequent upon the termination of the war and the shortage of shipping unfortunately render it impossible to continue these contributions, which have hitherto fallen almost exclusively upon Great Britain. This decision is arrived at without prejudice to any action that may be taken by any other of the Allied Powers or by the Powers acting in Paris as a whole.

Neither is this decision intended to imply any abandonment of the States in the event of their boundaries being crossed and their existence imperilled by an invasion of Bolshevik forces. In such a case, where the national liberties of Esthonia would be at stake, His Majesty's Government might be prepared to make the sacrifices, which are not justified by present conditions, and to reconsider their decision as to the supply of war material.

Similarly as regards the provision of credit, it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to assume at this stage a financial responsibility which they have hitherto been unable to accept. While they have exerted themselves to aid the States in the provision of loans from independent quarters, they cannot, in view of the grave financial straits in which the entire world is placed, depart from the attitude in this respect which they have consistently assumed.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that they are not entitled to exercise any pressure upon the free initiative of the Baltic States and that their Governments must be at liberty to decide upon such action as may be most conducive to the preservation of their own national existence. It is for them to determine with unfettered judgment whether they should make any arrangement, and if so of what nature, with the Soviet authorities; and if, as seems to be in contemplation, they decide to act in unison, the effective control of the situation should be within their power.

His Majesty's Government will not cease to use their influence, both in the councils of the Allies and through their diplomatic representatives in the States, to assist in the preservation of their liberties and in the task of their economic and commercial reorganisation.

You should make a communication in the above sense to the Esthonian Government.

Addressed to Riga (No. 66) and Kovno (No. 1); repeated to Astoria (No. 1179); Helsingfors (No. 646), and Warsaw (No. 288).²

² In a telegram of October 2 (Reval No. 273: received October 3) reporting on the outcome of the Baltic Conference held at Dorpat on September 29–October 1, Colonel Tallents stated that the 'declaration of policy contained in your telegram No. 66 [No. 445] had a very good effect in remedying impression that His Majesty's Government, while giving inadequate military and no financial support, expected continued advances against Bolsheviks. All delegates expressed approval towards England and they specially desire to retain her support.' The same telegram reported that the Conference at Dorpat had decided, in particular, that 'Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania will inform Bolshevik Government that they are inclined to begin preliminary pourparlers of peace not later than October 25. Finland will put matter definitely before their Diet and will communicate its decision to other States before October 23.'

No. 446

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)

No. 21 Telegraphic [132909/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 26, 1919*

Your telegram No. 28¹ (of September 22nd).

There is no intention at present of making any change in the status of Batoum. For the time being a British force will remain there.

¹ Not printed. This telegram reported an allegation by the Georgian Government 'that subordinate Russian officials acting in interests of General Denikin but pretending to be carrying out instructions of British Commandant are threatening Mussulman inhabitants of Batoum province and endeavouring to force them to pass resolutions against pro-Georgian action of local Mejlis'.

No. 447

*M. Sabline to Mr. Gregory (Received September 30)*¹

No. 1033 [135076/3669/38]

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, *September 26, 1919*

My dear Gregory,

General Miller telegraphs that British troops are evacuating Archangel with such despatch as to render his task of maintaining order in the city after the evacuation a very difficult one.

As the Port of Archangel is open until the end of October, and, according to the Archangel delegates, even later with the use of icebreakers, would it be possible to instruct Lord Rawlinson to effect the evacuation with less speed so that the British troops might remain there one week more?

Yours sincerely,
E. SABLINE

¹ The date is that of entry on the Foreign Office file. It appears probable that the date of original receipt in the Foreign Office was earlier.

No. 448

Lord Hardinge to Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok)

No. 571 Telegraphic [129878/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 27, 1919*

Private.

It is essential that you should bear in mind the official warning sent to you in F.O. Tel. No. 558¹ of Sept. 18.

HARDINGE

¹ No. 432.

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 2)
No. 797 Telegraphic [156301/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 27, 1919*

Following from Omsk, September 23rd.

General situation is at present as follows:—

Position (? on) front is still critical though resumption of offensive¹ has had most stimulating effect on armies which have advanced along whole front and are now approaching Tobol river (? behind) which Bolsheviks have evidently decided to withdraw. Operation can only be considered partially successful since Syrmia [*sic*] Cossack Corps which should have got behind the enemy and intercepted his retreat on the Tobol has failed to do this. Thus opportunity of destroying Red Army has been lost. Once behind the Tobol enemy will be able to await reinforcements from South which are known to be on the way and when they arrive will be able to resume offensive. It is doubtful whether Siberian Army, exhausted and without reserves, will be able to withstand it.

Internal position is still unsatisfactory but may quite well be remedied if Government will utilise response given by . . .² they could to develop reforms. Decision to call Zemstvo and Cossack Assembly was taken lately and details of project are not yet elaborated. Generally comments are favourable. Cutting down of unwieldy and unnecessary administrative establishments is being taken in hand: notably (? large) general headquarters has been reduced to minimum. Jealousies and intrigues between leading (? dignitarie)s, mainly heads of military organisations, still continue and are liable at any time to cause dangerous complications.

Hostility to Allies is gaining all classes. Failure to recognise Kolchak Government, buffer-state policy entailing dismemberment of Russia, cessation of military aid and absence of financial and economic assistance when these are most required are habitual themes of reproach. America is principal object of antipathy but feeling against (? France) also runs (? high). Great Britain has all through enjoyed a somewhat privileged position but she is rapidly losing this as the Russians charge her with abandoning them in their hour of need. Relations towards (? Czechs) have taken turn for the better since Cossacks have started paying (? court) to them in order to get their help on front, while Japan is continually gaining sympathy.

Popularity of Admiral Kolchak has suffered from his own mistakes and failure of his Government to secure improved internal administration. Treatment of Horvat and Gaida recently has weakened his hold in Far East and caused resentment amongst Czechs.

Government is habitually characterized as reactionary, but I³ do not admit justice of charge. Ministers are mostly politically colourless, some inclined to Socialism and none Extremists but, country being in state of war,

¹ By the forces of Admiral Kolchak.

² The text here is uncertain.

³ i.e. Mr. Hodgson.

(? Government) inevitably falls into the hands of Military Authorities who are often of reactionary tendencies.

Financial situation is desperate allowing of no possible issue except foreign loan. Economic situation is equally bad: all existing stocks of goods are requisitioned and imports automatically come to a stop: with loss of Ural whole productive capacity of country is paralysed and railway becomes dependent upon supplies from abroad. Transport is disorganised: country is flooded with refugees for whom neither accommodation nor occupation are available and amongst whom epidemic of disease is already rife: there is an almost complete absence of clothing and other articles of necessity.

By its own efforts Government cannot emerge from this position even granted continuance of successes on the front, for country is exhausted and has no recuperative power: yet its downfall will mean chaos and at the best assumption of power by left Social Revolutionaries who will seek for compromise with Bolshivism. Failing financial and economic relief it must fall and (? Ural)⁴ problem of Siberia will have to be faced anew.

⁴ An emendation on the original suggested that this should read 'whole'.

No. 450

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 2)
No. 798 Telegraphic [136302/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 27, 1919*

Following received from Omsk, September 22nd.

General Graves¹ has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that he is recommending his Government to cease despatch of all supplies to Siberia until Koltchak takes energetic measures to remove Atamans Semenoff and Kalmikoff. Meanwhile he has put embargo on 14,000 rifles now lying in Vladivostok which were bought in America and paid for in gold and are now urgently required for front. He has also stated he is closing Vladivostok paper (? Gori) ? Rodini (successor of Go(? ri) Primory(? e) recently closed at his instigation by Russian Authorities) for publishing article(? s) offensive to America and intends to arrest Editor.

Minister for Foreign Affairs who realizes that he must not antagonise America at present is telegraphing to Graves asking that . . .² matters be referred to Washington.

Hostility of Mr. Morris to Koltchak's Government besides being important factor in aid of (? Czech) Government movement in East has caused withdrawal of £7,000,000 loan promised by American Bank(s for) covering purchase of military supplies.

As a result Siberian Armies will be naked this winter. Graves is perfectly well aware that Koltchak does not deal energetically with Semenoff and Kalmikoff because he is not strong enough at present time to do so.

¹ General Commanding the U.S. Expeditionary Force in Siberia.

² The text here is uncertain.

Unreasonable attitude of Graves and . . .² Morris seems only explicable on supposition that these two American representatives are anxious to cause to Omsk Government maximum embarrassment at time when it is most in need of support.

No. 451

*Viscount Grey*¹ (*Washington*) to *Earl Curzon* (*Received October 3*)
No. 1407 Telegraphic [136709/11/57]

WASHINGTON, *October 2, 1919*

Secretary of State informed me yesterday that one American soldier had been killed and (? non-commissioned officers and men) flogged at Vladivostok by Russian General Rozanoff² who was violently anti-Ally though making exception in favour of (? Japan). Secretary of State considered attitude of Japanese in this matter very unsatisfactory and expressed great concern at seriousness of situation which made it very difficult for United States Government to get supplies through to Koltchak and increased pressure on United States Government to withdraw from Siberia.

I said I knew nothing of the circumstances and I am only repeating language of Secretary of State for Your Lordship's information.

Repeated to Canada by post.³

¹ H.M. Ambassador in Washington.

² In a telegram of September 30 (Vladivostok No. 804: received October 3) Mr. O'Reilly had reported that 'outrage reported in my telegram 786 [No. 443] has been followed during last week by two cases of shooting of an American and a Czech soldier (? respectively by) Russian officers on slightest provocation'. Mr. O'Reilly further reported upon the joint action with regard to these incidents taken by the Allied Military Representatives in Vladivostok, for which see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, p. 521 f.

³ In reply to this telegram Lord Curzon telegraphed to Lord Grey on October 11, 1919 (tel. No. 1853 to Washington): 'Our reports indicate that some misunderstanding regarding Rozenoff's part in the dispute seems to have arisen, but Japanese do not appear to be especially concerned. I continue to hope earnestly that the United States will leave their troops in Siberia.'

No. 452

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
No. 28 Telegraphic [136702/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 2, 1919*

Your telegram No. 29.¹

It is most important that at this moment when Denikin's progress against the Bolsheviks promises great success he should not be hampered by fear of

¹ Not printed. Cf. No. 454.

attack in the rear. Defeat of Bolshevism, even if we do not take active part in operations, is interest of this country.

You should therefore do all in your power to prevent Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments from taking any unfriendly action themselves against Denikin or encouraging such action in Daghestan, where insurrection financed and led by Bolsheviks is reported to be spreading.

No. 453

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 4)

No. 50 Telegraphic [137269/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 2, 1919

During my conversation with M. Jasarof at Baku, Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 29th September, he told me Azerbaijan Government was being vigorously attacked for not doing something to help Daghestan, but Mahommedans' appeal from that region for help had been sternly refused.

Ittihad Party, which has been one of progressive international parties, and is really affiliated to Turkish Committee of Union and Progress, is trying to rouse public opinion.

2. Bolsheviks are turning most of their attention to Central Asia, and, if they are driven out of Moscow, will make Tashkend their headquarters.

3. Tchitcherin has as his assistant a Baku doctor, Narimanof, who wrote from Astrakhan to Azerbaijan Government urging them to join Persian and Indian efforts in a great movement against England. Dr. Narimanof pointed out there was no desire on the part of Bolsheviks to impose on Mussulman countries Soviet form of government; only necessity was an anti-British policy.

4. To this I may add that Prime Minister, when I was at his house,¹

¹ In a telegram of even date (Tiflis No. 49: received October 4) Mr. Wardrop communicated some 'notes of conversation with M. Ussubbekof, Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, on the 28th September'. These notes included the following: 'Azerbaijan is most anxious to come to arrangement with General Denikin, and Ussubbekof went to Tiflis to persuade Georgians, but Denikin is not so well disposed to latter as to Azerbaijan, where (for mixed motives) he allows Russian officers to serve in army. It makes matters difficult that Denikin has no properly accredited agents in Transcaucasia. Denikinist and Bolshevik rule are equally repugnant to Azerbaijan, and their administration is almost equally bad. . . . At present Transcaucasia is like tail of Russian dog, and whenever things happen in Russia—successes or reverses of Denikin, Kolchak and Trotsky, the wretched tail is wagged. Azerbaijan only wants peace, and has no wish to embark on pan-Islamic-pan-Turk policies. All Transcaucasia looks above all to Great Britain for such moral and material assistance as may be possible in creation of an independent life, and is willing to do all she can to merit confidence and favour of His Majesty's Government. Italians, who came here on a mission, made a very bad impression by their greed for concessions and commercial advantages. (There is a rumour that they have secured contract to construct railway from Aliat, near Baku, to Djulfa.) . . . I may add I have formed a high opinion of M. Ussubbekof's sincerity and of his ability to control policy of his country. Relations I have established with him are promising for the future.'

showed me a letter in Russian and Turkish just sent to him by Tashkend Soviet exactly to same effect as Dr. Narimanof's letter. Tashkend message was carried in the double bottom of a teapot by an Erivan Tartar, who was forced to do this in return for permission to leave Tashkend.

5. M. Jasarof seems very anxious to attract British experts of all kinds to help him by organising country. My own opinion is that, if we could spare good men, it might be well to gratify this wish; such experts would only be responsible to head of State for advice on such matters as finance, railways, education, and any use of word 'control' would be inexpedient. I may mention that our acting vice-consul, Mr. Hewelcke, who is manager of Russian State Bank at Baku, was offered 1,000,000 roubles down and a very large salary to enter service of Government, and a similar offer was made to Major Anderson as a railway expert.

No. 454

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 7)

No. 57 Telegraphic [137986/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 4, 1919

Urgent. Your Lordship's telegram No. 28.¹

My telegram No. 29 (? refer)s to patrolling of railway near Batoum so reference must be to some other telegram of mine.

Statement that movement in Daghestan is financed and led by Bolsheviks is not (? confirm)ed by my (? information) but it is possible that mountaineers would accept help from any source. Denikinists use the word 'Bolshevik stipendiary' as a term of abuse to describe all with whom they disagree.

I never miss an opportunity of impressing on Georgians and Azerbaijanians absolute necessity of (? avoid)ing any unfriendly act against Denikin, and Governments of those countries detest Bolshevism and know that they personally would be (? overcome) at once if Bolsheviks had power.

So far as I understand situation in Daghestan trouble is due to oppressive conduct of Denikin's local officers and presence of Cossack settlers and absence of educated leaders.

Rumours of despatch of aid to Daghestan by Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments seem to me unfounded and malicious and have already been officially (? contradict)ed by both Governments.

I have to-day again verbally told Azerbaijan representative that any encouragement or aid given to Daghestan would be very seriously viewed by His Majesty's Government and I hope to make a similar communication to Georgian Government this evening.

¹ No. 452.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
No. 29 Telegraphic [131980/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 4, 1919

Proposed recognition of Transcaucasian Republics.

Your telegram No. 20¹ of 19th September.

The exact measure of recognition that could properly or safely be accorded to the Transcaucasian republics pending the final settlement of their status by the Peace Conference or the League of Nations is exceedingly difficult to determine, and your proposal that provisional recognition of *de facto* Governments should be accompanied by an assurance that acts of republics will not be disavowed would be tantamount to a *de jure* recognition that would prejudice that settlement, whenever or in whatever form it is ultimately arrived at.

Following are some of the further difficulties with which I am faced:—

1. Your arguments for recognition appear to apply to Georgia alone, while your conclusion is apparently for the recognition of all the republics. Am I to understand that, while recognition of Georgia is in itself alone desirable, recognition of Armenia and Azerbaijan must necessarily follow from it and synchronise with it? And what is then to be done with Daghestan?

2. I am quite in the dark as to what recognition will involve. It is easy to act independently if action is negative, as in the case of the Baltic States, but more difficult and perilous if we are to undertake obligations alone.

3. The internecine struggles of the republics themselves and the fact that their respective frontiers have not been even approximately settled, suggest that recognition might only be the incentive to increased disorders. If the Caucasus States would again form a federation or act together, or conjointly appeal to us or to the Allied Powers to act, it might be easier to deal with the case.

4. The problem of the relations of the republics to Denikin overshadows all the rest. I am constantly assured that Georgia and Azerbaijan are actively supporting the enemies of Denikin beyond their own frontiers, e.g., in Daghestan, and that although they may not have sympathy politically with the Bolsheviks, they are working hand-in-glove with them for Denikin's overthrow. Colour is of course lent to this by the agreement recently concluded between the two republics. Doubt is thrown on its purely defensive character, and evidence of active co-operation with Denikin's enemies is being constantly produced. Unless the republics are able to prove that these accusations are without foundation, and to give some concrete evidence of a desire to reach a friendly arrangement with Denikin, I do not see how it is possible in present circumstances to take any action on their behalf. We cannot afford to have Denikin's whole plan of campaign upset by intrigues in

his rear, nor can we, in order to defeat German schemes in the Caucasus, risk a wholesale defection to Germany of the greater anti-Bolshevik Russia which Denikin represents.

We have recently addressed a message to the Baltic States² pointing out that we have already recognised them as autonomous States and have dealt with them as such. We have told them that the question of *de jure* recognition of their independence is one which the Peace Conference, or the League of Nations sitting as sequel to the Peace Conference, is alone competent to decide, and have added that in any such decision His Majesty's Government may be relied upon to exert such influence as they may possess to secure the satisfaction of their legitimate aspirations so far as may be consistent with a final and peaceful settlement in North-East Europe.

Our [? But]³ Baltic States are acting together, and may even decide, in co-operation, to come to some arrangement with the Russian Soviet Government. In Caucasia it is not easy at present to discover any similar community either of interest or action.

I shall be glad of your views on all these aspects of the case.

² No. 445.

³ The text here is uncertain.

No. 456

Mr. Hoare (Murmansk) to Earl Curzon (Received October 5)

No. 119 Telegraphic [137207/3669/38]

MURMANSK, October 4, 1919

General Rawlinson has recommended that His Majesty's Ship *Erebus* should remain here for next few weeks; question of station throughout winter to be reserved for consideration on his arrival in England.

Such information as I have been able to obtain here indicates that adoption of above course would afford real support to our friends and I do not consider it need commit us to further active (? intervention). Situation is as follows.

Spirit of troops and population is better than on Archangel front and than that of Bolshevik forces opposed to them. Bolsheviks will endeavour to use propaganda on lines that Allies have gone, foodstuffs are very limited and no more can be expected from Allies. Those who join Bolsheviks will receive all the food that is available and others will be left to starve. Resistance will be crushed by force of arms.

Presence of British ships would effect disposal of such propaganda.

I naturally realise that maintenance of British ship at Archangel is impossible as Russians themselves would admit, but this does not apply to Murmansk and refusal to do so is tantamount to withdrawal of sympathy as well as physical support from those who have counted on one as much as on the other.

In my opinion there is virtual certainty that if we are represented here there is little danger of collapse either at front or base whereas if we are not represented at base, there will always be danger of collapse of civilian population and that danger which is recognised by all Russians will inevitably affect morale of troops. Presence of ship would constitute guarantee that if present position were maintained further supplies of flour would be forthcoming when stocks are exhausted in January. It must not be forgotten that we and other Allied Governments have adhered to Treaty of Murmansk signed July last year and that my written advice to acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in favour of withdrawal to Murmansk which you approved laid special stress on advantage of open port from point of view of future supplies.

Before I left Archangel I heard feeling of all classes against British was bitter. This is natural and inevitable and it is a feeling which is I believe already being exploited by Germans. Reputation for good faith has always been one of our greatest assets in Russia and whatever outcome of civil war may be this reputation should not be imperilled.

I realise that a rising might occur here in spite of presence of British ships although I think it most unlikely. Before detailing ships we should make it unmistakably clear to *Erebus* that under no circumstances would C.O. intervene actively. If trouble occur[s] and if Bolsheviks got the upper hand ship would be . . . [? withdrawn]¹ and no more food would be forthcoming.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

No. 457

Mr. Hoare (Murmansk) to Sir J. Tilley (Received October 5)
Unnumbered. Telegraphic [137207/3669/38]

MURMANSK, October 4, 1919

Private.

My telegram No. 119.¹

Most critical period will be first month after evacuation. If R(? awlinson)'s recommendation is adopted I suggest that I stay on board H.M.S. *Erebus* as long as she is here and then return to England. If no ship is left I shall leave October 8th with General Rawlinson as my continued presence would serve no useful purpose.

Please expedite reply.²

¹ No. 456.

² Reply not filed, but Sir J. Tilley minuted on October 7, 1919: 'I have answered Mr. Hoare's private telegram by saying that the matter is not quite settled but that there can be no objection to his remaining on the "*Erebus*" till she leaves, whether now or later. I hope this will be approved. He may have had to decide by himself meanwhile.' Mr. Hoare sailed from Murmansk on board H.M.S. *Erebus* on October 10, 1919.

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 7)

No. 814 Telegraphic [138219/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 4, 1919

My telegram No. 809.¹

I beg leave to commend following propositions to Your Lordship:—

1. That it is desirable that Bolshevism should be defeated preferably by a Government headed by Admiral Koltchak and desirable therefore that a

¹ The reference was to a telegram of October 1 from Vladivostok (received October 6), originally numbered 808 A and renumbered 809. This telegram stated:

"Mr. Preston, late His Majesty's Consul at Ekaterinburg, who, when at Omsk, used to make daily intelligence reports to High Commissioner, has been kind enough to furnish me with the following information regarding anti-Government movement here. Begins.

"The persons taking part in this movement at Vladivostok whom I interviewed yesterday were the following: Mr. Yakoushpetrof(? f) formerly President of Siberian Duma; Valerian Ivanovich Moravsky (a Pole); Jernokoff, agent of organisation at Novo-Nikolaevsk and representative of the Central organisations of Cooperative Societies. And Dr. J. Geiman, a German Jew who styles himself Director of Department of Foreign Affairs of the "All Siberian Union of Zemstvo and Municipalities".

"Of the above German inspires no confidence whilst the others give the impression that they are determined and serious (? men). General(? s) Pepelieff, Boldireff and Gaida are also connected with movement and are to accept prominent positions in the new Government. The movement is apparently supported by Czechs both here and at Irkutsk.

"When asked whether agreement with Koltchak could be arrived at they told me it was out of the question. The very name of Dictator Koltchak, which was entirely contrary to their democratic ideas of Government, would weaken and discredit their movement from the start. They also stated that Koltchak and his Government by their arbitrary methods (punishment for crimes of Cossacks who pillaged rural districts etc.) had done more to implant Bolshevism in Siberia than putting it down. They considered that if their scheme failed nothing could prevent Bolshevism gaining ground in Siberia.

"They assured me that their *coup d'état* would not have the effect of destroying army at the front as they had the army well prepared for it. They were sure that the army could continue to put up defensive against Bolsheviks until volunteers could be enrolled in the rear Siberia who would eventually . . . it [text uncertain]. These volunteers they were sure of because they would be fighting for a Government of their own choosing. As soon as coup had been brought off they intended to convoke Assembly representative of all the Siberian Zemstvos and municipalities, the Cossacks and various nations of Siberia, with the object of forming an administrative apparatus on democratic lines. When asked how they proposed to deal with the financial question, especially (? taking into) consideration that only bullion reserves were in hands of Omsk people, they stated that they thought it would be necessary to place a loan in Allied countries. In this they thought that there would be no difficulty as the Allies would see at once what popularity the Government would enjoy among its own people.

"They stated that 90% of the Siberian Zemstvos and municipalities would vote against Koltchak's half-hearted effort to popularise his Government by inviting Zemstvos to form an advisory legislature. They looked upon this scheme as a very feeble blind put up at the 11th hour by which they were not to be caught. . . .

"They state that they put Koltchak's (? *coup d'état*) which took place (? last year) down to influence of British reactionaries and were informed from (? Omsk) that greatest barrier to their plans was General Knox whose influence with British Government did a lot to keep Koltchak in power. They failed to understand attitude of Western democracies in support-

Government under him should survive and be recognised and amply assisted by Allies.

2. That present Government is likely to succumb to discontent now prevailing in spite of anything we can do for it on present lines, unless discontent is allayed or Allied armed force is used against it.

3. That discontent is not Bolshevik and therefore Allies cannot consistently with their principles use their armed force against it.

4. That reforms now proposed are subterfuge to allay discontent.

5. That more thorough reforms are therefore required for that purpose.

6. That if Czechs leave and are not replaced by other Allied troops Omsk Government will fall by cutting off its communications. It could not survive a retirement.

7. That no other Allied troops are in sight.

8. That it is therefore desirable to induce Czechs to stay.

9. That it is not impossible that they might be induced to stay, but only if Government were made such as they thought worth staying to support, and that Admiral Koltchak's Government should therefore be made such.

10. That Czechs will think Government worth supporting or not according as they think it an effective instrument against Bolshevism or not because their terror is a German Russia and they consider either an autocratic or a Bolshevik Russia would become German. They are better judges of Russian affairs than any of Allies and they consider the more democratic a Russian Government is the more dangerous it is to Bolshevism.

11. That the present proposal of reforms should therefore be extended in hope of securing active support of Czech Army here against Bolsheviks.

12. That principal obstacle of recognition has been failure to satisfy popular parties in Allied countries that Admiral Koltchak's Government is a democratic one.

13. That those parties will not be satisfied by anything but reforms satisfactory to Democratic Russian opinion.

ing Koltchak form of Government, which was born under suspicious circumstances involving loss of innocent lives and contrary to all democratic constitutional lines.

'They were very anxious to know whether Allies would withdraw their troops from Siberia as soon as new Government were in a position to restore order (? within) own military force. They suspected difficulties with Japanese.

'(Cooperation with Denikin). They thought they were striving for same democratic principles as Denikin and therefore did not anticipate any difficulties in cooperating with him.

'Conclusions. Geiman as a Minister for Foreign Affairs creates a very bad impression and one cannot help thinking that he might be a Bolshevik agent especially as he states that they do not intend to take any repressive measures against Bolshevik sympathisers, provided the latter refrain from (? attack, omitted)ing Government with armed force. The other members and faction of people like Czechs, Gaida, Boldireff and Pepelieff are supporting it, giving grounds for supposing that it is a very serious movement, supported by public organisations and intel(? ligencia) of Siberia who (in Siberia) owing to large number of educated emigrants among them represent a far larger proportion of total population than in Russia proper. Ends.'

14. That reforms required to allay Russian non-Bolshevik discontent, to gain support of Czechs, and to satisfy popular opinion in Allied countries are fortunately of the same kind.

15. That they are necessary to enable Admiral Koltchak's Government to defeat Bolshevism and should be therefore (urged) upon him by Allies for his own good as price of continued support and early recognition. Leaders of non-Bolshevik malcontents should at the same time be urged to accept Koltchak's conditions on his accepting reforms and Czechs should be urged to support him on same conditions.

16. If they can all be brought to (agree) Admiral Koltchak will probably not only survive but also succeed and Allies will regain all their popularity here and elsewhere.

17. If he refuses he will probably resign or fall, but Allies would have done their honest best for him and would not only not be involved in discredit but would (have) gained popularity here, except with reactionaries.

18. He would probably be succeeded by some kind of democratic Government enjoying Czech support, and therefore in no danger of becoming Bolshevik, which Allies could recognise and assist and which would possibly be acceptable to Denikin (as its) head.

19. Such a Government would be probably more dangerous to Bolshevism than Koltchak's Government as it is now.

20. Any Siberian Government will require great economic assistance and it would be easier to gain consent of Allied Parliaments to such assistance if it were demonstrably democratic.

(? Above) seems to me to offer best chance (? to us of) preserving Koltchak if it is possible to do so and also if he must fall, of mitigating consequences. It would be a far safer course than to go on banking on success of Koltchak on (? present omitted) lines. It is concurred in by my French (privately) and Italian and Czech colleagues though latter says it is too late and should have come four months ago.

It is of course wrong from a Siberian point of view [*sic*]. Possibly we might keep things going here on present lines till Denikin's (success) makes Siberia secondary. That is General Rozanoff's view in discussing general situation yesterday.

I am telegraphing separately observations of Mr. Preston² and will obtain those of Mr. Hodgson and of Americans here.

Repeated to Tokyo and Omsk.

² Mr. Preston's observations upon Mr. O'Reilly's propositions were transmitted in a telegram of October 5 (Vladivostok No. 816: received October 8). Mr. Preston generally concurred in Mr. O'Reilly's propositions: cf. No. 481. With regard to propositions 16 and 17 Mr. Preston stated: '(16) This is true and credit would be largely reflected on Britain seeing that rightly or not Britain is very widely considered responsible for supporting Koltchak's *coup d'état*. (17) This is true except that Allies and Britain in particular would be probably called responsible for having supported Koltchak's *coup d'état* which in the minds of revolutionary Russians took place under circumstances entirely contrary to all democratic principles and consequently our own.'

No. 459

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 7)
No. 60 Telegraphic [138196/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 5, 1919

From an absolutely trustworthy source I learn that German Government have formally offered to Georgian Government free education in Germany for 300 young men for two years.

I can hardly hope British Government will do anything of this kind but I would point out that the total cost of such a scheme at a maximum of £200 per annum would not (? equal) amount spent by some British firm[s] in advertising alone and that consequent gains from trade would be enormous.

Perhaps Chamber of Commerce might raise fund for giving British training in trade and industry to selected young foreigners from new countries like this. Individual British firms, especially in such branches as machinery and implements, would be well advised to try the experiment of giving free instruction and maintenance to a few suitable young Georgians, Armenians or Azerbaijanis. I need not point out political advantages of such action.¹

¹ A copy of this telegram was transmitted by the Foreign Office to the Department of Overseas Trade on October 17, 1919.

No. 460

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
(Received October 22)

No. 1842 [144289/1089/38]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 8, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information, extract from a report dated September 15, by Major Torin, on the occasion of his visit to Taganrog, dealing with the activities of the Volunteer Army.

I have, etc.,

RICHARD WEBB
for High Commissioner

ENCLOSURE IN No. 460

Extracts from a Report by Major Torin, G.S. 'I', Batoum, Sept. 15, 1919, of a visit to Taganrog.

Copy. G.H.Q. General Staff 'Intelligence', Constantinople, No. 2682/37 'I'.

At Taganrog a conference took place with General Holman on the 5th and General Denikin on the 6th, the chief subjects under discussion being

the importance of Tsaritsin and the state of the Volunteer fleet on the Caspian.

It appeared that General Denikin was quite indifferent as to the fate of the former, and had no conception of the condition of the latter.

The Commodore¹ explained that the [White Russian] Volunteers had only been able to properly man 4 out of 8 armed ships handed over, and that a large number of the crews were known to be Bolsheviks, and further, if Tsaritsin fell, the Astrakan fleet would be able to command the Caspian, and so be able to obtain Baku oil. Further, if it should become possible for them to obtain sufficient before the Volga freezes over to enable them to tide over the coming winter, this would be a matter of vital importance to them. As a result of this conference, General Denikin ordered Admiral Gerasimoff to send 500 men from the Black Sea to the Caspian, and stated he would send reinforcements to General Wrangel should this be necessary.

On September 3, General Holman read a strongly worded *aide-mémoire* to General Denikin and his entire staff dealing with their incapability of properly using the guns, equipment, stores, etc. supplied by us. In this he stated that he had just completed a tour of the whole front, and would be failing in his duty if he did not point out the true facts of the case, the gist of which was to the effect that the equipment etc., never reached the fighting troops and is either left lying at the base, given to the troops doing garrison duty only or is fraudently disposed of. He added we were nearing the end of our surplus stores and that this state of affairs must be instantly remedied or we might be compelled to cut off the supply of all stores as had been done in the case of Admiral Kolchak.

This had the effect of causing the entire administrative staff to tender their resignations. General Denikin however merely told them not to be children but to look the facts in the face and to set to work to remedy the state of affairs. When I left Taganrog it was too early to state whether any improvement in the situation had taken place.

The chief point which struck me whilst at Taganrog was the absolute determination of the Volunteers to carry out their 'All United Russia' policy *coûte que coûte*.

As regards the Caucasus, there appears to be only one point of view, namely, that they were an integral part of Russia; for the present they could stay as they were but as soon as the time came, they had got to come back to Russia, peaceably if possible, but if not, force would be used. The 'time' appeared to be merely when General Denikin had sufficient troops available to deal with them should they prove obstinate.

As regards Batoum, they (the Mission as well as General Denikin) considered there were only two courses open—the British to remain there for the present or for it to be handed over to General Denikin, whilst the latter appeared to be ready to take it over at once.

The same applied to Roumania. For the moment General Denikin has issued strict orders for his officers to ignore all hostile acts of the Roumanians

¹ Presumably Commodore D. T. Norris, British Senior Naval Officer, Caspian.

and to cooperate with them, but stated as soon as the moment was opportune, it was his intention to declare war on her and reoccupy Bessarabia.

L. H. TORIN

Major, General Staff, Intelligence.²

BATOUM, *September 15, 1919.*

² This report was minuted as follows by Lords Hardinge and Curzon:

'We shall have lots of trouble soon with the supporters of the "All United Russia" policy.
'H.

'A Frankenstein.

'C. 25.10.'

No. 461

Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)

No. 169 [141500/141500/38]

BUCHAREST, *October 8, 1919*

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that relations between Roumania and General Denikin have entered a new phase. At the request of the Russian Minister, M. Polewski, I made strong representations to M. Bratiano shortly before his resignation¹ as to the danger of adopting a hostile policy towards General Denikin. I pointed out that the encouragement of Petloura by Roumania was exasperating Denikin, who regarded the Ukrainians as traitors to the Russian cause, and consequently suspected that the Roumanian Government in assisting Petloura were animated by a wish to retard the regeneration of Russia. I called his Excellency's attention to the violent articles against Denikin appearing in the Roumanian press, especially in the Government organs, and said I thought that this press campaign could not but have a deplorable effect on the relations between Roumania and what would in all probability prove to be the future Government of Russia. I asked M. Bratiano seriously to consider the advisability of a change of policy, and advised him strongly to do his best to assist Denikin.

M. Bratiano replied that he would be glad to assist Denikin to the best of his power if the latter would make a declaration to the effect that he would recognise the decision of the Conference in regard to Bessarabia.

I repeated M. Bratiano's statement to M. Polewski, who thanked me for my intervention, and asked me to see M. Bratiano again and request him to make the same statement to him. The interview took place the following day. M. Bratiano had already resigned, but was still conducting the Government. His Excellency officially informed M. Polewski that he would be content with the declaration by General Denikin referred to above, and M. Polewski promised to put the proposal before the General. He has every hope that the latter will agree to the desired declaration. But in this connection I would observe that General Keyes² expressed to me the opinion that General

¹ M. Bratiano had resigned office as Rumanian Prime Minister on September 10, 1919.

² Political officer to the British Military Mission at General Denikin's headquarters.

Denikin would never agree to such a declaration, and would reply that he could not bind the future Russian Government to an engagement of this nature.

Meanwhile the hostile tone of the Government press has considerably abated, though the Opposition papers are still publishing articles full of abuse of General Denikin and his alleged Imperialistic entourage.

The new Prime Minister, General Vaitoianu, in an interview with me to-day took exactly the same line as M. Bratiano, and informed me that he was to see M. Polewski this afternoon and would repeat to him the offer made by M. Bratiano as reported above. He said he would add that nothing hostile to Denikin would be allowed to appear in the Roumanian press if General Denikin on his side suppressed the anti-Roumanian campaign at present in full force in the newspapers throughout the territory under his control.

I have, &c.,

FRANK RATTIGAN

No. 462

Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received October 20)

No. 440 [143369/775/38]

ROME, October 8, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit herewith [a] translation of Note Verbale from Italian Government of 8 October 1919, on the subject of Financial assistance to the Archangel Government.

I have the honour, etc.,

RENNELL RODD

ENCLOSURE IN No. 462

Translation of Note Verbale from the Italian Government, dated 8 October 1919

In reply to the Note Verbale dated March 22nd last and other Notes from His Britannic Majesty's Embassy enquiring whether Italy was disposed to contribute a monthly sum of 2,500,000 roubles towards the financial assistance to be given to the Archangel Government,¹ the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to inform the Embassy as follows:—

The Murman agreement of July 1918, to which Italy also adhered, fixes by Art. 12 the financial assistance for the Council of the Murman region. At that time the Archangel Government did not exist. When that Government was formed, it proclaimed the annexation of the region of Murman and obtained from the British Government the extension to the whole country of the agreement in question. Italy however, did not agree to this extension of the agreement: on the contrary the Royal Representative in Russia, on more than one occasion at the meetings of the heads of missions, made the fullest reservations regarding eventual financial engagements.

¹ Cf. No. 299, note 2.

In these circumstances, and in view of the present situation, the Royal Government do not feel able to join in the subvention to the Russian Government at Archangel.

No. 463

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received October 9)
No. 528 Telegraphic [139146/116696/59]

HELSINGFORS, October 9, 1919

My telegram 523.¹

Private.

General Marsh proposed to me privately to-day to dissolve N.W. Russian Government immediately.

I have most strongly urged that no such action be taken without reference to His Majesty's Government.

¹ In this telegram of October 6 (received October 7) Sir C. Kennard had reported:

'There is a growing impression here that if border States conclude terms with Soviet von der Goltz on plea of creating barrier against Bolsheviks will make an attempt to occupy them.

'Secret. Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that in handing to Finnish Government note containing recognition of Finnish independence by North West Russian Government representative here of this latter Government expressed his belief that von der Goltz was planning some such coup. Representative of North West Russian Government appeared to look not unfavourably on possibility.'

No. 464

Mr. Jerram (Novorossisk) to Sir W. Clark¹
No. 56 [154360/3151/38]

NOVOROSSISK, October 9, 1919

Sir,

It is with the greatest reluctance that I am forced to call attention to the atrocious standards of morality amongst the government officials in South Russia. Corruption has assumed proportions which would have appalled even the government officials of Imperial Russia. This is, as formerly, especially noticeable amongst Customs officials, who add to their crimes that of flagrant theft, which cannot be compared to the petty pilferings of the old régime. Whole packing-cases of articles disappear frequently from the Customs in broad daylight. A few days ago in my presence an officer holding a high position in the office of the Governor of the Black Sea Province announced openly to a large party of strangers that the present Chief of the Customs accepts, or rather demands, bribes on an enormous scale, and the newly appointed Governor himself, when I paid him my official visit, talked to me openly of the terrible corruption amongst the highest Government circles at Novorossisk. Meanwhile the Chief of the Customs retains his post,

¹ Comptroller-General of the Department of Overseas Trade. The dispatch was received in the Foreign Office on November 22, 1919.

and there is far from being any improvement since the appointment of the new Governor.

This epidemic of venality is particularly noticeable in what is now everywhere known as the 'traffic in export licences'. No goods may be exported from this country without licence, which is nominally given on production of proof that goods to a corresponding value have been imported. The obtaining of this licence is in reality however a question of payment. There are agents who will undertake to obtain an export licence for any articles at a fixed price. There is a definite scale of prices, and the whole matter is one of common talk. When application is made for these licences it is becoming usual for the government departments to imply that it will be necessary to pay a bribe of 50% on the profits of the transaction, and it is remarkable with what accuracy the officials are able to determine the profits accruing from such ventures. I was informed a few days ago by a local Jew, who had succeeded in obtaining a licence for the export to England of some few thousand poods of petroleum, that it cost him such sums to obtain the permission that he does not expect to make any profit on his transaction, or on the goods which he hopes to be able to buy in England on selling his cargo.

Towards such traders, a very small minority, as attempt to secure their permits on legal lines, a policy of intimidation is often adopted and carried into effect. The situation is such that a representative of the highest reputation for integrity of a British firm of the highest standing requested my opinion this morning as to whether it would not be better for him to float with the tide and act in Rome as the Romans. It is needless for me to state the advice I gave him, adding that he could be sure of the strongest British official support in any difficulty he might meet with in his attempts to procure permits by legal means.

Since commencing this despatch I learn that a slight improvement has been noticeable during the last few days in the Novorossisk Customs. Commercial morality is, however, at so low an ebb, that the most drastic upheaval would be unlikely to discover the ten righteous persons who could preserve this rank community from perishing in the flames of its own enormities.

I have, etc.,
C. B. JERRAM

No. 465

Earl Curzon to Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok)

No. 591 Telegraphic [136302/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 10, 1919*

Your telegram No. 798¹ (September 27th).

Following for Hodgson:—

Your telegram to Vladivostok of September 22nd.

Koltchak evidently realizes how serious his situation will be if he antago-

¹ No. 450.

nises America, but the antagonism appears to be created by nature of his administration.

If you can do anything by discreet advice to help Koltchak to remedy matters you should give all the assistance in your power.

No. 466

Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)

No. 1847 Telegraphic [136302/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 10, 1919*

Mr. O'Reilly's telegram No. 798¹ (of September 27th. American attitude in Siberia) repeated to you.

I should be glad if you would draw attention of United States Government to very serious situation which will arise in Siberia if United States Government withhold supplies from Admiral Koltchak. All our authorities agree that his fall would involve extension of Bolshevism throughout Siberia, and without the necessary supplies it is a practical certainty that he will not be able to maintain himself.

In the meantime we are instructing our representative at Omsk to endeavour to exercise a moderating influence with Admiral Koltchak as regards the internal administration of the country.

Repeated to Vladivostock No. 590.

¹ No. 450.

No. 467

Viscount Grey (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 11)

No. 1441 Telegraphic [140035/11/57]

WASHINGTON, *October 10, 1919*

Secretary of State sent for me this morning. He read to me some alarmist telegrams from Eastern Siberia to the effect that Cossacks might under Japanese instigation and with Japanese support in background attack American soldiers in Eastern Siberia.

General policy apprehended is that Semenoff, Kalmikoff and Rosanoff, who are beyond Koltchak's control, are working with German Russians of old régime and under Japanese instigation and may declare an independent state for Eastern Siberia, Mongolia, etc. They would then say presence of Allied troops is resented but state would be really Japanese creation and a part of Japanese policy. Secretary of State pointed out prospect of an eventual alliance between Germany, Russia and Japan which would be a great menace. He stated removal of American troops from Eastern Siberia was undesirable as it would leave Japanese in unchecked possession. United

States Government is, however, sending transports to Vladivostok in case American troops are forced out of the country.

United States Government is also considering despatch of some naval force to Vladivostok.

Secretary of State asked whether British Government will send some naval force to join Americans there. He thinks this would shew that Great Britain and United States are acting together and that moral effect would be wholesome. He asked my opinion on this last point. I said I knew nothing of subject and could only transmit to you what he had said. It is desirable to reply quickly as United States Government are seriously apprehensive.

Reason for despatch of Naval Force would be disturbed condition at Vladivostok.

Repeated to Canada by post.

No. 468

M. Kopwillem to Lord Hardinge (Received October 13)

No. 5487 [140615/140/59]

ESTHONIAN PROVISIONAL LEGATION, LONDON, *October 10, 1919*

Sir,

I am directed by the Esthonian Foreign Office to forward to you the following communication sent by wire from Reval on October 8th, 1919:

A note forwarded on September 28th by the British Consul General in Reval to the Esthonian Republican Government¹ gives grounds for anticipation that the British Government will continue to give sympathetic support to the aspirations of the Esthonian People as in the past.

The moral support of His British Majesty's Government has been manifested in the form of a *de facto* recognition of Esthonian independence during the German occupation, and during the invasion by Soviet Russia, in the despatching of a British Squadron to the Gulf of Finland, and by the supplying of various military necessities to Esthonia, when no actual support was forthcoming elsewhere, and now at a critical and decisive moment, when Esthonia together with the other Baltic States is laying a strong foundation for the future, His British Majesty's Government has once more been alone in not withholding its advice and recommendations.

This fact gives the British nation an indubitable right to voice their wishes on all important questions concerning Esthonian National life, and calls not only for the deep gratitude of the Esthonian people for the British nation, but for the protection of the political and economical privileges of Great Britain in Esthonian Republican territories.

I am, etc.,

J. KOPWILLEM²

¹ Presumably a transmission of the message contained in No. 445.

² Receipt of this note was briefly acknowledged with thanks in a Foreign Office note of October 22, 1919, to M. Kopwillem.

[142974/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 11, 1919*

From March onwards a series of Despatches was addressed to the Peace Conference in Paris dealing with:

1. The attitude of the Allied Powers to the Baltic States.
2. The recognition of Admiral Kolchak.
3. The relations between the border provinces of the late Russian Empire, Finland, Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia and the Caucasian Republics to the All Russian groups with whom the Allied Governments are co-operating.
4. The co-operation of the Allied Powers in carrying out their policy in Russia.

Little progress was however made with any of these questions, with the result that in August last the War Cabinet decided to address a further despatch to Paris suggesting an Inter-Allied Conference to consider the whole question of Inter-Allied co-operation in Russia.¹

No reply has yet been received to this despatch, and we have not yet received any indication from Paris that steps have been taken to consider the course suggested by the War Cabinet.

In the meantime His Majesty's Government have come to certain decisions independently of their Allies.

1. North Russia is being definitely evacuated.
2. Supplies to Admiral Kolchak have been stopped, the United States having been requested to take over this responsibility.
3. Henceforth His Majesty's Government must confine their share in the operations to General Denikin.
4. The Baltic States and Finland have been informed that His Majesty's Government, not being able to afford the support required by these States to continue the war against the Soviet Government, do not feel justified in dictating the policy of these States to the Russian Bolshevist Government.

Notwithstanding these decisions a Conference of the Allied Powers on the subject of general policy in Russia is still regarded as desirable. In a recent memorandum circulated by the Secretary of State to the War Cabinet, the Conference is urged on the following grounds:—

1. The German situation.
2. The status of the Baltic States.
3. The attitude to be adopted if the latter and Poland desire to make a real peace with the Soviet Government.
4. The degree of responsibility that the Powers are to assume individually towards the Anti-Bolshevist forces.

¹ No. 399.

If the War Cabinet approve a copy of this memo will doubtless be sent to Paris and it must be ascertained definitely whether they do or do not intend to take the question up.

W. SELBY²

² This document was minuted as follows by Lords Hardinge and Curzon:

'This is a question, like that of Montenegro, which ought to be taken up by the Peace Delegation without delay, instead of wasting their time upon details which ought to be decided by local Commissions, as they seem to me to be doing.

'H.

'There is no objection to sending the memo. But if any one is sanguine enough to believe that this moribund Conference is capable in its death throes of producing a Russian policy, I am not that man.

'I consider it much more profitable to formulate and pursue our own Russian policy within the limits (financial, political and geographical) open to us and to inform Paris when we have done it.

'C. 16.10.'

No. 470

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 15)
No. 837 Telegraphic [141693/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 11, 1919

Following received from Omsk October 9, No. 485.

Government is much agitated regarding Semenoff's incursion into railway zone.¹ Council of Ministers attended by General Dietrichs decided that orders should be given for Semenoff to withdraw immediately.² Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that Japanese might be behind this movement. Semenoff it seems explains his action by necessity of defending the honour of Russia alleged to have been slighted by Chinese authorities. (? He is) doubtless inspired by Rozanoff's triumph.³ Have you any reason to (? believe) Rozanoff to be an accomplice?⁴

Repeated to Harbin.

¹ The reference was to a recent incursion into the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway by elements of the Ataman Semenov's Cossack forces.

² In a telegram of October 11, 1919 (Peking telegram No. 541: received October 14), Sir J. Jordan transmitted the following message from Harbin: 'Omsk Government has ordered immediate withdrawal of Semenoff's troops from Chinese Eastern Railway area.'

³ The reference was to the outcome of the dispute which arose between General Rozanoff and the Allied Military Representatives in Vladivostok in connexion with the incidents referred to in No. 451, q.v.

⁴ Subsequently Mr. O'Reilly, in a telegram of October 13 (Vladivostok No. 842: received October 16), repeated the following message to him from Mr. Hodgson at Omsk: 'Semenoff's representative here is assured that no political importance is to be attached to this incident. A regiment of Trans-Baikal Cossacks was by arrangement with Rozanoff being transferred in four echelons to Grodevo and a regiment of Ussuri Cossacks is to take its place in Trans-Zemstvoia. Semenoff had no intention of leaving detachments in Manchuria but only a few men temporarily in different places for purchasing provisions and forage. Please let me know if subsequent events bear out this explanation.' In a later

message of October 17 from Omsk to Vladivostok (transmitted to Foreign Office in Vladivostok telegram No. 859 of October 20: received October 24), Mr. Hodgson stated: 'I attach no importance to report of a conspiracy between Rozanov and Atamans. Rozanov is, I believe, perfectly loyal to Government who have everything to lose from such an outbreak as is depicted by General Graves. As for Semenov incident I adhere to my opinion that it has arisen out of transfer of a Cossack Regiment from Trans-Baikal to Ussuri and has no hidden designs behind it. This is confirmed by Captain Rayner who has just arrived from Chita and had information that this transfer was intended.'

No. 471

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)

No. 1151 Telegraphic [136734/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 11, 1919

Following for Colonel Cartier for transmission to Tchicherine: Begins:—

I have received your radio of September 20th¹ and have since been in communication with the Danish Government regarding the conditions for the proposed Conference for the exchange of prisoners. I have informed them of your objections and in view of the modifications which they are willing to accept to the original proposal made in my radio received by you on September 15,² I hope that you will reverse your previous decision as it is of importance that there should be no further delay and as you have stated in your radio of October 1st³ that Monsieur Litvinoff will start immediately his safe passage has been guaranteed.

As soon as the Danish Government have been informed of the names of the two secretaries who will accompany Monsieur Litvinoff and have agreed to their proceeding to Denmark they will give the permission required for the meeting, and agree that,

- (I) The three members of your delegation will be allowed to move about with freedom: and
- (II) So far from being under semi-arrest as you allege they will have no special place of abode.

The Danish Government, however, insists on the condition number 4 in my previous radio that the right of either delegates to remain in Denmark ceases automatically as soon as their [either] party breaks off negotiations.

I would therefore be glad to learn as soon as possible the names of Monsieur Litvinoff's secretaries for submission to the Danish Government and trust that you will see your way to reconsidering your previous decision. I need hardly point out the great delay that would be involved in approaching another neutral Government. Curzon of Kedleston.

Ends.⁴

¹ No. 436.

² No. 417.

³ Not printed. This short wireless message related to the repatriation of a certain Captain Roupel. The last sentence of the message contained the statement here referred to.

⁴ This telegram was repeated to Copenhagen as No. 1422.

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)
No. 70 Telegraphic [141222/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 12, 1919

Following is substance of long proclamation widely circulated through Transcaucasia, signed by Chicherin and Dr. Nariman Narimanof, head of Near East Mussulman Section of Moscow Commissary for Foreign Affairs (see my telegram No. 50,¹ 2nd October).

'To workmen and peasants of Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan. Denikin is coming to restore authority (autocracy) and put you again under Russian yoke.

'But how can Denikin do this when your lands are declared to be under British protectorate? England is trying to crush Russian revolution, and Denikin is attacking you with knowledge of England, which, on account of its internal condition, is obliged to abandon Caucasus.

'But on leaving Caucasus England wishes to hand you over to Tsar's general, and prevent you from joining your Russian brothers who are about to triumph in their struggle against capitalism.

'Your Government, fearing dictature of proletariat, accepted first German then English protectorate, and now England is handing you over to Denikin.

'But why do your governing classes declare war on Denikin? Because they know they will be contested by Governors-General and old Tsarist régime will be restored.

'But it is even now possible that at England's dictation your rulers may say that if Denikin does not come, Soviet Russia will come and break up your peaceful life and *bourgeois* régime, and submit to Denikin to save themselves from Bolsheviks.

'All this is possible, and both England and your governing classes, who have carried on policy of duplicity and sold your rights, are capable of doing this.

'We therefore declare before whole world that Soviet Government has never gone out to seize other peoples' land or to establish Soviet power on foreign territory by force of arms. It has only defended itself.

'Soviet Russia has no intention of marching against your republics to establish its power. It upholds principle of self-determination even for backward races, and has given autonomy to Bashkirs and Kirghizes.

'And if you, Mussulmans and Georgians, are satisfied with form of Government of your republics then live at peace, self-determine yourselves and establish neighbourly relations with us.

'Soviet Russia expresses firm hope that workmen and peasants of Daghestan, Azabaijan and Georgia will not let their liberty be trampled under foot by the Tsarist General, the English hangman, Denikin.'

It is interesting that Chicherin treats Transcaucasian Governments as decidedly anti-Bolshevik, and yet asks for their collaboration and admits possibility of their being after all truly representative.

¹ No. 453.

No. 473

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 19)
No. 78 Telegraphic [143080/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 14, 1919

At a meeting of Georgian Cabinet, lasting from 8 p.m. 13th October till the early hours of 14th October, it was decided by eight votes to one that Great Britain should be requested to accept mandate. Solitary opponent favoured American mandate.

No. 474

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 19)
No. 77 Telegraphic [143079/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 14, 1919

In connection with Georgian Mission to Rome under Sahtarshvili, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, following confidential information obtained from a trustworthy source may be useful: Georgia[n] Government recently decided that they would grant concessions in proportions: 40% to Great Britain, 20% to Italy, 40% to other Allies and neutrals.

They are now offering Italy the forests in Svanetia and [? Bor]jom¹ district, the coal deposits at Tzvarcheli near Poti and all water-power in Georgia on condition that Italy grants them recognition. These four concessions seem to me to form an excessively liberal interpretation of 20% above referred to.

It may be observed that above percentages were apparently those agreed upon between Colonel Gabba, head of Italian Mission, and Azerbaijan Government with collaboration of Ismaria Litemi² (see my telegram No. 44³ of September 27th).

Though Azerbaijan has not actually given to Italians concession for Aliati-Djulfra railway (see my telegram No. 49⁴ of October 2nd, paragraph 7)

¹ The text here is uncertain.

² The reference is uncertain but it appears probable that it was to a person mentioned in telegram No. 44 cited below, namely, a 'famous film actress, Maria Notmi, divorced wife of German chief of propaganda'. In Rome dispatch No. 462 of October 22, 1919, reporting the arrival of the Georgian Mission in Rome, Mr. Kennard, British Chargé d'Affaires, stated that 'Maria Carmi, or Princess Matchabeli, as she is now called', was also in Rome, 'but I have been unable to ascertain what connection she may have with the Mission'. In the same dispatch Mr. Kennard reported that 'in newspaper interviews M. Sabachtarachvili states that the object of the Mission is to effect more intimate political and economical relations with Italy and to further develop the work begun by Colonel Gabba's mission in Tiflis. He draws attention to the fact that the Italian maritime services were the first to re-open communication with Batoum and that Georgia can supply Italy with coal, iron, copper, manganese, timber, tobacco, wood and petroleum, of which she is specially in need.'

³ Not printed.

⁴ See No. 453, note 1. In Tiflis telegram No. 106 of November 2 (received November 3) Mr. Wardrop further transmitted the following 'notes of a private unofficial conversation

I hear privately that this will be granted if ? Italy effectively supports recognition of Azerbaijan at Paris.

Georgia urgently needs ready money as pay of officers of regular army six weeks in arrear and that of all ranks of national guard 3 months. Exchange on London about 700 roubles to the £.

General opinion here is that any commercial, financial or industrial advantages given nominally to Italy are really for benefit of Germany.

Sent to Foreign Office No. 77, repeated to His Majesty's Embassy at Rome No. 1.

lasting two hours between Colonel Stokes and Prime Minister of Azerbaijan Ussubbekov at Baku on October 24.

'1. Italians have offered Azerbaijan arms, munitions of war, uniforms and Azerbaijan officer has gone to Italy to arrange details, patterns, etc.

'2. Aliat Julfa (? railway) concession has not been given to Italians but they have offered labour. No concession can be granted without knowledge of Parliament.'

No. 475

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 19)

No. 846 Telegraphic [143065/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 15, 1919

I hope phrase 'all our authorities' in your telegram to Washington No. 1847¹ will not be so interpreted as to include me, as American representatives know I have telegraphed to you in a different sense, e.g. in my telegram No. 814.²

Admiral Koltchak is certainly instrument by which Bolshevism (? may be) defeated with greatest convenience to us but he is not the only instrument nor perhaps even best in other respects.

The dilemma 'Koltchak or Bolshevism' is a bogey by which we have been scared too long and until we show that we have seen its falseness we shall be unable to give advice at Omsk with any effect because it will be thought that in last resort we would always do anything rather than allow Koltchak to fall.

I am repeating to Washington to save time, also to Omsk.

¹ No. 466.

² No. 458.

No. 476

Mr. Gregory to M. Sabline

No. 136807/W/38 [136807/3669/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 15, 1919

My dear Sabline,

We have just received a reply in regard to your note No. 1033¹ of the 26th ultimo, relative to the evacuation of Archangel, from the War Office to

¹ No. 447.

whom a copy was forwarded. The Military Authorities state that as all arrangements have been completed for the evacuation of the Allied Troops in North Russia, they much regret that it would be impossible to make any alterations at this juncture.

Yours sincerely,
J. D. GREGORY

No. 477

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received October 16)

No. 12/933 Telegraphic: by wireless [142057/9/38]

MOSCOW, October 16, 1919

Radio Moscow via Paris.

24 AAA. We understand from your radio of October the 15th¹ which reached us in a mutilated and incomplete form, you wish our delegate to meet your representative in Denmark in order to avoid further delays in the exchange of prisoners. We accept this proposal on the understanding that the ultimate place of residence shall be agreed upon by both sides at the commencement of negotiations. Mr. Litvinoff will probably be accompanied by Madame Zaretsky or some other typist whose name can hardly make any difference to the Danish Government, his secretary to follow at a later date should the necessity arise. We suggest for crossing the Esthonian or some other front but on no account through territory occupied by Russian counter-revolutionary forces. October 16th. 12/933.

Peoples Commissary for Foreign Affaires [sic],

TCHITCHERINE

¹ Transmission to Moscow of No. 471.

No. 478

Earl Curzon to Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok)

No. 603 Telegraphic [138730/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 17, 1919

Your telegram No. 817¹ (October 6th).

You should abstain from any further contact whatsoever with the opponents of Admiral Koltchak at Vladivostock.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram (received October 9) Mr. O'Reilly had reported: 'I have now received definite information from leaders of anti-Government movement that they are considering making appeal to dictator to embody their views in his constitutional reforms. I asked General Rozanoff whether he thought such an appeal (? would be) received and considered. He said that he thought it would but did not wish to be quoted as saying so as he could not possibly judge without knowing what they were going to ask or in what tone. He would only like them to be told that he thought above was best course they could adopt. I have conveyed this message accordingly and am trying to ascertain exactly what they are likely to ask for.' Mr. O'Reilly proceeded to report the views of a Czechoslovak representative in Vladivostok upon this matter.

No. 479

Earl Curzon to Mr. Alston (Tokyo)
No. 446 Telegraphic [144010/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 17, 1919*

Japanese Government have reported to their Embassy here that a Press telegram has been received in Japan from Vladivostok, indicating that the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Admiral Kolchak might possibly change.

Japanese Embassy have been informed that there is no foundation for this report, and that in any case His Majesty's Government would not alter their policy towards Omsk Government without previously consulting their Allies.

You are therefore authorised to contradict this report.

No. 480

Earl Curzon to Mr. Gosling¹ (Prague)
No. 168 Telegraphic [138757/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 18, 1919*

Reports have been received from Siberia indicating that leaders of Czechoslovak troops are supporting party which is working for the overthrow of Kolchak Government.

Please approach Czech Government and express hope that they will instruct their representatives in Siberia to abstain from any action against Kolchak.

¹ H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Prague.

No. 481

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 22)
No. 855 Telegraphic [144458/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, *October 19, 1919*

My telegrams Nos. 819, 820.¹

Following received from Omsk No. 497 October 14th.

Your recommendations as I understand them resolve themselves into necessity of bringing pressure to bear upon Admiral Kolchak with the object of inducing him to effect certain unspecified reforms of a democratic nature designed to gain for his Government sympathies of Allied peoples. As a reward you would hold out to him prospect of (? recognition) and . . .² assistance. You consider if convinced that a democratic regime is to be constituted Czechs will consent to remain on railway line and even to help

¹ Wrong references (subsequently corrected) for 814, 816: see No. 458.

² The text here is uncertain.

Russian armies on front: further that group which without being Bolshevik are opposed to present administration (? would be) brought to rally round it but that reforms now projected will prove inadequate to allay prevailing discontent.

Mr. Preston (? apparently) endorses these views with reservation that as a prelude to action on lines you indicate certain public bodies be consulted as to whether they are prepared to accept Admiral Kolchak's leadership under any circumstances.

Representations such as you suggest in form of conditions (? under which) recognition would be accorded were put before Admiral Kolchak last June and Admiral Kolchak's replies were entirely in accordance with wishes expressed by Powers.³ Yet no recognition ensued but only a reiteration of promises of support which has ever since then been weakening. But you propose to repeat this pleasantry. Last summer idea of subordinating recognition to acceptance of conditions provoked a storm: its reappearance now in face of rapidly growing national feeling of which you in Vladivostok have recently had some experience would cause a hurricane.

Czechs are tired of being in Siberia and tired of Allies: (? no) prospects of a democratic paradise for Russians would keep them in country. A fair proportion of them would however be willing to go to front if military situation continues to improve rather than face hazardous prospect of repatriation by sea. (Vide High Commissioner's telegram No. 348.)⁴

As projected reforms are still under consideration it is premature in my opinion to assert that they will not allay popular discontent. General attitude is favourable. (? There is a) danger of interference in this matter at present time intensifying anti-ally feeling.

I do not consider Mr. Preston's proposal needs discussion. His observations as to General Dietrichs' programme was dealt with by Sir Charles Eliot in his telegram No. 233.⁵ I agree with . . .² in last sentence of his telegram No. 1.⁵

My opinion as to merits of groups which have caused recent agitation in Eastern Siberia was given in my telegrams Nos. 447⁵ and 449.⁵

Mr. Ledward's observations as quoted in your telegram No. 720⁶ are I think perfectly sound except that in his paragraph 2 he contradicts himself. Kal[?mikoff]² exists today as a consequence of presence of Japanese and (? is result) of intervention.

³ See Nos. 233 and 255.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ The reference was evidently to local correspondence between Omsk and Vladivostok and is untraced in Foreign Office archives.

⁶ The reference was apparently to a telegram which was repeated as No. 820 from Vladivostok to the Foreign Office on October 6 (received October 8). In paragraph 2 of this telegram Mr. Ledward, a British Vice-Consul in Siberia, observed in particular: 'Allied intervention has nothing to do with Kalmikoff's existence. It is purely Japanese support and intrigues of Japanese General Staff Officers who have succeeded in keeping all Atamans on top in spite of fact that they are not even supported by a majority of Cossack (? population). Japanese have done this as a part of their policy of antagonizing peasants against Cossacks. Americans have done all they can to have Kalmikoff removed but have met with an absolute refusal on the part of Japanese.'

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)

No. 84 Telegraphic [144933/512/58]

TIFLIS, October 19, 1919

Following notes of (? my) journey in Armenia may be of interest pending a (? full)er report by despatch.

2. On October 14 I left Tiflis accompanied by Mr. Grundy, Commanders Birkeger [Birkett] and Luke (who were left here by Admiral de Robeck when he visited me privately on October 10)¹ and two military officers attached to my mission by Armenian and Georgian Governments.

3. On October 15 I arrived at Erivan where I was greeted with great cordiality. President of the Republic, Cabinet, Civil and Military authorities and public were present at the station and gratifying speeches of welcome were made.

4. Monsieur Khatissian told me that he and his countrymen considered me (? their) sincere friend saying that immediately on my arrival in Transcaucasia detente (? would) take place throughout (three) Republics and he was good enough to attribute to my action in (? Baku) vast improvement which had recently taken place in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, culminating in offers of submission (? to arbitration of) all questions pending between them.

5. In subsequent conversations Khatissian impressed on me . . .² you could protect Transcaucasia against General Denikin and said there was no pro-Russian party in Armenia itself though some Armenians abroad might for economic reasons prefer continuance of Russian connection. He was much disturbed that General Denikin had a few days ago sent as his representative in Erivan Colonel Zverievch who had been (? relieved) of his post as (? Chief of) Staff under Armenian Government.

6. At our third meeting President asked me to intercede with His Majesty's Government for immediate recognition of Armenian independence, which would enormously aid Government from financial, political and military point of view. In name of Government he begged any help in this matter.

7. He also said that Armenia desired above all things that Mandate should be given, (a) to Great Britain, failing this (b) to Great Britain and America jointly, (c) if we could not take it, to America only. In any case men used to carry out mandate ought to be British.

8. He implored for help in form of clothing, boots, medicines, etc. State of public health was deplorable. In Erivan there were epidemics of typhus, cholera, fevers. Only troops properly clothed were Guards of Honour and on southern frontier (? seventy) per cent. were (? incapacitated) through

¹ Admiral de Robeck subsequently reported of this visit: "The impressions that I carried away with me after this short visit are the extraordinary possibilities if the country was properly prospected and developed."

² The text is here uncertain.

malaria and were in rags and without medicines. There were over 200,000 destitute refugees from Turkey in receipt of relief.

9. State of city of Erivan is indescribable. Nearly everybody is suffering from or recovering from disease and I saw two men lying dying of hunger. Long continuance of this misery has (? demoralised the people).

10. I was greeted very enthusiastically at a sitting of Parliament when Speaker made an oration in my honour.

11. I called on His Holiness the Catholicos George V who begged me for British protection and I revisited Edchmiadzin which I found altered for worse during the last nine years.

12. By road I travelled to Elenovka where garrison and people met me, then along Lake Goktcha to Novo Bayard [Bayazid], where I was welcomed with embarrassing enthusiasm by the whole population. (? Road) along Lake had not an inhabited house for a (? stretch) of twenty miles; every house placed in ruins from internecine conflicts between Armenia and Tartars. In spite of praiseworthy efforts of Americans a large mortality during the winter seems inevitable.

13. (? For) whole day I was on bleak highlands round Lake Goktcha at an (? altitude) from 6,000 to 8,000 feet and I returned to railway through beautiful health resort of Deli(? jan) and Karaklis and (? arrived) in Tiflis this morning.

14. There are only twenty-two locomotives and four hundred trucks in all Armenia and they are in such a state that travellers run great risks. Road transport is also urgently required; motor lorries, horses, mules.

No. 483

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 22)

No. 81 Telegraphic [144528/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 20, 1919

Your Lordship's telegram No. 29¹ of the 4th October arrived here mutilated on the 14th October and was not delivered to me until my return from Armenia this morning.

1. Arguments for recognition of Georgia are stronger juridically, politically and economically than those for other republics, so I laid greater stress on that side of the question, but I am of opinion that Armenia and Azerbaijan should at the same time be recognised and that Daghestan should be placed under British or Allied control with a view to its final independence. This barrier against Russia seems to me an absolute essential for safety of our position in Persia and India.

2. Process would involve risks, but to allow Transcaucasia eventually to fall under hostile influence would be still more perilous to us as an Asiatic Power. Most desirable event for us would be that America should commit

¹ No. 455.

herself to some course of action in this part of the world which would make our interests identical.

3. You will have learnt from preceding telegrams that I consider further internecine struggles improbable, and a very small show of force on our part would keep the peace. Republics are already seriously engaged in attempt to fix their frontiers; declared intention of various Governments is in favour of a federation.

4. Fear of Denikin, and I believe it is well founded, is disturbing element, and even qualified recognition would greatly diminish it. If evidence can be produced that republics are really actively co-operating with Denikin's enemies, I shall confront Governments concerned with that evidence. So far I have nothing but rumours like that referred to in your telegram No. 41.² Both Georgia and Azerbaijan were trying to come to a *modus vivendi* through General Baratof³ before he was wounded, and I believe an agreement would be reached without much effort. Only impediment is fear of Denikin, and this fear is even shared by Armenia if I may believe M. Khatissian.

5. I have no confidence that a victorious volunteer army would be less pro-German than Bolsheviks.

6. If some such message as His Majesty's Government have, according to penultimate paragraph of your telegram, addressed to Baltic States were issued and accompanied by a solemn assurance that His Majesty's Government would effectively show their disapproval of any aggressive action on part of Denikin, I believe this would suffice for the present. Denikin would have more ground for objecting to what has been done in case of States in immediate vicinity of Petrograd than he could possibly have in case of distant regions like this.

7. There is a general and growing desire in three republics to work together, and national interest seems to me to be greater here than in Baltic States. There is here such variety of climatic and other conditions that a national economic policy and common fear of aggression would always furnish a guarantee for harmonious action in most fields. In all three republics Governments express their strong desire for abolition of customs barriers, for united currency, for collective control of railways, posts, telegraphs, &c. They have already shown their fitness for self-government and they (with the exception of Baku for a short period when it was in the hands of foreigners) are only part of what was Russia where Bolshevism had not had any success.

8. So long as we have garrisons in Batoum and North Persia mere gendarmerie would be sufficient to preserve order here, and I hardly think that would be necessary.

9. Failing some action such as I venture to suggest, there is a risk that Azerbaijan and Daghestan may incite Turkey to come in and that Mustafa

² Not printed. This telegram of October 13, 1919, referred to a report from a 'British liaison officer at Tiflis . . . that fifty Georgian officers and two hundred o[ther] r[anks], and one armoured train manned by Bolsheviks who originally came from Vladikavkas recently left Tiflis to assist Daghestan'.

³ General Baratoff was acting as representative of General Denikin in Tiflis.

Kemal or someone of the kind may attempt here what von der Goltz tried in the north.

10. I understand General Harbord⁴ will probably propose a mandate for whole of Turkey and Transcaucasia together. He maintains that this would involve use of much less military force. Like nearly everybody else he admits that Americans had not necessary training to manage Eastern peoples and suggests that personnel under mandate should be British. I hardly think that such a large group could be worked harmoniously, as in it there would be competing economic interests and possibility of Mussulman predominance and a pan-Islamic movement.

⁴ General Harbord of the United States Army had recently visited Tiflis in the course of a mission of investigation in the Near East.

No. 484

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)
No. 85 Telegraphic [144901/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 20, 1919

Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by Monsieur Ghambashidze (Georgian Delegate in London) called on me this evening and begged me to inform Your Lordship that there was great nervousness throughout country in Parliament and in Cabinet at continued silence of Allies and more especially Great Britain on the subject of future fate of Transcaucasia.

2. There was universal belief that as soon as Moscow had fallen Denikin would attack Caucasia and it was most desirable that some encouragement should be given to peoples here without delay.

3. Georgia had already made her views known to General Cory before I arrived here and had repeated them to me (see my telegram No. 4¹ and my despatch No. 5²). She was willing to accept any reasonable terms (? we) proposed for she knew her only hope lay in us.

4. His Government would ask that at very least they should be favoured with some message such as had been given to (? Baltic) States. Even a declaration on the part of Peace Conference that Trans-Caucasian question would be treated as an international question might have pacifying effect for a time.

5. After Lord R. Cecil's sympathetic words last January to Monsieur Ghambashidze and Avalov³ they had been hoping continually for some public declaration by His Majesty's Government and they could not believe it possible that they would ever again be abandoned to Russian rule under which they had suffered (? degradation), injustice and oppression.

¹ No. 412.

² Not printed.

³ MM. Ghambashidze and Avalov, Georgian representatives then in London, had had an interview with Lord R. Cecil in January, 1919. No minute of this interview has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

6. Nervousness was not limited to any one of republics but was common to them all. They were already settling their territorial and other questions and were working together towards federation but uncertainty of their future status had a paralyzing effect and they were oppressed by constant fear of Denikin. When once they were relieved from this fear they would work in complete harmony.

7. German and Turkish Agents are spreading rumours that His Majesty's Government has a secret agreement with Denikin that occupation of Batoum was continued by agreement with Denikin and that Great Britain is willing to hand over Trans-Caucasus as part of a federated Russia and oppose Americans who favour (? complete) independence.

(General Harbord is alleged to have declared there need be no question of a Mandate for Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan.) It is pointed out that Caspian Fleet which British (? gave) to Denikin was (? used) to destroy Mussulman quarters of Derbent and that British guns are held ready by Denikin to (? attack) Trans-Caucasus.

8. According to M. Gegechkori all this creates an intolerable situation and hinders internal and external development; he therefore (? earnestly) and repeatedly begged me to (? press) this matter and I venture to do so in the hope and belief that Your Lordship may favour me with instructions enabling me to diminish (? present) state of tension and anxiety.

9. In connection with my telegram No. 78⁴ Your Lordship will notice that M. Gegechkori said nothing to me about a mandate. I understand after Cabinet meeting on October 13th Government realized that if after all America should take mandate she might reasonably take umbrage at a preference shown against her in favour of Great Britain.

⁴ No. 473.

No. 485

Colonel Tallents (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received October 20)
No. 68 Telegraphic [143664/61232/59]

REVAL, October 20, 1919

Natural (*sic*) refusal of Allies to acknowledge *de jure* independence of Baltic States is having disastrous effect not essential refusal [*sic*]. These are preventing economic reconstruction of States and driving them into bankruptcy.

Present needs of situation would in my opinion be met if Allies secured them advantages of full recognition in certain limited respects. In particular they should be allowed to give raw material concessions especially for timber over term of years. Allies, if they approved terms of contract proposed, should on their part guarantee that any absorbing Russian Government of future would honour contracts thus made.

A request on these lines will shortly reach you (? re) Latvia. Urge this method of dealing with *de facto* Governments should at once be exploited as

a means of avoiding full recognition without destroying possibilities of internal reconstruction.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 68, repeated to Paris.¹

¹ A copy of this telegram was transmitted to Sir E. Crowe at Paris under cover of Foreign Office dispatch No. 7214 of October 25, 1919, wherein Lord Curzon informed Sir E. Crowe that he would 'be glad to learn your views on this matter'.

No. 486

Sir H. Rumbold¹ (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received October 25)

No. 371 [145573/40430/55]

WARSAW, October 20, 1919

My Lord,

In two conversations which I have had during the last few days with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Skrzynski has developed the idea of a close co-operation with His Majesty's Government in the affairs of Russia.

He proceeds from the point of view that, even when the Bolshevik régime shall have been swept away, the anti-revolutionary party will need foreign support in re-organising Russia and starting her afresh. In his opinion the Russians are incapable of discharging these functions themselves. Neither the British nor the Polish Governments can possibly wish that the Germans should take the above task in hand.

Only two Great Powers in Europe enter into consideration as far as Poland is concerned. Those are Great Britain and Germany. Poland, owing to her geographical situation and former connections with Russia, is intimately acquainted with the mentality, characteristics and needs of that country. She would therefore seem to be indicated to play a role in the re-organization of Russia.

If Poland were to work with Germany with the above end in view, it would only mean that at the end of about fifty years there would be a fresh partition of Poland. Monsieur de Skrzynski, therefore, comes to the conclusion that the co-operation of Great Britain and Poland is essential in the future work of re-organising Russia and for this purpose he considers that it would be advantageous if a confidential exchange of views were to take place between our two Governments with regard to Russia. He would not wish the Polish Government to commit themselves to any action in that country which might in any way hamper Great Britain. He realizes of course that commercial relations between Poland and Russia are bound to be very close in the future.

I have, etc.,

HORACE RUMBOLD²

¹ Appointed H.M. Minister at Warsaw in September 1919.

² In a subsequent dispatch (Warsaw No. 392 of October 26, 1919: received October 31) Sir H. Rumbold further reported on certain 'points which have struck myself and certain members of my staff when conversing with Polish Government officials and other Poles of

good standing. They very rarely mention the Czecho-Slovaks, but only Germany and Russia. Everyone appears to believe that the organisation of Germany has suffered but little, and that she still retains her connections in both Russian camps, that is with the Soviet Government and with the reactionary elements. Most show a great disinclination to indulge in prophecies as to the future of Russia, but think that it will be possible to create a satisfactory *modus vivendi* between Poland and a regenerated Russia. All, however, insist on the necessity for Poland of preventing German penetration in Russia. They are of opinion that they cannot do this by their own unaided efforts but that they could collaborate usefully with Great Britain if His Majesty's Government were to make a determined effort in that direction. Hence they welcome the establishment in Poland of British firms or of branches of British firms, as they believe that, in extending their activities to this country, British business men are merely intending to use it as a stepping stone to Russia. The Poles also appear to consider that anything is better for them than German penetration in Russia and that they could help us in that country in the same way as the Jews had helped the Germans there.'

No. 487

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 7119 [138629/956/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 20, 1919*

Sir,

I transmit to you, herewith, for such action as you may consider desirable, a copy of a letter from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London, on the subject of replacing the Czecho-Slovak forces, which are about to be evacuated from Siberia.

I am, etc.,
[for Earl Curzon of Kedleston,
GERALD SPICER]

ENCLOSURE IN No. 487

M. Sabline to Mr. Gregory

No. 1098

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, *October 7, 1919*

Dear Gregory,

In view of the imminent evacuation of Siberia by the Czecho-Slovak forces, it has become imperative to replace them by some other troops for the purpose of guarding the trans-Siberian Railway, otherwise the communications along the only route available will be cut, thereby jeopardizing the recent achievements of Admiral Koltchak's forces. As the present military situation on Admiral Koltchak's fronts demands all his available Russian forces being concentrated on the task of fighting the Bolsheviks, it is not possible for him to withdraw sufficient numbers to replace the Czecho-Slovaks.

Referring to the formal promise given by the Allies to help Admiral Koltchak, and to Article II of the Agreement of the 14th March, 1919, regarding the international administration of the Siberian Railway,¹ the Russian

¹ Cf. document 2 in Annex B to No. 256. (See also *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, p. 257.)

Delegation in Paris has requested the Allied Powers to use their influence with the United States and Japan, who are in the best position geographically, to take upon themselves the guarding of that portion of the Siberian Railway which lies to the west of Lake Baikal.

I should therefore be extremely grateful if the British Government could see their way to giving their representative in the Council of Five instructions to support the above request, in order that their Ambassadors in Washington and Tokyo may use every endeavour to influence the Governments to which they are accredited to send the necessary contingents.

Yours sincerely,
E. SABLINE

No. 488

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 24)
No. 857 Telegraphic [145283/956/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 20, 1919

Following received from Omsk, October 16.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was very despondent this morning. Japanese have definitely refused to send troops to guard railway. No reliance can be placed upon their promises and they do nothing but intrigue. Ambassador has no definite mission and appear(? s reserv)ed. Minister for Foreign Affairs (? intend)s to maintain similar (? attitude.)

Americans beyond friendly messages do nothing and Great Britain has evidently transferred her whole effort to Denikin.

Soldiers . . .¹ of attitude of Allies being equivalent (? to their) abandonment of Siberian front.

It is indeed hard to see how with departure of Czechs railway line can be guarded in spite of paragraph B. of railway agreement.²

¹ The text here is uncertain.

² See No. 487, note 1.

No. 489

Mr. Gosling (Prague) to Earl Curzon (Received October 24)
No. 121¹ Telegraphic [145282/11/57]

PRAGUE, October 20, 1919

Your telegram No. 168,² October 18.

President informs me it is not correct to state that the leaders of the Czech troops in Siberia are working for the overthrow of Kolchak's Government; he said that possibly one or two regiments may have gone over to Bolsheviks. He will repeat instructions to representative to abstain from action against Kolchak.³ President states that Kramarsh has with French Government

¹ In error for 201.

² No. 480.

³ On November 2, 1919, Mr. Gosling telegraphed to the Foreign Office (received November 3) a repetition of the present telegram in a somewhat variant and fuller text. In this repetition the following additional sentence occurred after the words 'action against Kolchak': 'Think President of the Republic not frank and knew more than he admitted.'

(? approval) gone on (the) mission to Denikin without President's consent: it is reported that Klofac, Minister of National Defence, will proceed to Siberia superintend withdrawal of Czech troops.⁴

Laid stress on the importance of prompt (? withdrawal) of Czech troops from Siberia.⁵

⁴ In the repetition of November 2 the following additional sentence occurred after the word 'troops': 'I told him it would not be safe in view of well known anti-discipline sentiment of latter. President of the Republic asserted the importance', &c.

⁵ Mr. Gosling further reported in Prague telegram No. 202 of October 21 (received October 25): 'Doctor Benes informs me friction between Czech troops and Kolchak's subordinates may have been caused by action of Czech General Gaida who has been recalled to Paris. Pavlu, Czecho-Slovak representative in Siberia who is not Socialist, is stated to be quite sound.'

No. 490

Earl Curzon to Mr. Alston (Tokyo)

No. 450 Telegraphic [140035/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 20, 1919

His Majesty's Ambassador, Washington, telegraphs that United States Government are alarmed by situation at Vladivostok, and fear that Cossacks under Semenoff, Kalmikoff and Rosanoff are beyond Koltchak's control, and with Japanese are working for independent state of Eastern Siberia, Mongolia etc.¹ They also fear that instigated by Japanese, Cossacks may attack United States troops. While they consider withdrawal undesirable, United States Government are sending transports to Vladivostok in case troops are forced to leave.

United States Government contemplates sending some naval forces to Vladivostok and enquire whether His Majesty's Government will do the same. United States feel that moral effect of countries working together would be wholesome. Reason given for despatch of naval forces would be disturbed state of Vladivostok.

Please report your views as soon as possible.

Please repeat to Vladivostok for early observations.

¹ See No. 467.

No. 491

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 26)

No. 865 Telegraphic [145735/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 22, 1919

Following sent to Omsk today No. 763.

Your telegram No. 503.¹

I have failed sadly to make successfully clear if you have understood I contemplated giving any support to other parties so long as we can by any

¹ See No. 494.

means make present Government a success. Only question is how best to do latter.

General Knox's policy seems to be:

- (a) To obtain Japanese to replace Czechs in return for control over Chinese Eastern Railway. This seems to be hopeless in view of present temper of America and in fact to be inviting a quarrel with latter.
- (b) To proclaim our *unconditional* support of present Government.

This seems to me to be bad tactics as we thereby give no lever to good elements (? in) Government to resist other elements which as you say in your telegram No. 465 (repeated to Foreign Office No. 797)² are apt to get upper hand in time of war.

Moreover such proclamation is rather empty so far as British support is concerned since we can (? give) neither men nor money nor material and can only offer recognition which Western Democrats can hardly be persuaded to sanction in present condition nor can we conscientiously recommend to sanction it if as General Knox's Intelligence officers report ninety-five per cent. of local population are at present against Government.³

What we could do (? is to) obtain from Government, if they would take our advice, support of elements which are able to help them effectively, namely popular parties here and at home, Czechs and Americans (? in an) Anglo-Russian solution towards which I have tried to work with appreciation, I believe, of authorities here. It is only effective way of 'putting ourselves behind Government and enabling it to maintain itself.' Of course it requires sincere co-operation of Government itself, to which I have no doubt been misrepresented, though neither by you nor by their representatives here, but I see signs of grace in recent action about the railway and in language of General Khreshchetitski who has arrived from Omsk and came to see me yesterday. He says that Government have made mistakes and are anxious to rectify them. He (? also) saw (? Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) at Harbin and sound(?ed him) as to his willingness to return here. Possible this may be the beginning of a new era of which I trust my successor may reap fruits.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

² No. 449.

³ On October 27, 1919, Mr. Hodgson telegraphed as follows to Vladivostok (Omsk telegram No. 523, repeated from Vladivostok to the Foreign Office on November 5; received November 9):

'I am not aware that General Knox has ever suggested handing over control of Chinese Eastern Railway in return for Japanese troops to replace Czechs, and I have looked in vain for any proposal of the kind in his telegrams to War Office. It is true he has insisted upon military necessity of having Allied troops to replace Czechs along vital line of communications through Siberia, and has put forward Japan as being only country likely to give these.

'Nor has General Knox advocated unconditional support of present Government considering, as he had presumably a right to do, that the conditions on which Allies would continue support to Koltchak had been definitely clinched by note from Conference in Paris of June 12 [No. 257, appendix 1].

'Military mission here has no knowledge of reports from intelligence officers to which you allude. Will you kindly give names of officers and indicate areas to which reports refer?'

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon
(Received October 25)

No. 1991 Telegraphic [145723/1015/58]

CONSTANTINOPLE, October 22, 1919

Rome telegram No. 667.¹

There are clear proofs that Italian subjects are being used as agents by German financial interests both here, in South Russia and Caucasus.

Any information as to combination in this direction in Italy itself or in Europe in general would be of very great value.²

¹ Not printed. This telegram briefly reported the arrival in Rome of the Georgian economic mission.

² The substance of this telegram was repeated by the Foreign Office to Rome (No. 837) and to Tiflis (No. 66) on November 1, 1919.

No. 493

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)

No. 1473 Telegraphic, en clair: by bag [144904/116696/38]

PARIS, October 22, 1919

The memorandum regarding the disposal of the Russian North West Army, enclosed in the War Office letter which is transmitted in Your Lordship's despatch No. 7027 of October 14th¹ is dated October 3rd. Since then the situation with regard to the North West Army has entirely changed in as much as the troops composing it are now irrevocably committed to continue the offensive operations now in progress towards Petrograd.

In these circumstances I hesitate to initiate discussions for the possible transfer of the Russian North West Army to another theatre, which would inevitably give the impression that His Majesty's Government have no faith in the ultimate success of the present operations.

I do not think, moreover, that in the present circumstances there would be any prospect of the other heads of Delegations extending any support to the War Office proposal which would involve heavy financial commitments on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments.

My military advisers concur in the above observations and unless I receive instructions to the contrary I do not for the moment propose to take action in the matter.

¹ Not printed. This dispatch transmitted for the consideration of Sir E. Crowe a copy of a War Office covering letter of October 7, 1919, to the Foreign Office, enclosing a General Staff memorandum of October 3 on the 'Disposal of Russian North-West Army in the event of the Baltic States making peace with the Bolsheviks'. This memorandum, after considering various alternatives, suggested that 'the Russian North-West Army, or at least the fighting portion of it, with essential Administrative services, should be moved to General Denikin's front as follows:—(a) By sea from Reval to Dantzic. (b) By rail from Dantzic via Warsaw-Lemberg-Czernowitz-Bielsi-Olviopol-Smila-Piriatin to Kiev. The tonnage required need not be great as the ships could each make several voyages from Reval to Dantzic.

This is essentially a matter which should be taken up at once by the Supreme Council in Paris.'

No. 494

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 27)
No. 866 Telegraphic [146297/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 23, 1919

Following from Omsk No. 503 of October 17.

Your telegram No. 748.¹

I quite understand your point of view and you may be sure that I am fully alive to the great weakness of present administration and of those of Koltchak personally; also I am entirely at one with you in believing that nearer one gets to him in this country the better.

But I think that transfer of our adherence to other political Parties now must entail dislocation of the army and destruction of what semblance of order exists . . . (? and if)² fair prey to Buccaneers like Anenkoff and Kalmykoff country would become a shambles.

If you were in Omsk you would realize that Government is indeed striving after internal improvement and I believe you would agree with me that the only line (? of action) likely to tide over unless [? until] European Russia rights herself is by putting ourselves behind this Government and enabling it to maintain itself.

¹ i.e. Mr. O'Reilly's Vladivostok telegram No. 748 to Mr. Hodgson at Omsk; this telegram does not appear to have been repeated to the Foreign Office. The telegram may have referred to Mr. Hodgson's telegram of October 14, for which see No. 481.

² The text here is uncertain.

No. 495

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received October 31)
No. 393 [147453/146803/38]

WARSAW, October 24, 1919

My Lord,

I have been much struck since I have been here by the manner in which the Polish Government appears to be pre-occupied with the Russian question. This is however perhaps only natural.

My impression is that as the Bolshevik régime seems to be nearing its end, the Poles are getting more nervous about the régime which will replace it. They are uncertain whether General Denikin when once he has established himself at Moscow and overthrown the Bolsheviks will develop reactionary tendencies. Such tendencies could not fail unfavourably to affect this country. The Poles have not said this to me in so many words, but that is the impression left on my mind.

The above impression will also explain why the Poles do not want to face a re-constituted Russia alone, but would like to have some understanding with, or to be able to count on the support of a liberal power such as Great Britain. They would argue that France is concerned to obtain repayment of the large

sum of money owing to her by Russia, and will not much mind the régime set up in that country provided she recovers the debt due to her.

I think, however, that it would be wise to discount a certain amount of the apprehension felt by the Poles with regard to the policy of a re-constituted Russia as, owing to their imaginative nature, these people are prone to exaggerate matters and to regard questions touching them from a pessimistic point of view. They easily get excited and upset. It is perhaps natural that a country which has endured so much in the past at the hands of the three powers which partitioned it should develop a suspicious outlook. The excitement of the Poles successively over the Teschen and the Eastern Galician questions will illustrate what I mean.

In a conversation which I had today with M. Paderewski we spoke about a variety of affairs and amongst others about Russia.

I told him that, in my opinion, the Poles would eventually have to a certain extent to choose between their two great neighbours. They would naturally wish to be on good terms with all the countries surrounding them but it would seem more natural that they should entertain cordial relations with Russia than with Germany. They knew the Russians well and had penetrated Russia in an economic sense before the war. Their commercial relations with their eastern neighbours were bound to be very close for Russia would be their principal outlet. M. Paderewski quite agreed with this view.

I then said that it was a pity that the Polish Government had not sent a really representative Pole to General Denikin's headquarters. The man they had sent was not of sufficient weight nor was he the right man. M. Paderewski entirely shared this view but explained that he had always encountered difficulties with the Diet when he proposed to send a really representative Pole to the Russian headquarters. He proposed to take the matter up again with General Pilsudski when the latter returned from Posen where he had gone for a few days. He would suggest to the General to send a Pole who carried weight in his own country for he realised that matters were moving so fast that it was necessary for Poland to see how General Denikin's policy was going to shape. He said that he would probably ask me to back up his representations on this point.

I have since learnt that General Pilsudski himself selected the nonentity who has been sent to General Denikin because he thought that such a person would be better able to find out what were the views of the Russian headquarters with regard to the future policy of Russia: in this question the Chief of the State and M. Paderewski do not see eye to eye. The former is anti-Russian and not inclined to forget his exile in Siberia.¹ Moreover he has not great faith in any Russian and doubts whether General Denikin will really get to Moscow and overthrow the Bolshevik régime.

I have, etc.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

¹ The Imperial Russian Government had charged M. Pilsudski with revolutionary activities and condemned him to five years' exile in Siberia, 1887-92.

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 31)
No. 877 Telegraphic [147553/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 26, 1919

Your telegram No. 603.¹

I am disappointed that Your Lordship should apparently misapprehend my action.

It is hard to see what greater service could be rendered to Admiral Koltchak than

- (a) to divert his opponents into peaceful courses with a view to
- (b) converting them into his supporters.

First of these has been achieved for the moment, thanks largely to action of foreign representatives here, as I am assured (? from) both Russian and Allied official sources and also from an (? irreproachable) British source which I am quoting in separate telegram. General Kh[reshchetitski]² (see my telegram No. 868)³ repeated it yesterday in presence of Mr. O'Brie(?n) Butler⁴ and Mr. Preston and has said same to others.

Second is a matter of time and naturally requires that Omsk Government should on its part adopt more liberal form. This as you know it is now doing and I have a good hope that if General Kh[reshchetitski]'s² information is (? correct) majority, including all the more (? worthy of) present malcontents, will come into line and form a substantially united Siberia behind Admiral Koltchak. I am now precluded from communicating good news to them (? but I have) told it to Czech (? representative) and Czech Commandant here who will both be glad to assist by every means in their power.

That necessary reforms should be unwelcome to reactionaries of every nationality is only natural (? and) I have no doubt been misrepresented to Your Lordship but I have been slow to defend myself expecting that you would understand and protect me. I have now the honour to request that my conduct may be formally reported on by Mr. Lampson.⁵

I am leaving on October 31st, handing over to Mr. Butler as instructed pending Mr. Lampson's (? arrival).

If in the meantime it is open to me to make any recommendation it is that Mr. Hodgson should forthwith be made High Commissioner. General Kh[reshchetitski]² describes him as only foreign representative at Omsk who understands this country and he ought to have a position in which General

¹ No. 478.

² The text here is uncertain.

³ Not printed. (Cf. No. 491.)

⁴ Acting British Consul at Vladivostok in the absence of Mr. Hodgson at Omsk.

⁵ Mr. Lampson, Acting First Secretary in H.M. Legation at Peking, was designated to succeed Mr. O'Reilly as Acting British High Commissioner in Siberia. Mr. Lampson was instructed by Foreign Office telegram No. 621 of November 8, 1919, to 'make formal report on O'Reilly's conduct as requested'. On November 15 Mr. Lampson telegraphed in reply that he would 'earnestly beg to be excused from invidious and extremely distasteful task of reporting on my predecessor and senior officer'. Mr. Lampson was accordingly excused from making the report.

Knox cannot overshadow him. I may add that I suggested to Sir Charles Eliot before his departure that Hodgson should be made Acting High Commissioner and that I should serve under him as Deputy.

Repeated to Peking and Omsk.

No. 497

*Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 1)
No. 878 Telegraphic [147958/11/57]*

VLADIVOSTOK, October 27, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Following is information from . . .² secret source.

'There is no doubt whatever that timely discovery of, and parleying with leaders of this movement, temporarily saved either Omsk Government from collapse or country from getting (? into) a state of chaos in rear of front.

'Representatives of movement who have just arrived from Omsk, report that everything was ready, down to the smallest detail, (? for an) overthrow of present régime at time which had originally been indicated (middle of September) as state [? date] of probable action: all that (? was) lacking was signal to commence.

'These people intend moving their headquarters from Vladivostok to some other part in Siberia, where they will be free from Allied interference in Russian (? rapprochement).

'Certain leaders have already left. They are quite optimistic, but personally I think, thanks to us, they have missed their chance . . . (? some of)² their leaders are now lamenting that they did not take action at the time originally intended.

'Optimists however say that it is only a question of time and their Military Organization is working full blast all (? through the country).'

Repeated to Omsk.

¹ No. 496.

² The text here is uncertain.

No. 498

*Mr. Alston (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Received November 5)
No. 421 Telegraphic [148875/11/57]*

TOKYO, October 27, 1919

Peking telegram No. 533.¹

Information contained in Harbin telegrams Nos. 67 and 68, putting forward Peking² and Vladivostok telegrams Nos. [8]42 (*sic*) and 859,³ seems to render superfluous comment by me on movements of Semínof's troops.

¹ See No. 440, note 3.

² These telegrams are untraced in Foreign Office archives.

³ See No. 470, note 4.

Should the Japanese harbour designs ascribed to misguided⁴ retention of United States troops in Siberia (Vladivostok telegram No. 843)⁵ would be best to [*sic*] check available . . .⁶ but nothing can effectually control 'peaceful' penetration (of China) by Japan except a decision by other members of League of Nations (in which we and United States would have to take lead) upon a definite policy of rehabilitation of China which (? Japan) would have to accept on pain of being actively (? opposed) by all other members of League.

Vladivostok telegrams Nos. 820 and 860.⁷

Allied Governments are prepared to recognise Koltchak (see my [? your] telegram No. 4(? 91) *sic*)⁸ when he deprives Cossack leader(?s of) high commands, requesting Allies to refuse them use of railway and all recognition except as outlaws if they resist, as it seems clear Japanese military authorities would be (? bound to) comply with Admiral's wishes; but until we recognize latter it seems (difficult) for Japanese to take action to suppress Russian commanders who are nominally acting as subordinates to Koltchak, and have in any case same legal position of possessing only *de facto* authority as Admiral himself. We were not apparently any of us prepared to take military action against Ros[anoff], in spite of having threatened to do so, and [? American]s⁶ have in past refused to take action against Bolshevik villagers who did not interfere with their section of railway.

Repeated to Vladivostok.

⁴ It was suggested on the file copy that this phrase should read 'ascribed to them'.

⁵ In this telegram of October 14, 1919 (received October 16), Mr. O'Reilly had reported that 'so far as can be judged from attitude of local American representatives there is no disposition to withdraw any American troops so long as any Japanese troops remain in this country. Presence of Japanese is in fact best guarantee of Americans remaining. A fresh (? American)-Japanese crisis arising out of Seminov's latest adventure seems probable.'

⁶ The text here is uncertain.

⁷ Not printed. (For telegram No. 820 see No. 481, note 6.)

⁸ The reference is uncertain.

No. 499

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 7242 [138758/1089/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 27, 1919*

Sir,

I transmit herewith copies of correspondence with the War Office,¹ relating to the difficulties encountered by General Denikin on his left flank in the Ukraine and in his rear in Daghestan.

As regards the position of the left flank of the Volunteer army, I should be grateful if you would bring the War Office proposal to the attention of the Peace Conference, and inform me of their decision on this question. At the same time I should be glad to know whether the Conference is prepared to

¹ This correspondence, not printed *in extenso*, was a letter of October 7, 1919, from the War Office to the Foreign Office enclosing draft telegrams 'A' and 'B': see below.

concur in the despatch of the draft telegram marked A to the British Military Mission at Taganrog.² In the meanwhile, I have agreed to the transmission of the telegram marked B to the British Military Mission at Bucharest.³

With reference to the situation in Daghestan,⁴ it would, I think, be well

² The relevant passage in the letter from the War Office read as follows: 'It is clear that the action of the Roumanian and Polish Governments in supporting the Government of Petlura tends seriously to interfere with General Denikin's plans. It is reported that Petlura is not interfering with the advance of the Bolsheviks against Kieff, and it is also reported that Petlura has issued a manifesto calling upon the Ukrainians to attack the Volunteer Army. In this manner therefore, it is clear that Petlura is actually co-operating with the Bolsheviks against General Denikin's forces. The Roumanians, on the other hand, although not directly co-operating with the Bolsheviks, are in fact doing so by their support of Petlura.

'The Poles and Roumanians, in adopting this attitude, appear to be actuated by the fear that General Denikin's power will grow too great, and that he will eventually endeavour to gain possession of Eastern Galicia and Bessarabia. . . . It is suggested that General Denikin should be called upon to respect the Peace Conference decisions relative to Bessarabia and Eastern Galicia. At the same time, if General Denikin complies with this request, the [Army] Council consider that the Roumanian and Polish Governments should be called upon to agree to assist General Denikin as far as they are able, if General Denikin requires such assistance.

'In this connection, a draft telegram (marked A) to the British Military Mission at Taganrog, for repetition to the British Military Missions at Bucharest and Warsaw, is attached for approval by the Foreign Office, and, if necessary, for approval by the Peace Conference.'

War Office draft telegram 'A' read as follows: 'As regards situation in Ukraine it appears that attitude of Poles and Roumanians towards Petlura is due to fear of Denikin's aspirations in Bessarabia and Eastern Galicia. It is considered therefore a primary essential that Denikin should respect decisions of Peace Conference regarding Bessarabia and Eastern Galicia. If Denikin makes declaration that he will fulfil his obligations in these respects Roumanian and Polish Governments will be called upon to make declaration of withdrawal on their part of all recognition and support of Petlura and of willingness to assist Denikin so far as they are able and if Denikin desires such support. Please wire urgently whether Denikin is willing to make declaration on such conditions. Question of attitude towards Petlura and measures to be taken with regard to situation in Daghestan and Chechen are being considered and you will be advised of decision as soon as possible.

'Endeavour is being made to arrive at solution whereby Denikin will be spared necessity of diverting forces in either direction, and in meanwhile you should press Denikin not to divert such forces unless situation imperatively demands.'

³ War Office telegram 'B' bore reference to a report from General Greenly, Chief of the British Military Mission in Rumania, 'that the Galician Government of Petrouchevich is desirous of coming to terms with General Denikin and would, if given support, attack Petlura. General Greenly is of the opinion that the Galician Government would follow this course as its one hope of existence lies in its entry as an autonomous unit into a future Russian federation.' In this connexion telegram 'B' requested 'information on following points urgently:—

- '(a) What exactly is implied by designation Galician Government?
- '(b) What territory does this government administer and of what forces does it dispose?
- '(c) What these forces be sufficient to garrison territory now held by Petlura in event of defeat of latter?
- '(d) What guarantees are there that Galician Government can obtain arms and equipment from Vienna and that Roumanians will permit passage of these?
- '(e) If this material is obtained what guarantees are there that they will be used against Petlura and Bolsheviks and not to detriment of Denikin?'

⁴ With regard to the situation in Daghestan the letter from the War Office stated: 'It is reported that insurrections, instigated by the Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments, have

that the Transcaucasian delegates in Paris should be warned that any hostility towards Denikin on the part of the Republics which they represent would gravely imperil the chances of their independence.

As far as I am aware, no such warning has been, up to the present, officially communicated to the Transcaucasian representatives.

I am, etc.,
(For the Secretary of State)
VICTOR WELLESLEY

spread to practically the whole of the Daghestan and Chechen districts. Attacks have been made by the insurgents on Derbent and Grozni oil reservoirs. The railway line between Grozni and Petrovsk, moreover, has been frequently attacked.

'In order to cope with this increasingly threatening situation, it is reported that General Denikin will probably be compelled to withdraw a considerable number of troops from his northern front. It is reported, moreover, that an insurrection is expected in Ingushetia, and that insurgents and Bolsheviks from the Kizlyar district are expected to co-operate.

'According to reports from natives and agents, the roots of these insurrections lie in Georgia and Azerbaijan, because these Republics have materially helped the late Mountain Government in its conflicts with the Volunteer Army; have sent agitators to stir up the population in Daghestan and Chechen against the Volunteer Army; have backed the rising with large sums of money; have given special advantages to Bolshevik Russians in their territories; have employed Turkish and German officers to assist in organising the insurrection and as leaders and instructors; have seized Russian property in Baku and Tiflis, and have persecuted and murdered Russian officers and soldiers; and have concluded a close inter-State alliance between themselves against the Volunteer Army.

'The Azerbaijan and Georgian Governments in acting in this manner, and supporting Bolshevik interests, evidently count on enhancing their chances of gaining independence. . .

'In connection with the situation in Daghestan, it has been suggested that, to improve the situation in this area the Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments should be compelled to change their attitude either by diplomatic, economic or military pressure. Failing these means, General Denikin has asked for a free hand to deal with the situation himself.

'Owing to the necessity which would arise for General Denikin to deflect considerable military forces, the Council consider it most undesirable that the latter course should be resorted to.

'With regard to the three alternatives first mentioned there can be no question of the employment of military pressure.' After considering the practical difficulties in applying economic pressure, this section of the letter concluded: 'It would appear, therefore, that pressure of a political nature would be most practicable and efficacious, and, in this connection, the Council suggest that the Peace Conference should intimate to the States concerned, that a continuance of their present attitude would be fatally prejudicial to their claims for future independence, and would result in the withdrawal of the goodwill of the Allied and Associated Powers.'

No. 500

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)

No. 594 Telegraphic [146339/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, October 27, 1919

My telegram No. 389.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me today whether I could give him any information as to reported intentions of French Government. I replied that

¹ Not printed.

I had none and that French Minister, whom I had just seen, was without information also. His Excellency then stated that he was very anxious that His Majesty's Government should be fully informed in regard to position of Finnish Government and he would therefore put at my disposal all information that they had received.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then showed me a telegram which General Mannerheim had sent from Paris to ex-Premier, Mr. Ingman ((? my despatch) 111²) who had immediately taken it to President of the Republic. This telegram stated that French Government were prepared to offer Finland a loan of value thirty million pounds in return for immediate intervention in Russia and added that Government would receive confirmation of this at once. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me though several days had elapsed Government had heard nothing about this matter officially, and President of the Republic and he were inclined to treat telegram as a political move by activist party.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then read me a telegram received yesterday from (? his) Minister at Paris in which it was stated that M. Sasanow was prepared to guarantee that future Russian Government would repay all expenses entailed on Finland by intervention. Mr. Enckell ended his telegram by urging, in language (? similar to) that used by extreme activists here, that Finnish Government should start military operations against Petrograd at once.

² No. 88.

No. 501

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received October 28)
No. 596 Telegraphic [146341/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, October 27, 1919

My telegram No. 594.¹

I am impressed as I have been throughout by manifold dangers and difficulties connected with possible Finnish intervention in Russia. Apart from very various influences at work in Party here which desire intervention and opinion I have expressed thereon,² I hold opinions:

1. That bulk of country public opinion against such a policy.
2. That difficulties of military operations are under-estimated in so far as it is represented that Bolsheviks will only put up faint resistance. S[enior] N[aval] O[fficer] here informs me recent incidents at Kronstadt have given evidence of high moral of Bolshevik Navy (commander and officers of a sinking destroyer recently refused to accept chance of saving themselves offered and went down with destroyer). I also consider Mr. Malone's statements,³ however biassed and unreliable they are, probably reflect truth on subject of decision to defend Petrograd to the utmost.

¹ No. 500.

² Cf. No. 88.

³ Colonel Malone, Member of Parliament (Coalition Liberal) for East Leyton, had recently visited the Petrograd region.

Difficulties entailed by opening winter season also comes into consideration.

It is to be presumed that if Yudenitch meets with definite check which seems now not improbable great pressure will be put on Finnish Government to intervene in order to save position. My telegram under reference affords proof that such pressure is already being exerted. (? Understand that)⁴ Allied Powers or an Allied Power are prepared to assist Finland financially and materially to a very full extent, to an extent in fact which must identify them with declared open warfare with Soviet, I continue to see gravest objections to Finnish (? resolution to) intervene in Russia.

⁴ It was suggested on the original that the text here should read: 'Unless'.

No. 502

M. Sabline to Mr. Gregory (Received October 29)

No. 1197 [146700/61232/59]

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, LONDON, *October 28, 1919*

Dear Gregory,

I herewith enclose for the information of His Majesty's Government the text of the reply given by Admiral Koltchak to General Knox regarding the suggestions made by His Majesty's War Office concerning the policy to be adopted towards the Baltic.

A similar document has been transmitted to the French Government.

Yours sincerely,
E. SABLINE

ENCLOSURE IN No. 502

17 octobre 1919

Le Général Knox a suggéré à l'Amiral Koltchak de la part du Ministère de la guerre britannique de satisfaire les prétentions des États baltiques quant à la reconnaissance de leur indépendance politique, étant donné que ces États sont enclins à conclure la paix avec les bolcheviks et qu'une démarche pareille de la part du Gouvernement national russe serait certainement de nature à paralyser les tentatives de paix précitées, qui furent elles-mêmes déterminées par l'offre des bolcheviks de reconnaître, de leur côté, l'indépendance de ces États.

Le Gouvernement national russe n'a pu répondre au Général Knox qu'en se référant à la communication de l'Amiral Koltchak aux Puissances du 4 juin 1919¹ concernant la réserve de la souveraineté de l'Assemblée nationale future.

Le Gouvernement national ne saurait d'ailleurs nier l'extrême danger que présenterait la signature de la paix entre les États baltiques et les bolcheviks, puisque cette paix enlèverait la dernière barrière qui empêche encore le bolchevisme de s'écouler vers l'Occident et permettrait aux rouges de libérer

¹ No. 255, appendix II.

une grande partie de leurs troupes pour la lutte contre les armées russes. Aux yeux du Gouvernement russe, le fait même de vouloir conclure un arrangement avec le bolchevisme est une preuve de la démoralisation de toutes ces petites unités politiques qui savent comment se défendre elles-mêmes [*sic*]. Mais il paraîtrait au Gouvernement national que ce n'est en voulant surpasser en matière de promesses les bolcheviks qui n'ont plus rien à perdre, qu'on pourrait le mieux endiguer de ce côté-là le bolchevisme. Il faudrait au contraire couper aux États baltiques toute aide ultérieure, et c'est cela qui constituerait le moyen d'action le plus efficace qui soit à la portes [*? portée*] des Puissances alliées.

En communiquant ce qui précède, l'Ambassade de Russie a l'honneur de prier le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de bien vouloir, s'il trouve ce raisonnement fondé, s'en faire l'interprète auprès de qui de droit.

No. 503

Mr. Lowdon¹ (Odessa) to Earl Curzon (Received November 6)
No. 28 Telegraphic [149302/58619/38]

ODESSA, October 29, 1919

I learn that, after retaking of Kief by (? Volunteer) Army about twelve days ago, Jewish pogrom took place. (? When Volunteer) Army were evacuating Kief about 14th October they were fired on from roofs of many houses, and believing this to be work of local Jews, after retaking the city they commenced to massacre Jews. Number of victims uncertain, but probably some hundreds. Russian General in command at Kief has taken measures to prevent repetition.

¹ Acting British Consul-General at Odessa.

No. 504

Memorandum from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London¹
Unnumbered [146747/26579/56]

October 29, 1919

Monsieur Sazonoff telegraphs as follows from Paris dated October 28th:

The very difficult situation in which General Youdenitch finds himself has compelled him to request the immediate help of the Finns. I have told M. Enkel that if this help is forthcoming it will have a very favourable effect on our future relations with Finland. At the same time I told him that, subject to an eventual confirmation of our action by the Constituent Assembly, we are ready to recognise the independence of Finland and to appoint a Diplomatic Representative at Helsingfors on the condition that the Finns recognise the necessity of safeguarding the interests of Russia in the Baltic. We

¹ This memorandum was communicated to the Foreign Office by M. Sabline on October 29.

are equally willing to reimburse the expenditure connected with the campaign. All economic and other questions regarding Russo-Finnish relations must be subsequently examined, Russia undertaking to consider the equitable desiderata of Finland in a sympathetic spirit.

It is understood that the French Government have advised M. Enkel at [? and] the Finnish Government at Helsingfors to accelerate Finland's co-operation, pointing out at the same time that otherwise Finland will lose an exceptional opportunity for establishing satisfactory relations with Russia.

It is extremely desirable that the British Government should pronounce themselves in the same sense in London and at Helsingfors.

No. 505

Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)

No. 1965 Telegraphic [145781/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 30, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1441,¹ October 10th.

Admiralty say that only one light cruiser will be available for service at Vladivostok. H.M.S. *Carlisle* is there at present.

¹ No. 467.

No. 506

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)

No. 412 [150004/40430/55]

WARSAW, *October 30, 1919*

My Lord,

Monsieur Paderewski called on me to-day.

He said that the Socialists, backed by the left wing of the Populist Party, had attacked him in the Diet, and had wished to know the objects of the Poles in their present war on the Eastern front. The Socialists argued that the Allied Powers were leaving them to do all the fighting against the Bolsheviks without giving them any assistance in the way of equipment, &c. Moreover, Great Britain had systematically blocked Polish aspirations in Danzig, in Eastern Galicia and elsewhere. Did Great Britain wish the Poles to become Bolsheviks?

M. Paderewski said that of course he did not share any of the above views, but his position was becoming very difficult for he did not know how to explain the failure of the Allies to provide the absolutely necessary warm clothing, &c., for the Polish army.

I said that the Socialists' arguments were ridiculous. His Majesty's Government had, I believed, borne the whole of the brunt of providing such equipment as the small Baltic States possessed, and had also furnished General

Denikin with equipment and stores to the extent of some 15 million sterling, but we could not do everything for everybody. Our action as described above was sufficient proof of our desire to see an end put to the Bolshevik régime. We recognised the services which Poland is rendering in fighting Bolshevism. It was also quite a mistake to connect such questions as the ultimate fate of Eastern Galicia, &c., with the struggle of the Poles against the Bolsheviks. After all, whilst Poland was undoubtedly rendering a service to the Allies in holding her eastern frontier against the Bolsheviks, she was also greatly interested in keeping Bolshevism out of her own country.

M. Paderewski said that the Polish Government had had very advantageous offers of peace from the Bolshevik Government,¹ offers which, as I understood from him, would realise the utmost aspirations of the Poles as regards their eastern frontier. Of course they had not listened to these proposals. I said that if Poland had committed the mistake of making peace with the Bolsheviks she would have made a permanent enemy of a reconstituted Russia, for the Bolshevik forces set free from the Polish front would be used against General Denikin or other Russian generals. M. Paderewski said he quite realised all this. Unfortunately the Socialists did not realise it.

He was going to make a declaration on foreign policy in the Diet next week, and he would use very vigorous language in dealing with the Socialists.

It is most regrettable that the French or the Allies as a whole have not yet succeeded in providing the necessary warm clothing for the Polish troops at the front. The matter is of vital importance. The winter has begun earlier than usual, and it is already below freezing point. I have troubled your Lordship with several telegrams on this subject of equipment, because I realise, in common with everybody else here, the extreme importance of the matter.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

¹ Cf. No. 516.

No. 507

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 3)

No. 2059 [148199/61232/59]

PARIS, October 31, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 7214¹ of 25th instant regarding a proposal that the Allied and Associated Governments should guarantee the recognition by a future Russian Government of concessions granted by the Governments of the Baltic States, I have the honour to observe that this proposal would involve the examination and approval by some Allied authority of all concessions which the Governments of the Baltic States pro-

¹ See No. 485, note 1.

pose to grant, and I feel very doubtful whether, at this late stage, it would serve any useful purpose to ask the present Conference to take up a difficult and controversial question of this kind.

2. I have the honour to suggest that, in order to facilitate the economic rehabilitation of these countries, His Majesty's Government might consider the possibility of acting independently in the matter, and guaranteeing against loss, in cases which appear to them deserving of support, British holders of concessions granted by the Governments of the Baltic States. In practice His Majesty's Government would probably be in a position to induce a future Russian Government to accept such obligations. If this suggestion does not commend itself to your Lordship, or if it is desired to take up this question more seriously in consultation with the Allied and Associated Governments, would not the most practical course be to refer it to the *ad hoc* Russian Conference which has frequently been proposed during the course of the present Peace Conference?

I have, &c.,

EYRE A. CROWE

No. 508

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received November 4)

No. III Telegraphic [148555/1015/58]

TIFLIS, November 1, 1919.

I have (? just) had a (? conversation) with Prime Minister and (? with reference to) your telegram No. 33,¹ October 6th, he said guarantees had been given twice and not kept on the subject of demarcation line in this region. This is a vital question for Georgia especially since Denikin (? has) strengthened his position in (? hill)s while Bzyb line is in open country Denikin runs no risk but Georgia cannot afford to give ground.

Monsieur Jordania is anxious for (? liquidation of) all questions with Denikin and is to-day sending General Odisheliforgoze to Taganrog.²

Food question (? is) becoming dangerous and it is urgent that Denikin

¹ This telegram instructed Mr. Wardrop to endeavour to secure the withdrawal of Georgian forces from Gagri to the line of the river Bzyb 'in conformity with line of demarcation laid down' (cf. No. 329, note 2).

² In this connexion Mr. Wardrop had reported in Tiflis telegram No. 96 of October 28, 1919 (received October 30), that the Georgian Government proposed to send such a mission at once with the object of 'arriving at a complete (? settlement)... I understand Georgians are prepared to demobilize and to guarantee Denikin's rear; question of frontiers to be left for decision in Paris. Denikin on his part to (? raise) blockade and remove his troops... Members of Medjliss of former North Caucasian Republic [i.e. Daghestan] have been invited to leave Georgia and will probably do so today or tomorrow... There was on October 24 an attempted Bolshevik *coup d'état* in a few places in Georgia (? e.g.) at Lagodekh and Kulash etc. Georgian Government vigorously crushed these outbreaks whose plan was to establish Bolshevik rule and march on Vladikavkaz against Denikin's rear. Matter was not serious.'

release flour bought (? last year). Prime Minister begged me to ask His Majesty's Government to use their influence and prevent food riots as harvest here is (? poor).

He referred to rumour that Great Britain and America were at variance in their views on Trans-Caucasia and suggested some action should be taken to contradict (? this).

Zangezur still causes anxiety³ and I said that I thought it might be well to keep a permanent session of Trans-Caucasian Conference where this and other questions affecting three Republics could be discussed. Even if questions were not rapidly solved (fact that) they were (known) to be under discussion (? 'would have' omitted) a tranquilising effect. Prime Minister said he agreed and would at once propose this to Azerbaijan and Armenia and continue efforts (? for) happiness (? most required) to all Trans-Caucasia.

He told me (? Mr. Balfour) wrote on September 29th that Great Britain would not take (? mandate).⁴ He said that he took this as a hint that Georgia should prove fit for independence.

Monsieur Jordania is now in better health.

³ Armenia and Azerbaijan maintained conflicting claims in the region of Zangezur.

⁴ After making inquiries in this matter of Mr. Balfour, who stated that he was 'at a loss to understand the origin of the statement', the Foreign Office telegraphed to Mr. Wardrop on December 12, 1919: 'No such letter can be traced.'

No. 509

Memorandum from the Italian Ambassador in London¹

[149045/1015/58]

LONDON, November 3, 1919

Translation.

The Italian Government would like to learn the view of the British Government respecting the question of the recognition or the non-recognition of the Republic of Georgia.

Information on this point is of interest to the Italian Government since it is their firm intention to act in the Caucasian question in perfect agreement with their Allies and to ensure British support and collaboration for the economic activity which Italy proposes to develop in those regions. Therefore if the British Government were disposed to recognise the Georgian Republic, the Italian delegate at the Peace Conference would not be averse to bringing before that body the question of the recognition of the young Transcaucasian republics, and thus conform to the insistent solicitations of the Georgian Delegation.

The British Government are thanked in advance for any information that they may, with their habitual courtesy, furnish.

¹ This memorandum was left at the Foreign Office by the Italian Ambassador on November 4, 1919.

*Sir G. Buchanan¹ (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 7)**No. 243 [149679/1015/58]*

ROME, November 3, 1919

My Lord,

With reference to your telegram No. 837² of the 1st November, I have the honour to report that the commercial counsellor has had a long conversation to-day with Signor Bissolati³ on the general subject of the Georgian Mission, the principal member of which, M. Sabachtarachvili, ex-Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was yesterday presented by him to the Prime Minister.

Signor Bissolati began by saying that he had long found himself in sympathy with the Georgian people, with whom he had originally come in contact when mountain climbing. That sympathy had been increased on account of their political conduct during the debacle in Russia, which had run parallel to his own theories as a reformist Socialist, namely, that modern socialism should be elastic, and should now represent the evolution of a people towards a higher ideal and the formation of a barrier against the extreme tendencies of anarchy and disorder.

The Georgian Mission had come to Europe in the first place to ask for recognition by the Allies of their newly-formed Government; and the conversation yesterday with Signor Nitti, at which Signor Bissolati had been present, had turned mostly on this subject.

The arguments laid down by M. Sabachtarachvili had, he repeated, his personal sympathy, but he was the first to admit that the matter was one of the utmost delicacy, and demanded common accord among the Allies. He believed that Mr. Lloyd George's opinion was, so to speak, suspended for the moment, and that a non-committal answer had been given. The same answer, he said, was returned yesterday by the Italian Prime Minister, who, after platonic expressions of courtesy and goodwill, had said that the matter must be referred to his colleague the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and must also be debated and settled with the allies of Italy.

The mission was also here for the development of closer economic and commercial relations with this country, which could supply manufactured articles against raw material, and especially coal, iron, and petroleum. With regard to this, Signor Bissolati said that negotiations were necessarily in a very embryonic state, owing especially to the lack of transport and the unsatisfactory condition of the petroleum industry. The former was, as far as he knew, represented by the sailing of one Italian ship about every twenty days; the latter was disorganised, owing to the breakage of the petroleum conduit, and the fact that it would take a very considerable time to repair the damage.⁴

¹ H.M. Ambassador at Rome in succession to Sir R. Rodd.² See No. 492, note 2.³ A leader of the reformist group of the Italian Socialist Party.⁴ A copy of the present dispatch having been transmitted by the Foreign Office on November 14, 1919, to Tiflis (and to Constantinople), Mr. Wardrop, in Tiflis dispatch No. 113 of December 9, 1919 (received January 8, 1920), stated with reference to this passage: 'I may remark that Signor Bissolati is misinformed as to the oil pipe line between Baku and Batoum. As your Lordship is aware from my recent telegrams, the line is working.'

The commercial counsellor, being naturally unable to give any hint which might betray the confidential information contained in your telegram No. 837,² told Signor Bissolati that the Embassy had been approached by a company in London (who, no doubt, in their turn, had been instigated by the Georgian Mission) with a view to join British and Italian enterprise in the Caucasus, and asked Signor Bissolati whether he thought that such an idea would, if eventually put forward, be acceptable to the Italian Government. The only thing, he added, which seemed to him to militate against the project was that it appeared that some sort of offer of a like description had been made to German financial houses. If, therefore, the Georgians were intriguing with the Germans, their chances of success with the English would be considerably reduced and probably rendered null and void.

The information (though true) was put out as a feeler, and Signor Bissolati answered that, though he perfectly understood why the Ukraines should intrigue with the Germans and the Vatican, as he believed they had been doing, he yet was at a loss to understand why the Georgians should also do so, since they had not the excuse of the geographical position, and, as far as commerce was concerned, he did not believe that German houses were in a position to afford assistance.

Given the known probity of Signor Bissolati and the fact that he cannot be accused of reticence in the past towards the British Embassy, I cannot help thinking that it is probable that he, at any rate, has no cognisance of the intriguing between Italian subjects and German financial houses in the Caucasus. I will, however, endeavour to find out more on the subject.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

No. 511

Mr. Lowdon (Odessa) to Earl Curzon (Received November 7)

No. 36 Telegraphic [149373/143839/38]

ODESSA, November 3, 1919

Following is short report on political situation at Odessa.

Although all classes of population of Odessa were glad to see end of Bolshevik rule last August, position has now somewhat changed.

Working class are inclined to be discontented because employers have withdrawn concessions and privileges forced on them by Bolsheviks. Jews, who form whole commercial community and 70 per cent. population, are uneasy. Recent pogrom at Kief has very much alarmed them, and they also assert openly that leaders of Volunteer army are reactionary and anti-Jewish. Recent fighting at Kief and activity of various bands of insurgents are causing much uneasiness here. Unfortunately, Odessa is without troops, all having been sent to front. I do not consider situation serious, but there are possibilities of trouble if Volunteer army should suffer any serious setback.

Repeated to High Commissioner.¹

¹ i.e. the British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

No. 512

Mr. O'Brien-Butler (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)
No. 894 Telegraphic [150310/11/57]

Following from Omsk, No. 526:—

VLADIVOSTOK, November 3, 1919

My telegram No. 465.¹

Siberian army has been unable to withstand pressure of heavily reinforced Bolshevik forces, and is now in retreat along whole front.

Tobolsk is lost, and army is retiring upon Ishim, having already lost all ground gained during September offensive. Troops, which have been fighting incessantly for two months, are exhausted and now outnumbered. Morale has been good up till now, but is said in latest reports to be deteriorating in first and second armies. Auxiliary services continue to be deplorable. Newly-raised regiment of Ruthenian prisoners of war, which had just joined Steppe army operating on left flank of third army, which is on railway line, went over bodily to enemy. This was followed by withdrawal of Siberian Cossacks, with result that army has been outflanked and enemy are now close to Petropavlosk. Only wretched state of Bolshevik transport may prevent advance on Omsk. Forty thousand raw troops are in reserve, but are not ready to be put into the line, and no great reliability can be placed upon them. It is conceivable army may collapse and be pushed back to the Irtysh, which is not yet frozen and is only crossed by one bridge.

Internal situation remains bad, though there is surface tranquillity among anti-Government factions as result of prospect of National Assembly being called. Country is overrun with refugees, who are living in appalling conditions of destitution. Towns are overflowing, and there is everywhere a shortage of foodstuffs, fuel and medical requirements. Harvest in many districts is a failure owing to continuous rain. Railway is working better, but is liable to be cut at any moment, and only has small reserves of fuel.

Government is contemplating evacuation of all but essential staff of Departments, with idea of turning Omsk into a military camp with only a minimum of personnel in Ministries. Shortage of rolling-stock would make evacuation of civilian population an impossibility, and is, indeed, likely to seriously hamper military operations if, as seems inevitable, retreat continues.

¹ No. 449 (Cf. No. 491, note 2).

No. 513

Mr. O'Brien-Butler (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 8)
No. 893 Telegraphic [149939/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 3, 1919

Following received from Omsk, No. 529, 29th October:—

My telegram No. 526.¹

Council of Ministers decided last night to commence immediately evacuation

¹ No. 512.

of Government Departments to Irkutsk. Government itself with personal staff of Ministers will remain here as long as possible. Gold reserve is to be loaded at once into railway waggons, but not despatched as long as there is a possibility of Omsk being held. Foreign diplomatic and military Missions are assured they will be given the necessary number of waggons for their departure should, and when, they elect to leave.

Ministry [? Minister] for Foreign Affairs is very gloomy, and has evidently made up his mind that position is critical.

No. 514

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received November 4)
No. 629 Telegraphic [148249/9/38]

HELSINGFORS, November 3, 1919

I have received long telegram from Mr. Gibson, British subject, member of British Committee Petrograd, dated Petrograd 8th October addressed to Mr. Paul Dukes.¹ Text by next bag. Following is brief summary.

1. Appeal to Foreign Office to exert every possible means to obtain release of British subjects detained in Soviet Russia.

2. Instructions are requested as to what extent British Committee is authorised to extend financial assistance to British subjects.

3. Position unendurable, approach of winter causing consternation. British subjects are burning their household effects.

4. Position some forty old English ladies particularly serious. Unless something can be done quickly they must die of starvation.

5. All British subjects in Petrograd entirely without winter clothing.

6. Case of Miss Winter in Vologda and Miss Nora Thornton in Petrograd particularly critical. Miss Winter living in hut with 200 other prisoners of whom only 14 are women. Has only clothes she wore when arrested. Miss Winter and other women forced to clean barracks occupied by the men.

7. Following is list of British prisoners captured at Cronstadt:² 1. Lieutenant William Hamilton Bremner, 2. Lieutenant Lawrence Napier, 3. Second Lieutenant Osman Giddy, 4. Benjamin Raynish, 5. William White, 6. Henry Dunkley, 7. Samuel McWeigh, 8. Herbert Bowles, 9. Charles Harvey.

The first is in Pomarine Hospital, Petrograd, remainder in Schpalernia Prison, Petrograd.

8. Atrocities perpetrated by Bolsheviks still continue to be equal to if not in excess of anything accomplished by Germans.

9. British authorities do not realise with what small force Bolsheviks could be crushed in Petrograd and town held till forces working in other quarters arrive. Current prices butter 600 roubles per pound, flour 150 to 170 per pound, wood 1500 per square fathom. Ends.

¹ Cf. No. 88, note 3.

² On August 18, 1919, British naval forces had attacked Cronstadt harbour. Three British coastal motor-boats did not return from this operation.

Russian Note to the Allied Powers¹

[612/5/1/20234]

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, PARIS, November 3, 1919

One of the main obstacles to Finland's cooperation with the object of delivering Petrograd from the bolsheviks is the request expressed by Finland of [? for] a financial subsidy of one hundred million francs.

It would be greatly unfortunate if the absence of financial help to Finland would create the least risk as regards the issue of the Petrograd operation, issue which is of capital importance for an early destruction of the bolshevist regime. To this consideration have to be added those of [a] humanitarian character; they are of the utmost gravity and necessitate, as an urgent duty of humanity, a speedy deliverance of Petrograd, in consideration of that city's sufferings from the bolshevist regime and from deplorable alimentary and sanitary conditions.

Any delay caused by the absence of Finland's cooperation which would be due to financial considerations, would be the more regretful [in] that this delay in the struggle with bolshevism will cost considerably dearer than the mentioned 100 million francs.

The Russian Government would have willingly granted this financial assistance to Finland; but the research of adequate means is rendered greatly difficult to them, being that so long as the Russian Government will not have been officially recognized, it is exceedingly difficult for them to contract loans.

In the meanwhile it is imperatively and urgently necessary to find an issue. Under these circumstances the most efficacious way would consist in the utilisation of the gold belonging to Russia which had been handed over to the Germans by the bolsheviks, by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and which had been delivered, since, by Germany to the Allies in accordance with the conditions of the armistice of November 11, 1919 [1918].

Part of this gold could be used as a guarantee for an operation of credit which would allow the Russian Government to provide Finland with 100 million francs. This gold is an inalienable part of Russia's national fortune and it is consequent that it should be used for one of the most important phases of the reconstruction of Russia in helping to deliver Petrograd, her capital.

The circumstance that Russia's Government has not yet been explicitly recognized is a formality which seems to be an obstacle to the proposed utilisation of this gold, but this obstacle ought to fall in face of the importance of the deliverance of Petrograd and of the necessity to come to a practical and speedy solution of the question which has been brought forward by events.

¹ This note was remitted by M. Sazonov to the Peace Delegations in Paris of the Principal Allied Powers. The note was entered in the registry of the British Delegation on November 7, 1919.

The Provisional Government of Russia draws the attention of the Allied Powers to this question and will be very gratified to them for lending all their attention to it, in view of securing a solution in conformity with the above exposed considerations.²

² On November 12, 1919, Sir E. Crowe sent a brief acknowledgement of the present note to M. Basily of the Russian Embassy in Paris. Sir E. Crowe informed M. Basily that a copy of the Russian note 'has been forwarded to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who alone is competent to decide the questions of general policy raised therein. The attention of the British representative on the Reparations Commission has also been drawn to the matter.'

No. 516

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received November 7)

No. 378 Telegraphic, en clair: by bag [149811/40430/55]

WARSAW, November 3, 1919

My telegram No. 336¹ of October 19.

I hear that the Bolshevik Red Cross Commissioner, who forms part of the Red Cross Commission which is by way of negotiating the exchange of prisoners with the Polish Red Cross Commission, has made very attractive offers to the Poles.

He has said that his Government would be satisfied with the ethnographic frontier of Great Russia, all White Russia, including the eastern parts not yet occupied by the Polish forces, to be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination in accordance with General Pilsudski's declaration at Vilna.²

Such proposals had seemed to indicate the imminent collapse of the Government which put them forward, but my informant does not think that the inference would be justified in the present case. He thinks that the Soviet Government is only trying to entangle Poland in a second treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram (received October 25) Sir H. Rumbold had reported that the Acting Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs had informed him that the Polish Government had recently sent a Polish Red Cross Mission to the eastern front to negotiate with a Soviet Red Cross Mission for an exchange of prisoners. 'At the first meeting the Bolshevik Commissioner stated that he had full powers to discuss peace terms with the Polish Commissioner. The latter replied that he was not authorized to talk politics but only to negotiate the exchange of prisoners. From an intercepted wireless message the Poles then learnt that the Bolshevik Commissioner had reported that if he discussed the exchange of prisoners and if an agreement were reached on that point the Polish Commissioner would leave and the Bolshevik Commission would lose the chance of discussing peace terms. He proposed, therefore, to discuss peace terms first and then to negotiate the desired exchange. The Bolshevik Commissioner had told the Polish Red Cross Commission that his Government would refuse to enter into any negotiations with England nor would they negotiate with the Letts or Esthonians if England were behind those states.'

² At Vilna General Pilsudski had issued a proclamation to the 'Inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania' on April 22, 1919, three days after the Polish forces under his command had captured the city from Soviet forces. This proclamation announced that a Polish civil administration would provide for local self-determination by way of a secret, general, and direct vote. The proclamation was shortly afterwards repudiated by the Polish parliament.

No. 517

Sir P. Cox (Teheran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 4)
No. 717 Telegraphic [148577/1015/58]

TEHERAN, November 4, 1919

Owing to the meagre information which we possess here and to various conflicting reports as to the probable future developments, position (? in) Caucasus which closely affects Persian interests is very confused.

In about a week's time the Persian Government contemplate sending a (? trust)ed confidential agent to Baku and Tiflis to ascertain first-hand real attitude and intentions of Caucasian principalities towards Persia.

It would be very convenient if you can kindly let me have before that latest information that can be unobjectionably imparted to me on the above subject; for instance

- (a) Are we likely to resume military control over Batoum-Baku route?
- (b) If not is any power likely to take Mandate for Caucasus?
- (c) Are Caucasian principalities likely to obtain their complete independence from peace conference or will they probably revert to Russian Suzerainty?
- (d) Can it yet be said when peace with Turkey is likely to be signed?

No. 518

Memorandum from the French Embassy in London¹
[148722/1015/58]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, À LONDRES, ce 4 novembre, 1919

M. Pichon désirerait connaître l'avis du Gouvernement Britannique en ce qui concerne le statut de Batoum.

¹ This memorandum was handed to Lord Hardinge by M. de Fleuriau, Minister in the French Embassy, on November 4, 1919.

No. 519

Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)
No. 494 Telegraphic [151742/1321/19]

BUCHAREST, November 5, 1919

Russian Minister told me yesterday that Denikin had now authorised him to give assurance to Roumanian Government that he wished to establish friendliest relations with Roumania, and that as regards Bessarabia he agreed that the question must be settled by diplomacy and not by sword. Russian Minister hopes that this will be sufficient for Roumanian Government.

I consider that above assurance may improve Roumano-Russian relations, but I hardly think that it will have any far-reaching effect.

No. 520

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received November 6)
No. 634 Telegraphic [149822/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, November 5, 1919

Circumstantial reports continue to reach me with regard to clandestine recruiting of volunteers for action in Russia. I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject who confirms general substance of these reports but not their details.

I think it would be useful if I could be instructed to warn Finnish Government that His Majesty's Government could not but look unfavourably on the schemes independent of Finnish Government for raising volunteers for action in Russia.

I suggest this in order to avoid possibility here of a private enterprise . . .¹ to (? preserve) Bermondt, I have every reason to believe that German intrigue is at the back of the promoters of these schemes.

Latest name mentioned is General Lofstrom (who captured Wiborg during civil war) who is reported to have called for 30,000 volunteers.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

No. 521

Sir C. Kennard (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received November 7)
No. 636 Telegraphic [149822/26579/56]

HELSINGFORS, November 7, 1919

My telegram No. 634.¹

M. Boije af Gennas called on me to-day and stated that he came on behalf of Protective Guard Organisation to make an application to His Majesty's Government for supply of equipment for 40,000 men for an expedition against Petrograd.

I informed M. Boije af Gennas that I could not put forward this application unless it was submitted to me through Finnish Government.

M. Boije af Gennas then expatiated on advantages to be gained by direct and independent action by Protective Corps. They could, he said, act immediately and would be prepared to advance against Petrograd 'without guarantees demanded by Finnish Government.'

I told M. Boije af Gennas that I could neither discuss nor listen to a proposition of this nature put forward otherwise than officially by Finnish Government.

I consider General Ignatius and Dr. Ingman's group are directly behind this *démarche*.

I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs of Boije af Gennas' visit.

Repeated to Stockholm and Reval for information of General Haking.

¹ No. 520.

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)

No. 432 [151949/73/55]

WARSAW, November 7, 1919

My Lord,

General Pilsudski asked me to go and see him yesterday.

At the beginning of our interview he explained that he had not sent for me before because he wished to give me time to make myself acquainted with the questions which are of interest to Poland and with conditions here generally.

General Pilsudski, who in several respects, both physical and other, reminds me of the late Lord Kitchener, began by saying that he had noticed for some time past a certain obstruction on the part of Great Britain in matters which concerned Poland. He did not know why this was, but it was so. Although I knew what was in General Pilsudski's mind, I asked him to specify some of the questions in which his Government had encountered, as he called it, obstruction at the hands of His Majesty's Government.

He replied by alluding to our attitude in regard to the question of Eastern Galicia,¹ of Danzig, and to the former advance of the Polish troops up to Dvinsk. As I was not conversant with the latter question, I could only listen to what he said.

He explained that if the Polish army had been allowed to take Dvinsk they would have been able to join up with the Letts and Esthonians, and so form a continuous barrier against the Bolsheviks. But, as his troops had been warned off, he had contented himself with rendering Dvinsk useless as a base for the Bolsheviks or the Russo-German troops of von der Goltz and Bermont.

General Pilsudski then went on to talk about Russia. He said that, in his view, there was little, if anything, to choose as regards the quality of the command and of the troops between the Denikin and Koltchak armies and those of the Bolsheviks. He did not think much of either. He admitted that the Bolsheviks had never been at such a low ebb as they were at present, but they might recover and become strong again next spring. What was certain was that whenever the Bolshevik régime was destroyed the régime that succeeded it would for a long time to come be quite incapable of organising such an enormous country as Russia. There would be scarcely anybody left to organise the country, and the Russians would have to turn to foreigners for this purpose. They would find the Germans ready to their hand, and of course the Germans were very favourably situated to undertake the economic and administrative reconstruction of Russia.

There was only one other great country which could take in hand the reconstruction of Russia, and that was Great Britain. But he did not know what the policy of His Majesty's Government was with regard to Russia.

Poland had nothing to fear from a material point of view from Russia in the future, for she knew that Russia was bound to be very weak for a long

¹ See Chap. III.

time to come and would not have the strength to resist Poland. He did not mean to imply that the Poles had any aggressive intentions towards Russia. He was merely stating facts. But Poland was too weak in an economic sense to organise Russia herself. She could only do so in co-operation with another Power, meaning Great Britain.

In regard to the Bolsheviks, General Pilsudski explained that his policy had always been to hit the latter whenever and wherever he could, and to make them see that he was an adversary to be reckoned with. The Polish army were holding a very long line, but whenever they were obliged to withdraw their front in one sector he gave orders to attack in another sector, and these attacks were invariably successful. Only three days ago he had wished to put the *moral* of the troops to the test, and had ordered an attack over difficult ground. This had succeeded completely. He knew that the Bolsheviks looked upon him in a very different light to that in which they looked upon General Denikin for instance. At this point he said that, whilst the Germans had been defeated on the Western front, they had not been beaten on the Eastern front, and it was only because they had lost their heads in Poland that he had been able—with his weak formations—to disarm and get rid of them.

In regard to the eastern frontier of Poland, General Pilsudski explained that he would not be able to call upon the Polish troops to continue their present effort against the Bolsheviks if those troops felt that the territory they had recovered from the Bolsheviks was eventually to be handed back to Russia, by which he meant presumably an anti-Bolshevik Russia. His solution would be to ask the inhabitants of the districts at present occupied by the Polish troops under which régime they wished to come in the future. I understood General Pilsudski to mean by these districts that portion of the territory lying between the eastern frontier of the former Kingdom of Poland and the line at present held by the Polish troops, though the General was not very precise on this point.

General Pilsudski then turned to the question of equipment for the Polish army on the Eastern front. He said that it appeared as if Poland had been left by the Allies to her own devices, both in dealing with Germany and in dealing with the Bolsheviks. That being the case, he drew the conclusion that it was for Poland to help herself and to make her own arrangements. He could not gamble with the *moral* of his troops, that is to say, he could not afford to wait until the last moment of their endurance. They had already spent one winter in the trenches under lamentable conditions, and he doubted whether he could call upon them to spend a second winter under similar conditions. I reminded General Pilsudski that the British troops had spent four winters in the trenches on the Western front, often under conditions of the utmost discomfort. It was true that they had been well equipped, but, although the cold was not so great on the Western front as in Russia, it seemed to me that if the Polish troops received warm clothing they ought to be able to spend a second winter on the front.

Continuing, General Pilsudski said that the Germans had asked impossible

conditions in return for permission for the transport of equipment and military stores through Germany. The Germans had, for instance, requested indefinite permission to move troops from West to East Prussia and vice versa across Polish territory.

I then asked General Pilsudski what he meant by saying that Poland would have to make her own arrangements for the solution of her difficulties. Did he mean that Poland would either come to an arrangement with the Bolsheviks or with Germany?

He replied that the Poles might possibly have to come to some understanding with Germany. I reminded him that he had only just told me that the Germans had already mentioned impossible conditions in return for permission for military stores, &c., to come through Germany. He then dropped the subject, but my American colleague, who saw the General the day before yesterday, tells me that the latter elaborated rather more fully his idea of some sort of understanding with Germany. General Pilsudski thought that, as long as the equipment, &c., to be transported across Germany was furnished by the Allies, the Germans would have no interest in facilitating its receipt by the Poles, and would continue to make conditions impossible of acceptance in return for permission for its transit across Germany. On the other hand, if, under some arrangement between Poland and Germany, the Germans were to provide the necessary equipment, they would, in a large measure, be satisfied to make capital in Poland out of this fact, and their other conditions would not be so stiff.

Alluding to a possible arrangement with the Bolsheviks, General Pilsudski said that Poland might declare that she would disinterest herself in the affairs of Russia provided that the Bolsheviks left the Poles alone on their side. I said this seemed to be an equivalent to a declaration of neutrality on the part of Poland, and I enquired whether, apart from other considerations, such a proceeding would not react most unfavourably on the internal situation in this country. He found no reply to this question, and it is certain that any understanding with the Bolsheviks would take the heart out of the Polish army. I am, therefore, inclined to doubt whether he seriously meditates an arrangement either with his eastern or western neighbour.

Reverting to the subject of Russia, he again said how useful it would be if he could know what the policy of His Majesty's Government was likely to be with regard to that country. I reminded General Pilsudski that Great Britain had just come through a most exhausting war, during which all the energies of the Government and of the country had been diverted from the consideration of internal problems. Those problems now called for solution, and for that reason alone it was not surprising that the Government had probably not had the necessary time to formulate their future policy in Eastern Europe. I reminded General Pilsudski that there had been a recent change at the Foreign Office.² Another consideration was that the situation in Russia constantly varied. At one time it looked as if General Denikin might get to

² Lord Curzon, formerly Lord President of the Council and Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had on October 29, 1919, succeeded Mr. Balfour as Secretary of State.

Moscow, or General Yudenitch to Petrograd, and then both Generals met with checks. In these circumstances it was very difficult to decide upon the policy to be pursued in the future with regard to Russia. Another point was that it was not possible to tell beforehand what policy Admiral Koltchak and his supporters would themselves pursue once they had overthrown the Bolsheviks. General Pilsudski said that, in his view, it would be premature for the Poles to formulate their future policy with regard to an anti-Bolshevik Russia. The utmost that the new régime in Russia could hope to accomplish was to set up some form of central government which would not, however, exercise much authority over the outlying parts of the country.

It will be observed that, while General Pilsudski and the Poles generally are very anxious to get some expression of the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to their future policy in Russia, they themselves do not apparently consider the moment ripe for deciding their future policy towards Russia.

Throughout this interview General Pilsudski spoke very quietly. He seemed discouraged, and in this respect confirmed the impression left on my American colleague, who had an interview with him the day before yesterday.

There is much to discourage General Pilsudski and the Polish Government at the present moment. The summer has been a bad one, and the crop has not only been below the average but was gathered in late. Hardly had the crop been gathered in when the winter set in a month earlier than usual, with the result that it is calculated that 25 per cent. of the potato crop has remained in the ground. The mark continues to fall in value, and it is impossible to foretell when the drop will be checked. In order to finance their war on the Eastern front and their purchases abroad, the Polish Government have to go on increasing the note issue. This sends up prices. The Polish Government are very short of rolling stock and cannot easily transport the necessary coal to the towns. The combination of these circumstances makes the situation rather a gloomy one. To use an expression attributed to one of General Pilsudski's staff 'it would seem, as far as Poland is concerned, as if Bolshevism had broken out in heaven'.

I have, &c.,
HORACE RUMBOLD

No. 523

*Mr. O'Brien-Butler (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 11)
No. 904 Telegraphic [150989/46019/57]*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 7, 1919

Following received from Omsk No. 532, October 31.

Sir Charles Eliot urgent telegram No. 16¹ from Omsk.

Cargo by Obi has arrived safely in Tomsk and Novo Nikolaievsk. I consider commercial utility of this route definitely established by successful

¹ No. 360.

expedition under most unfavourable conditions conceivable. There is a rich opportunity for British Shipping Company to take upon itself the organisation of a permanent service, probably forming an Anglo-Russian Company for the purpose. Colonel Kotelnikoff, who was in charge of expedition, is (undertaking to) come to London at once to give full information to Royal Geographical Society and other organisations. Professor Pares has full information.

No. 524

Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)

No. 481 [151920/1015/58]

ROME, November 8, 1919

My Lord,

M. Sabakhtarishvili, the Head of the Georgian Mission that arrived in Rome about a fortnight ago, called on me this morning and expressed the desire of his Government to get into closer contact with the Powers of Europe, more especially Great Britain. He expected, he said, to remain on here for another six weeks or two months and would afterwards probably proceed to Paris and London.

In reply to a question of mine he said that his Government disposed of a sufficient number of troops to maintain order and that they were not purchasing arms and munitions abroad, as they already possessed as much as they needed. While, however, the internal situation was quite satisfactory, the danger of an attack from the side of the Turks could not be ignored, and he would, therefore, welcome the return of some at any rate of the British troops which had been withdrawn.

He was not very communicative as regards the object of his mission here, though he spoke vaguely about the discussion of certain economic questions, but on my enquiring whether there was any idea of the Italians obtaining concessions for the purpose of developing the national resources of Georgia, he replied that his Government would grant such concessions to whatever country gave them the most effective support politically.

I next enquired what would be the attitude of his Government towards a reconstructed Russia. He replied that, though the Bolshevik Government might be overthrown, order and normal conditions would not be restored for several years to come and that, though his Government desired to be on the best possible terms with Russia, it did not wish to enter any future Russian Federal State as an autonomous Province.

I may mention that Count Sforza,¹ whom I saw yesterday, told me that the Georgian Mission had pressed him to give their Government *de facto* recognition and that he had told them that the presence of an Italian Mission at Tiflis and of a Georgian Mission at Rome was tantamount to such recognition. To do more would mean a *de jure* recognition, which the Italian

¹ Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Government could not grant at present. On my enquiring whether the Italian Government were selling arms and munitions to the Georgians, Comte [*sic*] Sforza replied in the negative. They had, however, he added, sold military clothing to General Denikin.

I have, etc.,

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

No. 525

M. Kopwillem to Mr. Gregory (Received November 12)

No. 6636 [151024/67181/59]

ESTHONIAN LEGATION, LONDON, *November 10, 1919*

Dear Mr. Gregory,

I have today received the following telegram from Professor Piip, acting Foreign Minister:

Reval, Nov. 8th 1919.

'The conclusion of peace, at least a *de facto* peace, is of momentous importance for Esthonia. The Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Constituent Assembly has requested me to ascertain the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards a *de facto* peace and towards a formal peace, severally, and also whether the British Government is prepared to take over the administration of the Neutral Zone¹ temporarily, or to allocate this either to another Power, or to the Red Cross. It is very essential for us to be quite clear as to our position with regard to the North Western Army from the British point of view, and the attitude we must take up with this Army, should peace be concluded. (Sgd.) Piip.'

I should be very much obliged for an early reply to this telegram.

Yours sincerely,

J. KOPWILLEM

¹ On November 19, 1919, the Supreme Council in Paris rejected a similar Esthonian request for the establishment of a neutral zone between Russia and the Baltic States: see Vol. II, No. 26, minute 3.

No. 526

Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey (Washington)

No. 2018 Telegraphic [147751/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 10, 1919*

War Office are anxious to know whether the United States have taken over the obligations in Siberia which were hitherto borne by us, and to receive a clear statement of United States policy with regard to furnishing Admiral Koltchak with economic and military assistance.

They also particularly desire information regarding the supply of 500,000 sets of equipment to the Omsk Government, concerning which negotiations are said to be proceeding in Washington.

No. 527

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 7445 [146699/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 10, 1919*

Sir,

I transmit to you, herewith, a copy of a communication from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London, together with a copy of a memorandum enclosed therein, urging the recognition of Admiral Kolchak's Government, on economic and financial grounds.¹ I propose to reply to this communication that the question has been carefully considered, but that His Majesty's Government are at present unable to afford recognition to Admiral Kolchak's Government.

Before sending this reply to M. Sabline, I should be glad to know what answer the French Government intend to return to the enclosed memorandum, a copy of which I understand, has been sent to them.

I am, etc.,

[(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

GERALD SPICER]²

¹ The enclosures are not printed. The communication from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London was dated October 28, 1919, and had been received in the Foreign Office next day.

² Signature supplied from files of the British Peace Delegation.

No. 528

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)

No. 910 Telegraphic [152183/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, *November 10, 1919*

Resolution by Vladivostok Bourse Committee was published here in press of 9th November to the effect that, having heard of a project in certain quarters to form a Government in Far East, the committee would consider any such attempt an act against existence of a united All-Russian Government, and that they are firm opponents of separation.

Though I am informed that committee has no special importance, resolution is significant in that genesis lies in a feeler put out by an agent of Rozanof as to how declaration of an independent Far East by himself, supported by Semenof, would be received.

General trend of opinion here, which I propound for what it may be worth, appears to be that position of Koltchak Government has been shaken by recent events, and that there may be a movement on the part of social revolutionaries.

Repeated to Tokyo, Peking, Harbin and Ho[?dgson].

No. 529

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 17)
No. 914 Telegraphic [152774/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 11, 1919

In course of long and interesting conversation to-night Japanese representative, referring to report that Japan was alleged to be behind rumoured intention of Rozanof to declare independence of Far East, stated categorically that allegation was entirely without foundation. He admitted that a junior officer of Japanese General Staff here had been indiscreet and had given Rozanof to believe that in the event of declaration of independence he might rely on Japan. As soon as report of this had reached his ears M. Matsudaiabe [? Matsudaira] had seen Chief of Japanese Staff and had impressed upon him folly of any such statement, immediate steps had been taken through Japanese military to correct erroneous impression.

In reply to enquiry why he had not made direct denial to Rozanof, as seemed best way of putting matters right, he said he had no relations with Rozanof of whom he disapproved strongly but if Rozanof mentioned matter he would certainly deny any such intention on the part of his Government.

M. Matsudai[ra] was evidently perturbed at reports in circulation and said he had sent a member of his staff to inform Chamber of Commerce with reference to their public statement, see my telegram No. 910,¹ that Japan had no connection whatever with any such movement.

¹ No. 528.

No. 530

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 17)
No. 916 Telegraphic [152714/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 11, 1919

My telegram No. 910.¹

General Rozanof to-day of his own accord categorically denied that he entertained any intention of creating independent State in the Far East. All he had wished to do was to sound various parties here as to their . . .² on form that Government should take in the event of fall.

Officer deputed to make these enquiries had entirely misunderstood his instructions and had mismanaged Bourse Committee. All these misunderstandings on part of subordinate officers are curious (see my telegram No. 914,³ repeated Omsk, Peking, Tokyo and Harbin).

¹ No. 528.

² The text here is uncertain.

³ No. 529.

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 19)
No. 915 Telegraphic [153428/11/57]

Following from Omsk, November 8:—

VLADIVOSTOK, November 11, 1919

My telegram No. 541.¹

I am leaving for Irkutsk where I shall remain pending instructions. Staff of High Commissioner go on to Omsk [*sic*] to-day for . . .² Vice-consuls Ledward and Woodhouse are with me in General Knox's train. French High Commissioner started on French military mission leaving immediately after us [*sic*]. Japanese Ambassador will follow. I called on Admiral Koltchak yesterday.

Ministers, including Minister for Foreign Affairs, have also decided to proceed at once to Irkutsk, which will become centre of civil administration. Undoubtedly movement, though inevitable, threatens the very existence of Government. Yet it is possible that by following a subterfuge policy it may succeed in establishing its authority in new territory. First act will be to promulgate law regarding peasant and Cossack Assembly which has now passed Council of Ministers. Koltchak stays in Omsk. Vologodsky continues as President of Ministers, it being thought he as a Siberian connected with Omsk Government since its inception is likely to command influence with population of Central and Western Siberia. Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to me his anxiety lest proposed arrangement, by which Koltchak surrounded by military advisers incompetent in civil affairs would dictate policy on administrative matters while Government remain only nominally in power 2,000 versts away, will prove unworkable. He stated he would refuse to continue in his post under such conditions.

It was proposed that General Dieterichs should be given full powers east of Baikal. So far, he has not been able to accept conditions offered him.

I expressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs hope that appointment would be made since Dieterichs is only person likely to kindle loyalty to Koltchak with influential portion of Atamans.

General Ivanof Rinof has been appointed assistant to General Sakharof. He is astute and capable, and has weight as Ataman of Siberian Cossacks, but his loyalty to Koltchak is doubtful. 2nd Army, weakened by withdrawal of 1st Army to Tomsk region for reforming, is unable to offer any resistance and is rapidly falling back. 3rd Army is said to be fighting in Petropavlovsk direction with determination. Some 7,000 volunteers have been raised in Omsk, and with reinforcements coming up from Novonikolaievsk and local troops there, should be thus quite capable of successfully resisting Bolshevik advance, but continual changes in high command produced general feeling of uneasiness.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of November 5, 1919 (transmitted from Vladivostok to the Foreign Office on November 10; received November 16), reported on preparations for the withdrawal of Allied diplomatic and military missions from Omsk to Irkutsk.

² The text here is uncertain.

Gold is all loaded in railway waggons, but has not yet been despatched. Probably it will be sent to Novonicolaievsk where there are Polish troops, besides parts of 1st Army still guarding railway.

No. 532

Mr. Lowdon (Odessa) to Earl Curzon (Received November 15)

No. 46 Telegraphic [152489/93/38]

ODESSA, November 11, 1919

My telegram No. 40¹ of November 8.

Arrangement between Galicians and Volunteer Army is to following effect.

1. Volunteer Army disclaims any intention of interference in Galician home affairs.

2. Ukraine is to be considered part of one indivisible Russia.

3. All Galician troops now in Ukraine to be placed at disposal of volunteer army for service against Bolsheviks.

Sent to Foreign Office. Repeated to High Commissioner.

¹ Not printed. This telegram reported that 'about 60,000 Galician troops have left Petlura and come over to Volunteer Army'.

No. 533

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received November 13)

No. 11/1355 Telegraphic: by wireless [151601/9/38]

MOSCOW, November 12, 1919

SS. nr952 w93 Le12/11 H 22R30.—Paris, for Lord Curzon of Kedleston, London, copy British Consul-General, Reval, 12th November.

M. Litvinof, accompanied by Madame Zaretzky, Madame Korobovkin and three British war prisoners, intends crossing the front line on 17th November if advised in time that the necessary instructions have been given to the Esthonian local military command. Anticipating difficulties in finding a suitable staff abroad, M. Litvinof decided to take two clerks. It is expected that a British representative will be present on the line. nr11/1355.

TCHITCHERIN

People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs

No. 534

Earl Curzon to Mr. Porter¹ (Reval)

No. 203 Telegraphic [151601/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 13, 1919

Please forward following message to Tchitcherin, Moscow:—

'I have received your wireless of 12th November stating that M. Litvinof intends crossing frontier on 17th November,² and I have instructed British

¹ Mr. A. E. Porter was temporary British Vice-Consul at Reval, at that time Acting Consul-General in the absence of Mr. Bosanquet.

Consul, Reval, to advise Esthonian Government accordingly, and to request them to make necessary arrangements as they had previously kindly undertaken to do. I am giving instructions that he shall be met on the frontier and accompanied to Copenhagen by British official. I am informing Danish Government that besides Madame Zaretsky, M. Litvinof will be accompanied by Madame Kovobovk and two clerks, and I trust they will raise no objection on account of not having been previously notified of their names. Please telegraph their names to me for communication on receipt of this.'

Repeated to Copenhagen, No. 1494.

No. 535

Earl Curzon to Mr. O'Grady¹

[152845/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 13, 1919*

Sir,

1. You are hereby appointed Chief of the British delegation which is shortly proceeding to Denmark in order to meet representatives of the Soviet Government.

2. The object of your mission is to attempt to secure the release and repatriation of all British prisoners of war in the hands of the Soviet Government belonging to the Navy, Army and Air Force; to secure the repatriation to the United Kingdom of all British civilians, men, women and children, who are at present for various reasons prevented from leaving Russia, though desirous of doing so; to secure the release and repatriation of all British political prisoners now undergoing sentences of imprisonment; and to make such arrangements as are possible for the feeding, clothing and general welfare of such British subjects as may elect to remain in those parts of Russia governed by the Soviet.

3. In order to achieve this object you are empowered to attempt to exchange the British prisoners of war in Russia for those Bolshevik prisoners of war now in the hands of His Majesty's Government, a list of whose names will be supplied to you.

4. In order to secure the release of the British civilians you may suggest the repatriation to Russia of such Russian subjects now in the United Kingdom who wish to return to Russia. You may also inform the Soviet Government that His Majesty's Government are willing to make arrangements for the return to Soviet Russia of such Russian sympathisers of the Bolshevik Government as are willing to be repatriated.

5. You will come to such an agreement as you consider suitable for the actual method by which the exchange and repatriation can be carried out, bearing in mind that His Majesty's Government will do everything possible to supply shipping and to secure transit facilities from the Government

¹ Labour Member of Parliament for East Leeds and Secretary of the National Federation of General Workers.

concerned; it would be preferable, if possible, that the journey of the British subjects should be via Helsingfors.

6. You will obtain from the Soviet Government such guarantees as you think necessary for the actual execution of such agreements as you may reach.

7. You will at once call for a report from the Soviet Government of the state of health of all the British subjects concerned, and you should point out that special arrangements will have to be made for cases of wounds and sickness.

8. You will no doubt consider it expedient to refrain from all political discussion with the Soviet representatives, and should be particularly careful in no way to countenance any attempt on their part to negotiate on any other subjects than that of the exchange of prisoners and the arrangements connected therewith.

9. Your colleague will be Mr. Robert Nathan,² and you will have the assistance of a secretary qualified to act as interpreter.

10. His Majesty's representative at Copenhagen will be instructed to give you such assistance and advice as you may require, but you are empowered to act entirely on your own responsibility.

11. You will correspond directly with the Foreign Office through His Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen, who will despatch your telegrams and forward your official correspondence by bag.

12. I shall be obliged if you will render a full report to the Foreign Office on the course of the negotiations on your return, and you should in an additional report submit such information concerning conditions in Russia as you may unofficially have obtained in the course of your conversation with the Soviet representatives.

13. The actual expenses of your mission will be defrayed by His Majesty's Government, and one of its members will be required to keep the accounts; should the negotiations involve any financial transactions of importance, you should refer to the Foreign Office through His Majesty's Minister at Copenhagen before incurring any expenditure which His Majesty's Treasury might not be willing to authorise.

² Sir R. Nathan was to represent the Home Office.

No. 536

Sir G. Grahame (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 17)
No. 1101 [152637/91/38]

PARIS, November 13, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to Your Lordship's despatch No. 7445¹ of November 10 (146699/W/38) on the subject of the recognition of Admiral Koltchak's Government, addressed to Sir Eyre Crowe.

¹ No. 527.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggested to me that it would be preferable that His Majesty's Embassy should make the enquiry of the French Government contained therein.

I accordingly spoke to M. Berthelot, Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to-day with regard to the matter, and he informed me that the French Government would return the same answer to the Russian Ambassador here as that which you propose to give to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London.²

I have, etc.,

GEORGE GRAHAME

² In a letter of November 22, 1919, Mr. Gregory accordingly informed M. Sabline that 'His Majesty's Government have given very careful consideration to the question raised. . . . They have, however, decided that they are not in a position to accord recognition to Admiral Koltchak's Government at the present time.'

No. 537

Mr. Porter (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)

No. 359 Telegraphic [152028/9/38]

REVAL, November 14, 1919

Following just received 13th November.

Following yesterday's radio No. 11/1355.¹

Our intentions are altered owing to the timely reception of the Estonian Government's answer; our delegation will be able to cross the front line on 16th November early. It is expected that a British representative will be present on the line.—No. 11/1366. Tchitcherin, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs. Ends.

¹ No. 533.

No. 538

Mr. Porter (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)

No. 360 Telegraphic [152189/9/38]

REVAL, November 14, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

In conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs I learn that intention of Litvinof proceed to Dorpat attend Conference,² exchange Estonian hostages. Numerous newspaper correspondents have proceeded there.

¹ No. 537.

² A second conference of representatives of Baltic States was then in session at Dorpat in connexion with the elaboration of a common policy towards Soviet Russia: cf. No. 445, note 2. (The date of October 25 there mentioned in connexion with pourparlers with the Soviet Government had been postponed in the light of the intervening offensive by the Russian North-West Army against Petrograd. After initial successes this offensive had, however, failed.)

Suggested it would perhaps be better Litvinof should proceed straight to Reval as his journey was arranged at the request of His Majesty's Government, and pointed out we had not been informed of date of arrival by Esthonian Foreign Office. He agreed question of crossing frontier was opened by His Majesty's Government and journey to Dorpat was side tracking main object.

Gather British officials meeting Litvinof on front can influence strongly decision whether proceed Dorpat or Reval.

No. 539

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received November 15)¹

Unnumbered. Telegraphic: by wireless [152476/9/38]

MOSCOW, November 14, 1919

November 14. I have received your wireless of to-day.² Our delegate Litvinof accompanied by Madame Zaretsky, Madame Korobovkin and one clerk have left Moscow for the frontier. They will cross the front line on the 16th November. The British Consulate-General in Reval is informed about the date of their arrival on the frontier. The clerk follows to Dorpat but not further. From Dorpat our delegate Litvinof with Madame Zaretsky and Madame Korobovkin will continue their journey to Denmark. Further communications on the same subject will be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. Best thanks for your kind solicitude.

¹ This wireless message from Moscow was picked up by the War Office on November 15.

² Evidently the transmission from Reval of No. 534.

No. 540

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 19)

No. 927 Telegraphic [153429/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 14, 1919

Mr. Nash¹ sends disquieting reports as to exasperation of population of Irkutsk at soaring prices and unpopularity of Koltchak Government, who are accused of taking no remedial measures.

Talk here of imminent coup by his opponents gains credence. Gaida bulks largely in public eye as probable leader of movement.

Atmosphere of Vladivostok is anti-Koltchak, and statements must be taken with reserve, but unanimity of opinion is too marked to be entirely disregarded.

Repeated to Peking, Tokyo and Harbin.

¹ H.M. Vice-Consul at Irkutsk.

No. 541

Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperiali

[149045/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 14, 1919

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Italian Ambassador and with reference to His Excellency's confidential Memorandum of November 3rd,¹ has the honour to state that the question of the recognition of Georgia is involved with that of the other Transcaucasian Republics, which is in turn bound up with the settlement of the whole Russian question, and, in a lesser degree, with the terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty.

The whole question is receiving the most careful attention of His Majesty's Government, and in the opinion of Lord Curzon it is impossible at the present juncture for His Majesty's Government to afford any indication of their policy beyond the expression of sympathy with Georgian aspirations which, as the Italian Government are aware, has already been given.

¹ No. 509.

No. 542

Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Teheran)

No. 606 Telegraphic [148577/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 14, 1919

Your telegram 717¹ (November 4th).

Answer to (a) is in the negative.

It is quite impossible to give any answer at present to your other questions.

Mr. H. G. [J.] Mackinder, M.P. has been appointed British High Commissioner with General Denikin and will shortly leave this country for Denikin's headquarters. On his arrival we hope that it may be possible to come to some general arrangement with regard to Trans-Caucasia.

¹ No. 517.

No. 543

Letter from Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Lord Hardinge

(Received November 24)¹

Unnumbered [155038/1089/38]

PARIS, November 15, 1919

My dear Hardinge,

I have been a good deal embarrassed by your official despatch No. 7242² of October 27 respecting Denikin's operations.

2. You will remember that whenever the Russian question has come before the conference, it has always created difficulties. These in the last resort have generally been due to the absence of any well defined policy on which all the allies are agreed and which has been thought out by them in

¹ The date is that of entry on the Foreign Office file. It appears probable that the date of original receipt in the Foreign Office was earlier.

² No. 499.

all its bearings. There was Prinkipo. There was the manifesto addressed to Koltchak and accepted by him. On these matters there was agreement. But almost everything else has been a hand-to-mouth affair sometimes arranged between France and England, sometimes with America as well, at other times based on decisions of the British or the French governments.

3. For some time the affairs of Russia have been dealt with outside the conference, and I was under the impression that so far as our own government was concerned, this was deliberate and intentional. There has been talk of letting the question of Russia be treated separately, by a conference *ad hoc*, in London. At any rate we have here acted on the understanding that the peace conference was not the proper organ for treating it. The Baltic regions have come before the conference practically only as involving the problem of German evacuation. The operations of Yudenitch, Denikin, and Koltchak have, so far as I can remember, not been before the Supreme Council for months.

We have recently discussed plans for winding up the conference by the 1st of December. In the debate on this subject it was taken for granted by all the five plenipotentiaries that the Russian problem was already excluded.

4. This being the situation, I see the greatest difficulty in now asking the Supreme Council to take up the extraordinarily complicated issue raised in your despatch. In this delegation, the experts, military and other, have covered many sheets with minutes, suggestions, criticisms and queries. Every conceivable problem is raised: concerning Petlura, the Ukrainians of Galicia, the relation between the Roumanians with Denikin on the one hand and with Petlura on the other, the relation of Koltchak to all of them. In addition the whole Transcaucasian question is rolled up.

5. If these matters are really to be gone into by the conference, it will be inevitable in the first instance to set up one or more special committees to study the issues involved. It is doubtful whether we on our part have all the information that we ought to possess. I might have to ask for more experts to come over from London. In any case if *we* are to raise the question in the Supreme Council it will be expected of us that we explain the whole situation to them lucidly. I am far from confident that we are in a position to do so.

6. Apart from all this, the War Office letter raising all these thorny matters is now six weeks old. The situation in Russia is at present quite different from what it was on October 7 when that letter was written.

7. I venture in these circumstances to ask whether on further consideration you do not agree with me that it will serve no practical purpose to mobilize the Supreme Council and seek its intervention a fortnight before its probable natural death, when, in any case, the whole Russian problem must be dealt with through other channels and other machinery.

Yours always,

EYRE A. CROWE³

³ On November 25, 1919, Mr. Gregory minuted on this letter: 'Lord Hardinge is replying personally.' This personal reply was not entered on the file. The question was not raised by Sir E. Crowe in the Supreme Council at Paris.

No. 544

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received November 24)

No. 137A Telegraphic [155471/1015/53]

TIFLIS, November 16, 1919

Your telegram No. 69.¹

You will have learnt from my later telegrams that person referred to is again in Baku where he is playing a part in present troubles.

All their activities have been object of my solicitude ever since I arrived and steady private pressure on Azerbaijan Prime Minister had succeeded in bringing about temporary result stated in my telegram No. 106.¹

If His Majesty's Government could give me any assurance for Azerbaijanians that they would be fairly treated and encouraged I (? believe) they would not adopt an actively Turkish orientation. Their present policy is one of despair. They might be made useful transmitters in checking pseudo-Bolshevik campaign in Central Asia with which they have (? really) no sympathy. With a very little vigour and tact we could clear out foreign intriguer(? s in) Trans-Caucasus and (? Cis-)Caucasus (? who are) becoming stronger the longer we leave them.

Reports from Tashkend, Bokhara and Samarcand tend to show that Soviet power there is tottering and a direct British offensive would clear out Bolsheviks there. Volunteer Armies' operations in Trans-Caspia are evidently ineffectual and rather conducive to (? diminish) our prestige in Asia.

I believe presence in Daghestan of an energetic tactful sympathetic British Representative independent of Denikin's influence would probably have an immediate wholesome effect in restoring peace and hampering Turkish Bolshevik intrigues thus improving situation in Asia generally.

¹ Not printed. In Tiflis telegram No. 106 of November 2, 1919 (received November 3), Mr. Wardrop had reported that Nuri Pasha, brother of Enver Pasha and formerly in command of Turkish forces in the Caucasus, had been 'sent away' from Azerbaijan. In reply Foreign Office telegram No. 69 of November 4 asked Mr. Wardrop: 'Can you do anything to secure arrest of Nuri, who escaped from Batoum after two of his British guard had been shot?'

No. 545

Colonel Tallents (Dorpat) to Earl Curzon (Received November 19)

No. 1 Telegraphic [153083/9/38]

DORPAT, November 17, 1919

Litvinof's first meeting with Baltic representative[s] was held at Dorpat 17th November afternoon. No Prime Minister or Foreign Minister except Estonian Piip is attending. I am informed that an agreement for exchange of prisoners of war hostages and political prisoners was considered and is likely to be concluded.

Deeply regret that there was discussion about armistice which will probably continue to 18th November. Litvinof tells Warrender he expects to leave for Reval 19th or 20th November.

I have interviewed the three English prisoners brought across by Litvinof. They are obviously harmless. Their reports indicate urgent need of winter clothing and boots for prisoners remaining in Moscow. Failing other arrangements Litvinof might be asked to take supplies back with him.

Sent to Paris, Copenhagen and Reval.

No. 546

Mr. Alston (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Received November 18)

No. 449 Telegraphic [153066/11/57]

TOKYO, November 17, 1919

Ji Ji newspaper reports abandonment of Omsk has upset plans of Japanese Government for relief of Russia and preservation peace and security of Far East. It says that the military authorities think as Omsk Government cannot station troops in Irkutsk, position of that Government will be jeopardized. In consequence it is most important Japan should, with the acquiescence of plenipotentiary, omit the words 'improper use its troops both to guard that Government and to preserve peace, &c.' [*sic*]. Paper says military authorities do not anticipate interference from other Powers, and that forces now in Siberia are insufficient for the purpose. Commander-in-chief has recommended despatch of reinforcements.

It is rumoured that recent visit of Prime Minister to Osaka was for the purpose of consulting Minister of War who is absent on manœuvres, and that as a result definite proposals will shortly be submitted to Cabinet and diplomatic council.

Repeated to Vladivostok.

No. 547

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 20)

No. 938 Telegraphic [153827/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 17, 1919¹

Crisis culminated this morning, and whilst Japanese and French representatives were with me, political representative of Omsk Government, M. Kurenkof, called with message from General Rosanof that Gaida had seized steamer in harbour and arrested five Russian officers whom he now held prisoners. He had also stopped railway traffic. Rosanof proposed to issue ultimatum to Gaida and disarm him, but wished first to obtain consent of Allied representatives.

In hope of avoiding bloodshed, we decided as first step to ascertain status of Gaida *vis-à-vis* of Czech authorities with a view to bringing pressure to bear on him. Latter stated he was Czech reserve officer lent to Russian

¹ The official date of dispatch of this telegram was recorded, apparently in error, as November 13; the actual date of dispatch was November 17.

Government, and that his dismissal had never been notified to them, so they still regarded him as a member of Russian army; but as a Czech citizen they would have to defend his personal liberty if threatened. They denied acts of which Gaida was accused, and said he was quite ready to meet Rosanof and discuss matter.

Meanwhile *coup d'état* took place, and proclamation appeared calling for overthrow of Admiral Koltchak cessation of civil war, and opening of peace negotiations with Soviet; this was followed by a ukase establishing 'Temporary Peoples' Administration of Siberia' under Yakushef. Almost simultaneously fighting began round railway station between Rosanof's and Gaida's troops, and has continued intermittently since Czech troops do not so far appear to be involved, but their sympathies are undoubted.

I declined to receive representatives of new Government this morning; they have since made written communication that their movement has support of whole population, that troops are going over to them, that Gaida has been appointed commander-in-chief of their army, and that they look to Russia's Allies for their sympathy in view of their declarations respecting democracy in Russia. Finally, they beg that Great Powers will maintain full neutrality if their army is compelled to take up arms. I have refrained from any reply, but it may be difficult and even dangerous to maintain this attitude.

At a meeting of Allied representatives this afternoon, we decided to reply to Rosanof's request verbally through senior member that no useful purpose would now be served by sending him answer, fighting being already in progress.

Allied military commanders have taken necessary steps for preservation of order in city, but will not intervene in conflict in any way.

It may be difficult if new movement carries the day for me to abstain absolutely from all communication with its leaders as laid down by your Lordship. Such action might merely endanger British interests, and even life and property. So far, I cannot say which party is gaining upper hand. I request instructions.

Repeated to Peking, Tokyo, Harbin, and Mr. Hodgson.

No. 548

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 21)

No. 942 Telegraphic [154126/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 18, 1919

My telegram No. 938.¹

Coup d'état collapsed this morning. (? Rozanof) captured Gaida and his troops after considerable bloodshed. Many civilian leaders of the movement have been arrested, and some military leaders said to have been shot. Many prisoners shot out of hand.

Town is now quiet and under martial law. All news from along line lacking, and despatch of railway traffic from here suspended.

¹ No. 547.

Gaida has been handed over by General Rozanof to Czech authorities, who seem to contemplate sending him out of Russia. This would be most wise step, as he will be disturbing influence as long as he remains here; could some such opinion be expressed by your Lordship to Czech Government? Attitude of Czech military has been most correct throughout incident.

I refused at Allied meeting to-day to be drawn into any enquiry as to responsibility of incident.

There are persistent rumours of trouble at Irkutsk, Omsk, Chita and Nikolsk.

Repeated to Admiral at Peking, Tokyo, Harbin, and Mr. Hodgson.

No. 549

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindley (Vienna)*¹

No. 7 Telegraphic [148592/775/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 18, 1919*

North Russian Conversion Office.²

There are still sixty-eight million new roubles outstanding of which public hold thirteen million and His Majesty's Government balance. There is only sufficient sterling at Bank of England to retire forty-eight million. Timely notice was given to Provisional Government that holders should present their new roubles to Conversion Office before 31st October, as His Majesty's Government then intended to present their holding for redemption, and thereafter new roubles would no longer be interchangeable for sterling.

Treasury have, however, hitherto refrained from doing so, and Mr. Young, present British Adviser to Conversion Office, urges that His Majesty's Government should refrain from cashing their notes in excess of amount to leave sterling cover for the thirteen millions in hands of public on grounds that His Majesty's Government are morally if not legally responsible for the scheme.

We are reluctant to urge Treasury to adopt course which would involve further loss to His Majesty's Government of £325,000 but we should be glad to know if you consider that His Majesty's Government should on political grounds save the Conversion Office from bankruptcy.

¹ Mr. Lindley, formerly British Commissioner and Consul-General in Russia, stationed at Archangel, had been recently appointed British High Commissioner in Vienna.

² Also referred to as the State Emission Caisse: see No. 283, note 2.

No. 550

Colonel Tallents (Dorpat) to Earl Curzon (Received November 19)

No. 3 Telegraphic [153464/67181/59]

DORPAT, *November 19, 1919*

I learn in answer to informal questions, November 18th, Litvinof offered to recognise independence of Provinces, withdrawal from Latgalen and

reparation for damage done by Bolshevik forces. In reply to Esthonians he expressed willingness to hand over Bolshevik fleet on condition that Baltic were neutralised. He said they needed no fleet but must be guaranteed against Allied warships coming to Petrograd.

He told Lettish Representative that Poland would not make peace jointly with province(s) but was already inclined to do so separately. This statement was not believed. Polish representative left Dorpat on Litvinof's arrival.

There is a host of American correspondents in Dorpat presumably diverted here after their Petrograd disappointment. I am informed that some of them lately telegraphed home suggesting that England was urging provinces against peace. Their only ground for this appears to have been the temporarily depressed appearance of a Lettish delegate.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Copenhagen, Paris, Reval, Helsingfors.

No. 551

Mr. Lindley (Vienna) to Earl Curzon (Received November 21)

No. 16 Telegraphic [154184/775/38]

VIENNA, November 20, 1919

Your telegram No. 7.¹

From beginning of new rouble scheme I expressed to Messrs. Harvey and Spring Rice my anxiety lest (? sooner or later) Caisse de la Dette might become bankrupt as it was clear to me that new rouble was quite certain to be considered an English rouble. Of course it was so considered by whole population and failure to pay will be regarded as a breach of faith.

I am very reluctant to express an opinion which may add to financial burdens of His Majesty's Government but since Treasury apparently offer to cash all new roubles presented before October 31st they will not even if they pay now lose more than they contemplated as possible when they made that offer.

Archangel area has undoubtedly a great commercial future and apart from general objection to acting in a manner which is bound to give rise to belief that we have failed to keep our engagements I should deprecate a proceeding which might well hamper our future trade with largest timber reserve in Europe.²

¹ No. 549.

² A copy of this telegram was sent to the Treasury under cover of a letter of December 4, 1919, from the Foreign Office stating that Lord Curzon 'concurs in the view expressed by Mr. Lindley'. The Treasury replied to the Foreign Office in a letter of January 2, 1920, which stated that the Treasury had, in deference to Lord Curzon's representations, 'agreed to the retention by the Caisse of the sterling cover for the outstanding Notes in the hands of the public, which now amount to about Roubles 6,000,000.'

No. 552

Mr. Russell¹ (Berne) to Earl Curzon (Received November 27)

No. 1328 Telegraphic, en clair [155901/91/38]

BERNE, November 20, 1919

Following information has reached me from a man who has recently visited Berlin, and who may be assumed to have repeated accurately and truthfully what he heard there:—

It appears that as soon as the British and French decisions regarding the cessation of active support to the powers of order in Russia got known, Ludendorf, at a meeting with his personal supporters, stated that this news was almost equal to a victory. He said that now the ground was clear for German influence in Russia. He added that America was not in a position to run Russia, and that he did not fear Japan. He went on to say that the new Triple Alliance would doubtless be Germany, Russia and Japan, and that before many years had elapsed the German Empire would be more powerful than it had ever been.

¹ H.M. Minister in Berne in succession to Lord Acton.

No. 553

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 7593 [148199/61232/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 21, 1919

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 2059¹ of the 31st ultimo. I consider this question of the recognition by a future Russian Government of concessions granted by the Governments of the Baltic States, to be a suitable subject for discussion at the forthcoming International Conference on Russia.

I am, etc.,

[(For Earl Curzon of Kedleston)

GERALD SPICER]²

¹ No. 507.

² Signature supplied from files of the British Peace Delegation.

No. 554

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received November 27)

No. 952 Telegraphic [156100/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 21, 1919

I appreciate situation in Siberia as follows:—

Movement of Government to Irkutsk is a wise one, but should have been made under cover of success, and not when rendered obligatory by disaster

on front. It is essential that all administration be centred in Irkutsk, and that Koltchak and his military advisers confine themselves exclusively to conduct of war.

Under these conditions it is conceivable that Koltchak may remain at head of affairs, but it is observable that he no longer enjoys the immunity from attack which he has hitherto enjoyed as one around which all anti-Bolshevik elements were gathered. Till now, Government and not his personality has been assailed as cause of failure; now his bravery and patriotism are forgotten, and weaker sides of his character—his impetuosity, obstinacy and faulty judgment of men—are blamed. Extreme Right see no hope of coming to their own again through him, while . . .¹ parties regard him as sold to reaction; Moderate Socialists have lost faith in protestations of democratic principles which bring nothing in their train; Left Socialists brand him as an autocrat and oppressor; peasantry, who suffer whether Reds or Whites are in power, welcome Bolshevik rule, which promises peace, and may, they think, give it in preference to Administration which has signally failed to secure them benefits which it undertook to bring.

Army, whose creation is only achievement of which Government has right to boast, was formidable when advancing; in retreat it falls to pieces, for none but a few little detachments have at heart the cause for which they are fighting. Men distrust officers, and latter place no confidence in chiefs who conduct private feuds at expense of armies for which they are responsible.

I regard militant anti-Bolshevism in Siberia as at an end, and Omsk Government, at all events in its present form, as moribund. Atamans continue to consume gold reserve from Omsk. Semenof's territory is poor, and he will be unable to maintain large group of officers who have congregated round him, and whose presence will incidentally prevent him from associating himself with any democratic movement which may take place. His troops are largely unreliable.

Bourgeois have proved themselves throughout Siberia selfish and lacking in public spirit; little is to be expected from them. Socialists seemed destined to come to the front again, and of these best are Oblastniki, who were represented last year by original Omsk Government and by Derber group in Vladivostok . . .¹ by Yakusheff-Gaida movement in latter place. Their doctrine is federated and self-governing Siberia with all power locally to zemstvos and municipalities. They are led by theorists who have no knowledge of practical government and are little fitted for taking charge of the country in a chaotic state, such as this is. Bourgeois and officer classes will be against them, and also Extreme Left, who demand exclusion from power of all members of propertied class, and advocate agreement with Bolsheviks, but they have influence of co-operative societies with them and enjoy warm sympathy of Czechs. I shall be better able to gauge their chance of coming into power when I have acquainted myself with position at Irkutsk and Chita. Things will be largely governed by fate of Omsk armies.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 24)
No. 1649 Telegraphic [154771/43654/38]

COPENHAGEN, *November 23, 1919*

Max learns from source which he considers reliable that Soviet Government while realizing that Copenhagen Conference has been arranged by His Majesty's Government solely for reasons affecting British prisoners nevertheless regard that meeting as a 'feeler' put forward by His Majesty's Government with a view to sounding public opinion on question of peace with Bolsheviks. In order to conciliate opinion in United Kingdom Soviet Government desire to appear moderate and *Pravda* recently published decree by which 2 Mencheviks, Martov and Dan, 3 revolutionary socialists and a cadet were admitted to Government. Freedom of press has been re-established in theory and Menshevik's organ *Vsegda v Pered* has been allowed to reappear.

No. 556

M. Kopwillem to Mr. Gregory (Received December 5)¹
No. 7036 [158915/67181/59]

ESTHONIAN LEGATION, LONDON, *November 24, 1919*

Dear Mr. Gregory,

I have just received the following telegram from Reval:—

'(Urgent.)

'Reval, November 23, 1919

'In view of the fact that the long war has greatly exhausted the power of the young State, that the present attacks from the east by strong forces are threatening us with great danger, and that our independence *de jure* has not been recognised, which fact would have strengthened the fighting spirit of our troops and would have consolidated the economic position of the country by stabilising the value of the Esthonian mark, we are compelled to accept the Russian offer to open peace negotiations, even should our neighbouring States not take part in them. The fronts of the latter have not been attacked for some considerable time already and this may be a reason for their delaying. It has been decided to open negotiations on 1st December, of which fact our neighbouring States have been informed.

'Inform immediately whom necessary of the above, advising us without delay of their attitude in the matter.

'With regard to the Dorpat negotiations for the exchange of prisoners of

¹ The date is that of entry in the files. It appears probable that the date of original receipt in the Foreign Office was earlier.

war, agreement has been reached between ourselves, the Lithuanians, Letts, and the Russians.'

I should be much obliged to you if you would see your way to give me the desired answer.

Yours sincerely,
J. KOPWILLEM

No. 557

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received December 1)
No. 956 Telegraphic [157315/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, November 24, 1919

Following received from Hodgson, Chita, on 22nd November:—

'Omsk was evacuated on 12th November and occupied by Bolsheviks on 15th November. Troops were withdrawn to east of town on account of turning movement from north, which threatened them with annihilation, as river was not yet frozen.

'Journey of Ministers through Siberia was uneventful, but aroused only perfunctory interest in centres on the way. Representatives of municipality and Zemstvos at Irkutsk refused to meet them on arrival. Minister for Foreign Affairs was at first very depressed, admitted defeat to be catastrophe, and appeared to recognise insecurity of position of Government; later having had news of triumph of Rosanof, he took heart and spoke stoutly of intention of Government to prosecute war against Bolsheviks, and as to his fear that Allies might be tempted to bring about understanding with (Moscow). He confessed that resources of man-power in Siberia were almost exhausted. Manifesto being published expressing contrition of Government for its faults of the past and giving assurances of good conduct in future. Reign of inquisitions and military terror is to be abolished. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that though not in favour of granting legislative power to new Assembly, Government would be prepared to make this concession if situation could be saved by it.

'Changes in composition of Government are imminent. Probably Pape-laief, now Minister of the Interior, will become President of Council. This would be best selection. He would himself choose members of Cabinet.

'Semenof is behaving satisfactorily at present. I think it unlikely that he will take any separatist action unless complete collapse of Omsk Government leaves him no other alternative.

'Koltchak is to come to Irkutsk as soon as situation on front permits.'

No. 558

Mr. Lowdon (Odessa) to Earl Curzon (Received December 5)
No. 59 Telegraphic [158989/1089/38]

ODESSA, November 25, 1919

Military situation may be characterised as general retreat of the Volunteer Army.

Kursk has been captured by Red Army and Kieff may fall at any moment. Situation behind line somewhat serious. Ekaterinoslav is in hands of Mak-nov¹ who has recently been joined by stragglers from Red Army and Petlura.

Repeated to High Commissioner.

¹ Anarchist leader of an independent force of irregulars in South Russia.

No. 559

Commander Smythies¹ (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received December 13)
No. 15 [161402/116696/38]

REVAL, November 25, 1919

My Lord,

1. The condition of the Russian North West Army is now such that, as a separate body, it may be said to have ceased to exist.

2. An agreement has been arrived at between the Military Commanders of Estonia and North West Russia which provides that those sections of the Russian North West Army which still remain organized and disciplined shall for all military purposes be placed under the control of General Laidoner, the Estonian Commander-in-Chief. It is difficult to give an exact estimate of the effective strength of these sections—General Yudenitch, I understand, estimates their strength at about 60,000, whereas General Laidoner has informed me that they number anything from five to ten thousand men. Perhaps 6,000 would be a conservative estimate.

3. As regards the disposal of the remaining portions of the Russian North West Army which, from various causes have become non-effective units, and the refugees from those parts which were temporarily freed from the hands of Soviet Russia, the following agreement has been arrived at between the Estonians and Russians:—

The Estonians have agreed that they shall be allowed to enter Estonia, provided that they do not pass to the westward of the road Johvi-Atsaiama-Olesnitsa. All Russians found west of this line will be disarmed by the Estonians and marched over to the Eastern side of the road, where they will be handed over to the Russian Military Authorities.

4. Regarding the question of Russian refugees within this area, a Commission is to be set up with its Headquarters at Johvi, to deal with this problem. The constitution of this Commission will be as follows:—1 English Military Officer, 1 American Relief Association Officer, 1 French Military Officer, 1 Estonian Representative, 1 Russian Representative. The duties of this Commission will be to go thoroughly into the housing, feeding and clothing of all Russian refugees, male and female.

5. As regards the military situation on the Estonian frontier at Narva, I remain of the opinion that the Soviet forces do not at present seriously intend to attempt to penetrate into Estonia proper, but will content themselves with the positions that they at present hold.

¹ Acting Assistant British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces stationed at Reval.

6. MM. Margoulies, Eishinski and Bogdanoff, Ministers of the North West Russian Government, have been ordered by the Estonian Government to leave Estonia within 14 days from November 21st. Up to the present no reason has been given by the Estonian Government for this action.

7. M. Maxim Litvinoff, Executive Commissar of Soviet Russia, arrived here by train from Dorpat on the morning of November 21st, accompanied by two other persons, Madame Korobkova and Madame Zaretskaya and Sir Victor Warrender Bart. The party were accommodated in an empty house under guard of the Estonian Authorities.

8. Owing to urgent representations made to me by Colonel Tallents from Dorpat regarding the condition of British prisoners in Moscow, I requested Colonel McGregor, the head of the Russian Section of the British Red Cross in Reval, to interview M. Litvinoff in my presence. The proposals put forward by Col. McGregor were that a truck-load of warm clothing, food, surgical appliances and other articles should at once be got together and passed over the Estonian frontier at Isborsk, or at a point convenient to the Estonian and Soviet Authorities, and that they should be conveyed to Moscow and placed under the charge of Mr. North, the English Chaplain there, for distribution. Colonel McGregor was desirous of accompanying these supplies so as to make certain of their reaching their destination.

9. M. Litvinoff expressed himself as unable to accede to this proposal. He stated that the authorities of Soviet Russia had decided that every proposal must now be looked at on a basis of reciprocity, and that as he felt that Great Britain would under no circumstances allow a Bolshevik Red Cross representative to land in England, he therefore was unable to allow a British Red Cross representative to enter Soviet Russia. He further stated that if these supplies were allowed in, the sight of British prisoners in warm clothing would, from his Government's point of view, create a very bad impression upon the population.

10. In a further interview which I had with M. Litvinoff, he appeared to base great hopes on the willingness of his Government to grant concessions as a first instalment for the payment of the external debts of Soviet Russia. These concessions, he stated, would be in the nature of the right to work the mineral wealth of the country, timber, flax etc. He agreed with my proposition that to be a concession, these things would have to be worked at a profit, and stated that as Soviet Russia was in the position of having capitalist nations as neighbours, she must conform to their ideas as regards her external financial affairs.

11. M. Litvinoff stated that from the first he had opposed his Government's repudiation of their external debt, as he felt certain that such a course would tend to unify the resistance of other nations against them.

12. During his stay in Reval, the Estonian Authorities were careful to do all that lay in their power to accommodate M. Litvinoff and his party in comfort, and before embarking he expressed his gratitude and thanks, both to the Estonian representative and myself, for the way in which he had been treated. M. Litvinoff and party, together with Sir Victor Warrender Bart.,

embarked on board H.M.S. *Princess Margaret* on the afternoon of November 22nd and left for Copenhagen at 10 p.m. the same evening.

I have, etc.,

L. A. SMYTHIES

No. 560

Mr. Gregory to M. Kopwillem

[151024/67181/59]

Dear Mr. Kopwillem,

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 25, 1919*

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 6636¹ of the 10th instant communicating the text of a telegram received from Professor Piip, enquiring as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards peace concluded by Esthonia with the Soviet Government.

As you are aware, last September, when the Baltic States asked for our views in regard to the question of negotiations with Soviet Russia, His Majesty's Government, after mature consideration, came to the conclusion that they must leave the States in question full liberty of action. The circumstances which prompted this decision still obtain, and they do not therefore feel in a position to offer advice on the relative merits of a *de facto* or of a formal peace with the Soviet Government, although they view with the most sincere sympathy the efforts of the Provisional Government to bring security and prosperity into the territory under their control.

His Majesty's Government regret that they would be unable to undertake responsibility for the control of a neutral area alluded to in your note, but there would be no objection, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, to such control being exercised by one of the Powers which were neutral during the late war.

J. D. GREGORY

¹ No. 525.

No. 561

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 1520 Telegraphic [155801/9/38]

Substance of following for O'Grady.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 25, 1919*

If Litvinof's ulterior motive in going to Copenhagen is to join contact with outside world and attempt peace feeler he will naturally protract exchange negotiations; at any rate, he would be very reluctant to be forced to return to Moscow immediately by your breaking off negotiations. It may therefore well be in your interest to force the pace of the negotiations and to endeavour to reach definite preliminary agreement on main principles at earliest possible moment, leaving more complicated details, such as transport arrangements, for more leisured negotiation.

Above is for your consideration, but you have of course full liberty to follow course you think best.

No. 562

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 25)
No. 1653 Telegraphic [155446/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, November 25, 1919

Following from Mr. O'Grady:—

Litvinof arrived Copenhagen to-day. Met him at landing stage. Had interesting conversation with him on way to hotel. Meeting at 3 o'clock to-day to commence business of our mission.

Litvinof is accompanied only by two ladies, secretaries speak English fluently, so that whole business of Commission will be carried on in our language.

No. 563

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 26)
No. 1657 Telegraphic [155487/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, November 25, 1919

Litvinof states that all military, naval and air force prisoners are now in Moscow.

Immediately before he left Russia he visited places where they live and saw representatives, including Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant Bremner. They are all well in health except in so far as some of wounded need special surgical attendance.

Litvinof has promised to send wireless messages to Moscow and Petrograd asking for names of civilian residents and state of their health.

This report will be forwarded to you at once. Think general purport of this telegram will ease public anxiety and suggest publication by you.¹

Above is from Mr. O'Grady.

¹ This suggestion was adopted and the substance of the present telegram was published in *The Times* on November 29, 1919.

No. 564

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received November 27)
No. 158 Telegraphic [156102/1015/58]

TIFLIS, November 25, 1919

Prime Minister of Azerbaijan before leaving for Baku today spent about an hour with me privately, and thanked me for my initiative in (? suggest)ing meeting with Prime Minister of Armenia and for action generally in bringing about agreement communicated to Your Lordship in my telegram No. 136 [156],¹ paragraph 1.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of November 24, 1919 (received November 26), transmitted the text of an agreement signed at Tiflis on November 23 by the Prime Ministers of Armenia and of Azerbaijan. By this agreement the governments of the two states in question undertook, in particular, to cease hostilities and not to resort again to force of arms. A conference

He said he knew your Lordship would always give a personal sympathetic hearing to any just claims by Azerbaijan and on his part His Excellency would be glad to use any influence he might have in Turkestan and Turkey to combat anti-British activities; he believed he might be of some use in this way if he had some general indication of British policy, but he was uneasy at reports of friction between Allies. I assured him that such reports could have little foundation; he had seen how I worked in complete harmony with Americans; he knew France and Great Britain were united by closest bonds of interest and affection; Italy was showing an extraordinary interest in Trans-Caucasian affairs, and seemed likely to out-distance other Allies in her exhibition of sympathy.

Mindful of your Lordship's telegram No. 78² I took the opportunity to ask who had offered arms and munitions of war to Azerbaijan. Prime Minister said offer was made by Colonel Gabba head of Italian Mission on behalf of Italian Government.

I returned to question of Nuri (see my telegram No. (?) 137³ and your telegram No. 69⁴) and said his presence in Azerbaijan would not do that country any good. Prime Minister agreed and said he would again invite him to leave but thought he could do no great harm in Azerbaijan where his movements were controlled while in Turkestan or Daghestan for instance he might be troublesome.

Turkey was the best place (? for) him but it was difficult to send him there; I said I thought I could help him in this if he really wished to get rid of Nuri. The matter was then dropped, but I have asked (? Colonel Stokes) to take it up again on first opportunity.

Yesterday agreement was signed by Colonel Rhea as a witness and he describes himself as acting Allied High Commissioner.⁵ I do not know how far this might be construed as a formal recognition of all these Republics, for M. Gegechkori also signed as witness and as Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At a banquet last night to celebrate signature speakers insisted that Trans-Caucasus had now staked everything on Western Powers especially Great Britain and America, to whom they looked for sympathy and if necessary protection and where they would seek guidance in diplomacy, commerce, industry and education. Prime Minister of Azerbaijan said that now he had heard Armenian Prime Minister publicly declare Armenia really desired her independence his mind was at rest; all the strife and bloodshed between the

of Armenian and Azerbaijan delegates was to meet on November 26 in order to discuss outstanding questions under dispute, with authority to settle all such questions by agreement or arbitration.

² This telegram of November 11, 1919, to Tiflis reported that 'Italian Government deny officially that they are engaged in any transaction for supply of arms to Georgia and Azerbaijan and do not believe that private Italian firms are busy in that direction. Italian Government are bound by Arms Traffic Convention Protocol not to supply arms to Trans-Caucasia.'

³ No. 544.

⁴ See No. 544, note 1.

⁵ Colonel Rhea of the United States Army was acting for Colonel Haskell.

two (? nation)s had been due to politicians and not to peoples who had lived one thousand years as good neighbours. Other speakers said this isthmus must not become a new Balkan Peninsula, and the only way to prevent this was by a strong confederation with wide autonomy.

Active measures are being taken to lay foundations at an early date of a strong (? Trans)Caucasian confederation.

No. 565

Sir J. Tilley to M. de Fleuriau
[148722/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 26, 1919*

Dear Monsieur de Fleuriau,

The present position at Batoum¹ is that the withdrawal of the British troops has been temporarily postponed owing to the disorders that would be certain to follow upon immediate evacuation. The status of Batoum after evacuation will no doubt be determined by the Peace Conference.

Yours etc.,

J. A. C. TILLEY

¹ See No. 518. In an interim reply of November 10, 1919, to this French memorandum of November 4, Sir J. Tilley had informed M. de Fleuriau that Batoum 'is, as you know, at present in the temporary occupation of a small British garrison. It would no doubt be rather difficult to discuss its future apart from the general question of Trans-Caucasia. But we should like to know what your Government have in mind in making the enquiry.' In a subsequent undated minute Sir J. Tilley recorded that M. de Fleuriau 'has seen Mr. Churchill's statement in the House [of Commons] and M. Cambon wants to know what is to happen when our troops leave'. In answer to a parliamentary question Mr. Churchill had stated on November 4: 'No British troops are at Baku or in any other part of the Caucasus except Batoum on the Black Sea. A brigade of British and Indian troops is temporarily remaining at Batoum at the request of the Foreign Office to prevent serious local disorders occurring at this particular moment.' Cf. *Parl. Debs. 5th Series. House of Commons*, vol. cxx, col. 1290.

No. 566

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)
No. 1524 Telegraphic [156128/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 26, 1919*

Following for Mr. O'Grady.

French Ambassador has reported a conversation between you, French Minister at Copenhagen and Mr. Grant Watson, during which you are alleged to have said that you expected Litvinof to raise the questions of the blockade of Soviet Russia, of our supply of material to General Denikin, and of the establishment of trade relations between this country and Soviet Russia, and that you had announced your intention of listening to proposals of this kind which would, certainly as regards the second and third points, be tantamount to peace proposals. French Ambassador further said that you were

going to send home a memorandum submitted by Litvinof containing these proposals. French Government are somewhat concerned at this information, as they fear it would be virtually impossible for you to listen without compromising your instructions to confine your discussions with Litvinof strictly to the question of the prisoners.

I agree that the blockade issue may easily become an element in your negotiations, and you should therefore treat it as such, and ask for further instructions; French Ambassador was told this would be the case.

The other two points are on a different footing. I need hardly remind you how sensitive public opinion is both here and abroad with regard to any suggestion of peace negotiations with the Soviet Government, and your mission is being subjected to the most severe scrutiny by the press and public of all the countries interested. It would therefore be wiser that you should refrain entirely even from listening to peace proposals of any sort, since even to listen may well imply a certain encouragement. Moreover, we have made it perfectly clear to our Allies that your mission is strictly confined to the object for which you have gone to Copenhagen, and we must scrupulously abide by our word. If the Soviet Government desire to make any advances in the direction of peace, it would be much better that they should do so quite openly, and not attempt to use the prisoners' negotiations as a cloak.

No. 567

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 26)
Unnumbered. Telegraphic [155120/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, November 26, 1919

Following from O'Grady.

Terms of your telegram No. 1520¹ exactly express my own view of Litvinoff's intentions and line of action we should take. It is however impossible to expedite negotiations without my credentials. You stated in your telegram No. 1521² that my letter of appointment would be sent on Friday next³ presumably by ordinary messenger. Please arrange for letter to be sent immediately by special messenger in one of H.M. destroyers. I desire to point out that I asked for letter of appointment prior to leaving London and was informed that it would reach my private residence on the night before I started. Two telegrams have been sent from Copenhagen making the same request. I cannot understand great delay.

Another reason for acting promptly is that Danish Government are nervous that Syndicalists and Red elements may make demonstrations in favour of Litvinoff which would make his further stay here difficult and that there are numerous White Russians who would like to see negotiations broken off and are doing all in their power to drive Litvinoff out of Copenhagen. In the circumstances please do expedite delivery of my credentials.

¹ No. 561.

² Not printed.

³ November 28, 1919.

No. 568

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)
No. 1526 Telegraphic [155120/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 27, 1919*

Following for Mr. O'Grady.

Your very urgent, personal telegram of November 26th.¹

I hope my telegram No. 1522² will suffice pending receipt of letter of appointment referred to in my telegram No. 1521.³ This letter left London Wednesday 25 [? 26].⁴ It is not credentials in the usual sense, viz. a document addressed to the head of State with which you are negotiating, but a letter signed by me and suitable for production to Litvinoff.

¹ No. 567.

² In this 'very urgent' telegram of November 25, 1919, Mr. Grant Watson had been instructed to 'inform Danish Government officially if this has not already been done that Mr. O'Grady is acting on behalf of His Majesty's Government in his negotiations with Litvinoff. He is authorised to discuss the question of British prisoners of war and civilians in Russia. He will be assisted by Mr. Robert Nathan who will act under his instructions. A copy of this telegram should be given to Mr. O'Grady who may shew it to the Soviet Representative. Letter of appointment signed by me to Mr. O'Grady follows.'

³ Not printed.

⁴ November 25, 1919, was a Tuesday.

No. 569

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28)
No. 1665 Telegraphic [156137/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, *November 27, 1919*

Following from Mr. O'Grady:—

I am astonished that French Ambassador should have been supplied by French Minister in Copenhagen with such a garbled version of my conversation.¹

I generally stated to Foreign Ministers what proposals I thought Litvinov might put forward arising out of (? July 24th) [*sic*] negotiations for release of prisoners of war and repatriation of British civilians now in Soviet Russia. These were blockade and cessation of military and financial aid to Denikin. I said that logically these proposals would be establishment of trade relations of Soviet Russia. I said that if Litvinov did this I would hear what he had to say but make it very clear that my instructions were release of military prisoners and repatriation of British civilians in Soviet Russia. I know nothing of any memorandum of Litvinov and cannot understand how the French Minister in Copenhagen mentioned it. I have made it clear to Press here and to Press representatives from England what my instructions are and also to Litvinov, indeed I read to him at our first meeting vital paragraphs of my instructions. Confusion in mind of French Minister at Copenhagen may have arisen through my stating whatever proposals Litvinov might

¹ See No. 566.

make arising out of our negotiations and impinging on Peace terms, I would not discuss remittance of them to you. I again assure you that I shall definitely and persistently keep to letter of instructions I had when leaving for Copenhagen.

No. 570

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28)
No. 1669 Telegraphic [156087/146362/38]

COPENHAGEN, November 27, 1919

Following from Mr. O'Grady.

Are there at present any Russian subjects in prison in England for political or war offences? If there are I presume there will be no objection to releasing them and repatriating them.

No. 571

Lord Acton¹ (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29)
No. 692 Telegraphic [156940/116696/38]

HELSINGFORS, November 27, 1919

Secret meeting was held at Helsingfors last night under auspices of Russian General Masolow to discuss present position of White Russian organization in Baltic provinces. Prominent Finnish advocates of Finnish intervention in Russia were present. It was resolved

- (1) To invite Yudenitch with Generals Palm, Arseniew, Rodzianko and Lieven to Finland.
- (2) Endeavour to bring about immediate return of General Mannerheim to Finland with a view to his assuming supreme command of a Russian-Finnish force for relief of Petrograd.

General Masolow is a Monarchist with pro-German inclinations. Above information emanates from Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹ Lord Acton had recently been appointed H.M. Minister at Helsingfors.

No. 572

Mr. Alston (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29)
No. 466 Telegraphic [156968/11/57]

TOKYO, November 27, 1919

Following from military attaché for War Office:—

General Tanaka, Minister of War, to-day asked me to transmit for submission to British Imperial General Staff his private opinion as follows regarding Bolshevik situation:—

1. Koltchak's army is in full retreat and may eventually reach Irkutsk. As a means of withstanding Bolshevism it is practically non-existing.

2. France and England have withdrawn all support in Siberia, and British Premier's speeches imply that no more assistance will be given to anti-Bolshevik forces anywhere after March next.

3. Without Allied support anti-Bolsheviks will soon collapse and Bolshevism will become firmly established throughout Russia and Siberia.

4. He is convinced . . .¹ will be alliance between Germany and Russia, which will enable Germany to recuperate rapidly as a military Power and, in conjunction with Russia, become a menace to the world.

5. American troops in Siberia are so few that they are of little consequence. The task of opposing Bolshevism therefore rests with Japan, who is financially and in face of hostile public opinion now unable to undertake it alone.

6. General Tanaka is not prepared with present enemy forces in Siberia to accept responsibility of preventing Bolshevism from spreading eastwards.

7. He is therefore insisting upon despatch of reinforcements, but, should the request be refused by Cabinet, he will urge total withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia.

8. Result in Far East will then be spread of Bolshevism not only throughout Siberia, but also through Mongolia into China.

9. General Tanaka therefore considers it essential that Allied support of anti-Bolshevik forces should be continued.

10. Opinion of British General Staff will greatly influence attitude to be adopted by him and Cabinet, and he therefore requests same for his private information as soon as possible.

I am of opinion General Tanaka will resign unless his proposals are agreed to by Cabinet. His resignation will be a serious loss to British cause in Far East. He is one of England's best friends, and firm believer in Alliance and in Anglo-Japanese co-operation as an essential factor in reconstruction of China. He is one of the ablest and strongest men in Cabinet, and I trust it may be possible to accede to his request for a definite expression of opinion, no matter whether it is in favour of or contrary to his views, so that he may feel at any rate, as leader of Japanese army, he has complete confidence of British General Staff. Message ends.

(Private.)

Military attaché considers, and I agree with him, that this opportunity should not be missed of reciprocating as far as possible confidence reposed in us by Minister of War which this request denotes and which I feel bound to state as being so successfully fostered by present military attaché.²

¹ The text here is uncertain.

² A copy of this telegram was communicated by the Foreign Office to the War Office on December 2, 1919. The War Office replied on December 29 and on the basis of this reply the following telegram to Tokyo was drafted in the Foreign Office:

'January 1920

'Your telegram No. 466 (November 27).

'General Staff share view of General Tanaka as to desirability of maintaining front against Bolsheviks, but as there are no British troops in Siberia, His Majesty's Government must

leave it [text imperfect] to those powers who have troops in Siberia to decide what forces to send or maintain there.

'You may use your discretion as to whether this message should be communicated to [Japanese] General Staff or not.'

This draft was, however, minuted by Mr. Hoare (who had become a member of the Russia Department of the Foreign Office upon his return from North Russia): 'So much has happened during last fortnight that I am inclined to say nothing at all.' Mr. Gregory minuted on this: 'All right.' The draft telegram was accordingly not sent. (It had been previously noted that, subsequent to Tokyo telegram No. 466 above, Mr. Alston had sent a further telegram, No. 468, on this subject. This telegram is missing from Foreign Office files, but a note of it stated that Mr. Alston 'does not favour discussions of foreign policy of [the] two Govts. being carried [?] on] through their respective War Offices'.)

No. 573

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 29)
No. 1671 Telegraphic [156605/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, November 28, 1919

Following from Mr. O'Grady.

At our meetings of yesterday and today Litvinoff discussed question of general exchange to include all (? prisoners of war) and all civilians wishing to . . . [?] return¹ to their own country. He said he was not prepared to negotiate on mere basis of Russian subjects in Great Britain as he was indifferent whether they stayed or returned and because his own people would not be content to return British nationals whilst Russian subjects were detained in other countries over which Great Britain has influence or for lack of facilities which Great Britain could secure. He then made following general proposition:

General Exchange. Russian Government to release all British subjects in their hands, military and civilian, while British Government will release Russian prisoners and civilians who can be immediately exchanged and should give certain guarantees for removing all obstacles due to blockade and war in way of return to their country all Soviet Russian nationals residing in Europe. Form of guarantees to be agreed upon by Conference. Russian Government also to be enabled through representatives appointed by them in neutral countries to be in communication with their friends left abroad pending their repatriation and to look after their welfare. Expression 'Europe' in this clause means Great Britain, Archangel and Murmansk district of North Russia, Caucasus and Caspian districts and Persia and India, Germany, Austria, neutral countries.

I then made following alternative proposal.

Russian Soviet Government to release all British subjects in their hands, military and civilian, while British Government would release Russian prisoners and civilians who can immediately be exchanged and should give certain guarantees for removing all obstacles due to blockade and war in

¹ The text here is uncertain.

way of return to their country all Soviet Russian nationals residing in Great Britain as soon as and when arrangements for transport are made. Form of guarantees to be agreed upon by Conference. In proposing this alternative I made several observations.

First I showed by detailed reference to wireless correspondence that nothing had transpired in negotiations which led to British Government obtaining facilities for Litvinoff's mission to show that Soviet Government proposed to include in discussion Russian nationals outside Great Britain. He endeavoured unsuccessfully to controvert this but it was clear he realized it himself.

Secondly I pointed out M. Litvinoff's proposals went far beyond my instructions and that I could not therefore deal with them without previous reference to you.

Thirdly I demonstrated that these proposals involved Governments of other countries and would thus be outside competence of His Majesty's Government.

M. Litvinoff declined to entertain my alternative. He first referred to my omission of his sentence about appointment of Soviet Government representatives in neutral countries and said that it was a *sine qua non* that he or some one else on behalf of Soviet Government should stay somewhere at hand until terms of any agreement which might be arrived at had been fully executed. He next (? objected to) substitution Great Britain for Europe and other countries which he had mentioned.

The course of conversation led me to believe however that point which he had most at heart was that he should be permitted to stay somewhere in Western Europe for ostensible purpose of supervising gradual exchange of nationals by batches across frontier. I do not consider M. Litvinoff would be prepared to negotiate merely on basis of Russian subjects in Great Britain but I am of opinion that if sufficient concessions were made to him to enable him to satisfy his own people he might be content with less than that for which he had asked. In fact he states he would be willing to consider alternative proposals.

He laid special stress on following points:

- A. Repatriation of Russian Soviet subjects now in Denmark which he thought might be easily effected.
- B. Return of Russian prisoners from Germany with regard to which he read extract from telegram which he had received from his Government at Pskoff on his way to Copenhagen.
- C. Release of Russian prisoners in Archangel and Murmansk district vide my telegram of yesterday.²

Will you please inform me whether you are prepared to accept whole or any part of M. Litvinoff's proposals as a basis for negotiations and if so whether you will give me extended powers for this purpose.

² The telegram in question is not printed.

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 30)
No. 1675 Telegraphic [156919/860/38]

COPENHAGEN, November 29, 1919

Following from Mr. O'Grady.

Question of sending supplies of warm clothing, both to prisoners of war and to British civilians in Russia, was discussed with M. Litvinof yesterday. He is prepared to agree these supplies should be sent, if necessary, by special ship provided we permit him to send at the same time consignment of drugs, smaller or larger, according as we send supplies for prisoners of war only or for civilians also. I trust, in view of what Mr. Gregory told me about sending drugs to Russia, that you will (? find) it possible to give this permission. M. Litvinof suggests supplies should be transmitted to Rev. Mr. North, who would send receipt for them. M. Litvinof is preparing a list of drugs he wants, and has asked for estimate of bulk of our consignment. Perhaps you can prepare rough estimate by indicating number and size of cases which would be needed. Following is best information I have been able to procure of number of British civilians in Russia:

Petrograd, 375; Moscow, 180; other parts of Russia, 200.

Petrograd colony includes 215 women and 64 children. Figure for other parts is very rough.

With reference to statement made by Mr. Harmsworth in the House of Commons on 17th November,¹ I hear it would be very difficult or impossible to obtain permission to send food for use of prisoners. M. Litvinof affirms that their rations are already superior to those of Red (? Army) and that much discontent has been occasioned thereby.

¹ On November 17, 1919, in answer to a parliamentary question, Mr. Harmsworth had stated in the House of Commons that he had requested Mr. O'Grady to raise with M. Litvinof the question of obtaining permission to send food to Petrograd for the use of British prisoners pending their exchange. Cf. *Parl. Debs. 5th Series. House of Commons*, vol. 121, col. 602.

Mr. O'Grady (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received December 6)
Unnumbered [159082/43654/38]

COPENHAGEN, November 29, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to state that in the course of yesterday's discussion Mr. Litvinoff said that if there were any chance of coming to a general peace understanding with the Allies, and first of all with Great Britain, the question of prisoners would thus settle itself in the most easy and satisfactory manner. He added that if I wished to discuss such questions he was quite ready and had full authority to do so. Adhering to my own instructions I did not pursue the matter further, but Mr. Litvinoff told me that, in addition to the

letter authorising him to exchange prisoners, he had also been given a document empowering him to enter into Peace negotiations with the Border States and with the Governments of the countries at war with Soviet Russia or between which and Soviet Russia a state of hostilities existed, and also an order from the Russian Red Cross appointing him to be their Chief Representative in Western Europe.¹ He showed me the three documents and subsequently gave me copies of them. I append copies² for your information.

I have, etc.,

JAMES O'GRADY

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 575

Copie

RÉPUBLIQUE RUSSE FÉDÉRATIVE DES SOVIETS.

COMMISSARIAT DU PEUPLE

POUR

LES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.

Tel. 4-23-65.

MOSCOW [*sic*], le 14 novembre 1919

N. 12/1026.

Par les présentes le Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple de la République Fédérative Socialiste des Soviets de Russie délègue tous pouvoirs au citoyen Maxime Litvinov, Membre du Collège du Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Étrangères, délégué de la Croix Rouge Russe, aux fins de négocier avec les Gouvernements de la Grande Bretagne et autres pays l'échange des prisonniers civils et des prisonniers de guerre, de régler des questions concernant la situation des citoyens russes à l'étranger et des citoyens étrangers en Russie, de prendre toutes les mesures que il [*sic*] jugera utiles pour sauvegarder à l'étranger les intérêts de la République de Russie et des citoyens russes, de conclure des emprunts pour les sommes qui pourront être nécessaires à l'exécution des missions dont il est chargé, de conclure et signer sur toutes les questions ci-dessus énumérées des conventions au nom de la République de Russie. Il est prescrit à tous les représentants et agents à l'étranger de tous les Commissariats et départements de la République de Russie de fournir au citoyen Litvinov toute l'aide possible et de se soumettre à toutes ses ordonnances légitimes.

Le Président du Conseil des Commissaires
du Peuple W. OULIANOFF (LÉNINE)

Le Commissaire du Peuple pour les
Affaires Étrangères G. TCHITCHERINE

Le Secrétaire YAKOUBOWITCH

¹ Mr. O'Grady had briefly informed Lord Curzon of the three above-mentioned documents in Copenhagen telegram No. 1679 A of November 29, 1919 (received November 30: not printed).

² The first two of the three documents referred to in this dispatch are printed below. The order from the Russian Red Cross, dated at Moscow on November 13, 1919, and headed 'Traduction (Copie)' is not printed.

Copie.

RÉPUBLIQUE RUSSE FÉDÉRATIVE DES SOVIETS
COMMISSARIAT DU PEUPLE
POUR
LES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

Tel. 4-23-65.

MOSCOW, le 14 novembre 1919

N. 12/1027.

Par les présentes le Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple de la République Fédérative Socialiste des Soviets de Russie délègue tous pouvoirs au citoyen Maxime Litvinov, Membre du Collège du Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Étrangères, pour engager des pourparlers de paix avec les Gouvernements des Républiques constituées sur les confins de l'ancien Empire de Russie ainsi que avec [*sic*] les gouvernements des autres pays en état de guerre ou d'hostilité contre la République Soviétiste, pour faire à ces gouvernements et pour recevoir d'eux toutes propositions de paix, pour conclure et pour signer toutes conventions préliminaires.

Le Président du Conseil des Commissaires
du Peuple W. OULIANOFF (LÉNINE)

Le Commissaire du Peuple pour les
Affaires Étrangères G. TCHITCHERINE

Le Secrétaire YAKOUBOWITCH

No. 576

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Mackinder*¹

[169487/150931/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 1919²

Sir,

I have to inform you that His Majesty's Government desire you to proceed to South Russia in the capacity of British political representative at the headquarters of General Denikin, and have accordingly appointed you British High Commissioner for that purpose.

You are already familiar with the Russian situation on general lines, but the particular nature of your mission clearly requires that I should draw your special attention to those elements in a notoriously complex, and temporarily insoluble, problem, with which it will be your immediate concern to deal.

In the first place you will be proceeding to an area where at the present moment the prospects of the armies in conflict with the Soviet power are not

¹ Unionist Member of Parliament for the Camlachie Division of Glasgow.

² Thus in filed original. The exact date was intended to have been that of Mr. Mackinder's departure for South Russia (December 4, 1919). This document was approved by the Cabinet on December 2, 1919: see No. 580.

the most favourable. The element of surprise, however, is always present in Russian military operations, conducted as they are over such vast distances and in territories of fluctuating political allegiance, and there is therefore no reason to conclude that the wheel of fortune has finally turned in favour of the Bolshevik armies and against their opponents; or that the military situation, such as we are witnessing to-day, will not be subject at any moment to a complete and unexpected transformation.

Nevertheless, for the immediate purpose of your mission, it is only possible to assess the conditions in South Russia as they are being actually reported, and you will have, in all probability, to deal on arrival with a receding force.

The failure of General Denikin to pursue his offensive to a victorious finish, and the simultaneous set-back in the fortunes of the North-West Russian and the Siberian armies, will have inevitably produced a feeling of depression among the Russian leaders with whom you will be called on to confer, if not a certain resentment against the Allied Powers for having failed to support them to a greater extent than they have done. It is doubtless with this state of feeling that you will immediately have to contend, and it will be one of your first duties to explain the attitude of His Majesty's Government as regards the extent and the limits of support that it has been possible for them to give.

The contributions which His Majesty's Government have made to the Russian forces in North and South Russia have already been made public, and I need not therefore reiterate the published statement.³ The present object of these contributions is also well known. It was fully set forth in the Allied letter to Admiral Koltchak, a copy of which is attached.⁴

With this end in view, it has been the policy of His Majesty's Government to support General Denikin as the only force in South Russia likely to bring about the creation of a stable Russian Government. General Denikin himself has recognised the authority of Admiral Koltchak, and may be described as the commander of the European wing of the latter's army.

The burden which has been thrown on Great Britain and her Allies by a five years' world war has, however, been so vast that, vital though the establishment of constitutional government in Russia has seemed to them, their resources are clearly not inexhaustible, and a term has therefore had to be set to the period during which the supply of war material to General Denikin can be continued. As you are aware, the final contribution to him has now been fixed, and after the 31st March next His Majesty's Government will not be in a position to give further material aid.

I cannot believe that General Denikin will fail to comprehend the reasons for this decision or to realise that Great Britain, despite her great position in the world, is unable to assume commitments of an indefinite kind, but in view of his partial isolation from Western Europe it is possible that he is not fully alive to the reasons for the decision. It may accordingly be necessary

³ This statement was published in Cmd. 395 of 1919: *Cost of Naval and Military Operations in Russia from the date of the Armistice to the 31st October 1919.*

⁴ Not printed. For this document see No. 233, appendix I.

for you to elucidate them more fully, and to assure him that the decision in no way implies a withdrawal of sympathy, and that he can continue to count not merely on the moral support of His Majesty's Government, but on such expert advice and guidance as he may care to seek on all political, administrative and economic questions.

It is chiefly to give this moral support and advice that you are proceeding on your present mission, and it is the political arena which will provide the main scope for action on your part.

General Denikin, deprived of further material assistance from abroad, is likely to be thrown back on the efforts to secure by political means the assistance, or at least to disarm the hostility, of elements in the former Russian Empire, both Russian and non-Russian, which at the present moment are confronted with their own problems for the future, and may easily through mutual misunderstandings defeat both the ends of the national Russians and their own. The policy of both Admiral Koltchak and General Denikin, which is directed to the reconstruction of Russia, has, in fact, already brought them at different points into sharp collision with the nationalist aspirations of both the ex-Russian border States and the Russian groups with whom they have come in contact.

The main problems of this nature are General Denikin's relationship with the Transcaucasian Republics, on the one hand, and with the Baltic States on the other.

The aspirations of both these groups of States is towards independence, while it has hitherto been the avowed policy of Admiral Koltchak and General Denikin to regard them as an integral part of Russia. The utmost concession which the Russian leaders have been prepared to make is contained in the reply which was sent by the Admiral to the Allied letter already referred to (copy also attached).⁵

As General Denikin's relationship with the Transcaucasian Republics is of immediate practical importance to him, owing to their proximity and the assistance they can render him, or the reverse, in his military operations, I will deal briefly with it first.

The dividing line as at present fixed between General Denikin's area and that of the Transcaucasian Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, starts on the Black Sea at the mouth of the Bzyb River and along its right bank to where it intersects the Kuban-Sukhum frontier, and thence along the southern frontiers of the Kuban and Terek provinces to a place where the Terek frontier intersects the Daghestan frontier, and then along the southern frontier of Daghestan to the Caspian Sea.

It is with the national aspirations of the various peoples living south of this line that His Majesty's Government are largely concerned. While in no way desirous of unduly prejudicing the structure of the future Russian State, they are bound to admit that the claim of these peoples to a national existence of their own is a strong one, though in what form this claim should eventually be given expression is a matter which cannot be adjudicated by His Majesty's

⁵ Not printed. For this document see No. 255, appendix II.

Government alone, but must be left to the decision of the Peace Conference or the League of Nations sitting in sequel to it.

There are, however, certain definite actions of General Denikin in his relations with the Caucasian States which are open to criticism. The chief of these is the blockade of Georgia, which he is now conducting from the Black Sea, a proceeding which is a matter of considerable concern to His Majesty's Government, inasmuch as it affects not merely Georgia, but the British-occupied province of Batoum and Azerbaijan. It is, moreover, apprehended that he may interpret the part which his fleet is playing in the Caspian as entitling him to occupy Baku. He should clearly understand that, in handing over to him the Russian fleet, His Majesty's Government intended him to employ it only in his operations against the Soviet forces while respecting in every sense the integrity of the Caucasus. You will have, in fact, to insist on his observance of the line of demarcation above referred to, and to remind him that continued support of him within the limit with which you are familiar is dependent upon the faithful fulfilment of his obligations in this respect.

It is so evidently to General Denikin's own interest not to alienate these communities that you should endeavour to persuade him to adopt as conciliatory an attitude as possible in his relations with them, if he is to gain their assistance in his struggle against Bolshevism.

With this end in view you should keep in close touch with Mr. Wardrop, who, as Chief British Commissioner at Tiflis, is responsible for the relations of His Majesty's Government with the three Transcaucasian Republics. Mr. Wardrop is representing His Majesty's Government in a sphere which comprises Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and (temporarily, at least) the province of Batoum, and while he will remain entirely outside your jurisdiction, you will, as occasion requires, detach General Keyes to act as your intermediary with him, in order to secure a constant exchange of views.

I would also mention in this connection that Colonel Haskell, an American officer, has been appointed Allied High Commissioner for Armenia (including both Transcaucasian and Turkish Armenia) by the Supreme Council in Paris, but it is understood that his functions will be mainly connected with relief work, and will not clash with those of Mr. Wardrop.

The situation with regard to the Baltic States is in practice less complicated as far as General Denikin's military operations are concerned, owing largely to their geographical position, but the political attitude adopted towards them by both Admiral Koltchak and General Denikin is none the less uncompromising.

The policy of His Majesty's Government towards these States has been the provisional recognition of their Governments as *de facto* independent bodies—of the Estonian Government in May 1918, of the Latvian in November 1918 and of the Lithuanian in September 1919. On the 25th September of this year His Majesty's Government were obliged for reasons given above to decline a request from all three Governments for a recognition of the independence *de jure* of the countries which they represented, but they accompanied their

refusal with an assurance that, when the question of the status of these countries came up for consideration by either the Peace Conference or the League of Nations, they would exert such influence as they could to secure the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as far as might be consistent with a final and peaceful settlement in North-East Europe.⁶

You will observe therefore from this sketch that while His Majesty's Government are unable at this stage to formulate a definite policy as regards the ex-Russian States, they are anxious to meet as far as possible their desire for a separate national existence to the extent that interests more comprehensive than those of any individual State or community permit.

The position of Bessarabia creates a slightly different problem. But here again General Denikin's progress has been retarded by the attitude of the Roumanian Government, who continue to support the Ukrainian forces so long as he refuses to recognise Roumania's right to Bessarabia. It is hoped, however, that a solution may be found before long, seeing that Denikin and the Roumanian Government have agreed to negotiate the matter.

The so-called Ukrainian Government, which with its forces under General Petlura has been driven to the western border of South Russia, claims to be the representative of the people of South Russia. The chief strength of its position lies, not so much in Russia, as in a vigorous propaganda campaign in foreign countries.

It is generally believed that the so-called Ukrainian Government does not command much popular support, a conclusion which is borne out by the rapid success of the volunteer army in the territory which the Ukrainians claimed as strongly Nationalist. General Denikin has therefore always treated the Ukrainian Government as hostile to United Russia.

Finally, you will bear in mind that His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the establishment of good relations between Poland and Russia. They desire to see Poland develop into a strong and prosperous country, but they are anxious that her development should take place on the basis of a close friendship with her Eastern neighbour, and you should therefore do all that you can to promote such friendship between General Denikin and the Polish Government.

I have enumerated the main political problems with which Denikin is confronted, and which, as you will observe, cover a large field. There will no doubt be a variety of other questions of a kindred nature which will arise while you are in South Russia.

It will therefore be necessary for you to watch the political developments with great care, and to refer to me whenever it appears to you that some new issue has arisen which must be considered by His Majesty's Government in the light of their general Russian policy, or when General Denikin seeks your advice on matters of first-rate importance.

But in general your advice should be directed to persuading him to adopt a policy consonant with the trend of Western democratic opinion, and to

⁶ See No. 445.

insist that peace in Eastern Europe, even at the expense of certain deep-rooted theories and cherished traditions, will be more valuable to Russia and the world at large than a struggle continued for any other purpose than the establishment of order and Constitutional Government.

Finally, I would bring to your notice the question of the alleged pogroms of Jews which is at present attracting much public attention in this country. The reports received by this Department have so far been few and vague in character, and it has therefore been impossible to give an adequate answer to the questions raised either in Parliament or by the various Jewish societies in this country. Moreover, the military mission at Taganrog has already been instructed to exercise a restraining influence on the councils of the volunteer army where any question concerning Jews may arise. You should, however, do all in your power to protect Jews and to prevent excesses, and you should explain that incidents of this nature create the worst possible impression in Western countries. As there is considerable doubt as to the truth of stories which reach this country, I should be glad to receive a report on the whole question as soon as you have time to examine the problem.

You will not be actually accredited to General Denikin, as the Government of which he is the military chief in South Russia is not recognised by His Majesty's Government, but you should maintain close relations with him and with his Government. In this connection I would remind you that, although this Government has received no recognition from His Majesty's Government, either as a *de facto* or a *de jure* Government, it has nevertheless, as you are aware, received their generous and consistent support in the form both of funds and supplies.

As High Commissioner you will be the chief political representative of His Majesty's Government in South Russia, while Major-General Holman will remain their chief military representative. You will confine your activities to the purely political sphere; General Holman to the purely military. You will both no doubt be ready at all times to exchange information, but I see no reason why you should ever encroach on one another's jurisdiction.

With regard to His Majesty's consular officers, instructions will be sent to them to communicate to you all the information at their disposal on political matters.

Reference must be made in conclusion to the economic aspect of the assistance which we are still prepared to afford to General Denikin. As you are aware, a commercial mission is now being formed and equipped by the Department of Overseas Trade, which will probably arrive in South Russia simultaneously with your mission. Their object will be to report on the economic condition of the country, to tender to you advice on commercial matters for communication to General Denikin and to take such steps as are possible for the establishment of trade and industry within the area which Denikin controls. It is also intended to send out a railway expert who will endeavour to assist in the proper administration of the railways and the repair of the rolling-stock. It may eventually also become desirable to send a financial expert to advise on a reorganisation of the currency. I am fully

alive to the crying necessity of assisting Denikin to place on a proper footing both these questions of railways and currency, since without that it is clearly impossible to proceed with a normal distribution of food or to bring about a regular system of imports and exports between this country and Russia.

I am, however, of opinion that these and kindred missions should operate independently of your mission, which, as I have endeavoured to point out, will be mainly occupied with political issues, but they will of course keep in close touch with you and will profit greatly by your advice and guidance; and for this purpose they will be instructed to report to you on all matters of primary importance.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 577

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
No. 108 Telegraphic [155471/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 1, 1919*

Your telegram No. 137 A¹ (November 16th).

You are authorised to inform Azerbaijan Government that so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, their case will receive friendly and sympathetic treatment.²

There are no British forces available for an offensive of nature suggested in penultimate paragraph.

¹ No. 544.

² In Tiflis telegram No. 193 of December 10, 1919 (received December 17), Mr. Wardrop reported that this message had been conveyed to the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan who 'expressed gratitude and was evidently impressed. Prime Minister asked how far and when he might expect fruits of this friendly attitude and was told presumably when case came before some international conference. It was agreed not to publish message.'

No. 578

Mr. Stevens (Batoum) to Lord Hardinge (Received December 29)
No. 75 [165637/1015/58]

BATOUM, *December 1, 1919*

Sir,

With reference to recent telegraphic correspondence¹ between His Majesty's Government and this Consulate on the question of supplies of lubricating and fuel oils to be drawn from this country for the United Kingdom, I have the honour to report that the absence, at Batoum, of the two classes of oil referred to is principally attributable to the shortage of the Transcaucasian railways of rolling stock adapted to the transport of petro-

¹ Not printed.

leum products in bulk and in a lesser degree to restrictive measures enforced at Baku by the Azerbaijan Government.

2. The quantity of illuminating oil at this port which is available for shipment is great. For the past two months, kerosene has been carried from Baku to Batoum by pipeline, which directly after the outbreak of war and until the time mentioned was used for the exclusive purpose of bringing fuel oil to this port. The supply of kerosene at Batoum at present is in excess of the demand. The pipeline doubtlessly could again be adapted to the transport of fuel oil, but this would entail a heavy expenditure in kerosene for cleaning the pipes on reversion to the transport of illuminating oil by the line.

3. Lubricating and fuel oils which are brought to this port by tank-car are scarce owing to the very limited number of cars available for their transport and it is on such scanty transport facilities that the heavy oil trade is entirely dependent.

4. At many stations along the line numbers of condemned tank-cars are to be seen on sidings. They are, however, in such a state of disrepair that they cannot be used.

5. The materials required for repairing the cars are not procurable in the country, besides which, the labour question is beset with so many difficulties that it is doubtful whether the damaged cars could be repaired within anything like a reasonable period, if at all.

6. Under these conditions the oil traffic is regulated by the apportionment of the number of tank-cars actually available to firms in proportion to their production. The larger firms are allotted a greater number of cars than the smaller producers. In this way the more important firms are able to accumulate considerable quantities of petroleum products on the spot (viz. at Batoum) which enables them to rule the trade and to corner the market at their pleasure.

7. In order to avoid the difficulties experienced in transport, it is necessary that the railway should be furnished with additional rolling stock. I am told that if about 1000 tank-cars and fifteen locomotives could be added to the existing rolling stock, the disabilities, under which the mineral oil trade of this country is suffering would, to a very great extent, be at once removed and the situation could then be satisfactorily dealt with.

8. I believe the Italian Mission at Tiflis has understood the abnormal conditions obtaining on the railway in regard to the question of the transport of heavy oils and is considering the means by which matters can be remedied. Improvements introduced by them, to judge by the way things are shaping, would mean also German participation in them and the surrender, by us into undesirable hands, of all control over the transport of oil to Batoum.

9. The possibilities of oil from the Caucasus as a commercial commodity are not of such small importance to Great Britain as to allow the trade to slip out of our hands. The development of the petrol engine in recent years has much modified the oil situation; the industry has assumed importance similar to that of coal as a motive power. Besides lubricating and fuel oils,

large quantities of benzine, or petrol, are available at Baku. The burning question, however, is how to get all this great mass of petroleum products to Batoum for shipment.

10. In the circumstances, I would submit that if competition on the part of other countries, which as already stated are keenly watching the situation, is to be prevented, the additional rolling stock needed should, without further hesitation, be supplied by us and with the least possible delay.

11. A second pipeline from Baku to Batoum would be another means of solving the transport problem. This, however, is an undertaking of considerable magnitude, and without careful study requiring both much time and money, could not be contemplated.

12. In placing the above remarks before competent circles at home, I cannot lay sufficient stress on the fact that if we desire to reap the full benefit of our efforts in the Caucasus during the past year, it is imperative that we should exercise greater control, than we at present do, over the Transcaucasian railways to and from the oil fields at Baku and their branches leading into Northern Persia and that the Transcaucasian Governments should be called upon to withdraw all and every restrictive measures now in force on practically all raw materials intended for export and especially on oil to Batoum for the use of His Majesty's Government and for general trade purposes; no weakening on these points is admissible.

I have, etc.,
P. STEVENS

No. 579

Mr. Alston (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Received January 13, 1920)

No. 503 [170046/951/23]

TOKYO, December 1, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a report which I have received from the Military Attaché to this Embassy on the subject of the possibility of an alliance between Japan, Russia and Germany.

I have, etc.,
B. ALSTON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 579

Report No. LXXXVI

Ref. M.A./20.

BRITISH EMBASSY, TOKYO, November 27, 1919

Possibility of an Alliance between Japan, Russia, and Germany

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that in the course of a conversation held today with Lieut.-General Tanaka, Minister for War, I spoke to His Excellency about the rumours which reach us from time to time as to the possibility

of an alliance being effected at some future date between Japan, Germany, and Russia.

General Tanaka emphatically refuted the idea and insisted that, in his opinion, such an alliance would be quite impracticable.

He then informed me that the Japanese Ambassador in London, as well as the Japanese Officers employed on the Boundary Commission in Germany, had reported that stories are prevalent both in Germany and England to the effect that there is a secret understanding between Japan and Germany, and that the two countries are working in with one another behind the backs of the other Powers. His Excellency said that he was deeply grieved to think that there are people in England who believe such rumours and he authorised me to state definitely that there is absolutely no truth whatever in them.

He added that he attributed them entirely to German propaganda.

I have, etc.,

C. R. WOODROFFE

Brigadier General

Military Attaché.

No. 580

Earl Curzon to Mr. Mackinder

[177752/1089/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 2, 1919*

My dear Mackinder,

The Cabinet discussed this morning and approved the draft instruction to you as prepared in the Foreign Office.¹

While these instructions however state the general lines upon which you are to proceed, and the present political relations of the various communities concerned, the Cabinet particularly desired that they should be supplemented in one respect.

The information about many of those areas is so conflicting, and so little is known with certainty about the condition and feeling in those parts of Southern Russia which have passed into Denikin's hands in the course of his advance; further his actual policy towards the states both in front of and behind him is in some cases so obscure that before embarking upon any fresh policy for the future, H.M.G. would like to receive a report from you on the entire situation in its various aspects as soon as you have been able, after moving about the country, and seeing the principal parties concerned, to form a considered opinion. This will be of the greatest value to the Government, not only in enabling them to understand the present situation, but in helping them to formulate a policy for the future, where [? when] the military contributions to General Denikin's army have for reasons with which you are familiar, come to an end.

¹ No. 576.

This letter may therefore be regarded as a supplementary instruction, and I shall be glad if you will act upon it at the earliest convenient date.

I am,

Yours sincerely,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 581

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)
No. 1539 Telegraphic [156605/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 2, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1671.¹

Following for Mr. O'Grady.

I approve the alternative proposal set forth in third paragraph of your telegram and the arguments with which you supported it.

You should definitely refuse to admit that the exchange of British subjects for Russians can be made dependent upon any arrangement for the release of Russians from Germany, Murmansk or elsewhere outside British jurisdiction. We would however agree to press Ministry of Shipping to provide shipping and all other facilities in our power for repatriation of 1,700 Russians in Denmark.

Confidential

It appears clear to us that if release of British subjects detained in Russia is to be made contingent upon release of Russians detained in countries where we have no jurisdiction there is small hope of any of the former being released this winter, as any triangular negotiations are sure to be very protracted.

We are however consulting D.M.I. as regards our attitude to a Russo-German exchange of prisoners once the Russo-British exchange has been effected.

¹ No. 573.

No. 582

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received December 3)
No. 1690 Telegraphic [157707/67181/59]

COPENHAGEN, *December 2, 1919*

Following from Mr. O'Grady:—

In conversation to-day M. Litvinof stated definitely that Soviet Government desired to come to understanding with border Baltic States, and that His Majesty's Government were chief obstacle which prevented those States from making peace. Do you wish me to make any statement to the effect that this is not so, and that (? consideration of) peace is entirely one for border States and Soviet Government to decide?

No. 583

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received December 3)
No. 1692 Telegraphic [158018/152181/38]

COPENHAGEN, December 3, 1919

Your telegram No. 1524.¹

Mr. O'Grady states that M. Litvinof regards Mr. Lloyd George's statement to the effect that no direct proposals for peace with Russia had been received as an evasion, as proposals conveyed by Mr. Bullitt directly expressed desires of Soviet Government. When Mr. O'Grady pointed out that proposals submitted in such a manner could not be seriously considered by a Government, M. Litvinof stated that he would submit proposals through me, supplying Mr. O'Grady and me with a copy of such proposals. Further, he would make certain that world should know of this by publishing fact in Danish press for reproduction in British papers.²

If M. Litvinof acts in this manner I propose to inform him that I am telegraphing to you to ascertain whether proposals should be transmitted to you or returned to M. Litvinof.

¹ No. 566.

² This exchange of views took place during a 'conversation that Mr. O'Grady had with M. Litvinoff when dining together at the Dagmar Hotel, Copenhagen, on Saturday, November 29, 1919'. (Copenhagen Archives/F.O. 211/504.)

No. 584

Mr. Alston (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Received December 9)
No. 475 Telegraphic [160097/11/57]

TOKYO, December 3, 1919

My telegram No. 466.¹

Military attaché has received following information:—

Diplomatic Advisory Council decided on 29th November to despatch to Siberia 13th Division, less one brigade, which is already there. Japanese Government has telegraphed United States Government for formal approval in view of American interests in Siberian Railway.

Japanese forces in Siberia will be then 5th Division at Chita; 14th Division, Hab . . . ;² 13th Division, probably Blagoveschensk; approximate total (? 40,000). Further reinforcements will follow if Minister of War gets his way.

United States Ambassador, when approached privately, informed him Minister of War refused to commit himself, but suggested economic support more urgent than military.

Minister of War's view is that, in order to ensure economic support, the lines of communication must be guarded.

¹ No. 572.

² Punctuation as in original.

No. 585

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received December 9)

No. 978 Telegraphic [160084/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 3, 1919

Following from military intelligence officer, Chita, dated 30th November:—

Colonel Vlashevski, chief personal adjutant of Semenov, states that a telegram has been sent to Scrobonarrski, representative of Semenov with Koltchak, asking him to make best terms with Omsk Government for following project:—

All Siberia east of Lake Baikal, plus the Russian concessions in Manchuria, to become a province as far as possible autonomous under the military dictatorship of Semenov.

It is proposed that under this military dictatorship local tribunals and Cossacks should each manage their own affairs.

Position he is angling for is that formerly held by Horvat.

Repeated to Tokyo, Peking, Harbin and Mr. Hodgson.

No. 586

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received December 6)

No. 980 Telegraphic [159395/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 4, 1919

Semenov, (? who is) ardent supporter of federal system for Russia, is favourably disposed towards Pepelaief as representing democratic national aspirations, with which he himself is in sympathy. Further (? he) appreciates importance of reconciliation with Czechs, and would welcome better relations with Americans. He is already on friendly terms with American troops at Verkhne Udinsk. A pernicious entourage was indeed (? recruited) at a time when Semenov was compelled by force of circumstances to accept every adventurer who offered his services, and he has not always been strong enough to control actions of lawless underlings, but he is now assisted by several superior officers of good type. He is merciless when misdeed(? s of) his subordinates are made known to him. Dietrichs has become his warm ally.

Economic situation in Trans-Baikalia has so far been relatively satisfactory in spite of poverty of district, as Semenov has throughout realised importance of securing bearable living conditions for population, and has dealt with speculation by distributing foodstuffs at less than cost price. Crisis is however now imminent, for his resources are at an end. He no longer receives support from Japanese, with whom he came into conflict over question of Mongolia, and in whose promises he finds no reliance can be placed; since he has (? come to) terms with Koltchak he is debarred from employing his former methods of raising funds, while (? break)down of the rouble makes

further (? purchase)s in Manchuria (? impossible). His troops are nominally 18,000 in number, but of these not more than 8,000 can be regarded as reliable. He is now in great difficulties to find means to (? clothe) and pay them.

(? Interests of) Government now forming¹ and Semenov being identical, it is to be expected that latter will give perfectly loyal support to former, provided he is treated with confidence and receives stiffening necessary to enable him to resist intrigues of (? reactionary) officers. We should make up our minds that Semenov is neither a bandit, nor a tool in the hands of Japanese, nor a mad monarchist, nor yet a Germanophil.

¹ i.e. the new coalition government of Admiral Kolchak's régime then forming under M. Pepelaiev as Prime Minister (cf. No. 557).

No. 587

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received December 13)

No. 981 Telegraphic [161571/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 4, 1919

Mr. Hodgson's telegram No. (? 587).¹

British subject Bidwell has applied for my approval to his entering into agreement with Semenov for supply of military equipment for 50,000 men to include rifles, machine guns, tanks, ammunition, clothing, boots, &c. Contract would be worth about 2 or 3 million dollars gold, and suggested source of supply would be Canada. Payment would be made with proceeds of local produce such as hides, furs, wool, &c., admittedly from Mongolia, to be sold abroad through Bidwell as Semenov's agent. Bidwell has already (? arranged) to supply Semenov with 15,000 cases of gasolene and (is) also proposing to sell him fifteen automobiles and tyres.

I told him that I could not in any case (? countenance) any military (? contract) with a British subject unless written assurance were given to me by Koltchak that he agreed to it fully, and even then I doubted whether such warlike stores would be allowed to be exported to Russia by a private firm in existing circumstances. But that quite apart from that I was opposed to scheme as it was obviously nothing more than outfitting of proposed filibustering expedition into Mongolia from Verkhne-Udinsk, about which we had already heard.

Bidwell undertook that he would enter into (? no agreement without my) consent, but asked whether I saw same objection to his taking on order from Semenov for agricultural machinery or supply of civilian clothing, &c. I said that was on a different footing. Bidwell goes to Chita to discuss matters further with Semenov and will apply to me again on his return. This application gains in interest when read with Mr. Hodgson's telegram No. 587.¹ There are undoubted indications (? here) that Japanese have turned off the

¹ Note on file: 'Cannot be traced.'

tap of supplies to Semenof, and this was recently confirmed to me by Besudaira.² Americans are puzzled to account for sudden extension to them of the olive branch by Semenof, and attribute it in part to split with Japanese, though it seems to me also possibly due to essential desire to avoid earlier causes of friction with them. Whole (? atmosphere in) Trans-Baikal appears to be changing for the better, but rumoured desire of Semenof to establish autonomy for eastern province hardly fits in, if true, with his professions of accession to Koltchak (see my telegram No. 978).³

I hazard opinion that Semenof is largely playing for his own hand as before, but that he has not proved as amenable to Japanese control as was intended, and that consequently he has to change his orientation to obtain supplies and support. He may also after all be loyal to his own country. Americans and ourselves are obvious quarter to which to turn. In addition, he would no doubt like to get British interests involved in his Mongolian intrigue.

Repeated to Peking, Tokyo and Harbin.

² Possibly in error for Matsudaira. M. Matsudaira was Japanese member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee in Siberia.

³ No. 585.

No. 588

Mr. Lampson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received December 11)
No. 987 Telegraphic [160772/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 4, 1919

Following sent to [? from] Irkutsk 2nd December.

New Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me this morning if I had any reason to think His Majesty's Government had decided to change its attitude towards Bolshevik Government and consider question of entering into relations with it. I said I had none. Minister for Foreign Affairs declared though such a change on the part of Great Britain or Allied Powers would undoubtedly be a heavy blow, yet it would have no influence whatever upon determination of Russian Government to continue struggle. He is convinced recent overtures to moderate Socialists, and report of the intention to call Constituent Assembly, are forced upon Bolshevik Government by exigencies of internal situation, and that Moscow considers moment of success on all fronts propitious for adopting only policy which can save it by winning for it sympathy of Allied Governments and securing lifting of blockade.

I should be glad to know what are views of His Majesty's Government at present time.¹

¹ Mr. Gregory minuted on this telegram on December 17, 1919: 'We are telegraphing the latest Russian decisions to Mr. Lampson, and this should be a sufficient reply to his telegram.' The decisions referred to were those taken at the Anglo-French discussions in London on December 11-13, 1919, for which see No. 629.

Note by Mr. Gregory of a conversation with Mr. Butler Wright
[160694/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 5, 1919

Mr. Butler Wright of the American Embassy came to see me yesterday to enquire what the views of His Majesty's Government were with regard to continued support of Kolchak, now that he was no longer an important force.¹

I said that, as far as I was aware, the question had not come up for discussion. I did not see however, that events had moved sufficiently far for us to see how the actual Governmental situation in Siberia was going to work out. I told him of the last reports we have received which show that an endeavour is being made to bring about a Coalition Government under Kolchak, and gave him a short appreciation of the relations between Kolchak, Semennoff etc., as we understand them. He said that his Government were anxious to learn at leisure what line His Majesty's Government intended to take.

I think it is too soon to contemplate any change in our Siberian policy, such as it is. But there is no reason why we should cling on to Kolchak, if he goes down. So long as there is one fairly stable Government in East Siberia, we should no doubt treat it in the same way as we have treated Kolchak's Government—neither recognising nor ignoring it, but maintaining informal relations with it as the *de facto* administration with which to deal.

We might perhaps in the first instance, consult Sir C. Eliot and also ask Mr. Lampson for his views.²

J. D. GREGORY

¹ A week later, on December 12, 1919, the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in London similarly called on Mr. R. H. Campbell at the Foreign Office and, according to Mr. Campbell's note of the conversation, explained that 'the Japanese Government are faced with the necessity of revising their policy consequent upon Koltchak's withdrawal from Omsk. They are therefore very anxious to know what line the British Government propose to adopt. Monsieur Nagai then went on to say that Viscount Chinda trusted that if, during the present discussions with M. Clemenceau, the question of Russia came up he might be invited to attend the deliberations, especially if other Powers were represented such as Italy, or the United States.' Viscount Chinda attended the five-power discussion of Russian affairs held in London on December 13, 1919: see Vol. II, No. 60.

² This suggestion was minuted as follows by Lords Hardinge and Curzon: 'Better ask Mr. Lampson in the first instance. Sir C. Eliot left Siberia many weeks ago.

H.

'Rather premature as yet.
C.'

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)
No. 1549 Telegraphic [158018/152181/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 6, 1919

Your telegram No. 1692.¹

You should decline to receive any peace proposals from Litvinof whatever may be the method in which he attempts to deliver them. Please also see my telegram No. 1524.²

¹ No. 583.

² No. 566.

No. 591

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 1551 Telegraphic [157707/67181/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 6, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1690.¹

Following for O'Grady:—

You should abstain from any discussion of political questions of this nature.

¹ No. 582.

No. 592

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received December 7)

No. 1707 Telegraphic [159360/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, *December 6, 1919*

Following from Mr. O'Grady. (Begins)

On receipt of your telegram of 4th December,¹ I continued my discussion with M. Litvinof on basis of its instructions.

Difficulty immediately arose that he is little interested in Russian prisoners of war and civilians in Great Britain, and will only make proposals covered by his wide credentials involving exchange with prisoners of war in other countries. He will not even include Russian civilians in England in his terms, on the ground that they are not wanted back during war. In order, if possible, to arrive at some understanding which would be acceptable to His Majesty's Government, I allowed him fullest opportunity to explain his views, and eventually I put forward series of proposals which, although they took account of Russian prisoners in Archangel, Germany and Persia, neutral countries, were so framed that return of our own prisoners and civilians was to take place at once, simultaneously with repatriation of Russians from Great Britain. Although these proposals went, as I explained to M. Litvinof, beyond my instructions, I hoped that, in view of my observance of this cardinal principle, you would be able to endorse them. M. Litvinof, however, declined to accept them, and after exhaustive discussion would not go further than following proposals:—

1. To exchange all British prisoners of war in Russia against—
 - (a) Prisoners of war in England.
 - (b) Return of such of twenty-six persons, included in list one of the prisoners in North Russia, who are still prisoners.
 - (c) Russian prisoners in Denmark.
 - (d) Russian prisoners in Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, provided that Governments of these countries agree.

¹ The reference is uncertain but the date may be that of the receipt in Copenhagen of No. 581.

2. To repatriate all British civilians who wish to leave Soviet Russia, provided that terms of first clause have been carried out and in exchange for—

- (a) Return of Russians in Persia and Mesopotamia included in list already (? sent you).
- (b) Return of such of 190 persons, included in list two of prisoners in North Russia, who are still prisoners.
- (c) Agreement with request of Inter-Allied Commission in Berlin to return Russian prisoners of war to Soviet or non-Soviet Russia according to wishes of individuals, and to secure appointment of representative of Soviet Government on Commission.

3. M. Litvinof to remain in Copenhagen or some other place in Western Europe until repatriation is completed.

I informed M. Litvinof that these conditions appeared unreasonable. They involved indefinite detention of our subjects and were opposed to instructions which I had received from you. I said, however, that I would again submit them and take your orders on them.

In default of arriving at general agreement M. Litvinof is prepared to exchange (? against non-commissioned officers and men) amongst our prisoners in Russia against [*sic*] Russian (? non-commissioned officers and men) in England and against Krivenko, who is No. 1 on War Office list. This will leave out of exchange twenty-two British officers and twenty-seven Russian officers and commissaries. Would you agree to this?

M. Litvinof would also be prepared to negotiate other partial exchanges, such, for instance, as an exchange of all British women and children in Soviet Russia against prisoners in Denmark and other countries as in clause 1 (*d*) above. I object on principle to partial negotiations of this nature, but if you wish it I am prepared to negotiate further for such exchange which would, however, always involve Russian prisoners in foreign countries.

I am sending by post full (? proposals) made by M. Litvinof, of which I have only given rough outline, as well as suggestion which I made to him subject to your approval.

No. 593

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 1556 Telegraphic [156919/860/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 8, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1675¹ and my telegram to Helsingfors No. 719.²

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

Warm clothing for British in Russia.

We agree in principle to allowing Litvinof to send a certain quantity of drugs on condition that we may send clothing to British military prisoners and civilians in Russia.

¹ No. 574.

² Not printed.

Where does he propose to purchase drugs? How will he pay for them?

A further telegram will follow as soon as we can estimate amount of clothing required and available.³

³ Mr. O'Grady was subsequently informed by Foreign Office telegram No. 1589 of December 20, 1919, to Copenhagen that 'a consignment of 63 packages, approximately 6 tons, has been provided by British Red Cross Society. This contains sufficient clothing and medical comforts for 150 prisoners of war and is being shipped in *S.S. Hengest*, United Shipping Company, expected to leave London for Copenhagen on Friday. . . . Arrangements for clothing for civilians not yet completed. If Litvinoff consents to despatch of food, draw on consignments sent to Helsingfors this spring by R[estriction of] E[nemy] S[upplies] D[epartment] and accept offer made by Mr. Abrahamson from Red Cross stocks.'

No. 594

Mr. Lowdon (Odessa) to Earl Curzon (Received December 14)
No. 73 Telegraphic [161587/150931/38]

ODESSA, December 8, 1919

Mr. Mackinder's appointment has aroused great interest here and local press is trying to prove that it is organised intervention by Great Britain. The title of High Commissioner is said to be discussed and taken to imply that Mr. Mackinder will have powers similar to those of Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople. I think it would be well if a statement were sent me for communication to press clearly defining Mr. Mackinder's position.¹

Repeated to Constantinople.

¹ In this connexion Mr. Lowdon was authorized by Foreign Office telegram No. 61 of December 24, 1919, to communicate 'the following information to the press: Mr. Mackinder has been sent as Political Representative of His Majesty's Government to South Russia, to give moral support and advice to General Denikin and to report on the general situation in the area occupied by General Denikin's forces. There is no question of Mr. Mackinder holding similar position to High Commissioner at Constantinople. His appointment similar to that of High Commissioner with Admiral Kolchak.'

No. 595

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)
No. 1560 Telegraphic [159542/146362/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 9, 1919

My telegram No. 1535.¹

There are less than 25 Russians in prison for political or war offences on widest interpretation e.g. landing from abroad in United Kingdom without permission: these are all serving sentences against D.O.R.A.² and Aliens Restriction Orders.

We would allow any Russian whether in prison or not to return to Russia if he desires to do so (some may not, now being Polish citizens) and would give them reasonable facilities for so doing.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of November 29, 1919, was an interim reply to No. 570, and stated that a further telegram on this subject would follow.

² Defence of the Realm Act.

No. 596

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)
No. 1559 Telegraphic [159469/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 9, 1919

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

Please make enquiries from Litvinoff about Mr. Gibson, United Shipping Company, Petrograd,¹ and ask what is the position of the inmates of the British old women's home in that town, as it is rumoured former is arrested and home closed.

¹ Cf. No. 514.

No. 597

*The Rev. North (Moscow) to Earl Curzon (Received December 10)*¹
Nr. 1144 W.30 9/12 1702 Telegraphic: by wireless [160316/9/38]

MOSCOW, December 9, 1919

Over 400 British subjects Moscow and district anxiously desire to leave Russia owing to great privations they are experiencing. Please expedite exchange. NORTH, *Chaplain*. Nr. 1615.²

¹ This wireless message was relayed via Paris.

² This telegram was repeated by the Foreign Office to Copenhagen on December 19, 1919.

No. 598

Sir C. Marling¹ (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received December 10)
No. 1724 Telegraphic [160362/43654/38]

COPENHAGEN, December 10, 1919

Your telegram No. 1549.²

Yesterday afternoon Litvinof sent a letter to British, French, Italian and United States Legations, stating that Soviet Government has addressed by wireless to those Governments and to Japanese Ambassador in London expression of desire of Soviet Government for peace, and adding that to ensure correctness of message he transmits a copy thereof.

He has also sent copy of message to Mr. O'Grady, from whom I learnt its purport before breaking seal of Litvinof's letter.

In view of clear understanding that his discussions would be strictly confined to questions of exchange of prisoners and of undertakings given by His Majesty's Government to Danish Government in that sense, French

¹ This telegram was originally entered as having been received from Mr. Grant Watson. The name of the sender was subsequently corrected in accordance with a request from Mr. Grant Watson.

² No. 590.

Minister and I are agreed that we cannot better mark our sense of his breach of good faith than by refusing to accept his letter.

We are accordingly returning it with simple statement that we are 'not authorised to receive communications from Litvinof.'

Italian Chargé d'Affaires and United States Chargé d'Affaires follow our course.

Letter addressed to me is returned unopened. Copies of his letter and enclosure obtained from French Minister will be sent by next messenger.

No. 599

*Letter from Mr. O'Grady (Copenhagen) to Mr. Gregory
(Received December 16)*

Unnumbered [162242/43654/38]

COPENHAGEN, December 10, 1919

Dear Mr. Gregory,

You have no doubt seen the Peace Resolution passed by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 5th, and Mr. Grant Watson has, I presume, informed you of the action taken by Mr. Litvinoff in this matter and what he and the other Entente Representatives here did about it.

In a letter on general subjects which Mr. Litvinoff addressed to me yesterday, he made the following reference to this so-called Peace offer:—

'In conclusion, I feel bound to inform you that a formal offer of peace has been sent out, per wireless, to the Allied Governments by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets. In order to make sure the receipt of the proposal by the Governments concerned, I forwarded to-day copies of the Resolution passed by the Congress to the British, French, American and Italian Legations in Copenhagen, and to the Japanese Legation in London.

'As this question has a direct bearing upon the questions under discussion at our Conference, and as the acceptance of our proposal would greatly facilitate our further work, I wish to express my hope that you, on your part, will not refuse your help in getting the above Peace message delivered to the British Government.'

In replying to Mr. Litvinoff, I merely said as follows:—

'Respecting the matter of the formal offer of peace which you state has been sent, per wireless, to the Allied Governments by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets—expressing a hope that I shall help in getting the peace message conveyed to the British Government, as that paragraph in your letter is of a personal character, I cannot, having regard to the conditions under which we remain in Copenhagen, say anything about the matter.'

I enclose a copy of the wireless message sent by the Soviet Congress.

Yours sincerely,

JAMES O'GRADY

Resolution passed unanimously by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December Fifth

The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets wishes to live in peace with all nations and to direct its efforts towards the constructive work of improving production, transport and the administration of the country on the basis of the Soviet regime. This work has been hampered and obstructed up to the present by the pressure of German Imperialism, then by the intervention of the Entente and the famine-causing blockade.

The Workers' and Peasants' Government has many times offered peace to the Entente Powers, namely: on August the fifth 1918 by a note of the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs to the American Consul General Mr. Poole, on October 24th by a note to President Wilson, on November 3rd to all the Governments of the Entente through representatives of neutral countries, on November 7th in the name of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, on December 23rd by a note of citizen Litvinoff to the representatives of the Entente in Sweden, then by radiograms of January 12th and 17th 1919, by a note to the Governments of the Entente of February the 4th, by the draft scheme worked out on March the 12th in conjunction with the Delegate of President Wilson, Mr. Bullitt, and finally by the statement made on May the 7th to Mr. Nansen. Fully approving of the steps taken in this direction by the Central Executive Committee, by the Council of People's Commissaries and by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Seventh Congress of Soviets confirms once more its unalterable desire for peace and proposes once more to all the Powers of the Entente, to Great Britain, to France, to the United States of America, to Italy, to Japan jointly and to each of these separately to enter immediately into peace negotiations and instructs the Central Executive Committee, the Council of the People's Commissaries and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to continue systematically this policy of peace in taking all the necessary measures for its success.

(signed) The Chairman of the Congress
Secretary.

No. 600

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received December 17)

No. 195 Telegraphic [162638/1015/58]

TIFLIS, December 10, 1919

In conversation 7th December, Azerbaijan Prime Minister told Colonel Stokes that Persian Prince Mirza Riza Kahn had suggested that Azerbaijan should confederate (*sic*) with Persia and gave impression that His Majesty's Government approved.

Prime Minister asks whether His Majesty's Government authorised or suggested or supported proposal.

He thinks confederation with Georgia and Armenia essential, but had never thought of Persia. He considers it is possible, however, that His Majesty's Government might prefer confederation of the two States.

I have told Colonel Stokes that I presume Prince was merely expressing his personal opinion.

Addressed to Teheran, No. 7.

No. 601

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 1564 Telegraphic [157707/67181/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 11, 1919*

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

Your telegram No. 1690¹ of December 2.

Although the matter is of course entirely outside your province, you are authorized to give an emphatic denial to the allegation, and to say that His Majesty's Government have never interfered to prevent the Baltic States from taking such action as they consider best in their own interests.

¹ No. 582.

No. 602

Lord Acton (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received December 12)

No. 734 Telegraphic [160765/67181/59]

HELSINGFORS, *December 11, 1919*

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Esthonian Minister of War informed Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs that Bolsheviks had now fifteen divisions concentrated against the three Esthonian divisions. He added there was not the slightest doubt that German staff officers were directing Soviet forces in this region. Tactics of Bolsheviks had changed and improved immensely during last month. A Russian commissary who had recently surrendered to Esthonian forces had stated he did so because he could no longer endure German-Jewish intrigues at Petrograd.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram No. 733 of even date (received December 12) Lord Acton reported on the negotiations between Soviet Russia and Esthonia at Dorpat which had started 4th December. Bolsheviks on that date announced their readiness to accept an armistice and negotiations were begun on this line. On December 6th attitude of Bolsheviks underwent a sudden change and they demanded conclusion of completion of peace. Negotiations were temporarily broken off and were resumed again, December 8th, when Bolshevik attitude proved still more menacing. At Cabinet Council held at Reval December 9th, Esthonian Government decided to send Esthonian Minister of War, Mr. Hanko, to Helsingfors to ask for advice and beg for help from Finnish Government. Hanko arrived Helsingfors, December 10th, had at once long interview with Finnish Ministers which were [*sic*] resumed to-day.

Minister of the Interior informed Sir C. Kennard later this evening that a Bolshevik agent arrested yesterday at Terioki stated German officers were becoming more and more numerous in Soviet forces, and were directing operations.

No. 603

Earl Curzon to Lord Acton (Helsingfors)

No. 729 Telegraphic [157741/26579/56]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 12, 1919*

Sir C. Kennard's telegrams Nos. 634¹ of 5th November and 636² of 7th November.

I approve Sir C. Kennard's action, as reported in his telegram No. 636.² My view is that we should be interfering in Finnish domestic politics as much by inciting the Government to suppress the volunteer movement as by instigating them to intervention.

You may, however, convey to the Finnish Government an assurance on the matter similar to that already given by General Haking,³ but our attitude should remain strictly non-committal.

¹ No. 520.

² No. 521.

³ The reference was to a statement in a telegram of November 5, 1919, from General Haking to the War Office that he had informed Dr. Holsti 'that I was sure British Government would not recognize any organisation either military or otherwise created in Finland which was not recognized by the existing Finnish Government.'

No. 604

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 1566 Telegraphic [159360/9/38]

Your telegram No. 1707.¹

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 13, 1919*

Following for O'Grady:—

I have given very careful consideration to Litvinof's proposals, they are wholly unreasonable, and include three points which His Majesty's Government are quite unable to entertain, namely:—

1. The suggestion that non-commissioned officers and men should be exchanged to the exclusion of officers.
2. The introduction into the negotiations of Russians outside our jurisdiction.
3. The disproportion in numbers involved, *i.e.*, about 100 British prisoners against at least 2,000 Russians.

The time has therefore come for you to let Litvinof know that, unless he modifies his proposals, you will break off negotiations (in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Danish Government he may then at once have to leave Copenhagen), in which event all the correspondence will be published, in order that the world at large may fully realise the utter insincerity of the Soviet Government.

¹ No. 592.

I leave it to your discretion whether or not you give him a few days' grace between the threat of breaking off negotiations and actually doing so. Litvinof is probably only too anxious to remain at Copenhagen, and a display of firmness may bring him to heel.

Should you break off negotiations, I hope that you will be able to arrange for the despatch of at any rate one consignment of clothing, &c. A further telegram will follow on this subject.²

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of your telegram, I object, as you do, on principle to any partial negotiations, but, in view of my instructions in this telegram, I do not see that the question need arise.

If negotiations are broken off you should, I think, once again and in writing reaffirm what we have several times already told the Soviet Government, namely, that they will be held individually and personally responsible for the welfare of the British prisoners of war and civilians in Russia. Any complaint of subsequent maltreatment by the Soviet authorities will be laid to the charges of the responsible persons.

² On December 23, 1919, Sir R. Nathan concluded a provisional agreement with M. Litvinov whereby Great Britain was to send via Helsingfors up to ten tons of clothing and foodstuffs for the relief of British prisoners in Russia. A consignment was dispatched from Copenhagen to the Rev. North at Moscow on January 14, 1920. Under cover of a dispatch of January 18 (received January 23), Mr. O'Grady transmitted to Lord Curzon a translation of extracts from 'a despatch' of January 17 from M. Litvinov to the Soviet Government. This document read in part: 'Although the consignment is not of any considerable value, I none the less attribute the greatest significance to its safe delivery at Moscow. Any hitch will exercise an unfortunate effect upon my negotiations with O'Grady. . . . It is essential that care should be taken that delivery from North should be accepted in the prisons and concentration camps without hindrance and parcels handed to prisoners.' (Cf. No. 644, note 2.)

No. 605

Lord Acton (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received December 15)

No. 751 Telegraphic [161638/67181/59]

HELSINGFORS, *December 14, 1919*

Bolshevik-Esthonian negotiations.

1. It is worth considering whether it might not be desirable for Finland to follow the example of (? Esthonia) and recognise *de facto* Soviet Government, provided this can be done without imposition of adverse terms.

2. An energetic Polish offensive would also relieve both Esthonian and Finnish fronts.

3. I do not know whether His Majesty's Government contemplate early raising of blockade of Bolshevik Russia, which blockade, according to my information, chiefly injures women and children, whom we desire to save, while leaders and their adherents at Petrograd live in luxury.

These personal suggestions of mine, made after mature reflection, should be regarded as forming part of a comprehensive whole, and I venture to hope that they will receive consideration at your Lordship's hands even though you should disagree with them.

No. 606

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 1567 Telegraphic [160362/43654/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 15, 1919*

Your telegram No. 1724.¹

I approve your action.

¹ No. 598.

No. 607

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received December 19)

No. 1746 Telegraphic [163316/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, *December 18, 1919*

Following from Mr. O'Grady. Begins:—

Litvinof states his Government will not negotiate on basis of exchange of prisoners and civilians within British jurisdiction.¹ He has therefore broken off negotiations. He is about to issue press communiqué, to which I shall, if necessary, make a brief reply. I have arranged for him to remain until Monday² to complete arrangements for despatch of warm clothing, &c.

¹ Mr. O'Grady had telegraphed on December 15, 1919 (Copenhagen telegram No. 1736: received December 15), that he had that day conveyed to M. Litvinov the 'general purport' of No. 604. Mr. O'Grady reported that M. Litvinov said 'that conditions laid down in it make no advance on proposals I first made based on my original instructions and that he did not think that any agreement could be reached on those lines. He wished however to submit matter to his Government.'

² December 22, 1919.

No. 608

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 1584 Telegraphic [163859/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 19, 1919*

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

In an interview given to Reuter's Copenhagen correspondent last night, M. Litvinof is reported to have made the following statement as to the minimum demands of the Soviet Government:—

First, the repatriation of about 225 prisoners captured by troops under British command in North Russia before its evacuation by British troops, according to a list submitted, and also of nine Russians taken in the Caucasus by the British.

Secondly, transport facilities for the return to Russia of Russian prisoners at present in neutral countries, subject to such neutral countries agreeing thereto.

Thirdly, that just as General Denikin is represented by Colonel Brandt on the Inter-Allied Commission which has charge of the Russian prisoners in Germany, so the Soviet Government shall have a representative on the

Commission, and that these prisoners shall, in course of time be repatriated to whatever parts of Russia they voluntarily choose.

Fourthly, a Soviet representative shall be permitted to stay in a neutral country to see to the execution of the agreement.

This is clearly a less unreasonable proposition than that reported by you in Mr. Grant Watson's telegram No. 1707¹ of 6th December, and, had it been put forward at that time, would certainly not have been rejected off-hand.

Even now it could form the basis of further discussion, if, in spite of Litvinof breaking off negotiations, as just reported in Mr. Grant Watson's telegram No. 1746,² it is still possible for you to ascertain from him whether the above statement accurately represents the point of view of his Government, and in that case to reopen conversations with him on those lines.

Moreover, there are other concessions which, in that event, we might be prepared to consider, namely:—

1. The supply to the Soviet Government of 30,000 tons of surplus American food now lying at Vyborg which have been left over from food originally shipped for relief purposes, together with a few surplus food supplies which we have here.

2. A speeding up or even extension of the despatch of supplies of condensed milk, &c., for the children's hospitals in Petrograd, for which we are already endeavouring to negotiate a free passage through Finland.

3. The supply to Soviet Government of some specific commodity of which they may stand in particular need, such as agricultural implements.

You might insinuate one or more of these points by way of inducement of Litvinof to continue negotiations and, if you find it successful, you should at once refer home for more detailed proposals.

There remains possibility of raising blockade which appears to have receded into background during discussion, and for which consent of Supreme Council would be required.

I cannot help feeling that a final effort should be made to secure a basis for renewed discussion, and that door should not be actually closed until all our resources have been exhausted.

¹ No. 592.

² No. 607.

No. 609

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 1585 Telegraphic [163859/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 19, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Please inform Danish Government immediately that we are still not without hope that it may be possible for Mr. O'Grady to resume negotiations with M. Litvinof, and say that we trust that they will take no drastic action in regard to removing him from Denmark until we are quite convinced that further negotiations are out of the question.

¹ No. 608.

No. 610

Earl Curzon to Colonel Tallents (Riga)
No. 167 Telegraphic [160764/67181/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 19, 1919

Serious questions raised by Lord Acton's telegrams Nos. 733 and 734¹ are under consideration. Meanwhile you should use your influence in the manner and to the extent which you consider desirable in order to bring about prolongation of negotiations and escape from humiliating terms. You should not, however, give or imply any promise of further military assistance from us. Esthonians must as we have previously said be only judges of their true interests and we do not wish to become responsible for their action in this crisis or expose ourselves to any justifiable reproach should their decision whatever form it takes have disastrous consequences.

Admiralty are being asked to send ships to Reval to encourage Esthonians.

Repeated to Helsingfors No. 735² and Astoria 1503.

¹ See No. 602.

² With reference to this repetition to Helsingfors Lord Acton reported in Helsingfors telegram No. 781 of December 21, 1919 (received that day): 'I sent for Esthonian diplomatic representative yesterday and informed him that His Majesty's Government considered Esthonia should take decision which she regarded in accordance with her interests, that England could take no responsibility for results of such decision, that we could not undertake to help further with war material, but that British ships would probably be sent to Reval. . . . Esthonian Minister said Red Russians insist on Esthonia assuming their share of Russian debt down to 18th November, that secret and humiliating articles had not yet been submitted to by Esthonia, and that front still held, although Bolsheviks had advanced further into country than my previous telegram [not printed] had described. I understand Colonel Tallents is proceeding to England with details of Esthonian request for material assistance.'

No. 611

Mr. O'Brien-Butler (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received December 25)
No. 1005 Telegraphic [165037/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 19, 1919

Following from Mr. Lampson, Irkutsk, No. 614 of 17th December:—

'Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning took very gloomy view of situation which he regards as becoming every hour more threatening in view of delay in arrival of Admiral Koltchak and Pepelaief. Until they reach Irkutsk there is no possibility of stabilising Government. He regards as essential:—

'1. Despatch of 2,000 Japanese troops to Irkutsk, where Russian garrison, 4,000 strong, is unreliable and already insufficient to deal with local Bolshevik uprisings.

'2. Economic assistance as being sole means of improving living conditions amongst population. He suggests that gold reserve should partly be used for

making necessary purchases. He accuses Czechs of purposely retarding Admiral Koltchak's journey, and asked our assistance in direct removal of obstructions. This matter has already had attention, but General Janin's information supported from other sources is to the effect that delay is result of shortage of fuel supplies and is common to all traffic. It is admitted that General Janin's authority over Czechs is nominal, and that he is, in fact, powerless to get his orders executed. There is only one company of Japanese troops here at present, and it is my conviction that in disturbed conditions with which Government now has to deal, further foreign military support is necessary if Government is to have a fair opportunity. I am likewise of opinion that economic assistance is of utmost importance. American consul-general has just received categorical assurances from his Government that they intend to continue support of Admiral Koltchak, and imply that guarantee of such support will be on extensive scale.

'It is confirmed that Novonicolaevsk has been abandoned to Bolsheviks. Kappel has asked General Dietrichs to resume command of army, but latter has refused.'

Repeated to Peking. Repeated to Tokyo.

No. 612

Mr. O'Brien-Butler (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received December 22)
No. 6 Telegraphic [164202/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 20, 1919

Following received from Irkutsk, No. 622, 19th December:—

'Japanese Ambassador, in response to request of Minister for Foreign Affairs, has suggested to Japanese Government despatch to Irkutsk of two or three battalions of Japanese troops from division now at Chita.

'Owing to popular feeling in Japan against further commitments in Siberia, these troops are to be described as Amban's [? Ambassador's] guard. His Excellency added that this was third appeal from Russian Government for despatch of Japanese troops to Irkutsk.'

Repeated to Peking and Tokyo.

No. 613

Foreign Office Memorandum on Siberia
[165784/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December, 1919¹

A survey of the Siberian situation, both domestic and international, such as we have witnessed it developing during the last two years, is best treated

¹ On December 20, 1919, this memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet under cover of the following note from Lord Curzon: 'This memorandum, by the able author of the recent note on the Baltic States which attracted the attention of the Cabinet [No. 197], has

in two main divisions, though the two are at times inextricably intertwined. Roughly they concern the fortunes of *Kolchak*, on the one hand, and *intervention* under its different aspects on the other. There is a connecting link been prepared at the request of the latter for circulation. With the memorandum on Transcaucasia it completes the trilogy on the existing Russian situation.' The author referred to was Mr. J. D. Gregory. The Foreign Office memorandum on Transcaucasia, dated December 24, 1919, and not written by Mr. Gregory, is not printed. This memorandum mainly gave a background survey of the region of Transcaucasia and of recent political developments there, as illustrated in preceding documents. The last section of the memorandum was headed 'The Question of Recognition' and read as follows: 'It must be conceded at once that Armenia is in a different position from Georgia and Azerbaijan in this respect, since all the Allied Powers during the war have committed themselves more or less directly to the creation of an independent Armenian State under a European or an American mandate. The only question to be decided in the case of Armenia is the extent of Turkish territory which should be added to the Erivan Republic to make up the new State.

'Turning to Georgia and Azerbaijan, the claim of the former to an independent existence is infinitely stronger than that of Azerbaijan. Georgia has had a long history as an independent State, and possesses a cohesion and capacity for self-government much superior to those hitherto manifested by the mixed population of Azerbaijan. The latter, like Daghestan, was for centuries under Persian rule, and has no more moral claim to independence than have the inhabitants of the Persian provinces of Ghilan and Azerbaijan. At the same time it is very difficult, if not impossible, to treat Georgia in one way and Azerbaijan in another. If the Russians are allowed to cross the Caucasus range and occupy Azerbaijan at one end of the Batoum-Baku railway, the liberties of Georgia can never be secure. On the other hand, in the absence of any more definite expression of local opinion in favour of such a course, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to consent to the reincorporation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, carrying with it of course Baku and its vast oil resources, in Persia. Such a step would be resented more bitterly by Russians of all shades of political opinion than the establishment of Azerbaijan as an independent State.

'For practical purposes it must therefore be assumed that the two republics must be treated on the same footing. The problem then becomes largely one of

- (a) How far we are prepared to affront Denikin and the All-Russia party, and
- (b) How much importance we attach to the creation of buffer States between Persia and the reconstituted Russia of the future.

'An idea which appears to command a considerable amount of sympathy among the advocates of a federated Russia is that the independence of the republics should be immediately recognised by the Allies, and that they should be placed under a British or American mandate, pending the formation of the League of Nations. Recognition should be dependent on the agreement of the Republics concerned (including possibly Armenia) to form a federated State, and should be followed by a declaration of the mandatory Power's willingness to extend its mandate over any autonomous part of the former Russian Empire, provided its governing body is formed on a democratic basis. It is anticipated that the immediate effect of this step would be to secure the incorporation of the Don, Terek and Kuban Cossack districts, followed by the Ukraine, in the new federated State. This latter would gradually extend all over the former Russian Empire, forming a democratic federated republic in which there would be no room for Bolshevism.

'Action on these lines could hardly fail to bring the mandatory Power into acute conflict with Denikin and the All-Russia party, and to involve responsibilities which no single Allied Power would probably care to undertake at the present time.

'Another alternative would be to continue to abstain from recognising the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan until General Denikin's position becomes more certain, whilst putting pressure on him not to attack either of these two Republics.

'A third alternative would be to recognise the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan forthwith, subject to the decision of the League of Nations in, say, five years' time as to their

in the part played by the Czecho-Slovak forces, inasmuch as while they contributed to the establishment of the Kolchak Government by opening up the main line of communication, namely, the Trans-Siberian Railway, they also supplied, through the dangerous position in which they found themselves, the immediate motive for inter-Allied intervention. In addition to these main currents, there appears quasi-independent action on the part of Japan, and as this may not improbably be the most durable element arising out of the events that have been taking place, it may not be inconvenient to treat it separately.

This survey will accordingly fall under the following heads:—

I.

(A) *Siberia prior to the Bolshevik Revolution.*²

(B) *Siberia since the Bolshevik Revolution.*

- (i) *The Political Situation.*
- (ii) *The Military Situation.*³
- (iii) *Causes of Kolchak's Failure.*
- (iv) *The relations between Admiral Kolchak and the Allied Powers.*

II.

(C) *The Czecho-Slovaks.*⁴

III.

(D) *Intervention.*

- (i) *American and Japanese.*
- (ii) *British.*
- (iii) *The Inter-Allied Railway Agreement.*
- (iv) *Economic.*

IV.

(E) *The Aims of Japan.*

reincorporation, as autonomous States, in a Russia reconstituted on a federal basis. Prompt action on these lines might possibly restrain General Denikin from employing the winter months in the subjugation of Transcaucasia, which there is every indication that he is at present contemplating. On the other hand, it may be doubted whether qualified recognition of this kind would be by itself sufficient to force him and the party for which he stands into the arms of Germany.⁵

² Not printed. This section briefly outlined the development of Siberia from the thirteenth century onwards. (In printing this very long memorandum it has been necessary to omit the less important sections giving background information and factual data.)

³ Not printed. This section briefly outlined military developments in Siberia during 1919. (For a summary estimate of the contemporary military situation there see section B. i.)

⁴ Not printed. This section gave a summary account of the military activities of the Czechoslovak forces in Siberia, mainly in 1918. (For an account of these activities as they affected Allied intervention in Siberia, see section D. i.) Section C concluded: 'The departure of the Czechs will create an awkward problem, inasmuch as the lines of communication will thereby have to be taken over by the Russians, who are incapable, or to be left unguarded, or to be taken over by the Japanese. This last alternative would clearly increase Japan's stake in the country, and it is thought that it is this prospect which may induce the Japanese to supply the shipping for the Czechs' removal.'

A variety of cross-currents at times obscure the situation, and, while Kolchak so far remains the dominant figure, there are a number of personalities who constantly appear on the scene with fluctuating success and who may be destined to play a greater rôle in the future. The principal characters among these are the Cossack Atamans, *Semenoff*, *Horvat*, *Kalmikoff*, *Rozanoff*, and their like, who are little more than *condottieri*, and whose power is now rapidly growing owing to the virtual collapse of the Kolchak Government: the Social Revolutionary politicians such as *Avksentieff*, *Derber*, and others, who have been temporarily in the background but are already beginning to reappear: and the Czech leaders, *Dietrichs* (himself a Russian) and *Gaida*, whose activities are apparently at an end. The Kolchak period appears to be over, at least in the form in which it has existed since November 1918, and the future of Siberia is quite uncertain. Intervention has not proved itself the success that was hoped; and when the Powers meet to discuss the Russian problem,⁵ they will be at a loss to know whether it should be continued or dropped. His Majesty's Government, however, having decided that such assistance as they may be prepared to give to the anti-Bolshevik forces is to be given exclusively to Denikin, have to that extent disinterested themselves in the Siberian sphere. They have decided, nevertheless, to maintain the political influence which they have hitherto exercised, and though the appointment of a new High Commissioner in the place of Sir C. Eliot remains in suspense, they have no present intention of abolishing the office and so abandoning the political future to the Americans and Japanese.

I

... (B)⁶ SIBERIA SINCE THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

(i) *The Political Situation*

... In⁷ September 1918 there was the curious spectacle at Omsk of two Governments functioning in the same town—the All-Russian Government under Avksentieff, mainly Socialistic in character and considering itself under the orders of the Constituent Assembly to be summoned in January, and the Siberian Government under Vologodski, *bourgeois* in character and supported by the Siberian army. A compromise was, however, arranged on the 5th November, by which the Directory and the Siberian Government were amalgamated, the latter being represented by a Council of Ministers, in whose hands lay in practice the direction of affairs, while the members of the Directory represented the head of the Government, and the compromise necessarily resulted in a weak Government. At last the military element became exasperated, and decided on drastic measures for depriving the Directory of its power. *On the night of the 17th November Avksentieff and two*

⁵ It appears that this memorandum was drafted early in December 1919, and the writer may have had in mind the forthcoming Allied discussions in London and Paris, for which see Vol. II, Chap. II.

⁶ For the omission of section (A) see note 2 above.

⁷ The earlier part of this section, covering the period November 1917–September 1918, is omitted.

other members were arrested by the Cossack leaders, and the Council of Ministers forthwith decided that they should take over the powers of the Directory and concentrate them in the hands of one man. In this way Admiral Kolchak, who had been acting as Minister of Marine in the Omsk Government, was elected.

Kolchak, a young man in the early forties, had been, as already mentioned, an Admiral under the Tsar's Government. He was in command of the Black Sea Fleet when the revolution broke out, but soon became involved in trouble with the sailors, who were in fact making impossible demands. He declined to be dictated to, resigned his appointment and came to Petrograd, where he arrived just before the Kornilov revolt. At the advice of several members of the early Provisional Government, such as Miliukoff, he went to the Far East so as to be in readiness in case he were needed in the future for a movement to restore order. He was thus in Tokyo when the Bolsheviks overran Siberia in March 1918.

He at once accepted the new order inaugurated by the *coup d'état* of 17th November, proclaimed himself 'Supreme Ruler' and Commander-in-Chief for Siberia, the Cossack districts of the Ural and Orenburg, and stated that his chief aims were the re-establishment of the fighting power of the army, the triumph over Bolshevism, and the re-establishment of law and order, 'so that the people may, without hindrance, select its own form of Government'. In practice the Socialistic element was henceforth entirely eliminated from the administration, and became and has remained irreconcilable. On the other hand Kolchak has been all along supported by the military, and the principal trading and industrial circles. The co-operative societies, the peasants and the zemstvos and municipal institutions, have since rallied to his support in increasing numbers. Amongst the public at large, however, there has been the usual apathy.

Already in May as a result of Kolchak's early victories General *Denikin* had openly placed himself under Kolchak's authority, and may be described as the Commander of the European wing of the latter's army. His administration at Ekaterinodar is not to be regarded as an independent Government, but as possessing a purely temporary character designed to facilitate the work of the Volunteer Army until union could be effected with Kolchak's troops. The North Russian Government at Archangel likewise placed itself under Kolchak's authority about this time, and the Russian diplomatic representatives of the Kerensky régime equally acknowledged his authority and became dependent on his Government for their salaries and upkeep.

In Siberia itself, however, the actual authority of Kolchak's Government has been effective chiefly in Western and Central Siberia alone. East of Lake Baikal it has been considerably weaker, and there is little doubt that the principal cause for this has lain in the action of the Japanese (see E).

The growth of Bolshevism (or its equivalent for practical purposes) in the rear of Kolchak's army was certainly due in part to the circumstances of the suppression of the Social Revolutionaries which accompanied his entry upon office, and the general feeling that his ultimate object was the re-establishment of a monarchical reactionary régime. The military rule which apparently it

became necessary to establish throughout the countryside was hardly calculated to mitigate the political discontent. Even Kolchak himself seems to have completely lost sight of the need for keeping the mass of the civilian population attached to him, and not merely to have persistently ignored the support given him by the co-operative societies, the zemstvos, and the representative institutions generally, but to have permitted attacks on them by his subordinates and agents. The diplomatic representatives on the spot have frequently recommended that the Allied Governments should endeavour to persuade Kolchak to gain the confidence of the loyal classes by adopting a more liberal attitude, and to convene some representative organ, such as the Siberian Duma, to which the people could appeal. The suggestions were of course difficult to carry out in practice. Kolchak had offered hitherto the most solid and durable element that could be found in Siberia, and his power depended on his steering a middle course between the Social Revolutionaries and the military party. So long as the military successes at the front continued he was able to maintain his position and to take drastic measures for the removal of obstacles to the rapid restoration of law and order. It was clearly essential, too, that the Allies should do nothing, by irritating him with requests for reform or encouraging his political opponents, that might create difficulties for him while his great battles were in progress. But it was staking heavily on his success.

As events have turned out, the last battle is finally lost and all hope of retrieving the military situation has practically vanished. Omsk has fallen, and the Administration has moved to Irkutsk. Kolchak is trying to rally this defeated army. In his rear the disaster is producing the domestic troubles which were only to be anticipated. *Gaida*, the successor of Dietrichs as commander of the Czecho-Slovaks, attempted a *coup d'état* at Vladivostock on the 17th November, and called for the overthrow of the Kolchak Government, the cessation of civil war, and peace negotiations with the Soviet Government. *Gaida's* movement was, indeed, crushed by *Rozanoff* on behalf of Kolchak;⁸ but the subterranean hostility to the latter continues just the same, and may at any moment break out afresh, all the more as, if the reports are true, the retreating armies are murdering all the inhabitants with a democratic reputation and burning their villages on the mere suspicion of political disloyalty. The Government itself has taken fright and is reported to be contemplating a change in the administration. The present intention is apparently to make Dietrichs administrator of Eastern Siberia, with Semenoff under him as Commander-in-Chief of a newly-formed military district at Chita, Horvat as commander of the Chinese Eastern Railway area, and someone else at Vladivostock. The Socialists, on the other hand, are once more raising their heads and are envisaging the idea of a federated and self-governing Siberia with all power locally in the hands of the zemstvos and municipalities. The general opinion seems to be that the Government can only survive if it forthwith convokes a national assembly with legislative powers. But the result of the cataclysm has been to drive the peasantry

⁸ See Nos. 547 and 548.

towards Bolshevism as the only hope of obtaining peace. The only evident thing is that the Kolchak régime is moribund, if not already defunct, and that a new era is opening with boundless possibilities of evil.

... (iii)⁹ *Causes of Kolchak's Failure*

Kolchak's failure has been in the main due to a combination of military incompetence and corruption with political ineptitude.

As just stated, in so far as his military operations were concerned, the most elementary principles of war appear to have been disregarded. His advisers, his staff, and his officers generally have shown an almost unparalleled incapacity for war, and moreover, appear never to have been properly impressed with the gravity of the situation. But there have been considerably worse features in the story even than this, and there is clearly a long record of maladministration and malpractices which account for much of the trouble. Indeed, they cast a lurid light on the Russian character, even when in distress, and leave us with little wonder that there is never stability in any Russian situation.

It is notorious that Russians will never pull together, even under the most critical circumstances. But the spectacle of disunion under the Kolchak régime has been more lamentable than usual. From the very beginning there have been endless bickerings between him and his generals, and between the generals themselves, and at times open rupture. We have had Semenov and Ivanoff-Rinoff pulling one way, Rozanoff another, Horvat still another, along with complete mistrust between Kolchak and his actual Chiefs of the Staff and Commanders-in-Chief. Gaida, who was his first prominent Commander, and the most popular man in Siberia, was clearly out of sympathy with him from the first on political grounds. Like all the Czechs, his leanings were pronouncedly democratic, and he disapproved throughout of what he conceived to be Kolchak's reactionary leanings. But early in July Kolchak openly quarrelled with him, accusing him of demoralising the army and corrupting it with Bolshevism by the introduction of Social Revolutionaries, 'the enemies of Russia'. Gaida retorted that the fault lay with Kolchak's other generals like Lebedeff, his Chief of the Staff, whom he accused of being pro-Japanese, and of robbing the country. The result of the quarrel was that Gaida was dismissed.

Next came Dietrichs, who commanded the army from the middle of July till the beginning of November. Then he in his turn fell into violent conflict with Kolchak—the result of an intrigue carried on against him by Lebedeff and Sakharoff. Dietrichs resigned, and Sakharoff is now installed in his place. He has since been superseded.

Kolchak's General Headquarters, in fact, has been a hot-bed of intrigue, and crowded with *embusqués* of the worst type. Even at the front the higher officers appear to have been mainly engaged in trying to get away from it and obtain appointments at Omsk, while a large proportion of those that remained abandoned themselves to pleasure. We heard, for instance, of a

⁹ For the omission of section (ii) see note 3 above.

military train, in which were the staff of an army corps, containing as many women as staff officers.

The condition of the junior officers has been no better. In success they have been corrupt and pleasure-loving; in defeat they have been demoralised and cowardly; in both they have been given over to drunkenness. The men have openly said that the peasants were made to do all the fighting and that none of the *Intelligentsia* were within miles of the front. Misbehaviour, carelessness, and dishonesty on the part of the officers, and particularly of the staff, has naturally led to complete chaos in the matter of transports and supplies. There has been constant congestion at the base and distribution has been at a standstill. But for the efforts of the Inter-Allied Railway Board, there would have been practically no railway service at all.

A second source of trouble lay in the reactionary political tendencies and harsh methods of Kolchak's nominees. Almost everywhere he appointed Military Governors who showed themselves totally unable or unwilling to distinguish between genuine Bolsheviks and merely democratically-disposed peasantry and others. Rozanoff, Ivanoff-Rinoff, and Romanovski were types of this kind, and they set themselves systematically to repress both Social Revolutionaries and officials of the Co-operative Societies with the utmost severity. Ivanoff-Rinoff issued an order in his districts that hostages were to be taken from Bolshevik sympathisers and that ten of these hostages were to be shot for each act of terrorism by the Bolsheviks. At Krasnoiarsk Rozanoff issued a number of orders for deaths without trial for giving assistance to the Bolsheviks, one of the orders stating that the Bolsheviks in prison would be held as hostages and twenty shot for every crime committed in their district. Even as late as November we have a report of twenty-seven persons, not apparently Bolsheviks, being shot for political offences.

Nor in the purely political realm has anything ever been done to remedy the genuine grievances of the civilian population or to take any account of their political aspirations. In particular, Kolchak's disregard of the *zemstvos* led to the greatest estrangement of political opinion.

The *zemstvo* system corresponds roughly with the local government organisations which exist in England at the present day. The *zemstvos* are representative bodies elected by the people themselves, and perform approximately the same functions as in England fall to the share of the county, town, urban and district councils. Before the Russian revolution the *zemstvos* were probably more reliable instruments for the expression of public opinion than the Duma, which was more easily controlled from above, and could be dispersed whenever it seemed likely to become at all dangerous to the bureaucracy. The *zemstvo* system since its introduction has enjoyed both at home and abroad a reputation unique among Russian institutions. It has always been quoted as a saving grace whenever the shortcomings of the Russian Government have come under discussion.

When the Omsk Government had succeeded in establishing itself firmly throughout Siberia, Admiral Kolchak issued a series of declarations promising government on strictly democratic lines, and implying that he was

opposed to the limitation of public rights. It was quite natural that in the selection of members of his Government and of his administration Admiral Kolchak should for the most part choose men of his own political tendencies. It was equally natural that the Government should strive to obtain greater power by applying the principle of centralisation of authority. But the extensive application of the principle was bound to lead to general discontent. The Social Revolutionaries and, to a certain extent, the Social Democrats resented what they considered the excessive influence of the Extreme Right, and in the course of time the zemstvos, whose members largely belonged to these two parties, came into open disagreement with the Government, which found itself obliged to adopt measures calculated to reduce the influence of these organs of local administration. This discontent reached its climax in February 1919, when several members of the Executive Committee of the zemstvo of the Maritime Provinces were arrested and without trial removed from Vladivostock on suspicion of active propaganda against the Omsk Government. These men were subsequently released, and a commission of Judicial Enquiry set up to investigate the charges. But the harm was done, and the action of the Government, combined with indiscriminate punitive measures against the peasantry, has merely had the effect of manufacturing Bolshevism right and left and weakening Kolchak's authority where it was most needed to ensure his military success. The recruiting has steadily fallen off, the peasants have resisted conscription altogether, desertions at the front have been numerous, while the Red troops are prevented from coming over to the Siberian side because they are fairly certain that they will be shot if they do.

In addition to all this, the financial and economic situation has been as bad as it could reasonably be. At the present moment there are said to be over thirty different forms of currency in Eastern Siberia, from a Romanoff rouble to the picture on a cigarette box, and in many places the latter token is more valuable than the former. The confusion has latterly been increased by extensive forgeries, and the Minister of Finance has persistently declined to listen to the proposals for reform put forward by our own financial expert on the spot. The depreciation has led to an enormous increase in prices, which are now far higher than they were under the Bolshevik régime of last year. No improvement has been possible until the transport problem could be solved, and that, in its turn, has been complicated by the dishonesty of the officials at Vladivostock, who for corrupt speculative purposes of their own have prevented the removal of supplies from the base. Besides this, wholesale requisitioning of stocks by the Government has brought imports automatically to a stop, while, with the loss of the Urals, the whole productive capacity of the country has been paralysed and the railway has become dependent upon supplies from abroad. The influx of refugees, for whom neither accommodation nor occupation were available, has further increased the chaos, and there is now practically a complete absence of clothing and other articles of necessity.

Nor do Kolchak's troubles end there. He has had external difficulties to

face, too, from Japanese, Americans, and Czechs alike. The former have consistently undermined his authority by their support of the Atamans, and of the reactionary parties, while to the latter he has appeared an impenitent anti-democrat. He has thus, both in his foreign and domestic relations, fallen hopelessly between two stools.

Yet in himself he is admittedly an honest and perfectly broadminded man. He is as brave as a lion, but at the same time evidently as obstinate as a mule. He has none of the steadiness which has been Denikin's chief asset, and he has the misfortune of possessing an ungovernable temper. He was not strong enough for the post of dictator, a post which he did not himself covet. There is no reason to believe that he has not been quite sincere in his democratic views, but like other Russians he realised that too much talk about democracy has been the bane of Russia, and has resented our efforts to get democratic statements out of him. He recognised, though far too late in the day, that political concessions were necessary, and in July opened an economic congress of the principal districts and institutions of Siberia. But he spoilt it at once by instructing it to confine its attention to economic questions. Only under the influence of panic last month did his Government at last promulgate a law convoking a Peasant and Cossack Assembly.

He has suffered since the very beginning from being surrounded by ex-bureaucrats of the old Tsarist régime, who have consistently hampered him at every turn, and from lack of patriotism and war-tiredness among all classes. He has readily acknowledged that things were bad, but has been too weak to remedy them. He has known that a proper agrarian programme was the only means of gaining the support of the peasantry, yet all he has done has been to issue temporary decrees leaving them in possession of their land, but giving them no security for the future. He has continually fallen back on a Constituent Assembly of an uncertain future for the permanent settlement, and has thus left the impression that the much-wished-for reforms are dependent on unknown factors.

But the main cause of his failure has been the arbitrary actions of his lieutenants, the corruption of their subordinates and the economic chaos. The wonder is that he had lasted so long.

(iv) *The Relations between Admiral Kolchak and the Allied Powers*

The relations between the Powers and Kolchak were defined in despatches to our Representatives abroad on the 17th April, 1919, as follows:— 'Admiral Kolchak enjoys the nominal goodwill of His Majesty's Government, of the French Government, and, in a lesser degree, of the Japanese Government, together with a general expectation of material assistance from all three. The attitude of the United States Government, on the other hand, is undoubtedly, in practice at least, neutral, not to say unsympathetic.' The 'goodwill' referred to was conveyed to Kolchak in January 1919 by the British High Commissioner in these terms:— 'As your Excellency has assumed the control at Omsk, His Majesty's Government desire to express their warm sympathy with every effort to establish a free Russian Government on the

basis of public confidence. Nothing short of this can restore Russia to her proper position among the nations of the world, or enable her to take her full share in the work of civilisation.' The object of this declaration was to give a stimulus to Kolchak and his troops, on the one hand, and, on the other, to make it more difficult for the Japanese to promote the encouragement of other political centres of government under ambitious leaders.

The next step, namely, the recognition of Kolchak's Government, which was closely allied with that of material assistance, became the subject of discussion from April onwards. Besides the practical issue of the security of its position, there were two main objections to affording it recognition: (a) Admiral Kolchak stands for a 'United *Indivisible* Russia'; (b) if not Admiral Kolchak, at least his immediate *entourage* are in favour of restoring a monarchy in Russia (see B (i)). It was therefore clearly necessary to attach two conditions to recognition: (i) that the assistance given to Kolchak for the sole purpose of the war against the Bolsheviks should never be used to bring the ex-Russian Border States into a Russian Federation *by force*; (ii) that there should be no attempt to impose a monarchy on the Russian people as a result of Kolchak's victories in the field. One means of meeting these difficulties was to recognise the Kolchak Government merely as a *Provisional Government for Siberia*, and not as a Government for All Russia; and this view has prevailed with His Majesty's Government every time that the expediency of recognising Kolchak has arisen.

The question came up before the Peace Conference in *May*, and a *note was addressed by the Powers jointly to Kolchak* and his associates enquiring whether they would agree to certain conditions, upon the acceptance of which the Powers would render assistance. These conditions included . . .¹⁰

Admiral Kolchak replied that he accepted the Allied conditions, with reservations regarding the immediate meeting of the Constituent Assembly of 1917 and the question of Bessarabia, and the Peace Conference expressed themselves satisfied with his assurances and promised further supplies.¹¹ Nevertheless Kolchak's Government remained unrecognised to the bitter disappointment and discomfiture of his followers who had counted on the Exchange of Notes being a prelude to recognition. When Kolchak replied, however, his armies were in full retreat, and the moment was hardly propitious to confer a privilege which might easily have proved an empty one almost as soon as it was conferred. Nor indeed was any further action taken to give effect to the agreement in principle as to the relations between the future Russia and the border States, and indeed such arrangement as was arrived at in the Exchange of Notes has remained a dead letter ever since, pending a general consideration of the Russian problem as a whole by the Allied Powers which has not yet taken place. M. Sazonoff, on behalf of the Russian Committee in Paris, made a further attempt to get the question taken up, and on the 20th September appealed in this sense to M. Clemen-

¹⁰ There followed a summary of the eight conditions as enumerated in No. 233, appendix I.

¹¹ See No. 255, appendix II and No. 257, appendix I.

ceau, as President of the Peace Conference,¹² but without result. Finally the point was once more considered by His Majesty's Government six weeks ago, when the tide of war seemed to have definitely turned in favour of Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch simultaneously, on the ground that it would be expedient that they should gain the victories which for a few days looked inevitable with the full blessing of the Allied Powers, and not fall promptly under German influence as a result of the Allies holding aloof at a critical moment. A wiser policy, however, prevailed and has been fully justified by events.

... III¹³

(D) INTERVENTION

(i) *American and Japanese*

The policy of intervening with a military force, in particular Japanese, in Eastern Siberia was first discussed by His Majesty's Government in December 1917. There were then two points at issue (a) the protection of foreigners; (b) the protection of the vast stocks of war material at Vladivostock. Later on a third point was added, namely, the need of preventing Germany from seizing the Siberian harvests and supplementing the supplies from the Ukraine; and, finally, the hope of eventually being able to re-establish the Eastern front against the Germans was never quite abandoned. The argument against intervention was a strong one, namely, that if the Russians apprehended that Japan was to be loosed against them, they would make peace with Germany, and even possibly fight against us with her. Nevertheless, an enquiry was made at Washington and Tokyo whether the hour of intervention had arrived. The United States Government replied that they themselves had decided nothing, but that in the event of German control of Russia becoming probable, Japan would, they had been told, mobilise and take the necessary steps to counteract such a movement. Further enquiry at Tokyo elicited the information that Japan could not undertake the duty of guarding the Siberian Railway from Vladivostock to Moscow, but would be willing to discuss a more modest operation to Harbin, or even to the junction of the Amur Railway; also that American participation would be unpopular in Japan. On the 31st December the United States Government were told that His Majesty's Government hoped they might see their way to co-operation in the event of the Japanese taking protective measures of their own; but the United States Government intimated that they were averse from either solitary intervention by Japan or combined intervention by Japan and America. The Japanese thereupon took offence, professed to be pained at His Majesty's Government's disapproval of solitary action by Japan, and expressed the hope that they would trust her to intervene at

¹² On September 20, 1919, the Russian Political Conference in Paris addressed a note in this sense to M. Clemenceau. An English text of this note (dated, apparently incorrectly, September 23) is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, pp. 431-2.

¹³ For the omission of section II (C) see note 4 above.

Vladivostock, especially as enemy action in East Russia and on the East Siberian littoral was to her a matter of peculiar and intimate concern.

There was indeed much to be said for inviting Japan to take independent action on behalf of the Allies, if she thought it desirable to do so; it would have shown our appreciation of Japanese feeling and confidence in Japan, and would commit her more deeply in the world struggle against Germany and German influence. Accordingly His Majesty's Government decided to propose at Paris, Rome and Washington that *Japan should be invited to act as the mandatory of the Allies* for the special duty of protecting the Siberian Railway and resisting German penetration (January 26, 1918). The French immediately agreed, but the Italians hesitated, and President Wilson confined himself to a promise that he would give the matter careful consideration as to the military advantages to be expected. Subsequently the United States Government declared that Russia would not welcome any interference in her affairs, which must therefore be considered inopportune for the present, but, if intervention should ultimately become unavoidable, any military expedition should be undertaken by international co-operation and not by any one mandatory Power.

Meanwhile the Ataman Semenoff had equipped an expedition of his own in Manchuria to fight against the Bolsheviks in Eastern Siberia and was scoring some initial successes (see C).¹³ The Japanese had from the beginning shown a remarkable interest in his organisation (see E), secretly supplying him with arms and ammunition, and late on the 28th February the Japanese consul at Harbin avowed the Japanese action to his British colleague, and said that Japan was ready to send an expedition to assist him, but would not occupy Siberia. Yet almost simultaneously the Japanese Government suggested that, if England and France agreed, Japan could go ahead without the consent of America, certainly to Irkutsk, perhaps further; and again they hinted at the possibility of Japan breaking from the *Entente* in order to be free to intervene in Siberia and secure what she wanted in the Far East, and even to come to an understanding with Germany on the ground of a common hostility to Bolshevism.

At this point (March) the Bolsheviks unconditionally surrendered to the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, and, though the Bolsheviks stated that they still intended to organise resistance to German aggression in spite of their peace treaty, His Majesty's Government decided that immediate Allied action in Siberia had become imperative, far preferably by Japan acting as mandatory rather than alone, and if possible on a direct invitation from the Soviet Government, to obtain which Mr. Lockhart's¹⁴ efforts were henceforth directed. The Japanese Government, however, now executed a *volte-face*, and said that it would be difficult for Japan to act as mandatory for the Powers, if she could not count on the United States for assistance in money, steel, &c. President Wilson was therefore asked by us to give material as

¹⁴ Mr. Bruce Lockhart, former Acting British Consul-General in Moscow, was at that time on special mission in Russia. Cf. R. H. Bruce Lockhart: *Memoirs of a British Agent* (London, 1932), *passim*.

well as moral support to Japanese intervention, without which Japan would not move; and we pointed out that Japanese intervention was useless unless it was carried far enough to deny the Germans the immense supplies available from Western Siberia; and that an expedition getting thus far would also cover any German advance upon Turkestan to the peril of India. President Wilson, however, remained unmoved.

During the following month (April), though unceasing efforts to convert President Wilson continued, the attention of His Majesty's Government was mainly diverted to the task of endeavouring to extract an invitation from Trotsky, or at least to obtain his assent to Japanese intervention, and at one time it looked as though this might be effected. In fact, on the 23rd April Mr. Lockhart reported from Moscow that, if Lenin could be assured that the Allies would not seek to destroy the Soviet form of government, but would loyally co-operate with it and guarantee the independence of Russian territory, there was good reason to believe that he would not refuse any reasonable offer from the Allies. So things went on with no result; the Soviet Government merely played with the idea of intervention for purposes of their own, and President Wilson still remained immovable.

Thus four fruitless months passed, in which both Japan and America alternately gave and withdrew their assent to the various proposals put forward by the Western Powers. At one moment a grudging assent was offered by the United States, only to be withdrawn two days afterwards; at another moment the Japanese, who had never disguised their intention to intervene alone, if necessary, indicated their willingness to proceed on the invitation of Great Britain and France and without America. But, after a change of Government, this suggestion was withdrawn, and Japan declared that intervention on a substantial scale was impossible without the help of money and metals from America. His Majesty's Government exhausted all possible arguments to induce the United States to consent to intervention, but without success. With equal insistency they pressed on Japan, first, a scheme of 'mixed' intervention, and, when that proved distasteful, invited her as mandatory of the Allied Powers to undertake the duty alone—again without success. It may be that domestic and political reasons prevented both countries from acting as we urged them to do; but there was clearly no point at which intervention would have been possible without the risk of breaking (a) with the Japanese, if we had insisted on a 'mixed' expedition, or (b) with the Americans, if we had been able and willing to persuade the Japanese to act without the consent of the United States Government.

In the meantime, the military situation on the Western front was growing steadily more critical, and it was becoming vital to deny Russian supplies to the Central Powers, and, by renewing the Allied menace to their Eastern frontiers, to stop the flow of their troops to France before Germany had time to consolidate her hold on Russian resources and Russian territory. Fresh efforts had therefore to be made towards bringing about intervention.

The visit to Washington of Viscount Ishii, the new Japanese Ambassador to the United States, towards the end of April, afforded a fresh opportunity

for conversations with President Wilson, who was showing himself more favourably disposed towards intervention, apparently owing to the reports that were coming in of Trotsky's good dispositions. But three weeks later the President still remained of the opinion that the advantages which might be gained by intervention would be far outweighed by the disadvantages. Meanwhile we were informed by the Japanese Government that they were prepared to recede from the original position which they had taken up, namely, that any expedition into Siberia should be solely Japanese, and that while still holding the view that, since Japan was to contribute most of the troops, their movements should be controlled by Japanese Generals, they were prepared to give favourable consideration to any plan that might be proposed for Allied co-operation. (May 3.) A few days later the Japanese Government declared that in any case they only contemplated intervening to prevent German penetration to the Pacific coast, and that intervention to the extent of sending a force to Cheliabinsk 'was an entirely new idea'. Mr. Lockhart at this point came to the conclusion that intervention was so urgent that we ought to act at once, whether we obtained the invitation from the Bolsheviks or not, and on the 13th June it was practically decided to warn the Soviet Government that, in view of the continued German advance in Russia and the growth of German influence there, and particularly in view of hostile instructions which they had given in regard to our action at Murmansk, that we should regard ourselves free to take any steps that seemed to us desirable to prevent the further establishment of German influence in any part of Russia.

On the 3rd June the question of intervention was formally considered by the Supreme War Council in Versailles, when it was decided that an official enquiry should be addressed by His Majesty's Government and the French and Italian Governments to the Japanese Government, whether the latter were prepared to take common action in Siberia with such help from the other co-belligerents as the military exigencies of the situation would allow; and that the following conditions should be fulfilled, in order to make Allied intervention acceptable both to the Russian people and to public opinion in America and the Allied countries: (a) the Allies to declare that they would take no side in Russian internal politics and to promise to respect the territorial integrity of Russia; (b) the Allied expedition to advance as far west as possible, its avowed object being to meet German influences and defeat them, and to compel the Central Powers to reverse their policy of sending all their forces to the Western front. On receipt of a favourable reply from the Japanese Government, the views of the Allies were to be submitted to the United States Government in the hope of receiving their assent and co-operation, since the whole policy must evidently prove abortive unless that were obtained.

The Japanese Government replied on the 24th June that they could give no decision until a complete understanding had been reached between the three Western Powers and the United States; that in any case they could not engage to extend the sphere of their military activities beyond the limits of

Eastern Siberia in view of the grave difficulties with which such operations would be practically confronted; and that, in the event of common action being taken, they attached great importance to unity of command which they trusted would be placed in the hands of Japan.

During this time American public opinion had to a certain degree swung round to the idea of intervention, but intervention of rather a vague and general kind; and the proposal that held the field and at all [*sic*] appealed to the President was the despatch to Siberia of a relief commission supported by a protective armed guard, but an armed guard consisting mainly of American troops, and merely supplemented by the Japanese and a small number of the other Allies.

At this point, however, the Siberian situation entered into a new phase owing to the *action of the Czecho-Slovak troops* in fighting their way from European Russia across Siberia (see C).¹³ Some of these troops had reached Vladivostock by July, but the larger number were scattered along the railway, and were in grave danger of being cut off and overwhelmed by the armed German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners, who were concentrating at Irkutsk and constituting a formidable menace. An appeal for immediate military assistance had already been made by the Czech National Council to the Allied consuls at Vladivostock.

The Supreme War Council met at Versailles on the 2nd July and presented a further appeal to President Wilson, based on the urgent necessity of affording assistance to these Czech forces. The President thereupon proposed to the Japanese Government that each of the two Governments should despatch about 7,000 men to Vladivostock to replace the Czechs moving westward to the rescue of their comrades. The Japanese Government formally accepted the proposal on the 20th July, but they declined to bind themselves to send exactly the same number of troops as the United States Government to Vladivostock, and wished to be free to dispose of bodies of troops at various stations along the Siberian railway west of the Manchurian frontier to keep open communications for the Czechs. They determined to send a division to Vladivostock and another division a little later on to guard the railway.

On the 3rd August His Majesty's Government, in concert with their Allies, decided to extend military help to the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia.

On the 5th August the United States Government issued a public statement to the effect that they had decided on a limited intervention in Siberia with the sole purpose of rendering protection to the Czecho-Slovaks against the German and Austrian prisoners and 'to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be ready to accept assistance'. They further hoped 'to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labour advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organising the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind, in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open'.

Intervention was therefore a *fait accompli* at last. The Allied forces agreed upon were: America, 7,000; Great Britain, 3,500; Italy and France, 3,000; Japan, 12,500. Japan was to have the supreme command of the total force of 25,000. The United States Government expressed themselves ready to entertain the idea of subsequent reinforcements, if necessary. Japan agreed to send 12,000 men to Vladivostock, stating that she would consult the United States Government with regard to moving them outside that town and disposing of extra bodies of troops at various places along that railway. She reserved, however, to herself the right 'to take immediate action should a sudden grave emergency call for such a course'.

In opposition to suggestions that the scale of intervention should be enlarged, the United States Government has held steadily to its point of view that 'it should be left to a later time and circumstances not yet developed to consider radical alteration of the whole scale and character of action in Siberia'. The Japanese originally sent a force up through Manchuria to Chita, where it has remained ever since; but neither they nor the Americans have ever made any attempt to advance westwards, in spite of numerous requests from us that they should do so.

(ii) *British*

The political factor in bringing about Allied intervention in Siberia was overwhelmingly British, and it was emphasised by the appointment on the 21st August, 1918, of *Sir Charles Eliot* as British High Commissioner, who proceeded first to Vladivostock and subsequently to Omsk, where he resided practically continuously, until he returned to this country prior to taking up his post as British Ambassador at Tokyo. During the first period of his residence at Omsk he was represented at Vladivostock by Mr. Alston as Deputy High Commissioner, then by Mr. O'Reilly, and later by Mr. Lampson. Mr. Porter was attached to Sir C. Eliot's staff as British Commercial Commissioner.

But compared with America and Japan the military and material contribution of Great Britain was on a relatively small scale. We took part, however, at once in the actual arrival of the Allied forces: in fact we were there first, as the Middlesex Regiment (25th Battalion), under *Colonel John Ward*, M.P., landed at Vladivostock on the 3rd August, 1918. They were followed on the 27th November by the 1/9th Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment.

The Canadian Government also sent a contingent of 4,000 men under General Elmsley to Vladivostock, but decided that they should not move further westward. Canadian opinion, however, appears to have been against the expedition from the beginning and in favour of withdrawal as soon as possible, and after considerable discussion the Canadian Government yielded to popular pressure on the 5th April, and all the troops were withdrawn from Siberia during the course of that month.

General Knox arrived at Vladivostock on the 5th September (1918), and proceeded to Kolchak's headquarters. His duties have been (a) to form liaison between the War Office and the High Command of the Allied ex-

peditionary forces; (b) to report on the military operations; (c) to assist the Japanese High Command; (d) to undertake the organisation of the Russian volunteer forces; (e) to distribute equipment and stores for the Russian forces which were furnished by His Majesty's Government. One of his additional activities has been the organisation of a school on Russian Island, for training Russian officers, which by July last had turned out 650 young officers and 850 non-commissioned officers, while at Tomsk he had 400 more officers under training, and others at Irkutsk.

At the same time *General Janin* was sent by the French Government to take command of the Czech forces in Siberia and all French troops co-operating with them, subject to the Supreme Japanese Command, and arrived at Vladivostock in the middle of November. A mild controversy ensued as to his exact relations with General Knox, but in the middle of January 1919 an agreement was come to, in conjunction with the Omsk Government, defining the respective spheres of activity of General Janin and General Knox, and this was approved and published in an order by Admiral Kolchak dated the 21st January, 1919, which set forth the agreed terms briefly as follows: (a) General Janin has assumed office as Commander-in-Chief of the troops of countries allied with Russia and operations in Western Siberia and Eastern Russia; (b) the Russian Chief of Staff, in directing operations, is to co-ordinate his work with General Janin's staff to secure unity of action; (c) General Knox enters upon his duties in connection with the supply of material from abroad for the army, and in the unification of Allied assistance in the organisation and training of troops in rear; (d) The Minister of War to co-ordinate his work in the branches mentioned under (c) with General Knox's staff.

General Otani, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Force, arrived in Vladivostock on the 18th August, 1918, and, by agreement between the Allies, took command of all Allied forces.

In December 1918 his command was extended to comprise the whole of Siberia east of Lake Baikal.

The British forces have been bound by no restrictions as regards moving westward, and the Middlesex Regiment under Colonel Ward took a distinguished part in Kolchak's first offensive. They sailed for England from Vladivostock on the 8th September of this year, and were followed by the Hampshires on the 1st November.

His Majesty's Government decided in December 1918 to supply Admiral Kolchak with material assistance. Equipment, clothing, and general ordnance stores, and such guns as could be spared up to 200 were furnished for the use of the Siberian armies. In August 1919, however, His Majesty's Government reversed their previous decision, partly in view of Kolchak's critical position, partly on the grounds of economy and the impossibility of bearing on their shoulders all the Allied commitments in Russia, and determined on concentrating entirely on Denikin.¹⁵ Accordingly they diverted to the latter the stores which had been prepared for shipment to Siberia.

¹⁵ See No. 369.

In so doing, however, His Majesty's Government had no intention of disinteresting themselves in the Siberian situation, and it was decided that the office and functions of the British High Commissioner should remain unchanged (August 20, 1919).¹⁶

(iii) *The Inter-Allied Railway Agreement*

The control of the railway communications in Siberia has been so important a factor in the political and military developments of the last two years and so vital to the success of the Allied intervention that no survey of the situation would be complete without some account of it. It has from the very first been a controversial question, often acute and bitter, and has supplied the main cause of friction between the Japanese and Americans. To this day it remains an open sore, and may be the immediate cause of the withdrawal of the American forces from Siberia—an event which will necessarily leave the Japanese in exclusive control, with possibly incalculable consequences to the future of the country and Japan's relations with the Allies.

The history of this question begins with the arrival of the American troops at Vladivostock in August 1918. On the 21st August a conference took place at Vladivostock between the Allied military representatives and the Russian railway officials (the British representative being *Colonel Jack*), when it was decided that the direction and management of the Russian railways should be left in the hands of the Russian officials. But three days before the conference the American Commander-in-Chief had notified his Allied colleagues that he was recommending to his Government that American engineers should be formally placed at the disposal of the Allied commanders to supervise the military use of the railways necessary for joint operations, owing to the hopeless inefficiency of the existing Russian railway administrations. The concrete proposal subsequently made by the United States Government was that *Mr. J. F. Stevens*, chairman of the Railway Advisory Commission to Russia, should undertake the necessary operations of the different parts of the Trans-Siberian Railway and its branches, with the assistance of American engineers in the service of Russia, known as the Russian railway corps, in conjunction with the Russian railway officials and personnel in co-operation with the Allies. All rights held by anyone in the line were to be expressly reserved. His Majesty's Government, unaware apparently of the decisions of the Vladivostock Conference of the 21st August or dissatisfied with them, at once declared that they had no objection to the American proposal, provided the co-operation of the Japanese could be secured; but we subsequently adopted an amendment made by Sir C. Eliot that the Japanese might be allowed to control the railways of the Ussuri and the Amur to the same extent which it was proposed that the Americans should control the main line. The Japanese Government replied (26th September) that, while they were perfectly willing to recognise that these proposals were actuated solely by considerations of military necessity, these considerations did not seem to

¹⁶ See No. 392.

them to justify a measure which would necessitate the displacement of Russian officials. General *Horvat* had been duly appointed as Director of the Chinese Eastern Railway, his appointment was duly confirmed by the last Government of Russia and in that capacity he was also left in charge of the Ussuri Railway, the administration of which under Russian law had been entrusted to the Chinese Eastern Railway. It seemed to the Japanese Government that the removal of General Horvat and his officials would constitute an intervention in the domestic affairs of Russia which it had always been the declared policy of the Allied Governments to avoid.

As regards the military necessity of the United States proposals, the Japanese Government saw no reason to modify the decision of the Vladivostock Conference and were consequently opposed to the proposal put forward by the United States Government.

His Majesty's Government thereupon at once informed the Japanese and United States Government that the only desire of His Majesty's Government was the effective working of the railways, and that they were quite ready to adopt any arrangement which was agreed upon by the United States and Japanese Governments which would secure this result.

A scheme was then devised (October 31) by the United States Ambassador at Tokyo and Mr. Stevens, as follows:—

- (i) The general supervision to be regulated and controlled by a special Inter-Allied Committee consisting of representatives of each Power, including Russia, having military forces in Siberia, the chairman to be a Russian, the Committee to exercise supervision through—
 - (a) A central office to be established for operations of all railways in the zone.
 - (b) An Allied military bureau to be created for co-ordinating military transportation under direction of proper military authorities.
- (ii) The protection of the railways to be placed under the Allied military forces and the technical administrative and economic management of all railways in the zone to be entrusted to Mr. Stevens, who should be appointed by the senior military officers of the Allied forces in the several districts occupied by them. Mr. Stevens to be given title of Director-General.
- (iii) At the head of each railway should remain a Russian manager or director with powers conferred by existing Russian law. The mutual relations of the chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee and the Director-General with the managers of the railways to be regulated according to the existing laws and rules for the operation of Russian railways.

The Japanese Government at once objected (November 10) that this American scheme involved American administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which Japanese public opinion would never admit; and they submitted counter-proposals, involving a joint General Directorate of Mr. Stevens and a Japanese representative, which the United States Government

in their turn rejected. Thereupon the Japanese General Staff submitted a project of their own, the effect of which was to confine the Director-General's jurisdiction to advice and assistance, and conferred no power to compel Russian managements to follow that advice. Mr. Stevens at once pronounced the scheme unworkable.

In the end (*February 1919*) the *Japanese and United States Governments came to an agreement*,¹⁷ which was accepted by His Majesty's Government, the French, Italian, and Chinese Governments, and Admiral Kolchak, all of whom proceeded forthwith to appoint representatives to the various boards to be set up under it.

The agreement provided for an *Inter-Allied Railway Board* with a Technical Board and a Military Transport Board subordinate to it. Mr. Stevens became president of the Technical Board, while General Jack became the British representative on it.

Between February and June all went smoothly. Several meetings of the Inter-Allied Railway Board and of the other boards were held, and measures were approved which led to considerable improvement in the traffic between Omsk and Vladivostock, as many as six trains a day going forward in June as against one in February.

According to the decisions of the Board, the Allied troops were distributed along the railway in four separate sections. The Japanese obtained one section, the Americans another, the Chinese another (including the whole of the Chinese Eastern Railway), and the Russians a fourth (extending west as far as Baikal City). The guarding of the railway west of Baikal City was left largely in the hands of the Czecho-Slovaks. The question was also raised at the time whether the authority of the Board should extend west of the Ural mountains as well as east. This would have involved the control of the section being British, and to this there were objections from our point of view, inasmuch as we should have been bound to afford material assistance and it would have been impossible for us to continue to supply personnel for reorganisation beyond the Urals on the same scale as we had supplied it on the eastern side. So the question never went any further.

The successful execution of the scheme clearly depended largely on adequate financial arrangements being made, and the Inter-Allied Railway Board recommended the creation of a fund for its work. His Majesty's Government agreed to participate on condition that the expenditure borne by them should be utilised solely for purchases in Great Britain and Canada, but the United States Government then requested His Majesty's Government to participate to the extent of 5,000,000 dollars in providing a fund of 20,000,000 dollars, on which the Board could draw at its discretion. This further liability His Majesty's Government felt unable to accept, in view of the fact that Great Britain had done more than any other Power in the matter of assisting Admiral Kolchak, to say nothing of their Russian commitments elsewhere, and that the numerous military staff under General Jack were already being paid at the rate of nearly £9,000 a month.

¹⁷ See No. 256, annex B.

In June, things began to go wrong. The Japanese and Americans fell out as to the extent to which their respective troops should be used for the purpose of guarding the Siberian railways.¹⁸ The root of the trouble lay in the differences which had arisen as regards the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief east of Lake Baikal. The Japanese Government claimed that General Otani, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, should be in control, and the claim was recognised by His Majesty's Government and the French Government, but General Graves, commanding the American troops, declined to agree, maintaining that he alone could be responsible to the United States Government for the disposition and activities of his own troops. The Japanese now contended that the sphere of activity of the Allied troops in Siberia should not be limited, and that they should be at liberty to deal with Bolshevik forces wherever they were situated. General Graves, on the other hand, maintained that the activities of his forces must be strictly limited to the railway zone, and that he was not empowered to use his forces anywhere outside that zone. This point, however, shortly afterwards solved itself, as the Americans were attacked by Bolshevik bands, and lost a considerable number of killed and wounded. Thereupon, they took action themselves against the Bolsheviks in the Ussuri region, and a United States cruiser participated in the action.

The next complication that arose was due to the support given to Semenoff by the Japanese. This unruly individual took to putting every conceivable obstacle in the way of the traffic of the Siberian railways, commandeering wagons and locomotives, and at times completely obstructing the communications between Omsk and Vladivostock. The root of the trouble lay no doubt in the dispute between Kolchak and Semenoff, but the Japanese have practically taken no steps to restrain the latter, in spite of remonstrances from their allies, though they could quite easily have done so.

Next, the Japanese began to show designs on the Chinese Eastern Railway which, as mentioned above, had been consigned to the Chinese. The immediate excuse was a strike of the railway employees on that line on July 31 over a question of the currency in which their wages should be paid. We at once urged the Chinese Government to take steps to deal with the situation, and simultaneously the wages question was settled and the strike came to an end. But the Japanese would not let it rest there. Their representative on the Inter-Allied Technical Board announced that the Japanese military authorities intended to begin relieving their troops at Chita on the 15th August, and that unless railway traffic was resumed by that date the Japanese would open the line themselves. This at once aroused the suspicions of the Allied representatives, who assumed that the Japanese intended to gain control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and His Majesty's representative at Tokyo endeavoured to persuade the Japanese Government not to move their troops until ordinary traffic had been resumed, or to carry out the relief by way of the Amur Railway. In the meantime the Japanese representative on the Inter-Allied Technical Board proposed that the protection of the Chinese

¹⁸ Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, p. 563 f.

Eastern Railway should be taken over by the Japanese Command, but the Board refrained from expressing any opinion on the proposal.

Simultaneously, reports came through from our representatives that the Japanese were once again taking no steps—in spite of all the assurances that had been given at Omsk and Tokyo—to restrain Semenoff from raiding the railway, and, in fact, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief quite frankly told the Railway Board that his troops could not interfere between Russian authorities. So critical did the position become at the end of August that Mr. Morris (the American [? Ambassador] at Tokyo, at that time on a visit to Siberia) threatened to withdraw all the American railway officers from the Trans-Baikal section, which would probably have meant the suspension of all traffic.

Incidentally, suggestions were being made at this time in military quarters as to the desirability of getting Japanese troops up to Kolchak's front, or at least to replace the restive Czechs on their section of the railway, the inducement being temporary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway.¹⁹ But His Majesty's representatives in the Far East unanimously expressed their vigorous opposition to any such action, and so the suggestions were rejected.²⁰

The dispute between the Americans and Japanese now came to a head. On the 2nd September the United States Government addressed a note to the Governments of Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, China, and to the Russian Ambassador in Washington, drawing attention to the Japanese behaviour.²⁰ The main points dealt with in the note were (a) the Japanese claim to limit the duties of their troops to the mere guarding of their section of the line on the ground that they were under no obligation to co-operate in furthering the general plan for maintaining railway communications; (b) the Japanese contention that disagreements between Russians under the control of the Omsk Government and a national of a country engaged in the operation or protection of the railway, must be a matter for discussion between the Omsk Government and the Government of the person concerned; (c) the refusal of the Japanese military commanders to protect the lives of the Allied instructors in the territory under the control of Semenoff; (d) the refusal of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief to give the support of his forces in making effective the declared purposes of the agreement. Having recited the misdeeds of the Japanese, the American note proceeds to threaten the withdrawal of all American troops in Siberia, unless some radical action was taken to alter the situation.

The Japanese Government replied to the American note on the 19th November and dealt with the charges in detail.²¹

They explained their position as regards the protection of the railway, and maintained that, while it was their duty to guard and keep open the line and to protect it against attack, they were doing all they could to maintain the operation of the railway plan. On the other hand, they repudiated any

¹⁹ See No. 413.

²⁰ See No. 431, note 5.

²¹ The text of this Japanese reply is printed op. cit. pp. 588-92. The date of the Japanese note is there given as October 30, 1919.

suggestion that the Allied military forces should be made subordinate to the Inter-Allied Railway Board or to the Technical Board acting under it. They denied the charge that their troops did not protect the lives of Allied instructors in the territory controlled by Semenoff, but at the same time they pointed out that in the Japanese instructions it was laid down that it was only when trains were obstructed by the lawless elements of the population that armed force should be used, while any dispute involving Russian military authorities should be looked upon as an internal political trouble, and should be referred to the higher Russian authorities.

Here the matter stands for the present, and the Americans have still to consider whether they will carry out their threat of withdrawal, to which significantly no reference was made in the Japanese note. We on our side have been urging the Americans to take no step in this direction which would play directly into the hands of the Japanese by leaving them in sole control.²⁰

Considerable space has been devoted to this subject of the railways, because it is round them that the much-predicted quarrel between the Americans and Japanese has been simmering ever since they both appeared on Siberian soil, and has at times broken out into an open row. The Americans have, on the whole, had right on their side, and, had they been free to employ Mr. Stevens and his technical staff from the first, the railway administration might have been placed on an efficient basis six months before it actually was. That might even have altered the general course of events, military and political. The Japanese are entirely responsible for the obstruction that has occurred, and have played a political game throughout. We have still to see what the next move is going to be.

(iv) *Economic*

During the period from May to August 1918, when, owing to the attitude of the United States Government, a complete deadlock had occurred as regards the prospects of Inter-Allied military intervention in Siberia, the idea grew up that, if we could not intervene with armies, we could at least promote a scheme (for political purposes), to which no one could object, for despatching supplies for the relief of the Siberian population. The United States Government were of the same mind. The first step then was to organise a scheme on an Inter-Allied basis, though, for geographical considerations and owing to the need for economy in tonnage, &c., in the West, it was clear that the main burden must fall on Japan and the United States—though a certain amount of British goods at Vladivostock and Habarovsk could be made immediately available, while Canada and other parts of the British Empire could supply later on.

This scheme of economic relief was quickly elaborated for administration under the Allied Governments. The two principles underlying the supply of goods to Siberian consumers were laid down as follows: First, that the whole transaction should be as far as possible self-supporting and not eleemosynary (since there was little evidence of real destitution), and so prevent abuses like the exploitation of the consumers by Chinese and other middlemen; and that

the element of profit-making should be excluded from the supply and distribution sent for purposes of relief, so as to make it clear that the object was to benefit the local population and to avoid any suspicion that the Allies were aiming at the exploitation of the economic necessities of Siberia for private gain. At the same time it was highly desirable that all the Allied Governments taking part in the scheme should pursue the same policy in regard to the terms on which the goods should be disposed of to Siberian consumers.

To give effect to this, as the British contribution, it was arranged that a business organisation should be set up at Vladivostock, under the supervision and control of the Board of Trade, and under them the Commercial Commissioner in Siberia, to act as the agent of His Majesty's Government for the supply of goods. The task of setting up and working this organisation was entrusted to Mr. Leslie Urquhart, and the organisation itself was christened the Siberian Supply Company. It was forbidden to trade on private account, and was to be remunerated by reimbursement of in- or out-of-pocket expenses, and $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the turnover. Mr. Urquhart's functions were to acquire and sell goods and stock at Vladivostock or elsewhere in Siberia; to procure orders for goods to be supplied from the United Kingdom, to import such supplies as were available in Canada and the rest of the Empire; and obtain and export goods available in Siberia in exchange for goods to be sold there.

A notice was issued to British firms by the Board of Trade at the end of September (1918) publishing the formation of the Siberian Supply Company, and announcing the establishment of an agency which was ready to entertain applications from British firms who had established Siberian trade, subject of course to tonnage possibilities and export restrictions. The first shipment of goods (to the value of £20,000) took place on the 28th September.

Ever since the inception of the scheme the United States Government had been asked to co-operate with us, but it was not until the end of November that they took any definite action towards the economic relief of Siberia. Their method was to organise a corporation under the name of the 'War Trade Board of the United States Russian Bureau Incorporated' with a capital of 5,000,000 dollars, and Mr. Vance McCormick as the president. Its policy was to secure that goods should be sold at the lowest possible price, and distributed in Russia so as to reach those in need of them. Where private traders were unable or unwilling to secure such distribution, the War Trade Board were prepared at once to take the necessary steps.

The Japanese also attempted to sell goods in the Amur province through an official organisation, but it proved a failure and the local Japanese merchants caused their Government to suspend the sales. But this was not before the latter had used their agent to secure valuable concessions and rights of all kinds.

Nor were the British firms in Siberia any more pleased than the Japanese with the establishment of an official agency, and in December steps had to be taken to pacify them by a local announcement by the High Commissioner that every endeavour was being made at home to facilitate private trade and

that manufacturers were being encouraged to use their own agents and correspondents in preference to the Government agency, whenever the former were willing to act. But it was clear, from Sir C. Eliot's reports three months after the agency had been formed, that the scheme was at least a partial failure, and had never apparently been heard of west of Harbin.

Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government thought it would be impracticable to close down the agency at once, and determined to carry it on until conditions were more normal, and private enterprises had been successfully established to meet local needs.

Before long the agency was going begging. First there was an idea that the Canadian Government would like to have it for the purpose of distributing Canadian goods. Then came the turn of the United States Government, and Mr. Hubbard, the Managing Director of the Siberian Supply Company, proceeded to Washington to talk the matter over with the War Trade Board. All to no avail.

The Siberian Supply Company is now in process of liquidation as an agency of His Majesty's Government, and arrangements are being made to terminate as soon as possible the Board of Trade's agreement with Mr. Leslie Urquhart of the 18th September.

In spite of the criticisms that have been levelled at it and its rather inglorious end, the company's services must not be underrated. It has been instrumental in purchasing and despatching to Vladivostock during the course of the present year goods (chiefly textiles) to the value of approximately £280,000, and by an agreement concluded last July between the company and the Union of Siberian Creamery Association[s] £200,000 worth of these goods, sold to the Union, will be distributed by the latter amongst the population.

IV

(E) THE AIMS OF JAPAN IN SIBERIA

The designs of Japan on the Far Eastern continent have long been the subject of discussion: but we are no nearer finding out the real Japanese objective.

We have latterly conceded to Japan the German Pacific Islands, but although she thereby acquired considerable war gains at a relatively low price, they have brought her up against the barrier of the Equator, which obstructs irrevocably her advance south and confines her once more within a definite space. The concession, therefore, cuts both ways; and, if we have made an unpleasant virtue of necessity, Japan has, as far as her southward Pacific penetration is concerned, come up against an almost equally unpleasant condition of finality. Accordingly she has now only two possible fields of expansion left: either the Philippines and the Dutch Islands or the Far Eastern continent.

Japan is the country *par excellence* where *Realpolitik* is the only consideration in foreign policy. She owes her present position in the world entirely to this

country for having kept the ring during the Russo-Japanese war. We slighted her, it is true, in August 1914,²² but the balance still remained in our favour. Yet she failed us, and above all she failed Russia, when, at a grave moment in the latter's history, she denied help. She courted the Germans secretly during 1916. The Japanese General Staff thought they were going to win; a section of Japanese opinion hoped they would.

In the middle of all this, July 1916, she all of a sudden signed a treaty with Russia,²³ which perhaps was primarily a reinsurance treaty against a German *revanche* in the event of a German victory. Incidentally she obtained from Russia sixty miles of Manchurian railway. But, if the ultimate effect of the treaty was obscure, one practical result was bound to ensue, namely, that Russia would proportionately disinterest herself in the Far East as the main objective of her policy. The Russo-Japanese Treaty, read in connection with the Constantinople Agreement,²⁴ could hardly indicate other than the swing of the Russian political pendulum from east to west. This would amount to a further consolidation of the Japanese position on the Far Eastern continent, and, unless Russia subsequently acquired fresh strength and redirected her activities into their former channels, the equilibrium was to that extent modified in Japan's favour.

This, of course, is now back history, but it is of interest as showing that already three years ago Japan had embarked on a Russian policy of her own. Her plans were evidently already laid when a year later the Bolshevik revolution broke out in Russia. Viscount Motono²⁵ at once declared that he could not remain indifferent to an outbreak of disorder in Siberia.

But we straightway pursued towards her a policy almost equivalent in effect to that of August and September 1914. In those days, having asked for her assistance, we hesitated over the limits within which we should allow her to give it. Japanese action should not, we insisted, extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory except that in German occupation on the Asiatic continent. Our procedure was dictated, no doubt, by Imperial considerations, on the assumption that the war would not assume such proportions as to absorb all British energy into the west, and lead to an indefinite condition of impotence in the Far East. Yet little more than a year later we were begging her to send her troops to Russia and her ships to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

A month after the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution the Japanese Government informed us that they were very anxious about the situation at Vladivostock, that the Bolsheviks were gaining in power there, and that Japan had great interests in that part of the world. They were told at once

²² See below.

²³ The text of this treaty of July 3, 1916, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers* (1916), vol. cx, pp. 922-3.

²⁴ For the secret Constantinople Agreement of March 1915 between Great Britain, France, and Russia, cf. H. W. V. Temperley: *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi (1924), pp. 4-9.

²⁵ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1916-18.

that if it became necessary to land a force for their protection, it was very desirable to avoid, as far as possible, any appearance of invasion, and that only a very small force should be landed, if possible, in concert with the Americans. Two months later we decided to invite Japan to act as the mandatory of the Powers in Siberia, and four months after that we were urging the despatch of a large Japanese army as far as Cheliabinsk, and, if possible, beyond the Urals into European Russia (see D (i)).

Small wonder, then, perhaps that the Japanese, feeling themselves required to act in full unison with the Western Powers only when it suited the latter's interests, felt free to confine themselves wholly to their own. No doubt it was inexpedient that the Japanese should take solitary action in Siberia, but the reminder by us that this was our view was bound to create the same slight and breed the same suspicion as three years before.

But there are equally many reasons for believing that our apprehensions in the matter were justified. The Japanese accompanied their entry into Siberia with the usual proclamation of disinterestedness. The proclamation affirmed the constant desire of Japan to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people, and reaffirmed her avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. It further declared that upon the realisation of the objects indicated, the Japanese troops would immediately withdraw from Russian territory, and leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether military or political. Nevertheless a self-seeking and obstructive attitude on the part of the Japanese became evident at once. Their first action on arrival in Vladivostock and in Khabarovsk was to occupy high-handedly a huge number of public and private buildings at enormous cost without any reference to the Russian authorities and regardless of the fact that they would be required by the Russian units when they proceeded to start forward. The Amur steamers they seized as prizes of war. Their progress through the country was marked by utter contempt of the population, and they proceeded to occupy pacified territory in the rear with a force five times stronger than was required, while doing nothing to help the half-armed and half-clothed Russians and Czechs to fight. The immediate impression created was that they were endeavouring by every means in their power to prevent the establishment of a strong Central Government with a single army, and their behaviour was generally described as that of a people who intend to annex what they have occupied. It must not, however, be forgotten that military occupation even in a friendly area is inclined to be uncompromising, and even General Poole treated Archangel and the surrounding territories as a conquered country.

Side by side with this, a strong anti-Ally spirit was prevalent. The *mot d'ordre* through the army was reported even to be actively pro-German, and there were individual instances of officers stating openly that Japan had no intention of fighting against Germany, that the Japanese did not consider the Germans as enemies, and were under no circumstances going beyond Irkutsk, and that in the very near future Japan and Germany would be one.

But it was in their dealings with Kolchak and his Government that their lack of harmony with their Allies was to prove most inconvenient, and to arouse the greatest suspicion of their motives.

Semenoff had in the days before intervention been a sufficiently active anti-Bolshevik element to attract assistance from both Great Britain, France, and Japan. There was no Government and no organisation in Siberia with interests to consider, and the employment of irregular forces was unobjectionable from a wider standpoint. When, however, Kolchak assumed the reins of Government, the need for unity behind the lines and for the co-operation of the Allies in helping Kolchak to establish it clearly outweighed every other consideration. Yet the Japanese deliberately obstructed. Over and over again we have asked them to come into line and not to support the free-lances, Semenoff, Kalmikoff, Horvat, and their like, who were doing nothing but make Kolchak's task of reorganisation almost impossible, especially by perpetually raiding the Siberian railways and otherwise endangering his lines of communications. What other object could they have but the pursuit of an individual interest to the detriment of an orderly Government in Siberia, or possibly with that very purpose in mind?

On the 13th June of this year China tore up her treaties with Russia, and General Hsü Shu-cheng advanced with a Japanese-equipped force, financed, it is believed, out of a Japanese loan, into Outer Mongolia with the ostensible object of reasserting Chinese authority. At the same time there was a remarkable increase in the numbers of Japanese at Kalgan and Urga. Simultaneously Semenoff produced a scheme for Mongolian independence. The incident in itself may be of subsidiary importance. But a few months before Semenoff had been dismissed by Admiral Kolchak, who had despatched troops to Chita, where he was at the time, to see that the order was carried out. It was Japanese support alone that saved him, and he was made to feel that he owed his position to Japan.

This is an illustration of what the Japanese have done, and it could be easily multiplied. Nor have they during this Semenoff period been inactive in other directions. Kolchak himself reported early this year that they were carrying on an influential propaganda among the reactionary elements at his headquarters, promising an effective campaign against the Bolsheviki in European Russia and a restoration of traffic in return for mining rights in Eastern Siberia; while at the same time that they supplied Kolchak with rifles they withheld the ammunition, without which of course they were useless.

The signature of the armistice between the Allies and the Germans came as an undoubted shock to the Japanese military party, who had counted first on a German victory and then on a stalemate. Possibly it modified, if it did not reverse, the orientation in their Siberian policy. At least their behaviour towards their British Allies changed from arrogance to courtesy. Gradually they showed signs of rallying to Kolchak's Government, and actually in May of this year they proposed its recognition by the Allies.²⁶

²⁶ See No. 223.

During this time, however, they acquired sole control of the railway from Changchung to Harbin, of the whole of the Amur railway from Khabarovsk, and of a portion of the Ussuri Railway; and though Article 5 of the Railway Agreement provides that the scheme by which they acquire this control 'shall cease to be operative upon the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Siberia, and all the foreign railway experts appointed under this arrangement shall then be recalled forthwith', yet who shall say that excuses will not be found for delaying evacuation? In effect the Japanese have acquired entire control of the railway from Korea to Harbin, as also of the Ussuri and Amur branches of the Siberian Railway, which they have not hitherto enjoyed. At least it was made worth their while to throw in their lot wholeheartedly with their Allies. This did not, however, prevent them from making simple and direct proposals to Kolchak himself for the cession of the northern half of Sakhalien and part of Kamchatka in return for the despatch of an army to Western Siberia—proposals which were clearly not accepted. But they did not for that lose touch with Semenoff, Kalmikoff, and the other Atamans, to whom they continued to supply arms and ammunition, and when, after a temporary disorder at Vladivostock, Rozanoff, another Ataman, gained the upper hand, they hailed his success as a Japanese triumph. In general, their argument in meeting remonstrances seems to be that the Allies have no exclusive obligations to Kolchak so long as his Government remains unrecognised, and that the Atamans are Russian commanders nominally acting as his subordinates, and have in any case the same legal position of possessing only *de facto* authority as the Admiral himself.

With the failure of Kolchak's offensive and his retreat to Irkutsk, the control of his Government has sensibly weakened, if it is not to collapse altogether. The immediate result has been a marked increase in the power of the Atamans. Semenoff has evidently thought the moment propitious to assert his power. He has possessed himself of a quantity of rifles intended for another destination, and stopped a consignment of the Omsk gold in transit eastward. He will possibly soon be the only solid anti-Bolshevist force in the country. If so, the Japanese will have played their cards well; they are already, indeed, reaping the fruits of their diplomacy. A Japanese syndicate has just been formed with a capital of 23,000,000 yen, of which the Japanese Government will provide 20,000,000, with the object, it is alleged, of acquiring from Semenoff all the forests and mines in the region between the River Argun and Lake Baikal.²⁷ At the same time Semenoff is raising

²⁷ This information had reached the Foreign Office as a report from H.M. Consul at Harbin transmitted by Sir J. Jordan in Peking telegram No. 565 of November 3, 1919 (received November 6). With reference to this report Mr. Alston stated in Tokyo telegram No. 469 of November 30 (received December 6) that 'careful enquiry has failed to substantiate suspicions at first (? entertained) and no evidence is forthcoming in support of report that Japanese syndicate is endeavouring to secure concessions (? from) Semenoff. It is, however, asserted that in the spring he made frequent unsuccessful attempts to borrow money in Japan. This may be origin of rumour.' Subsequently, in Peking dispatch No. 14 of January 10, 1920 (received March 1), Sir J. Jordan further reported that 'on receipt of Mr. Alston's telegram to Your Lordship No. 469 of November 30, I asked His Majesty's

an Asiatic division, numbering 4,000, composed of Mongolians and Chinese, and the Japanese, who are unable to increase the number of their own troops in Trans-Baikalia, are to provide him with sufficient equipment to enable him to raise his forces to 18,000. Besides this, his influence is steadily growing with the Cossacks and the reactionary elements, and it is suggested that he is aiming at complete independence, counting on Japanese support.

Finally, there are numerous reports that Rozanoff, with the support of Semenoff, has a project on foot for the formation of a Far Eastern State, and, though the Japanese have denied it, there is evidence that they are actively behind the project.

What are we to deduce out of all this tangle of intrigue and back-door diplomacy? The immediate purpose of it is certainly obscure. It has been frequently suggested from our authorities on the spot that the whole aim and object of the Japanese is to keep Siberia in a state of unrest, and so manufacture a possible excuse for their continued occupation of North Manchuria where 95 per cent. of their troops have remained. They admittedly want the eventual control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the reversion of the Russian rights in Manchuria and Mongolia. But is this all?

It is clear that, in spite of periodical fluctuations, at heart they have throughout desired the collapse of the Kolchak Government as serving their ends in some form or other. When that came in prospect in August last, they declared that the situation in Siberia was fast approaching a crisis for the Japanese Empire; that if the Government had to withdraw into the zone guarded by Japanese troops the latter would be compelled to fight the Bolshevik armies; and that, if the British, Americans, and Czechs were to withdraw, Japan would have to think out a definite policy independent of the Allies to be ready to meet future developments.

The Americans are convinced that under Japanese instigation Semenoff, Kalmikoff, and Rozanoff are working with the German-Russians of the old Consul at Harbin to furnish me with any further particulars in his possession as to the activities of the Japanese syndicate alleged to have been formed with the object of acquiring concessions for forests and mines in Trans-Baikalia.

'Mr. Sly reported last month that he had been assured by the Russian Consul General at Harbin that there was no doubt as to the existence of this project or as to the visit of Japanese representatives to Chita. Mr. Sly received a similar assurance from General Horvat, who added that the territory of Barga was included in the region affected and indicated the rivers Hailar, Han (both in Barga) and Onon as three areas in which operations were contemplated. Later, however, Mr. Sly reported on the authority of the Russian Consul General, that the project had failed owing to the exacting demands of the Japanese who desired to have certain reservations placed entirely at their disposal and under their complete control.

'I have now received a telegram from Mr. Sly referring again to this project, and reporting that Semenov had leased a large forest area near Lake Baikal to a Japanese named Mori for a period of 36 years.

'All accounts confirm that Semenov has been disposing of any property, moveable or immovable, on which he can lay his hands to any adventurers ready to take the risks involved. In the present disturbed state of Siberia it is unlikely that any concessions thus obtained will have much value unless they are subsequently strongly supported by the Government of the nationals concerned.'

régime towards the creation of an independent state comprising Siberia and Mongolia, and that this will lead to an eventual alliance between Japan, Russia, and Germany.

The first of these conclusions is possibly not unjustified, but it would not necessarily mean annexation. That is not the Japanese way—certainly not in the first instance; and it is believed that for climatic reasons the Japanese could never live in Siberia. There are two opinions as to the general policy of Japan in the Far East. The first is that Japan, in the capacity of a Far Eastern Prussia, has long been aiming at the military domination of China and a Pan-Asiatic programme fraught with evil consequences to India. There is much to support this view, for the famous demands of May 1915,²³ which we successfully blocked at the expense of our own popularity, would have involved a virtual Japanese military dictatorship over China. But the manifestations of a political programme, evidently with this end in view, have been due at great measure to the ebb and flow of the conflict between the military party in Japan and the more balanced and enlightened elements. The other opinion is that the real Japanese programme is substantially commercial. Japan, according to this theory, aims at herself developing the natural resources and so ultimately controlling the raw material of the Far East; at securing China in particular as a retail market for her manufactured goods to the greatest extent possible; and at ensuring that on the Far Eastern continent there shall grow up strong Japanese bulwarks against the West, and not as a menace to herself. In this case the integrity of China and the maintenance, within certain limitations, of the independent sovereignty of States on the Far Eastern continent becomes a cardinal point of Japanese policy, and partition and annexation will not figure in the programme. In theory and on paper the Western Powers and America will have nothing to complain of in the gradual development of this programme, and it will be nominally their own fault if they fail in the competition. But, in practice, if the precedent of Manchuria is followed, we may look forward to one encroachment after another on the policy of the open door—or, in better phraseology, equal opportunities will gradually disappear, and, as far as we are concerned, the predominance of British trade will proportionately decline.

The prospect of a German-Russian-Japanese alliance has become a familiar bogey: but, for the present, it may merely be a natural but unfounded apprehension. Nevertheless, we are confronted with a situation in which two predatory Powers at the extreme ends of Russia are credited with designs on her integrity: and the presence of numerous Japanese agents in Esthonia and Latvia might easily be interpreted as a subterranean conspiracy between the two. Every other Power is avowedly and admittedly disinterested. But every Japanese is born and bred with ideas of aggressive patriotism, of his superiority to foreigners, of his national call to head a revival of the neighbouring brown and yellow races. His success in the Russo-Japanese War made these ideas a practical and living force in the national life. His training, military and

²³ For the twenty-one demands made by Japan upon China early in 1915, see H. W. V. Temperley: *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 631 f.

commercial, is on German lines, and his character appears naturally to assimilate German methods of organisation and discipline. Not only is he aggressively patriotic, but he is nationally aggressive, individually truculent, fundamentally deceitful, imbued with the idea that he is under an obligation to impose his own particular form of *Kultur* on his neighbours. It is impossible to disregard the fact that Japan has not got equal opportunities in the world generally, for her people are virtually excluded from Australia, Africa, North and South America, and even part of Asia. The question is, are we going to draw a tight circle round her activities, or are we going to allow her latitude for ostensibly legitimate operations outside her appointed sphere? It may be said that she must expand somewhere. If so, is there any grave objection to her expansion taking place in the wide, undeveloped territories which lie at her door—Manchuria, Mongolia, Sakhalien, and Eastern Siberia?²⁹ At any rate, we have at all costs to prevent such expansion from being effected in patent opposition to us, and not by a combination which would mean the most formidable menace we have yet had to face.

²⁹ The question of permitting Japanese expansion in Siberia was raised by Lord Curzon at an Anglo-French meeting in London on December 13, 1919: see Vol. II, No. 59.

No. 614

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received December 21)
No. 1756 Telegraphic [163890/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, December 20, 1919

Following from Mr. O'Grady. Begins:—

I was glad to receive your telegram No. 1584¹ stating concessions, outside my original instructions, which you are willing to make to secure repatriation of British subjects.

Proposals made by M. Litvinof were those forwarded to you in form in which he drafted them, with my letter of 8th December, and they were summarised in my telegram of 6th December.² He did not subsequently make any modification of them. In issuing communiqué to press he endeavoured so to state them as to minimise fundamental differences that had arisen in order to attempt to gain tactical points. Nevertheless, after careful comparison I do not see that there is any substantial difference between statement of four points in which you summarise his communiqué and his formal proposals which I had communicated to you. Main difference I can detect is that, owing to less precise wording of communiqué, an interpretation regarding stage of proceedings at which our prisoners of war and civilians would be repatriated might be placed upon your four points in the sense of my counter-proposals, which I indicated in my telegram of 6th December and forwarded in full with my letter of 8th December. Moreover, it was clearly impossible for me to consider any proposals from M. Litvinof on line of your four points, or even on line of my counter-proposals in view of explicit statement made in your telegram No. 1539,³ that a definite refusal should be

¹ No. 608.

² No. 592.

³ No. 581.

made by me to admit that exchange of British subjects for Russians can be made to depend upon any arrangement for repatriation of Russians from Germany, Murmansk, or elsewhere outside British jurisdiction and of its repetition with additional emphasis in phrase used in your telegram No. 1566⁴ that 'His Majesty's Government are quite unable to entertain introduction into negotiations of Russians outside our jurisdiction'.

Immediately on receiving your telegram I had personal interview with M. Litvinof. He has agreed to resume negotiations on basis of four points, and I am reopening discussion with him on these lines this afternoon.

⁴ No. 604.

No. 615

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)

No. 141 Telegraphic [162638/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 20, 1919*

Your telegram No. 195¹ (of December 11 [10]).

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me recently² that he had been approached by Azerbaijan delegation at Paris with a view to his adopting a policy aiming at the eventual union of the Azerbaijan Republic with Persia.

His Highness handed me a paper which he declared represented the political desires of the Azerbaijan Delegation at Paris of which following is a précis:—

Azerbaijan:

1. To be definitely separated from Russia whatever Government be established in that country;
2. To be recognised as a free and independent Republic with Baku as its capital;
3. To be joined to Persia under Confederation to be agreed upon by both Governments and approved by Parliaments, foreign relations of both States being unified;
4. For above purposes Azerbaijan desires help of Great Britain for establishment and maintenance of her independence, etc., on lines similar to that accorded to Persia.

His Highness claims that the Ittihad party³ is in favour of a Persian policy while the Musavat⁴ inclines to the Young Turks, though an important section of the latter party is wavering and might be brought into the pro-Persian orbit. He is apparently in communication with the leader of the Ittihad party at Baku through Teheran and the Persian Consul at Baku. He represents strongly the danger to both Persia and Great Britain of allowing

¹ No. 600.

² The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Firuz Mirza, had recently visited London and had conferred with Lord Curzon.

³ i.e. Freedom Party.

⁴ i.e. Equality Party.

the pro-Turkish party to gain permanent ascendancy in Azerbaijan and practically asks for our support of a policy aiming at little less than the eventual incorporation of Azerbaijan in the Persian Empire.

I have not encouraged him beyond giving a general assurance that we should favour the establishment of good relations between the two countries and offering to instruct you to assure the Azerbaijan authorities that any strengthening of the bonds between them would give satisfaction to His Majesty's Government. His Highness is not satisfied with this offer and asks for a more explicit assurance of support of his policy.

Is there any ground for supposing that the movement has any strong local support or that the initiative really came from the Azerbaijan Delegation in Paris?

Please repeat to Teheran.

No. 616

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received December 23)

No. 217 Telegraphic [164662/1015/58]

TIFLIS, December 21, 1919

Azerbaijan Prime Minister December 19th asked Persian Commission whether it would be possible for my representative at Baku to be present at negotiations there between Persia and Azerbaijan, chiefly referring to rectification of frontiers and proposed confederation of Persia and Azerbaijan.

Colonel Stokes asks whether he should accept invitation if given. Negotiations are on the point of beginning.

Subject to Your Lordship's opinion I am inclined to answer in the negative.

Persian Commission would probably in any case give us full information of what passed and presence of our representative might commit us even if he preserved attitude of mere listener which would be difficult.

I should be grateful for early reply.¹

Sent to Foreign Office No. 217, Teheran No. 11, Constantinople 72.

¹ Foreign Office telegram No. 147 of December 27, 1919, to Tiflis stated in reply: 'I agree with you that it is undesirable that your representative should attend the negotiations.'

No. 617

Mr. Alston (Tokyo) to Earl Curzon (Received December 22)

No. 508 Telegraphic [164280/11/57]

TOKYO, December 21, 1919

Vladivostok telegram No. 1005.¹

French Ambassador informs me that Minister for Foreign Affairs has received telegram from Japanese Ambassador at Irkutsk stating that unless 2,000 Japanese troops are sent there town will fall into hands of Bolsheviks. Japanese Government are prepared to despatch these troops at once if step

¹ No. 611.

is approved by Powers, more especially by United States, who are no longer concerned, and whom they are consulting.

United States Ambassador thinks this is being done at Washington, as he has not been approached.

No. 618

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)

No. 142 Telegraphic [163512/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 22, 1919*

Foreign Office and War Office regard with serious concern present strained relations prevailing between Georgia and the Volunteer Army, the continuance of which may endanger the whole peace of Transcaucasia besides compromising the success of General Denikin's operations against the Bolsheviks, to which peaceful conditions in his rear are essential.

2. Without endeavouring to determine the responsibility for the present situation or entering upon any discussion on the rights and wrongs of the past, you should endeavour, in conjunction with General Holman, to bring about a settlement between the two parties on the following basis:—

- (1) The Georgians shall retire to the Bzyb;
- (2) British control officers (to be nominated by General Holman in consultation with you) shall be placed in the Gagri zone to prevent any infringement of the terms arranged;
- (3) Georgian vessel *Chorok* shall be released by Denikin;
- (4) Denikin shall abandon all economic measures directed specifically against Georgia or Transcaucasia;
- (5) Georgia shall undertake not to proceed with expulsion of Russian nationals from her territory.

3. I hope and consider that the above conditions will afford fair basis for a settlement. In order to increase chances of success and ensure co-operation you should take earliest possible opportunity of meeting General Holman and of discussing this proposal with him before approaching the Georgian Government. War Office are telegraphing him similar instructions, instructing him also to lay the whole situation before Mr. Mackinder on the latter's arrival.

This should not, however, be awaited.

No. 619

Memorandum by Mr. Hoare

[168207/43654/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 22, 1919*

The policy of His Majesty's Government as stated by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on November 17th¹ is a pure negation:—'no further expenditure, no blockade, no negotiations with the Bolsheviks'. At

¹ This speech by Mr. Lloyd George upon the policy of H.M. Government in relation to developments in Russia is printed in *Parl. Debs. 5th Series. House of Commons*, vol. cxxi, col. 715 f.

the same time the Prime Minister expressed the fear that the civil war would last for a considerable time longer.

It is difficult to see how a policy of 'no blockade' and 'no negotiations' can be carried out unless the Germans are to be given an immense opportunity of establishing trade connections with Russia without any British competition. There is every reason to believe that there are in North Russia very considerable quantities of commodities such as flax and timber and the Bolsheviks will certainly place no obstacles in the way of traders who are prepared to give manufactured goods and food in exchange. The profits of foreign importers will be very great and the political advantage of being first in the field is of even greater importance. But if we allow British merchants to trade with Bolshevik-controlled Russia, we shall gradually drift into haphazard relations with the Soviet Government, and the uncertainty of the position will be used by the latter and by extremists in England to foment class war.

It is not easy to write briefly about the question of our Russian policy. The question is a very speculative one and past events are viewed from different standpoints and are invoked to justify diametrically opposite conclusions.

British statesmen and public servants (whether soldiers or civilians) who have been directly concerned with Russian affairs may conveniently be divided into two categories (*a*) those who at one time believed that very little outside help would be sufficient to enable the Whites to overthrow the Bolsheviks, (*b*) those who feared that partial intervention would do more harm than good. Category (*b*) has proved to be right but His Majesty's Government have not yet drawn the full logical conclusions. They have decided to stop intervention but they hesitate to go further and treat the Soviet Government as one of the *de facto* authorities in Russia. They admit their inability to make war and at the same time they refuse even to consider peace proposals.

It is logical (though not necessarily correct) to assume that this ambiguous policy is due to the fact that category (*a*) still exercises a strong influence on our Russian policy in spite of the fact that events have proved it to be wrong.

If this assumption is correct it means that the hope is still entertained that the Bolsheviks may be overthrown in Russia by force of arms. But an unprejudiced review of the events of the past year, our knowledge of the character of the officer class which forms the backbone of the White forces and a comparison of the resources controlled by the opposing sides make it utterly impossible to hope anything of the sort. There are reasons for asserting that the Bolsheviks have an advantage even in moral.

At the best Denikin will succeed in maintaining himself, at the worse the Bolsheviks will win the war in the course of next summer.

We have two main interests in the Russian problem: (1) the early establishment of stable conditions and the renewal of trade; (2) to ensure that whatever the future of Russia may be, Bolshevism shall not hurt us.

A continuation of our negative policy will not advance either of these aims. The question remains whether there is at present any constructive—as opposed to negative—course of action open to us, and the answer to the

question necessarily depends on what view we take on the genesis and future of 'Bolshevism'. First, to define 'Bolshevism'—for our purposes and as existing in Russia to-day, it may be described as a military tyranny which aims at the overthrow of existing civilization by means of propaganda backed by force of arms.

As stated above there is every probability that in the course of next year Bolshevism will be established as the only Government in Russia. If that occurs, we may find ourselves compelled to fight Russia in defence of our Empire. The successful conduct of a great war depends mainly on the state of public opinion in the belligerent countries. At present it is difficult to see how public opinion could be roused to support a war with Bolshevism. There is undoubtedly a widespread feeling which may be summed up in the phrase: 'they have not been given a chance', while the Labour party take the point of view that, admitting Bolshevik practice in Russia to be brutal, the 'capitalist classes' which have enjoyed our support are very little better. Neither 'atrocities propaganda' as now conducted by *The Times* nor evidence of subversive Bolshevik activity in India, Egypt or elsewhere would suffice to convince the country as a whole that Bolshevism must be fought. If the fight is to come we require both the conviction of our own people that it was inevitable and, so far as possible, the active or passive support of the Russian people.

The only means of obtaining these two results seems to be first to endeavour to mediate between the warring parties. Such an attempt would do much to win us the goodwill of the overwhelming majority of the Russian people, not one in 10,000 of whom wish for the victory of either Reds or Whites. Owing to recent Bolshevik successes the prospects of the attempt being successful are remote: their conditions might indeed amount to a claim to complete victory, while the Whites are probably not yet convinced that success is impossible and would consequently adopt the same attitude as at the time of the Prinkipo proposal.

The Bolsheviks would then probably renew their peace offers to which we could reply that while we were not prepared to consider anything of the nature of formal relations until we were satisfied that methods of terrorism had been abandoned we were ready to facilitate the resumption of business relations and we suggested that representatives of the principal co-operatives should proceed to Reval to determine in conjunction with representatives of British firms how trade could be restored. It would not be easy for the Bolshevik Government to refuse such an offer and its acceptance would be first step towards the establishment of informal relations if the Bolsheviks continued to be successful. It is only by getting a footing in Bolshevik Russia that we can convince the Russian people that we are their friends and, if war with Bolshevism is inevitable, convince our own people that Bolshevism has 'really had its chance' and that its existence side by side with European civilization is impossible.

On the other hand there is a real possibility that once the Bolsheviks have won the civil war, Bolshevism will die of inanition. It would never have conquered Russia but for the misery induced by isolation, wilful maladministration, hunger and defeat. Since then, Bolshevism has lived on violence

(before intervention took place in June 1917 Lenin is reported to have described his régime as 'a corpse with no one to bury it'), and when the pretext for violence furnished by the civil war and foreign hostility is removed, it is not impossible that Bolshevism will vanish away.

Whichever view is taken there seems to be much to gain and nothing to lose by establishing contact with those parts of Russia which are under Bolshevik tyranny.

Two other points appear to be worth advancing in favour of an active Russian policy: the first is that of the Japanese position in Siberia. So long as we maintain an attitude of uncompromising hostility to the Bolshevik Government, it is impossible to object to the presence in Siberia of a strong Japanese force. During the first three years of the war, there was a considerable amount of evidence that pan-Asiatic ideas were gaining favour in Japan, and they manifested themselves in a lively interest in the welfare of the seditious British Indians established in the Far East. The longer the Japanese remain in Siberia, the more difficult will it be to induce them to withdraw.

The other point is connected with the unfortunate fact that the question of our attitude towards Russia has become in a great measure a matter of party politics. The principle of continuity in foreign policy is in danger of being abandoned. The chances of a general election within the next year must be reckoned with and also the possibility that it may result in the establishment of a Government largely dependent on Labour support. Should that be the case and should no definite Russian policy have been adopted, it will become one of the main subjects of discussion and agitation. Such a result would be deplorable both because it would adversely affect the general situation in England and also because it would render it more difficult for the Government of the day to induce the French and other allied Governments to accept their Russian policy.

R. H. H[OARE]²

² This memorandum was minuted as follows by Lord Curzon:

'Mr. Hoare's description of the Prime Minister's speech on 17th November is quite erroneous. If he will read the speech in Hansard he will find that the Prime Minister said nothing of the kind.

'Mr. Hoare not unfairly says that our policy has been attended both with much grief and with lack of success. But I am not clear that his would be free from either of these vices.

'C. 31/12/19.'

No. 620

*Letter from M. Litvinov to Mr. O'Grady (Copenhagen)*¹

[166428/43654/38]

Dear Mr. O'Grady,

COPENHAGEN, December 22, 1919

I would like to avail myself of your present journey to London to report affairs to your Government to ask you to bear in mind certain aspects of the situation.

¹ This letter was brought to London by Mr. O'Grady and was transmitted to Lord Curzon on December 26, 1919.

You have, by now, no doubt convinced yourself that many of the difficulties cropping up during our negotiations have their root in the want of confidence between our respective Governments—a want of confidence natural considering the state of actual hostility existing.

Recent pronouncements made by Mr. Lloyd George would point to some change in the attitude of the British Government towards Soviet Russia, but by no means of a reassuring nature. In fact, these pronouncements have been contradictory, leaving considerable loopholes for the continuance of the present state of war. For instance, after having stated that the British Government has decided upon a policy of non-intervention in Russian affairs, Mr. Lloyd George went on to say that Great Britain will make no peace with Russia until a National Assembly has been convened. The present Russian Constitution is regarded by the bulk of the Russian people as the most democratic in the world, allowing an *active* participation in national affairs to a larger proportion of the population than is the case in any other country. When, therefore, another country demands the substitution of some other form of national representation for the Soviets, together with a threat that hostilities are to continue until this demand is conceded, it must be regarded as flagrant interference in Russian internal affairs, experience having taught us that nations are either at peace or at war with each other. Moreover, the very fact that Great Britain has given recognition and actual support to the self-appointed 'Governments' of Koltchak and Denikin, which had no form of popular representation whatever, deprives such a demand of any semblance of justification.

Supposing, however, the British Government to have actually decided to withdraw the military and naval support hitherto given to the forces fighting against Soviet Russia, there remains still the blockade, in which all neutral countries and Germany have recently been invited to participate. Those neutral Governments which have accepted this invitation have done so reluctantly and under pressure from the Allies. No mere declaration of the raising of the blockade by Great Britain would in itself be of any avail unless definite intimations are also given to the other countries that Great Britain no longer opposes their entering into commercial relations with Russia. The same applies also to the border States of Russia, which entertain the fear that if they make peace with Soviet Russia and allow it the use of their ports and the right of transit for goods, they themselves may be blockaded. And even if the blockade were fully raised, Soviet Russia would still be prevented from trading with the outer world unless her representatives had free access to other countries.

In citing the above details, I desire to impress upon you that a mere public declaration of the raising of the blockade would be of very little value to Russia. If it is really desired to allow Russia to work out her own salvation, to extricate herself from the economic ruin brought upon her by five and a half years of incessant warfare, *actual* peace must be established and normal relations resumed.

I need not dwell upon the advantages which would accrue to all countries

from renewed intercourse with Russia, but there is no getting away from the facts that Great Britain is in need of flax and other raw materials accumulating in Russia, and that Russia in her turn could absorb enormous quantities of British manufactured goods. The Soviet Government is disposed to consider favourably any suggestions on the part of British industry and finance for placing economic relations between the two countries on a sound basis.

From the point of view of the vital interests of both countries there should be no obstacle to the establishment of real peace, excepting the bogey of revolutionary propaganda. If formal guarantees from the Soviet Government on this point be considered insufficient, could not means of preventing this propaganda be devised without barring the way to mutual representation?

I trust that this short résumé of the situation may be helpful to you.

Yours sincerely,

MAXIM LITVINOF²

² This letter was minuted as follows by Lord Curzon:

'The letter is a direct invitation (1) to recognise the Soviet Government by entering into negotiation with it for peace; (2) to raise the blockade.

'As such, it lies outside the scope of Mr. O'Grady's instructions, and cannot be answered by him.

'C. December 28, 1919.'

(The original of this minute was sent to Mr. O'Grady. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.)

No. 621

Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received January 8, 1920)

No. 233 [168709/150931/38]

BUCHAREST, December 24, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that Mr. Mackinder, accompanied by General Keyes and his staff, arrived here on the 21st December, 1919.

The same morning M. Vaida¹ came to see me and I took the opportunity of presenting to him Mr. Mackinder and General Keyes. A conversation took place lasting two hours during the course of which Mr. Mackinder explained at length the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Russian question.

M. Vaida declared that he was in full agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Mackinder. He was of opinion that General Denikin must rid himself of reactionary influences and adopt a more progressive and democratic policy, especially in regard to the land question, if he wished to enlist the sympathies of the Russian people and thus save his cause, which was at present in danger of complete defeat. M. Vaida appeared to be somewhat sceptical as to the possibility of convincing General Denikin of these facts, but Mr. Mackinder explained that he was authorised to use very considerable

¹ M. Vaida-Voevod was Rumanian Prime Minister.

pressure to attain this end. Mr. Mackinder had said that Russia must be reorganised under either German or British influence. Roumania would naturally prefer to see the latter solution, as this would imply a democratic Russia free from imperialistic and aggressive designs.

M. Vaida sympathised with the wish of His Majesty's Government to see Poland and Roumania friendly to such a Russia, and there would be nothing to prevent this so far as concerned Roumania, provided the Bessarabian question were definitely decided in her favour. If this were done the Roumanian Government would at once do all in their power to assist Denikin. They would, for example, release all the remaining Russian arms and ammunition and facilitate the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war. M. Vaida hinted that he would be prepared to go even further in case of necessity. He referred to his proposal to cede to Bulgaria the Baltchik-Dobritch area in Southern Dobruja if Bessarabia were definitely attributed to Roumania. Mr. Mackinder, while taking note of this offer, abstained from holding out any hope of an immediate settlement of the Bessarabian question.

I have, &c.,

FRANK RATTIGAN

No. 622

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 4, 1920)

No. 237 Telegraphic [167584/1015/58]

TIFLIS, December 27, 1919

Your telegram No. 146¹ very mutilated.

Following is repetition of my telegram No. 218.¹ Begins.

'Secret.

'Situation in Transcaspia and its bearing on Transcaucasus causes me some anxiety.

'Bolsheviks evidently intend to take Krasnovodsk. They are sending numerous agents to Caucasus and Persia² with large funds, including forged

¹ Not printed. Foreign Office telegram No. 146 of December 25, 1919, had requested the repetition of certain passages in Tiflis telegram No. 218 of December 21 which had been received on December 24 in a mutilated text.

² In Tiflis telegram No. 234 of December 26, 1919 (received December 29), Mr. Wardrop had transmitted and endorsed a report from Colonel Stokes which stated in part:

'According to reliable information some 1,500 Bolsheviks from Georgia and Azerbaijan are being sent via Baku to Persia. First 500 are now leaving Baku in small boats for Lenkoran, whence they will enter Persia by land. Persian Commissioner at Baku has asked his Government to take precaution on frontier, and is also, I understand, suggesting that two armed ships flying Persian flag but with some British personnel be placed on Caspian to guard Persian littoral.

'Question of control over Caspian Sea in my opinion demands immediate consideration. 'Denikin's fleet is unsatisfactory, and is expected to join Bolsheviks if they take Krasnovodsk.'

In reply Foreign Office telegram No. 22 of January 10, 1920, to Tiflis stated:

'We concur with War Office in regarding the despatch of 1,500 Bolsheviks to Persia as

Bradburys,³ and are trying to buy over the Turkomans. He [*sic*] has seen their two leaders, who are co-operating with Volunteer Army, but inefficiency of latter and ill-treatment of troops have alienated their sympathy. They ask British support (? for their) claims of future independence, and declare they could form anti-Bolshevik barrier from Caspian to Merv threatening enemy's communications. He says His Majesty's Government refused four months ago to entertain proposals for British protectorate or small British mission, but thinks matter worthy of reconsideration in view of present danger to Persia and Caucasus.

'Saïid Zia Uddin considers threat to Persia serious, and says several commissaries at Askabad are Persians, and Bolsheviks are active in Persia. Colonel Stokes could get into touch with Turkomans through Saïid, Persian Commissioner in Baku, if authorised, and he has suggested present telegram as matter is urgent.

'Small vessels have resumed regular sailings from Baku to Enzeli and Krasnovodsk.

'I do not feel competent to express decided opinion on above, especially as I am not thoroughly aware of extent of Afghan activity in Central Asia. I could not go further than to submit that sending British Mission to Turkomans to enquire and report might have temporary good effect in Transcaspia.

'See my telegram No. 160 and your Lordship's reply No. 110.'⁴

Sent to Constantinople, No. 73 and Teheran No. 12.

highly dangerous and you should protest strongly to Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments against such a measure.

'His Majesty's Minister at Teheran is being instructed to urge Persian Government not to allow them to land.'

³ British Treasury notes.

⁴ Not printed.

No. 623

Mr. Leggett¹ (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received January 2, 1920)

No. 1020 Telegraphic [167168/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 28, 1919

Following from Irkutsk, No. 646 of 25th December:—

'Socialist revolution has occurred here and revolutionary troops hold station, communication between which and town is cut off.

'Presence of Czechs should prevent actual fighting and ensure safety of line.

'General Lochvitsky, personal representative at Irkutsk of Admiral Koltchak, telegraphed (? Admiral Koltchak) at Nijniudinsk, through General Janin, urging him to place gold in charge of Czechs in order to ensure its safety.

'At a meeting last night of all foreign representatives and General Janin it

¹ Temporary British Vice-Consul in Siberia.

was decided that it was essential to prevent gold falling into hands of Socialists, which would mean its eventual surrender to Bolsheviks.

'As there was no time to obtain sanction of our Governments, we agreed that gold should be sent through to Vladivostok as only safe place under Czech escort, and there placed under international control pending instructions from home.

'It was to be made clear that this step was in accordance with wish of admiral and that of M. Sazonof (who has recently been telegraphing in that sense to Koltchak Government), and that there is no intention of foreign compulsion.

'We decided that departure of foreign representatives from Irkutsk could not be long delayed, but that we should await developments before actually leaving.'

Repeated to Peking and Tokyo.

No. 624

Mr. Leggett (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received January 2, 1920)

No. 1022 Telegraphic [167229/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 29, 1919

Following from Lampson, Irkutsk, No. 651, of 27th December:—

'Irkutsk station and left bank of river, including railway, remains in hands of insurgents, town and right bank are in those of Government.

'We have had difficulty in preventing Government commandant from bombarding insurgents, whom they accuse of sheltering themselves behind Allied Missions and Czechs. They claim, and with reason, that delay in dealing with trouble gives their competitors time to gather force.

'Two delegates from Government placed their point of view before Allied representatives yesterday, and asked our advice.

'As for several reasons it was impossible for foreign missions to evacuate station, and thus allow Russian forces free action, and as interruption of working of railway would be disastrous from every point of view we decided that only solution was to neutralise railway zone from Krasnoyarsk to Miso-vaya (to which point American guard extends) by placing it under Czechs. Russian Government have accepted this proposal, and it will be put into force forthwith. Semenof, three of whose armoured trains are already in immediate vicinity of Irkutsk, has been asked to hold his hand in view of our negotiations for peaceful solution with Russian Government.

'Admiral Koltchak has addressed an insane telegram to Horvat and Semenof bidding them oppose passage eastwards of Czechs by force, destroying bridges if necessary. Fortunately relations between Semenof and Czechs are improving.'

Repeated to Tokyo and Harbin.

No. 625

Mr. Lowdon (Odessa) to Earl Curzon (Received December 30)

No. 90 Telegraphic [166155/143839/38]

ODESSA, December 29, 1919

My telegram No. 88,¹ December 28th.

(? Situation) unchanged. Panic continues but good order prevails in city. With concurrence of Captain, H.M.S. *Ceres*, I am assuring Russians that in case of necessity British will provide transport to take away all who are compromised with Bolsheviks.

Sent to Foreign Office. Repeated to Constantinople.

¹ Not printed. Mr. Lowdon had previously reported that the 'continued advance of Red Army which has now reached Jmerinka is causing serious panic in Odessa and there is great lack of confidence in Volunteer Army.'

No. 626

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 1541 Telegraphic [166120/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 29, 1919

As you are doubtless aware, we have for some time past been negotiating with Litvinof at Copenhagen through Mr. O'Grady, M.P., for the exchange of British prisoners of war and civilians in Russia. Mr. O'Grady is now in London, having come to discuss Litvinof's proposals more fully than could be done by telegram. The two conditions made by the Soviet Government on which the negotiations hang are:—

(1) The release of certain Soviet prisoners of war captured in North Russia and left in the hands of the Archangel Government when the Allied troops evacuated that area. This we foresee will involve considerable difficulty, as we do not know where these men are, or even if they are still alive. We are approaching M. Sabline, and (2) permission for the Soviet Government to have a representative of their own on the International Commission at Berlin for the purpose of controlling the repatriation of the Russian prisoners in Berlin. We have fully discussed this point with General Malcolm, who, apart from the political aspect of the question, sees no practical difficulty in meeting such a request, especially as the commission is not yet in existence. The object of the Soviet Government is, of course, to counteract the influence of Colonel Brandt. The only objection which could be raised is that such a step might foreshadow the ultimate recognition of the Soviet Government; we do not hold this view, as there does not appear to be any material difference between the appointment of a Soviet representative and that of a Koltchak-Denikin representative, as the latter's Government has not been recognised either. We feel, however, that the matter must be one for the Supreme Council, and you should raise the question at the first possible opportunity, pointing out that not only His Majesty's Government, but

nearly all other Governments are interested in securing the release of their nationals from Soviet Russia, and that the permission to a representative of the latter to have a voice in the disposal of the Russians in Germany is an absolute condition *sine qua non* of any exchange of prisoners.

The matter is of extreme urgency, as, if the negotiations at Copenhagen are further protracted, the chances of a successful settlement are bound to diminish and in the meantime the sufferings of the Allied prisoners in Russia will increase as the winter becomes more rigorous.

No. 627

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received January 1, 1920)
No. 522 Telegraphic [166815/40430/55]

WARSAW, December 31, 1919

Polish Government received a radiogram three days ago from Tchitcherin proposing peace on behalf of Soviet Republic and asking Poles to fix a date and place for a Conference with above end in view.

This proposal from Bolsheviks is rather embarrassing to Polish Government because, when they get to hear of it, parties of left are likely to do their (? utmost) to get Polish Government to make peace. Poles are now considering answer to be returned but do not propose to send immediate reply. Poles will undoubtedly decline Bolshevik overtures and question is what form their answer is to take having regard to peace party in Poland.

No. 628

Commander Smythies (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received January 1)
No. 115 Telegraphic [166850/67181/59]

REVAL, January 1, 1920

Military Convention between Esthonia and Bolshevik Russia concluded and signed Dorpat 31st December. Convention enacts that military operations between Esthonia and Russia cease 10 a.m., 3rd January, Reval time. Armies will continue to hold present positions. Actual ground dividing armies to be neutralised, and no communication to take place over this belt of any kind. Convention continues in force period of seven days, end of which time it will be automatically renewed if contracting parties mutually agree. Twenty-four hours' notice to be given before either contracting party renew military operations. Both sides mutually agree to abstain from regrouping of forces. Peace Conference will continue to sit and discuss all further details relating to Peace Treaty.

No. 115 addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Paris, Copenhagen, Helsingfors, Riga and Kowno.

*Earl Curzon to Lord Acton (Helsingfors)*¹
No. 749 Telegraphic [167089/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 1, 1920*

At the recent Anglo-French Conference in London during M. Clemenceau's visit² the following resolutions were agreed upon as regards Russia:—

1. Not to enter into any further commitments beyond what have already been promised, or, in the case of Siberia, may be decided upon between the Governments of the United States and Japan, as to furnishing assistance to anti-Bolshevik movements, whether in the form of troops, war material or financial aid; the anti-Bolsheviks to be free to purchase war materials in Allied countries; the Allies to be free to leave on the spot all political or other missions and Bolshevik Russia to be left, as it were, within a ring fence.

2. The conference considered that a strong Poland was in the interests of the Entente Powers. The question of the form and extent of the assistance to be given her for her defence was left for further consideration.

3. The conference agreed that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to summon any general conference of the representatives of the anti-Bolsheviks at the present time.

4. As regards the border communities with non-Russian populations which have been struggling for freedom and self-government, the Allies will give them such assistance in defending their liberties as may be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arises.

The above is communicated for your confidential information and for your guidance.

¹ This circular telegram was also sent to Warsaw as No. 463, Vladivostok as No. 676, Riga as No. 7, Tiflis as No. 5, and Rostov as No. 1 for Sir H. Mackinder (Mr. Mackinder received the honour of knighthood on January 1, 1920).

² For the proceedings of this conference see Vol. II, Chap. II.

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 6)
No. 3 Telegraphic [167947/1015/58]

TIFLIS, *January 3, 1920*

It would be prudent to consider possibility of complete collapse of Denikin at an early date.

This would immediately be followed by vigorous Bolshevik attack on Transcaucasus.

I suggest following action to protect our communications with Persia:—

We should endeavour to raise strong barrier in Transcaucasus.

Batoum requires at least a division of thoroughly equipped troops.

Civil administration should be strengthened by addition of trained civilians, and undesirable refugees should be expelled; present population includes numerous Bolshevik agents or sympathisers. Energetic measures should be

taken to supply food, for there will be no bread in a few days, and hunger riots are impending.

North Persian Force should be strengthened and fitted to assist Baku against Bolshevik attack, and to detach troops to North-West Persia and perhaps North-East Asiatic Turkey, to prevent ingress of C.U.P.¹ agitators and armed forces.

Two breech-blocks for guns at Baku should be at once available to make possible some resistance to a naval attack. Aircraft should be sent to Enzeli. Submarines could be sent in sections and put together in Baku. Transcaucasian Railway needs material long ago indented for. Some at least of Caspian flotilla should be taken over by our naval authorities.

Georgia and Azerbaijan, with encouragement from us, would make a good fight, but they need material and financial and moral support. Daghestan also could be induced to expel Nuri and Turks, who have made themselves very unpopular.

It would seem necessary from point of view of our interests to recognise *de facto* existence of Daghestan as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and promise support for their future claims of self-determination.

Unless some speedy action is taken there is a grave risk of the crushing of Transcaucasia by Bolsheviks, who will then work their will in Persia and Transcaspia and beyond.

Repeated to Constantinople, No. 3, and Mackinder, No. 2.

¹ The Committee of Union and Progress, the organ of the movement of the Young Turks.

No. 631

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 8)

No. 5 Telegraphic [168506/1015/58]

TIFLIS, January 6, 1920

My telegram No. 2.¹

Acting Prime Minister and Minister of War came to me to-night and spoke at length on present situation. On behalf of Government and people, they handed over to me a note, of which following is substance:—

Bolsheviks, having failed to upset Europe, have made agreement with Mussulmans to attack Great Britain. Both Turks and Bolsheviks have adopted this as a policy of despair. Lenin has taken Wilhelm's place.

Denikin's early collapse is probable, and Transcaucasus becomes the bridge which Great Britain must defend to prevent union of two hordes. It, and especially Georgia, is natural barrier separating two forces hostile to Allies.

At present, in consequence of impending advance of Red Army towards the Caucasus, the situation in Georgia becomes complicated. Without effective aid, Georgia, which is passing through painful economic crisis, will

¹ Not printed. In this telegram of January 3, 1920 (received January 5), Mr. Wardrop transmitted and supported an urgent request made by the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs for British assistance, especially in bread and cartridges.

be unable to resist attack from both north and south, and crushing of Georgia will have serious consequences for Allies, and especially for Great Britain. But if Allies help her, Georgia will have sufficient courage and strength to defend her frontiers.

Georgian Government therefore consider in its own interests that British Government should help Georgia in her struggle against men from south and north. They consider that it is essential for needs of present time that following effective aid should be granted:—

1. Recognition of independence.
2. Restitution of outlying parts of province of Batoum to Georgia, so that she may fortify southern frontier, which is quite unprotected, while British garrison, supported by British navy, hold port and vicinity as a naval base, in accordance with offer repeatedly made by Georgia.
3. Powerful aid in arms and ammunition, provisions and finance; most urgent needs are bread, cartridges, boots.

If such aid be given in time, it will rouse extraordinary outburst of enthusiasm and national energy, rendering quite feasible safeguarding of interests of Great Britain and Georgia, which are absolutely united at this historical moment.

But if, despite her interests, Great Britain denies this indispensable aid, Georgian people, being deprived of all hope of British support, may unwillingly be forced to some desperate course to save their existence.

I should most strongly impress His Majesty's Government of necessity of taking immediate steps to hold Transcaucasus against Bolsheviks and Turks. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have now Governments which I believe to be prepared to do their best to defend their frontiers against invasion, and if help be given without delay, there is reason to hope that defence would be successful.

I urgently beg that at an early date I may be enabled to give some encouraging message to Transcaucasian republics, and that I may remind your Lordship that it was only five days before fall of Batoum, 9th April, 1917 [? 1918], that Colonel Pike² was authorised to offer financial aid, which came too late.³

Repeated to Mackinder, No. 3, and Constantinople, No. 4.

² Colonel Pike was, in 1918, head of the British Military Mission at Tiflis. The local Transcaucasian administration received British financial support and encouragement against the advance of Turkish forces which, however, occupied Batoum in mid-April 1918.

³ In Tiflis telegram No. 11 of January 8, 1920 (received January 9), Mr. Wardrop further transmitted a report by Colonel Stokes of an interview which he had had on January 7 with the Azerbaijan Minister of Foreign Affairs who had given Colonel Stokes 'a copy of wireless message, dated Moscow, 2nd January, received at Baku, 6th January, from Norwcherin [Chicherin], addressed to Azerbaijan and Georgia, inviting them to attack Volunteer Army and then assist in giving it *coup de grâce*. He pointed out that successful advance of Bolsheviks on both sides Caspian Sea has brought Bolshevik danger to door of Transcaucasia, and Azerbaijan must decide very soon her policy towards Bolsheviks; indeed, in my opinion that decision may not improbably be taken out of hands of his Government by

Bolshevik revolt in Baku itself. He stated that his Government is entirely anti-Bolshevik, but if Great Britain will not come to its assistance it may be compelled to make terms with Bolsheviks.' Colonel Stokes considered that the 'Minister for Foreign Affairs did not overstate his case', and recommended the 'immediate grant of full independence and whole-hearted support of Azerbaijan, despatch of arms and equipment . . . and prompt payment of all sums due by us to Azerbaijan in connection with our military occupation. . . . In regard to question of recognition of independent Transcaucasian States, I wish to state my conviction that no promise of autonomy in any shape given by any existing Russian Government, even if guaranteed by Allies, will carry any weight. Policy advocated above may be regarded as drastic, but in my opinion half-measures would be of no avail, and delay would mean disaster.' Mr. Wardrop commented on this message: 'I entirely concur.'

No. 632

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received January 7)

No. 7 Telegraphic [168475/11/57]

PEKING, January 6, 1920

Following reports as to situation in Siberia received from His Majesty's consul at Harbin:—

Insurgents at Irkutsk have been reinforced by 9,000 fugitives from front with guns, machine guns and aeroplanes, and further reinforcements are continually arriving.

Semenof's forces have had to abandon area west of Chita, and position at Chita itself gives cause for anxiety. Immediate danger is rather of further risings along line east of Irkutsk¹ than of progress eastwards of Bolshevik forces from west.

Semenof is organising for his own defence strong detachment out of German prisoners in Trans-Baikalia, said to number about 3,000, under German General Hoffman. He has also asked for despatch of Japanese division to Irkutsk.

Telegraphic communication with Irkutsk still interrupted.

Repeated to Tokyo and Vladivostok.

¹ In Vladivostok telegram No. 5 of January 4, 1920 (received January 5), Mr. Leggett had transmitted the following report by Mr. Preston:

'As a mark of disapproval of present régime, strike was proclaimed on 3rd January by employees of all Government and public institutions. Strikers included all labourers in port, railway, tramways and electric-light stations. Proclamations were widely distributed, signed by central bureau of representative unions, deprecating action of Government in continuing civil war and murder of innocent people without proper trial, and stigmatising régime as one of generals and Atamans, who are kept in power against the will of the population by the bayonets of foreigners, to whom country is being sold. Allies are also treated to a hurricane of abuse in this proclamation, being described as world-wide marauders, who, under a pretence of charity and in spite of declarations of non-intervention, make most of Russians' unfortunate position to interfere with her internal affairs and rob her. This proclamation is typical of the feeling of the masses, and it seems that if violent attempts to overthrow Government are not made, it is only due to fear of foreign troops present (especially Japanese). Statement by military authorities that rioting in town would be put down by force prevented any taking place.

'So far I have no further reliable news of what is taking place between Irkutsk and Chita.'

No. 633

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 17 Telegraphic [167095/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 8, 1920*

Following for Mr. O'Grady:¹

Soviet representation on the International Commission at Berlin.²

Our proposals as formulated at our conferences last week were brought to the notice of the Supreme Council. As already explained by General Malcolm, it is improbable that this commission will ever come into being, owing to financial difficulties with the German Government.

Should this be the case, the German Government is unlikely to allow the Allies to have any say regarding maintenance and disposal of Russian prisoners in Germany, so that the question of Soviet representation in Berlin for this purpose would probably be one for German and Soviet Governments to arrange direct.

Should the commission, however, be set up, the Supreme Council considered the proposal to be one involving general political questions of first magnitude, and were therefore unable to give a reply, but suggested that the matter be dealt with at forthcoming meeting of Prime Ministers and foreign secretaries.

This is for your confidential information, and you should only inform Litvinof that the question is undecided, and will be referred to authorities higher than the Supreme Council.

¹ Mr. O'Grady had recently returned from London to Copenhagen.

² The information given below summarized Sir E. Crowe's telegram No. 1766 from Paris (not printed), dated January 1, 1920 (received January 2), in which, in reply to No. 626 above, he reported the relevant discussion in the Supreme Council on December 31, 1919. The official minute of this discussion is printed in Vol. II, No. 49.

No. 634

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received January 9)

No. 28 Telegraphic [169179/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, *January 8, 1920*

Following from Mr. O'Grady. (Begins.)

Russian Delegates Committee inform M. Litvinof that several Russian political refugees are imprisoned in England without any charge being preferred against them.

In view therefore of fact that representations made by M. Litvinof to his Government asking that any British subjects interned or undergoing imprisonment should be released where possible, have resulted in certain British women being set free, may I suggest any Russian prisoners should be released in accordance with terms of your telegram No. 1535?¹ M. Litvinof will ask his Government to supply names of these women through Mr. North.

¹ See No. 595.

The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received January 11)
No. 19 Telegraphic [169528/1015/58]

PARIS, January 10, 1920

Following from Lord Curzon¹:—

Supreme Council decided this morning, in reconstituting Inter-Allied Military Council at Versailles under the presidency of Marshal Foch, to refer to it anxious situation in Black Sea, Caucasus and North Persia, described in Wardrop's telegram No. 5² and Sir P. Cox's telegram No. 10,³ with a view of seeing whether any inter-Allied action is possible for settlement of situation.

Simultaneously I proposed to Council that *de facto* recognition should be given by Allied Powers to Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments, Armenia being omitted as falling within purview of Peace Treaty with Turkey. This proposition was carried unanimously with consent of French and Italian Governments,⁴ and you may announce it at once in case of Governments concerned.

At the same time, Secretary of State for India and I have agreed in consultation that military aspect of situation, which in main affects ourselves, should be considered at home.

We think meeting of Eastern Committee should be held on Monday⁵ under chairmanship of Lord Hardinge, at which responsible representatives of India Office, War Office and Admiralty should be present to discuss following points:—

1. Retention of British forces at Batoum.
2. Possibility of aid to Georgian forces.
3. Diversion to Caucasus of any balance of Denikin's 'packet.'
4. Protection of Baku in the event of Bolshevik menace from Krasnovodsk.
5. Recovery from Denikin of Caspian fleet and possible reconstitution of British marines, or in alternative, if this be impossible, destruction of Denikin's fleet.
6. Possible strengthening of advanced British force at Kazvin.

¹ Lord Curzon had accompanied Mr. Lloyd George to Paris for discussions between Allied Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs (cf. No. 633).

² No. 631.

³ Not printed. This telegram of January 6, 1920 (received January 7), from Teheran reported, in particular, that the 'capture or certainty of capture of Krasnovodsk [by the Red Army] has accentuated alarm here. Frontier officials are beginning to panic and Prime Minister now presses me to ask Your Lordship urgently for an announcement or indication of measures which His Majesty's Government are prepared to take, emphasising fact that Persia's danger is also our own, and that joint policy of two Governments cannot progress unless country is secured against being overrun by Bolshevism.' In reply Foreign Office telegram No. 11 of January 9 to Teheran stated that the matter was under Cabinet consideration.

⁴ The official minutes of these discussions in the Supreme Council are printed in Vol. II, Nos. 54 and 65.

⁵ January 12, 1920.

7. Despatch to Caucasus or Persia of aeroplanes from any other theatre of action.
8. Steps to be taken for watching or protecting Khorassan frontier.
9. Despatch of British officers to that quarter.
10. Strengthening and transferring to War Office of Anglo-Indian force at Meshed.
11. Prolongation of railway to Neh.

No. 636

The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received January 12)

No. 24 Telegraphic [169629/1015/58]

PARIS, January 10, 1920

My telegram of to-day.¹

Recognition of *de facto* independence of Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments does not of course involve any decision as to their present or future boundaries, and must not be held to prejudice that question in smallest degree.

LORD CURZON

¹ No. 635.

No. 637

Sir P. Cox (Teheran) to Earl Curzon (Received January 11)¹

No. 14 Telegraphic [169530/1015/58]

TEHERAN, January 11, 1920

My telegram No. 10² of 6th January.

Prime Minister is receiving from Persian Mission in Caucasus reports and views to much the same effect as those which are reaching His Majesty's Government from our representatives. These reports refer to primary desire of South Caucasian principalities to resist subjection to Bolshevism, and active inclination of Baku Government to enter into close relations with Persia with object of strengthening its position to that end.

In latter connection Prime Minister begs me to urge upon His Majesty's Government what an enormous advantage it would be to Persia and to British interests in Persian commerce and politics if independence of Azerbaijan Government could now be recognised and it were to place itself under friendly guidance of Great Britain and ally itself in some definite way with Persia. He emphasises that, should Great Britain or Allies in conference decide (as he hopes they will) to assist Caucasian principalities to hold the Batoum-Baku line and Caspian against Bolshevik aggression, the present moment is obviously most favourable for bringing about arrangement above indicated. Not only would it put an end to pan-Turanian idea of combining

¹ In this and subsequent telegrams addressed to Lord Curzon and received during his temporary absence in Paris, the date of receipt is that of receipt in the Foreign Office.

² See No. 635, note 3.

two Azerbaijan . . .³ under Turkish auspices, but it would also help to solve in a way favourable to Persia and Great Britain the future control of Southern Caspian.

In theory Prime Minister's arguments seem to point. . . .³ How far his proposals are compatible with our policy and practical necessities of present situation I must leave to wise consideration. . . .³

³ The text here is uncertain.

No. 638

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 14)
No. 20 Telegraphic [170159/1015/58]

TIFLIS, January 11, 1920

Following telegram from Colonel Stokes. (Begins.)

Azerbaijan Government ask if His Majesty's Government would authorise the sending of immediate help to Daghestan to prevent Bolshevik predominance.

I suggest withdrawal of Volunteer Army and affirmative answer to Azerbaijan request. Please instruct me urgently. (Ends.)

I am replying that question has been urgently referred to His Majesty's Government, and that meanwhile, though I cannot authorise crossing of lines, I see no objection to Azerbaijan taking immediate steps on frontier to prevent invasion of Bolsheviks, and give moral support against Bolsheviks pending your Lordship's answer.

(Sent to Mackinder, No. 9; Constantinople, No. 14; and Teheran, No. 9.)

No. 639

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
No. 26 Telegraphic [168506/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 12, 1920

Your telegrams Nos. 2, 3 and 5¹ (of January 3rd and 6th).

Questions of military and economic assistance are under consideration of the Cabinet.

¹ See Nos. 630 and 631.

No. 640

Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Derby (Paris)
No. 44 Telegraphic [169528/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 13, 1920

Your telegram No. 19¹.

Following for Lord Curzon:—

Eastern Committee meeting was held yesterday afternoon.

Chief Imperial General Staff said that War Office had been considering three alternative lines of defence against possible Bolshevik aggression:—

¹ No. 635.

(a) Constantinople, Batoum, Baku, Kraznovodsk, Merv. This would entail command of Black Sea and Caspian, two divisions in Caucasus, and five divisions from Kraznovodsk to Merv.

(b) Constantinople, Batoum, Baku, Enzeli, Teheran, Meshed. This would entail command of Black Sea, but not necessarily of whole of Caspian. Approximately same total of seven divisions would be required.

(c) Northern Palestine, Mosul. Some point about 100 or 50 miles from Khanikin. Meshed force, if attacked, to fall back upon Birjand. This was only alternative considered practicable by War Office, and even in this case it was not certain that we could retain Mosul or Meshed.

Figures for alternatives (a) and (b) were for British troops only. Co-operation of Allies would entail larger forces still, whose support and maintenance would become increasingly difficult as numbers increased. In any case War Office representatives were strongly of opinion that if there was to be any question of employment of considerable forces, even if only of two divisions, to hold the Batoum-Baku line, they would be more effectively employed in some such manner as an advance on Moscow through Poland with consequent heartening effect on anti-Bolshevik elements on all fronts, or in support of Denikin in Southern Russia.

Admiralty stipulated retention of Baku essential to command of Caspian, though existing stocks of oil at Enzeli might render maintenance of Caspian fleet possible for a limited time. They were prepared to control Caspian if Baku were held, and pointed out that opportunity was unlikely to recur.

Air Ministry could not contemplate provision of aircraft, as they were reluctant to release machines now available in Egypt and India.

Committee were of opinion that in view of our inability to find the force entailed in the holding of line (a) or (b), of the difficulties of reinforcing troops in areas south and east of Caspian, and of military argument that such a force would be more profitably employed in aggressive action elsewhere, it was inevitable that we should fall back on alternative (c).

At the same time it was not suggested that any immediate withdrawal should take place. It must first be established beyond question that there was no prospect of remnant of Denikin's force remaining in being as a screen against the Bolsheviks.

Committee suggest following reply to the eleven queries in your telegram:—

1. Troops to remain for time being at Batoum, but to be evacuated before they are forced into a position similar to that of the French at Odessa.

2. No military, naval or aerial assistance to the Georgian forces could be provided.

3. So long as Denikin remained in being, only such small part of his packet as could be regarded as diverted in his own interests by lessening the possibility of republics throwing in their lot with the Bolsheviks should be diverted to Caucasus. If he were to collapse altogether, supplies given to the republics would be merely a present to the Bolsheviks.

4. Protection of Baku could not be contemplated unless alternatives (a) or (b) were to be adopted.

5. Though Denikin would undoubtedly welcome return of British naval personnel to Caspian, this could not be done unless Baku were to be held. He would almost certainly not agree to the destruction of his fleet, nor could we well insist on such destruction.

6. Advanced British force at Qazvin to fall back when threatened, but not until forced to do so.

7. Despatch of aeroplanes impracticable.

8 and 9. General Malleon² to be asked whether he could make use of additional officers to watch the Khorassan frontier.

10. Strengthening of force at Meshed only desirable if alternatives (a) or (b) were adopted, in which case control should pass to War Office. In case of alternative (c) Malleon to fall back to Birjand if and when threatened. Transfer to War Office in this case unnecessary.

11. Prolongation of railway to Neh only justifiable if Malleon to be reinforced. If he is to fall back on Birjand it will not be required.

Full report follows by bag to-day.

² General Malleon was in command of a small British force based on Meshed.

No. 641

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 21)

No. 25 Telegraphic [172086/1015/58]

TIFLIS, January 13, 1920

Recognition roused great patriotic demonstration in Tiflis. Within an hour of announcement the city was flagged, traffic stopped, offices, shops and factories closed. Whole garrison with cavalry and artillery marched past my house cheering and then at Palace Prime Minister and I witnessed parade joined by Trade Unions and population of all classes. Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs made patriotic anti-Bolshevist and strongly pro-British speeches to enormous crowd. I received continuous ovations during day and was carried on shoulders of crowd to my motor car. City illuminated and great pro-British demonstration at opera followed by banquet with numerous pro-British speeches lasted from eleven p.m. yesterday till after four a.m. to-day. Reports from Azerbaijan state that uncompromising telegraphic reply has been sent to Bolsheviks declaring adherence to Allies and agreeing in tone with Georgian reply.¹ Both Governments harmoniously together and Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs expected here tomorrow. Armenians were somewhat uneasy at their inclusion in recognition² but it have allayed their fears (? but it has allayed their fears). Prime Minister arrived from Erivan this morning.

Sent Foreign Office No. 25, Constantinople No. 16, Mackinder No. 10, Teheran No. 12.

¹ Cf. No. 631, note 3.

² It appears from other evidence that a premature report as to Allied recognition *de facto* of the Armenian Government (cf. No. 635) was then circulating. For the subsequent conferment of this recognition see No. 655.

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received January 13)

Unnumbered. Telegraphic [170156/11/57]

PEKING, January 13, 1920

Following from Mr. Lampson, Chita, 11th January. Begins.

Following for Foreign Office. Confidential.

A new set of circumstances having arisen with fall of Admiral Koltchak¹ I venture to ask for some indication of future policy of His Majesty's Government in Siberia.

Allies came to this country with two objects, re-establishment of eastern front and saving of Czechs; at a later stage Allied policy developed into moral and material support of Admiral Koltchak, the one man showing evidence of sufficient capacity to cope with situation. But his task was rendered more difficult by the non-recognition of his Government by Powers and absence of financial assistance he so sorely needed.

With fall of Koltchak chaos again reigns and Bolshevism stretches unchallenged from Petrograd to Krasnoyarsk.

In Trans-Baikalia situation is little better. Semenov, whom I believe to be personally sincere, is surrounded by an entourage which he is unable to control. Countryside has been so harried by his troops and so many persons shot or flogged for alleged Bolshevik sympathies that a large proportion of population is disaffected. At Petrovski Zavod, through which I have just passed, a detachment of his troops had carried out about fifty summary executions which can only further exasperate the people and probably lead them to retaliatory attacks on railway line.

Without foreign military support it is only question of time until Semenov goes under.

In above conditions I submit further presence of Allies in Siberia can serve no useful purpose, it is indeed actively harmful in that it retards natural development of Russian people . . .² ultimate form of that development, we are now powerless to prevent it.

My Japanese, American and French colleagues fully share these views and state that they are addressing their Governments accordingly. Japanese further informs me confidentially, though he anticipates opposition in Japanese military circles, he proposes to request his Government to withdraw all Japanese forces from Trans-Baikalia.

Matters being as stated above it may seem to His Majesty's Government no longer necessary to maintain High Commissioner in Siberia. I understand that similar recommendation is being made by my colleagues to their respective Governments. In that event needs of situation would be met by appointment of a consul-general for all Siberia residing at Vladivostok (see

¹ For the fall of the régime of Admiral Kolchak see Nos. 648, 653, and 659.

² The text here is uncertain.

my telegram No. 615)³ with subordinate consular officers at such posts as might subsequently prove desirable.

In order to avoid danger of false deductions before His Majesty's Government have decided upon their future international policy I shall make only short stop at Chita and proceed forthwith to Harbin there to await your instructions. Ends.

Repeated to Tokyo.

³ Not printed.

No. 643

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 36 Telegraphic [168987/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 14, 1920*

Your telegram No. 36.¹

Following for Mr. O'Grady.

General Miller at Archangel is willing to meet our wishes regarding Soviet prisoners, and a list of those required by Litvinof has been sent to him for observations.

For your confidential information. We are still awaiting reply; as you will recollect there is some doubt as to the condition of these persons.

In return General Miller asks for the exchange of the ex-Commanding Officer Colonel Mikhaief, said to be seriously ill at Vologda, and other officers of the 5th regiment taken at Onega in July, on whose behalf he offered to negotiate two months ago with the Soviet Government who refused to do so. Please ascertain urgently from Litvinof what he proposes to do.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram of January 12, 1920 (received January 13), Mr. O'Grady inquired as to progress with regard to the question referred to under head (1) in No. 626 (cf. also paragraph 3 in No. 644).

No. 644

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received January 15)

Unnumbered. Telegraphic [170875/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, *January 14, 1920*

Following from O'Grady. (Begins.)

I have been unable to make any further progress since my return to Copenhagen. I therefore feel it my duty to submit following for your very earnest consideration.

1. From commencement of negotiations Litvinof has removed scope of discussions far beyond their original object arising out of previous telegraphic correspondence between British Government and Government of Soviet Russia by demands involving repatriation of Russian prisoners of war in Archangel Government, the East, Germany and neutral countries. Negotiations have therefore assumed international character. This tendency has

been further strengthened by requests proffered by certain Governments that I should be allowed to negotiate with Litvinof for repatriation of their nationals.

2. Possible concessions enumerated in your telegram No. 1584¹ were subsequently found to be dependant on international obligations into which we had entered with other Allied Powers with object of maintaining a blockade of Russia.

3. Immediate return of British prisoners of war depends on return of twenty-six prisoners at Archangel. Negotiations with Archangel Government seem likely to be protracted indefinitely and to involve new complications in the event of any of these persons being missing. Release of British nationals depends upon representation being given to Soviet Government on committee in Berlin dealing with repatriation of Russian prisoners of war.

Having regard to the fact that this committee has ceased to operate and that there is an idea of reconstituting it as international committee (? that) is likely to protract indefinitely negotiations which formed object of my mission here.

4. Execution of ton for ton agreement concluded by me with Litvinof for the purpose of relieving distress amongst British subjects in Russia² is dependent on approval of Supreme Council for export of Soviet property held in certain countries and of goods purchased, and to agreement of Governments of those countries to allow export of such property and goods upon conditions imposed by them as to release and succour of their own nationals in Soviet Russia.

I have throughout the course of the negotiations endeavoured to fulfil terms of my instructions, but it has become increasingly difficult to do so. Question of exchanging prisoners of war and of providing for repatriation of civilians has become merged in whole issue of a resumption of relationships between Western Europe and Soviet Russia, and initiation of these discussions has coincided with collapse of anti-Bolshevik armies and with growth of widespread desire among the peoples of Europe for a solution of Russian question which has come to be regarded as essential to re-establishment of normal economic conditions in western countries.

Having regard to these circumstances, and more especially in their relation to point 3, will you agree to raising blockade and make necessary representations to Supreme Council for achieving this object as soon as possible?³

¹ No. 608.

² See No. 604, note 2. (In exchange for the import into Soviet Russia of the British relief supplies, it was agreed that M. Litvinov should arrange for the import of ten tons of goods for Soviet use.)

³ For the decision of the Allied Supreme Council on January 16, 1920, with regard to the resumption of certain trading relations with the Russian people, see Vol. II, Nos. 71, 74, 76. In the light of this decision no official reply was sent to the above telegram but Mr. Harmsworth, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote privately to Mr. O'Grady on the matter. This letter was not filed.

No. 645

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
Unnumbered. Telegraphic [170159/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 15, 1920*

Your telegram No. 20¹ of 11th January.

Although whole question of assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan is still under consideration by Cabinet and Paris Supreme Council, I think it right to warn you that it is very doubtful whether any military assistance whatever will be given, or whether the sending of help to Daghestan can be 'authorised' in the sense of the Powers accepting responsibility for the consequences. You should therefore avoid giving any encouragement to the republics to take aggressive action against either Denikin or the Bolsheviks.

Please repeat to Teheran, Constantinople and Mr. Mackinder.

¹ No. 638.

No. 646

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received January 20)
No. 36 Telegraphic [172050/40430/55]

WARSAW, *January 17, 1920*

My telegram No. (? 6).¹

Prime Minister informed me today that Polish Government had sent an interim reply to Bolsheviks to the effect that they could not send definite answer to Bolshevik peace proposals until they had consulted Allies. Prime Minister said that this was a proof that Poles wished to do nothing in this matter without consulting Allies. He added that Poles would be most reluctant to make peace with Bolsheviks, but that choice lay between making peace (? and) prosecuting war to a successful conclusion. In order to achieve latter end it would be necessary for Allies to give Poles support in way of war and railway (? material). Government would also have to (? convince) nation and army that it was in interests of Poland to continue war.

He said that Polish Government were awaiting Mr. Patek's return² before (? settl)ing terms of their definite reply to Bolsheviks.

They expect Mr. Patek to be in possession of views of Allied Governments regarding Russian problem and Bolshevik (? peace) offer and should further deliberations be necessary in connection with reply to Bolshevik peace offer, he would propose that these should be conducted in consultation with Allied Ministers at Warsaw.

Referring to Helsingfors Conference³ Prime Minister said that whilst it will be of (? interest to) Polish Government to learn decisions come to, he

¹ Not printed. Cf. No. 627.

² M. Patek, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, had during the past month been visiting Paris and London. Cf. No. 664.

³ A conference of Baltic States, at which Poland was represented, was then in session at Helsingfors.

did not think that those decisions would affect Polish policy at present moment.

Prime Minister (? dwelt) at length on shocking conditions prevailing in localities on Eastern front recently occupied by Polish troops. At Proskurov Poles had found 4,000 cases of typhus. Prime Minister conveyed impression that prevalence of typhus would have to be borne in mind in connection with any possible military operations.

Sent to Helsingfors.

No. 647

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 19)
No. 31 Telegraphic [171843/1015/58]

TIFLIS, January 18, 1920

Your private and secret telegram unnumbered of 14th January.¹

Aggression of any kind on the part of Georgia and (? Azerbaijan) seems highly improbable. Both Governments have recently publicly declared their policy of absolute neutrality in Russian (? affairs). All they desire is aid to preserve that attitude. They both realise that Bolshevism is now a cloak for Russian imperialism, but Daghestan is less conscious of danger from that quarter and some encouraging utterance by His Majesty's Government with regard to North Caucasus would be very valuable at this critical moment.²

Sent to Teheran, No. 17; Constantinople, No. 21; and Mr. Mackinder, No. 13.

¹ The reference should be January 15, i.e. to No. 645.

² In reply Mr. Wardrop was asked in Foreign Office telegram No. 40 of January 21, 1919, to Tiflis: 'What do you suggest as the basis for the encouraging utterance which you desire His Majesty's Government to make to North Caucasus?'

No. 648

Mr. Leggett (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received January 24)
No. 13 Telegraphic [173283/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, January 18, 1920

Following received from Lampson, Verkhne-Udinsk, No. 5, of 7th January.

Government forces being on the point of defeat, on 2nd January deputation consisting of President of the Council, Minister of War and Assistant (? Minister of Communications) visited Allied representatives.

They communicated written concurrence of Russian Government in our proposed steps to secure safety of Koltchak and custody of gold—see my telegram No. 1.¹

President then reviewed whole history of failure of Koltchak Government from the time of the fall of Omsk in spite of (? their) honest attempt to save

¹ No. 653.

the situation. Communication (? with) Nijni-Udinsk being cut off he asked Allied representatives to send message from him to Admiral advising latter's immediate resignation. We agreed on condition that we acted simply as channel of communication.

His Excellency then enquired if, in view of desperate plight of Government troops, Allied forces were prepared to co-operate and then secure Irkutsk as base for future campaign against advancing Bolshevik menace.

Japanese and Czech representatives concurring, negative reply was returned.

Basing his action on above decision his Excellency then appealed to Allied representatives to intervene and obtain cessation of hostilities for twenty-four hours so that some (? arrangement with) revolutionaries might be reached.

Appeal was couched in such terms that it would have been impossible to reject it in any case, but more particularly in view of declared policy of Allied Governments of supporting Koltchak Government. We accordingly agreed to sound revolutionaries unofficially, and if replies were favourable offer our good offices for attainment of some arrangement.

Revolutionary leaders, to whom we made it clear that our action was solely actuated by humanitarian motives, at once agreed, and on night of 2nd January armistice of twenty-four hours, from midday 3rd January, was arranged.

Whole of 3rd January was passed in vain negotiations, Government showing complete inability to face facts and deal with the situation in practical manner. My colleagues and I were impressed by reasonable attitude of revolutionaries as opposed to that of Government delegates. During night 3rd January, revolutionary authorities agreed to extension of armistice for further twelve hours. On 4th January, at their own request, Council of Ministers met revolutionary leaders at station. Allied representatives confined themselves to expressing hope that goodwill would be shown by both sides and further bloodshed avoided. Both sides formally thanked us for our good offices, and we then withdrew.

Revolutionary leaders had earlier in afternoon declared that their determination to oppose . . .² Bolshevism, and had enquired whether they might rely on non-intervention of Allied troops against them in their struggle. Czech representatives having agreed we declared our conviction that, in the circumstances, our Governments would regard matter as one of internal Russian politics in which they would not intervene.

Relief of revolutionary leaders at . . .² participate in this reply was evident.

Later same evening Janin received telegram from Koltchak declaring his intention to resign, and begging for protection by Allied troops. Renewed instructions were at once telegraphed to Czech commandant at Nijni-Udinsk to take urgent steps for Admiral's protection, and for that of his immediate entourage.

Latest news last night was that practically all Government troops had gone over, and that Government's case was hopeless. Locomotive having at last been found through offices of Czechs, I left Irkutsk morning of 5th January.

² The text here is uncertain.

Result of last night's negotiations between contending parties was not then known, but can hardly have other than complete capitulation. American representative had already left in the afternoon on 3rd January, and Japanese and French representatives are following me to Chita, where we can consider the situation fully. It is fairly recorded that we have been all favourably impressed by Social Revolutionaries of Irkutsk, and their programme of democratic and representative government are idealists (? are) [*sic*] divided amongst themselves, and lack necessary resources and troops to hold out against Bolsheviks for any length of time. We must face prospect of extension of Bolshevik rule up to Lake Baikal. East of that Bolshevism is unlikely to get upper hand as long as Japanese troops remain. Semenov un(?aid)ed cannot control situation.

Please repeat to Tokyo, Peking and Harbin.

No. 649

Mr. O'Grady (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received January 23)
Unnumbered [172962/9/38]

My Lord,

COPENHAGEN, January 18, 1920

I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship's consideration, the text of a draft agreement for the exchange of prisoners of war and civilians which M. Litvinof is prepared to submit to his Government for approval.

The draft has been prepared in great haste, and therefore the wording may call for some revision. However, in view of my desire that your Lordship should receive this draft at the earliest possible moment I hope you will excuse it, as the King's Messenger is leaving in half an hour.

I have, &c.,

JAMES O'GRADY

ENCLOSURE IN No. 649

Basis for Agreement on a General Exchange of War Prisoners and Civilians

(Draft.)

(A.) The British and Soviet Governments agree immediately to exchange all prisoners of war in Soviet Russia and Great Britain respectively on the following terms:—

1. The British Government will repatriate all Russian prisoners of war in Great Britain, all Soviet prisoners of war and civilian officials taken by the British military forces when in supreme command of the forces operating against the Soviet forces in Northern Russia and now in the hands of the Archangel Government, including those mentioned in the list submitted by the Soviet Government.

2. Russians taken prisoner in the Caucasus, on the Caspian and in Persia, according to a list submitted by the Soviet Government.

3. The Soviet Government of Russia are desirous that all Soviet prisoners of war and military men escaped from Germany and from France to Den-

mark, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, who wish to return, shall be repatriated, the exchange to take place on the frontier at a place to be settled subsequently.

4. Should the Governments of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland not agree to these proposals or accept them only subject to conditions, the execution of the agreement shall not on this account be delayed.

(B.) The British Government agrees to render all possible assistance in sea transport if required for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war now interned in Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark.

The British Government will make representations to the Governments of the Baltic States of Russia to grant the necessary facilities for the free passage of the Russian prisoners of war and civilians repatriated under this agreement.

(C.) The British Government favour the claim of the Soviet Government for a representative on the commission now sitting in Berlin dealing with the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, and will make urgent representations to the Supreme Council that such claim shall be endorsed and ratified. The representative of Soviet Russia on this commission to have equal rights with other members of the commission. Those rights to include communication with the Soviet Government and the making of arrangements with the commission for the speedy repatriation of those Russian prisoners of war now in Germany who elect to be sent to Soviet Russia.

(D.) The British Government agree that all Russian civilians now resident in Great Britain, whether at liberty, interned, or in prison, having sympathies with Soviet Russia and willing to return to that country shall be immediately repatriated, the British Government providing transport facilities for that purpose.

(E.) The Soviet Government agrees to repatriate all British civilians who wish to leave Soviet Russia, including any who may be in prison, with such reasonable amount of personal belongings as is usual, subject to the regulations and decrees of Soviet Russia as to restrictions on the export of goods and valuables.

(F.) The terms of this agreement to be carried out by representatives of the British and Soviet Governments and, until the completion of the repatriation of Russians under this agreement, the Soviet representative will be given facilities to remain in Denmark or in some other country of Western Europe, the place of abode to be agreed upon between the British and Soviet Governments. The Soviet representative shall be given facilities for communicating with his Government by wireless and also with the Soviet representative on the commission in Germany dealing with the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war.

(G.) The fulfilment of the terms of these clauses and sub-sections of clauses of this agreement by the British Government will be dependant on the departure of the first batch of British civilians by the 15th February, 1920, and upon the completion of the repatriation of British civilians by the 15th March, 1920.

January 18, 1920.

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 43 Telegraphic [171166/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 19, 1920*

Your telegram No. 28¹ of 8th January.

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

Statement given in my telegram No. 1560² still hold[s] good.

No Russian political prisoners are imprisoned without charge. Those referred to in my telegram No. 1560² were serving definite sentences imposed by competent courts for various offences, and are not known to have any claim to be regarded as political refugees in any sense.

If Litvinof is not satisfied with this statement, you may inform him that we are quite ready to make further enquiries on receipt from him of fuller details including, if possible, the names of the 'political prisoners'.

¹ No. 634.

² No. 595.

No. 651

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received January 23)

No. 41 Telegraphic; by bag [172749/40430/55]

WARSAW, *January 19, 1920*

My telegram No. 36¹ of January 17th.

I think it right to submit to Your Lordship my opinion on the present position of Poland as affected by the collapse of General Denikin's army.

The military situation here has entirely changed since Mr. Mackinder passed through Warsaw.² As far as can be foreseen the Bolsheviks, when they think they have finished with General Denikin, will be free to attack Poland with the whole of their forces since it would appear that the Roumanian army is in a strong defensive position. This is not the case with the Polish army. The prospects of a Bolshevik offensive in the spring against Poland are no doubt being skilfully exploited by Bolshevik and, possibly, German propaganda in Poland itself. But it is a contingency with which to reckon. In my opinion it will anyhow not be possible for the Poles to continue for any appreciable length of time their present limited operations against the Bolsheviks. Although these operations are not costly in men, the expenditure involved is reacting unfavourably on the internal political situation and financial resources of the country and adding to its economic difficulties. The Polish Government are therefore faced, as they have pointed out, with the alternative of making peace now, when they can do so on advantageous terms, or, as they say, endeavouring to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion with the help of the Allies.

Unless I am mistaken the Poles, through either of the above courses, hope to achieve three main points: (1) a settlement of their eastern frontier com-

¹ No. 646.

² On his journey to South Russia. See No. 656.

bined with a solution of the Lithuanian and White Russian questions in a way which they would consider satisfactory to themselves, (2) immediate economic and financial relief and (3) the means of effectually controlling and checking Bolshevik propaganda in Poland.

On the other hand if the Poles continue their present limited operations without any definite objective, and without Allied support, even supposing the Bolsheviks were to allow them to retain the initiative in military matters, they risk eventual defeat supposing the Bolsheviks attack them with all their forces. They would then have to make peace on very unfavourable terms. The Prime Minister has said that if, on the return of M. Patek from Paris, further deliberations are necessary with regard to the terms of the definitive reply of the Polish Government to the Bolshevik peace offer, the Polish Government would wish to concert the terms of that reply with the Allied representatives. Whilst it is right that the Poles should keep the Allied Governments informed, through the Allied representatives here, of their decision with regard to the Bolshevik peace offer, it seems to me that the Poles wish to throw too much responsibility on the Allies in this matter, which, I think, ought to be determined principally by Poland's own interests. Having said this, however, I am convinced that the Prime Minister's intention is due to his confidence in one or two of the Allied Ministers here and is not solely dictated by a desire to shift the responsibility for a decision on to the Allied Governments. In anticipation of the Polish Government applying to me for advice with regard to the terms of their reply to the Bolshevik peace offer, I should be grateful if Your Lordship would telegraph whether you would approve my replying that this is a matter as to which the Poles should be principally guided by their own interests.

Authoritative statements recently made in the press that Poland is now the only barrier against Bolshevism, have forced this country into the limelight, and the Polish Government will no doubt take advantage of that fact.

The situation here is undoubtedly serious from every point of view. Prices are rising daily: meat is no longer within reach of the poor and economic conditions generally are favourable for the spread of Bolshevism. Typhus is spreading throughout the country. The value of the mark is steadily depreciating, nothing is being exported and the Poles are now in a vicious circle from which there are only two avenues of escape i.e., a settlement of one sort or another with the Bolsheviks and, eventually, the resumption of exports. But the Poles will only be able to begin exporting later on in the year when the economic situation should improve. If the plebiscites in the Teschen area and in Upper Silesia go in favour of the Poles their economic prospects will, of course, become much brighter.

I do not think that, in present circumstances, the Polish army by itself can finally dispose of the Bolsheviks although the Polish troops are infinitely superior to the Bolshevik troops. The Polish army might, in cooperation with the Roumanian army, bring the Bolsheviks to terms. The alternative is to remain on the defensive, but in order to maintain a successful defensive the Poles will undoubtedly require considerable support in the way of military

equipment and railway material so as to improve their communications at the front. They would also need to transfer all their troops from the Western to the Eastern front and would, in this connection, undoubtedly ask the Allies to guarantee them against molestation by the Germans or Czechs. The Polish Government are well aware of the critical situation of the country, and will not be slow to exploit this fact to the utmost in asking for Allied support.

Looking at the problem from a general point of view, it seems clear that if the Polish barrier against Bolshevism goes, the barrier will be shifted much further west and an opportunity will be given to latent Bolshevism in Czecho-Slovakia to join hands with Russian Bolshevism thereby creating a very serious state of things for Central Europe and the Western Powers.

To sum up, whilst I would strongly deprecate a Polish offensive against the Bolsheviks, if the Poles are to stand alone I am of opinion that everything should be done to assist them to withstand a Bolshevik offensive. The latter policy would necessarily tend to make the Poles more amenable in regard to the eventual settlement of their eastern frontier, and of the Lithuanian and White Russian questions. We should have a hold over them and be able to check any imperialistic tendencies.

It would be of interest to this Legation to be kept informed of any developments as between Roumania and the Bolsheviks.

No. 652

The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received January 21)
No. 68 Telegraphic [172322/1015/58]

PARIS, January 20, 1920

Following from Lord Curzon:—

'At meeting on Monday, 19th January, Supreme Council accepted principle of sending help to Transcaucasian States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in shape of arms, munitions of war and, if possible, food.¹ British and French General Staffs were instructed to consult as to means, and have telegraphed to General Milne to send an officer from Batoum to visit threatened States and report without delay as to their needs. Please instruct Wardrop and our other representatives in Caucasus to lend every possible aid to these enquiries.'

¹ The minute recording the discussion of this question in the Supreme Council is printed in Vol. II, No. 77.

No. 653

Mr. Leggett (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received January 24)
No. 21 Telegraphic [173359/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, January 20, 1920

Following from Lampson, Irkutsk, No. 1 of 2nd January. Begins.

'Our departure is still delayed by repeated breakages of line between frontier and Lake Baikal.

'On night of 31st December General Janin received from senior Czech officer at Nijni-Udinsk a telegram to the effect that on 1st January Koltchak would be summoned to resign and to hand over gold reserve to local revolutionary Government. General Janin asked for our guidance; he added that in the meantime a cordon of Czech troops was protecting Government train.

'In view of immediate danger threatening Koltchak on 1st January Allied representatives handed General Janin signed document to the effect that all possible measures must be taken to ensure Koltchak's personal safety. If Koltchak voluntarily handed himself over to protection of Allied troops he must obviously be protected at all costs, and his safe conduct to some place to be decided later by Allied Governments must be ensured.

'If admirals were not prepared to invoke protection of Allied troops, a situation might arise in which it would be difficult for Allied troops to decide their line of action, and question at once becomes one of internal Russian politics, in which case Allied troops could not be required to take military action. Even in that event they must, however, take all measures in their power to ensure Koltchak's personal safety by conciliatory methods. A copy of this paper was at once sent to Russian Government.

'As regards gold we have invited Russian Government to concert with us as to measures necessary for its safety. We have suggested that it be handed over to Commander-in-chief of Allied troops in the event of troops now guarding it being inadequate, and that it be conveyed under escort to Vladivostok where it will be kept until Allied Governments in agreement with representatives of Russian Government shall have come to a decision as to its ultimate destination.

'Meanwhile, in view of urgency of circumstances, General Janin has been authorised to take immediate steps that gold be retained intact, making it clear to all parties that our action is taken solely in the interests of Russian people . . .¹ to be transported under joint Russian and Allied protection, and if desired, local representatives to be allowed to accompany it as witnesses.

'At same meeting it was decided to notify Russian Government on our departure from Irkutsk that arrangement of 26th December by which control, &c., of line was with consent of Russian Government entrusted to Czechs (see my telegram No. 651²) having been broken by both sides, it was no longer possible to expect Czechs to enforce it, and that we therefore decline all further responsibility. Czechs would in future confine themselves to endeavouring to keeping line intact and preventing interruptions of traffic.

'In view of necessity of taking immediate action on questions as they presented themselves it has been impossible to refer home for instructions. I trust in the circumstances I may have your Lordship's approval.

'A composite battalion of Japanese troops have now reached Irkutsk and are quartered in the station. Their strict neutrality in present conflict will be guaranteed by Japanese authorities who will state that their presence is solely for protection of Japanese and Allied missions.'

Repeated to Tokyo, Peking.

¹ The text here is uncertain.

² No. 624.

No. 654

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Lampson (Harbin)

No. 3 Telegraphic [170156/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 21, 1920*

Your unnumbered telegram of January 11 from Chita¹ has been referred to the Conference at Paris, and instructions will be sent to you as soon as possible.

¹ No. 642.

No. 655

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)

No. 42 Telegraphic [172323/512/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 21, 1920*

Supreme Council at Paris has decided that Government of Armenia should be recognised as a *de facto* Government on condition that such recognition should in no way prejudice eventual settlement of frontiers.¹ It is of course understood that this decision is confined to Armenian State now existing with capital at Erivan and does not affect Turkish Armenia.

You should communicate this decision at once to the Armenian Government.

Please repeat to Constantinople, Teheran and Denmiss.

¹ The minute recording the discussion of this question in the Supreme Council on January 19, 1920, is printed in Vol. II, No. 77.

No. 656

Report by Sir H. Mackinder on the Situation in South Russia¹

No. 1 [176979/1089/38]

H.M.S. *Centaur*, off MARSEILLES, *January 21, 1920*

My Lord,

I beg leave to present to your Lordship my promised report on the situation in South Russia. I hope and believe that I am now in possession of all the larger facts essential to a judgment on the position. Undoubtedly I should have preferred to spend a few more weeks in the country before giving an opinion, but the time is critical, and I think that His Majesty's Government will desire to have my views at once, now that I see them in broad outline, since it is obvious that a policy should be adopted and decisions taken with as little delay as possible.

My Journey.

After interviews in London with all persons I could hear of with special knowledge of Russia, I left England on the 4th December and went to Paris.

¹ This report was circulated to the Cabinet by Lord Hardinge.

There I saw four members of the All-Russia Council—MM. Sazonof, Maklakof, and Savinkof, and Prince Lvof. I had seen the fifth member, M. Chaikovsky, in London. I also met M. Yaroshinsky,² and I had an interview with the Polish representative, M. Dmowsky. I had conversations with General Spear[s],³ Colonel Kish, Mr. Carr, and others. Brigadier-General Keyes joined me on the 8th December, and we left Paris on the 10th December and arrived at Warsaw on the 13th December, where I was entertained by our Minister, Sir Horace Rumbold. In company with Sir H. Rumbold and General Keyes I had a long and satisfactory interview with General Pilsudsky, the President of the Polish Republic, particulars of which have been given in telegrams from Sir Horace Rumbold (Appendix A). I had two long interviews with M. Paderewsky, and I talked with General Carton de Wiart, the Head of our Military Mission, and with Colonel Young, our representative at Kovno in Lithuania. I also had a conversation with Baron Ropp, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Petrograd, in regard to the present situation in Soviet Russia. I append a memorandum on this interesting conversation (Appendix C).

I left Warsaw on the 17th December in General Pilsudsky's railway saloon, a fortunate compliment paid to me, for the journey was very slow, the conditions were barbaric, and there were temperatures of 40 degrees of frost. I travelled through Lemberg and Czernovitz to Bucharest, where I arrived on the 21st December, and was the guest of Mr. Rattigan, our Chargé d'Affaires. There I had an interview with M. Vaida, the new Prime Minister. From what I learned, both from Mr. Rattigan and Mr. Madge, I came to the conclusion that an early change of Government was likely, and that it was not desirable to enter into serious discussions with merely interim Ministers. Mr. Madge informed me that he had had conversations both with M. Manu⁴ and General Averescu,⁵ which led him to believe that on the resumption of the sittings of the Roumanian Parliament at the end of January a strong Coalition Government would be formed. I therefore decided to proceed on my journey without delay. Before leaving I telegraphed to Constantinople to ask General Greenly, the Chief of our Military Mission at Bucharest, to await my arrival. I understood that General Greenly had left Bucharest with the object of visiting General Denikin, to try and arrange matters between the Roumanian and South Russian Governments. I felt that it was desirable that such questions should be reserved for consideration by me.

I left Bucharest on the 23rd December, and arrived at Sofia on the 24th. There I dined with General Baird, the Chief of our Military Mission, who took me to visit the King. I had a long conversation with His Majesty, who is a very intelligent young man, and popular, I understand, in Bulgaria. He lent me his private saloon for the journey to Constantinople, and again

² M. C. Yaroshinsky was a prominent Russian financier.

³ Chief of the British Military Mission in Paris.

⁴ M. Maniu was the leader of the National Party and President of the Directing Council in Transylvania.

⁵ General Averescu was for a short period in the cabinet of M. Vaida-Voevod.

it was fortunate that this particular compliment was paid, for I passed the twenty-four hours of Christmas Day in Philippopolis station, owing to a strike on the railway.

I arrived in Constantinople only on the 28th December. There I met Admiral de Robeck, General Milne, Admiral Webb, and Mr. Hohler.⁶ It was reported that General Denikin's retreat continued and that it was likely Odessa would be abandoned. At their urgent instance I joined Admiral de Robeck and General Milne in pressing that, if possible, Odessa should not be abandoned, in view of the very difficult problems which were likely to be raised by the crowd of refugees. M. Stcherbatsky the Russian Minister, called on me. I also had conversations with M. Bilinsky, probably the best-known financial authority in this part of the world, and with Mr. Dickson, the manager of the British Trade Corporation. A memorandum from Mr. Dickson is attached (Appendix D 2). In view of a message brought by destroyer from Odessa, I agreed with Admiral de Robeck to send one of my staff, Captain Hill, to ascertain the position in that city, and Captain Hill reported to me afterwards by telegram at frequent intervals. Just before leaving Constantinople I had a conversation with the French Admiral de Bon, who had been with General Denikin ten days previously. The Admiral told me that in his opinion General Denikin was doing the right thing in ordering the present retreat, and that Denikin agreed that a mistake had been made in advancing so far and so rapidly during the past summer.

I left Constantinople on the evening of the 30th December in the battleship H.M.S. *Marlborough*, under the command of Captain Johnson, and arrived at Novorossisk on New Year's Day. The *Marlborough* also gave passages to General Greenly, who joined me at Constantinople, and to the Russian General Heroy. I took the opportunity of talking with General Heroy, a trustworthy friend, I was told, of the Allies, in the hope that he might break the ice for me with General Denikin, and this hope was fulfilled.

At Novorossisk I found Mr. Wardrop, who came into port an hour before me in H.M.S. *Calypso*, from Batoum. He spent the day with me, and we discussed the position in Transcaucasia. Mr. Wardrop represented that position as steady, and the two republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan as reasonably well established and on good terms with one another. I asked him whether, in the event of Bolshevism sweeping forward to the northern foot of the Caucasus, he thought that Georgia and Azerbaijan would stand firm. He replied that under such circumstances he could not be quite sure. Mr. Wardrop agreed to keep in communication with me, and left in the evening by the *Calypso* for Batoum.

On the same day Baron Nolkin came off to the ship with a telegram from General Denikin to me, in which Denikin welcomed me, but said that, owing to the position of affairs at the front and the congestion of traffic on the railways, he could not for the moment meet me. On the 2nd January I had a discussion with Commander Watson on the position of Denikin's

⁶ Mr. Hohler was a member of the British High Commission at Constantinople.

flotilla in the Caspian. Watson was with that flotilla as late as the end of September, and struck me as a man of good judgment.

I remained in the *Marlborough* until the 7th, when I succeeded in obtaining suitable quarters on shore and landed. On the same day I had long talks with M. Neratof, the Under-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and with Mr. Harold Williams, the well-known English authority on Russia. M. Neratof had been sent down by General Denikin to arrange for my journey up-country, and Mr. Williams had just come down from Rostov.

On the 8th January I left Novorossisk by rail and arrived next day at Ekaterinodar, and thence proceeded to Tikhoretskaya Junction, the headquarters at the moment of General Denikin. There I at last succeeded in meeting General Holman. I had a long interview with General Denikin, and discussed with him the whole situation (Appendix B 1). The position at the front was at its worst, and the Green Guards,⁷ who were derailing trains every other day on the section of the line between Novorossisk and Ekaterinodar, had cut the telegraph wires behind us. The officers of the volunteer army were in danger of becoming demoralised, because of concern for the fate of their wives and families. The rumour had been spread that the British Military Mission was about to leave the country, and Russian officers were beginning to fly to the help of their families. Under the circumstances I felt that I was justified, at the urgent instance of General Holman, in promising on behalf of His Majesty's Government that the wives and families of officers would be removed by us, if and when the necessity arose, and that the British Military Mission would be their rearguard (Appendix E). This was done to arrest the panic, for most certainly all these women would be murdered if they fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks. I felt that it was unthinkable that we should abandon them after having encouraged their husbands to fight. I need hardly add that the private soldiers ran no similar risk, since they and their families could disappear into the general population.

I left Tikhoretskaya on the 10th of January, after further talk with General Holman, and arrived back next day at Ekaterinodar. There I made acquaintance with General Wrangel. I was delayed at Ekaterinodar for twenty-four hours, owing to the derailment of a train in the hills by the Green Guards. Twenty thousand refugees were living around me in railway carriages in the station of Ekaterinodar. On the morning of the 11th January General Wrangel took my car on to his train and I proceeded under the shelter of his Cossack guard and a score of British bayonets. General Percy went with me to take charge of the base of our Military Mission at Novorossisk.

I arrived back in Novorossisk on the evening of the 12th January. The next day I had further interview with General Wrangel, and on the 14th a meeting of General Denikin's Ministry was held in my house. There were present General Lukomsky, M. Krivoshein, M. Bernatsky, and M. Fenin. I was accompanied by General Keyes. The Ministers spent the greater part of the day with me. General Lukomsky brought an important telegram from

⁷ Independent bands of partisan peasant forces.

General Denikin (Appendix B 2). This telegram concedes the matter for which I had struggled in vain with M. Sazonof. M. Sazonof, and indeed General Denikin himself, had up to this point based their whole policy on the idea of 'La Russie intégrale,' including the border peoples. It will be seen that by this telegram General Denikin has abandoned his *non possumus* attitude, which rendered negotiations with Poland impossible, and has agreed that the eastern frontier of Poland shall be determined on ethnographical grounds. As dictator he has also now definitely accepted the principle of a constituent assembly to be elected by the Russian people proper, and of subsequent negotiations with the *de facto* Governments of the Border States, the Allies to be parties to these negotiations. I believe, therefore, that there is now a fair prospect of fruitful negotiations between General Denikin and General Pilsudsky, and of joint operations against Bolshevik Russia. I annex a further document handed to me by General Lukomsky at the conclusion of our negotiations (Appendix D 1).

At this time I was receiving copies of a number of telegrams to the Foreign Office, sent by Mr. Wardrop and Mr. Stokes. It appeared that, on his return to Tiflis, from visiting me, Mr. Wardrop was suddenly faced with the very contingency to which I had drawn his attention. There is now evidently danger of revolution in Transcaucasia.

I had many minor interviews, at various times and places, which I need not enumerate, though they contributed to my understanding of the problem before me. I may, however, mention an important deputation from the British Traders in South Russia which I received at Novorossisk. I annex statements which they presented to me (Appendix D 3, 4, 5).

In view of the urgency of the whole situation and the need of formulating an all-round policy, I now determined to run home for a few days, and I asked Admiral Hope to give me a passage in a destroyer, so that I might consult with your Lordship and place my promised report in the hands of the Cabinet. I left Novorossisk on the 16th January in H.M.S. *Speedy*, and General Keyes remained in charge of the mission. Just before leaving I heard of the recognition of the *de facto* Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan. I would like, at this point, to express my deep obligation to General Keyes for his loyal and invaluable help.

While crossing the Black Sea in rough weather I exchanged signals with General Milne, who was proceeding in H.M.S. *Benbow* to Novorossisk. At Constantinople on the 17th January I saw the Acting High Commissioner, Admiral Webb, and learnt of the developments in the general situation round the Black Sea during my comparative isolation in South Russia. Off Tenedos I left H.M.S. *Speedy* for H.M.S. *Centaur*, and off Mytelene on the 18th January I had a couple of hours with Admiral de Robeck in H.M.S. *Iron Duke*, and exchanged information with him.

Some Leading Men.

The personalities of a very few men are among the determining factors in the Russia of to-day. Except in regard to the two armies and the Bolshevik

propaganda almost all organisation has disappeared, and there is, therefore, little scope for minor personal forces. It is said that if five or six men were to be removed the Bolshevik terror would end. In South Russia also there are a few men on whom everything depends. It seems to me important that the personalities of three of them should be appreciated.

1. *General Denikin*.—I spent five hours with General Denikin in his railway train at Tikhoretskaya Junction on the 10th January. The towns of Rostov and Novocherkassk had just fallen, and enemy cavalry had crossed the mouth of the Don on the ice. But the General was quite calm, was at times even humorous, could concentrate his mind on the political questions which were engaging us, and only once or twice had he to glance at papers which were brought to him. In short, the Commander-in-chief and his immediate surroundings were wholly aloof from the prevailing panic.

General Denikin is a man of medium height, stout in build, but not corpulent, with a broad face and bald head, except for hair over the ears, and humorous grey eyes. His moustache and short pointed beard are grey. In conversation he says little, but I am told he is capable of oratory of no mean order. He has a clear mind and will listen to argument, but knows no language but his own, and no other country, and is somewhat innocent in matters of economic and civil administration. He is absolutely straight, and his loyalty to his friends is such that it amounts to a failing. At the same time he is shrewd and acute. While I was talking with him (Appendix B 1) it was urged that he should appeal to the Cossacks: he did not accept the idea, and even objected to it, but in the evening, after I had left him, he sent me a message to the effect that he had appointed the Ataman of the Don Cossacks to be his First Minister! I have no doubt that he had made the offer before our conversation, but said nothing because he had not received the Ataman's acceptance. This move on his part anticipated and probably nullified an intrigue which was on foot among some of the younger officers for the purpose of forcing his resignation. General Keyes has told me of a similar swift and silent decision on a previous occasion. Denikin was informed of a movement to put General Wrangel in his place. He made no reply at the time, but shortly afterwards it was announced that General Wrangel had been appointed to the command of the Caucasian army, on the extreme right of the line, a command which removed him from the centre of things and from the possibility of mischief. Denikin is both stubborn and idealist; it is this combination of qualities and his loyalty of nature which constitute his strength, but render him somewhat difficult to deal with. He was asked, for instance, by General Holman to blow up the Rostov bridge when the enemy was advancing, and General Holman offered to take an armoured train forward, and to do the thing himself, but Denikin refused. He said that the bridge belonged to Russia; that he was advised that in the present state of the world it would take two or three years to make the damage good, and that the people of Central Russia would require the food of the Kuban. His one political ideal has been to maintain the unity of Russia, that unity being interpreted territorially as being within the pre-war limits. He thought of

the constituent Assembly promised to the Allies by Admiral Koltchak as being elected from all Russia including all the border peoples. Autonomy was to be granted to the borders by the majority in the Assembly with whatever limitations that majority might decide. For this idea of the All-Russia he has considered himself a trustee, so that he was not free to negotiate in regard to modifications of frontier. It was evidently at the cost of a great effort that he faced the present situation, and told me that he would accept the responsibility of making a decision now if, after a little thought, he came to the conclusion that it was for the future good of Russia. The tragedy of the past six months is partly due to the fact that, although he has some good generals around him, and himself inspires confidence and even worship, most of his civilian advisers are so inferior that there seems to be no one to whose advice he will listen. Once after a six hours Economic Conference he quietly remarked, 'Gentlemen, you have wasted my time.'

2. *General Wrangel*.—General Wrangel has at times been put forward as the rival of General Denikin. He is a striking and distinguished figure. Tall, slim and erect, he would look almost gaunt in civilian clothes, but wears a most becoming Cossack General's uniform. His head is shaven and his look direct. He speaks with a loud voice, and is said at times to drink, and I should think could be tactless, but he is an intelligent man, with a wider range of ideas than Denikin. He is, however, vain and ambitious, and allows his ambition to appear. Undoubtedly he is the best organiser among Denikin's generals; the Caucasian army is the only group in the Volunteer army whose discipline has risen to the Western level. He is admired by the younger officers. At one time he was attracted by the idea of turning to Germany, especially when he was swept with disgust at what he regarded as the Allied desertion implied in Mr. Lloyd George's speeches, but he has now for the time being been subdued by Denikin, and has again come to see that England and not Germany can give Russia her chance. General Wrangel's difference with General Denikin is in part due to the fact that Denikin sticks to General Romanovsky, the Chief of his Staff, who is very generally criticised, and Romanovsky and Wrangel are enemies. I took an opportunity of saying to General Wrangel that, while I had no right to intervene in the internal affairs of General Denikin's army, yet I must say to him that if there were dissension it would tell against the Russian cause in the West. General Wrangel admitted that a deputation had visited him, but assured me, 'as a gentleman and a Russian,' that he had joined Denikin for the sake of Russia, and though he had had differences with him on matters of strategy and policy, yet he would neither act against him nor desert him. He added that he was often described as pro-German and autocratic; on the contrary he could read the signs of the times and he fully accepted my idea of a 'modern' Government and adhered to the Allies.

3. *M. Krivoshein*.—M. Krivoshein was Minister of the Interior under the Czardom, but he is not a man of narrow views. At the last moment before the revolution the late Czar invited him to be Prime Minister. The difference is great between him and Sazonof; both of them have wide and metropolitan

experience, whereas the other politicians round Denikin are merely provincial; but Krivoshein perceives the change wrought by the war and has an elastic mind, whereas Sazonof has a quite ossified mind. Krivoshein is a man of dignified presence of a definitely civilian type. From the message sent me by Denikin (Note to Appendix B 1) I gather that the General is beginning to realise that Krivoshein is essential to him. Above all it is necessary to get a capable civilian element into this Government of generals and Cossacks.

The Reasons of the Failure of the Recent Advance on Moscow.

The advance on Moscow of the past summer and autumn was in the nature of a great adventure. This was the term applied to it in conversation with me by General Pilsudsky, the Polish President, who has an uncanny fellow-Slavonic insight into the realities of the Russian position. I attribute the failure of that adventure to three minor and one major reason.

1. *Military Reason.*—So far as the front line was concerned, the campaign was a co-ordinated military operation and might have succeeded. The two flanks, in the direction of Tsaritsin and Kief, made good and to the end resisted all attack. The failure occurred principally in the army which stood third from the right of the four armies. This Third Army was under the command of an old but capable general, Maimaievsky. When he had advanced as far as Kharkof, the strain of the campaign became too much for him, and he gave way to drink. He should have been removed, but the Chief-of-Staff, Romanovsky, stuck to him. The Third Army advanced as far as Orel, the general drinking, and his officers gradually becoming demoralised. Unfortunately, it was precisely upon this army that the weight of the Red attack fell, when Red reinforcements could be spared owing to the defeats of Koltchak and Yudenitch. Maimaievsky's failure involved the retirement, and in the end the defeat of the whole of the Denikin army. When it was too late, General Wrangel was brought from the Caucasian army to relieve Maimaievsky, and Wrangel's conduct during the last three months of the retreat enhanced his reputation.

2. *Moral Reason.*—It is not part of my function to criticise our own Prime Minister. He has to consider not merely Russia, but also the condition of opinion in the whole world, and especially in our own country. But when the Prime Minister received me, before I left England, he asked me to speak without fear of any man when I came to express my opinions formed during the mission. I am, therefore, bound to say that the two speeches which Mr. Lloyd George made at the Guildhall and immediately afterwards in Parliament,⁸ when interpreted in Russia by skilful propaganda, did most certainly produce the impression that England intended to change her policy and abandon the anti-Bolshevik cause. Excerpts from these speeches, carefully edited, began to make their effect felt just at the moment of discouragement,

⁸ Mr. Lloyd George had given a review of British policy in his speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet at the Guildhall on November 8, 1919 (text in *The Times*, November 10, 1919); the Prime Minister made a further statement in the House of Commons on November 17 (*Parl. Debs. 5th Series. House of Commons*, vol. 121, col. 715 f.).

when the turn of the tide had taken place. It is difficult for people in England to realise the power in Russia just now of the spoken word, for good or for bad, of our great British leader. It must be remembered that you have here, as General Denikin reminded me, not regular armies of the Western type, but militias and local levies, which sweep forward and backward, and gather and dissolve, and are inspired or depressed with volcanic suddenness.

3. *Administrative Reason.*—Of deeper import, however, than any military inefficiency or any discouragement due to the speeches of the powerful, was the failure to organise in rear of the advancing line, alike in military, economic, and administrative matters. The body responsible for such organisation was the Special Council. It consisted of about twenty-five members, Ministers and others. The Special Council spent its time debating the whole future of Russia, and whether the principle of her organisation should be central or federal. General Denikin, as Dictator, dissolved this futile body when the retreat was already passing into panic.

4. *Economic Reason.*—The three causes above described all had their influence in bringing about the defeat, but the principal cause of the greatness of the disaster lay, I am convinced, in the fact that from lack of all financial resources the Denikin army had to live on the country. It was welcomed with flowers when it first advanced, but gradually it came to be hated by the people hardly less than the Bolsheviks, because of its excesses. The Cossacks were undoubtedly the chief offenders, for they not only made levies on the country without paying for them, but also looted on a large scale, so that it is said, perhaps with exaggeration, that after Mamontof's brilliant raid behind the Bolshevik line,⁹ the train of wagons filled with loot extended to 80 versts. The Cossacks were employed under the Czardom for punitive expeditions, and the poor people who suffered under Mamontof asked what they had done that they were punished. Moreover, the peasants are no more able than under the Bolsheviks to obtain manufactured articles in exchange for their produce. The universal cry, except among those classes which flourish on anarchy, is for order and the decencies of a civilised life. If there is a serious movement in favour of Germany, it is chiefly because the Germans did impose order and organise administration during the months they occupied the country. As M. Neratof told me with evident conviction, they are believed still to be powerful, having been defeated in an economic but not in a military sense.

The Conditions within Soviet Russia.

It has often been asserted that the Germans are behind the Bolshevik policy, and the younger officers in Denikin's army undoubtedly believe that Germany has only to utter the word and the Bolshevik advance would stop. It may well be that there are subterranean German agencies, probably through Jewish channels, and there is now much more definite evidence

⁹ In August–September 1919 General Mamontov had led a force of Don Cossack cavalry on a raiding expedition in depth behind the Soviet lines on the South Russian front.

than before that German soldiers of fortune are obtaining scope in the Bolshevik army, but I can obtain no mass of evidence that the German Government is at present directing Bolshevik policy. (But see Appendix F.) This, however, does not affect the serious fact, which has become very evident during the recent Bolshevik advance, that the Bolshevik army is rapidly adopting German methods of fighting. The well-authenticated story of the Denikin nurse, in whose house a number of German officers lodged, may perhaps be discounted on the principle that one swallow does not make a summer, but the new fire tactics, the new strategy of attacking at the joints between armies, the assaults just before dawn, and many other phenomena, afford conclusive evidence of a very different kind. Thus far the new efficiency has not reached the point that the Bolshevik army could not be overthrown with ease by a properly organised and sustained military effort on quite a moderate scale, but if that effort be not made within the next few months there is undoubtedly great risk that such a weapon will be forged as may become a danger to the world, in alliance, as it will be, overt or covert, with the Germans and the Turks. It looks as though the time when officers of the old régime were made to command the Bolshevik troops, the officers themselves being unarmed but accompanied by armed commissaries, were passing, and a new professional force, apparently highly paid, was in process of development.

Of the conditions behind the front of the Bolshevik army it is very difficult to give any general description, not so much for the reason of our ignorance, as because there are very few general statements, other than negative, which can in truth be made. The most recent and authentic description which I have had was given me in an interview at Warsaw with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Petrograd, Baron Ropp, who was in Moscow as late as the 18th November (Appendix C).

All the archbishop said to me tallies entirely with what I have learnt since in South Russia, except that there are, of course, there the most terrible stories, only too well authenticated, of the cruelties perpetrated. For the purpose of forming political conclusions, however, these atrocities need not be too much dwelt upon. It is quite likely that at times terrible vengeance has been taken by the Cossacks and even by the Volunteer army. What is to the point, however, is that the cruelties now being perpetrated by the Bolsheviks have all the characteristics of thorough-going German 'frightfulness'; they are a definite weapon of strategy. During the present advance the Bolshevik propaganda posted notices in the villages through which the Volunteer army retreated to the effect that whenever a village was found to be without its proper complement of men the women and children would be killed. The Russian loves his family and home, and desertion became rife. When the retreat had extended as far as Rostov a panic seized the Volunteer officers, the reason assigned being that they feared that their wives and children, now refugees moving back to the coast, would be massacred, and that the British Military Mission would sail away and leave them to their fate. It was obvious that propaganda had been at work, and to prevent a total

collapse I gave the guarantee of which I have already spoken. General Wrangel told me subsequently that this guarantee was having a great effect.

The Present Triumph of Bolshevism.

Bolshevism is for the moment triumphant. The wheat and coal areas of South Russia are now accessible from Moscow, and Bolshevik tyranny has a new lease of life. That fact alone must encourage all the forces of disorder in the world. Peace with the Soviet at this moment would be universally construed as a decisive victory for Bolshevism.

It might be quite possible at this moment to make a truce with the Bolsheviks. They were very near to military defeat last summer, and very near to economic collapse last autumn. They have been saved almost by a miracle, and it may be that they would come to terms with us. That is the opinion of General Pilsudsky, but he said that he, for his part, would enter into no negotiations with them, for they had not the smallest intention of keeping their promises. There is also the risk that they would use negotiations simply for the purpose of insulting what they describe as the 'Capitalistic Powers', and by way of super-propaganda. In either case their object would be to gain time for organisation and recuperation.

There are indications of what would be the nature of that organisation in its civil as well as military aspects. Trotsky has in practice abandoned his communistic theories, and is now seeking to erect a centralised and bureaucratic State of the same essentially socialistic character as the pre-war Prussia, but Jacobin instead of aristocratic. General Denikin's Ministers gave me information concerning the activities of one Krassin, who before the war was the manager of the Russian Siemens Company. Krassin has been set as autocrat to control the economic organisation of Soviet Russia, including the railways. Trotsky, who now overshadows Lenin, rests on his army, and the economic life of the country is to be revived for the supply of that army.

Further, we must not forget the Bolshevik propaganda. A book such as Maxim Gorky's 'Dans le Peuple' shows the beginning of that propaganda, its apprenticeship in the years following the first revolution in 1905. To-day the propaganda is a distinctively Russian service with a tradition which has grown and strengthened gradually, just as the British fleet and the German army have been based on slowly developed traditions. Unless destroyed at the root the Bolshevik propaganda may be a danger to all civilisation before long. Its centre is a great office at Moscow, in the Kremlin, I believe, and it has a trained personnel at its disposal which is as efficient as the general staff of one of the great armies.

The Need of an Alliance.

It is now obvious that the Denikin Government alone cannot defeat Bolshevism, and that the method of mere military adventure associated with the names of Koltchak, Yudenitch and Denikin must be abandoned. There must be substituted a system of alliances and of steady organisation *pari passu*

with limited military advances. General Wrangel said to me that it must be by Slavonic blood that Moscow must be won. He recognises that no British or French invasion can be thought of. The Polish Republic and Serbian and Bulgarian Volunteers, on the other hand, he regards as in a different category. The same view is taken in General Denikin's telegram to me (Appendix B 2).

In my conversation with General Pilsudsky it became clear that the position of Poland was such that she must at the proper time throw her whole weight against the Bolsheviks. She cannot afford to rest between Germany and a new Russian Czardom of the proletariat. Neither can she afford to make a peace which would be a mere truce for the gaining of time by her enemy. On the other hand, demobilisation and financial economy are essential to her, and she cannot afford indefinitely to keep an army on the Berezina, half-way to Moscow.

General Pilsudsky told me that it was his opinion as a General that he could march to Moscow next May, but he added as a politician: 'What could I do when I got there?' I replied that clearly he must not go there except in alliance with Russians, and it was agreed that I should do all that I could to bring his Government and that of General Denikin into conference. His chief objection lay in the fact that he had tried to come to terms with Denikin and had failed, either because Denikin referred him to distant Koltchak or refused to consider frontier problems altogether, saying they were reserved for the future Russian Constituent Assembly. My own opinion is that both the Denikin representative at Warsaw and the Polish representative with Denikin have been small and futile men, and have been played with by the propaganda. Both Generals alike have been badly served.

I have pointed out to General Denikin that he could not expect Poland to throw her whole weight into the war unless the principle, at any rate, on which the frontier would be fixed were accepted beforehand. If Poland took any other course, what would be her position as a small State when she had helped to set up afresh a mighty Power at Moscow? I told him quite plainly that the attitude which he had hitherto assumed would not result in business, and I am glad to say that as the conversation progressed he saw the point and told me he would accept responsibility as Dictator, provided that after a little consideration he felt that what he was asked to do was best for the future of Russia. The happy outcome of that consideration will be found expressed in General Denikin's telegram to General Lukomsky four days after my interview (Appendix B 2).

The Present Prospect.

The Volunteer army has now been defeated, and I do not yet feel quite sure that the Cossacks will resist the Bolshevik advance. The last word I had with General Denikin was through General Holman just before I left Russia. Denikin regarded the position as temporarily stabilised, provided that the Cossack politicians did not listen to the propaganda which was insinuating that the Bolsheviks would give them special terms. I am sure, however, that

the Cossacks may be trusted to rise again at the first opportunity, even should they come to terms in the present crisis. When I left, the news from the front was encouraging, some 8,000 prisoners having been taken from the Bolsheviks in two encounters on the Don. The ice on the Don had broken up in the rapid thaw which had providentially set in. General Denikin had reconstituted his Ministry, and had included representatives of the three Cossack peoples—Don, Kuban and Terek. The signs were thus propitious in regard to the General's bid for Cossack support. Six or eight weeks hence the river Don will be coming down 10 miles broad.

The present hope of the Denikinites is to preserve as a base for future action a row of three relatively small territories, which they are seeking to defend by a war of position, namely: (1) the peninsula east of the Strait of Yenikali, including the important port of Novorossisk, with a wide and fertile glacis in the Cossack country east of the Sea of Azov; (2) the peninsula of the Crimea south of the Isthmus of Perikop; and (3) the city and district of Odessa. Naturally, the question arises whether the Government of such a relatively small group of territories is worth supporting when we have discharged our debt of honour by removing those who would inevitably suffer the vengeance of the conquerors. In this regard I would point out three considerations.

1. *First Consideration.*—In the first place it is certainly the intention of General Denikin in the last desperate resource to lead his Volunteer army, reduced to a few thousands of determined and courageous men, and to fight his way out in some direction. He can only take one of two directions: either he must go into the Caucasus region—and that would obviously be very undesirable—or he must be able to pass across the Strait of Yenikali into the Crimea. I think we ought to guide him in the second direction.

2. *Second Consideration.*—The other two are larger considerations. If it is true that General Pilsudsky and the Poles must only go to Moscow in alliance with Russians, then it appears to me of the first importance to keep in being the only Russian Government in Europe outside the Bolshevik area. I think, moreover, it is worth our while doing this. Denikin's men have learned their lesson, though it has taken a bitter schooling to teach it. I believe that they are now in a mood to accept our guidance. I think that there are great numbers in Bolshevik Russia who will gradually congregate afresh around the Denikinite flag, if that flag be carried forward with a new and sustained effort, and under new conditions leading to wholly new results. The Denikinites now accept the principle that organisation and military advance must take place alternately, and that each step in the advance must henceforth be limited by the rate of organisation. They realise that the soil in which Bolshevism thrives is that of economic paralysis.

3. *Third Consideration.*—The third consideration arises out of the success of my negotiations. We have now a Russian Government pledged to a resettlement of Russia on the lines of policy which we desire. It would therefore obviously be very convenient if that were the Government which recovered Moscow.

The Economic Difficulty.

The practical problem is how to set Denikin's army free from the necessity of living on the country through which it advances. I have considered this question with General Denikin's Ministers. It is quite clear that, in view of the terrible losses among the educated classes, the Russians have no sufficient organising power left to lift themselves out of the slough. They cannot even marshal a train on the sidings of a station. Moreover, we have to deal with small and obstructive people such as the Cossack farmers, with poor and therefore corrupt officials, and with speculators taking advantage of propaganda. Yet if the country is to be reorganised, piece by piece, and the military defence is to be moved forward by echelons, there must be an army of a new type—an army which can stand on a line and no mere militia, which, as Denikin says, can only advance or retreat. Moreover, the Cossacks should be dispensed with except for the defence of their own territory, or as scattered recruits in a regular army.

These requirements imply some regular financial system. Finance in turn postulates commercial exchanges, even if only in the nature of barter. Thus we have an inexorable chain—(1) army which can stand without advancing and without looting, (2) finance, (3) commerce.

At the present time a general receives his long settled pay of 2,000 roubles a month, which in pre-war time was equivalent to £2,400 a year, but is now equivalent at the rate of 2,000 roubles to the pound sterling to only £120 a year. You can to-day buy a cooked goose at Ekaterinodar for the pre-war equivalent of £100 and an uncooked goose for about £40. A subaltern's pay will not give him his own breakfast, let alone that of his wife. The present financial system consists of a printing press, which for all I know has been captured at Rostof. The exchange of goods has been so paralysed that the peasant will willingly sell neither grain for human food nor horses for the cavalry, and this Russian warfare is largely a matter of food and cavalry.

A Constructive Plan.

The only plan that I can think of is to form a temporary monopoly for the control of credit and imported goods. The Denikin Government has tried to control exports and has failed, as was inevitable under the circumstances. If the resources of a whole group of existing British agencies were syndicated, a very powerful instrument might be forged which would operate just as the Merchant Adventurers used to operate—by imposing a certain discipline on the British importers into Russia. You have the Board of Trade, which controls the credit of twenty-six million pounds for the guaranteeing of exports to Eastern Europe; the Wheat Commission, which can give credit on the export of wheat from Russia; the South Russian Banking Agency; the Canadian Government, which I understand might give credit to exporters of agricultural machinery; and such firms as Vickers, who are interested in locomotives. Individual traders might be grouped by such British Chambers of Commerce as that of Constantinople. The British traders of South Russia

itself are, it will be noted, asking to be organised (Appendix D 3), and Denikin's Ministers are willing to accept help (Appendix D 1). The co-operative system is still partially operative and should be made use of for the detail of barter, but is not free from graft and would not act efficiently on the larger scale.

If such a temporary monopoly could be established, and if the proposed syndicate were to agree to work in harmony with the High Commissioner for South Russia, then the High Commissioner would have in his hands a very powerful weapon wherewith to exact reasonable practice in regard to export licences and similar matters. Such an arrangement would, in fact, go right past graft and speculators, and place manufactured goods at an honest price for barter against the rich supplies of food which the country produces for export. It seems at this moment with food; I have seen it with my own eyes, and it should be quite feasible to set going again such ports as Novorossisk and Odessa, to the advantage among others of the British taxpayer, who is at present burdened with the wheat subsidy. Had such [a] system been in operation last summer, I feel sure that the present disaster would not have occurred. There might have been defeat at the front, but there would not have been the sudden collapse of moral.

I have suggested to General Denikin that in return for the necessary rights the syndicate should tax itself, either on the imports and exports handled, or on the total profits, and should thus collect revenue for his Government. With graft and speculation eliminated the goods would be cheaper, even though taxed. This would enable Denikin to set a real Government going. At present there is an army and no real Government. He has no methods of obtaining order except military methods. I have talked this plan over with various people who know the country and I find no dissent on the broad idea. I will not burden this report with the discussion of details.

The First Step Forward.

The first military movement forward should be limited to an advance from the Odessa-Perikop direction to a line which would include the Donetz Basin. The wheat country which feeds Odessa would be recovered, and also the coal of the Donetz Basin. If supplied with manufactured articles the Kuban would in the meantime probably feed the whole area—Novorossisk, Crimea and Odessa.

My belief is that, owing to the nature of the produce in this country—wheat, coal, sugar and hides—a single season would suffice to set the economic life going again, and I am inclined to think that it would not require much more than such a limited military advance as I have indicated, and such an economic organisation as I have sketched, to establish a contrast on the two sides of the defensive line, a contrast as it were between Heaven and Hell, which would result in the sudden collapse of the Bolshevik tyranny. There might also result, I would point out incidentally, something in the nature of a Federal System, since the part of Russia first reorganised would coincide with the Ukraine, in the large sense, and the Cossack territory.

But such federal projects should not be spoken of publicly in England. They will be realised, I think, but at present they merely tend to divide Denikin's supporters.

The Caucasus and the Near East.

There remains to be considered the bearing of the Russian situation on affairs in the Caucasus and the Near East. Mr. Wardrop came to meet me on New Year's Day. We went into the harbour of Novorossisk at the same hour in two men-of-war. He described to me with pride his Georgians. He described the system of arbitration treaties which he had secured between the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. He told me that at that very time a conference was sitting in Tiflis which was studying the question of their federation. I asked him whether, if a sea of Bolshevism rolled forward and lapped against the northern foot of the Caucasus, he thought that his federation, and at any rate the Georgians, would remain true. He was very unwilling to think that they would go under, but in the end he admitted that possibly there might be such a menace as would prove irresistible. No sooner had he returned home on the 3rd January, than he sent me a telegram showing that the danger had suddenly burst upon him, and after that date I had a series of telegrams which indicated that the Georgian Government was under threat of disappearing in a revolution. The Allied recognition of the *de facto* Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan has for the time being again strengthened the orderly elements in those States, but I venture the opinion that we must not rely indefinitely on the storm of patriotism described in Mr. Wardrop's last telegram.¹⁰ The people of Baku have been Bolshevik before and undoubtedly may go Bolshevik again.

I am informed on reliable evidence that General Denikin's flotilla is likely in the first instance to remain proof, but that, deprived of its base at Petrovsk, it might attack Baku. This was undoubtedly the idea of the younger officers last September, but they were restrained by the senior officers under orders from General Denikin. I have already telegraphed to your Lordship suggesting that as a temporary measure this flotilla should be offered the hospitality of Enzeli in North Persia, and General Denikin has, I believe, asked that it should be received in a friendly way at Baku. These, however, could only be very temporary measures. When the Volga ice melts towards the end of March, the Bolshevik flotilla will make its appearance in the Caspian Sea, and may base itself upon Baku and Krasnovodsk. The oil trade may forthwith be set going up the Volga, and the resources of the Bolshevik State be enormously increased. On the other hand, the Bolshevik flotilla consists only of shallow-draught vessels, and British leadership would probably give victory to the Denikinite flotilla. Or, again, there are not wanting indications that in certain eventualities, if left to itself, the Denikinite flotilla might go Bolshevik, the crews overpowering the officers.

It is only by strong immediate measures, taken before the thawing of the Volga ice, that the advance of Bolshevism, sweeping forward like a prairie

¹⁰ Possibly No. 641.

fire, can be limited, and kept away from India and Lower Asia, pending the advance from Poland and Odessa. It must be remembered, moreover, that the very success of that Polish and South Russian advance, on a line extending from the Gulf of Finland to the Sea of Azoff, would tend to drive the Bolsheviks into Asia, and it is essential, therefore, to regard the Caspian and Caucasian barrier as a part of the larger policy. But I cannot look upon a Caucasian barrier as more than a temporary expedient of a not very substantial character: the only final remedy is to kill Bolshevism at the source.

A very significant capture was recently made in the Crimea of two Turkish officers who had crossed the Black Sea from Asia Minor. The one was the nephew of Mustapha Pasha, the Nationalist leader in Asia Minor, and the other was an A.D.C. to Enver Pasha. They had expected that by the date of their landing the Bolsheviks would have been in possession of the Crimea. Thus the correlation of the Nationalist movement among the Turks with the Committee of Union and Progress is proved, and also their understanding with the Bolsheviks. In this connection, I must draw attention to the fact that Sevastopol in the hands of the Bolsheviks would, to say the least, be very inconvenient to us as a sea power in the Black Sea.

A similar understanding is, I think, indicated by the advance of Bolshevik cavalry from Astrachan southward simultaneously with Wardrop's warning from Georgian sources that a Bolshevik republic was to be proclaimed in the North Caucasus in a fortnight's time. Unfortunately, the congestion on the railways prohibited my travelling in the direction of Daghestan, nor did I think it wise to accept Mr. Wardrop's invitation to Tiflis until I could go there with Denikinite representatives to negotiate an alliance. I hope nothing untoward will occur in relation to Daghestan in the meantime. Now that Georgia has been recognised as a *de facto* Government, negotiations are not very practicable unless the Denikinite Government is also so recognised. Alone, I do not believe, from all I can gather, that the Transcaucasian republics would stand long against Bolshevism. In alliance with Denikin and Poland, they would be essential links in the chain confining the enemy. Therefore, the Daghestan problem must be regarded as subordinate to the problem of arriving at friendly relations between Georgia and Denikin. I tried to impress that view on Mr. Wardrop.

Two Political Difficulties.

I see two difficulties in the way of my proposals. The one is the possible jealousy of France, and the other is the hostility of certain classes of our own electorate. In regard to France, it is quite clear we must carry her with us. The awkward fact, however, remains, and has been quite frankly stated to me both by General Denikin and General Wrangel, that for reasons which are well known to your Lordship the French are for the time being hated in South Russia. I feel, therefore, that it would be wise if the French would allow us to take the lead in the economic organisation which I have outlined. I agree that they should subsequently be brought into any temporary monopoly.

In regard to the other difficulty, the hostility of our own working classes, I feel that the time has come when the truth should be carried home to them. They must be made to realise that, whatever the communistic ideals originally characteristic of Bolshevism, there is to-day a growing threat from Moscow of a state of affairs which will render this world a very unsafe place for democracies.

Incidentally, it may here be remarked as a useful point when combating the propaganda, that the Cossacks, who are just now Denikin's mainstay against the Bolsheviks, are a very democratic people. As an example, they have just put an embargo on the safes of the profiteers in the banks at Ekaterinodar in order to stop the export of the diamonds on which the said profiteers had hoped to live in peace in other lands. The Cossacks are now contemplating a Duma, and have just freely elected their own Atamans.

Alternative Dangers in the Offing.

1. *A Jacobin Czardom.*—Two possibilities, other than that of German penetration and veiled control, present themselves to my mind as the result of my contact with South Russia affairs. On the one hand is the growth of a Jacobin Czardom, which at some opportune juncture, when the Allies were suffering from misunderstanding, would be accepted as the overt ally of Germany and Turkey. The new army, the persistent propaganda, and the beginnings of a centralised industry all point in this direction. I need not more than refer to the danger of Bolshevism under such circumstances in India and China.

2. *A Well-fed Barbarism.*—The other possibility is that which might well ensue if the advice of those were taken who would leave Bolshevism to stew in its own juice. Let us assume that Trotsky and his terror dissolved in that juice. What would be the result? Nothing impresses itself more clearly on my mind than that, without an organised effort based on foreign brain and capital, Russia is now quite incapable of re-establishing herself unless after a generation and by a new birth. I believe that left to herself she would for a long time relapse into a condition of well-fed barbarism. The present state of economic paralysis could continue indefinitely only in a country most parts of which overflow with food.

The war-cry of Makhno, the bandit leader in the Southern Ukraine, is very instructive. The Makhno rising in rear of the Denikin army last summer and autumn was no political movement against Denikin and in favour of Bolshevism. Its slogan was as follows: 'Down with all authority; kill the lords, for they own the land; kill the Jews, for they own the money; kill the generals (*i.e.*, the Denikinites); kill the Communists (*i.e.*, the Bolsheviks), and then the country will deal with the towns, and will say what the towns must give in return for food (*i.e.*, what manufactured articles).'

Had Denikin got to Moscow last autumn, and had order then broken down generally, as I think most likely, or had Bolshevism, unopposed, been left to decay of itself, as some people advocated—in either case, I believe that a vast amorphous population would have been the outcome. The elements of

the situation would have been an immense monotonous plain, inhabited comparatively thickly by an illiterate peasantry, a few decayed towns, speculators, mostly hated Jews, supplying such manufactured articles as could be absorbed at extortionate prices; no educated class, or none capable of diffusing more than a glimmer of light; an impoverished and superstitious Church, and bands of marauders roaming the country. Out of such a welter history might produce again, as so often before from these very plains, some great leader of nomads who would gather the bands together and fall now on this border region and now on that. Asia and Europe alike would have to maintain military borders. Already a generation of unschooled, and in some cases deliberately depraved children is growing up in the Russian towns. The common talk in South Russia is of a period of ten or twenty years of anarchy: there have been two or three such periods in the national history.

It is true that no man can say for certain what would be the course of events if you allowed Bolshevism to enjoy its present triumph, but explore the future as you will on that assumption and I can see no peace for the world. Whether the future of Russia be anarchy, or tyranny, or servitude to the German, matters not; none of these conditions can co-exist with democracy in the world of to-day. Last spring, and perhaps even last summer, had the question been studied on the spot, and had action been taken not merely to supply munitions to General Denikin, but to give him sufficient advice and economic help, these dangers might perhaps have been exorcised at a comparatively cheap rate. This year I believe that they can still be effectively dealt with, though at a somewhat greater cost. Next year it may well be too late for any but heroic measures.

Immediate Steps Proposed.—But immediate steps must be taken if a constructive and truly remedial policy is contemplated. A firm declaration by Britain especially that she will not make peace with Bolshevism should be issued; it is she and not France which is suspect; it is her support and not that of France which is valued; it is Mr. Lloyd George's definite promise and not that of M. Clemenceau which is desired, and ardently desired. Timely assistance should be given in naval and technical ways for the holding of the Isthmus of Perikop and the defended areas of Odessa and Novorossisk. Help in the way of loan should be promised to the Poles, provided they ally themselves with Denikin on proper terms in regard to their eastern frontier. The Denikin Government should be recognised *de facto*, provided that its basis be broadened. The organisation of the syndicate for giving credit and for the control of imports into South Russia should be set on foot. The position in the Caspian Sea should be assured. The Baltic provinces, Georgia and Azerbaijan, should be brought into the Polish-Denikin League of Governments.

The initial steps of such a policy would, I am persuaded, send a thrill through all the east of Europe, which in a month would wholly alter the moral of the people in that part of the world. Mere vague promises will not have much effect now. There have been too many of them, and the people of Russia are too weary to be stimulated by anything but the opening moves

of a coherent and energetic policy, which should then be carried through without hesitation.

I have the honour, etc.,

H. J. MACKINDER

British High Commissioner for South Russia

Note.—I have not referred to the agrarian question in this report because my time for enquiry has as yet been short. The matter of alliances and barter seemed much more urgent. But the agrarian question was touched upon in my conversations with General Denikin and his Ministers, and it was assumed that a bold agrarian reform must be a part of any 'modern' policy.

H. J. M.

APPENDIX A TO No. 656

Document 1

From Sir H. Rumbold [Warsaw] to Foreign Office, London

Telegram No. 487 of December 16, 1919

Mr. Mackinder arrived here on the 13th instant, and we have thoroughly discussed the Russian question as seen from here.

I find that the advice which I have consistently tendered to the Polish Government, namely, to get on good terms with General Denikin, is in accordance with Mr. Mackinder's instructions. I specially explained to Mr. Mackinder that the Polish Government were perplexed at the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Bolshevism, and emphasised our unpopularity in connection with the decision relating to Eastern Galicia.¹¹

Mr. Mackinder, General Keyes, and myself were received together by General Pilsudsky yesterday. The interview lasted nearly two hours. General Pilsudsky's demeanour was stiff at the beginning of the interview, but it became much more cordial after hearing Mr. Mackinder's explanations regarding the desire of His Majesty's Government for a strong Poland in friendly relations with Russia, and in view of the light cast on the Eastern Galician decision.

We asked General Pilsudsky whether, in his opinion, Bolshevism was merely a façade behind which a moderate party was developing. He replied emphatically that whilst a short time ago the moderate element seemed to be progressing, the extreme elements were now in command. He said that whilst the Bolsheviks would probably be prepared to make peace, they would never stick to any agreement they made, and he certainly would not enter into negotiations with them.

At the beginning of the interview he expressed himself pessimistically about General Denikin's organisation, but admitted that the Polish troops had only come into contact with loosely organised bands of Denikin's troops who were operating in the Ukraine. He spoke in the same manner about General Denikin to us as he did to General Mannerheim, as reported in my telegram No. 482¹² of 13th December. He expressed the opinion that at the present moment the Bolshevik military

¹¹ See Chap. III.

¹² Not printed.

organisation was superior to that of General Denikin. He asserted that General Denikin would never alone be able to overthrow the Bolshevik régime.

None the less, he regarded the Bolsheviks at the present time as living in none too good case, and was decidedly of opinion that the Polish army alone could go to Moscow next spring, but from a political point of view he asked himself what he should do when and if he got there. We then said that this pointed a co-operation with Denikin, and he agreed. We pointed out that the Polish war against the Bolsheviks was a great financial drain on his country; as he had himself said that he did not mean to negotiate with the Bolsheviks, did not that point to definite steps to come to an agreement with Denikin? He replied that, although he had a representative at Denikin's headquarters, all attempts to talk with the latter had been met with elusive reference to Admiral Koltchak. At this point Mr. Mackinder suggested that General Pilsudsky might perhaps send to Denikin's headquarters a more influential Polish representative with whom Mr. Mackinder could keep in touch. General Pilsudsky saw the point, and said that he would seriously consider the matter.

We then enquired whether, supposing Mr. Mackinder could persuade Denikin of the desirability of effective negotiations with the Poles, a meeting might not be held between the two parties. General Pilsudsky, in reply, proposed that Denikin should come to Warsaw, but we pointed out that the latter could hardly be expected to come here, and that some halfway house such as Czernowitz might be more suitable. General Pilsudsky seemed favourable to this idea, as he thought that serious negotiations could be better conducted in a more quiet atmosphere.

At this stage of the discussion it seemed desirable that we should explain the reasons for the apparent hesitation of British opinion in regard both to the Poles and to General Denikin. We therefore said as regards the former that British public opinion had some suspicion as to the use to which the Poles might put their victory over the Bolsheviks. General Pilsudsky emphatically disclaimed imperialistic desires and made the important declaration that he was willing to allow the future position of the inhabitants of the country as far back as the Conference line through Brest-Litovsk to be submitted to a plebiscite. We expressed satisfaction at this declaration, having regard to the effect it would produce on British public opinion and probably on Denikin. As regards the latter, Mr. Mackinder admitted that it was probable that there were reactionary elements round Denikin, but that he was instructed to express to Denikin the hope of the British Government that he would follow a modern policy. This settlement [? statement] was welcomed by General Pilsudsky, who made no concealment of the fact that Polish public opinion coincided in this matter with the British, and he added that he was convinced of the danger of reactionary tendencies in South Russia.

To sum up, we brought General Pilsudsky to the point of expressing his gratitude to us for the prospect of negotiations with Denikin with a view to co-operation next spring, but we are of the opinion that some difficulty may be found in the subordinate position of General Denikin with reference to Admiral Koltchak. We would therefore like to suggest, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, whether British influence might not be brought to bear on Admiral Koltchak with a view to some public modification of General Denikin's position on the initiative of Admiral Koltchak.

General Pilsudsky called our attention to what he regarded as the unfortunate impression produced, especially on the Baltic States, by the present negotiations at Copenhagen.

Document 2

From Sir H. Rumbold to Foreign Office

Telegram No. 488 of December 16, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹³

Mr. Mackinder and I had a long talk with M. Paderewsky after our interview with General Pilsudsky. Although M. Paderewsky is no longer in office, he can speak with authority both in [*sic*] the facts of the situation and on the views of the Polish Government. He endorsed what General Pilsudsky had said as regards the present complexion and power of the Bolshevik Government and confirmed General Pilsudsky's declaration regarding the readiness of the Poles to allow plebiscites back to the Brest-Litovsk line.

M. Paderewsky agreed as to the desirability of Polish negotiations with a view to effective co-operation next spring with General Denikin. He referred, however, to the Eastern Galician and Lithuanian questions, and expressed the hope that definite decisions in regard to them might be deferred lest Polish public opinion should be discouraged.

As regards Eastern Galicia, he said that the proposed statute for Eastern Galicia¹¹ was a bar to the exercise of an effective mandate comparable with the mandates entrusted to other States. There would be an initial Ruthenian majority in the proposed Eastern Galician Diet which would from the outset render the Polish mandate nugatory. The position of the Polish Government as mandatory would thus be a difficult one. In support of his desire that a definite decision in this matter might be postponed, he pointed out that within the last few weeks the position had changed owing to the elimination of Petlura from the Ukraine.

As regards Lithuania, Mr. Mackinder said that, according to his instructions, the British Government attached importance to the national aspirations already recognised in a *de facto* sense of the three Baltic provinces, but that their independence was regarded as subject to limitation in respect of superior interests. M. Paderewsky said that, in regard to Esthonia and Latvia, the superior interests were clearly Russian, and in the case of Lithuania he thought that they were Polish. He said that the Poles were willing to give complete autonomy to Lithuania with a local Diet, but wished to retain a common defence, customs, and currency. In fact, the proposed combination would be comparable to the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and he regarded it as essential to Poland both for the purpose of keeping Germany and Russia apart and of giving Poland access to the ports of Memel and Libau.

Document 3

From Sir H. Rumbold to Foreign Office

Telegram No. 491 of December 17, 1919

My telegram No. 487¹³ of the 16th December.

At our interview with the Chief of the State, the latter referred to the critical position of the Esthonians and said that they were too far off for effective help. General Pilsudsky shared the view that the Bolsheviks meant to try to deal with their enemies one by one, and said that he had certain information showing that they meant to tackle Poland last of all.

¹³ Document 1 above.

1. *Memorandum by Mr. Mackinder of interview between General Denikin and himself at Tikhoretskaya on January 10, 1920*

Present:

General Denikin.

General Romanovsky.

M. Neratof.

Also, towards the end, two other Russian generals and Baron Nolken.

Mr. Mackinder.

General Keyes.

Also, towards the end, General Holman.

Colonel Svigentsof (interpreter—excellent).

After an exchange of compliments, I asked if, in view of the critical events in progress, and of the value of the General's time, I might venture to speak boldly and directly. General Denikin assented willingly. I said that the campaign of the past year appeared at one time to be on the point of success. His Majesty's Government had supported General Denikin with munitions. Now, however, that the campaign had failed, I was bound to tell him His Majesty's Government did not believe that Bolshevism could be conquered by arms alone. The recent advance on Moscow had been a great adventure. The ground gained was not properly organised and administered in rear. The result was that the Makhno and Green bands marauded in the South. Had General Denikin reached Moscow it was a great question whether order would not have broken down all over Russia before the economic life of the country could have been restored.

If the position were now to be saved, it being assumed that the Kuban and the Crimea could be held, the only course was to undertake the war against Bolshevism by stages, advancing and organising alternately. The Russian masses want peace; the peasants wish to enjoy their land and their homes. No army which lives on the country can be anything but unpopular. Therefore, the army of the future must be properly paid and provided for. This implied an organised system of taxes and finances, and for this you must restore trade. In other words, a State, and not merely an army, must be set going. The riches of South Russia are such that this could be done in a few months with Western help.

But the West will not help unless assured of the aims as well as the businesslike methods of the contemplated State. When Mr. Lloyd George recently quoted Lord Beaconsfield as against a United Russia¹⁴ he was thinking of two alternative Russias which he saw before him. On the one hand, a conquering despotism called Bolshevism; on the other hand, a restored centralised Russia, the Government of which had learned nothing from the events of the last few years. Such a restored and unregenerate Russia, quite possible of realisation in the present exhausted state of the people, would only imply further revolutions or foreign adventures to avoid them.

¹⁴ In his speech in the House of Commons on November 17, 1919 (cf. note 8 above), Mr. Lloyd George had referred to 'Lord Beaconsfield, who regarded a great, gigantic, colossal, growing Russia rolling onwards like a glacier towards Persia and the borders of Afghanistan and India as the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with'.

I said that everyone trusted General Denikin himself, but that the peoples of the West would not believe in the intentions of his Government unless they saw that reforms were put in progress as he advanced. He must set up, I would not say necessarily a fully democratic Government in the Western sense, but a modern Government. But General Denikin alone could not now defeat the Bolsheviks; he must have allies. The British would not put an army into Russia, however great their desire to suppress Bolshevism. For one reason, the pride of the Russians themselves forbade it. Therefore the Finns, the Estonians, the Letts, the Poles, the Georgians, and perhaps the Roumanians were the allies to be sought, with the British and French giving support by economic methods and organising brain. The Poles were essential. They were themselves in danger. Their terms would not be hard—I spoke with knowledge. But General Denikin must be prepared to take political responsibility. Would he accept the proposal of calling in the Great Powers, or two or three of the most disinterested of them, to settle frontier questions? It was useless to think that Poland would co-operate effectively, unless she were assured beforehand of the equitable settlement of her Eastern frontier. There must be no such calamity as a war between Russia and Poland, after they had marched into Moscow together as allies.

General Denikin then replied to my various points. He said that he did not think a soldier would describe his recent advance as an adventure. I interposed that it was General Pilsudsky who first used that expression to me. He said that the conditions of life in Bolshevik Russia were very bad. I said that it was true that the peasants had welcomed his army with flowers, but that gradually the exactions levied by his officers, and the robberies of the Cossacks, had changed that feeling, and that now I believed the peasants hated both the contending armies impartially. General Denikin said that he was afraid it was too true, but that circumstances had been against him. The present armies were merely militias and must advance or retreat; they could not stand still. He then turned to the question of the autonomy of the border peoples. He said that his principle was to restore the All-Russia, great and indivisible. He said that at present central power was indispensable, and military dictatorship, and that no collegium was possible, but that plans were being elaborated and would be submitted to the future Constituent Assembly of the Russian people. I asked if it were his intention that that Assembly should include representatives of the border peoples. He replied in the affirmative. I then pointed out that, if that were so, the border peoples would each of them form a very small minority in the presence of the great majority of Russians proper; that the border peoples at present have *de facto* independence and the support of the Allies, and that he could hardly expect them to accept conditions which implied that an all-powerful majority was, of its mere goodness and freewill, to grant them some crumbs of autonomy. He saw the point, but said that he had thought of his principle as a trust, and had hoped to defer political questions until Bolshevism was defeated. On what authority was he to take political responsibility? It was true that Admiral Koltchak had given him liberty of action, but his Government and that of Admiral Koltchak were not recognised by the Powers. I said that I quite saw his objections, and from the point of view of juridical theory they were good, but at present the question was of saving Russia, and he had already told me he was a dictator. Poland could not be expected to attach weight to his scruples; General Pilsudsky complained that he could not negotiate because General Denikin was elusive. Before a Constituent Assembly was elected someone would

have to take the responsibility of deciding the limits of the area within which the elections were to be held.

At this point it became evident that General Denikin had made up his mind for a change of attitude. He told me that under the circumstances he would accept responsibility if, after a little thought, he came to the conclusion that what he was asked to do was for the good of Russia.

The discussion then turned to financial matters, I pointed out that he must not expect further financial help from the British Treasury, and that he must utilise the very great resources of South Russia itself, and I sketched to him the scheme which will be found set forth in Appendix D to this report. I told him that if some such schemes were adopted I thought that the proposed temporary syndicate might tax the imports and exports which it handled, and so give him a real revenue as a substitute for his present printing press. He made minor objections, but at the end of five hours of very pleasant, if serious, discussion he thanked me, saying that he would consult with his Ministers and communicate with me further without delay.

H. J. M.

Note.—The same evening he sent Baron Nolken to me with a message to say that he had just appointed the Ataman of the Don Cossacks as his new first Minister, but that he begged me to continue my negotiations with the existing Ministers as experts, reminding me at the same time that the power was his. He added that M. Krivoshein was one of the existing Ministers I should meet, and that although the new Ministry had not been completed he thought that M. Krivoshein would be in it. H. J. M.

2. *Telegram from Lieutenant-General Denikin to Lieutenant-General Lukomsky,
January 1/14, 1920*

(Translated by General Keyes and Colonel Svigentsof. Original at Novorossisk.)

I instruct you to communicate the following *verbatim* to Mackinder:—

1. I recognise the *de facto* independence of the border governments who are carrying on the struggle against the Bolsheviks.
2. The settlement of the future relations of the border with Russia must be accomplished by means of an agreement between the All-Russian Government and the border governments.
3. The mediation of the Allies can be accepted in this matter.
4. The question of the Eastern frontier of Poland will be settled by an agreement between the All-Russian Government and the Polish Government on ethnographical principles.
5. Poland should afford assistance by armed forces in an immediate partial offensive in order to divert part of the Bolshevik forces and by the further development of operations at as early a date as possible and in full measure.
6. The Allies should—
 - (a) Decisively and immediately take steps to protect the Black Sea Government, Crimea, and Odessa by means of naval power.
 - (b) Assist Bulgaria and Serbia to send troops.

- (c) Ensure the transport of troops mentioned in (b) by their tonnage.
(d) Continue the supply of military munitions to armed forces of South Russia.

DENIKIN.

Countersigned—

Acting President of the Government and Military and Naval Member,
LIEUT.-GENERAL LUKOMSKY.

Member for Supplies and Food Control,
A. KRIVOSHEIN.

Member for Finance,
M. BERNATSKY.

Member for Trade and Industry,
E. FENIN.

Legal Member,
V. CHELICHCHEF.

Note 1.—In regard to 6 (d) I have pointed out that direct assistance cannot be given after the 31st March, but that very great assistance can be given indirectly by the organisation of the resources of Russia herself. H. J. M.

Note 2.—The form of this telegram is that of an army order or staff minute. It is so that General Denikin gives all his political decisions. An order in similar military form was taken by a British General to Poland and shown to General Pilsudsky. It gave great offence where none was intended. I think it is time that Generals were prohibited from roaming about Europe on unauthorised political missions. H. J. M.

APPENDIX C TO No. 656

Memorandum of Interview at Warsaw between Mr. Mackinder, M.P., and Baron Ropp, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Petrograd, on December 17, 1919

Archbishop Ropp stated that he had been arrested by the Bolsheviks as a hostage on the capture of Vilna by the Poles, that he had been confined in five different prisons, warned that he would be shot by way of reprisal if necessary, then kept under open arrest in the house of a priest in Moscow, and finally released and enabled less than a month ago to leave Moscow and cross the lines into Poland. At our Legation it was learnt that his release had been effected by exchange in the regular way. The Archbishop announced his intention of proceeding to the Vatican and then returning to his diocese in Soviet Russia.

Asked to give his impressions of Soviet Russia, Baron Ropp replied that it was possible to describe the Government or institutions of England or France, but not of Soviet Russia, where it was possible only to quote instances of the sort of things that were happening.

The country was in the hands of five or six men, so-called Idealists, chiefly Jews, and of a band of brigands. He considered that if Trotsky, Radek, Zinovief, Derzjinsky, and Lenin (who was losing importance) were removed, Bolshevism would collapse. He was of opinion that the Intelligenzia in Soviet Russia were far too much crushed to make any effort to rise against the Bolsheviks, but he was sure that they would all welcome above everything else the arrival of Denikin at Moscow and Petrograd, pushed by the Allies. The peasants, too, would welcome him if he came as a reasonable man.

Until a couple of months ago the people looked confidently towards the Allies,

but recently the continuous tergiversation of the Allied policy was causing them to lose faith in the Allies and to place their hopes in the Germans. He thought that there were not many Germans at present in Bolshevik Russia, but that there was nevertheless constant liaison between Petrograd and Germany. This was greatly facilitated by the lack of any effectual national boundary between Soviet Russia and anti-Bolshevik countries.

Asked whether he subscribed to the view that the hands of the Bolsheviks were strengthened by the active opposition of the anti-Bolshevik Russians and of the Allies, the Archbishop replied that he knew there were people in Soviet Russia who held this view, but that he himself could not express an opinion on the matter.

As an example of the Jewish hold over the country, he mentioned that a friend of his had heard the Commissaries at Smolensk say that they only allowed non-Jews to hold power in such conspicuous places as Petrograd and Moscow, but that the Commissaries in the provinces were all Jews.

The theory of the Bolshevik system was to collect food to central institutions and thence to distribute it direct to the people without the intermediary of middle men. For purposes of distribution the people were divided into four categories, the first two being manual and intellectual workers. The last two received, to use the Archbishop's phrase, 'only matches'.

In practice, however, the system was corrupt from top to bottom. Had Russians been angels it might have worked, but Russians being what they are, it was quite impracticable. Thus an official commission sent to get food from South-East Russia had to bribe people all along the line before they could transport into the interior.

The economic condition of the country was becoming worse and worse. All fences round Moscow were being pulled down, and many houses were being broken up for fuel. Trains were becoming rarer and rarer.

The Bolshevik army was held together mainly by terror, and owed its success over its opponents principally to sheer weight of numbers. As an instance of their lack of zest for their cause, he quoted the capture of Orel by Denikin's troops as seen by a friend of his. The Bolshevik troops to the number of about 100 erected a barricade in the main street, a commissary harangued them, a single mounted Cossack appeared at the other end of the street, the commissary disappeared, the Bolsheviks fired and killed the horse of the Cossack, who escaped into a side street. Four more of Denikin's men then appeared and put up their rifles, whereupon the Bolsheviks raised a white handkerchief. Their leader came out to parley, and was asked by Denikin's men to cross himself. This he did, and similarly all his men. The Denikinites and the 100 ex-Bolsheviks then went through the town re-establishing the local authorities and turning out all Jews.

The stories of Bolshevik treatment of women and children were exaggerated. Women were not nationalised, but all difficulties had been removed in the way of obtaining divorce. Parents voluntarily sent their children to Bolshevik schools because they were well fed there. But they were also badly spoilt and taught nothing.

With regard to the land question, the Archbishop was clear that the proprietors must not be allowed to return on the heels of Denikin and that the peasants must buy the land from the State. He considered that big properties should not be abolished but diminished.

He admitted that the peasants of Great Russia might be disposed towards Communism, but in this connection he emphasised the distinction that must be

drawn between such Slavonic races as the Poles, White Russians, and Little Russians, and the Great Russians, who are Finns and Tartars in origin.

As to the question of labour, Baron Ropp stated that managers were now paid about twice as much as their workmen, and that all works were divided into four grades, of which the first two were those that were in good order and well situated. He mentioned with ridicule that a Bolshevik professor had instanced to him as conclusive proof of the pride that workmen were now beginning to take in their work, the fact that certain workmen of the second category made trouble until they were raised into the first category! Only the first category received a full supply of fuel.

Archbishop Ropp produced the impression of having a fair and well-balanced judgment and of having an intimate and personal experience of conditions in his country.

APPENDIX D TO No. 656

Document 1

To Mr. Mackinder,

The Government of the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in South Russia, Lieutenant-General Denikin, recognises the extreme desirability of the British Government considering the question of economic co-operation in South Russia in order that, as the army advances, railway and water transport may be put in order in the shortest possible time, and also the economic life of the country be restored and a sound system of barter be established with Allied countries.

Acting President and Member for War and Marine,

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LUKOMSKY.

Member for Supplies and Food Control,

A. KRIVOSHEIN.

Member for Finance,

M. BERNATSKY.

Member for Commerce and Industry,

E. FENIN.

Legal Member,

V. CHELICHICHEF.

January 15, 1920.

Translation by General Keyes and Colonel Svegentsof. Original at Novorossisk.

Document 2

Memorandum by Mr. A. G. H. Dickson, Manager of the British Trade Corporation and Chairman of the London Committee of the National Bank of Turkey

Trade and the South Russia Banking Agency (Limited)

In what he described as a fundamental discussion, held in Constantinople on the 28th December, 1919, Mr. H. J. Mackinder, High Commissioner to South Russia, explained that British traders doing business with that country must not look for fresh credits or guarantees from the Treasury beyond the Export Credit Scheme of the Board of Trade and the purchases which the Wheat Controller might perhaps make.

It is essential, he said, for the flow of trade to commence, and it is up to the City of London to devise and organise a scheme of barter, it being for the moment impracticable to attempt a reorganisation of the rouble currency. In doing this, we shall only repeat what we have often successfully done in the past by chartered companies and by bodies of 'merchant adventurers', who have collectively opened up trade with undeveloped regions. Practically speaking, Russia is to-day an unorganised country with no civil Government. It is for England to provide and run the machinery required for the exchange of commodities, and in his opinion the prize is well worth the effort.

Mr. Mackinder explained that he proposed to spend the coming weeks in examining the position on the spot, and that anything he now said was subject to modification resulting from this enquiry. But he had given careful thought to the matter, and had so far come to the conclusion that the surest way to success would be through control of the bulk of imported goods by some body or institution run by Englishmen, and which would operate under his direct inspiration; its agents up-country, who might euphemistically be called 'commercial travellers', would set up the organisation required.

By such an arrangement Mr. Mackinder would be armed with a powerful fulcrum wherewith to exercise pressure on the Russian authorities, who would thus be forced to authorise exports on an equitable footing; the unscrupulous importer would be held in check, and undue competition against each other on the part of individual British firms would be reduced or eliminated.

Assuming, as is probable, that the Denikin front is again stabilised, a fresh offensive on his part is to be anticipated in the spring, and by that time arrangements should have been completed to allow of the suggested organisation commencing operations at the right moment.

Can the South Russia Banking Agency (Limited) either as at present constituted or suitably enlarged, undertake the work suggested by Mr. Mackinder?

The following points merit consideration:—

- (i) It is the only suitable British organisation on the spot, and, being of undoubted standing, would presumably inspire confidence.
- (ii) It has from its inception intended to specialise in handling goods consigned to it and to run warehouses for their storage and exchange against produce.
- (iii) Through its founders it will be in a strong position for offering financial facilities against shipments in both directions.
- (iv) Arrangements should be made whereby British goods consigned to it would be eligible for advances under the export credit scheme, even though unsold, on condition that it undertook not to part with the goods except against produce of approximately corresponding value; such produce to be held at the disposal of the Export Credit Department. It is suggested that this or some similar arrangement would be of a nature to confer a virtual monopoly to the institution selected as regards direct shipments from England.
- (v) In the case of large consignments, the probability is that shippers would send out special representatives to attend to their sale, but where necessary the agency would undertake to sell on behalf of customers at limits fixed by them. Should it be found feasible to control prices in Russia, and thus be thought desirable to limit the profit of exporters to a maximum per-

centage of cost, as the Export Credit Department is already checking cost prices, it could easily extend its system to fixing sterling sale prices for Russia.

- (vi) It would, however, be necessary to control the price of all imports and not only those shipped direct from England. This could probably best be done by an Anglo-Russian Commission sitting in South Russian ports on the lines organised in Greece during the war. This Commission would employ the South Russia Banking Agency (Limited) for the handling of all the imports authorised by it. In this manner the fulcrum desired by the High Commissioner would be greatly strengthened in the common interest.
- (vii) The agency would provide expert valuers of the principal articles of export, such as cereals, wool, tobacco, oil, hides, &c., to assist purchasers of such commodities both at the ports and the leading centres up-country.

A. G. H. DICKSON

December 29, 1919.

Note.—The South Russia Banking Agency was organised under official inspiration by the following banks:—

The London and Provincial Bank of England (Limited).

The London County, Westminster, and Parr's Bank (Limited).

Lloyd's Bank (Limited).

The British Trade Corporation.

Document 3

Memorandum from a Deputation of British Traders who waited on the High Commissioner on January 14, 1920

To H. J. Mackinder, Esq., M.P.,

His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in South Russia.

Sir,

The following is the considered opinion of the Committee elected by the British trading community in South Russia as to the general principles upon which trade relations between Russia and Great Britain should be based.

The vicissitudes of civil war and the constant changes in the economic policy of the Russian Government made it impossible to carry on trade on ordinary lines, solely on the responsibility of individual traders. The ultimate possibilities of trade here are enormous, and in order to retain all opportunities for British enterprise it is strongly urged that trade operations between the two countries should be co-ordinated, as far as matters of principle are concerned, through a central organisation, preferably under Government auspices, and that this organisation should continue to function until normal conditions are re-established.

It is desirable that representatives of His Majesty's Government should approach the Government of the Armed Forces of South Russia in order to draft the principles of a trading policy between the two countries. This policy should be worked out in detail in order that the responsibilities and difficulties to be faced by British trading organisations should be precisely defined and made clear to all concerned. In this connection the utter depreciation of currency is a matter to be seriously considered.

The organisation of transport and of the chief shipping ports represents a first

essential, and, so far as is possible, should be effected through a joint organisation of Russian and British representatives.

Data in amplification of the above proposals have been brought together, and can be submitted for the consideration of His Majesty's Government as a basis for the future conduct of economic affairs with South Russia.

R. G. PEARCE
C. GRABOWSKY
ARTHUR DEACON

NOVOROSSISK, *January 15, 1920.*¹⁵

APPENDIX E TO No. 656

*Guarantee given by Mr. Mackinder to General Denikin at Tikhoretskaya
on January 10, 1920*

The British High Commissioner for South Russia, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, guarantees that all available ships, naval and commercial, will be used to evacuate the wives and families of Russian officers if and when the necessity arises, and that the British Military Mission will form the rearguard for the protection of these wives and families, but both the High Commissioner and General Holman are convinced that the necessity will not arise if all Russian officers will rise to the great occasion which confronts them.

APPENDIX F TO No. 656¹⁶

Note on German Official Relations with the Soviet Government

When I was on the point of leaving Novorossisk on my journey home General Lukomsky made the following statements to me:—

1. Krassin makes frequent journeys to Berlin.
2. Madame Kharitonenko, wife of the proprietor of a sugar factory, went from Malta to Geneva some one or two months ago. At Geneva she met by accident in a drawing-room Bülow¹⁷ and Allersleben [? Alvensleben]¹⁸. They told her they had received plenipotentiary powers to go to Moscow, and to get into relations with the Soviet Government. One or other of them showed her their passports. Madame Kharitonenko was in Novorossisk when I left, but I had not time to send for her and to cross-examine her. I see no reason, however, to doubt the accuracy of General Lukomsky's report of what she had told him, though it seems curious that such a meeting should have taken place by accident.

¹⁵ This document was followed in the original of this appendix by documents 4 and 5. Document 4 was a short, undated memorandum, bearing the same three signatures as document 3 and reading as follows: 'The total approximate value of British goods at present in the port of Novorossisk is three and a half million pounds sterling.' Document 5, not printed, was a 'List of British Firms presently represented in South Russia who appointed the Deputation to His Majesty's High Commissioner for South Russia'. The list contained the names of twenty-four firms.

¹⁶ This appendix is lacking in the original typescript and has been supplied from Confidential Print.

¹⁷ Possibly Herr B. W. von Bülow, formerly a member of the German Peace Delegation at Versailles. Herr von Bülow had recently resigned from the German diplomatic service on an issue of policy.

¹⁸ H.M. Minister at Berne had reported in May 1919 that Count Alvensleben owned a villa by the lake of Geneva and was reported to have been summoned to Berlin with a view to proceeding to Petrograd and entering into negotiations with the Soviet Government.

No. 657

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received January 22)
No. 66 Telegraphic [172677/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, January 21, 1920

Following from Mr. O'Grady. Begins:—

Mr. North writes me from Moscow that dysentery, typhus and smallpox have broken out in two Lagers. Three Englishmen suffering from smallpox. North appeals to expedite exchange of prisoners and nationals. This is impossible until Archangel matter and Berlin Commission is settled. How do these questions now stand?

No. 658

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received January 23)
Telegraphic: by wireless [172708/9/38]

MOSCOW, January 21, 1920

On 19th September, in our answer to your radio of 15th September¹, we pointed out that Denmark would not be a place well fit for the conference between the delegates of our two countries and we tried to make it clear that we could not allow our representative to be placed in humiliating conditions of semi-arrest.² We rejected especially any attempt of a semi-internment of our delegate in special place of abode. In your radio of 15th October³ you insisted upon the choice of Denmark, guaranteed to our delegation freedom of movement and promised that no special place of abode would be assigned to them. We withdrew accordingly our objections, being desirous of meeting in every possible way the wish of the British Government. Unfortunately, the promises of the Danish Government have been grossly violated and the guarantees given to us by the British Government have proved now to be without effect. The stipulation concerning our delegate's freedom of abode has been transgressed by the Danish Government from the beginning; it has created intolerable conditions for his work and many times already has our delegate, Litvinof, insisted before Mr. O'Grady upon the necessity of transferring the negotiations to another country. This transfer has now become inevitable owing to the conduct of the Danish Government, and the Soviet Government sees itself compelled to insist upon the immediate adoption of measures in this sense. The perpetual presence of a number of detectives at the hotel where M. Litvinof resides has had as result that the hotel-keeper objects to his further presence and at the same time the Danish authorities do not allow M. Litvinof to choose himself his place of abode and to move freely so that he virtually is in a state of semi-arrest. The Danish Government has not kept its promise and the pledge given by the British Government remains without effect. Just now, when a satisfactory outcome of the pourparlers seems to be imminent, this happy result, so desirable for both

¹ Transmission to Moscow of No. 417.

² See No. 436.

³ Transmission to Moscow of No. 471.

countries, is rendered impossible until the conference is transferred. We protest most strongly against our delegate being put in a state of semi-arrest and we do not doubt that the British Government will readily meet our most lawful desire.

No. 659

Mr. Leggett (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received January 27)
No. 23 Telegraphic [173908/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, *January 22, 1920*

Following from Mr. Lampson, Harbin, No. 27, 21st January. Begins:
'In an order dated Nijni-Udinsk, 4th January, and countersigned by Premier Pepelaief, but only published by Semenof on 20th January, Admiral Koltchak announces his resignation as supreme ruler in favour of General Denikin, and, pending latter's instructions, hands over full military and civil power in the Far East to Semenof.'

Repeated to Peking and Tokyo.

No. 660

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received January 25)
No. 48 Telegraphic [173360/91/38]

WARSAW, *January 23, 1920*

I had a long interview with Chief of State today.

He described to me conversations he had had with MM. Savinkoff and Tchrikovsky [? Tchaikovsky] who have recently come here to see him. General Pilsudski said that he felt in dealing with anti-Bolshevik Russians it was no longer any use starting from theory that Russia could revert to position of pre-war Russia minus Poland and Finland. It was necessary to start from some other basis. He had therefore welcomed visit of MM. Savinkoff and Tchrikovsky as he and former had many mutual friends, and he had known latter personally for a number of years.

He had laid before them two plans, a large and a smaller plan. Larger plan consisted of an alliance between all the Russian Border States, Finland and Poland and anti-Bolshevik Russia for combating of Bolshevism. Lesser plan would merely seek to regulate future relations between Poland and anti-Bolshevik Russia.

Under larger plan he suggested all the former Russian border States should elect constituent Assemblies, which should be in touch with each other and which should guarantee integrity of their respective territories. Proposal for election of Constituent Assemblies would *ipso facto* bring these States into opposition to Bolsheviks who are opposed to summoning of a Constituent Assembly. Summoning of such Assemblies in Russian Border States would indicate to world that these States wished their Governments to be based

on public opinion. This would be a good cry. He said that his idea was in fact creation of a kind of League of Nations in Near East of Europe for combating of Bolsheviks. He had asked Messieurs. Savinkoff and Tchrikovsky to consider this proposal and to see him again.

They returned after an interval of two days and said that they accepted his larger plan but that they would prefer to call combination of States a Federation rather than an alliance. General Pilsudski pointed out that neither Poland nor Finland could be included in a Federation because they were independent States. Russians hoped that he would not encourage other Border States to object to word 'Federation'. Briefly he had gathered clearly from MM. Savinkoff and Tchrikovsky that they would never be resigned to agree to complete independence of former Russian Border States and would only be prepared to grant them autonomy.

Russians then asked whether he would agree to Russian formations being attached to and fighting with Polish Army. He had told Russians frankly that whilst this proposal might seem feasible in principle, it was not practicable.

He could not be certain of Russians who might be recruited in Poland. (? He was most) unfavourably impressed by fact that (? war) between (? Bolsheviks) and anti-Bolsheviks had taken on a character of war of revenge. Polish troops would be compromised if Russian formations attached to them antagonised peasantry. M. Savinkoff has left for Paris with General Pilsudski's scheme and M. Tchrikovsky has gone to Denikin's headquarters.

Repeated to Constantinople for Sir H. Mackinder.

No. 661

Lord Acton (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received January 24)

No. 98 Telegraphic [173314/61232/59]

HELSINGFORS, *January 23, 1920*

Esthonian Prime Minister asked me this evening whether His Majesty's Government would oppose decision of his delegation to decline proposal of Latvia, Finland and Poland that Esthonian Peace with Russia should be deferred until conclusion of general peace between Border States and Soviet Government. He said that there were three distinct currents of opinion in Conference in connection with Military Convention:¹ Latvia was aggressive in spirit and desired to subordinate defensive character to evacuation of Latgallia (Bolsheviks on the other hand decline to surrender railroad section Pleskow-Dwinsk).

Secondly. Finland was determined in her (? anti-)Bolshevism but was afraid to move lest she should offend Entente.

Lastly. Esthonia who still held her front prevented displacement of Bolshevik forces to detriment of other Border States but was now unable to

¹ A proposed military convention between the Baltic States had been discussed at the conference at Helsingfors. Cf. No. 646, note 3.

longer defer conclusion of preliminaries of peace. By making contact with Soviet, Esthonia considers that she will render service to Allies should economic *modus vivendi* lead to inevitable political peace. But Esthonia did not wish to open the door between Bolshevism and Western Europe should political *status quo* between Great Powers and Soviet endure.

I replied that it was inconceivable that other Border States with full knowledge of recent experience of Esthonia at Narva and Dorpat should demand of latter State that she should renew policy imposed by events and further jeopardise her defences. I also reminded him of advice given by Your Lordship to Esthonia last month² to the effect that latter State must be arbiter of her own destinies and abstain from burdening Great Britain with (? responsibility for) momentous decision.

M. Tonnisson told me Bolsheviks at Dorpat are stiffening their attitude in respect of economic questions and that signature is not imminent.

Repeated to Warsaw and Reval.

² See No. 610.

No. 662

Lord Acton (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received January 26)
No. 106 Telegraphic, en clair [173332/61232/59]

HELSINGFORS, January 24, 1920

In public statement made by Finnish Prime Minister on close of Baltic Conference, results were summed up as follows. Conference agreed all differences of opinion on territorial questions between themselves or between themselves and Russia to be decided on basis of popular right of self-determination. Important to Finland with regard to East Carelia, liberation of population of that country from foreign sway being one of main points of foreign policy. Conference hopes that the independence of Esthonia, Lettland and Lithuania will be internationally recognised *de jure* as soon as possible. The conference has agreed on a common programme of defence against the Eastern danger. Bolsheviks now holding further Carelia and following imperialist policy south of the Gulf of Finland. Relations with Soviet Russia are to be settled in understanding with the Entente in so far as this can be done in agreement with the conditions vital to the life of the separate States. Latter are opposed to Bolshevism, which they believe will soon be replaced by a democratic system in Russia, whether the Bolshevik system falls or is overthrown by force of arms. The States hope the former may be the case, and see signs that it will be so. The vital interests of these States must not be sacrificed to Russia, but the Russian people must create their own political life. The conference is agreed on the arrangement of economic and commercial conditions. States represented have enormous possibilities of development mutual exchange [*sic*] of goods, especially if Ukraine should join them. Poland recognises the independence of Lithuania. Their differences only concern the frontier. A special commission is proposed

to clear up the difference of opinion between the two States. Proposed special commission to meet in Vilna, and it is hoped it will come to a result. The question of the neutralisation of the Baltic is to be considered and submitted to a later conference. It is specially important for Finland and Esthonia that the Gulf of Finland should be neutralised, especially as the Bolsheviki are now planning to build a fortress on Hogland which would command the whole gulf. It is, however, also important to other States to avoid the necessity of maintaining an expensive fleet in these waters.

No. 663

Mr. Hodgson (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received January 29)

No. 27 Telegraphic [174572/11/57]

VLADIVOSTOK, *January 24, 1920*

Following from consul, Chita, No. 17, 22nd January. Begins.

Semenof this morning gave me a copy of following telegram from Irkutsk, dated 21st January. Begins.

'To all Institutions and Revolutionary Committees.

'To-day power in Irkutsk has been taken over by Military Revolutionary Committee of Russian Social Sovetski Republic. Political Centre¹ surrendered without conflict. January 25th there will be summoned a council of workmen, soldiers and peasant deputies. Revolutionary Committee.' Ends.

Repeated to Peking.

¹ The Political Centre at Irkutsk was an organization which included moderate non-communist opponents of the régime of Admiral Kolchak. The Political Centre had assumed power in Irkutsk on January 5, 1920.

No. 664

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw)

No. 46 Telegraphic [174277/40430/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 27, 1920*

Yesterday M. Patek had an interview with the Prime Minister on the subject of the Bolshevik offer of peace to Poland. The Prime Minister stated formally to M. Patek that, while it was not for Great Britain to advise Poland, which must take the full responsibility for deciding as between peace and war, the British Government certainly did not advise war. He then explained to M. Patek the situation as he saw it. Six months ago there was a great converging movement against Bolshevism, including Koltchak, Denikin, Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and the British at Archangel. Poland at that time was only a unit in a great combined movement pressing the Bolsheviks on all sides. Now, on the other hand, Poland was alone. The Allies had withdrawn from Russia. Koltchak had disappeared. Denikin had been defeated. Esthonia had made an armistice, and, if his information was correct,

Latvia intended to follow suit immediately.¹ There was clearly, therefore, grave risk that Poland might be left to face a Bolshevik concentration by itself. The Prime Minister therefore wished to make it perfectly clear to the Polish Government that the British Government did not wish to give Poland the slightest encouragement to pursue the policy of war, because if it were to give that advice it would incur responsibilities which it could not discharge.

The Prime Minister then gave certain reasons for his opinion that Bolshevism did not constitute a serious military menace outside its own borders. The danger from its propaganda was perhaps as great as ever, but he did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet authorities to organise a really formidable army for offensive purposes against the West, while there was reason for thinking that the revolutionaries were becoming afraid of the military instrument they had created. A military *coup d'état* in Russia might be a very formidable menace to Poland. He did not think that the Bolshevik armies, in view of the great desire of the population for peace, now constituted a military menace against any well-organised State. Their transportation and manufacturing resources were not sufficient to admit of great offensive operations. In addition, there was nothing in the shape of food or raw materials to attract an army to march into Poland, Hungary, or Germany.

The conversation then turned upon the character of a possible peace between Poland and Russia. The Prime Minister made it clear that, in his opinion, the principal difficulty would be the fact that the Polish armies had advanced far beyond the racial boundary into considerable territories which contained large Russian majorities. The Prime Minister said that if the Poles made a sincere attempt to make an equitable peace and the Bolsheviks either refused peace or, having made peace, proceeded to repudiate it, Great Britain would feel bound to assist Poland to the best of its power. He was sure that it would be possible both for the French and British Governments to rouse their people, exhausted as they were by five years' war, to make fresh efforts if Poland had made a sincere attempt to make peace on fair terms and the Bolsheviks rejected it and attacked Poland instead. If, on the other hand, Poland insisted on retaining within Poland areas which were indisputably Russian according to the principles generally applied by the Peace Conference, and if the Bolshevik Government refused the peace on this ground and attacked Poland in order to recover Russian districts for Russia, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the British Government to get public opinion to support military or financial outlay in these circumstances. The

¹ On January 29, 1920, a note from M. Bisseneek informed Lord Curzon that the Latvian Government intended to conclude an armistice with Soviet Russia and desired to ascertain the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this matter. In a reply of February 5 Mr. Spicer informed M. Bisseneek that he was directed by Lord Curzon to state that the attitude of His Majesty's Government as defined in No. 445 remained unchanged, and that 'the question of the conclusion of an armistice with the Soviet Government is one which must be decided entirely in the interests of Latvia, and His Majesty's Government would wish to leave the Lettish authorities full liberty to make a decision according to their own judgment in the matter.' An armistice between Latvia and Soviet Russia was concluded on February 11, 1920.

Prime Minister further said that the Allies intended, if possible, to re-establish trade relations with Russia through the co-operative organisations partly because they believed that this was the best method of bringing peace and mitigating Bolshevism in Russia and partly because Russian sources of supply of food and raw materials were essential to the feeding of Europe and the bringing down of prices. The British Government did not want Poland, which was itself short of food and raw materials, to maintain an economic barrier through warlike operations between itself and Russia while the Allies were themselves trading to the best of their ability with the Russian people.

Finally the Prime Minister said that Great Britain entertained feelings of the most sincere friendship for Poland, and it was in the spirit of this friendship that he felt bound to make perfectly clear to the Polish Government at once what was the British attitude towards the whole question. The responsibility of deciding between peace and war was one which must be taken by the Polish Government alone, but he thought that it was essential that the Polish Government should know fully the mind of the British Government before it took its decision. Hence the declarations which he had just made.

In reply M. Patek asked two questions. In the first place he pointed out that the Soviet Government was not recognised by the Allies nor by great sections of Russian opinion. Would the Allies guarantee any peace made with Soviet Russia, for under existing circumstances there was nothing to prevent either the Soviet Government itself, which was not a *de jure* Government under international law, or its successor from repudiating any treaty it made? The Prime Minister replied that it was obviously impossible for the Allies to guarantee a treaty or to go beyond the general guarantees contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This difficulty was inherent in the existing state of affairs, and it was really a question of the balance between the risk of making peace with an unstable Government and the risk of war. Secondly, M. Patek asked whether the Prime Minister's declarations were those of all the Allies. To this the Prime Minister replied that they represented in the first place the deliberate decision of the British Government, and that he could inform M. Patek that Signor Nitti² entirely agreed with them. As to M. Millerand the Prime Minister had not discussed the question with him because M. Millerand had not had time to get into office.³ He was pretty confident, however, that France and the Supreme Council when it came to consider the question would take the same attitude as he had just outlined. In conclusion the Prime Minister expressed the hope that Poland would be able to settle its controversies with Lithuania at an early date and peacefully, and that Poland would take no action against Lithuania without in the first instance bringing the matter before the Supreme Council. M. Patek agreed, remarking that he did not anticipate serious difficulty in arriving at an agreement.

The interview was most friendly and cordial throughout.

² Italian Prime Minister.

³ M. Millerand had succeeded M. Clemenceau as French Prime Minister when the latter resigned office on January 18, 1920, after the recent elections in France.

No. 665

*Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin)*¹

No. 19 Telegraphic [171809/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 27, 1920*

In our negotiations at Copenhagen with Litvinof, through Mr. O'Grady, the former has claimed Soviet representation on the International Commission for Russian Prisoners of War in Germany; in return for such representation Litvinof said he would repatriate all British civilians in Russia.

The matter was considered by the Council of Ambassadors² to raise questions which were beyond their competence, and it was to be referred to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretaries, but during the recent Conference in Paris they had no opportunity of discussing the question, which is therefore in abeyance.

As soon as the affairs of the Inter-Allied Commission are wound up we shall be in a stronger position regarding Litvinof; in any case, it seems that the present Commission can have no status as the treaty has now come into force.

We shall be glad if you will ascertain definitely from the German Government whether they intend to set up International Commission to deal with prisoners of war.

The repatriation of the prisoners to South Russia having been suspended, we should be glad to learn exactly what Colonel Brandt is doing in connection with these prisoners. Has he unrestricted access to them? Is he engaged in propaganda? If so, it might be suggested to the German Government that his continued presence is likely to lead to demands from Soviet Government which they may find embarrassing.

Addressed to Berlin, No. 19; repeated to Copenhagen for Mr. O'Grady, No. 58, Confidential.

¹ Lord Kilmarnock had been appointed British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin in consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles on January 10, 1920, thus formally re-establishing a state of peace with Germany.

² In fact by the Supreme Council (Heads of Delegations): see No. 633.

No. 666

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 61 Telegraphic [171809/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 28, 1920*

My telegram No. 58, repeating my No. 19 to Berlin.¹

Following for Mr. O'Grady.

You will see that the question has not been discussed by Prime Ministers. Lord Derby is pressing for the winding up of the Allied Commission now existing, and as there is little prospect of the International Commission being set up, the way would be clear for the course foreshadowed in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 17.² If you think it desirable you may inform Litvinof that Colonel Brandt's activities are being enquired into.

¹ No. 665.

² No. 633.

No. 667

Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Received January 30)

No. 29 Telegraphic [174916/9/38]

Your telegram No. 19.¹

BERLIN, January 29, 1920

Inter-Allied Commission for Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War ceased to exist on 2nd August, 1919, in accordance with ruling given by Marshal Foch.² International Commission was then formed to replace it, but Germans refused always to . . . [? acknowledge]³ reception of it officially or to appoint delegates to it though they attended its meetings unofficially.

At meeting held on 3rd January Germans stated that German Government had invited International Red Cross to take over whole question in place of International Commission which had been proposed in Paris. This the International Red Cross promised to consent to do, and it was understood Herr Frick⁴ would shortly come to Berlin to arrange details.

Above was reported to Supreme Council by General Malcolm in his telegram of 13th January⁵ to Britcil⁶, Paris, and repeated to Director of Military Intelligence.

In the circumstances it scarcely seems necessary to enquire intentions of German Government, and I propose not to do so without further instructions.

Colonel Brandt has no access to prisoners of war. He is believed to indulge in propaganda and intrigue when opportunity offers. German Government have indicated that they wish to remove all existing missions of various Russian States now working in prisoners of war camps in Germany. They add that if any of these Russians have done good work with (? Entente) missions and it is not desired that they should be reinterned, arrangements should be made for them to leave the country. Colonel Brandt's activities will therefore presumably soon be brought to an end. (See report of Conference held 13th January and forwarded to Paris and Director of Military Intelligence.⁵)

Repeated to Copenhagen.

¹ No. 665.

² Cf. No. 44.

³ The text here is uncertain.

⁴ Swiss delegate of the International Red Cross.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Telegraphic address of the Military Section of the British Peace Delegation in Paris.

No. 668

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 65 Telegraphic [174895/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 29, 1920

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

'We have received your draft of a possible agreement with Litvinof.¹ We agree with its general tenour, but as there are various points which will require careful attention before they can be finally embodied you should not agree to it, except as a working basis, until you hear further from us.'

¹ See No. 649.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Porter (Reval)
No. 37 Telegraphic [172708/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 29, 1920*

Please transmit following to Tchicherine, Moscow.

His Majesty's Government have received your wireless of the 21st January protesting against the treatment accorded to M. Litvinof at Copenhagen.¹

It is unnecessary that I should recapitulate at length the reasons for which it was decided that the negotiations regarding the release of prisoners of war, and other British subjects in Soviet Russia, should be held at Copenhagen. They appeared to be valid at the time and I think it would only create further delays if the attempt were made to transfer the negotiations to some other city.

There is really no ground for the allegation that M. Litvinof is in a state of semi-arrest; he is at liberty to choose any hotel in Copenhagen for his abode: though the Danish Government cannot compel any hotel to afford him hospitality; the question of his accommodation has now been satisfactorily settled; he has always been free to receive any visitors whom he may wish to see. As, however, M. Litvinof is in Denmark under a safe conduct, and as civil war in Russia has roused violent passions, the Danish Government has adopted the very natural precaution of attaching detectives to him for the protection of his person. So far as His Majesty's Government are aware, M. Litvinof has never expressed a desire to have them removed. No restrictions are being placed on his activities and it is to be observed that he is able to correspond all over the world, including cypher messages to your Government, the Danish Government have scrupulously abstained from censoring his telegrams in any way.

You are aware that when the negotiations were instituted the Danish Government, as also His Majesty's Government, were under the impression that they would be concluded within a few days. The fact that they have been so prolonged is entirely due to the action of the Soviet authorities who have continually introduced fresh demands.

I must urgently request that you will instruct M. Litvinof to hasten the conclusion of the negotiations as I am in entire agreement with you, that a satisfactory outcome of the negotiations is most desirable. Throughout their course there has been every desire on our side to meet any reasonable demands of the Soviet Government, and you can rest assured that I am still ready to do all in my power to bring about a settlement between us in the interest of the unfortunate individuals stranded on both sides and longing to return to their respective countries. It is they who have to suffer from a protraction of the negotiations and I am certain that you will recognise with me that it is unfair to them and their relatives to delay a settlement any longer.

Repeated to Copenhagen 63.

¹ No. 658.

Lord Acton (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received January 31)

No. 132 Telegraphic [175145/860/38]

HELSINGFORS, *January 30, 1920*

Following sent today to Copenhagen No. 52.

My telegram No. 50.¹

Lieutenant Bremner who is . . . [? bearer]² of a letter from Mr. North to Mr. O'Grady asks me to state by telegraph in view of the length of the passage from Hango to Copenhagen that condition of affairs in prisons and camps at Moscow is far worse than that described in Mr. North's letter which was couched in euphemistic language as it was submitted to perusal of Bolshevik authorities.

He desires O'Grady to know that feeling amongst British military and naval prisoners in Moscow is running high owing to suggestions (? made in) Soviet Russia that economic change of policy means thin end of the wedge. Prisoners are apprehensive lest exchange may be delayed and their own interests sacrificed to political aims.

It is urgently necessary that consignments of serum against spotted typhus and smallpox should be despatched at once to Mr. North.

Latter is in no financial stress as he distributes food to 200 British subjects daily, such food being purchased with money lent him by Jews at rate of 8 million roubles monthly.

Mr. North however presses for arrangements for despatch of regular consignments of food from England for distribution amongst British prisoners.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

¹ This reference to correspondence between Helsingfors and Copenhagen is uncertain but it appears probable that this telegram may have been a repetition to Copenhagen of Helsingfors telegram No. 128 of January 30, 1920, to the Foreign Office reporting that the 'secretary to vice-consulate at Wiborg arrived at Helsingfors unexpectedly this morning with Lieutenant W. H. Bremner, R.N.', and three other wounded British military prisoners from Russia who had been suddenly released and repatriated by the Soviet Government as an act of grace. (Mr. O'Grady subsequently reported in Copenhagen telegram No. 141 of February 6, 1920, received February 7:

'Litvinof agrees to release immediately all British non-commissioned officers and men and any other military or naval prisoners who are wounded or sick, together with aged women and sick civilians, provided that transport facilities are made available at once for repatriating Russian prisoners in England, Holland and Denmark. As it is not yet clear how many Russian prisoners of war are in Holland and some delay may occur in arranging for departure, Litvinof is prepared to postpone repatriation until a later date if it is not practicable to send them now. I ask for your earnest consideration of this proposal after discussion with Brem[ner], who urges that no opportunity of securing immediate repatriation of non-commissioned officers and men should be lost, otherwise lives might be sacrificed from pestilence. While Brem[ner] considers it possible that men may refuse to leave without their officers, he is certain that latter would insist on their departure.'

This proposal was, however, superseded by the general agreement concluded by Mr. O'Grady and M. Litvinov on February 12, 1920: see No. 686.)

² The text here is uncertain.

No. 671

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received January 31)
No. 110 Telegraphic [175173/9/38]

Following from Mr. O'Grady.

COPENHAGEN, *January 31, 1920*

Your telegram No. 65¹ of 29th January.

I should be glad (? to receive your) final views as soon as possible concerning various points of agreement requiring careful consideration. No further progress can be made until question of Archangel prisoners has been cleared up. In the event of International Commission in Berlin failing (? to do so) M. Litvinof is prepared to release civil prisoners subject to your acquiescing in any agreement for exchange of prisoners of war concluded between Soviet Government and German Government.

In view of disturbing (? influence) which protracted course of negotiations is exercising here, M. Litvinof and myself are anxious to sign agreement without any further delay.

¹ No. 668.

No. 672

Commander Smythies (Reval) to Earl Curzon (Received February 2)
No. 6 Telegraphic [175582/67181/59]

REVAL, *February 2, 1920*

Treaty of Peace between Esthonia and Soviet Russia signed at Dorpat 2nd February.

No. 673

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 4)
No. 119 Telegraphic [176026/9/38]

Following from Mr. O'Grady:—

COPENHAGEN, *February 3, 1920*

Litvinof has copy of wire you despatched to Chicherin 29th January¹ in which (? you) require Litvinof should be instructed to hasten conclusion of negotiations. He protests against implication that he is delaying negotiations as he was willing a week ago to sign agreement, draft of which you have.

¹ No. 669.

No. 674

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received February 8)
Telegraphic: by wireless [177160/9/38]

MOSCOW, *February 6, 1920*

The Russian Soviet Government have received your radios of January 30th¹ and February 4th.² Our Delegate Litvinoff tried to ignore the presence

¹ Transmission to Moscow of No. 669.

² Not printed. This telegram No. 42 of February 3 from the Foreign Office to Reval for

of the numerous detectives until the fact of their obtrusive activity impelled the hotel-keeper to evict him while rendering it impossible for him to find an appropriate abode well fit for his work. For this same reason the hotels where Mr. O'Grady had very kindly hired rooms for our Delegate returned to him the money he had paid in advance, refusing to become the abode of a throng of troublesome police agents. Mr. O'Grady, who has invariably been obliging and attentive in the highest degree, has in his possession the proofs of all these facts. Even now the right of freely choosing his place of residence has been refused to our Delegate. Appropriate rooms were hired by him upon agreement with Mr. O'Grady in Sabarban Hotel but the Danish authorities forbade him to live in this hotel thus violating the solemn promise of freedom of sojourn guaranteed to him by the Danish and also by the British Government. The Soviet Government cannot possibly conceive that the Danish Government and the British Minister in Copenhagen should not have been able to spare to the Russian Representative humiliating conditions and troubles which hinder him most unfortunately in the completion of his work. It seems strange to us that the Danish Government should not have found it possible to watch over the security of our Representative without rendering him unable to live in an appropriate dwelling and to proceed in a normal way with his work. These facts can hardly be considered as testifying of the goodwill of the Danish Government which has also refused the permission of visiting our Delegate to the Swedish citizens Stroem and Hellberg who came to see him in connection with affairs referring to the negotiations entrusted to him. Moreover the Danish Wireless Station has during these two months thrice interrupted for a more or less considerable time the transmission of our correspondence with our representative at the Soviet Government's protests. The same time [? we protest] most emphatically against the assertion that protraction of the negotiations should have been due to the action of the Soviet Authorities. As a matter of fact the conditions of the Soviet Government have been formulated by its Delegate in the beginning and no fresh demand was introduced by him during the whole of the negotiations, many of the Soviet Government's original demands having been on the contrary taken back or deduced [? reduced]. Only once did our Delegate refer to Moscow and that at the moment when the negotiations were threatened with a complete breakdown and the answer from Moscow came on the second day. The powers of Mr. O'Grady were on the contrary so limited that he had to refer to London concerning every detail and he waited for answers and for new instructions sometimes during several weeks. He interrupted the negotiations in order to go to London where he remained two weeks and the signature of the final agreement was then postponed by Mr. O'Grady and not transmission to M. Chicherin at Moscow stated that in accordance with M. Litvinov's wishes the Danish Government had agreed to withdraw the detectives who had been attached to him. The telegram concluded: 'M. Litvinov went to Copenhagen under a safe-conduct, but, as he has now asked for the discontinuance of such measures as were taken to make it effective, both the Danish Government and His Majesty's Government feel bound to place it on record that should any regrettable incident occur, which they would naturally deplore, they cannot be held responsible.'

by our Delegate. It was agreed that the signature was to take place on January the thirtieth when the news came from London that the British Government desired to introduce fresh demands and to modify some of the previous conditions. The responsibility for the postponement of the agreement rests thus entirely with the British Government. In spite of the abnormal conditions created to our Delegate in Denmark he has consented to remain there until the agreement is signed whereupon for the period of its realization Mr. O'Grady consents to go together with our Delegate to another country. Seeing that the joint efforts of both Delegates will be necessary for conducting the exchange to a successful ending we look forward to your proposals about transferring their activities to a country where no hindrance will be put to the latter.

No. 675

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 96 Telegraphic [177412/9/38]

Following for Mr. O'Grady:

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 7, 1920

A draft agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government has been prepared on the basis of that submitted by you and has been approved by the Cabinet.¹

¹ This draft agreement read as follows:

'Draft Agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government of Russia for the Exchange of Prisoners.

'The British Government and the Russian Soviet Government, being desirous of effecting an exchange of combatant and civilian prisoners and others and of facilitating the return of their nationals respectively, have agreed as follows:—

'Article 1.—Repatriation of Russian Combatants.

'The British Government will repatriate all Russian combatant prisoners in the British Empire or in any territory over which the British Government at present exercises direct authority.

'Article 2.—Repatriation of Russian Civilians.

'The British Government will repatriate all Russian civilians in the British Empire or in any territory where the British Government exercises direct authority, whether they are at liberty, interned, or imprisoned, who are willing to return to Russia.

'Article 3.—Repatriation of certain specified Russians.

'The provisions of Articles 1 and 2 will apply to Russians captured in the Caucasus or the Caspian and in Persia whose names, so far as they can be identified, appear on a list of such persons submitted by the Soviet Government to the British Government.

'Article 4.—Repatriation of Russians from Archangel.

'The British Government undertakes, subject to the provisions of Article 8, to secure the delivery to the Soviet Government of the Russian combatant prisoners and civilian officials who are in the custody of the Archangel Government and who have been captured at any time since the landing of the British forces in North Russia. This undertaking will apply to all those whose release is desired by the Soviet Government and who themselves desire to leave the territory under the control of the Archangel Government. This undertaking will include also the persons whose names appear on the list already submitted by the Soviet

This agreement, together with a letter from M. Sabline containing a list of forty prisoners whom General Miller is in a position immediately to exchange at Archangel in return for Colonel Mikhaief and the other 'White' officers of Archangel forces in the hands of the Soviet Government, is being brought to you by the commanding officer of His Majesty's Ship *Whirlwind*, due Copenhagen 8th February.

Government, which list is set out in Annex (A) [twenty-six names: not printed] to this Agreement, in so far as they can be identified.

'Article 5.—Transport Facilities.

'The British Government undertakes to provide transport facilities for all persons who will be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of this Agreement.

'The British Government further undertakes to render every possible assistance, so far as sea transport is concerned, if it should become necessary to do so, for the repatriation of Russian nationals who are at present either prisoners in or who are unable to leave Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland. This undertaking is subject to the conclusion by the Soviet Government of agreements with the Governments of the above-mentioned States for the repatriation of the persons concerned.

'The British Government further undertakes to make representations to the Governments of the Baltic States for the granting of the necessary facilities for the safe conveyance of all persons who are to be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing Articles.

'Article 6.—Proposed International Commission in Berlin.

'In the event of the establishment of an International Commission in Berlin for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany, the British Government undertakes to support, so far as it lies within its power to do so, the claims of the Soviet Government to be represented on such a Commission and to have equal rights with other members of the Commission. These rights are understood to include communication with the Soviet Government by their representative and the making of arrangements with the Commission for the speedy repatriation of those Russian prisoners of war at present in Germany who desire to return to Soviet Russia.

'Article 7.—Repatriation of British Prisoners.

'The Soviet Government will repatriate all British combatants and civilian prisoners and all other British nationals at present in Soviet Russia who wish to return to any portion of the British Empire.

'Article 8.—Repatriation of Russian Combatants of the Archangel Forces.

'In return for the undertaking given by the British Government in Article 4 above to secure the delivery to the Soviet Government of those nationals captured in North Russia, whose names appear in Annex (A), the Soviet Government on its part will return to the Archangel Government all officers, doctors, and military clerks of the 5th North Rifle Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the Artillery Division captured on the Onega who wish to return to North Russia. This undertaking includes those persons whose names appear on the list contained in Annex (B) [ten names: not printed] to this Agreement. Arrangements for this exchange of prisoners will be subsequently arrived at by means of direct communications between the military authorities on the spot.

'Article 9.—Operation of this Agreement.

'Notwithstanding any delay which may take place before the putting into force of the arrangements contemplated in Articles 4, 5, 6, and 8, the British and Soviet Governments respectively undertake to carry out the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 3, and 7 immediately after the signing of the Agreement.

'Signed on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government:

'Signed on behalf of the Russian Soviet Government.'

The instructions issued by the Cabinet are that you should present this agreement as soon as possible to Litvinof. If he is still unwilling to accept the numerous concessions made, His Majesty's Government will publish the terms of the proposed agreement and give the Soviet Government seven days within which finally to accept or reject it.

Failing acceptance by the Soviet Government at the close of that period, you will break off negotiations and return to London. Please telegraph when you have received the document.

No. 676

Earl Curzon to General Keyes (Novorossisk)

No. 81 Telegraphic [177675/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 9, 1920*

His Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the proposals discussed between General Denikin's Government and Mr. Mackinder for combined offensive operations between the Poles and the Russians against the Bolsheviks. The situation has changed radically from many points of view since these discussions, which, at the time, had my full approval.

In the first place, evidence has been accumulating that internal conditions in Poland are not such as to admit of their undertaking military operations on a large scale.

Secondly, failure of General Denikin's administration has been so complete that it is idle to hope for any substantial recovery.

Thirdly, the food situation of Europe in general makes it imperative that by some means or another surplus supplies in Russia should be made available as soon as possible. This is obviously impossible if military operations on a large scale are to continue for an indefinite period.

In view of these three factors, His Majesty's Government have, as you are already aware, informed the Polish Government that if they undertake an offensive against the Bolsheviks they will not receive support.¹ (For your confidential information, it seems probable that the Polish Government will consider peace proposals already made to them.) Further His Majesty's Government are endeavouring to set on foot through the Co-operative Societies an exchange of commodities with Soviet Russia.² Whether or not this attempt will be successful remains to be seen, but its failure is certain if all available transport in Soviet Russia has to be diverted to the movement of troops.

As regards the trading scheme, discussed by Mr. Mackinder when in South Russia, it is evident that, until the position is stabilised, little can be done to develop these proposals.

The above is for your personal information, and I leave it to your discretion as to how far you are to use it in your conversations with Denikin. I fully realise how difficult your position is, after so many months of loyal and active

¹ See No. 664.

² Cf. No. 644, note 3.

co-operation with General Denikin. It has, however, been impossible to control the course of events, and I am now firmly convinced that, in view of the failure of his administration to gain the good-will and loyal support of the population, no support which we could have given him in either men, money or materials would have sufficed to bring about the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, and the establishment of a stable Government in Russia.

No. 677

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 10)
No. 152 Telegraphic [177712/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 10, 1920

Following from Mr. O'Grady begins:

Your telegram No. 96.¹

I have received despatch brought by H.M.S. *Whirlwind* and will communicate with Litvinoff immediately.

¹ No. 675.

No. 678

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 11)
No. 155A Telegraphic [178039/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 11, 1920

Your telegram No. 96.¹

Mr. O'Grady has decided to present a draft to Litvinof and request his immediate signature. In Mr. O'Grady's draft article 9 of Cabinet draft is omitted, and an article is inserted providing for stay in Western Europe of Soviet representative to supervise execution of agreement. Other minor changes have been introduced into new draft, general effect of which may delay departure of our prisoners and civilians.

I urged Mr. O'Grady to endeavour to maintain at least article 7 and article 9 of Cabinet draft. Mr. O'Grady is inclined to think that Litvinof will not even accept his amended version.

¹ No. 675.

No. 679

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 12)
Unnumbered. Telegraphic [178052/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 11, 1920

Your telegram No. 96¹ of February 7th.

Mr. O'Grady presented draft agreement approved by Cabinet to Litvinoff yesterday. Latter refused to sign and he and Mr. O'Grady discussed various additions and alterations.

¹ No. 675.

Chief points which Litvinoff desires to insert are:—

Point 1. To provide for continued stay in Western Europe of Soviet representative pending execution of Agreement.

Point 2. To delay release of British civilians until Archangel prisoners have been released and to make their release dependent on fulfilment of Point 1.

Although Mr. O'Grady has not accepted these two points there is a danger that Litvinoff may induce him to sign an agreement under which release of civilians will be delayed.

I have informed Mr. O'Grady that I considered it a very serious matter to alter text especially of Article 7 and Article 9 without consulting Your Lordship and I will telegraph whether I have been able to persuade him to adopt this view.

Though Mr. O'Grady will doubtless explain fully reasons which have led him to adopt this line of action, I have thought it my duty to inform you without delay that negotiations are being continued.

I am sending this telegram without informing Mr. O'Grady.

No. 680

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 108 Telegraphic [178052/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 12, 1920

Following for Mr. O'Grady.

I had hoped to have heard¹ already of your presentation of the draft agreement to Litvinoff.

I trust that you clearly understood from my telegram No. 96² that the agreement had to be presented exactly in the form in which it was approved by the Cabinet, and that Litvinoff has to choose between accepting or rejecting it as such.

¹ i.e. from Mr. O'Grady in person.

² No. 675.

No. 681

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 13)

No. 159 Telegraphic [178371/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 12, 1920

Following from Mr. O'Grady. Begins.

I have to-day signed agreement telegraphed to you *en clair*, acting under clause 10 of letter of instructions of 15 [13] November¹ when appointed. In doing so I was influenced by anxiety for the lives of British prisoners of war and civilians in Russia, which was accentuated by two urgent telegrams from North, asking me to expedite repatriation of our nationals.

¹ No. 535.

No. 682

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 13)
No. 160 Telegraphic [178313/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 12, 1920

Following from O'Grady.

Trotsky has informed Litvinof by wireless that the British Government may rest assured that all British officers and men who have fallen into the hands of Red Army while serving with Denikin and Koltchak's armies will be well treated.

No. 683

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received February 12)
No. 12 Telegraphic [178310/11/57]

PEKING, February 12, 1920

Following from Chita, No. 57, 10th February.

Captain Stilling¹ telegraphs from Irkutsk, 7th February. Begins:—

Regret to report that Admiral Koltchak and his Prime Minister, Pepeliaef, were shot 5 o'clock morning of 7th February, by order of Military Revolutionary Committee, Irkutsk. Have personally received confirmation of foregoing from Committee. Unable to protest, owing to fact that sudden meeting held and fate decided only three hours before execution carried out. Reason given, revolutionary movement discovered to release Koltchak and overthrow present Government.

Voitzheovski's² removal in progress.

(Repeated to Tokyo.)

¹ Capt. N. A. Stilling was a member of the British Military Mission in Siberia.

² General Voitzheovsky, successor to General Kappel, had approached Irkutsk with a White Russian force, and demanded the liberation of Admiral Kolchak.

No. 684

Earl Curzon to Mr. Alston (Tokyo)
No. 50 Telegraphic [177073/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 13, 1920

War Office propose complete withdrawal of the Military Mission in Siberia on the grounds that Admiral Koltchak's army has finally collapsed, that popular feeling throughout Eastern Siberia appears to be definitely opposed to any further intervention, and that the withdrawal of all Allied Troops has been recommended by Allied diplomatic representatives.

I should be glad if you would inform the Japanese Government of the above and say that in the circumstances we propose to withdraw the Mission at an early date.

If the Japanese Government decide to maintain a force in Siberia and conduct operations against the Bolsheviks question of attaching an officer, under the orders of Military Attaché at Tokyo will be considered.¹

¹ In a Foreign Office telegram of February 21, 1920, Mr. Alston was asked to repeat the present telegram to Peking and Vladivostok.

No. 685

Letter from Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Mr. Gregory
(Received February 19)
Unnumbered [179726/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 13, 1920

Dear Gregory,

Well, an agreement has been signed, an emasculated form of the Cabinet draft. As it provides vaguely for the release of our prisoners, I suppose that the Government will be obliged to accept it. If the Bolsheviks wish, as would seem probable, to conciliate opinion in England, then they will allow our prisoners and civilians to leave, if not, they will find plenty of loopholes in the agreement to enable them to delay the release and at the same time make out a case in their favour.

When O'Grady first decided to ignore the instructions issued by the Cabinet, I tried to dissuade him but when I saw that that was impossible I tried to save at least articles 7 and 9 from the wreck, but O'Grady would not insist on 9 as he said that the distinctions made therein were humiliating to the Bolsheviks.

Litvinoff tried to avoid signing even O'Grady's amended draft and again played for time, but when on the 12th O'Grady showed a firm front, he signed without a murmur. There is, I think, no doubt that he would have signed the Cabinet draft if O'Grady had been firm at the beginning. However, Litvinoff wanted some vague assurance that he would have permission to stay in Western Europe pending the execution of the agreement, and he probably would have insisted on this point.

I attribute O'Grady's failure to carry out the Cabinet instructions to his sensitiveness about his parliamentary position which prevents him from taking any action against the Bolsheviks which could be interpreted as harsh or even firm, to the personal ascendancy which Litvinoff has won over him through superior brain and cunning—this enables Litvinoff to irritate him constantly about non-essentials. . . .¹

If the Government accept the agreement, it would seem desirable to hand over the execution to Mr. M. A. Abrahamson, of the British Red Cross, who took a prominent part in the repatriation work of British prisoners from Germany last year. Apart from other considerations O'Grady has so many affairs in England, including his parliamentary duties, to attend to that I do not think that he would be here for many days at a time, and the Danish Authorities did not like it when O'Grady went away last time and

¹ A personal observation upon Mr. O'Grady's conduct is here omitted.

left Litvinoff. Then, however, Nathan carried on the negotiations. Now he is no longer here. It would seem natural, too, for the Red Cross to undertake the work of meeting the prisoners at the frontier, conveying them to the ships etc., which by the way, in spite of Litvinoff's insistence on Reval will have to go to a Finnish port, probably Hangø. It would be best, therefore, for their representative to be in direct touch with Litvinoff.

Litvinoff personally is very unpopular with the Danes, owing to his behaviour since his arrival, and though they would not object to another Soviet representative remaining for a long stay in Denmark, I do not think that they will allow Litvinoff to remain here much longer—at any rate after the Russians have been removed from Denmark. He himself wants to go to Christiania, but in view of his savage attacks on the Danish Government when enjoying the hospitality of Denmark I do not suppose any Scandinavian Government will be anxious to have him. According to O'Grady's article 9 his stay in Western Europe can be almost indefinite. . . .² In his negotiations with O'Grady he uses threats of the most flagrant kind. I fear, however, that the release of our men would be jeopardised if we were to ask the Soviet Government to recall him and send another representative. As soon as our men leave Russia, however, I hope that Litvinoff will be sent back to his native country. . . .²

I am writing you this version of what happened during the last few days unofficially because I thought that that would be the most easy way for you to deal with it. If, however, you would wish it sent home officially please send me a line. In any case please acknowledge the receipt of this letter as I am sending it by the post.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

H. A. GRANT WATSON

² A personal observation upon M. Litvinov is here omitted.

No. 686

Mr. O'Grady (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 20)
Unnumbered. [179964/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 14, 1920

My Lord,

In confirmation of my telegram of the 12th instant,¹ I have the honour to inform your Lordship that an Agreement providing for the exchange of Prisoners of War and Nationals between the British and Soviet Governments was signed by Mr. Litvinoff and myself on Thursday, the 12th of February, and copies of the Agreement were duly exchanged. I enclose my copy² herewith.

¹ No. 681.

² Not printed. This final text of the Agreement, with annexes, is printed in Cmd. 587 of 1920: *Agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government of Russia for the Exchange of Prisoners.*

There is no substantial difference between the Agreement and the draft you sent me. The only modifications of importance are the deletion of your Article 9 and the substitution of an Article providing for the residence of Representatives of both Governments in some country of Western Europe until the Agreement has been carried into effect.

A Note is attached to the Agreement, signed by Mr. Litvinoff and myself, urging upon our respective Governments that the Articles of the Agreement should be carried into effect immediately.

In my opinion this meets the deletion of your Article 9.

I have strengthened your Article 7 by providing that British officers and men who may fall into the hands of the Soviet Armies up to the date of the signing of the Agreement and such as may be captured during a period of one month after the signing of the Agreement shall be released and repatriated.

As stated in my telegram, dated February 12th,¹ I took this action under Clause 10 of my Letter of Instructions, dated November 15th [13th], 1919, on the occasion of my appointment.

Mr. Litvinoff asked me to inform you that he protests strongly against Article 8 as introducing new matter into the Agreement and at first he insisted on referring it to his Government for their consent. However, after strong pressure from myself, he accepted the Article on his own responsibility.

I have, etc.,

JAMES O'GRADY

No. 687

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 120 Telegraphic [178371/9/38]

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 16, 1920*

I have now been able to study the agreement which you have signed with Litvinof.¹

The modifications introduced into it require some further handling if it is not to meet with hostile criticism in the country.

Of the three serious modifications I am most disquieted by that which excepts from release British prisoners 'who have committed grave offences.' You have no doubt satisfied yourself that Litvinof does not propose that his Government should commit any flagrant injustice towards our men which would violate the spirit of the agreement, but we cannot let the matter rest on a personal understanding between you and Litvinof which is likely to be of no avail once you have parted company.

Litvinof knows perfectly well that His Majesty's Government have no desire forcibly to detain any Russians in this country, while our information—which doubtless you have likewise received, but which you should on no account divulge to Litvinof for fear of compromising the source—is that the

¹ In Copenhagen telegram No. 161 of February 12, 1920 (received February 13: not printed), Mr. O'Grady had given textual citations of the divergencies between the agreement as signed (see No. 686, note 2) and the Cabinet draft (see No. 675, note 1).

Soviet Government intend to deprive of the benefits of the agreement at least five of our men in their hands whose particular offences could under no circumstances be considered as 'grave.' The appearance of reciprocity in this matter is therefore purely fictitious.

If, as we anticipate, the Soviet Government take advantage of the new clause to retain the four men referred to, and possibly others, I fear that the country will be disappointed at the incompleteness of the agreement and indignant at the way in which it will feel we have been tricked by Litvinof.

It is I suppose too late to qualify the phraseology of the agreement itself, and the best course I can suggest is that you and Litvinof should sign an explanatory statement to the effect that the words 'grave offences' are to be interpreted in their ordinary sense, *i.e.*, grave offences against criminal law, and do not refer to political charges such as espionage. You should at the same time make it clear to him, if necessary, in writing, that, should the Soviet Government proceed to interpret the words in the latter sense and retain any of our men on that ground, you will consider that he has betrayed you personally and will hold him responsible for any reprisals in the execution of the remainder of the treaty which we may be compelled to take in order to have it carried out in its entirety and in the spirit in which you and he intended it to be carried out. You can point out to him that while you could understand the reluctance of the Soviet Government to release prisoners who might have information of a military character, so long as military operations between the two countries were in progress, now that no British forces are operating in Russia, the Soviet Government could have no possible ground for acting in that way.

The other modifications on the agreement which are likely to present future difficulties are in clause 6, in which we are committed to acquiescing in hypothetical arrangements made by the German and Soviet Governments, for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, whatever their nature; and the re-drafted clause 9 by which we agree to have a representative of Soviet Russia in Western Europe until the Russian repatriation is complete.

I do not propose that you should complicate the first issue raised in this telegram, which is vital, by embarking on further discussions with Litvinof as regards these last two points, which might lead him to suppose we were not going to ratify the agreement that you and he have signed. Nevertheless, I assume that he realises that the continued presence of a Soviet representative in Europe does not depend on the consent of His Majesty's Government alone, but implies that of the country in which he desires to reside and over which His Majesty's Government have clearly no control; and we shall be obliged to make this admission ourselves when your agreement is subsequently subjected to Parliamentary and public criticism.

Please inform us as soon as possible by what date the repatriation can commence, on what days, and in what numbers the British can reach the Russian frontier and where. This is of the greatest importance as we have immediately to arrange shipping transit facilities through the country across which the various parties must travel and make the necessary quarantine arrangements.

No. 688

*Telegram from General Miller (Archangel)*¹

[180271/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, *February 17, 1920*

Bolshevik propaganda, coupled with the news of reverses on all the other anti-Bolshevik fronts, has moved the population and the armies of the Northern region to a sense of the hopelessness and futility of continuing the struggle.

The moral disintegration of the army, signs of which have been noticeable for some time in the shape of ever increasing desertions, reached a crisis on February 6, when parts of the 3rd regiment mutinied and went over to the bolsheviks. Similar occurrences took place subsequently in other regiments. The soldiers simply leave their units and refuse to make the slightest show of resistance. Owing to the hopelessness of the situation at the front, the Provisional Government has today been obliged to acknowledge the impossibility of continuing the struggle on the Archangel front.

I address the request to the British Government that their influence be used with the Soviet Government in order to compel the latter to refrain from any acts of violence against the representatives and the property of the population.

I have spoken in this sense to the British Military Representative—Captain Novitzky.

The Provisional Government will very probably be transferred to Murmansk.

¹ This telegram was communicated to the Foreign Office by M. Sabline and was received on February 19, 1920.

No. 689

Earl Curzon to General Keyes (Novorossisk)

No. K. 135 Telegraphic [178787/150931/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 18, 1920*

Following from Mackinder.

What we did at Warsaw and in South Russia has been approved by Lord Curzon but circumstances and policy have changed. In view of present position I could not usefully return to South Russia and have therefore resigned my office of High Commissioner.¹

I desire to thank you for your wise and loyal help and all the members of the Mission for their effective aid.

¹ In a private letter of February 4, 1920, to Lord Hardinge, Sir H. Mackinder had stated: 'It was up to me to propose and defend a policy. But events and opinion had marched while I was isolated in Russia. On a larger view, which I appreciate though I may not attach precisely the same values to the factors in the balance, the Cabinet appears to have rejected my plan.' Sir H. Mackinder tendered his resignation as British High Commissioner for South Russia on February 13, 1920, and it was formally accepted on February 20.

No. 690

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 123 Telegraphic [176884/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 18, 1920*

Following for Mr. O'Grady.

On 6th February Ambassadors' Council in Paris agreed to the suppression of the International Commission at Berlin for the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, and it was decided that there was no objection to agreeing to the request of the International Red Cross at Geneva that they should undertake the relief work necessary for these prisoners.

See Lord Kilmarnock's telegram No. 29.¹

¹ No. 667.

No. 691

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)

No. 124 Telegraphic [177102/9/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 19, 1920*

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

We have been greatly perturbed in receiving the summary of Mr. North's letter as conveyed in your telegram No. 145¹ as well as the reports brought by Lieutenant Bremner. You should at once point out to Litvinof that this state of affairs is a disgrace to any Government and that immediate steps should be taken to ameliorate the conditions in which honourable prisoners of war and civilians, who appear to be kept in internment only as hostages, are at present living.

Like Mr. North, we are unable to understand why some British should be kept in prison and others in concentration camp.

You might also mention to him that though the Soviet authorities constantly protest that they wish to live in friendship with the rest of the world, their action in the case of these prisoners of war and hostages is in absolute contradiction to their words.²

¹ This Copenhagen telegram of February 7, 1920 (received February 9), is not printed. It summarized a letter from the Rev. North dated from Moscow, January 25, 1920, giving detailed particulars of the condition of British prisoners in the Boutirka, Sokolniki, and Taganka prisons and in the Andronovsky, Novy Pzkoftsky, and Ivanovsky 'lagers'. In general it was stated: 'Typhus very prevalent in all prisons and lagers. Prisoners of war and hostages kept under much stricter conditions than is customary with prisoners of this character. Unable understand reason why some British are kept in prison, other[s] in concentration camps.'

² In Copenhagen telegram No. 199 of February 21, 1920 (received that day), Mr. Grant Watson reported that the substance of the present telegram had been conveyed in a memorandum to M. Litvinov 'who will inform his Government. He admits bad sanitary conditions form legitimate ground for protest.'

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 19)
No. 188 Telegraphic [179782/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 19, 1920

Your telegram No. 120¹ of 16th February.

Following from Mr. O'Grady:—

I have signed with Litvinof annex B² to agreement in following terms (see my telegram immediately following, No. 189).³

I am leaving for London 18th February, and would be glad to discuss matter with you further on arrival. During conversations with Litvinof I have not obtained information as to any British subjects who are likely to be retained for 'grave offences.'⁴

As regards last paragraph, if Russian prisoners of war in Great Britain (about 125) and Denmark (about 1,700) are embarked, then about 200 British, *i.e.*, 136 prisoners of war, 30 old women, 30 sick civilians, would at once be sent to Bolshevik frontier.

I am still awaiting reply from Riga as to whether Russian prisoners of war can be repatriated via Libau. British will be sent by Finnish front to Hango.

If it is desired that Copenhagen branch of the Red Cross should undertake care of British during passage from Bolshevik front to port, instructions should be issued without any delay, and bureau should be authorised to make the best arrangements possible for disinfecting clothing, feeding, &c., and a suitable credit be granted.

As regards date of repatriation of British civilians (see my telegram No. 172, 15th February).⁵

¹ No. 687.

² *i.e.* annex II (cf. Cmd. 587 of 1920).

³ No. 693.

⁴ In Copenhagen telegram No. 193 of February 19, 1920 (received February 20), Mr. Grant Watson stated: 'It is ominous that Litvinof, during discussions about "grave offences," introduced question of release of Bela Kun, and I feel convinced that he will not consent to release of four persons referred to in your telegram [No. 687], except in return for further concessions, such as release of Bela Kun.'

⁵ Not printed. In this telegram Mr. O'Grady had reported that 'our civilians can leave Russia as soon as Archangel arrangements are completed.'

No. 693

Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received February 19)
No. 189 Telegraphic [179783/9/38]

COPENHAGEN, February 19, 1920

Following from Mr. O'Grady:—

Annex B¹ to agreement of 12th February, begins:—

'In view of the difficulty of coming to an understanding with regard to British subjects who have been imprisoned for grave offences, we have agreed

¹ *i.e.* annex II (cf. Cmd. 587 of 1920). This annex was dated at Copenhagen, February 18, 1920.

to sign [the] agreement in order to expedite [the] exchange of [the] prisoners and nationals outside this point of difference, leaving this special point for further discussion.' Ends.

No. 694

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)
No. 258 Telegraphic [170156/11/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 19, 1920*

Please inform French Government that, in view of the present situation in Siberia, we propose to abolish post of High Commissioner, and ask whether they intend to do the same.¹

¹ In reply, in Paris telegram No. 228 of February 28, 1920 (received March 1), Lord Derby reported: 'French Government state instructions have been sent to French High Commissioner telling him to close the mission and return to France.'

No. 695

Earl Curzon to Mr. Porter (Reval)
No. 61 Telegraphic [180271/3669/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 20, 1920*

Please transmit following message to M. Tchicherine Moscow:—

Begins:

I have received from General Miller a telegram¹ stating that the Provisional Government of the Northern Region have decided that they can no longer maintain the struggle against the Soviet Forces on the Archangel Front, and that they, therefore, propose to surrender the town. Their intention appears to be that those who have been prominent in the Civil War will withdraw. General Miller has requested me to communicate the request that when Archangel passes into the hands of the Soviet Government no violence will be done against the representatives or property of the population. From this message I gather that the Provisional Government would install at Archangel an authority in sympathy with the Soviet Government.

You will readily understand that as His Majesty's Government were for over a year in a large measure responsible for the feeding and general well being of the population of the Northern Region it would make a peculiarly painful impression in this country if serious disorders occurred or severe reprisals were exercised by the Soviet authorities against the population which had resisted them for many months. If you have any proposals to make to General Miller with a view to a peaceful capitulation and wish to make these proposals through me I should be happy to transmit them.

Curzon of Kedleston. Ends.

¹ No. 688.

No. 696

M. Chicherin to Earl Curzon (Received February 23)¹

Telegraphic: by wireless [180342/3669/38]

MOSCOW, February 21, 1920

In answer to your radio received to-day² we request you to convey to the White Guard forces and authorities of the Northern area the following proposals:

1st. All the Northern districts which belonged to the former Russian Empire are without any restriction or limitation to be delivered and given over to the Russian Soviet Government including the Carlion and the Murmansk regions, and littoral, as far as the frontier which existed before the war in 1914 between Russia on one side and Finland and Norway on the other.

2nd. All the Governmental and military property including all transport means, railways, vehicles, ships, boats, in general all sea and river craft and all aerial apparatus, likewise all food, equipment, munition and other stores and stocks are to be delivered and given over to the Russian Soviet Government in full, unimpaired and intact without any damage, deterioration or destruction.

3rd. At the moment of capitulation the troops deliver and give over to the Russian Soviet authorities all arms, equipment, and munition[s] they have, all property and stores in full, everything completely intact and unimpaired.

4th. To all officers, men, employe[e]s, and crews of the former so-called Northern Government and of its military and naval forces in case they immediately and voluntarily surrender life is to be guaranteed and to all responsible representatives of the former so-called Northern Government and persons belonging to the commanding corps of its military and naval forces in case they immediately and voluntarily surrender free departure from Soviet Russia is to be permitted. We entertain the hope that the British Government will take opportunity of the influence it exerts upon the Northern White Guards in order to bring to an end unnecessary effusion of blood and hopeless resistance on their part and to reconstitute the integrity of the Russian territory in the Northern area.

¹ A copy of this wireless message was sent to M. Litvinov at Copenhagen.

² No. 695.

No. 697

Earl Curzon to Mr. Porter (Reval)

No. 76 Telegraphic [180342/3669/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 28, 1920

Please transmit following to M. Tchicherine, Moscow. Begins.

'I have just received your wireless message¹ which it is now too late for me

¹ No. 696.

to communicate to North Russian Government², but I presume you will instruct the officer commanding your troops in North Russia to communicate your terms to any anti-Bolshevik forces which may still be under arms. I have telegraphed your message to Alexandrovsk for communication to the Revolutionary Government apparently established at Murmansk with whom you have presumably not yet established telegraphic communication.' Ends.

² On February 19, 1919, General Miller had departed from Archangel on an icebreaker. Two days later the Red Army entered Archangel and on the same day, February 21, a revolt occurred in Murmansk and a Soviet régime was proclaimed.

No. 698

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lampson (Peking)

No. 88 Telegraphic [185240/2766/57]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 12, 1920*

Post of High Commissioner in Siberia has been abolished. You should arrange to close the mission.

Mr. Hodgson should be informed.¹

¹ After receipt of Paris telegram No. 228 of February 28, 1920, from Lord Derby (see No. 694, note 1), Mr. Hoare had minuted on March 8: 'We can now telegraph to Mr. Lampson and tell him that the post of High Commissioner in Siberia has been abolished. Mr. Hodgson should be informed.' Lords Hardinge and Curzon minuted on this as follows:

'So ends a | not very | creditable enterprise

H.

| highly dis |

C.'

CHAPTER III

Negotiations relative to the status and attribution of Eastern Galicia

June 18–December 22, 1919

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The background of Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Eastern Galicia, and the British attitude thereto as expressed by Mr. Lloyd George in the Council of Four, are indicated in Chapter II (see, in particular, Nos. 227, 231–2, 234–5, 240, 247).

In continuation of its earlier deliberations the Council of Four on June 12, 1919 (C.F. 62, minute 9) considered the question of a 'Poland-Ukraine frontier'. In opening this discussion President Wilson suggested that 'a line' should be established between Poland and the Ukraine. In reply 'Mr. Lloyd George thought the same course should be adopted as in the case of Upper Silesia. M. Paderewski had told him that the Ukrainians were anxious to enter Poland. The situation there, according to M. Paderewski, was almost the same as in Upper Silesia. There was an area where there was one Pole to two Ruthenians, the upper grades of the population being Poles, but the Ukrainian population was also said to be in favour of junction with Poland. The best plan therefore, would be to hold a plebiscite.

'President Wilson suggested that experts should be got together to draw a plebiscite area.

'(On the suggestion of President Wilson, it was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be invited to examine this question with experts, and after hearing representatives both of Poland and of the Ukraine on the subject, should advise the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers—

- (a) As to whether they recommended a plebiscite.
- (b) As to the area of the plebiscite.)'

Meanwhile the Commission on Polish Affairs of the Peace Conference had been taking action in accordance with an earlier decision of April 26, 1919, whereby the Council of Foreign Ministers had authorized the Commission 'to proceed with the examination of the frontier to be assigned to Poland in Eastern Galicia and to submit a report'. This report, printed as document No. 699 below, was finally agreed by the Commission on Polish Affairs on June 17, 1919.

*Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs*No. 3 [*Confidential/General/177/3*]

QUESTION DE LA GALICIE ORIENTALE

(17 juin 1919)

Rappel des séances

Après avoir tenu compte des données statistiques, ethnographiques,¹ historiques, religieuses et autres et des considérations politiques, la Commission a pensé que le problème qu'elle avait mission d'examiner se divisait en deux parties:

- 1° La fixation du statut futur de la Galicie orientale.
- 2° La délimitation des frontières de cette région.

Dans l'Empire d'Autriche, la Galicie orientale était une circonscription judiciaire de « Kronland » de Galicie.

Toutefois, comme les Membres de la Commission sont unanimes à estimer qu'à tous points de vue, la partie occidentale de la Galicie orientale devrait être en tous cas réunie à la Pologne quel que soit le statut adopté par la Galicie orientale, la discussion touchant ce statut porte seulement sur la zone située à l'est de la ligne A décrite à la section III.

Cette zone compte, d'après les statistiques confessionnelles une population de 4.574.000 habitants dont environ 1.046.000 ou 22 p. 100 sont de rite catholique romain, 2.924.000 ou 63 p. 100 sont de rite catholique grec, et 573.000 ou 12 p. 100 sont juifs.

Les statistiques linguistiques donnent les chiffres suivants:

Polonais	1.699.000 ou 39,28 p. 100.
Ruthènes	2.798.000 ou 60,72 p. 100. ²

Nota: Il y a lieu de remarquer que la frontière roumaine proposée par la Commission des Affaires roumaines en Bukovine³ laisse hors de la Roumanie un territoire, contigu à la Galicie orientale, dont la population est de 103.000 habitants dont 1 p. 100 de Polonais, 83 p. 100 de Ruthènes, 14 p. 100 de langue allemande (Juifs pour la plupart).

¹ Note in original: 'Voir les tableaux résumés à l'Annexe II.'

² Note in original: 'La religion catholique grecque étant la religion prédominante des Ruthènes, la religion catholique romaine la religion prédominante des Polonais, comme les Juifs ont été généralement comptés dans la statistique linguistique comme Polonais, la Commission est d'avis que les chiffres fournis par la statistique confessionnelle sont plus près de la vérité que ceux que donne la statistique linguistique pour établir le nombre des Ruthènes et celui des Polonais.'

³ This frontier had been adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 23, 1919: see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. iv, pp. 748-9.

SECTION I

STATUT DE LA GALICIE ORIENTALE

La Commission a envisagé les solutions suivantes:⁴

L'ordre dans lequel elles sont présentées n'est choisi que pour faciliter l'exposition.

1° *Indépendance de la Galicie orientale.*

2° *Autonomie provisoire pour une période limitée*⁵ avec les modalités suivantes:

- A) administration par un Haut-Commissaire nommé par la Société des Nations;
- B) administration par une Grande Puissance mandataire de la Société des Nations;
- C) administration par un État voisin mandataire de la Société des Nations.

3° *Rattachement de la Galicie orientale à la Pologne.*

- A) sous forme d'autonomie avec mandat de la Société des Nations;
- B) sous forme d'une large autonomie locale ou d'un lien fédéral;
- C) sous forme d'annexion.

4° *Consultation à bref délai des habitants par voie de plébiscite.*

La solution d'une union avec l'Ukraine n'a pas été envisagée du fait qu'il n'existe pas de véritable État ukrainien.

I. *Indépendance de la Galicie orientale*

La Commission a été unanime à estimer que les désavantages de cette solution ne sont pas compensés par ses avantages.

Avantages.

Cette solution pourrait être acceptable pour les Ruthènes qui sont la majorité de la population, parce qu'elle séparerait la Galicie orientale du reste de la Galicie et de la Pologne.

Inconvénients.

1° Un État aussi peu étendu, incapable de se suffire au point de vue économique, sans débouché sur la mer, et entouré de voisins puissants pourrait difficilement conserver son indépendance.

2° Sa stabilité politique serait menacée par des conflits entre la minorité polonaise, plus cultivée et plus influente, et la majorité ruthène, en ce moment troublée par la guerre et par les événements dont la Galicie orientale a été le théâtre.

3° Le mouvement national ruthène est comparativement récent et peu développé. Les Ruthènes sont eux-mêmes divisés sur la solution envisagée: indépendance ou union avec l'Ukraine ou union avec la Russie.

⁴ Note in original: 'Voir Annexe N° 1 — Tableau des différentes solutions.'

⁵ Note in original: 'A l'expiration de cette période il serait procédé à une consultation de la population pour déterminer le statut définitif de la région.'

4° Un État aussi faible et aussi divisé exciterait les ambitions des États voisins et constituerait ainsi une menace permanente pour la Paix.

Sa création risquerait de provoquer des dissensions et des mouvements irrédentistes en Pologne, en Ukraine et peut-être en Russie.

II. *Autonomie provisoire pour une période limitée*

Cette solution, sous les trois modalités envisagées, comporte l'établissement d'un régime provisoire, pour une période limitée. A l'expiration de cette période, les populations seraient consultées sur les solutions que la Société des Nations, — à laquelle il appartiendrait, en dernier ressort, de fixer le statut définitif à établir, — reconnaîtrait susceptibles de réalisation.

Le principal avantage de cette solution est qu'elle apparaît la plus équitable vis-à-vis des diverses parties intéressées.

Son principal inconvénient réside dans ses énormes difficultés d'application.

A. *Autonomie provisoire pour une période limitée avec administration par un Haut-Commissaire nommé par la Société des Nations.*⁶

Cette solution impliquerait la nomination d'un Haut-Commissaire pour une période que la Commission proposerait de fixer à deux ans, et qui pourrait être renouvelée si la Société des Nations le jugeait convenable. Le Haut-Commissaire aurait des pouvoirs étendus d'administration et de contrôle et aurait mission d'organiser une gendarmerie, à recruter dans le pays. Ses pouvoirs n'excluraient pas l'élection d'une Diète, ni l'organisation progressive d'autorités administratives locales.

Considérations générales.

Cette solution n'exclut pas la possibilité pour la Russie de parvenir en fin de compte jusqu'à la crête des Carpathes.

La répercussion d'un changement d'une telle importance sur la situation politique de l'Europe, et en particulier sur l'avenir des États en voie de formation ou de transformation dans l'Europe centrale, mériterait la plus sérieuse attention.

Avantages.

1° Cette solution éviterait d'attribuer immédiatement la région à l'une des deux parties rivales et renverrait le règlement définitif à une époque où les passions nationales seraient moins vives et la situation générale plus claire et plus stable.

Elle serait ainsi le meilleur moyen de s'assurer des désirs réels des habitants.

On éviterait aussi de se prononcer sur l'avenir des Ruthènes de Galicie orientale avant que le sort de l'Ukraine n'ait été définitivement réglé.

2° Elle donnerait satisfaction au désir de certaines personnalités russes, qu'il ne soit pas mis obstacle aux vœux des habitants, au cas où ils deman-

⁶ Note in original: 'Les mots « la Société des Nations » pourraient être remplacés par ceux de « les Principales Puissances alliées et associées ».'

deraient leur rattachement à la Russie, dont les pertes dans ce pays au cours de la guerre, aussi bien que la situation présente, méritent des égards.

3° Elle n'exclut pas la possibilité que, si les liens existant entre la Galicie orientale et la Pologne sont plus puissants que l'antagonisme actuel, la population puisse par la suite, de sa propre volonté, être unie à la Pologne.

Inconvénients.

1° Cette solution laisserait les populations dans l'incertitude de leur avenir et amènerait, en même temps qu'une recrudescence de l'agitation politique, une période de stagnation dans l'ordre économique et social, à l'heure même où la Galicie orientale va se trouver en présence de problèmes de la plus haute gravité et dont la solution est urgente: réforme agraire, réorganisation industrielle, établissement d'un système monétaire, etc.

2° Le Haut-Commissaire devrait, sous peine de voir son autorité inefficace et méconnue, et le prestige de la Société des Nations compromis, être appuyé par des troupes d'effectif considérable. Les Alliés seraient-ils disposés à les fournir et à les maintenir?

3° La Galicie orientale est directement menacée par les bolchevistes, pour qui elle constitue la voie de jonction la plus directe avec le Gouvernement soviétiste hongrois. Du fait que la Société des Nations accepterait l'administration du pays, elle assumerait aussi la charge et la responsabilité de le défendre contre le bolchevisme, à moins que celui-ci ne vînt à cesser de lui-même.

B. Autonomie provisoire pour une période limitée avec administration par une Grande Puissance, mandataire de la Société des Nations.

L'objet général de cette solution est le même que celui de la solution II A: établir un régime provisoire pour un certain nombre d'années et ensuite consulter les habitants.

Ses avantages et ses inconvénients sont semblables à ceux de la solution II A.

En outre de ceux-ci, elle aurait l'inconvénient de faire supporter à une seule Puissance les charges et les responsabilités qui, dans la solution précédente, incombaient à la Société des Nations. Elle créerait aussi au mandataire des difficultés lourdes résultant de la situation géographique de la Galicie et de la précarité de ses communications avec la mer.

C. Autonomie provisoire pour une période limitée avec administration par un État voisin, mandataire de la Société des Nations.

L'objet général de cette solution est le même que celui des solutions II A et II B: établir un régime provisoire suivi d'une consultation des habitants. Elle comporte la plupart des avantages et inconvénients des solutions II A et II B.

Les mandataires éventuels dans cette hypothèse seraient: a) la Roumanie, b) la Tchéco-Slovaquie, c) la Pologne.

a) LA ROUMANIE

Avantages.

1^o Le Gouvernement roumain offre les garanties nécessaires pour remplir une mission de ce genre.

2^o L'intervention de la Roumanie serait peut-être plus facilement acceptée par la partie ruthène de la population que ne le serait celle de la Pologne.

3^o Cette solution offrirait provisoirement les avantages d'ordre politique et économique qui découlent du contact de la Roumanie et de la Pologne.

Inconvénients.

1^o Les relations entre Roumains et Ruthènes passent pour n'être pas actuellement satisfaisantes.

2^o L'acceptation par la Roumanie d'un tel mandat paraît peu vraisemblable.

3^o Cette solution serait une cause d'antagonisme futur entre la Roumanie et la Pologne.

b) LA TCHÉCO-SLOVAQUIE

Les avantages et les inconvénients seraient dans ce cas, à l'exception de l'avantage III et de l'inconvénient I, les mêmes que ceux qui se présenteraient dans le cas de la Roumanie.

Considérations Générales.

Cette solution placerait de part et d'autre des Carpathes, les Ruthènes de Galicie sous la même juridiction que les Ruthènes de Hongrie.

Le fait que le mandat d'administration de la Galicie orientale serait conféré à l'État tchéco-slovaque, auquel a été rattaché le territoire des Ruthènes de Hongrie, aurait des répercussions politiques qui méritent la plus sérieuse attention.

c) LA POLOGNE

La différence entre cette solution et celle qui suit immédiatement (III A) est que, dans le cas présent, le mandat serait, après un délai fixé, suivi d'une consultation des habitants, tandis que, dans le cas de III A, le mandat serait renouvelable par la Société des Nations, à moins que l'administration de la Pologne n'apparût pas satisfaisante.

Les avantages et les inconvénients sont donc semblables à ceux qui sont mentionnés ci-dessous (III A), sauf que l'importance des uns comme des autres est modifiée par la brièveté du temps pendant lequel le mandat serait exercé.

III. *Rattachement de la Galicie orientale à la Pologne*

Cette solution comporte trois modalités.

1^o Mandat de la Société des Nations conféré à la Pologne;

2^o Autonomie de la Galicie orientale avec ses diverses modalités, dans le cadre de l'État polonais.

3^o Annexion. (Solution mentionnée seulement pour mémoire.)

A. *Autonomie provisoire sous l'administration de la Pologne, mandataire de la Société des Nations.*

Ce mandat serait conféré pour une période limitée et serait renouvelable par la Société des Nations, à moins que l'administration de la Pologne n'eût pas été jugée satisfaisante.

Avantages.

1^o L'octroi d'un mandat à la Pologne serait la meilleure manière d'assurer sous son autorité l'autonomie de la population de la Galicie orientale, car ce mandat pourrait être soumis à des conditions précises et strictes et à un contrôle effectif de la Société des Nations. La Pologne aurait ainsi les plus sérieuses raisons de satisfaire aux désirs de la population locale. La possibilité d'une consultation des habitants ne serait pas exclue, pour le cas où, après une période de calme, ils se montreraient mécontents de leur sort.

2^o Cette solution assurerait une frontière commune entre la Pologne et la Roumanie, ce que désirent ardemment les deux pays. Ce contact des deux pays pourrait être, pour la Pologne, d'une importance vitale au cas où le port de Dantzig serait fermé, du fait de l'Allemagne ou pour toute autre cause.

3^o Du point de vue économique, cette solution faciliterait une jonction entre la Baltique et la Mer Noire. Une jonction de ce genre serait avantageuse pour la Pologne, la Roumanie et la Galicie orientale elle-même.

D'autre part, et bien que les experts économiques ne soient pas unanimes sur ce point, on a fait remarquer que la majeure partie des produits de la Galicie orientale, en particulier du pétrole, sont naturellement exportés vers l'Ouest et que l'ensemble de la Galicie forme *un bloc* économique qu'il y a de fortes raisons pour ne pas dissocier.

Inconvénients.

S'il est fondé que l'antagonisme entre Polonais et Ruthènes en Galicie orientale est profond et durable, il serait contraire au principe de libre disposition des peuples de donner à la Pologne l'administration de la Galicie orientale, quelles que soient les garanties exigées, surtout à l'heure où cette Puissance est en conflit avec un parti galicien contre lequel elle mène, à l'encontre des désirs de la Conférence, des opérations offensives.

Sur le sentiment de la population cependant, les opinions sont partagées: d'une part il a été soutenu qu'il y a des preuves suffisantes pour croire à la possibilité d'un tel antagonisme,

d'autre part on a fait remarquer qu'on ne connaît pas réellement les sentiments de la population, et qu'il est douteux que la majorité de la population (et même de la population ruthène) soutienne l'armée ukrainienne qui combat en Galicie orientale.

A l'appui de cette opinion, on fait remarquer qu'il y a un grand nombre de Polonais en Galicie orientale, que les candidats polonais y obtenaient, avant la guerre, une forte proportion des suffrages (38 p. 100 aux dernières élections), et que, d'après des renseignements sérieux, on est autorisé à penser

que les inconvénients, les excès et les dangers du bolchevisme, tels que les fait ressortir le régime actuel, ont pu inciter beaucoup de Ruthènes à désirer un rapprochement avec les Polonais.

De plus, les mesures de réforme agraire qu'on est sur le point d'introduire en Pologne peuvent faire disparaître la cause principale d'animosité entre deux peuples qui ont vécu pacifiquement côte à côte pendant des siècles. Dans ces conditions il ne semble pas possible de se rendre compte des aspirations réelles des Ruthènes et de leurs véritables sentiments à l'égard des Polonais.

B. Autonomie avec lien fédératif ou avec large autonomie locale.

Le régime autonome pourrait être conçu avec des gradations diverses, depuis l'autonomie provinciale dans l'État polonais, jusqu'à la fédération, susceptible d'assurer aux Ruthènes toutes les garanties nécessaires de « self-government ».

Les avantages et les inconvénients généraux sont semblables à ceux qu'énumère la solution précédente (III A), par laquelle la Pologne recevrait un mandat en Galicie orientale. Il en est surtout ainsi de l'avantage d'une frontière commune entre la Pologne et la Roumanie.

En outre, deux points spéciaux méritent d'attirer l'attention :

Avantage.

Cette solution a l'avantage particulier, en plus de ceux que présente le mandat attribué à la Pologne, d'avoir un caractère plus définitif, qui donnerait aux habitants un sentiment de sécurité et leur permettrait de se consacrer immédiatement à des tâches urgentes de reconstitution économique et sociale.

Inconvénient.

Précisément à cause de son caractère définitif, les résistances locales pourraient être plus accentuées que dans le cas où un mandat serait confié à la Pologne par la Société des Nations.

C. Annexion pure et simple à la Pologne.

Cette solution n'est mentionnée que pour mémoire. Elle rencontrerait une vive résistance et opposition de la part des Ruthènes. Cette résistance serait légitime et ne pourrait probablement être vaincue que par la force. D'autre part, cette solution ne présente aucun avantage sur la précédente.

IV. Consultation à bref délai des habitants par voie de plébiscite

Cette solution consisterait à organiser un plébiscite dans l'ensemble de la Galicie orientale sous le contrôle d'une Commission interalliée. Les forces ukrainiennes et polonaises devraient évacuer le pays et seraient remplacées par des contingents alliés.

Avantages.

1° En raison des divergences de vues qui se manifestent sur les véritables aspirations des populations, il y a tout intérêt à s'en remettre à celles-ci du soin de décider de leur sort.

2° On aboutirait ainsi à une solution définitive et relativement rapide, qui serait acceptée par la majorité des habitants.

Inconvénients.

1° L'envoi et le maintien pendant le temps nécessaire pour préparer et effectuer le plébiscite, de contingents alliés importants, constitueraient dans le temps présent une lourde charge militaire et financière pour les Alliés.

2° Il y aurait des difficultés à obtenir l'évacuation du pays par les troupes polonaises, qui sont en ce moment maîtresses de la plus grande partie de la région.

3° Le problème est trop complexe pour que la solution du plébiscite ne soulève pas de difficultés. Si, par exemple, les Galiciens se prononcent en faveur du rattachement à l'Ukraine, et que celle-ci reste en fin de compte unie à la Russie, ils seront devenus ressortissants russes, et peut-être sans l'avoir voulu ni prévu.

4° Un plébiscite en Galicie orientale aboutirait à des résultats particulièrement compliqués, en raison des conditions locales de la répartition ethnographique des populations.

SECTION II

DÉLIMITATION DES FRONTIÈRES DE LA GALICIE ORIENTALE

Quelle que soit l'hypothèse envisagée parmi celles prévues, les frontières Nord, Est et Sud de la Galicie Orientale ne varient pas. Ce sont celles même du « Kronland » de Galicie, à savoir :

Au Nord et à l'Est, l'ancienne frontière entre l'Empire d'Autriche et l'Empire de Russie.

Au Sud-Est, la limite administrative entre la Galicie et la Bukovine. Au Sud-Ouest, l'ancienne frontière entre l'Autriche et la Hongrie.

Quant à la frontière occidentale, qui séparerait le territoire de la Galicie Orientale du reste de la Galicie, elle reste à fixer suivant l'hypothèse envisagée.

La Commission a discuté deux lignes : l'une (la ligne A) basée en principe sur des considérations ethnographiques, l'autre (la ligne B) devant inclure en Pologne la ville de Lemberg et la région pétrolifère de Drohobycz (voir la carte). Ces deux lignes, qui sont définies en détail à la section III, ne sauraient être discutées *in abstracto*. Leur valeur relative dépend dans une large mesure du statut à venir de la Galicie Orientale.

En ce qui concerne les solutions impliquant ou susceptibles d'impliquer séparation de la Galicie Orientale de la Pologne — Solutions I, II, (A, B, C,)

et IV — l'une des Délégations⁷ a estimé que la ligne A était préférable dans tous les cas, deux autres Délégations ont donné la préférence à la ligne B, la quatrième a réservé son opinion à l'égard des solutions II (A, B, C,) et IV, et s'est prononcée en faveur de la ligne B dans le cas où la solution I serait adoptée.

Dans le cas au contraire où le statut de la Galicie Orientale serait réglé selon l'une des solutions impliquant rattachement de ce pays à la Pologne (solution III, A, B, C), toutes les Délégations ont été d'accord pour adopter la ligne A, les arguments invoqués dans l'hypothèse précédente en faveur de la ligne B, n'ayant plus dans cette hypothèse de raison d'être.

Cette remarque faite, il y a lieu d'exposer les arguments en faveur de l'attribution de Lemberg et de la région avoisinante à la Pologne, ainsi que les objections que peut soulever cette proposition. Il reste entendu que cette discussion ne porte que sur les solutions impliquant ou susceptibles d'impliquer, à titre provisoire ou définitif, la séparation de la Galicie Orientale du reste de la Galicie et de la Pologne.

Il a été présenté tant en faveur de l'adoption de la ligne B que pour l'adoption de la ligne A, des arguments contradictoires qui sont développés ci-dessous, dans la forme même où ils ont été présentés par leurs défenseurs.

A. Arguments en faveur de la ligne B, qui donne Lemberg et la région pétrolifère de Drohobycz à la Pologne.

1^o Lemberg a, pour les Polonais, une valeur morale inestimable. Cette ville occupe le troisième rang parmi les plus grandes villes de Pologne: elle est le siège de la plus grande université polonaise, d'une école polytechnique polonaise, et d'innombrables institutions polonaises économiques, sociales, scolaires et intellectuelles.

Récemment, la ville s'est défendue elle-même pendant six mois contre les attaques des Ukrainiens, toute la population, hommes, femmes et enfants, prenant part au combat et déployant le plus grand héroïsme. Il serait difficile de donner des preuves plus frappantes de la volonté irréductible de Lemberg de rester polonaise. Attribuer cette ville aux Ukrainiens, ce serait déchaîner à coup sûr en Pologne un orage qui aurait des suites incalculables et la cession effective ne pourrait certainement pas avoir lieu sans recours à la force.

2^o L'industrie pétrolifère, dont le centre est dans le district de Drohobycz, semble être orientée vers l'Ouest et trouver son marché naturel plutôt en Pologne qu'en Ukraine.

Abstraction faite des capitaux étrangers qui y sont engagés, cette industrie a été fondée et est dirigée jusqu'à présent exclusivement par des savants polonais, des experts techniques polonais et des travailleurs polonais.

On peut difficilement douter que les Polonais ne soient bien plus capables de maintenir et de développer cette industrie si importante que les Ruthènes, qui n'y ont jusqu'ici montré aucune aptitude et qui, à tout prendre, y sont restés complètement étrangers.

3^o La partie de la Galicie orientale qui écherrait à la Pologne, si la ligne B était adoptée comme frontière, contenait, en 1910, environ:

⁷ The British Delegation.

1,048,000 personnes parlant polonais contre 1,104,000 parlant ruthène et 700,000 catholiques romains contre 1,200,000 catholiques grecs.⁸

Aux dernières élections du Parlement (1911) le nombre total des voix, dans cette région, fut:

pour les candidats polonais de 158,000 environ,

pour les candidats ukrainiens de 105,000 environ,

et pour l'ensemble de tous les candidats ruthènes de 165,000 environ.

Il ressort de ces évaluations, autant que la langue et les élections peuvent le montrer, que dans cette région l'importance de l'élément polonais est à peu près égale à celle de l'élément ruthène.

4° Si au contraire la ligne A était adoptée, les conséquences en seraient les suivantes:

334,000 Ruthènes seulement seraient compris dans les frontières polonaises, tandis que 1,699,000 Polonais de Galicie orientale en seraient exclus (d'après les statistiques linguistiques).

A s'en tenir aux statistiques confessionnelles les chiffres respectifs seraient de 367,000 Ruthènes compris en Pologne et 1,046,000 Polonais de Galicie orientale exclus de Pologne.

Note sur le rite catholique grec.

Les renseignements suivants précisent la situation réciproque des catholiques de rite grec et des catholiques romains.

Les catholiques de rite grec — fréquemment dénommés « uniates » — reconnaissent l'autorité du Pape; il n'existe entre eux et les catholiques romains que des différences rituelles. Les mariages mixtes entre catholiques romains et catholiques grecs sont très fréquents en Galicie; la différence de rite joue un rôle très secondaire dans les relations entre les uns et les autres.

Au contraire, il existe un fossé profond entre les catholiques de rite grec et les orthodoxes; ces derniers sont considérés par les premiers comme schismatiques.

B. Arguments en faveur de la ligne A en tant qu'elle est opposée à la ligne B qui inclut en Pologne Lemberg et les régions pétrolifères de Drohobycz.

1° Sans nier la valeur considérable que représente Lemberg pour les Polonais et l'héroïsme que ceux-ci ont apporté à sa défense, il y a lieu de remarquer que la majorité polonaise y est très faible: 51 p. 100 de Polonais contre 19 p. 100 de Ruthènes, le reste de la population étant composé de Juifs. Il y a lieu d'observer également que le nombre des Polonais est augmenté du fait de la présence de nombreux fonctionnaires polonais en raison de l'importance de Lemberg comme centre administratif. Néanmoins dans le district de Lemberg il y a 45 p. 100 de Ruthènes contre 43 p. 100 de Polonais.⁹ Au Nord-Ouest de la ville surtout la population ruthène est très dense.

⁸ Note in original: 'Voir note sur le rite catholique grec.' (See below.)

⁹ Note in original: 'Ces chiffres sont extraits des statistiques religieuses, en considérant comme Polonais les catholiques romains et comme Ruthènes les catholiques grecs.'

Il y a lieu de remarquer aussi que les inconvénients qu'entraînerait l'attribution de Lemberg aux Ruthènes pourraient être diminués aux yeux de l'opinion publique polonaise si la cité était constituée en ville libre sur le modèle de Dantzig.

2° En ce qui concerne l'industrie du pétrole qui a largement bénéficié de l'apport des capitaux étrangers, il n'est pas du tout certain que dans l'avenir le pétrole galicien doive nécessairement aller en Pologne, l'Ukraine et en fait toute la Russie courant le risque de manquer de pétrole en raison de la situation présente des régions pétrolifères du Caucase.

3° Le territoire qu'on propose de rattacher à la Pologne si la ligne B est adoptée est trop étendu et habité d'une façon trop dense pour justifier un arrangement qui ne prendrait pas en considération les désirs de la majorité de la population et sans faire tous les efforts possibles pour donner aux habitants une occasion d'exposer eux-mêmes leurs désirs.

4° La Galicie orientale ne peut être constituée en État d'une façon satisfaisante, ni sous le rapport administratif ni sous le rapport économique, si la ligne B est adoptée.

Un tel État serait privé de sa capitale naturelle et il n'existerait aucune ligne directe de chemin de fer du Nord au Sud qui ne traverserait pas le territoire polonais.

5° Si les Ruthènes se voient enlever la région à l'Ouest de la ligne dans laquelle ils sont en majorité, ils conserveront contre les Polonais des sentiments de rancune qui rendront illusoire dans l'avenir tout espoir de rapprochement entre les deux races.

6° Le territoire situé entre la ligne B et la ligne A renferme, d'après les statistiques religieuses données à l'Annexe II:

Catholiques grecs (considérés comme Ruthènes) . 833,000 ou 58 p. 100.

Catholiques romains (considérés comme Polonais) 395,000 ou 27 p. 100.

Juifs 196,000 ou 13 p. 100.

Même en s'en tenant aux statistiques linguistiques les chiffres pour la population de ce territoire sont les suivants:

Ruthènes 770,000 ou 54 p. 100.

Polonais 632,000 ou 44 p. 100.

Mais, ainsi qu'on l'a fait remarquer plus haut les statistiques linguistiques comprennent, parmi les Polonais, la plupart des Juifs.

SECTION III

FRONTIÈRE ORIENTALE DE POLOGNE EN GALICIE

Deux solutions sont envisagées: la ligne A et la ligne B.¹⁰

Description de la ligne A

En partant de l'ancienne frontière entre la Russie et l'Autriche, au point

¹⁰ Note to official French edition of original: 'Voir la carte de la page 206 [p. 840] sur laquelle ont été reportées les indications de la carte annexée au Rapport n° 5.' (Report No. 5 is printed in Vol. I, No. 61, appendix C.)

ou la limite administrative orientale de la commune de Belzeg la rencontre et vers le Sud-Ouest :

cette limite administrative, puis la limite administrative entre les districts de Cieszanov à l'Ouest et de Rawa-Ruska à l'Est ;

de là vers le Sud la limite administrative entre les districts de Cieszanov et Jawarow, tout en coupant le saillant formé autour du village de Lipowiec par une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain passant à 2 kilomètres environ au Nord de cette localité ;

de là vers le Sud la limite administrative entre les districts de Jaroslaw et de Jaworow, puis entre les districts de Przemyśl d'une part, et de Mosciska, puis de Sambor, puis de Stary-Sambor de l'autre, puis entre les districts de Dobromil et Stary-Sambor jusqu'au saillant à 1 kilomètre au Sud-Est de la cote 519 (Radycz) ;

de là vers le Sud jusqu'au saillant de la limite administrative entre les districts de Dobromil et Stary-Sambor à 15 kilomètres environ au S.-O. de Chyrow et à 2 kilomètres au S.-E. de la cote 733 une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain coupant le chemin de fer Chyrow-Sambor à 2 kilomètres environ à l'Est de Chyrow et suivant la ligne de crête entre les bassins du Strwiaz et du Dniester ;

de là vers le Sud cette limite administrative, puis la limite entre les districts de Lisko d'une part et de Stary-Sambor puis de Turka de l'autre, jusqu'au point de rencontre avec la frontière de Tchéco-Slovaquie. La frontière s'écarte toutefois de ces limites en deux points où le tracé sera à déterminer sur le terrain :

a) lorsque la limite administrative passe à l'Ouest de la route de Chyrow à Lutowska de façon à laisser cette route entièrement en territoire polonais ;

b) aux environs de la localité de Bobrka de façon à laisser cette localité en territoire polonais.

Description de la ligne B

A partir du point où l'ancienne frontière entre la Russie et l'Autriche est coupée par le cours principal du Bug :

le cours principal du Bug vers l'amont jusqu'à son confluent en aval de Kamionka avec la rivière qui passe à Jazienica ;

de là dans la direction générale du S.-O. jusqu'au point où la limite administrative entre les districts de Kamionka-Strumilovo et de Zolkien coupe la rivière Kamionka à 5 kilomètres au sud de la ville de Kamionka :

une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain remontant la rivière qui passe à Jazienica, traversant la voie ferrée Stojanow-Kamionka passant à l'Ouest de Jazienica et à l'Est de Dernow ;

de là vers le Sud cette limite administrative, puis la limite administrative entre les districts de Lemberg d'une part et de Kamionka puis de Przemyślany de l'autre, puis entre les districts de Przemyślany et Bobrka jusqu'au point où cette limite coupe la route Bobrka-Przemyślany ;

de là vers l'O.-S.-O. jusqu'à la cote 397, point commun aux trois limites administratives des districts de Lemberg, Bobrka et Zydaczow ;

une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain passant au Sud de Bobrka et de Chlebowice et au Nord de la station de Wybranowka;

de là la limite administrative entre les districts de Lemberg et Sydaczow puis entre les districts de Drohobycz, d'une part, et de Zydaczow puis de Stryj de l'autre, sauf dans le saillant de Bliczeski Las qui est coupé par une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain suivant le cours de la rivière Niezachowka;

à partir d'un point de cette limite administrative à environ 2 kilomètres au Nord du point de rencontre avec la limite administrative du district de Skole et vers l'Ouest jusqu'au saillant de la limite administrative du district de Skole près de la cote 942 la crête limitant au Nord le bassin de la Stynawka;

de là vers le S.-S.-O. la limite administrative occidentale du district de Skole jusqu'au point où elle rencontre la frontière de Tchéco-Slovaquie.

JULES CAMBON

17 juin 1919.

ANNEX I TO No. 699

Statut de la Galicie orientale

Les Différentes Solutions Envisagées

Nature des Solutions	Caractère au point de vue de la durée	Conditions pratiques d'Exécution Mesures à prévoir par les Principales Puissances	
		Administration	Occupation
<i>Indépendance</i>	Solution définitive et immédiatement applicable.
<i>Autonomie provisoire</i> pour une période limitée avec:			
a) Administration par un Haut-Commissaire nommé par la Société des Nations.	Solution immédiatement applicable mais provisoire.	Interalliée de longue durée.	Interalliée de durée indéterminée.
b) Administration par une Grande Puissance mandataire de la Société des Nations.	Solution immédiatement applicable mais provisoire.
c) Administration par un État voisin mandataire de la Société des Nations.	Solution immédiatement applicable mais provisoire.
<i>Réunion de la Galicie à la Pologne</i>			
a) Sous forme d'autonomie avec mandat de la Société des Nations.	Solution immédiatement applicable mais non définitive.
b) Sous forme d'un lien fédéral ou d'une large autonomie locale.	Solution immédiatement applicable et définitive.
c) Sous forme d'annexion . . .	Solution immédiatement applicable et définitive.
<i>Consultation des habitants par voie de plébiscite.</i>	Solution différée.	Interalliée de courte durée.	Interalliée de courte durée.

ANNEX II TO No. 699

Superficies

Anciennes circonscriptions judiciaires:

	Kilomètres
Galicie occidentale	23,150
Galicie orientale	55,350
Total pour la Galicie	78,500

	Kilomètres
Territoire de la Galicie attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « A » . . .	31,300
Territoire de la Galicie orientale attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « A » .	8,150
Territoire de la Galicie orientale exclu de la Pologne par la ligne « A » .	47,200
Territoire supplémentaire attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « B » . . .	12,950
Superficie totale du territoire de la Galicie orientale attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « B »	21,100
Territoire de la Galicie orientale exclu de la Pologne par la ligne « B » .	34,250

Population d'après la Statistique Religieuse

(Recensement autrichien de 1910)

Anciennes Circonscriptions Judiciaires	Total	Rite Catholique Grec (religion des Ruthènes).	Rite Catholique Romain (religion des Polonais)	Juifs
Galicie occidentale	2,693,000	87,000 (3 p. 100.)	2,384,000 (88 p. 100.)	213,000 (8 p. 100.)
Galicie orientale	5,336,000	3,291,000 (62 p. 100.)	1,351,000 (25 p. 100.)	660,000 (12 p. 100.)
Total pour la Galicie	8,029,000	3,378,000 (42 p. 100.)	3,735,000 (46 p. 100.)	873,000 (11 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « A »	3,455,000	454,000 (13 p. 100.)	2,689,000 (77 p. 100.)	300,000 (8 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « A » .	762,000	367,000 (48 p. 100.)	305,000 (40 p. 100.)	87,000 (11 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale exclu de la Pologne par la ligne « A » .	4,574,000	2,924,000 (63 p. 100.)	1,046,000 (22 p. 100.)	573,000 (12 p. 100.)
Territoire supplémentaire attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « B »	1,435,000	833,000 (58 p. 100.)	395,000 (27 p. 100.)	196,000 (13 p. 100.)
Ensemble du territoire de la Galicie orientale attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « B »	2,197,000	1,200,000 (54 p. 100.)	700,000 (31 p. 100.)	283,000 (13 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale exclu de la Pologne par la ligne « B » .	3,139,000	2,091,000 (67 p. 100.)	651,000 (21 p. 100.)	377,000 (12 p. 100.)

Population suivant la Statistique Linguistique
(Langue Usuelle)
(Recensement autrichien de 1910)

<i>Anciennes Circonscriptions Judiciaires</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Ruthènes</i>	<i>Polonais</i>
Galicie occidentale	2,667,000	76,000 (3 p. 100.)	2,561,000 (95 p. 100.)
Galicie orientale	5,317,000	3,132,000 (59 p. 100.)	2,115,000 (40 p. 100.)
Total pour la Galicie	7,984,000	3,208,000 (40 p. 100.)	4,676,000 (59 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « A »	3,427,000	410,000 (12 p. 100.)	2,977,000 (87 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « A »	760,000	334,000 (44 p. 100.)	416,000 (55 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale exclu de la Pologne par la ligne « A »	4,557,000	2,798,000 (61 p. 100.)	1,699,000 (37 p. 100.)
Territoire supplémentaire attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « B »	1,426,000	770,000 (54 p. 100.)	632,000 (44 p. 100.)
Ensemble du territoire de la Galicie orientale attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « B »	2,186,000	1,104,000 (50 p. 100.)	1,048,000 (48 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale exclue de la Pologne par la ligne « B »	3,131,000	2,028,000 (65 p. 100.)	1,067,000 (34 p. 100.)

Statistiques des Élections au Reichsrath de 1911

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Ruthènes</i>	<i>Polonais</i>	<i>Sionistes</i>
Galicie orientale	811,086	479,186 (59 p. 100.)	310,239 (38 p. 100.)	21,661 (2.7 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « A »	112,217	44,365 (39 p. 100.)	66,846 (59 p. 100.)	1,006 (61[? i] p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale exclu de la Pologne par la ligne « A »	698,869	434,821 (62 p. 100.)	243,393 (35 p. 100.)	20,655 (3 p. 100.)
Territoire supplémentaire attribué à la Pologne par la ligne « B »	216,010	120,680 (56 p. 100.)	91,139 (42 p. 100.)	4,200 (2 p. 100.)
Ensemble des territoires de la Galicie orientale attribués à la Pologne par la ligne « B »	328,227	165,045 (50 p. 100.)	157,976 (49 p. 100.)	5,206 (1 p. 100.)
Territoire de la Galicie orientale exclu de la Pologne par la ligne « B »	482,859	314,141 (65 p. 100.)	152,263 (32 p. 100.)	16,455 (3 p. 100.)

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, June 18, 1919, at 3 p.m.¹

I.C. 197 [*Confidential/General/141/1*]

Present: *United States of America*: Hon. R. Lansing, Mr. L. Harrison, Colonel U. S. Grant, Dr. Lord, Colonel Embick, Dr. Coolidge, Dr. Day, Dr. Seymour.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir Esme Howard, Mr. E. Phipps, Captain E. Abraham, Rear-Admiral Sir G. Hope, Colonel F. H. Kisch, Major Temperley, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. H. J. Paton.

France: M. Pichon, M. Arnavon, M. de Béarn, Captain de Saint-Quentin, M. de Percin, Captain A. Portier, M. Tardieu, M. J. Cambon (for Questions 1 and 2), M. Hermitte (for Questions 1 and 2), M. Degrand (for Questions 1 and 2), General Le Rond (for Questions 1 to 3), M. Laroche (for Questions 1 and 3), M. Aubert (for Question 3).

Italy: Baron Sonnino, M. Bertelé, Lieut. Zanchi, Marquis della Torretta, M. Brambilla, Count Vannutelli-Rey, Colonel Pariani, Major Pergolani.

Japan: Baron Makino, M. Kawai, M. Otchiai (for Questions 1 and 2).

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

1. *Final Settlement of Frontiers between the Poles and the Ukrainians.*

M. PICHON said that the Council of Foreign Ministers had been asked by the Council of Four to find a definite settlement of the frontier between the Polish and Ukrainian territories, in order that the forces of the two countries might be ordered to withdraw behind it.² He would ask M. Jules Cambon, as President of the Commission dealing with the subject, to explain what conclusions had been reached.

MR. LANSING observed that he had read the report of the Commission.³

M. PICHON then asked whether any member wished to address any questions on the subject to M. Cambon.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Commission had been ordered to make suggestions, but to give no advice. The result was that the settlement of the question was left to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He had read the report and had talked to his military advisers regarding the situation in Galicia. He concluded that, as a basis for discussion, it would be preferable to put forward concrete proposals. He had therefore written a memorandum, a copy of which had been furnished to each of the Ministers members of the Council. (See Annex A.) His justification for writing it was that M. Cambon's Commission did not deal with the military question, which was of vital importance at the moment. The Bolsheviks were attacking Galicia and gaining

¹ An American text of this document and annex A below is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. iv, p. 827 f.

² See Introductory Note.

³ No. 699.

successes, and the Allies, on the other hand, were hampering the action of the Poles. This led to an unfavourable situation. If a solution favourable to the military action of the Poles were adopted, means must be found to safeguard the future political status of the country. His memorandum, therefore, aimed at meeting the pressing necessity of keeping out the Bolsheviks and of providing an opportunity in the future for the self-determination of the Ruthenian population, which might choose to become part of Poland, or of Russia, or to form a federation with one or the other, or even to be independent. He therefore suggested that his memorandum should be taken as a basis for discussion.

BARON SONNINO said that the Commission had formulated a number of projects. Among them was one suggesting autonomy for Galicia under Polish sovereignty. This had the advantage of supplying a definite solution. A plebiscite would lead to agitation and intrigue by all the parties whose ambitions were centred on the final issue. If, therefore, the Ruthenians could be guaranteed such rights as they required under Polish suzerainty, all these disadvantages would be avoided. But it must not be forgotten that many parties were interested in the decision; for instance, the Poles and Roumanians wished to have a common frontier. Russia, which he hoped would ere long be restored, would doubtless wish to induce the Ruthenians to become Russian subjects. This would clash with the ambitions of the Roumanians, Czecho-Slovaks and Poles; and the Hungarians also might wish to have a common frontier with Russia. If, therefore, the whole question could be settled once for all, peace in that part of Europe would be greatly benefited.

MR. LANSING said that his view of the question was based largely on the condition of the Ruthenian population. It must be recognised that this population was 60 per cent. illiterate, and therefore unfit for self-government. A period of education was necessary before it could be ripe for autonomy. Its natural connection by blood was with the Ukrainians, but it would seem that its disposition was rather towards the Poles, by reason of the relative stability of the Government in Poland as compared with the Ukraine. He was therefore in general accord with Mr. Balfour's memorandum, which proposed that a High Commissioner should be nominated by the League of Nations or, pending the constitution of the League of Nations, by the Great Powers, in general control. At the same time, Polish troops would be authorised to extend their operations up to the River Zbrucz. It would be notified through the High Commissioner that the occupation by Polish troops was only temporary, until such time as the Great Powers might consider a plebiscite appropriate. Until then, the country would be under Polish military authority, subject to supervision by the Commissioner.

The Ukrainians were commonly called Bolshevik, but he was not sure that this was correct. In some places they appeared to be fighting the Bolsheviks. He had received reports from the country, including one from Lieutenant Foster, from Tarnopol, dated the 8th June. Lieutenant Foster observed, among other things, that the great majority of the population was overjoyed at the arrival of Polish troops. Secondly, that the Ukrainian régime had been

one of force and brutality, entirely destructive and not constructive in its character. This report also went to support Mr. Balfour's solution. He understood that it would have been easy for the Poles to occupy the whole of Eastern Galicia but for the veto of the Great Powers. The Ukrainians were now extremely aggressive, and the Poles could not stop their operations. All the military representatives at Warsaw appeared to take this view.

BARON SONNINO said that all the reasons alleged by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing appeared to confirm the desirability of a definite solution, namely, that the country should be placed under Polish sovereignty, with guarantees for the Ruthenians. If the population was as ignorant as Mr. Lansing believed, it would be a long time before an intelligent plebiscite could be held among them. They would meantime be wooed by Roumanian, Polish, Czecho-Slovak, Hungarian and Russian agitators. Hence, for the very reasons advanced by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing, he advocated a definite solution. It would be easy to guarantee the linguistic and educational rights of the Ruthenians under Polish government. If this were not done there would be continual unrest and strife, fomented by neighbouring countries with rival interests.

M. CAMBON said that he gathered from the observations of Mr. Lansing, Baron Sonnino, and Mr. Balfour that there was a considerable measure of agreement between them. The Ukrainian question, as such, could not be solved, as it was not known what the Ukraine was, nor what its future would be. Further, there appeared to be no ground for trusting any Ukrainian Government, as Ukrainian Governments had hitherto behaved atrociously. Among the neighbours of Eastern Galicia, the only one with a high civilisation was Poland. The towns in Galicia were Polish, and so were the best classes throughout the country. The solution proposed by Mr. Balfour, therefore, appeared to him to be excellent. Polish control would be exercised under the Great Powers, represented by a High Commissioner. Thus, a mandate would be conferred on Poland for the government of the country. He would point out that this solution was among those proposed by the Commission. He referred to solution B in Report No. III of the Commission.³ If the Conference left the question open, Galicia would become the arena of every form of intrigue. He thought, therefore, that a Galicia with local autonomy secured, and governed in a liberal spirit by Poland, was the right solution. It had, moreover, another advantage. One of the most troublesome questions was the western delimitation of Eastern Galicia. Two frontiers had been proposed, and both were very questionable. If Baron Sonnino's solution were adopted, it would be unnecessary to trouble any further about the frontier question. Frontier A could be adopted, and the whole of Eastern Galicia could be placed under the same régime.

M. PICHON asked whether Baron Sonnino's proposal was complementary to Mr. Balfour's.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that the two solutions were different. He proposed to secure Ruthenian autonomy at once, and to give sovereignty to Poland. This dispensed with the High Commissioner and with the plebiscite.

In addition, the frontier question was also solved at once, and the struggle concerning Lemberg was equally dispensed with.

M. PICHON pointed out that this would place Lemberg outside Poland.

BARON SONNINO said that it would nevertheless include Lemberg in territory attached to Poland.

MR. BALFOUR said that there were two inconsistent policies before the Council. Baron Sonnino's suggestion was different from his own. He thought there was much truth in Baron Sonnino's observation that if the question of the future sovereignty of the country were left undecided, the result would be years of intrigue and unrest. At the same time, he thought that Baron Sonnino a little exaggerated the advantages of his plan. M. Cambon had gone so far as to say that the Conference need trouble no more about the frontiers of Eastern Galicia. Baron Sonnino said that frontier A could be adopted, among other reasons, because the Poles, who objected to handing over Lemberg to an independent Galicia, could not object to including it in a dependent Galicia. He thought that this was not quite correct. He was informed that the majority in Eastern Galicia, though doubtless ill-educated, was vigorously anti-Polish, and unwilling to be absorbed. He would like to know exactly what the autonomy offered by Baron Sonnino meant.

BARON SONNINO said that he meant administrative self-government. There were various degrees of self-government, and regulations had been proposed in other cases. Mr. Balfour doubtless knew what he meant when he spoke of Irish Home Rule.

MR. BALFOUR said that personally he attributed no meaning to Irish Home Rule. He pointed out, however, that Baron Sonnino appeared to confuse self-government with linguistic and educational privileges. If his policy meant nothing more than minority guarantees, he thought that it would not satisfy the Ruthenians.

BARON SONNINO said that a representative body could be added, as there were many degrees of self-government up to federation.

MR. BALFOUR said that he ventured to suggest that the matter with which the Council had to deal was the Bolshevik threat to Galicia. The Ruthenians would not be satisfied with the safeguarding of their language and schools. He thought, therefore, that the method which he had suggested would have to be adopted.

BARON SONNINO said that the Ruthenians might be satisfied with the kind of autonomy granted to Finland under Russian sovereignty. Mr. Balfour's method did not offer the Ruthenians self-determination; it practically told them that they must wait for another generation before exercising it.

M. CAMBON said that if the presence of Polish troops in Eastern Galicia were held to endanger the rights of the Ruthenians, it was nevertheless difficult to find any other Allied troops to police the country. The Poles were the troops nearest at hand, and it was for the Conference to determine the limits of Polish control and to safeguard the rights of the Ruthenians. The objection, he thought, would come not from the Ruthenians but from the Ukrainians. It was clear that Galicia must not be ceded to the Ukrainians.

M. PICHON asked M. Cambon to give his opinion as regards Mr. Balfour's scheme.

M. CAMBON said that, as he had not consulted his Commission, he could only give a personal opinion. He agreed with Mr. Balfour's first point that the country should be occupied by Polish troops. As to the second point—that control should be exercised by the Great Powers through a High Commissioner—he personally preferred Baron Sonnino's plan. He thought that anything which would give to the undecided populations of those areas the impression of an indication that the Peace Conference was expressing its final will would put a stop to unrest and disorder.

MR. LANSING said that he had listened with interest to the views expressed. He was impressed by some of the points made by Baron Sonnino. He saw the difficulty of administering the country through a High Commissioner under whose authority customs and a judicial department would have to be set up. It would be extremely difficult to organise in detail, out of nothing, a complicated administrative machine. He therefore agreed with M. Cambon that it would be more satisfactory to give a mandate to Poland to hold the country, under such conditions as might be fixed by the League of Nations or the Great Powers, until such time as these might decide that a plebiscite should take place. His conclusion, therefore, was that Eastern Galicia within frontiers to be determined by the Commission should be administered by Poland as mandatory, under conditions likewise to be determined by the Commission, until such time as a plebiscite could be taken regarding the ultimate sovereignty of the country. He therefore suggested that the matter should be referred to the Polish Commission, which should be asked to submit a draft covering all the details required to carry out this policy.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought Mr. Lansing's plan open to the objections raised by Baron Sonnino, namely, that until a plebiscite had finally settled the sovereignty of the country there would be an open field for every sort of intrigue. Nor had the plan, he feared, the advantage of his own suggestion which, he admitted, was based on the hostility of the Ruthenian majority to the Polish minority. If his opinion on this subject were open to doubt, he would be prepared to revise his proposals.

MR. LANSING asked from what source Mr. Balfour had obtained his information.

MR. BALFOUR said that all the information received tended to produce, in his mind, the impression that in Western Galicia the majority was Polish or pro-Polish, while exactly the reverse prevailed in Eastern Galicia. He was quite ready to refer this matter to the Commission if there were any doubt about it.

MR. LANSING said that his information was totally different. He therefore thought it would be well to refer the matter to the Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that his conviction was that the Ruthenians did not wish to be ruled by the Polish minority. It would therefore be an abuse of the mandatory principle to give Poland the mandate.

MR. LANSING said that it would be a waste of time to continue a discussion based on totally different hypotheses. There were three possible suppositions:—

1. That the Ruthenians were hostile to the Poles.
2. That they were friendly to the Poles.
3. That the Council did not know what their feelings were.

His own proposal was based on the theory that the Ruthenians were friendly to the Poles, but with the qualification that he was not quite certain of this. It was for this reason that he had proposed that, after a certain interval of time, the Ruthenians should have a chance of option. Meanwhile, to avoid difficulties of administration under a High Commissioner, he would give a mandate to the Poles. He was quite ready to refer back to the Commission the question whether the Ruthenians were friendly or hostile to the Poles.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no objection. He would like to add that the Commission might, with advantage, examine the Constitution which had been proposed for the part of Ruthenia to be attached to the Czecho-Slovak State and discuss whether the adoption of a similar plan could fit the case of Eastern Galicia.

M. CAMBON pointed out that this solution was one of those suggested by the Commission.

MR. BALFOUR requested that it might be put on record that Polish troops should have full liberty to advance up to the River Zbrucz without prejudice to the future status of the country.

(It was decided that M. Pichon should communicate this decision in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments officially to the Polish Government and unofficially to the Ukrainian Delegation in Paris.⁴

It was further decided that the Commission on Polish Affairs should be asked to report regarding the sentiments of the population of Eastern Galicia, and also on the suitability of a scheme of autonomy similar to that devised for the Ruthenians to be attached to the Czecho-Slovak Republic.)...⁵

ANNEX A TO No. 700

Note by Mr. Balfour

The question referred to the Foreign Ministers by the 'Four' on the subject of Eastern Galicia, differs in some very important respects from other problems connected with the frontier arrangements in Eastern Europe.

We have got, if possible, to find a plan which will—

1. Satisfy the immediate military necessity of resisting the Bolshevik invasion of Galicia; and

⁴ Mr. Balfour informed General Carton de Wiart at Warsaw of this decision in telegram No. 173/174 of June 18, 1919, and stated therein that 'it would be advisable that Inter-Allied Officers should make every effort to protect Ruthenians during [Polish] advance and subsequent occupation'.

⁵ The meeting passed to the consideration of other matters.

2. Avoid compromising the future interests of the Ruthenian majority who now inhabit Eastern Galicia.

These two objects seem, at first sight, inconsistent, for the only troops which we have at our disposal for resisting the Bolsheviks in this region are the Poles; and if the Poles are given complete military freedom—as from a military point of view they certainly ought to be—their occupation of the country may compromise the political future of this district. The Ruthenian majority is backward, illiterate, and at present quite incapable of standing alone. The urban and educated classes are largely Polish, and when not Polish are Jewish. The whole country is utterly disorganised. There is, or was (for some slight improvement seems to have taken place), a most embittered feeling between the Poles and the Ruthenians, and it is manifestly impossible at the moment to determine the character of public opinion by a plebiscite, or other similar methods. If the Polish military occupation be permanent, it is hard to see how this state of things will find a remedy.

The best suggestion I can make is the following:—

Appoint as soon as may be a High Commissioner for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations, as proposed in plan II A of the Report of the Polish Commission.³ He must be instructed, while the Bolshevik peril lasts, to work in harmony with the Poles, and to facilitate the use of Polish troops as military necessity may require.

The Poles, on the other hand, must be informed that their military occupation of Eastern Galicia is a temporary one, and can only be allowed to last as long as the needs of common defence against the invading Bolshevism renders this proceeding necessary, and that of this the High Commissioner must be the judge. The Ruthenians must be told that, though the Poles are temporarily in occupation of their country, they are acting under the directions of the League of Nations, and that the Ruthenians will be given a full opportunity of determining by plebiscite, within limits to be fixed by the League of Nations, what their future status is to be.

This opportunity will be given them as soon as tranquillity is restored and there is some chance of a fair vote being taken.

I do not know whether the Poles would accept this plan, though I think they might be induced to do so. Its advantages are that—

1. It provides for the defence of Galicia against the Bolsheviks, which seems all-important, both in the interests of the Ruthenians themselves and of the security of Eastern Europe.
2. It combines with this a policy of self-determination, to be exercised as soon as circumstances permit.

No other plan that I have been able to think of combines those two advantages, both of which seem essential to any satisfactory policy for dealing with this embarrassing problem.

A. J. B[ALFOUR]

PARIS, *June 18, 1919.*

*Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, June 25, 1919, at 3 p.m.*¹

I.C. 199 [Confidential/General/141/1]

Present: *United States of America*: Hon. R. Lansing, Mr. L. Harrison, Colonel U. S. Grant, Dr. R. H. Lord, Mr. G. L. Beer, Mr. M. O. Hudson.

British Empire: The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour (for part of the meeting), Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir Esme Howard, Mr. H. Norman, Major A. M. Caccia, Captain C. T. M. Fuller, Lt.-Col. F. H. Kisch, Sir H. J. Read, Mr. Bourdillon.

France: M. Pichon, M. de Béarn, Captain de Saint-Quentin, Lieut. de Percin, Captain A. Portier, Lieut. Fould, M. J. Cambon, General Le Rond, M. Degrand, M. Hermitte.

Italy: Marquis Imperiali, M. Bertelé, Lieut. Zanchi, Marquis della Torretta, Count Marazzi.

Japan: Viscount Chinda, M. Kawai, M. Otchiai, M. S. Tachi, Colonel Sato.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

1. *Political Status of Eastern Galicia*. M. PICHON said that he had received a note from Mr. Balfour, stating that he would be delayed owing to other engagements, and that Sir Eyre Crowe would attend in his place.

The first question on the Agenda Paper related to the political status of Eastern Galicia. He would call on M. Cambon, the President of the Commission on Polish Affairs, to whom the question had been referred on the 18th June last (I.C. 197),² to make an oral statement.

M. CAMBON said that a copy of the Supplementary Report on Eastern Galicia had been circulated to all the members of the Conference (Annex A). That report discussed two possible solutions for the status of Eastern Galicia, namely:—

- (a) A provisional administration under a High Commissioner, acting on behalf of the League of Nations, with a temporary Polish military occupation and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.
- (b) A provisional administration under the Polish Government, with full local autonomy and military occupation as for (a), and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.

It would be seen that both proposals contemplated a temporary Polish military occupation and provided for an ultimate plebiscite in order to ascertain the wishes and national aspirations of the people. The two proposals merely differed in regard to the character of the Chief of the State. In the first case, the provisional administration would be under a High

¹ An American text of this document and annex A below is printed op. cit., vol. iv, p. 847f.

² No. 700.

Commissioner, acting on behalf of the League of Nations. In the second case, the provisional administration would be under a representative of the Polish Government. Before proceeding further, he thought the Council of Foreign Ministers might wish to give a decision on that point.

M. PICHON agreed. The question for the Council to decide was whether the provisional administration should be placed under a High Commissioner acting on behalf of the League of Nations or under the Polish Government.

MR. LANSING enquired what was meant by a 'provisional administration'.

M. CAMBON explained that the administration would necessarily be 'provisional', since it was agreed that sooner or later a plebiscite would be held in order to decide the ultimate form of government desired by the inhabitants.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that before a decision in regard to the character of the administration was taken it would be advisable to decide whether there should or should not be a plebiscite. The report submitted by the Commission on Polish Affairs laid considerable stress on the present disturbed condition of Eastern Galicia and the neighbouring countries, and on the fact that a plebiscite might fail to represent the real and fundamental desires of the inhabitants. The Commission had thought it its duty to make the following observation:—

'A decision to proceed in Eastern Galicia to a plebiscite after a long delay would involve a danger of very serious political consequences; it might cause neighbouring States to compete with each other with the object of attracting Eastern Galicia within their orbit.'

In these circumstances, he thought that it would be impossible to separate the two questions, namely, the form of government to be established in Eastern Galicia and the expediency, or otherwise, of holding a plebiscite.

M. PICHON enquired whether the Commission on Polish Affairs had made any definite proposal on that question.

M. CAMBON replied that the Commission had always been guided by the spirit which had animated the Council of Foreign Ministers when referring questions to it. The Commission had always been told to study the questions referred to it without taking a definite decision. Nevertheless, the arguments for or against the holding of a plebiscite after a short delay, or after a long delay, had been clearly summed up in the report submitted by the Commission in the following terms:—

'In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a short delay, that the value of such a solution would be seriously impaired by the present disturbed condition of Eastern Galicia and the neighbouring countries, and might fail to represent the real and fundamental desires of the inhabitants. In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a long delay, that such a solution succeeding a prolonged provisional régime would obviate the disadvantages alluded to above.'

On the other hand:—

'A decision to proceed in Eastern Galicia to a plebiscite after a long delay would involve a danger of very serious political consequences; it

might cause neighbouring States to compete with each other with the object of attracting Eastern Galicia within their orbit.'

In the circumstances, he personally recommended that the people of Eastern Galicia should be told that a plebiscite would be taken either by the League of Nations or by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at a date to be selected later, without, however, fixing any definite date.

M. PICHON thought that the Council should be asked to decide the two following questions:—

1. Should a plebiscite be held?
2. If so, at what date should a plebiscite be taken?

MR. LANSING said that he had read the Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs with considerable interest, since it entirely conformed to his views. The Commission had unanimously agreed that there should be a temporary Polish military occupation, at all events up to the River Zbrucz. Bearing these proposals in mind, he had thought it wise to prepare the following resolution to form the basis of discussion:—

It was agreed—

- '1. That the Polish Government be authorised to occupy with its military forces Eastern Galicia up to the River Zbrucz.
- '2. That the Polish Government be authorised to utilise any of its military forces, including General Haller's army, in such occupation.
- '3. That the Polish Government be authorised to establish a civil Government in Eastern Galicia under a mandate from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, which shall be conditional to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants.
- '4. That the mandate shall be predicated upon the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance, the time for the exercise of such choice to be hereafter fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or by a body to whom they may delegate that power.
- '5. That the drafting of the mandate be referred to the Polish Commission, subject to revision by the Drafting Committee.
- '6. That the Polish Government be forthwith advised of the foregoing decisions, and of the propriety of acting immediately upon Articles 1 and 2.
- '7. That the military representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Poland be advised of these articles of agreement.'

MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he was prepared in principle to accept Mr. Lansing's proposal, which possessed the great advantage that a definite Government would be set up in the territory in question. On the other hand, the great advantage thereby gained would be almost cancelled by the proposals contained in Article 4, namely, that the continuance of the Government so constituted should depend on 'the ultimate self-determination of the

inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance.' That condition would necessarily have the effect of giving to the administration a provisional character, and so leaving an open field for every sort of intrigue and giving rise to the serious political consequences referred to by M. Cambon.

M. PICHON enquired whether the Marquis Imperiali dissented from Mr. Lansing's proposal.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI replied in the negative. In his opinion Mr. Lansing's proposals were excellent. He merely thought that the proposals would be improved by omitting the articles which prescribed the holding of a plebiscite.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that Mr. Lansing's draft resolution should be considered article by article.

(This was agreed.)

Article 1. (Article 1 was accepted without amendment.)

Article 2. SIR EYRE CROWE enquired whether any military objection existed to the proposal that the Polish Government should be authorised to utilise General Haller's army for the occupation of Eastern Galicia.

GENERAL LE ROND explained that it would be the duty of the Polish Command to decide how the troops placed under its orders could best be employed. The article in question merely gave the Polish authorities the power to utilise their military forces in Galicia. In that connection he would invite attention to the fact that up to the present the Council of Four had objected to the employment of Haller's troops in Galicia. It was now proposed to withdraw that veto.

MR. LANSING said that he had consulted his military advisers, who were entirely in favour of the proposals contained in the article under discussion. Furthermore, the United States Minister at Warsaw, who had just arrived at Paris, had informed him that all the local military authorities were in favour of using Haller's army in Galicia, since it constituted the only really trained force available.

(Article 2 was accepted without amendment.)

Article 3. SIR EYRE CROWE called attention to the situation which had arisen at the meeting of the Council held on the 18th June, 1919. Mr. Balfour had then suggested the appointment of a High Commissioner for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations, basing his proposal on the fact that a most embittered feeling existed between the Poles and the Ruthenians, and that it would, in consequence, be manifestly impossible at the moment to determine the character of public opinion by a plebiscite or other similar method. Mr. Balfour had, moreover, expressed his conviction that the Ruthenians did not wish to be ruled by the Polish minority, and that it would be an abuse of the mandatory principle to give Poland the mandate. Nevertheless, Mr. Lansing had now proposed, in accordance with the terms of the clause under consideration, to give the mandate to the Polish Government under the authority of the Allied and Associated Powers, even though the Commission on Polish Affairs had, in its Supplementary Report, clearly borne out Mr. Balfour's contention that feelings of animosity against Poland indisputably

existed among an important part of the Ruthenian population. Consequently, speaking for Mr. Balfour, he felt compelled to urge the Council to give due weight to Mr. Balfour's original proposal, recommending the constitution of a provisional administration for Eastern Galicia, under a High Commissioner, acting on behalf of the League of Nations.

MR. LANSING drew attention to the fact that, while the Commission had, as stated by Sir Eyre Crowe, expressed the opinion that 'feelings of animosity against the Poles indisputably existed among an important part of the Ruthenian population,' it had qualified that statement by adding the following remarks, namely:—

'Without entering into a discussion as to the origin of this state of feeling, the Commission considers it necessary that its existence should be taken into account in devising any system by which the province would be even provisionally placed under Polish authority. It believes, however, that such a system, carefully organised so as to respect the special and local rights of the Ruthenian population, might prove acceptable to the latter as a provisional arrangement.'

Furthermore, he wished to complete the statement made by Sir Eyre Crowe in regard to what had occurred at the last meeting. Mr. Balfour had proposed the appointment of a High Commissioner under the mandate of the League of Nations, and Baron Sonnino had proposed the unconditional surrender of Eastern Galicia to Poland, whilst his own proposal had been a compromise between the two.

M. CAMBON said that, speaking in his own name, he wished to urge the necessity of placing the provisional administration under a Polish High Commissioner. The Council had decided that the country should be occupied by Polish military forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces would obviously be a great personage, and it would facilitate his relations with the High Commissioner should the latter also be a Pole. Consequently, in the interests of ensuring a good understanding between the High Commissioner and the Polish Commander-in-Chief, it would, in his opinion, be expedient that both should be Poles. In the second place, it followed as a consequence of Mr. Lansing's proposals that the administration of Eastern Galicia under a Polish High Commissioner would be controlled and supervised by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Would it be wise for the Allied and Associated Powers to abandon this control and to mix themselves up in local politics by themselves taking over the administration of the country? In his opinion, the Allied and Associated Governments would exercise their control more easily and more authoritatively on a Polish official than on a Commissioner appointed by themselves.

(Mr. Balfour here entered and received a short summary of the foregoing discussion.)

MR. BALFOUR said that his own views could be easily expressed. Should the feelings of the native Eastern Galician population allow them to be joined to Poland without local disturbances, that would undoubtedly be the best

plan to follow. But he feared that the feeling of the local population was averse from any such proposal, and in that case it might be difficult to join them to Poland. In his opinion, the appointment of a Polish High Commissioner was tantamount to the assertion that Eastern Galicia would permanently be joined to Poland. He personally wished that to happen, but he hesitated to give more trouble to Poland by adding to it a country consisting largely of Little Russians, who did not wish to join her. In his opinion, the whole question turned on a correct estimate of Ruthenian public opinion, of which he, personally, could give no positive indication.

M. PICHON said that the information received by the French Foreign Office from Galicia positively indicated that no feelings of hostility existed between the Ruthenians and the Poles. On the contrary, a good understanding appeared to exist between them. Further, the views expressed by the United States Minister, Mr. Gibson, appeared to bear out these reports.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that his information fully confirmed that received by M. Pichon. The largest part of the population was indifferent, and all signs of disturbance were undoubtedly due to external causes. On the other hand, religious sentiment turned towards Poland rather than towards the Ukraine, the latter territory being fully Orthodox.

MR. BALFOUR said that, in the circumstances, he would withdraw his objection.

(Mr. Balfour then withdrew.)

SIR EYRE CROWE enquired whether it would not be well to avoid the use of the word 'mandate', which had been given a particular meaning in connection with the League of Nations. He suggested that in the Treaty with Poland certain stipulations should be embodied, dealing with the question of Eastern Galicia.

MR. LANSING suggested that the word 'agreement' should be substituted for the word 'mandate' throughout the resolution.

(This was agreed.)

(Article 3, as amended, was accepted.)

Article 4. MARQUIS IMPERIALI said he would like, in connection with this clause, once more to raise the question of the necessity for holding a plebiscite. As previously stated by him, he felt that the establishment of a provisional Government would merely lead to continual intrigues and disturbances.

MR. LANSING explained that the question of holding a plebiscite had been fully discussed at the last meeting. The proposals which he had just submitted were intended as a compromise between the radically different views then expressed. He felt certain that Mr. Balfour would refuse to accept any plan which did not leave the door open for an expression of the wishes of the people.

MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that, in the circumstances, he would not press the matter further.

(Article 4 was accepted.)

Articles 5, 6 and 7. (These Articles were accepted without amendment.)

MR. LANSING proposed that a copy of the resolution should be transmitted to the Ukrainian representatives at Paris with a request that they should inform their Government in order that measures might be taken for the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from Eastern Galicia.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Ukrainian representatives at Paris had no means of communicating with their Government. He thought that a copy of the resolution should be forwarded to the Allied Military Commission in Poland, who would arrange to transmit it to the Ukrainian authorities. A copy of the resolution might also be sent to the French military representative at Lemberg for transmission to the Ukrainian Government.

MR. LANSING proposed that M. Pichon should be authorised to notify the parties concerned, using all possible means to achieve that object.

(This was agreed.)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Commission on Polish Affairs had attached to their Report on Eastern Galicia a proposal for the future status of Eastern Galicia based on the hypothesis of its receiving the largest measure of local autonomy within the Polish State. The Commission had taken as the basis of its studies the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and the Czecho-Slovak State on the other.³ He suggested that in drafting the final articles the Commission should be instructed to lay stress on the provisional character of the administration to be given to Eastern Galicia, in order that nothing should be included which might in any way interfere with the possibility of holding a plebiscite.

M. CAMBON pointed out that the Council had decided 'that the drafting of the agreement be referred to the Polish Commission, subject to revision by the Drafting Committee'.

MR. LANSING proposed that the Polish Commission should have full power to confer with the Polish, Ukrainian and Ruthenian representatives if so desired.

(It was agreed:

1. To accept the following resolution:—

- (1) That the Polish Government be authorised to occupy with its military forces Eastern Galicia up to the River Zbrucz.
- (2) That the Polish Government be authorised to utilise any of its military forces, including General Haller's army, in such occupation.
- (3) That the Polish Government be authorised to establish a civil Government in Eastern Galicia under an agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, which shall be conditioned to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants.
- (4) That the agreement shall be predicated upon the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance, the time for the exercise of such choice to be

³ i.e. the treaty for the protection of minorities in Czechoslovakia. The final text of this treaty is printed in Cmd. 479 of 1919.

hereafter fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or by a body to whom they may delegate that power.

- (5) That the drafting of the agreement be referred to the Polish Commission, subject to revision by the Drafting Committee.
 - (6) That the Polish Government be forthwith advised of the foregoing decisions and of the propriety of acting immediately upon Articles 1 and 2.
 - (7) That the military representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Poland be advised of these articles of agreement.
2. To authorise M. Pichon to forward a copy of the above resolution to all parties concerned, including the Ukrainian Government, by whatever means might seem best to him.
 3. To authorise the Commission on Polish Affairs to confer with the Polish, Ukrainian and Ruthenian representatives if so desired.) . . .⁴

ANNEX A TO NO. 701

Report No. 4 of the Commission on Polish Affairs

EASTERN GALICIA

Supplementary Report

At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the 18th June several possible solutions for the status of Eastern Galicia, including the following, were discussed:—

- (a) Provisional administration under a High Commissioner acting on behalf of the League of Nations, with a temporary Polish military occupation so long as this may be necessitated by the Bolshevik menace, and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.
- (b) Provisional administration under the Polish Government with full local autonomy and military occupation as for (a), and an ultimate consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants.

From the discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers already referred to, it appears to the Commission that the choice between these two solutions, or any others which may also be considered, will to some extent be dependent on a correct appreciation of the sentiments existing between the Polish and Ruthenian inhabitants of Eastern Galicia. The Commission has accordingly considered this question, and their conclusion is as follows:—

The Commission is of opinion that feelings of animosity against the Poles indisputably exist amongst an important part of the Ruthenian population.

Without entering into a discussion as to the origin of this state of feeling, the Commission considers it necessary that its existence should be taken into account in devising any system by which the province would be even provisionally placed under Polish authority. It believes, however,

⁴ The meeting passed to the consideration of other matters.

that such a system, carefully organised so as to respect the special and local rights of the Ruthenian population, might prove acceptable to the latter as a provisional arrangement.

The Commission on Polish Affairs has also been charged by the Council of Foreign Ministers to suggest the general clauses which it would be advisable to adopt, on the hypothesis of Eastern Galicia receiving a large measure of autonomy within the Polish State, under conditions analogous to the connection with the Czecho-Slovak State of the Ruthenian territory to the south of the Carpathians. (See Sub-Annex.)

The question of holding a plebiscite to determine the aspirations of the population having been referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs, the Commission formulates the following conclusions:—

It is unanimously agreed that a consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants, before fixing the definitive status of the country, would be just and equitable.

On the question of practical convenience and political expediency, the Commission considers:—

- (a) In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a short delay, that the value of such a solution would be seriously impaired by the present disturbed condition of Eastern Galicia and the neighbouring countries, and might fail to represent the real and fundamental desires of the inhabitants.
- (b) In regard to a plebiscite to be held after a long delay, that such a solution, succeeding a prolonged provisional régime, would obviate the disadvantages alluded to above.

The Commission, nevertheless, thinks it its duty to make the following observation:—

The decision to proceed in Eastern Galicia to a plebiscite after a long delay would involve a danger of very serious political consequences: it might cause neighbouring States to compete with each other with the object of attracting Eastern Galicia within their orbit.

JULES CAMBON
R. H. LORD
EYRE CROWE
DELLA TORRETTA
K. OTCHIAI

June 20, 1919.

SUB-ANNEX

Proposed Status of Eastern Galicia on the Hypothesis of its receiving the Largest Measure of Local Autonomy within the Polish State.

The Commission has taken as the basis of its [studies the] draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and the Czecho-Slovak State on the other,³ in regard to the territory of the Ruthenians

(Heading II). This draft Treaty, drawn up by the Commission on New States, takes into account the memorandum on this question which was submitted to the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak State.

The Commission on Polish Affairs considers that the stipulations of this draft Treaty apply in a general manner to the case of Eastern Galicia under discussion, but that it is nevertheless desirable to complete and to define them so as to take into account the facts, firstly, that the population of Eastern Galicia is mixed instead of being homogeneous, and secondly, that it is immeasurably more competent than the Ruthenian territory to furnish the officials necessary for its own administration.

The Commission submits, as an indication of its views, the following draft articles. If the general line of this scheme should be approved, it would be necessary to define the details of its application after a more careful study of the previous status within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of Galicia and the other provinces of that Monarchy, and after hearing the views of the Polish Delegation and of representatives of the Ruthenian population.

Draft Articles

Article 1. Recognition of the Autonomy of Eastern Galicia within the Polish State

Poland consents to recognise Eastern Galicia, as defined by the frontiers fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in the form of an autonomous unit within the Polish State, enjoying all the liberties compatible with the unity of the Polish State.

Article 2. Functions of the Diet and of the Governor of Eastern Galicia

The general provisions of Article 2 of Heading II of the draft Treaty with the Czecho-Slovak State are satisfactory, but must be more precisely defined if adopted in principle.

Article 3. Representation of Eastern Galicia in the Diet of the Polish State

The general provisions of Article 4 of Heading II of the draft Treaty with the Czecho-Slovak State offer a satisfactory basis, but the details of their application should not be settled until the views of the Polish Delegation have been heard.

Article 4. Representation of Eastern Galicia in the Council of Ministers of the Polish State

Eastern Galicia shall be represented in the Council of Ministers of the Polish State by a Minister without portfolio, nominated by the Head of the Polish State from among the representatives of Eastern Galicia either in the Diet of the Polish State or in the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

Article 5. Selection of Officials

Poland consents to the officials of Eastern Galicia being selected in principle from among the inhabitants of that province.

The officials shall be nominated by the Governor, exception being made when necessary in the case of certain officials to be nominated by the Government of the Polish State.

Article 6. *Creation of a special Section of Affairs of Eastern Galicia in certain Ministries of the Polish State*

In each Ministry of the Polish State which deals with the affairs of Eastern Galicia a special section of those affairs shall be organised.

It is further advisable that the Polish Government should be able at any moment to obtain information on Ruthenian affairs through a special Adviser, to be nominated by the Head of the State.

No. 702

Extract from Notes of a Meeting held at President Wilson's House in the Place des États-Unis, Paris¹

C.F. 92 [*Secret/General/162*]

Wednesday, June 25, 1919, at 4 p.m.

Present: *United States of America*: President Wilson.

British Empire: Mr. Lloyd George.

France: M. Clemenceau.

Italy: M. Sonnino.

Japan: Baron Makino.

Secretaries: Sir M. Hankey, Count Aldrovandi and Mr. Portier.

Interpreter: Professor Mantoux.

... 20.² *Galicia: Authorisation to the Polish Republic to Extend their Operation.*
The Council approved the attached Note to the Polish Government submitted by the Council of Foreign Ministers. (Appendix VIII.)³

(The following Note was signed by the four Heads of Governments:—

'Gouvernement Polonais, Varsovie, 25 juin 1919.

'En vue de garantir les personnes et les biens de la population paisible de Galicie orientale contre les dangers que leur font courir les bandes bolchevistes, le Conseil Suprême des Puissances alliées et associées a décidé d'autoriser les forces de la République Polonaise à poursuivre leurs opérations jusqu'à la rivière Zbruck.

*'Cette autorisation ne préjuge en rien les décisions que le Conseil Suprême prendra [prendra] ultérieurement pour régler le statut politique de la Galicie.'*⁴

The Note was signed by the representatives of the Five Powers, and was

¹ This document is printed op. cit., vol. vi, p. 669 f.

² The remainder of these minutes related to other matters.

³ Not printed. This appendix contained, not the note to the Polish Government printed below, but Mr. Balfour's note of June 18, 1919, for which see No. 700, annex A.

⁴ At a meeting of the Council of Four held at 4 p.m. on June 27, 1919 (C. F. 96), the following telegram was further 'approved and initialled by the representatives of the Five Principal

communicated by Captain Portier to a messenger who had brought it from the Council of Foreign Ministers.) . . .²

Allied and Associated Powers: "The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has decided to authorize the Polish Government to utilise any of its military forces, including General Haller's army, in Eastern Galicia." ' This telegram was sent to the Polish Government next day. General Carton de Wiart informed Mr. Balfour in Warsaw telegram No. 615 of July 1 (received July 2): 'Poles' counter-attack started favourably, June 28, in Eastern Galicia. Poles regained Lemberg-Stanislaw railway, also Brody, Zloczow and Brzezany.'

No. 703

Mr. Norman (Paris) to M. Dutasta

[130/5/1/14077]

PARIS, July 5, 1919

My dear Ambassador,

I have had the honour to receive the letter from the Secretariat General, dated 29th ultimo,¹ regarding the communication to the interested parties of the decisions taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 25th, concerning Galicia.

I observe that only the first of these decisions² has been communicated to the Ukrainian Government,³ and I would venture to suggest to Your Excellency the desirability of informing it of the other decisions also, not only on the ground of expediency, but also because such would appear to have been the intention of the resolution adopted by the Council.

Believe me, etc.,

H. NORMAN⁴

¹ Not printed.

² i.e. decision 1(1) at the conclusion of No. 701.

³ This communication from the Secretariat General to the Ukrainian Delegation, dated June 26, 1919, is printed by Dr. Michel Lozynsky: *Décisions du Conseil Suprême sur la Galicie Orientale* (Bureau Ukrainien, Paris, 1919), pp. 47-8.

⁴ Mr. Norman renewed this representation in a further letter of July 9, 1919, to M. Dutasta. After citing textually decisions 1(1-7) and 2 taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers concerning Galicia (see No. 701), and underlining the words 'including the Ukrainian Government' in decision 2, Mr. Norman concluded: 'It would therefore appear that the Council wished the Ukrainians, as well as the Poles, to have knowledge of these resolutions.'

No. 704

M. Sydorenko¹ to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received July 11)

[130/5/1/15027]

Excellence,

PARIS, le 9 juillet, 1919

Je tiens à attirer votre bienveillante attention sur la copie de la note que vous trouverez ci-jointe et que j'ai adressée à Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix à Paris.

Veuillez agréer etc.,

G. SYDORENKO

¹ President of the Ukrainian Delegation in Paris.

Ukrainian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference²

PARIS, le 2 juillet, 1919

Excellence,

La Déléation de la République Ukrainienne près la Conférence de la Paix à Paris, vient de recevoir communication de la décision prise le 25 juin par le Conseil Suprême des Puissances Alliées et Associées, au sujet de la Galicie Orientale.

Cette décision autorisant les forces de la République Polonaise à poursuivre les opérations jusqu'à la rivière Zbrucz, la Déléation de la République Ukrainienne à Paris a l'honneur de vous faire la déclaration suivante:

La décision du Conseil Suprême ne procède pas de la victoire de la justice et du droit.

Le peuple ukrainien de la Galicie Orientale formant une majorité très considérable sur ce territoire ukrainien depuis des siècles, pouvait incontestablement non seulement d'après le droit et la justice, mais aussi d'après les principes des États de l'Entente, proclamer après la désagrégation de l'Autriche-Hongrie, son indépendance et sa réunion à la République Ukrainienne, en un seul État, formé de tout le peuple ukrainien.

La République Polonaise en manifestant ses prétentions, nullement justifiées, sur la Galicie Orientale et en faisant la guerre à la République Ukrainienne pour réaliser ses prétentions, a violé le droit du peuple ukrainien.

Le Gouvernement Ukrainien, confiant dans les principes proclamés par les Puissances de l'Entente, espérait que les Puissances, assumant la tâche de juger impartialement dans cette guerre des Polonais contre les Ukrainiens, se prononceraient contre l'annexionisme polonais et défendraient le droit de libre disposition du peuple ukrainien.

La Déléation Ukrainienne à Paris constate qu'il n'en est pas ainsi.

La Commission du Général Barthélemy³ a imposé le 24 février aux Ukrainiens une suspension d'armes, au moment où le plus grand danger menaçait l'armée polonaise assiégée à Léopol par les troupes ukrainiennes.

La même commission a proposé le 28 février un projet d'armistice qui, non seulement laissait aux Polonais les parties du territoire ukrainien occupées par l'armée polonaise, Léopol inclus, mais aussi de grands territoires et la région du Drohobytych, si riche en pétrole, qui se trouvaient aux mains des Ukrainiens.

Il est évident qu'une telle décision, dictée par la partialité, ne pût être acceptée par le Gouvernement Ukrainien. Néanmoins, il continue à croire à la justice de l'Entente et demande une décision plus équitable.

La deuxième intervention de l'Entente dans la guerre polono-ukrainienne a été la décision du Conseil Suprême du 19 mars, par laquelle les deux partis étaient invités à conclure une trêve dans le plus bref délai possible.⁴

² This document is printed by Dr. M. Lozynsky, op. cit., pp. 49-57.

³ General Barthélemy was chief of an Allied mission sent to Lemberg by the Allied Commission at Warsaw.

⁴ See No. 227, note 6.

Le Gouvernement Ukrainien se rendit à l'appel du Conseil Suprême et se déclara prêt à conclure une trêve, mais les Polonais ne l'imitèrent pas et continuèrent les opérations.

Le motif de leur conduite devient maintenant manifeste. D'une part, leur situation militaire s'était améliorée, par suite de l'armistice conclu avec les Tchèques et les Allemands et de la prochaine arrivée de l'armée Haller en Pologne. Ils pouvaient donc espérer la conquête de toute la Galicie. D'autre part, ils étaient sûrs que leur désobéissance au Conseil Suprême n'encourrait aucun reproche et que les résultats obtenus leur resteraient acquis parce que approuvés [*sic*] par le Conseil Suprême. C'est ce qui s'est produit.

Le Gouvernement Ukrainien renouvela vainement ses propositions de suspensions d'armes, mais les Polonais les rejetaient.

La désignation d'une commission d'armistice polono-ukrainien n'a eu aucune influence sur la suite des événements. La commission proposa aux deux partis le projet d'un armistice que les Ukrainiens acceptèrent mais les Polonais s'y montrèrent opposés. Dans toutes les déclarations des représentants de l'Entente, les Ukrainiens ont toujours compris que la décision de l'Entente se baserait [*sic*] sur les principes de justice et ne tiendrait aucun compte des faits accomplis.

Le Président de la Commission pour l'armistice ukraïno-polonais, le Général Botha a attiré l'attention des deux partis sur la responsabilité énorme encourue par le parti qui n'accepterait pas l'armistice et continuerait la guerre contre la volonté de l'Entente. Or les Polonais n'ont pas accepté l'armistice et ont continué la guerre. Dans sa décision du 25 juin, le Conseil Suprême n'a nullement tenu les Polonais pour responsables. Non seulement il a accepté le fait accompli de leur occupation, mais encore il autorise les Polonais à poursuivre leurs opérations jusqu'à la rivière Zbrucz, c'est-à-dire : l'occupation de toute la Galicie Orientale.

Le Conseil Suprême explique sa décision en disant que l'occupation polonaise a pour but de 'garantir les personnes et les biens de la population paisible de la Galicie Orientale contre les dangers que leur font courir les bandes bolchévistes'.

La Délégation Ukrainienne affirme que le Gouvernement Ukrainien a toujours garanti les personnes et les biens de la population paisible sur le territoire de la Galicie Orientale sur lequel son pouvoir s'étendait.

La Délégation Ukrainienne affirme que sur le territoire de la Galicie Orientale, où s'étendait le pouvoir du Gouvernement Ukrainien il n'y a jamais eu aucune bande bolchéviste et un ordre parfait y a toujours régné.

La Délégation Ukrainienne affirme que le Directoire de la République Ukrainienne, fort de l'appui très efficace du Secrétariat d'État de l'Ukraine Occidentale, a été le seul obstacle qui a barré aux Bolchéviks Russes la route de l'Ouest.

La Délégation Ukrainienne affirme que c'est précisément l'armée de l'Ukraine Occidentale qui, après avoir défait les Bolchéviks sur la rivière Zbrucz, a empêché leur jonction avec les Bolchévistes de la Hongrie.

La Délégation Ukrainienne affirme que le Gouvernement Ukrainien a

décliné une invitation du gouvernement bolchévik lui proposant une suspension d'armes, juste alors qu'une offensive avait été déclanchée par les Polonais contre la Galicie Orientale après leur rejet du projet de l'armistice.

Tous ces faits que la Délégation Ukrainienne affirme démontrent que c'est précisément le Gouvernement Ukrainien et l'armée ukrainienne, et plus particulièrement le Gouvernement Ukrainien et l'armée ukrainienne de la Galicie Orientale qui ont formé l'unique rempart contre le bolchévisme, et que les Polonais, en attaquant l'armée ukrainienne de l'Ouest, alors qu'elle était engagée dans une lutte avec les Bolchéviks se sont montrés les alliés des Bolchéviks.

Nous affirmons que même maintenant si les Polonais recevaient l'ordre du Conseil Suprême de se retirer de la Galicie Orientale, qu'ils occupent, l'armée ukrainienne serait en mesure de maintenir l'ordre dans le pays.

Nous affirmons, enfin, que les 'bandes bolchéviks' ne menacent pas du tout la Galicie Orientale, parce que l'armée ukrainienne enregistre des succès considérables dans sa lutte contre les bolchéviks et les oblige à reculer de plus en plus vers l'Est.

S'il y a quelque danger pour les personnes et les biens de la population paisible de la Galicie Orientale il vient précisément de l'occupation polonaise.

La lutte polono-ukrainienne pour la Galicie Orientale a une histoire plusieurs fois séculaire. La Pologne après la conquête de ce pays ukrainien, a tout le temps manifesté, et manifeste encore l'intention d'en faire un pays foncièrement polonais, en supprimant l'élément ukrainien. D'autre part le peuple ukrainien s'est efforcé pendant toute la domination polonaise de recouvrer son indépendance.

Le partage de la Pologne et l'occupation de la Galicie par l'Autriche, n'a [sic] pas mis fin à cette lutte polono-ukrainienne; d'autant plus que le Gouvernement autrichien se fit protecteur des Polonais contre les Ukrainiens. Pendant les dernières cinquante années, la lutte polono-ukrainienne a augmenté d'intensité au fur et à mesure que nous nous approchions du mouvement actuel.

Les élections galiciennes, où, par ordre des autorités polonais, coulait le sang des paysans ukrainiens [; de grandes grèves agricoles faites par des paysans ukrainiens]⁵ contre les propriétaires fonciers polonais; la lutte pour le suffrage universel au Parlement autrichien et à la Diète galicienne manifestée par de larges mouvements de masse, par l'obstruction de la part des Ukrainiens dans la Diète et par des répressions sanglantes de la part des Polonais; la lutte pour la création de l'Université Ukrainienne, où le sang a également coulé; l'assassinat du Gouverneur de la Galicie, le comte polonais André Potocki, par l'étudiant ukrainien Miroslav Sitchynsky;⁶ enfin les mesures cruelles contre les Ukrainien[s], les prêtres, les intellectuels, prises d'après les ordres des autorités polonaises pendant la dernière guerre de l'Autriche contre la Russie; tous ces faits expliquent suffisamment le caractère des relations polono-ukrainiennes.

⁵ This passage was inadvertently omitted from the present text. The passage has been supplied from another copy.

⁶ On April 12, 1908.

Une nouvelle preuve est donnée par la guerre actuelle entre les Polonais et les Ukrainiens.

Les Polonais dénoncent au monde entier les atrocités des soldats ukrainiens.

La Délégation Ukrainienne proteste de la façon la plus énergique contre ces affirmations.

Néanmoins, il est bon de remarquer que l'accusation des Polonais contre les soldats ukrainiens fait ressortir la haine que nourrit le peuple ukrainien contre les Polonais, et qui le porterait à commettre des atrocités.

Les Polonais, d'autre part, ne cachent pas que leur conduite à l'égard de la population ukrainienne de la Galicie ne s'inspire d'aucune pitié. N'ont-ils pas inventé 'les bandes bolchévistes' de la Galicie Orientale, pour justifier leurs atrocités?

Tous les moyens sont bons à l'occupation polonaise pour supprimer l'élément ukrainien. Les organisations et les sociétés ukrainiennes, les écoles, les églises ukrainiennes sont fermées; la presse ukrainienne est supprimée. Les paysans ukrainiens, les prêtres et les intellectuels sont fusillés en masse, ou jetés en prison ou enfermés dans des camps de concentration. Bref, toute la vie ukrainienne a disparu. Est-ce ainsi que les Polonais assurent les personnes et les biens de la population paisible de la Galicie Orientale?

La Délégation de la République Ukrainienne constate que le Conseil Suprême par sa décision du 25 juin a livré la population ukrainienne d'un pays ukrainien à la domination de son plus grand ennemi, qui n'a qu'un seul but: supprimer l'élément ukrainien, afin que ce pays devienne réellement polonais.

'Cette autorisation', dit le Conseil Suprême à la fin de la décision, 'ne préjuge en rien les décisions que le Conseil Suprême prendra ultérieurement pour régler le statut politique de la Galicie'.

Cette promesse ne peut satisfaire d'aucune façon le peuple ukrainien. Elle ne le préserve pas contre le régime de la terreur instauré actuellement par le pouvoir polonais, et ne lui donne aucune garantie pour l'avenir.

Le peuple ukrainien, étant donné la décision actuelle du Conseil Suprême qui est toute en faveur des Polonais, a toutes les raisons de croire que les décisions ultérieures de ce même Conseil Suprême auront la même orientation.

Mais si le Conseil Suprême changeait d'attitude à l'avenir qui réparera les dégâts moraux et matériels occasionnés au peuple ukrainien par l'occupation polonaise?

Supposons que le Conseil Suprême fasse procéder plus tard à un plébiscite. Précédé d'une longue période d'occupation polonaise du régime polonais [*sic*] qui ne s'inspire que de la terreur et du désir de supprimer l'élément ukrainien par tous les moyens dont on dispose pendant l'état de guerre, ce plébiscite offrira-t-il toutes les garanties et exprimera-t-il réellement la volonté de la population?

Les faits étant ainsi, la Délégation de la République Ukrainienne déclare que:

La décision du Conseil Suprême relative à la Galicie Orientale porte

atteinte à la souveraineté territoriale de la République Ukrainienne, en livrant une partie de son territoire à l'occupation polonaise.

Cette décision laisse [lèse] le droit du peuple ukrainien à disposer de lui-même, et sanctionne le fait accompli de l'occupation polonaise.

Cette décision livre le peuple ukrainien aux mains de son ennemi historique et condamne la terre ukrainienne à la polonisation.

Cette décision offense gravement les sentiments nationaux du peuple ukrainien, parce qu'il n'y a pas d'offense plus grave pour la dignité d'un peuple que de la soumettre à une domination étrangère ennemie.

Cette décision condamne la population de la Galicie Orientale, sans différences de nationalité et de religion, à la misère la plus affreuse, parce que le pays ne peut rentrer dans le calme sous l'occupation polonaise, mais deviendra le terrain d'une lutte de plus en plus acharnée qui nécessairement l'amènera à la ruine et à l'anarchie la plus complète.

Contre cette décision, la Délégation de la République Ukrainienne au nom du Droit et de la Justice, élève devant la Conférence de la Paix,⁷ sa protestation la plus solennelle et la plus énergique.

La Délégation de la République Ukrainienne, qui avait pour but d'obtenir de la Conférence de la Paix la reconnaissance de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance de la République Ukrainienne, englobant tous les territoires ukrainiens, déclare que cette décision ne peut être acceptée par le peuple ukrainien, et que, par tous les moyens, il défendra l'indépendance et l'intégrité de son État. Par conséquent, la Délégation de la République Ukrainienne ne prend aucune responsabilité des événements qui pourront survenir.

G. SYDORENKO

Président de la Délégation de la République Ukrainienne

Délégués extraordinaires pour l'Armistice ukraïno-polonais

DMYTRO WITOWSKY,
Colonel

DR. MICHEL LOZYNSKY

Sous-Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Étrangères de l'Ukraine Occidentale

⁷ The text of this document as printed by Dr. Lozynsky (see note 2 above) here reads: '... élève devant le Conseil Suprême des Puissances Alliées et Associées, et devant la Conférence de la Paix, ...', etc.

No. 705

M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received July 15)

[130/5/1/15292]

PARIS, 11 juillet, 1919

Mon cher Collègue,

Conformément au désir que vous avez bien voulu m'exprimer dans vos lettres des 8 [?] 5] & 9 juillet,¹ j'ai notifié à la Délégation Ukrainienne de Paris les décisions Nos. 3 & 4 prises par le Conseil des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères dans sa séance du 25 juin dernier au sujet de la Galicie Orientale.

¹ See No. 703.

J'ai en même temps fait inviter le Général Henrys par le Maréchal Foch à notifier ces décisions au Gouvernement Ukrainien.

Je ne crois pas que la résolution du Conseil des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères vise les décisions Nos. 2, 5, 6 & 7 qui ne concernent pas les Ukrainiens.

Bien cordialement à vous,
P. DUTASTA

No. 706

*M. Sydorenko to M. Clemenceau*¹

[130/5/1/16591]

PARIS, le 15 juillet, 1919

Excellence,

La Délégation de la République Ukrainienne près la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de lui accuser réception de la communication du 11 de ce mois, concernant la décision du Conseil Suprême, disant que 'le Gouvernement polonais sera autorisé à établir un Gouvernement Civil en Galicie Orientale'.²

En se référant à toutes ses déclarations précédentes concernant la Galicie Orientale, spécialement à la déclaration du 2 de ce mois,³ faite à la suite de la décision du Conseil Suprême par laquelle 'les forces de la République Polonaise sont autorisées à poursuivre leurs opérations jusqu'à la rivière Zbrucz' la Délégation de la République Ukrainienne a l'honneur de faire la déclaration suivante:

I. Le peuple ukrainien de la Galicie Orientale, qui forme plus de 70% de la population de ce pays, a proclamé le 19 octobre 1918 d'accord avec le peuple ukrainien de la Bukovine et de la Hongrie par son Conseil National, composé des députés au parlement autrichien, des députés à la Diète Galicienne et de Bukovine, élus par le suffrage universel, et des délégués des partis politiques ukrainiens, sa volonté de se séparer de tous les autres pays de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Le 1^{er} novembre 1918 le Conseil National Ukrainien s'est emparé du pouvoir en Galicie Orientale et sur les autres territoires ukrainiens ci-dessus désignés et a formé de ces territoires la République Ukrainienne Occidentale.

Le 3 janvier 1919 le Conseil National Ukrainien a unanime[me]nt décidé la réunion en un seul état de la République Ukrainienne Occidentale et de la République Ukrainienne, formée sur les ruines de l'ancienne Russie.

Le 22 janvier sur la place de Ste Sophie à Kieff, capitale de la République Ukrainienne, la réunion des deux républiques fut solennellement proclamée.

De cette manière la Galicie Orientale par la volonté de sa population est devenue partie de la République Ukrainienne.

¹ A copy of this note was received by the British Delegation on July 21, 1919. The note is printed by Dr. M. Lozynsky, op. cit., pp. 72-7.

² Cf. No. 705. This note is printed *ibid.*, p. 71.

³ See No. 704.

II. La République Polonaise, qui a fait la guerre à la République Ukrainienne dans le but de conquérir la Galicie, où la population polonaise s'élève à peine à 16 % et où la domination de la bureaucratie polonaise à l'époque de la monarchie austro-hongroise a été établie exclusivement grâce à la dynastie des Habsbourgs et au Gouvernement autrichien, a montré des visées impérialistes nullement justifiées, contraires aux principes proclamés par les Puissances de l'Entente et méritant de ce fait le blâme le plus sévère.

III. Le Conseil Suprême en invitant par sa décision du 19 mars 1919 les deux parties en présence à conclure une trêve a déclaré 'qu'il est disposé :

1^o — à entendre l'exposé des revendications territoriales de l'une et de l'autre partie en cause :

2^o — à s'entremettre à Paris auprès des délégations ukrainienne et polonaise ou par l'intermédiaire de telle représentation qualifiée que les parties jugeront devoir choisir en vue de transformer la suspension d'armes en armistice.'

IV. La conclusion de la suspension d'armes n'eut pas lieu parce que le Gouvernement polonais rejeta la proposition du Gouvernement ukrainien et parce que le Conseil Suprême n'imposa pas au Gouvernement [? polonais] l'exécution des décisions qu'il avait prises.

La conclusion de l'armistice n'eut pas lieu, parce que le Gouvernement polonais rejeta le projet d'armistice, présenté aux deux partis par la Commission Interalliée et accepté par les Ukrainiens, et le Conseil Suprême n'imposa pas aux Polonais l'acceptation de ce projet.

L'exposé des revendications territoriales des Ukrainiens au sujet de la Galicie Orientale n'a pas été entendu par le Conseil Suprême.

Le Président de la Commission Interalliée pour l'armistice ukraïno-polonais, Général Botha, a déclaré à la délégation ukrainienne au cours de la séance de la Commission du 8 mai 1919 que le Conseil Suprême décida de procéder à l'audition de l'exposé des revendications territoriales des deux partis en présence seulement après la conclusion de l'armistice.

V. La décision du Conseil Suprême du 19 mars 1919 s'adressait également aux deux partis.

On en pouvait conclure que le Conseil Suprême protégerait le parti qui se soumettrait à la décision et tiendrait pour responsable le parti qui ne s'y soumettrait pas.

Mais le Conseil Suprême s'est solidarisé avec le parti qui ne s'est pas rendu à sa décision du 19 mars 1919, et sans entendre les Ukrainiens, se basant uniquement sur ses pourparlers avec les Polonais, a autorisé le Gouvernement polonais à occuper la Galicie Orientale et à y établir l'administration civile.

VI. La remise de la Galicie Orientale à l'occupation et l'administration de la République Polonaise viole la volonté du peuple ukrainien, de la Galicie Orientale qui a manifesté son désir de faire partie de la République Ukrainienne et porte atteinte à l'intégrité et [sic] de la République

Ukrainienne, la Galicie Orientale formant une province autonome de cette République.

La remise de la Galicie Orientale à l'occupation et l'administration de la République Polonaise est en contradiction avec la décision du 19 mars 1919, qui promettait au peuple ukrainien l'audition de l'exposé de ses revendications territoriales en Galicie Orientale et la conclusion d'un armistice entre l'Ukraine et la Pologne.

La remise de la Galicie Orientale [à] l'occupation et à l'administration de la République Polonaise est en contradiction avec les principes de la libre disposition des peuples, principes proclamés par l'Entente, parce qu'elle décide du sort du pays non pas en accord avec la volonté de la majorité ukrainienne du pays mais dans l'intérêt de la minorité polonaise, en livrant le pays ukrainien et le peuple ukrainien à la domination de l'oligarchie polonaise.

La remise de la Galicie Orientale à l'occupation polonaise et à l'administration de la République Polonaise abandonne un parti belligérant, les Ukrainiens à la merci de l'autre parti, des Polonais. Les Polonais useront de leur pouvoir pour détruire autant que possible l'élément ukrainien et s'assurer la possession de ce pays. Les procédés polonais dans la Galicie Orientale jusqu'à l'heure actuelle, ainsi que la Délégation de la République Ukrainienne a eu l'honneur de faire connaître à la Conférence de la Paix par sa note du 11 courant,⁴ illustrent suffisamment quoique incomplètement la conduite des Polonais.

La remise de la Galicie Orientale à l'occupation et l'administration de la République Polonaise rend impossible au peuple ukrainien l'exercice du droit de libre disposition, prévu pour l'avenir dans la dernière décision du Conseil Suprême, le Gouvernement Polonais ayant le pouvoir en Galicie Orientale d'user de tous les moyens pour empêcher cette disposition de lui-même du peuple ukrainien. Sous la domination du conquérant on ne saurait parler de la libre disposition du conquis.

VII. La Délégation de la République Ukrainienne élève par conséquent sa protestation la plus solennelle au nom de la République Ukrainienne et au nom du peuple ukrainien contre la remise de la Galicie à l'occupation et l'administration de la République Polonaise.

La Délégation de la République Ukrainienne a l'honneur de déclarer qu'il n'y a qu'un moyen de solutionner la question de la Galicie Orientale conformément au principe d'autodisposition des peuples, proclamé par les Puissances de l'Entente et suivant les promesses que le Conseil Suprême a faites dans sa décision du 19 mars 1919: délivrer la Galicie Orientale de l'occupation polonaise et donner au peuple ukrainien de ce pays la possibilité de disposer de lui-même en liberté, c'est-à-dire, lui donner la possibi-

⁴ Not printed. This note gave a long list of alleged Polish atrocities in Eastern Galicia, and is printed, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-70. (Under cover of Warsaw dispatch No. 59 of June 25, 1919, to Mr. Balfour at Paris—received June 30—Sir P. Wyndham, H.M. Commissioner in Warsaw, had transmitted a note of June 23 from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs enclosing a detailed report upon alleged Ukrainian atrocities in Galicia.)

lité de faire partie de la République Ukrainienne, qui assurera les garanties les plus complètes aux minorités nationales.

G. SYDORENKO

Président de la Délégation de la
République Ukrainienne à Paris

No. 707

Lord Acton (Berne) to Earl Curzon (Received July 24)

No. 1113 Telegraphic [106795/28011/55]

BERNE, *July 21, 1919*

The following has been sent to-day to Astoria, No. 231.

'I learn that the Ukrainian representatives here are now saying openly that they regard Eastern Galicia as irretrievably lost: they apparently consider that it will be given to the Poles in order to compensate the latter for the loss of Upper Silesia which will, they think, be left to Germany.

Addressed to Peace Conference No. 231, copied to Foreign Office, No. 1113.'

No. 708

M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received July 25)

[609/4/1/16179]

PARIS, *24 juillet 1919*

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation Britannique copie d'une protestation du Comité Carpatho-Russe¹ au sujet de la remise aux autorités civiles polonaises de l'administration de la Galicie Orientale.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 708

Protestation du Comité Carpatho-Russe de Paris

Le Conseil Suprême des Alliés a décidé de remettre définitivement la Galicie Orientale, c'est-à-dire des territoires habités en majorité écrasante par des Russes, aux mains de l'administration civile polonaise. Le Comité Carpatho-Russe considère cet acte comme une violation directe du principe de libre disposition des peuples; cet acte sera également vivement ressenti par tous les Russes qui ont versé leur sang pour la libération de leurs frères des Carpathes.

Une incorporation par la violence des Carpatho-Russes dans un Corps d'État non russe ne peut être et ne sera jamais une solution définitive de cette question. Cette incorporation préparerait tout au plus la voie à une irrédentisme national; la situation sera la même qui existait avant la guerre en Alsace-Lorraine et dans les territoires italiens de l'Autriche.

En partant de ce point de vue, le Comité Carpatho-Russe continue à s'en

¹ For Carpatho-Russian representation at Paris, cf. No. 269.

tenir au droit, pour les Carpatho-Russes, de disposer librement de leur sort et de manifester leur volonté au moyen d'un *plébiscite*.

Toute autre disposition qui ne s'accorderait pas avec la libre volonté du peuple ne saurait être regardée par le Comité que comme une décision provisoire et non définitive.

Le Président du Comité Carpatho-Russe
DIMITRY MARKOFF

PARIS, le 21 juillet 1919.

No. 709

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received August 13)
No. 1586 [115522/28011/55]

My Lord,

PARIS, August 12, 1919

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 5137¹ (106515/W/55) of the 31st ultimo asking what reply should be returned to the request of the Ukrainian Delegation² for the appointment of a British Commission of investigation on the alleged atrocities in Eastern Galicia, I have the honour to suggest that since the Peace Conference is working out a scheme of autonomous government in Eastern Galicia which it is hoped will prove a satisfactory provisional settlement, it would be wiser to allow the Eastern Galicians to rely on their own efforts rather than to embark on a special interference on the part of His Majesty's Government or other Foreign Powers.

Under the scheme free scope will be given to the people of Eastern Galicia to express their sentiments and give effect to their political desires in a constitutional manner.

I am, etc.,
(for Mr. Balfour)
EYRE A. CROWE

¹ Not printed.

² i.e. the Ukrainian Delegation in London.

No. 710

Notes of a Meeting of the Commission on Polish Affairs held in Paris on
August 20, 1919

No. 32 [Confidential/General/177/3]

PROCÈS-VERBAL: SÉANCE DU 20 AOÛT 1919

La séance est ouverte à 18 heures 28, sous la présidence de M. Jules Cambon, Président.

Sont présents: Le Dr. Lord (*États-Unis d'Amérique*); le Lieut^t-Colonel Kisch (*Empire Britannique*); M. Jules Cambon (*France*); le Marquis della Torretta (*Italie*); M. Kuriyama (*Japon*).

Assistent également à la séance: M. Bourdillon (*Empire Britannique*); le Général Le Rond, M. de Percin (*France*); M. Stranieri, M. Brambilla (*Italie*).

Discussion du rapport présenté par la Sous-Commission.¹

LE PRÉSIDENT prie le Général Le Rond de vouloir bien rendre compte des travaux de la Sous-Commission.¹

LE GÉNÉRAL LE ROND dit que la Sous-Commission s'est efforcée de connaître les vues de tous les éléments de la population galicienne. Elle a entendu quatre fois la Délégation polonaise qui s'est fait une fois accompagner de représentants des Polonais de Galicie. En ce qui concerne la population ruthène, la Sous-Commission n'a pu que s'adresser aux membres galiciens de la représentation ukrainienne à Paris; ils ont refusé de se présenter devant la Sous-Commission, alléguant qu'ils ne pouvaient reconnaître le principe de la décision du Conseil des Ministres des Affaires étrangères, en date du 25 juin, relative à la Galicie. Toutefois, M. Paneyko,² dont le retour à Paris est imminent, a télégraphié pour demander à être entendu avant la remise du rapport au Conseil suprême. Peut-être sera-t-il encore possible de lui donner satisfaction.

Les Israélites, par contre, ont comparu devant la Sous-Commission à laquelle ils ont exposé leurs vues. Les Carpatho-Russes ont également été entendus.

La Sous-Commission a donc conscience d'avoir fait tout le possible pour entendre tous les intéressés, et si elle n'y a pas pleinement réussi, la faute en est aux Ruthènes qui se sont jusqu'à présent toujours refusés à accepter le principe de la décision du Conseil.

LE LIEUT^{ANT}-COLONEL KISCH dit que la Délégation britannique a l'intention de formuler des propositions nouvelles, dans l'espoir de réduire le nombre des points sur lesquels on n'a pu parvenir à l'unanimité, sinon même d'arriver à une entente complète.

Le Délégué britannique se déclare prêt à abandonner la rédaction anglaise de l'article 2, l'article 41³ et la clause additionnelle à la proposition relative

¹ The Sub-Commission on Eastern Galicia.

² Dr. Paneyko was a representative of the Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia). In a letter dated at Paris, August 28, 1919, Dr. Paneyko informed M. Clemenceau that 'l'Ukraine occidentale qui se constitua état indépendant le 19 octobre 1918 et s'unit le 20 janvier 1919, sur les principes de confédération à l'ukraine autrefois russe [cf. No. 706], reprend aujourd'hui, conformément aux clauses prévues dans les conventions signées par les deux gouvernements, ses droits de représentation distincts auprès de la Conférence de la Paix.

'En conséquence, je vous prie, Excellence, de vouloir bien donner des instructions au Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix pour que les communications relatives aux questions de l'Ukraine occidentale soient adressées, à partir de ce jour, à la Mission Extraordinaire, composée du Dr. Basile Paneyko, président, du Dr. Étienne Tomaschivsky, conseiller, et de M. Alexandre Koultchitsky, secrétaire, et qui est seule autorisée à représenter la population ukrainienne de Galicie et de Bukovine.'

³ The text proposed by the British Delegation for article 41 of the draft treaty relative to Eastern Galicia read as follows in the official French text: 'Toute divergence de vues entre le Gouvernement polonais et la Diète de Galicie orientale, qu'elle porte sur un point de droit ou sur un point de fait, relative à l'interprétation du présent traité, pourra être soumise par l'une et l'autre parties au Conseil de la Société des Nations, et sera, si la majorité du Conseil en décide ainsi, déferée à la Cour permanente de justice internationale à fins d'arbitrage. La décision de la Cour permanente sera définitive et aura la même force

à l'établissement du régime définitif, si les autres Délégations acceptent d'insérer cette proposition sur laquelle tout le monde est d'accord, à la fin de l'article 2. Par contre la Délégation britannique doit maintenir son texte pour les articles 12 (législation agraire), 16 (représentations à la Diète de Varsovie) et 38 (service militaire).

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) ne croit pas qu'il soit possible d'accéder au désir du Délégué britannique, parce qu'en insérant dans le corps du Traité la proposition relative à l'établissement du régime définitif, la Commission outrepasserait le mandat qui lui aurait été donné. Mais on pourrait suggérer au Conseil, s'il approuve cette proposition, de l'insérer à la fin de l'article 2. Cela pourrait constituer une base d'accord.

LE GÉNÉRAL LE ROND propose la rédaction suivante:

'En ce qui concerne l'établissement d'un régime définitif, la Commission croit devoir soumettre au Conseil suprême la proposition suivante, qui, si elle recevait l'approbation du Conseil, pourrait être insérée à la fin de l'article 2.'

D'autre part, une note serait mise à la fin de l'article 2, renvoyant à la proposition additionnelle au Traité.

Après un échange de vues, la Commission se met d'accord sur cette formule. La Délégation britannique retire en conséquence son addition à l'article 2, l'article 41, et la clause additionnelle à la proposition relative à l'établissement du régime définitif.

LE LIEUT^{NT}-COLONEL KISCH, commentant la divergence relative à l'article 12, dit que la Délégation britannique n'entend pas confier la réforme agraire à la Diète de Galicie, mais seulement empêcher qu'elle ne puisse être imposée aux Galiciens sans le consentement de la Diète.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) demande si la proposition britannique doit s'entendre dans ce sens que la Diète de Galicie n'aura sur la réforme agraire qu'un droit de veto, ou désire-t-on qu'elle puisse collaborer à l'exécution de cette réforme?

LE LIEUT^{NT}-COLONEL KISCH précise qu'il n'entend pas donner aux Galiciens le droit de rédiger leur loi agraire, mais seulement celui de s'opposer à l'adoption d'une loi qu'ils jugeraient contraire à leurs intérêts. Il espère que la Commission voudra bien se rallier à son point de vue.

LE GÉNÉRAL LE ROND objecte que la proposition du Délégué britannique risque de retarder sensiblement le moment où la loi agraire sera appliquée en Pologne.

LE LIEUT^{NT}-COLONEL KISCH estime que les Galiciens sont, sur cette question, les meilleurs juges de leurs intérêts. Si la réforme agraire était acceptée par la Diète de Galicie, son exécution resterait entre les mains du Gouvernement polonais qui administre le pays.

LE GÉNÉRAL LE ROND dit qu'il n'est pas à craindre que les Polonais veuillent imposer à la Galicie une législation qui ne serait pas faite pour elle, qu'une sentence rendue en vertu de l'article 13 du Pacte.' Draft article 41 was subsequently deleted from the draft text of the treaty, for which, as for British drafts of other articles, see Vol. I, No. 61, appendix C.

car l'exécution de la réforme agraire sera assurée par des commissions locales où les paysans auront la majorité.

LE LIEUT^T-COLONEL KISCH juge impossible de ne pas laisser aux Galiciens voix au chapitre sur une question qui passionne au plus haut degré la population rurale.

L'inconvénient provenant du retard apporté à l'application de la loi agraire n'est pas bien sérieux, car la réforme ne sera pas achevée avant quinze ans.

LE MARQUIS DELLA TORRETTA (*Italie*) se demande s'il ne serait pas possible d'arriver à un accord sur la base d'une distinction entre la législation elle-même et les dispositions d'application. Peut-être également pourrait-on accorder à la Diète de Galicie une sorte de droit de contrôle *a posteriori*, qui ne mît pas obstacle à l'entrée en vigueur de la loi.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) craint qu'il ne soit pas possible d'arriver à un accord au sein de la Commission. Il suggère de laisser au Conseil suprême le soin de se prononcer entre la thèse de la Délégation britannique et celle des autres Délégations.

La Commission se range à cette manière de voir. Deux rédactions restent donc en présence sur l'article 12, ainsi que sur les articles 13 et 38.

L'ensemble du rapport est adopté.⁴

LE PRÉSIDENT, avant de lever la séance, tient à remercier la Sous-Commission, ainsi que son Président, des remarquables travaux qui ont abouti à l'élaboration du rapport qui vient d'être approuvé.

La séance est levée à 19 heures 25.

⁴ Note to official French edition of original: 'Le texte du Rapport est annexé au procès-verbal de la séance du 23 août, au cours de laquelle diverses modifications y furent apportées.' (See No. 711.) For the final text of this Report No. 5 (dated August 23, 1919), as submitted to the Supreme Council, see Vol. I, No. 61, appendix C.

No. 711

Notes of a Meeting of the Commission on Polish Affairs held in Paris on August 23, 1919

No. 33 [Confidential/General/177/3]

PROCÈS-VERBAL: SÉANCE DU 23 AOÛT 1919

La séance est ouverte à 15 h. 30, sous la Présidence de M. Jules Cambon, Président.

Sont présents: Le Dr. Lord (*États-Unis d'Amérique*); le Lieut^T-Colonel Kisch (*Empire Britannique*); M. Jules Cambon (*France*); M. Stranieri (*Italie*); M. Tani (*Japon*).

Assistent également à la séance: M. Bourdillon (*Empire Britannique*); le Général Le Rond et M. de Percin (*France*).

Audition de MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski

Sur la proposition du Président, la Commission décide de commencer la séance par l'audition des Délégués ukrainiens.

MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski sont introduits.

LE PRÉSIDENT prie les Délégués ukrainiens de vouloir bien exposer leurs vues sur le régime futur de la Galicie orientale.

M. PANEYKO donne lecture d'une déclaration (*Voir Annexe I*).

LE PRÉSIDENT demande quel est le sens exact du paragraphe 5 de cette déclaration.

M. TOMASCHESKI explique que dans les actes internationaux, on devra dire la Pologne *et la Galicie* et non pas simplement la Pologne. Tel est le sens général de cette clause.

LE PRÉSIDENT relève la contradiction qui apparaît dans le document qui vient d'être lu par M. Paneyko. Il paraît difficile de protester contre la décision du Conseil suprême et de s'y associer en même temps.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) demande, à titre de renseignement, si ce document n'exprime que les idées personnelles des Délégués présents ou s'il a l'aveu du Gouvernement ukrainien.

M. PANEYKO répond que ce document exprime les vues du Gouvernement de l'Ukraine occidentale, mais que la rédaction a été faite par lui-même et par M. Tomaschewski.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) demande des précisions sur le sens de l'article 8.

M. TOMASCHESKI dit que la Diète pourrait présenter trois ou quatre noms de candidats à la Société des Nations qui choisirait parmi eux le Gouverneur.

M. PANEYKO spécifie que ce Gouverneur devrait être de nationalité ruthène.

Une discussion s'engage sur le sens de l'article 3 d'où il résulte que c'est l'indigénat qui ferait la base de la nationalité galicienne.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) voudrait connaître l'opinion des Délégués ukrainiens sur la représentation de la Galicie à la Diète polonaise.

M. PANEYKO estime qu'il est de l'intérêt des Polonais comme des Ruthènes d'éviter toute représentation de la Galicie à Varsovie. Il a confiance que le bon sens politique des Polonais eux-mêmes les empêchera d'imposer une solution dont les conséquences ne pourraient être qu'extrêmement fâcheuses pour les deux peuples intéressés.

LE PRÉSIDENT prie les Délégués ukrainiens de vouloir bien se retirer momentanément. La Commission les rappellera dès qu'elle aura étudié le document qui vient de lui être remis.

MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski se retirent.

Discussion de la déclaration des Délégués ukrainiens

La Commission reprend un à un les divers articles de la Déclaration et constate qu'elle a pris en considération la plupart des points de vue qui y sont exprimés.

LE LIEUT^{ANT}-COLONEL KISCH (*Empire Britannique*) estime cependant qu'il serait utile d'insister davantage sur la nécessité de fixer un délai à l'expiration duquel la date de la consultation des habitants devra être fixée, et il propose l'envoi au Conseil suprême de la note insérée en Annexe II.

LE GÉNÉRAL LE ROND (*France*) croit qu'il sera possible de tenir compte des vues du Délégué britannique sans modifier sensiblement le Rapport et sans adresser au Conseil une note spéciale.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) croit qu'il y aurait intérêt à renvoyer la discussion de cette question après que l'audition des Délégués ukrainiens sera terminée.

Après un échange de vues, il est décidé que les articles du projet élaboré par la Commission ne sauraient être communiqués à MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski, qui ne représentent pas leur Gouvernement et ne déposent qu'en leur nom personnel. La Commission décide de se borner à poser les questions suivantes :

1° S'il n'y a pas de représentation galicienne à Varsovie, comment seront réglés les rapports de la Pologne et de la Galicie orientale dans les affaires qui leur sont communes ?

2° Le refus d'une participation de la Galicie orientale à la Diète Polonaise comporte-t-il le refus de toute relation par le moyen d'un Ministre ou d'un Délégué galicien à Varsovie ?

3° Y a-t-il objection à ce que chaque commune puisse choisir la langue enseignée dans les écoles primaires et à ce que la Diète de Galicie soit chargée de faire les règlements s'appliquant à l'enseignement secondaire et à l'enseignement supérieur ?

4° La formation de corps galiciens rattachés au Commandement polonais peut-elle être admise ?

5° Comment les Délégués conçoivent-ils le régime électoral de la Galicie orientale ?

MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski ayant été introduits à nouveau, ce questionnaire leur est soumis. Les Délégués ukrainiens demandent quelques instants de réflexion pour répondre aux questions posées.

MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski se retirent.

Question des minorités

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) soumet à la Commission la formule suivante qui répond aux vues exprimées auprès de la Délégation américaine par l'Association des Délégations juives :

'Aucun habitant de la Galicie orientale ne pourra être molesté ou soumis à aucune restriction en ce qui concerne ses droits civils ou politiques, du fait que dans des documents publics, il déclarerait être de langue polonaise, ruthène (ou ukrainienne ou russe), juive ou toute autre langue.'

La Délégation américaine craint que les Juifs et les Carpathes-Russes ne puissent être molestés par les Polonais, du fait qu'ils refuseraient, lors d'un recensement par exemple, de se dire soit Polonais, soit Ruthènes. Le texte qu'il propose obvierait à cette possibilité.

LE GÉNÉRAL LE ROND (*France*) verrait des inconvénients à s'engager sur ce terrain. Ce serait vouloir perpétuer les divisions déjà existantes.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) n'entend pas viser des nationalités différentes. Il se place uniquement au point de vue de la race et de la langue.

LE L^T-COLONEL KISCH (*Empire Britannique*) croit qu'il sera possible de s'accorder sur la formule proposée par le Délégué américain en y apportant toutefois quelques modifications.

LE GÉNÉRAL LE ROND (*France*) croit que la question en discussion présentant une certaine importance, il convient de n'arrêter aucun texte avant d'en avoir référé aux jurisconsultes.

M. JULES CAMBON, attendu à une autre Commission, s'excuse de ne pouvoir assister à la fin de la séance. Il passe la présidence au Général Le Rond.

Présidence du Général Le Rond

LE PRÉSIDENT propose d'ajourner la suite de la discussion sur ce sujet, les Délégués ukrainiens étant prêts à répondre au questionnaire qui leur a été soumis.

MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski sont de nouveau introduits.

Suite de la déposition de MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski

Sur la première question, M. PANEYKO dit que les affaires communes doivent être réduites au minimum et s'étendre seulement aux questions relatives à la représentation à l'extérieur, aux chemins de fer, à la poste, au télégraphe et à la douane.

Sur la seconde question, M. Paneyko conçoit l'existence d'une Commission mixte polono-ukrainienne qui serait recrutée en nombre égal parmi les Membres de la Diète de Galicie et parmi ceux de la Diète de Pologne et présidée par un mandataire de la Société des Nations qui déciderait, en dernier ressort, en cas de partage égal des voix.

Sur la troisième question, M. Paneyko émet l'avis que les communes doivent décider de la langue d'enseignement primaire et la Diète de Lemberg régler les questions relatives à l'enseignement secondaire et à l'enseignement supérieur.

Sur la quatrième question, M. Paneyko pense que le corps galicien devrait être stationné en Galicie et être soumis, au point de vue administratif, au Gouvernement galicien. Le corps d'officiers devrait être composé de ressortissants galiciens des différentes races, selon la proportion existant entre les langues parlées en Galicie orientale.

Sur la cinquième question, M. Paneyko dit que le système électoral devrait être analogue au système belge, les femmes étant admises à voter.

LE PRÉSIDENT remercie les Délégués ukrainiens de leurs déclarations. Il exprime le regret qu'il n'ait pas été possible de les entendre plus tôt et constate que ce retard n'est pas imputable à la Commission.

MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski se retirent.

Reprise de la discussion sur la question des minorités

LE PRÉSIDENT ne croit pas possible d'accepter le texte du Dr. Lord, qui contient une énumération incomplète des langues parlées en Galicie orientale. D'ailleurs, on ne saurait employer l'expression de langue juive pour désigner

le yiddisch. La véritable langue juive, c'est l'hébreu. Il serait préférable, de l'avis du Président, de s'en tenir à une formule générale.

LE LIEUT^{ANT}-COLONEL KISCH (*Empire Britannique*) pense également qu'il suffirait de parler d'une langue autre que le ruthène ou le polonais.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) maintient que, seuls, les Juifs et les Carpatho-Russes ont besoin, à cet égard, d'une protection spéciale. Les rédactions proposées par les Délégués britannique et français ne lui paraissent pas acceptables.

LE PRÉSIDENT propose de consulter les jurisconsultes sur l'interprétation juridique des diverses formules proposées et de renvoyer la suite de la discussion à la prochaine séance.

Cette proposition est approuvée.

Corrections au projet de rapport no. 5

Sur la proposition du PRÉSIDENT, certaines corrections sont apportées au texte du rapport n° 5 de la Commission. Notamment, un sixième paragraphe est ajouté aux arguments présentés par la majorité à l'appui du texte qu'elle propose pour l'article 16. Ce paragraphe est ainsi conçu :

'Enfin, aux termes mêmes du Traité, le Ministère de Galicie orientale a sa compétence définie par les articles 11 et 22. La question qu'il y aurait, d'après la rédaction britannique de l'article 16, à traiter sort entièrement de sa compétence, d'où des difficultés peut-être sérieuses à prévoir, résultant des conséquences que certains chefs de parti ruthènes pourraient essayer de tirer de cette discordance'.

La Commission décide, en outre, l'insertion, dans la partie préliminaire du rapport, du paragraphe suivant relatif à l'audition de MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski :

'Dans une séance tenue le 20 août, la Commission a examiné le rapport de la Sous-Commission. Au cours d'une nouvelle séance tenue le 23 août, la Commission a entendu un exposé fait à titre personnel par MM. Paneyko et Tomaschewski sur les conditions auxquelles le rattachement provisoire de la Galicie orientale à la Pologne serait acceptable pour les Ruthènes de Galicie. Elle a, à cette même séance, adopté, avec quelques modifications, le rapport de la Sous-Commission.'

Il est décidé, enfin, d'attirer l'attention du Conseil suprême sur la proposition relative à la fixation de la date à laquelle une décision devra être prise regardant l'époque du plébiscite par l'insertion, à la fin de la partie préliminaire du rapport, du paragraphe suivant :

'En ce qui concerne la seconde partie, il y a lieu d'observer que le mandat de la Commission ne lui donnait pas mission d'inclure dans le Traité une clause relative à l'établissement du régime définitif. La Commission estime, cependant, devoir proposer l'insertion dans le Traité d'une clause fixant l'échéance à laquelle les Puissances détermineront la date et les conditions de la consultation des habitants. L'audition des représentants du parti ruthène de Galicie orientale qui ont insisté sur la nécessité d'une semblable disposition pour que le régime établi par le Traité soit accepté sans troubles

par la population ruthène a confirmé la Commission dans cette opinion. Elle attire, en conséquence, l'attention du Conseil suprême sur la proposition insérée à la page 17.¹

LE PRÉSIDENT demande s'il y a lieu de surseoir à l'impression du rapport jusqu'à ce qu'une décision ait été prise sur la question soulevée par le Délégué américain et relative à la protection des minorités.

LE DR. LORD (*États-Unis d'Amérique*) ne croit pas nécessaire de retarder le dépôt du rapport. Il sera toujours possible, si l'on arrive à un accord sur cette question, d'envoyer une note au Conseil suprême proposant l'insertion dans le Traité avec la Pologne d'un article additionnel.

Il est décidé d'envoyer immédiatement à l'impression le rapport sur le statut de la Galicie et de reprendre dans la prochaine séance, fixée au 26 août, la discussion du texte proposé par le Dr. Lord.¹

La séance est levée à 18 heures 40.

ANNEX I TO NO. 711

Déclaration des délégués ukrainiens

En paraissant, conformément au désir du Secrétariat général de la Conférence de la Paix, devant la Commission chargée de l'élaboration du statut provisoire de la Galicie orientale, nous élevons au nom du peuple de l'Ukraine occidentale une protestation solennelle contre le traitement infligé à notre pays par la Conférence de la Paix.

Contre tout principe de justice et de libre disposition, les Ukrainiens, seuls parmi les peuples de l'Autriche-Hongrie, n'ont obtenu aucune satisfaction au point de vue national et politique; en outre partagés entre trois états voisins sans avoir été consultés, ils vont vers un avenir plus sombre encore que n'était leur situation d'avant la guerre.

Malgré les promesses formelles qu'aucun fait accompli n'influencerait les décisions de la Conférence, l'occupation polonaise et l'occupation roumaine du territoire ukrainien ont trouvé auprès des Alliés non seulement une approbation mais encore un appui effectif, et le régime de terreur, exercé notamment en Galicie sur la population ukrainienne, jouit d'une pleine tolérance.

Dans ces circonstances, pour abrégier le martyre du malheureux peuple ukrainien, nous consentons, à notre corps défendant, à participer à la délibération concernant le règlement provisoire de la Galicie orientale, sur la base de la décision du Conseil suprême du 25 juin, en ajoutant cette déclaration: que nous ne pouvons prendre la responsabilité morale et politique du résultat de la coopération qu'aux conditions suivantes:

1^o Le statut ne doit porter atteinte d'aucune manière, ni par la forme, ni par l'esprit, aux principes fondamentaux de la décision du Conseil suprême, c'est-à-dire au caractère provisoire du règlement, à la libre disposition du peuple et à l'autonomie du pays pendant cette période transitoire.

¹ Note to official French edition of original: 'Ce fut en réalité la Sous-Commission chargée d'étudier la frontière orientale qui se réunit le 27 août (Voir Procès-Verbal n° 48 [not printed]) à l'effet de discuter le texte du Dr. Lord.'

2° L'intégrité territoriale des parties ukrainiennes de Galicie et de Bukovine doit être respectée.

3° Le droit de propre nationalité doit être pris comme base pour tous les droits politiques.

4° La date et les conditions du plébiscite doivent être précisées dans le statut même.

5° La distinction entre la Galicie et la Pologne pendant la validité du statut doit être exprimée à l'extérieur.

6° La population indigène du pays ne pourra être obligée de servir dans l'armée polonaise.

7° La compétence éventuelle des pouvoirs de la Pologne sur certains domaines de la vie publique de la Galicie doit être clairement précisée par le statut.

8° Le Gouverneur de la Galicie devra être de langue ukrainienne et la Diète aura toute influence sur sa nomination.

9° La publication du statut sera accompagnée d'un acte de garantie pour assurer l'exécution totale du statut.

D. [B.] PANEYKO
TOMASCHIEWSKI

PARIS, le 23 août 1919.

ANNEX II TO NO. 711

Projet de note pour le Conseil Suprême

La Commission des affaires polonaises ayant été priée de rédiger un accord en vertu duquel la Pologne serait autorisée à instituer un Gouvernement civil en Galicie orientale se permet de présenter un rapport contenant un tel accord.

« Dans la deuxième partie de ce rapport, la Commission explique les principes dont elle s'est inspirée pour élaborer l'accord. Ce sont: 1° la force et la sécurité du Gouvernement (§ a et d); 2° garantie de liberté culturelle pour tous les éléments de race et les éléments religieux (§ b); 3° autonomie de la Galicie orientale en ce qui concerne le gouvernement local (§ c).

« La Commission estime que son mandat ne lui donnait pas le pouvoir de comprendre dans le projet de traité une clause se rapportant au règlement final du sort de la Galicie orientale.

« La Commission estime cependant qu'il est de son devoir de proposer qu'une clause soit insérée, qui fixe la date à laquelle les Puissances devront déterminer la date de la consultation finale des habitants. Elle se trouve confirmée dans cette opinion par l'audition de représentants du parti ukrainien de la Galicie orientale qui font ressortir avec force que le régime provisoire ne pourra être accepté d'une façon pacifique par la population ruthène que si l'accord prévoit des sauvegardes suffisantes pour son caractère provisoire.

« La Commission estime que ces considérations nécessitent l'introduction, dans le Traité lui-même, de la clause proposée à la fin du projet de Traité. »

M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received August 27)

[130/5/1/18378]

PARIS, le 26 août, 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation Britannique 10 exemplaires d'une note de la Délégation polonaise exposant le point de vue du gouvernement de Varsovie sur la question de la Galicie Orientale.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 712

The Polish Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference

PARIS, le 25 août, 1919

Monsieur le Président,

Par la lettre du 29 juin dernier Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a bien voulu communiquer au Gouvernement polonais la décision prise le 25 juin par le Conseil des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères concernant l'établissement d'un gouvernement civil polonais en Galicie Orientale et l'accord qui doit le précéder.

A la suite de cette décision la Délégation Polonaise a été convoquée aux séances de la Sous-Commission pour les Affaires Polonaises afin de donner des explications nécessaires et d'émettre son avis sur les bases de l'accord qui devait être élaboré par la Commission.

Comme la compétence de la Commission était limitée par la décision du Conseil à l'élaboration des bases de l'accord, la Délégation Polonaise ne pouvait dépasser ces limites dans la discussion aux séances de la Sous-Commission.

La Commission ayant actuellement terminé son travail et la question du gouvernement de la Galicie Orientale devant être décidée par le Conseil Suprême, la Délégation Polonaise a l'honneur de soumettre à Votre Excellence les considérations suivantes:

La Délégation Polonaise a revendiqué dès le début la Galicie Orientale comme territoire polonais. Dans cette revendication elle se base non seulement sur le fait que ce pays était partie intégrante de l'État polonais depuis 1340 jusqu'aux partages de la Pologne, mais aussi sur le caractère même de sa population.

La Galicie Orientale est un pays de population mixte. Le territoire défini par la Sous-Commission des affaires polonaises comprenait en 1910 près de 4,600,000 habitants dont 37.1 % ont déclaré au recensement la langue polonaise comme leur langue maternelle, et 61.3 % la langue ruthène. Au point de vue confessionnel, cette population se divise comme suit: 23 % catholiques de rite latin, 64 % catholiques de rite grec et 13 % de confession juive.

La population de langue ruthène et de rite gréco-catholique est la plus

nombreuse. Mais en même temps elle est la moins civilisée, possédant le plus petit pourcentage de la classe instruite et économiquement la plus passive (elle est représentée très faiblement dans toutes les professions sauf des petits cultivateurs, des prêtres et des instituteurs des écoles primaires).

En outre c'est seulement dans les derniers temps [? que] la langue ruthène a commencé de s'élever au-dessus du niveau d'un patois, les productions littéraires en ruthène sont peu nombreuses, la littérature scientifique n'existe presque pas. C'est pourquoi cette langue n'est pas suffisamment développée et ne peut suffire à tous les besoins d'un homme instruit. La civilisation du pays est polonaise; le polonais est la langue de relations sociales et économiques, tandis que le ruthène reste toujours la langue de famille de la majorité de la population rurale à laquelle on a reconnu la qualité de langue officielle à côté du polonais.

Même l'Autriche dont la tendance était d'affaiblir les Polonais, de diminuer leur influence et d'arriver à la division de la Galicie en deux pays — polonais et ruthène — était obligée de respecter l'unité du pays, de reconnaître son caractère polonais et de confier son administration aux Polonais comme au seul élément capable de le gouverner.

La période d'autonomie et d'administration polonaise qui a suivi celle du régime centraliste et germanisateur en 1867 a été une période de progrès très rapide du bien-être et de l'éducation du peuple.

La Diète de Galicie consacrait presque 2/3 de son budget à l'œuvre de l'instruction publique, particulièrement au développement des écoles primaires aussi bien ruthènes que polonaises.

Les autorités polonaises travaillaient à obtenir la collaboration harmonieuse de tous les groupes de la population au progrès du pays dans les conditions les plus défavorables. Ces conditions consistaient avant tout dans la propagande venant du dehors et ayant pour but d'exciter la population ruthène contre la Pologne; les intrigues autrichiennes d'un côté, russe de l'autre et enfin celles de Berlin, travaillaient à amener l'anarchie et à rompre les liens séculaires qui unissaient les Ruthènes à la Pologne.

Considérant que ce pays situé sur les confins de la Pologne avait été toujours dans son passé le théâtre des guerres contre les envahisseurs de l'Est, particulièrement contre les Tartares et les Turques [*sic*], ce qui a empêché son développement paisible, le progrès du respect du droit et des institutions publiques et la disparition des instincts primitifs chez sa population, il est facile à comprendre jusqu'à quel point cette agitation augmentait les difficultés du Gouvernement. Ce n'est que grâce à l'existence dans le pays de la population polonaise dans une très forte proportion que le progrès du pays était assuré et un régime d'ordre possible. La tâche de l'administration était encore compliquée par les conditions d'ordre sociale et économique, étant donné la répartition des propriétés foncières très disproportionnée et le fait que toute la grande propriété se trouvait dans les mains polonaises. Ceci permettait d'exploiter l'antagonisme social des paysans contre les grands propriétaires pour une lutte contre le polonisme.

Le Gouvernement de la République polonaise est convaincu que dans les

conditions nouvelles où la Galicie fera partie de l'État polonais indépendant, État démocratique, les difficultés d'administration de ce pays disparaîtront dans une grande mesure. D'abord, la réforme agraire supprimera la distribution anormale des terres et fera disparaître les antagonismes sociaux. Ensuite, la dissolution des liens avec l'Autriche allemande mettra fin aux intrigues venant de Vienne. Le Gouvernement de la Pologne indépendante aura des moyens beaucoup plus efficaces contre l'influence venant du dehors qui travaillait à la désorganisation du pays. En même temps la tendance de donner satisfaction à tous les besoins des nationalités faisant partie de la population de la Pologne, permet d'espérer que la pacification de la Galicie Orientale et la réconciliation de la population ruthène avec la Pologne pourront s'effectuer dans un avenir peu éloigné.

Cependant la condition essentielle d'un développement normal de la vie politique et sociale du pays et de l'efficacité de son administration est la stabilité de son statut politique.

La conviction que le nouveau régime n'est que provisoire sera une source d'agitation et de luttes continuelles contre les autorités établies, ce qui, vu le caractère assez primitif de la population, produira nécessairement des difficultés incalculables.

Une convention qui ne reconnaîtrait pas la Galicie Orientale comme partie intégrante de l'État polonais mais qui autoriserait seulement la Pologne d'établir dans ce pays un Gouvernement civil à titre provisoire, serait une source d'encouragement pour toutes agitations et créerait des obstacles au développement pacifique du pays.

Pour les raisons ci-dessus énoncées la Délégation polonaise considère comme une nécessité absolue *que la Galicie soit attribuée à la Pologne comme partie intégrante de l'État polonais.*

Cette décision ne privera pas la population ruthène des garanties de ses droits vu d'une part l'attitude de la Diète et du Gouvernement polonais et d'autre part, les dispositions du pacte de la Ligue des Nations qui permettront aux grandes Puissances de soulever la question au cas où le Gouvernement polonais se montrerait incapable de satisfaire aux besoins de la population ruthène et d'assurer le développement pacifique du pays.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

ROMAN DMOWSKI

No. 713

M. Bartoszewicz¹ to Mr. Balfour (Paris. Received August 30)

[130/5/1/18382]

PARIS, le 29 août, 1919

Votre Excellence,

La Délégation Polonaise vient de recevoir le télégramme suivant de la part du Comité International pour la Protection de l'Industrie du Pétrole

¹ At that time Secretary-General of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference.

Britannique, Française, Belge etc., qu'elle a l'honneur de communiquer à Votre Excellence:

'After many years of uncertainty regarding the future of British oil interests in Galicia our Companies are now enabled to restart their business owing to protection afforded them by an orderly Polish Government and its disciplined troops. Unfortunately the establishment of a threatened provisional régime for Eastern Galicia makes it impossible for us to execute our important schemes and invest fresh capital in order to recover the losses sustained by British Companies during the war as also to develop our oil properties. Our Committee cannot agree to any provisional arrangement because they are detrimental to the economic interests in general and our oil interests in particular. In accordance with a promise given to us by British representatives at the Peace Conference our Committee asks to be heard verbally before any decision in the matter of Eastern Galicia is arrived at. Any attempt to diminish Polish sovereignty in Eastern Galicia will jeopardize interests of seventy-five thousand British shareholders.

'The International Committee appointed to protect British, French, Belgian and Allied oil interests in Galicia.

Charles Perkins, Charivan [Chairman]
Hotel de l'Europe, Warsaw.²

Veuillez agréer, etc.

J. BARTOSZEWICZ
Secrétaire Général

² This telegram had also been sent direct to the British Delegation on August 22 (received August 25) and had been answered as follows in an unnumbered telegram of August 27 from Mr. Balfour to Mr. Perkins: 'His Majesty's Government are fully aware of views of International Oil Committee, but cannot accept, or recommend the Conference to accept, principle that rights and liberties of inhabitants of any particular country should be subordinated to real or supposed interests of foreign investors.'

No. 714

*Dr. Paneyko to M. Clemenceau*¹

[130/5/1/18762]

PARIS, le 1^{er} septembre, 1919

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le Gouvernement Polonais constitue [? continue] à ignorer l'autorité du Conseil Suprême dans la question de Galicie orientale, en traitant cette dernière — contrairement à l'esprit de la décision du 25 juin — comme une province purement polonaise. A la terreur qu'il fait régner et aux persécutions qu'il exerce sur la population ukrainienne, viennent s'ajouter deux nouvelles mesures incompatibles avec ce même esprit de la décision du Conseil Suprême:

¹ This note was communicated to the British Delegation at Paris by the secretariat-general of the Peace Conference and was received on September 9, 1919.

1. Le Gouvernement polonais exige des employés publics ukrainiens un serment officiel dans lequel on a deux fois inséré cette clause: 'fidélité au peuple polonais'; le refus de prêter ce serment entraînant la perte des moyens d'existence.

2. La mobilisation générale des classes de 1897 à 1900 a été proclamée à Stanislaw sans distinction de nationalité, toute résistance étant punie par la justice militaire. Ces mesures prouvent que les Polonais ne sont pas encore près de reconnaître ni le caractère provisoire du rattachement de la Galicie à la Pologne, ni le principe de libre disposition du peuple, et elles justifient suffisamment notre méfiance à l'égard de leur politique.

Nous élevons une protestation solennelle et demandons que le Conseil Suprême impose aux Polonais le retrait de ces mesures et établisse dans le pays un régime conforme à l'esprit de la décision du 25 juin.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

DR. PANEYKO

No. 715

Sir P. Wyndham (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received September 9)

No. 265 [126748/28011/55]

WARSAW, September 4, 1919

My Lord,

In my telegram No. 225¹ of the 2nd inst., I had the honour to report that an armistice had been concluded between the Poles and the Ukrainians.

The Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed me yesterday that this arrangement was of a purely military nature.

As I have already reported, negotiations between the Polish Government and Petlura have for some time been proceeding but, as Mr. Skrzynski told me, the Polish Government had declined to sign any treaty with the Ukrainian Government on the ground that this Government had not emanated from the will of the people and had not been recognised by the Allies. In the recent negotiations the Polish Government had however agreed to accept a declaration signed by the Ukrainian Delegates and two draft declarations had been put forward. In the first of these the Ukrainians accepted the Zbruch as the Polish frontier but they traced frontiers further north between Poland and the Ukraine. The Polish Government, not wishing to anticipate the decisions of the Peace Conference, refused to accept the latter part of this declaration regarding the frontiers in Volhynia.

In the second declaration that was put forward the question of an alliance was raised, the Zbruch was again recognised in Eastern Galicia but no mention was made of the Volhynian frontier.

Mr. Skrzynski explained that there was no question of an alliance but of an arrangement under which the Ukrainians should make use of the arms

¹ Not printed. This short telegram (received September 3) reported that a Polish-Ukrainian armistice of thirty days' duration had been signed on September 1, 1919. This armistice was subsequently renewed.

and ammunition, with which they had been supplied by the Roumanians, against the Bolsheviks. He was particularly emphatic in declaring that any such action would not be directed against General Denikin and he expressed the hope that the Poles might eventually act as intermediaries between General Denikin and the Ukrainians.

If an understanding of the nature contemplated can be arrived at, it will probably be followed by subsidiary arrangements under which Poland will receive grain from the Ukraine which will be of the greatest importance to Poland during the coming winter. Poland in exchange would supply salt and petroleum.

Mr. Skrzynski asked me to treat the above information as confidential as negotiations are still proceeding.

I have, etc.,
PERCY C. WYNDHAM

No. 716

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received September 27)

No. 1373 Telegraphic: by bag [134198/28011/55]

PARIS, September 25, 1919

Part I.

Discussion of Report No. 5 of Polish Commission¹ embodying draft constitution for Eastern Galicia was resumed² at today's meeting of Council. It appeared clearly that a great impression had been made by M. Paderewski's impassioned appeal and protest summarised in my telegram No. 1364³ of September 23rd.

Mr. Polk at once submitted suggestions with a view to reconcile [*sic*] present Treaty with M. Paderewski's principal objections as regards:—

- a. The provisional nature of the settlement.
- b. Agrarian legislation.
- c. Representation in the Polish Diet.

As regards (a) proposed alterations which are repeated textually in part II below constitute a radical departure from the basis of the present draft Treaty, namely, 'That the agreement shall be predicated upon the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance, the time for the exercise of such choice to be hereafter fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or by a body to whom they may delegate that power.'

¹ See No. 710, note 4.

² Report No. 5 of the Polish Commission had been presented to the Supreme Council, and discussion of it began there on September 19, 1919; for this discussion see Vol. I, No. 61. On September 23 the Supreme Council had heard M. Paderewski on the subject of Eastern Galicia: see Vol. I, No. 63. On September 25 the Supreme Council resumed its discussion of this question, as reported in the present telegram: see also Vol. I, No. 64.

³ Not printed: cf. note 2 above.

(Resolutions adopted on the proposal of Mr. Lansing by the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 25th, 1919.)⁴

In spite of the new clause which it is proposed to introduce in accordance with para. D. of Part II of this telegram,⁵ I cannot but feel that the adoption of the amendments proposed by the American Delegation would in reality involve the definitive union of Eastern Galicia with Poland, although the Polish Administration would be subject to the supervision of the League of Nations.

Believing that the acceptance of the resolutions of June 25th by H.M.G. was based on the consideration that they provided for a future plebiscite, thus leaving open the possibility of a union of Eastern Galicia with either a reconstituted and reunited Russia or a separate Ukrainian State, I have reserved my opinion on Mr. Polk's proposals pending a reference to Your Lordship and the Prime Minister, informing the Council of my reasons for so doing.

The proposals were strongly supported by both the French and Italian representatives, who welcomed them as providing a definitive solution subject to stringent guarantees as to local autonomy and minority rights. They urge, with much force, on the one hand that the stronger we make these guarantees the less will it be necessary to make definite and immediate provision for a possible eventual separation, and on the other hand that Mr. Paderewski will be the readier to accept the most stringent guarantees the less we insist on making the whole arrangement provisional.

The proposals are no doubt somewhat difficult to reconcile with the principles of Nationalities and of Self-Determination and could readily be criticized on this ground, but in view of fact that British Delegation is likely to be isolated on this question the political expediency of opposing the American propositions is for consideration.

I request that I may be furnished with instructions by telegram as early as possible as further discussion is being meanwhile deferred at my request.

As regards other points raised by Mr. Polk.

Item *b*. Question of agrarian legislation has been settled on the basis that Galician Diet shall be entrusted under article 12 of draft treaty with agrarian legislation subject to a suspensory Polish veto. If veto is maintained, matter is to be referred to League of Nations.

Item *c*, deals with representation in Polish Diet. As Paderewski is especially insistent on this point, Polk proposes to accept majority proposal in article 16 draft treaty, which provides for representation of East Galicia in the Polish Diet with certain restrictions.

I had throughout taken the line that a question of this kind involving as it does a principle which has been much controverted by practical politicians, a decision had best be left to be worked out by the parties directly concerned.

⁴ See No. 701.

⁵ Part II of this telegram is not printed. It gave textually the main contents of Mr. Polk's memorandum of September 25, 1919, printed in Vol. I, No. 64, appendix K. Paragraph D here under reference corresponded to paragraph D of part I of this memorandum.

It is quite possible that Ruthenians themselves will insist on representation in Warsaw diet. In any case I should be prepared to yield on this point, more particularly if you were to decide on agreeing to American proposals under (a) above. . . .⁵

No. 717

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 3)

No. 1395 Telegraphic [136565/28011/55]

PARIS, October 1, 1919

Reference to my telegram No. 1373¹ by Bag of 25th September (proposed constitution for Eastern Galicia).

I am being pressed for a decision in regard to our attitude.

I presume that in view of the apparent unanimity of the other delegations you will not wish me to insist on maintaining the position hitherto held by His Majesty's Government.

I would like, however, to receive definite authorisation before accepting the present proposals, and request that I may receive instructions by telegram as early as possible as the decision of the Council is at present postponed at my request.

¹ No. 716.

No. 718

M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received October 4)

[130/5/1/19358]

PARIS, le 1^{er} octobre, 1919

Le Secrétariat-Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation Britannique, copie d'une lettre en date du 25 septembre adressée à M. le Président de la Conférence de la Paix par M. Paneyko au sujet de la Galicie Orientale.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 718

Dr. Paneyko to M. Clemenceau

PARIS, le 25 septembre, 1919

Excellence,

La déclaration du Président du Conseil Polonais, Monsieur Paderewski, faite ces jours et devant le Conseil Suprême, réclamant l'attribution définitive de la Galicie Orientale à la Pologne, nous fournit l'occasion de vous présenter les objections suivantes:

L'argument du Chef du Gouvernement Polonais que l'établissement d'un statut provisoire ne manquerait pas d'amener des troubles dans ce pays ne tient pas devant un raisonnement sérieux. Qui sont-ils ceux qui doivent susciter ces troubles — les Ukrainiens ou les Polonais? La majorité ukrainienne qui a suffisamment prouvé sa volonté irrésistible de ne pas appartenir à la Pologne n'aura aucune raison de s'opposer à un régime provisoire qui lui promet pour l'avenir l'application du droit de libre disposition. Bien au contraire cette perspective, après cinq ans d'une guerre qui a ruiné le pays, après les sanglantes luttes de cette dernière année contre les Polonais représente le seul moyen de calmer les esprits et la seule compensation à tous les espoirs déçus. Si la décision du Conseil Suprême ne contenait pas la clause relative au plébiscite la population ukrainienne ne verrait dans cette décision qu'un verdict d'esclavage perpétuel et une politique de désespoir serait aussitôt adoptée qui constituerait un foyer dangereux et menaçant pour la paix de l'Europe Centrale (on ne doit pas oublier qu'une armée de Galicie, peu nombreuse mais résolue, existe encore hors du pays).

La minorité polonaise qui, d'après les chiffres tendencieux des Polonais mêmes, ne dépasse pas 23 % de la population, aurait-elle l'intention de se révolter contre le régime provisoire? Certes, Monsieur Paderewski était plus autorisé [*sic*] pour lancer des menaces au nom de ce groupe mais nous croyons que le bon sens de l'élément polonais en Galicie Orientale et du peuple polonais tout entier éviterait toute manifestation contraire aux principes invoqués par la Pologne pour ses régions occidentales où l'élément polonais se trouve dans des conditions numériques et sociales plus défavorables que celles des Ukrainiens en Galicie. Car en ce qui concerne le traitement futur de ces derniers en Galicie on ne peut émettre que deux hypothèses: ou les Polonais désirent respecter la pleine autonomie du pays, ou ils nourrissent déjà secrètement des convoitises au détriment du caractère national et politique de la Galicie ukrainienne. Dans le premier cas ils devraient avoir pleine confiance dans le plébiscite futur dont le résultat pourrait non seulement maintenir l'union entre la Pologne et la Galicie mais encore exercer une influence favorable sur les autres terres ukrainiennes voisines.

Dans le second cas rien n'est aussi nécessaire que la clause qui prévoit le plébiscite. C'est la seule garantie réelle capable d'assurer au pays une protection efficace contre toutes les atteintes qui menaceraient les autres clauses du Traité. Sans cette garantie le traité entre la Pologne et les Puissances principales comprenant le statut ne représentera bientôt qu'un chiffon de papier: entre eux les Polonais parlent déjà aujourd'hui de la colonisation et de la polonisation totale de la Galicie Orientale d'ici sept ans.

Pour les raisons mentionnées ci-dessus, nous demandons au Conseil Suprême de repousser les exigences polonaises et de maintenir sans altération le caractère provisoire du rattachement de la Galicie à la Pologne.

Veuillez agréer, etc.,
PANAYKO

Note by Mr. Campbell¹ of a conversation with Count Horodyski²

[140681/28011/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 2, 1919

Count Horodyski came to see me this morning, and explained that, owing to the situation created by the strike in this country³ and his consequent desire not to impose upon the time of the Prime Minister, M. Paderewski had postponed his visit, which he was to have paid this week at the invitation of Mr. Lloyd George. M. Paderewski had, however, sent Count Horodyski in his place, in order that he might lay one or two considerations before H.M. Government; and the Count hoped that the Prime Minister would be able to receive him, if only for a few minutes.

Count Horodyski represented that M. Paderewski's position in Poland was somewhat critical, and he presumed that H.M. Government would agree that a strong and well ordered Poland—which, in default of other leaders, could be realised at this moment only under M. Paderewski—was in the interests, not only of Great Britain, but of the Allies and of Europe in general.

There were three questions, he said, which it was necessary to clear up without delay:

(1) The question of Eastern Galicia, which, if not settled soon in favour of Poland, would lose M. Paderewski the support of the peasant class, and would entail his downfall. This question is now being discussed in Paris; the Supreme Council have come round to M. Paderewski's view, and favour the abolition of the provisional clauses of the settlement—with the exception of the British Representative, who has telegraphed for instructions. See Sir Eyre Crowe's telegram No. 1373,⁴ which is shortly to be sent to the Prime Minister with a brief memorandum.

(2) According to Count Horodyski, there are some 4,000 railway trucks (continental pattern) and 400 locomotives belonging to the British Government, who had offered them to the French. The latter had, however, refused to buy, as they already had more than enough for their own requirements. M. Paderewski urges that Poland be allowed to open a credit for the purchase of this material, and also of any clothing or other military stores in France.

(3) The need for a definite Eastern policy. Was Poland, for instance, to support Denikin?

Count Horodyski stated that he must leave London tomorrow (Friday) evening, in order to be back in Paris before M. Paderewski leaves for Warsaw, where he has to meet the Polish Diet. If, therefore, the Prime Minister is

¹ Private Secretary to Lord Curzon.

² Count Horodyski (who had lately been associated with the International Commission for the Supply and Relief of Poland) visited London as M. Paderewski's representative: see below.

³ The reference was to a widespread British railway strike, which was then in progress.

⁴ No. 716.

able to receive him for a few minutes, it would have to be some time tomorrow. He added that the Polish Minister had been informed by Mr. Paderewski of his (Count Horodyski's) Mission.

R. H. CAMPBELL⁵

⁵ On the morning of October 3, 1919, Count Horodyski and Prince Sapieha, the Polish Minister in London, had a conversation with Mr. Gregory at the Foreign Office. Mr. Gregory recorded that the Polish representatives again 'laid stress on the fact that, if the Eastern Galician question is not settled in favour of Poland, M. Paderewski is bound to fall . . . M. Paderewski has to return to Warsaw on Monday, and if no decision has been taken, owing to the British attitude, the Diet will insist on his resignation. Count Horodyski has been sent over by M. Paderewski to make this clear to the Prime Minister, but it is improbable that the latter will now be able to see him.' No record of an interview between Mr. Lloyd George and Count Horodyski has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 720

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received October 6)

No. 299 Telegraphic [137703/28011/55]

WARSAW, October 4, 1919

Major Paris¹ who has been at Lemberg for past five months (? called) to-day on his way to England.

He urged two practical objections to an eventual Plebiscite in Eastern Galicia.

1. Such a Plebiscite would not have definite result and could not be (? true) expression of opinion or wishes of population because there would not be a definite issue such as Poland or Ukraine before that population. Some might vote for incorporation in Poland others for attachment to Ukraine whilst others again might wish to (? set up) an independent (Ruthenian) State.

2. The land-owner population, most of whom are all Polish and many of whom have been practically ruined by War, would not raise money in order to restore their estate(?s if) eventual status of Eastern Galicia were left in suspense. Thus economic recovery of country would be greatly retarded.

He concluded in favour of definite assignment of Eastern Galicia to Poland and despatch of an Inter-Allied Mission to former country which should (? remain) there for some time in order to ensure (? that) Poles respected interests of subject races.

Sent to Peace Conference.

¹ Member of the British Military Mission in Poland.

No. 721

M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received October 11)

[130/5/1/19524]

PARIS, le 10 octobre, 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation Britannique deux copies d'un

aide-mémoire de l'Ambassade de Russie relatif à la situation en Galicie Orientale et sur l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à consulter la population sur ses aspirations nationales avant de procéder à l'attribution définitive de la région en question.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 721

Aide-Mémoire

PARIS, le 27 septembre, 1919

No. 681 bis.

L'Ambassade de Russie est informée qu'une vive inquiétude s'est emparée des milieux politiques de la Galicie orientale, à la suite de nouvelles attribuant à la Conférence de la Paix l'intention d'incorporer ce pays à la Pologne.

Dans son mémoire en date du 10 mai 1919,¹ la Conférence politique russe

¹ This memorandum was addressed to M. Clemenceau and was signed on behalf of the Russian Political Conference at Paris by Prince Lvov and MM. Sazonov, Tchaikovsky, and Maklakoff. The memorandum set forth the considerations which, it was represented, should, in the interests of Russia, be given due weight in the elaboration of the preliminaries of peace between the Allied Powers on the one hand and Austria and Hungary on the other. After requesting that the two latter powers should, like Germany, be compelled to renounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and all treaties or agreements previously concluded with any part of the former Russian Empire, the memorandum proceeded:

'La démocratie russe a été une des premières à proclamer le principe de la liberté des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes. Aussi la Russie est-elle unanime à saluer avec la plus vive satisfaction la création des nouveaux États indépendants, la République Tchéco-Slovaque et le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, auxquels elle est liée par une affinité de race. Elle éprouve également un réel plaisir à voir s'accomplir les vœux des populations de Trieste et du Trentin, ainsi que ceux des Transylvaniens de s'unir à leurs congénères respectifs de l'Italie et de la Roumanie, ses Alliées. Il a déjà été dit dans le mémoire précité [of April 9, 1919: not printed] avec quelle sympathie la Russie accueille la renaissance de la Pologne, dont la Galicie occidentale formait un des principaux tronçons.

'Dans ce même ordre d'idée[s], la Russie est certaine que les Puissances Alliées et Associées s'inspireront de principes identiques en ce qui concerne le règlement du sort des populations appartenant à la famille russe qui se trouvaient placées avant la guerre sous le joug austro-magyar. Ces populations constituent, comme on sait, la majorité dans deux provinces autrichiennes (la Galicie Orientale et la Bucovine) et dans sept comitats hongrois sur le versant sud des Carpathes.

'En Galicie Orientale les Russes sont en majorité écrasante à très peu d'exceptions près dans tous les districts. En outre, la Lemkovtchina qui fait partie de la Galicie Occidentale, a dans certains cantons un caractère nettement russe.

'En Buccovone [*sic*] la population russe prédomine dans les districts de Kotzman, Czernowitz, Wiznitz et le Canton de Stanestie.

'Dans les sept comitats hongrois mentionnés plus haut, la population russe est surtout concentrée dans les 21 communes les plus rapprochées de la crête des Carpathes. . . .

'La population russe de toutes ces régions doit avoir le droit incontestable de disposer librement de son sort, aussi le morcellement de cette population et l'attribution contre son gré des territoires habités par elle à des états limitrophes, de nationalité différente, seraient une violation des grands principes de justice que la Conférence de la Paix s'honore d'appliquer aux autres peuples qui ont fait partie de l'ancienne Monarchie Austro-Hongroise.

'Quelles que soient les formes que devront revêtir dans l'avenir les rapports réciproques des divers groupes du peuple russe, il est indispensable, dans l'intérêt d'une paix durable,

a déjà eu l'occasion d'attirer l'attention de la Conférence de la Paix sur la nécessité d'assurer à la population russe de l'ancienne Autriche-Hongrie le même droit de disposer librement de son sort qui a été reconnu aux autres peuples de la Monarchie danubienne.

L'Ambassade de Russie a l'honneur de se référer à ce mémoire pour faire valoir, une fois de plus, les arguments en faveur d'une consultation de la population de la Galicie orientale, afin de calmer l'effervescence qui se manifeste dans cette province.

que par les nouvelles délimitations qui s'imposent, il ne soit pas créé de dangereux foyers d'irréductibilité.

'D'autre part, étant donné que dans l'Ouest russe l'industrie est fort peu développée, il serait de toute importance qu'un contact immédiat fût établi entre ces régions et les grands centres industriels de la Bohême et de la Moravie. A cet effet, il est absolument nécessaire que les territoires russes obtiennent une frontière commune avec la Tchéco-Slovaquie.'

The memorandum proceeded in conclusion to claim for Russia, in general terms, equality of treatment with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as regards reparation, economic settlements, and representation on all organs of control, execution, &c., created under the peace settlement (Cf. No. 275, note 1). This memorandum was printed at the time in Paris in the form of a pamphlet.

No. 722

*Dr. Paneyko to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)*¹

[130/5/1/19358]

PARIS, le 13 octobre, 1919

Excellence,

La presse précise les arguments dont se sert la délégation polonaise devant le Conseil Suprême pour rejeter le caractère provisoire du rattachement de la Galicie orientale. Ce sont les suivants:

- 1) la division de la Galicie en orientale et occidentale est artificielle;
- 2) la Galicie orientale comme pays complètement ruiné par la guerre, ne pourra être restaurée tant qu'on n'aura pas statué définitivement sur son sort;
- 3) ne pouvant pas exister par elle-même, elle deviendra un objet de convoitise pour tous ses voisins; les Allemands en particulier chercheront à l'enlever à la Pologne pour la rendre à un de ses voisins.

Aucun de ces arguments ne tient devant une critique sérieuse:

I. Un coup d'œil sur la carte démontrera le caractère artificiel de l'unité de la Galicie dans sa forme autrichienne, un partage d'après le principe géographique et ethnographique étant nécessaire.

II. La Galicie orientale est, au point de vue économique, un pays actif et, possédant une bonne administration, elle se restaurera par ses propres moyens, tandis qu'annexée par un état économiquement faible et chargé de lourdes dettes comme la Pologne elle sera écrasée.

III. Il n'est pas vrai que la Galicie, comme pays séparé ne pourrait pas exister par elle-même; au contraire ses richesses naturelles lui garantissent

¹ The date of receipt is uncertain.

une vie normale. La crainte de voir la Galicie orientale devenir, pendant la période provisoire, l'objet des convoitises voisines et des intrigues allemandes aurait quelque fondement si la conclusion était juste, c'est-à-dire si les Polonais, pour éviter ces conséquences, exigeaient la consultation de la population par un plébiscite *immédiat*, et non dans 15 ans; mais ils demeurèrent hostiles à l'application du droit de libre disposition. Le plébiscite est d'autant plus justifié que la situation politique, à l'est du pays, va s'éclaircir. En outre, les Polonais veulent-ils faire croire qu'un pays définitivement attribué à un état étranger cessera d'être un objet de convoitises et d'intrigues voisines? L'exemple de l'ancienne Autriche est suffisant.

Le meilleur moyen de prévenir ces possibilités serait de borner la Pologne à ses limites ethnographiques.

En considération de ce qui précède, je me permets de prier Votre Excellence de ne pas accéder aux demandes injustifiées des Polonais.

Veuillez agréer, etc.,

PANEYKO

No. 723

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 1228 Telegraphic: by bag [140681/28011/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 13, 1919*

Your telegrams Nos. 1373¹ of September 25th and 1395² of October 1st. (Proposed constitution for E. Galicia).

This matter has been fully considered by me and the Prime Minister and we cannot agree to the amendments proposed. We consider that under no circumstances should E. Galicia be annexed to Poland. Its population is two-thirds Ruthenian and the questions of its relations with the Ukraine will inevitably become acute at some future date. It would be fatal if the League of Nations were committed to the permanent incorporation in Poland of this territory and a permanent separation of its people from their racial fellows whatever their wishes may be and whatever guarantees of local autonomy might be given. The League of Nations must keep perfectly free hand to deal with this question whenever they consider necessary.

We cannot help pointing out that Poland, which has suffered so cruelly from oppression and from disregard of its national feeling and traditions and which has now won self-determination practically entirely through the sacrifices of others, now appears bent on denying to another race the rights it has so long demanded for itself. The present attitude of Poland is in singular contrast to the vehement but sound defence made by her delegates of the principle of nationality in the Teschen question. The prospects of any ministry, however admirable, can hardly be allowed to weigh against the permanent interests of any nationality, however weak.

At the same time we agree that so long as Poland is to be responsible for

¹ No. 716.

² No. 717.

the Government of Eastern Galicia, its authority should be effective, and no unnecessary opportunities should be given for factious agitation. The best hope for a satisfactory and peaceful settlement would seem to be that Poland should be given a mandate, subject to the necessary provisions for local autonomy, such as those embodied in the draft Treaty, for a period of say, ten years, at the end of which time the League of Nations should be called upon to decide whether the territory should be transferred to another State, should become independent, should be incorporated in Poland, or should remain for a further period in a temporary status. If the inhabitants know that at the end of ten years their case will be considered afresh after such tests of local opinion as the League of Nations thinks best, they are far more likely to accept Polish rule peacefully in the interim, and the Poles are far more likely to give education and good Government in the hopes of persuading them that the best course is to remain with Poland.

You should therefore urge our point of view as indicated above.

Repeated to Warsaw, No. 313.

No. 724

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received October 16)

No. 1444 Telegraphic: by bag [142186/28011/55]

PARIS, October 15, 1919

I have received by bag to-day copy of your telegram No. 1228¹ of October 13th respecting Eastern Galicia. Original of this telegram has not reached me.

Before I press the scheme of a mandate now proposed on the Supreme Council, I venture to urge that the introduction of a 10 year time limit may be reconsidered. The idea of a time limit was originally put forward as part of the scheme of a plebiscite. I may be able to persuade the Supreme Council to adopt the principle of a mandate, but as the League of Nations will under a mandate always be in a position to intervene, could we not refrain from specific provision for automatic revision after a fixed period? For all practical purposes, the acceptance by Poland of a League of Nations mandate would offer all reasonable guarantees that Ruthenian population in Eastern Galicia would not be forced to remain under Polish sovereignty if conditions arose which would satisfy the League that this would not be a just arrangement.

I believe I am right in saying that the clauses of the Covenant containing the provision respecting mandates would never have been accepted if the principle of automatic revision after fixed periods had been included. We should, in the specific case of Poland, be imposing a condition which was deliberately kept out of the Covenant because it was known to be generally unacceptable and certainly so to the British dominions.

I feel sure that on this point we should meet the most determined opposi-

¹ No. 723.

tion not only of the Poles themselves but of all the Allied plenipotentiaries and especially those of the United States.

If you would authorise my proceeding on the lines of a mandate, within the scope of Article 22 of the Covenant, I should have more confidence in my ability to bring them round.

I venture to ask for an immediate reply by telegraph.

No. 725

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 1288 Telegraphic [142186/28011/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 24, 1919*

Your telegram unnumbered of October 15th¹ (Constitution of Eastern Galicia).

We have fully considered your proposal that no time limit should be introduced in the Polish mandate for Eastern Galicia.

The matter was discussed by the War Cabinet on the 16th instant, when they had before them Monsieur Paderewski's note to the Prime Minister² containing resolution of the Polish Diet for final reunion of Eastern Galicia and Poland: the Cabinet saw no reason to modify policy communicated to you in my telegram No. 1228.³

The Prime Minister's view is that a mandate pure and simple is practically speaking tantamount to annexation: he thinks that if the Peace Conference decides against your proposals based on the instructions given in my telegram No. 1228,³ it should be against the vote of the British Representative.

¹ No. 724. (This telegram, as originally received, was unnumbered, the number being supplied subsequently.)

² Not entered on Foreign Office files.

³ No. 723.

No. 726

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 1329 Telegraphic: by bag [148823/28011/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1919*

Parliamentary question for 11th November enquires whether Supreme Council have consented to permanent occupation of Eastern Galicia by Poles and its annexation to Poland, and whether plebiscite is to be taken as in Upper Silesia before this apparent negation of self-determination is permitted.

In order to enable us to reply, please report at once what action Supreme Council have taken since my telegram No. 1288¹ of 24th October; and any further developments affecting the answer to this Parliamentary question should be reported by afternoon of 10th November.

¹ No. 725.

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 6)

No. 1526 Telegraphic: by bag [149308/28011/55]

PARIS, November 5, 1919

Eastern Galicia.

Your telegram No. 1329.¹

Question of future of Eastern Galicia has not yet come before Supreme Council. I will, of course, expound views of His Majesty's Government in accordance with Prime Minister's directions. But I have difficulty in understanding what exactly it was intended to convey by concluding sentence of your telegram No. 1288² of 24th October.

The Peace Conference cannot 'decide' anything against the wishes of the British plenipotentiary. If the other plenipotentiaries object to the proposal which I shall put forward, it will simply mean that no decision is arrived at. Of course this involves the non-adoption of our proposal, and, in all probability, a complete deadlock.

I will report as soon as the Supreme Council shall have considered the question.

¹ No. 726.

² No. 725.

No. 728

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 10)

No. 1533 Telegraphic: by bag [150308/7067/39]

PARIS, November 7, 1919

Following for Cabinet:—

Proceedings of Council this morning.

. . . 3.¹ The Council discussed the question of Eastern Galicia. Sir E. Crowe explained the situation and the view of His Majesty's Government that Poland should hold a mandate for the province, the people of which, at the end of ten or fifteen years, would have the right to determine its future status under the auspices of the League of Nations. Mr. Polk set forth the disadvantages inherent in the fixing of a time limit, and the difficulty of deciding to what country the province should be attached if not to Poland. He suggested that the question should be referred to the Committee on Polish Affairs, with instructions to examine it and report on Monday, 10th November. This was agreed. . . .¹

¹ The remainder of this telegram reported the discussion in the Supreme Council of other matters. The official minutes of this meeting of the Council are printed in Vol. II, No. 16.

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 10)

No. 1542 Telegraphic [150583/28011/55]

PARIS, November 10, 1919

With reference to my telegram No. 1526.¹

Question of Eastern Galicia was discussed by Polish Committee² for three hours on Saturday,³ when all four Allied delegates strongly opposed our proposal for a mandatory to Poland under League of Nations for a period of ten years. I am glad, however, to report that Committee were eventually, but not without much difficulty, brought to agree to principle of such a mandatory subject to an extension of the time limit, without which they would not accept principle of a provisional mandatory.

In report of Committee⁴ it is proposed to give effect to their conclusions by substituting following for Article 2 in original Treaty, whilst omitting phrase in preamble referring to a plebiscite:—

Revised Article 2. 'In accordance with Covenant of League of Nations and in conditions laid down in the present Treaty, Poland accepts mandatory to organise and administer Eastern Galicia, which will constitute an autonomous territory within boundaries fixed by Article 1. This mandatory is conferred on her for a period of twenty-five years, at expiration of which Council of the League of Nations will have full power to maintain revision or change the status defined by present Treaty.'

With regard to extended duration of the mandatory our representative⁵ reserved his opinion, but found it impossible to obtain the consent of his colleagues to fix a more limited period than twenty-five years, as they were unanimously favourable to extending it so that mandatory should outlast the lives of generation which had been involved in recent conflict between Poles and Ruthenians. On these grounds they favoured a period of thirty years, which, after a prolonged discussion, was reduced to twenty-five.

The American Delegation has to-day⁶ placed on record a formal declaration that its acceptance of principle of a mandatory for a limited period only is absolutely conditional on our agreeing to extent of period to twenty-five years, failing which American Delegation revert to its proposal for a mandatory with no time limit. In these circumstances and to avoid a complete deadlock I propose to agree to twenty-five years' limit when Committee's report comes before Council, probably to-morrow. It will be observed that other conditions of the solution put forward in your telegram No. 1228⁷ are well covered by a revised Article 2 as quoted above.

¹ No. 727.

² i.e. the Commission on Polish Affairs of the Peace Conference.

³ November 8, 1919.

⁴ This report, adopted by the Commission at a further meeting on November 10, is printed in Vol. II, No. 19, appendix F.

⁵ Colonel Kisch.

⁶ In the report of November 10, 1919: cf. note 4 above.

⁷ No. 723.

No. 730

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 12)

No. 1550 Telegraphic, en clair: by bag [151359/7067/39]

PARIS, November 11, 1919

Following for Cabinet:—

Proceedings of Council this morning:

. . . 6.¹ The Council considered the report of the Commission on Polish Affairs on the status of Eastern Galicia. The Commission had agreed to recommend that Poland should hold a mandate for the province for 25 years and that at the expiration of that time the League of Nations should have the power of revising the Constitution set up by the Treaty. The Commission was further unanimous in proposing that the Polish Government should be authorised to apply the Polish military service law in the province on condition that the contingents raised there should form special units and should not be obliged to serve outside the province save in a defensive war. As regards the representation of the province in the Polish Diet, the British Delegation had been unable to modify its previous view. Sir E. Crowe however expressed his willingness to accept the period of 25 years for the mandate and the solution proposed for the question of military service, on condition that an agreement could be reached on the remaining point, that of representation in the Polish Diet. On this point he declared himself ready to accept the proposal of the majority on condition that the following words were added to it:—

‘This arrangement shall be considered as subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.’

This was accepted by everybody and the Commission instructed to make the necessary changes in the draft treaty in agreement with the Drafting Committee. It was further decided to publish nothing on the subject till the whole question was settled, for fear that the susceptibilities of the Polish Government should be aroused by the knowledge that the question was being decided without its further co-operation. . . .¹

¹ The remainder of this telegram reported discussion of other matters. The official minutes of the proceedings of the Supreme Council on November 11, 1919, are printed in Vol. II, No. 19.

No. 731

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 1352 Telegraphic [150583/28011/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 12, 1919

Your telegram No. 1542¹ (Eastern Galicia).

We accept compromise in order to secure unanimity.

¹ No. 729.

No. 732

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received November 22)

No. 1599 Telegraphic: by bag [154682/7067/39]

Following for Cabinet:—

PARIS, November 21, 1919

Proceedings of Council this morning.¹

1. The Council considered a report of the Committee on Polish Affairs regarding the status of Eastern Galicia. This report had already come up at the previous meeting.² The United States, French, Italian and Japanese delegations recommended that the wording of article 2, paragraph 2, of the proposed treaty should be modified by the introduction of the words 'by a majority of votes,' so as to obviate the necessity for unanimity in the Council of the League of Nations in deciding the fate of the province after the expiration of the twenty-five years' mandate to be given to Poland. Sir E. Crowe deprecated bringing forward any new proposals in view of the fact that a definite agreement with regard to the terms of the treaty had at last been reached after great trouble and after numerous references to the Governments. He said he could not accept any fresh modification without once more referring home. Was it not better to stand by the decision already reached and close this chapter of our discussions? Mr. White, who represented the United States in the absence of Mr. Polk, still pressed for some modification, and proposed the following text for article 2, paragraph 2:—

'2. At the expiration of twenty-five years the principal Allied and Associated Powers, or the Council of the League of Nations, to whom the Powers may delegate their rights under this treaty, shall have full power to maintain, revise or change the status defined by the present treaty.'

The Chairman however appealed to Mr. White not to insist, as it was really important that the Conference should be able to record a definite decision without further delay. This attitude was supported by the other plenipotentiaries, and Mr. White finally agreed to withdraw his proposition. The original British text³ was therefore adopted. . . .⁴

¹ The official minutes of these proceedings are printed in Vol. II, No. 28.

² See Vol. II, No. 27, minute 6 and appendix F. At this meeting of the Supreme Council on November 20, 1919, Polish representatives had been heard on the question of Eastern Galicia: v. loc. cit.

³ i.e. the British text of article 2 as given in the annex to the report of the Commission on Polish Affairs under consideration (cf. note 2 above).

⁴ The remainder of this telegram reported discussion in the Supreme Council of other matters.

No. 733

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received December 3)

No. 454 Telegraphic [158009/73/55]

WARSAW, December 2, 1919

Decision in matter of Eastern Galicia has become known and is creating considerable excitement here, though press is hitherto restrained in its com-

ments. But there is undoubtedly much bitter feeling. Marshal Dietrichs¹ called on me late last night, and said he wished to ask me privately whether apparently unfriendly policy of His Majesty's Government in Danzig and East Galicia questions meant that Great Britain was in reality hostile to Poland and Polish aspirations. He said he was afraid of violent criticism of England in Diet, and he wished to avoid this. He had been approached on the subject by different parties of Diet and he wished to know my opinion.

I replied that at present I was without direct official information that East Galicia question had been definitely decided one way or the other; but on assumption that news that Poland was to be given a mandate over East Galicia for twenty-five years was correct, I pointed out this was decision of Supreme Council as a whole and not of one member of it. He agreed, but said that Great Britain was credited with having opposed permanent union of East Galicia with Poland.

I went over all the arguments I could think of to justify our attitude in Danzig question, and as regards East Galicia said that mandate for twenty-five years was a long period. If, during that time, Poland repaired ravages of war in and reconstructed economic life of East Galicia and administered that province for benefit of inhabitants, I thought League of Nations would certainly hesitate to take it away from her at end of period in question. I said I was merely expressing a personal view.

I then said that it did not seem to me right to draw inference that because Great Britain was supposed to have alone resisted many Polish claims her general policy was hostile to Poland. I did not see any necessity for connecting two questions, and felt sure that His Majesty's Government wished well to Poland. I reminded him of immense effort, both military, naval and financial, made by Great Britain in war, largely as result of which Poland had recovered her independence. That we had not seen eye to eye with Poland in regard to solution of Danzig and other questions did not mean unfriendliness towards Power whose independence we had so largely helped to bring about. Finally I said I did not think our mutual interest clashed at any point. I said although I spoke for myself, I hoped that he would find these remarks of use to him.

Marshal Dietrichs was a member of German Reichstag. He is a very level-headed quiet man, who impresses me considerably.

Sent to Peace Conference.

¹ M. Dietrichs was Marshal of the Polish Diet.

No. 734

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received December 5)

No. 457 Telegraphic [158872/28011/55]

WARSAW, December 4, 1919

Following sent to 'Astoria' to-day, No. 256.

Prime Minister called on me yesterday evening to say that General Denikin's left wing had had a serious reverse, and that his troops were retreating

in disorder. Kief was all but surrounded. This might react unfavourably on Polish troops now occupying position on frontier of Eastern Galicia. In these circumstances he asked me to back his request that publication of decision of Supreme Council with reference to Eastern Galicia might be delayed for a few months. If Polish troops who had freed Lemberg and other Eastern Galician territory from Ukrainians were to get it into their heads that they would have to abandon those places eventually it would take all heart out of them in their resistance to Bolsheviks, and bring about a serious state of affairs in the Southern Army.

I replied that I had no direct information as to decision of Supreme Council in the matter of Eastern Galicia, and suggested, if his request were to be complied with, it might raise false hopes in the Poles. He disputed this view, though he admitted Poles would have to try to get proposed statute for Eastern Galicia modified in some important particulars. Whilst an assent to M. Paderewski's request would undoubtedly make it easier for him to stay in office and enable Polish Government to try to obtain a modification of statute of Eastern Galicia I venture to support request on following general grounds which are totally unconnected with M. Paderewski's personality.

Poland is passing through a severe economic crisis, and winter will be very critical. Bolsheviks have hitherto not been able to produce any impression on Polish army, and I venture, therefore, to think it is not in Allied interests to take any step which might complicate situation here for the moment and dishearten a portion of Polish army.

Polish General Staff confirm news that Denikin has had a reverse on his left front.

No. 735

Sir H. Rumbold (Warsaw) to Earl Curzon (Received December 13)

No. 512 [161341/28011/55]

WARSAW, December 4, 1919

My Lord,

In the course of his visit to me yesterday, as reported in my telegram No. 457,¹ I asked M. Paderewski how the news of the decision of the Supreme Council in regard to the Eastern Galician question had been made public. He replied that he supposed that there had been leakage in Paris, and that one of the members of the Diet had received a telegram on the subject from Paris.

I told him that I had not been officially informed of the decision of the Supreme Council.

He then went on to explain the principal points of the organic statute which was to govern the régime in Eastern Galicia during the period of the Poles' mandate. He said there were points in this statute which were entirely unacceptable to the Poles. The Diet was to be elected on the basis of universal suffrage, and as the Poles formed 37 per cent. of the population they would

¹ No. 734.

be in a perpetual minority. I said that I understood from him that there would be a Polish Governor, and that Eastern Galicia would send deputies to the Polish Diet. He said that this was not sufficient, whilst a separate army for Eastern Galicia would lead to the greatest difficulties. The intention was that this army was only to be employed in the defence of Eastern Galician territory, but it would be partly composed of Poles who would wish to fight for the whole of Poland if the latter were in danger. Some parts of Western Galicia were over-populated, and it would therefore be desirable to send the surplus population into Eastern Galicia. But this procedure was barred out by the terms of the statute.

M. Paderewski as much as said that the Galician deputies would oppose him on the ground of his failure to obtain a definite solution of the Eastern Galician question, and hinted that this might prevent his continuance in office. He informed me, however, simultaneously, that he could now count on a majority of something like thirty-five in the House, and I am under the impression that his difficulties are not so much on account of Eastern Galicia as on account of his objection to the retention of office by M. Wojciechewski.² The Left are insisting that M. Wojciechewski should remain in the Cabinet.

It was quite clear to me, when he spoke, that M. Paderewski would personally stand to gain by a few months' delay in the publication of the decision of the Supreme Council as regards Eastern Galicia. For one thing he would not be put in a position of having to refuse to sign the Treaty. To the above extent his request may be said to be a bit of special pleading. On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the internal situation here is far from good, and I would deprecate the publication at the present moment of the decision of the Supreme Council in a matter about which the Poles feel so keenly. Poland has always looked upon Lemberg as the third capital of the country, and the Poles cannot understand why they are only to be given a provisional mandate over it, even although the latter is for twenty-five years. Even discounting the tendency of this nation to exaggerate and to get excited about one question after another, this question of Eastern Galicia, and especially of Lemberg, is one which does appeal very strongly to the Poles. I think it would therefore be wise from the Allied point of view to refrain for the present from publishing the decision of the Supreme Council with reference to Eastern Galicia, and allow this country to get through the winter as best it can without the additional ferment which the publication of this decision would cause.

I do not hold any particular brief for M. Paderewski, but I am inclined to think that if he were to leave office the result would be a marked orientation to the Left and the advent to power of a succession of weak and short-lived Governments. This is not to be desired in the interests of the country, and it is not improbable that it would eventually become necessary to establish some sort of dictatorship. In the meanwhile the credit of Poland abroad would suffer.

I have, &c.,

HORACE RUMBOLD

² Polish Minister of the Interior.

Dr. Markoff to Sir E. Crowe (Paris. Received December 9)

[130/5/2/21111]

PARIS, le 6 décembre, 1919

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de vous remettre sous ce pli la déclaration que nous faisons parvenir à la Conférence au sujet de sa décision touchant le sort de la Galicie Orientale.

Je vous prie, Votre Excellence, de bien vouloir agréer l'hommage de mes sentiments respectueux.

DR. DIMITRI MARKOFF

Le Président du Comité Carpatho-Russe

ENCLOSURE IN No. 736

PARIS, le 6 décembre, 1919

Le Comité Carpatho-Russe a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de la Haute Conférence la déclaration suivante:

Suivant les informations publiées dans les derniers temps par la presse française et étrangère, le Conseil Suprême aurait décidé de soumettre la partie russe de la Galicie, sans plébiscite, pour une durée de 25 ans, à la domination polonaise. Le Comité Carpatho-Russe de Paris tient à déclarer à ce sujet qu'une telle décision serait contraire au droit de la population carpatho-russe à disposer d'elle-même, droit reconnu à tous les peuples de l'ancienne monarchie austro-hongroise et ayant servi de base au traité de paix. Le Comité considère qu'il est de son devoir d'attirer encore une fois l'attention du Conseil Suprême sur ce fait que l'élément russe habitant la partie ethnographiquement russe de la Galicie représente 70 % en moyenne de la population totale tandis que l'élément polonais n'y forme qu'une minorité ne devant décider du sort du pays. De plus, le Comité ne saurait assez relever que le territoire russe de la Galicie et de la Bucovine a constitué autrefois celui de l'ancienne principauté russe de Halicz-Wladimir qui, par voie de conquêtes, tomba sous la domination de la Pologne, tout en continuant à former, même sous cette domination, une unité administrative appelée *Voivodie* russe. Lorsqu'elle passe, à la fin du 18^e siècle, sous la domination autrichienne, ce ne fut pas en tant que territoire polonais, mais comme royaume de Galicie ou Russie Rouge, n'ayant rien à voir avec le grand duché de Cracovie et les duchés de Auschwitz-Zator qui formaient la Galicie occidentale. La population russe de la Galicie ne reconnut jamais la domination polonaise fondée sur la conquête et non sur les droits et la volonté du peuple. Les guerres incessantes et les luttes nationales que soutint le peuple russe de la Galicie le prouvent surabondamment. Les événements qui se déroulèrent au cours de l'an dernier ne laissent subsister le moindre doute qu'aussi dans l'avenir la domination polonaise sur la Russie Rouge ne saurait être que l'expression de la violence exercée contre les aspirations et la volonté des

Carpatho-Russes. Qu'il en soit ainsi à l'heure actuelle déjà nous en avons une preuve avec les camps de concentration et les prisons remplis par l'élite de la population carpatho-russe où celle-ci succombe sous les privations et les maladies qu'elle y contracte de même qu'à la suite des violences dont elle y est l'objet; nous en avons une autre preuve avec les nombreux cas que le Comité Carpatho-Russe a dénoncés, malheureusement sans résultat, à la Conférence dans les notes du 25 mai, du 13 août, du 25 août,¹ etc.

Le peuple carpatho-russe aspire à sa réunion avec la Russie et s'appuie dans ses aspirations sur ces droits nationaux et historiques indéniables et sur les principes qui ont été proclamés solennellement par les Alliés. Il a beaucoup souffert pendant la guerre et continue, même à présent, à faire de sanglants sacrifices pour la libération de sa patrie, aussi ne saurait-il admettre pareille décision qui restaurerait dans son pays une domination étrangère et qui l'empêcherait de se réunir avec le reste de la nation russe.

DR. DIMITRI MARKOFF

¹ These notes denouncing alleged Polish atrocities are not printed.

No. 737

M. Dutasta to Mr. Norman (Paris. Received December 13)¹

[130/5/121172]

PARIS, le 12 décembre, 1919

Le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix a l'honneur de faire tenir ci-joint au Secrétariat de la Délégation de l'Empire Britannique copie d'une lettre de la Délégation Polonaise en date du 10/12/19 relative au texte du Traité concernant le statut de la Galicie Orientale.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 737

M. Patek to M. Clemenceau

PARIS, le 10 décembre, 1919

Monsieur le Président,

Par sa décision du 21 novembre, le Conseil Suprême a arrêté le texte d'un Traité entre les Principales Puissances alliées et associées et la Pologne, concernant le statut de la Galicie orientale. La Délégation Polonaise à la Conférence de la Paix, après avoir pris connaissance des clauses du dit Traité a l'honneur de présenter les observations suivantes:

Le mandat que le Conseil Suprême propose de donner à la Pologne, pour organiser et gouverner la partie orientale de la Galicie pendant une période de vingt-cinq ans, est de nature à créer un état de choses qui ne répondrait pas aux intérêts et au bien-être de la population du territoire visé dans l'article premier du dit Traité et établirait une situation dangereuse pour la paix à l'Est de l'Europe.

¹ Copies of this note and enclosure were transmitted by Sir E. Crowe to Lord Curzon on December 17 (received December 19).

Depuis l'an 1340, la partie orientale de la Galicie actuelle fait partie intégrante de l'État Polonais. Bien qu'habitée par une population mixte, polonaise et ruthène, elle n'avait jamais eu de régime spécial. Lwow (Léopold) qui a toujours affirmé son patriotisme polonais, était un des centres intellectuels de la Pologne.

A la suite du premier partage de la Pologne, l'Autriche avait acquis cette partie du territoire national polonais ainsi que d'autres territoires situés plus à l'ouest qui, avec le Grand Duché de Cracovie, formèrent une province autrichienne — la Galicie. L'unité de cette province au point de vue administratif, judiciaire et législatif, était complète et elle a été maintenue jusqu'au dernier jour de la monarchie des Habsbourg.

Il n'y a donc jamais eu de Galicie Orientale.

La Pologne est prête à doter ce pays d'une large autonomie et elle y verrait la réalisation du principe de liberté qui a toujours été la règle directrice de son gouvernement. Elle ne peut cependant cesser de considérer ce pays comme une partie intégrante de son État. Ce point de vue est conforme aux intérêts de la population ruthène.

Le régime d'un mandat temporaire accordé à la Pologne pour gouverner la Galicie, dite orientale, en rompant son unité avec la Pologne, présenterait de graves inconvénients pour le développement économique du pays et pour l'établissement d'une paix intérieure. Pour relever économiquement ce pays ravagé par la guerre et par les troubles récents, qu'avait provoqué l'intrigue de l'Allemagne et de l'Autriche, il faut des milliards. La Pologne est prête à les donner et elle a déjà commencé l'œuvre de reconstruction. Ces efforts, cependant, ne peuvent être continués qu'à la condition d'un rattachement définitif de la Galicie à l'État Polonais, auquel elle appartient depuis plus de cinq siècles.

Le régime d'un mandat temporaire peut compromettre aussi la paix intérieure et l'ordre public dans le territoire autonome. Il encouragerait les menées de ceux qui voudraient rendre à jamais impossibles les bonnes relations entre Polonais et Ruthènes et servirait de base pour les intrigues venant du dehors. Vu les relations intimes et bien connues des meneurs ukrainiens avec l'Allemagne, il est facile de comprendre où serait le foyer de ces agitations. Il ne serait donc pas indiqué de rendre très difficile la tâche d'un gouvernement en Galicie orientale, tâche sans cela assez compliquée que la Pologne seule est capable d'assumer et de mener à bonne fin.

De plus, l'introduction à l'heure présente d'un régime de mandat temporaire pour la Galicie, dite orientale, présente un danger capital pour la paix à l'Est de l'Europe. La Galicie confine aux territoires sur lesquels actuellement une lutte acharnée est menée contre les troupes bolchévistes de la Russie. L'armée polonaise prend part à cette lutte et c'est sur elle que, dans les provinces de Volhynie et de Podolie, pèse tout le poids des efforts et des responsabilités militaires. Pour mener victorieusement cette campagne, l'armée polonaise doit pouvoir s'appuyer en toute sûreté sur sa base d'opération qui est sur le territoire de la Galicie Orientale. Les combattants polonais, pour soutenir cette lutte suprême, doivent être convaincus que leurs succès

militaires auront pour résultats la consolidation de leur patrie et non son affaiblissement. Le régime d'un mandat provisoire, en créant un état d'incertitude et d'énervement, pourrait affaiblir l'élan de la Pologne et diminuer les chances d'une victoire définitive sur l'armée bolchéviste.

L'armée polonaise est nécessaire à la Pologne et à l'Entente. Il faut soutenir son moral. Les soldats, qui ont si glorieusement combattu pour Léopold, ne sauraient pas lutter avec la même bravoure contre les bolchévistes après avoir eu connaissance du sort réservé par les Alliés à la Galicie orientale.

Pour les raisons ci-dessus énoncées la Délégation Polonaise croit de son devoir de prier le Conseil Suprême de bien vouloir modifier sa décision concernant 'la Galicie Orientale' dans le sens, qu'au lieu de conférer à la Pologne un mandat pour une durée de 25 ans, la Galicie dite orientale lui soit attribuée comme partie intégrante et autonome de son territoire.

Veuillez agréer, etc.,

STANISLAS PATEK

Délégué Plénipotentiaire de la République
Polonaise à la Conférence de la Paix

No. 738

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crowe (Paris)

No. 1506 Telegraphic [164226/28011/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 20, 1919*

At recent conference in London, M. Clemenceau pressed that recent decision at Paris as to twenty-five years' mandate for Eastern Galicia should be held in suspense and become matter for reconsideration later on.¹ This proposal was assented to, though with great reluctance, by Prime Minister and British representatives.

You should therefore proceed upon that assumption, though it is unnecessary for you to take initiative in bringing matter again before Conference.

¹ See Vol. II, No. 55.

No. 739

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 23)

No. 1732 Telegraphic: by bag [164572/28011/55]

PARIS, *December 22, 1919*

Eastern Galicia.

Your telegram No. 1506¹ of 20th December reached me just as I was about to despatch to you a telegram recording a communication made to me by M. Clemenceau. He had informed me of what had passed in London, and said he proposed to ask the Supreme Council to adopt a resolution recording

¹ No. 738.

the concession agreed upon. Before doing so, however, he wished me to telegraph in order to obtain if possible the exact terms of the formula assented to by the Prime Minister.

I communicated to M. Clemenceau this morning the form of words employed in your telegram under reply, and he accordingly submitted his proposal to the Supreme Council, as stated in my report of the proceedings.²

² See No. 740.

No. 740

Sir E. Crowe (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received December 23)

No. 1733 Telegraphic: by bag [164573/7067/39]


PARIS, December 22, 1919

Following for Cabinet.


Proceedings of Council this morning:


1. M. Clemenceau said that the Polish Government had complained very bitterly of the limit of twenty-five years assigned by the Supreme Council to the Polish mandate for Eastern Galicia, and had asked that the question might be reopened. The Polish Government had said that a decision more favourable to Polish aspirations would do much to improve the spirit of the country and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in the army. During his recent visit to London he had urged these considerations on Mr. Lloyd George, who had agreed that the recent decision of the Supreme Council respecting a twenty-five years' mandate for Eastern Galicia should be held in suspense and become matter for reconsideration later on. The Council adopted a resolution to this effect, and instructions were given to the Secretariat-General to make the necessary communication to the Polish Delegation. . . .¹

¹ The remainder of this telegram reported discussion of other matters. The official minutes of the proceedings of the Supreme Council on December 22, 1919, are printed in Vol. II, No. 44.



GALICIE ORIENTALE





— Lignes visées dans le rapport n°3
 — Limites de la Galicie Orientale (rapport n°6)
 — Frontières internationales et Trés de l'Etat

Echelle 1:1.000.000

..... Antennas frontières internationales
 Limites administratives

S.G.A. 12.23